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NASA-Dryden test pilot William H. Dana with the 
X-15-3 after a successful mission. Courtesy of  NASA, 
no. EC67-1716. The back cover images: (left) The ad-
vanced X-15A-2 shows its new external fuel tanks. 
Courtesy of  NASA, no. EC65-0893, (middle) NASA 
test pilot Neil A. Armstrong with the X-15-1 fol-
lowing a mission. Courtesy of  NASA, no. E60-6286. 
(right) X-15-3 being secured by ground crew after 
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Neil Armstrong, amongst others, has called the X-15 “the most successful research airplane in 
history.” That might be stretching a point, but it was certainly the most successful of  the high-
speed X-planes. 
It had taken 44 years to go from Kitty Hawk to Air Force Captain Charles E. Yeager’s first su-
personic flight in the Bell X-1 on 14 October 1947. Six more years were required before NACA 
test pilot Scott Crossfield got to Mach 2 in the Navy-Douglas D-558-2 Skyrocket. A remarkably 
short three years had passed when Captain Milburn G. Apt coaxed the X-2 above Mach 3, before 
tumbling out of  control to his death. There, progress stalled, awaiting the arrival of  the three 
small, black North American X-15 research airplanes that would more than double the speed and 
altitude milestones.
The X-15 flight program began slowly, mostly because the million-horsepower XLR99 engine was 
not ready. This undoubtedly worked in the program’s favor since it forced the engineers and pilots 
to gain experience with the airplane and its systems prior to pushing the envelope too far. 
The first 20 months took the X-15 from Crossfield’s glide flight to essentially duplicating the per-
formance of  the X-2: Mach 3.5 and 136,500 feet. Then the XLR99s arrived and things got serious. 
Six days after the last flight with the interim XLR11s, Major Robert M. White took X-15-2 past 
Mach 4, the first time a piloted aircraft had flown that fast. Mach 5 fell, also to Bob White, four 
months later. Mach 6, again to White, took six more months. Once it began flying with the ulti-
mate engine, it took only 15 flights to double the maximum Mach number achieved by the X-2.
Altitude was a similar story. Captain Iven C. Kincheloe, Jr. was the first person to fly above 100,000 
feet, in the X-2 on 7 September 1956. Thirteen flights with the big engine allowed Bob White to fly 
above 200,000 feet for the first time. Three months later, he broke 300,000 feet. Once it began flying 
with the ultimate engine, the X-15 took only 19 months to double the maximum altitude achieved 
by the X-2. Ultimately, during its 199 flights, the X-15 recorded a maximum altitude of  354,200 feet 
and a maximum speed of  4,520 mph (Mach  6.7). They were stunning achievements. 
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X-15: Extending the Frontiers of  Flight is the result 
of  15 years of  research into the cooperative NASA-
Air Force-Navy X-15 research airplane program. 
This history covers the program from its inception, 
through the preliminary conceptual studies, the air-
frame and engine competitions, the flight program, 
and the follow-on research program. Particular at-
tention is paid to the program highlights, such as the 
development of  a workable full pressure suit and 
early biomedical testing in the human centrifuge at 
the Naval Air Development Center Johnsville.  
Despite appearances, the program was not about set-
ting records. It is interesting to note that although 
the X-15 is generally considered a Mach 6 vehicle, 
only two of  the three airplanes ever flew that fast, 
and then only four times. On the other hand, 108 
other flights exceeded Mach 5, accumulating 1 hour, 
25 minutes, and 33 seconds of  hypersonic flight. It 
was a fast airplane. Similarly, there were only four 
flights above 300,000 feet (all by X-15-3), but only 
the initial glide flight was below 40,000 feet. How-
ever, the actual speed and altitude achieved by the 
program were not the ultimate test, and the fact 
that the basic airplane never achieved its advertised 
6,600 feet per second velocity was of  little conse-
quence. What interested the researchers was the en-
vironment in which the airplane flew. They wanted 
to study dynamic pressures, heating rates, and total 
temperatures. In that regard, the X-15 performed 
almost flawlessly, and the data collected during the 
program represented the majority of  the hypersonic 
database available when the development of  Space 
Shuttle began in the late 1960s.
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xiv Foreword
FOREWORD: WILLIAM H . DANA
 The X-15 was an airplane of accelerations . When an X-15 pilot looks back on 
his X-15 flights, it is the accelerations he remembers. The first of these sensations 
was the acceleration due to B-52 lift, which held the X-15 at launch altitude and 
prevented it from falling to Earth. When the X-15 pilot hit the launch switch, the 
B-52 lift was no longer accessible to the X-15. The X-15 fell at the acceleration 
due to Earth’s gravity, which the pilot recognized as “free fall” or “zero g.” Only 
when the pilot started the engine and put some “g” on the X-15 was this sensation 
of falling relieved.
 The next impression encountered on the X-15 flight came as the engine lit, 
just a few seconds after launch. A 33,000-pound airplane was accelerated by a 
57,000-lbf engine, resulting in a chest-to-back acceleration of almost 2 g. Then, as 
the propellant burned away and the atmosphere thinned with increasing altitude, 
the chest-to-back acceleration increased and the drag caused by the atmosphere 
lessened. For a standard altitude mission (250,000 feet), the weight and thrust 
were closer to 15,000 pounds and 60,000-lbf at shutdown, resulting in almost 4-g 
chest-to-back acceleration. The human body is not stressed for 4 g chest to back, 
and by shutdown the boost was starting to get a little painful. Milt Thompson once 
observed that the X-15 was the only aircraft he had ever flown where he was glad 
when the engine quit.
 On a mission to high altitude (above 250,000 feet), the pilot did not regain any 
sensible air with which to execute a pullout until about 180,000 feet, and could 
not pull 1 g of lift until 130,000 feet. Flying a constant angle of attack on reentry, 
the pilot allowed g to build up to 5, and then maintained 5 g until the aircraft was 
level at about 80,000 feet. There was a deceleration from Mach 5 at 80,000 feet to 
about Mach 1 over the landing runway, and the pilot determined the magnitude of 
the deceleration by the use of speed brakes. This ended the high-g portion of the 
flight, except for one pilot who elected to start his traffic pattern at 50,000 feet and 
Mach 2, and flew a 360-degree overhead pattern from that starting point.
 Flight to high altitude represented about two-thirds of the 199 X-15 flights. 
Flights to high speed or high dynamic pressure accounted for the other third, and 
those flights remained well within the atmosphere for the entire mission. The pilot 
of a high-speed flight got a small taste of chest-to-back acceleration during the 
boost (thrust was still greater than drag, but not by such a large margin as on the 
high-altitude flights). The deceleration after burnout was a new sensation. This 
condition was high drag and zero thrust, and it had the pilot hanging in his shoul-
der straps, with perspiration dripping off the tip of his nose onto the inside of his 
face plate .
 Milt Thompson collected anecdotes about the X-15 that remain astonishing 
to this day. Milt noted that at Mach 5, a simple 20-degree heading change re-
quired 5 g of normal acceleration for 10 seconds . Milt also pointed out that on a 
speed flight, the (unmodified) X-15-1 accelerated from Mach 5 to Mach 6 in six 
seconds. These were eye-opening numbers at the time of the X-15 program. 
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 Those of us in the program at flight 190 thought that the X-15 would continue 
indefinitely. Then, on flight 191, Major Michael J. Adams experienced electrical 
irregularities that made the inertial flight instruments unreliable and may have 
disoriented him. In any case, at peak altitude (266,000 feet), the X-15 began a yaw 
to the right. It reentered the atmosphere, yawed crosswise to the flight path, and 
went into a high-speed spin. It eventually came out of the spin but broke up during 
the reentry, killing the pilot. 
 The loss of the airplane and pilot was the death knell for the entire program. 
Program management decided not to fly the X-15A-2 again, and to fly X-15-1 
only for calendar year 1968. The X-15 flew its last flight on 24 October of that 
year, and then faded into aeronautical history. 
William	H .	Dana	
Test Pilot, Dryden Flight Research Center
Pilot, last X-15 flight
Bill Dana greets his family after the last flight of  the X-15 program on 24 October 1968. (NASA)
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PREFACE: ROCKETS OVER THE HIGH DESERT 
 Neil Armstrong, among others, has called the X-15 “the most successful re-
search airplane in history.” That might be stretching a point, but it was certainly 
the most successful of the high-speed X-planes. Given the major advances in 
materials and computer technology made in the 40 years since the flight program 
ended, it is unlikely that many of the actual hardware lessons are still applicable. 
Having said that, the lessons learned from hypersonic modeling and pilot-in-the-
loop simulation, and the insight gained by being able to evaluate actual X-15 
flight test results against wind-tunnel and theoretical predictions greatly expanded 
the confidence of researchers during the 1970s and 1980s.1 
 It would not have surprised anybody involved that the actual X-15 technology 
did not find further application. Researchers such as John Becker and Norris Dow, 
and engineers like Harrison Storms and Charlie Feltz never intended the design to 
represent anything other than a convenient platform to acquire aero-thermo data. 
Becker once opined that proceeding with a general research configuration rather 
than a prototype of a vehicle designed to achieve a specific mission was critical to 
the ultimate success of the X-15. Had the prototype route been taken, Becker be-
lieved, “we would have picked the wrong mission, the wrong structure, the wrong 
aerodynamic shapes, and the wrong propulsion.” They are good words of advice.2 
 In fact, the decision to pursue a pure research shape was somewhat contro-
versial at the beginning. Kelly Johnson, for one, believed the vehicle should be 
adaptable as a strategic reconnaissance aircraft. Indeed, several of the proposals 
for the X-15 sought to design a vehicle with some future application. Neverthe-
less, the original Langley concept of a vehicle optimized to collect the desired 
data as safely as possible ultimately won. As Harley Soulé told Harrison Storms, 
“You have a little airplane and a big engine with a large thrust margin. We want 
to go to 250,000 feet altitude and Mach 6. We want to study aerodynamic heating. 
We do not want to worry about aerodynamic stability and control, or the airplane 
breaking up. So, if you make any errors, make them on the strong side. You should 
have enough thrust to do the job.” North American succeeded brilliantly.3 
 It had taken 44 years to go from Kitty Hawk to Chuck Yeager’s first super-
sonic flight in the X-1. Six more years were required before Scott Crossfield got 
to Mach 2 in the D-558-2 Skyrocket. A remarkably short three years had passed 
when Mel Apt coaxed the X-2 above Mach 3, before tumbling out of control to 
his death. There progress stalled, awaiting the arrival of the three small black air-
planes that would more than double the speed and altitude milestones.
 The X-15 flight program began slowly, mostly because the XLR99 was not 
ready. This undoubtedly worked in the program’s favor since it forced the en-
gineers and pilots to gain experience with the airplane and its systems prior to 
 The Armstrong quote is in the foreword to Milton O. Thompson, At the Edge of Space: the X-15 Flight Program 
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 992), p. xii.
2 John V. Becker, “The X-5 Program in Retrospect,” 3rd Eugen Sänger Memorial Lecture, Bonn, Germany, 5 
December 968, pp. -2
3 Harrison A. Storms, “X-5 Hardware Design Challenges,” a paper in the Proceedings of the X-15 30th Anniver-
sary Celebration, Dryden Flight Research Facility, Edwards, California, 8 June 989, NASA CP-305, p. 27.
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pushing the envelope too far. The first 20 months took the X-15 from Crossfield’s 
glide flight to essentially duplicating the performance of the X-2: Mach 3 .5 and 
136,500 feet. Then the XLR99s arrived and things got serious. Six days after the 
last flight with the interim XLR11s, Bob White took X-15-2 past Mach 4, the first 
time a piloted aircraft had flown that fast. Mach 5 fell, also to Bob White, four 
months later. Mach 6, again to White, took six more months. Once the X-15 began 
flying with the ultimate engine, it took only 15 flights to double the maximum 
Mach number achieved by the X-2 .
 Altitude was a similar story. Iven Kincheloe was the first person to fly above 
100,000 feet, in the X-2 on 7 September 1956. Thirteen flights with the big engine 
allowed Bob White to fly above 200,000 feet for the first time. Three months later, 
he broke 300,000 feet. Once it began flying with the ultimate engine, the X-15 
took only 19 months to double the maximum altitude achieved by the X-2 . These 
were stunning achievements. 
 It is interesting to note that although the X-15 is generally considered a 
Mach 6 aircraft, only two of the three airplanes ever flew that fast, and then only 
four times. On the other hand, 108 other flights exceeded Mach 5, accumulating 
1 hour, 25 minutes, and 33 seconds of hypersonic flight. At the other end of the 
spectrum, just two flights were not supersonic (one of these was the first glide 
flight), and only 14 others did not exceed Mach 2. It was a fast airplane. Similarly, 
there were only four flights above 300,000 feet (all by X-15-3), but only the initial 
glide flight was below 40,000 feet.4  
 Despite appearances, however, the program was not about setting records.5 
The actual speed and altitude achieved by the program was not the ultimate test, 
and the fact that the basic airplane never achieved its advertised 6,600 feet per 
second velocity was of little consequence. What interested the researchers was the 
environment in which the airplane flew. They wanted to study dynamic pressures, 
heating rates, and total temperatures. More specifically, the goals were to:
Verify existing (1954) theory and wind-tunnel techniques
Study aircraft structures and stability and control under 
high (2,000 psf) dynamic pressures
Study aircraft structures under high (1,200°F) heating
Investigate stability and control problems associated with 
high-altitude boost and reentry
Investigate the biomedical effects of both weightless and 
high-g flight
 The X-15 achieved all of these design goals, although Project Mercury 
and other manned space efforts quickly eclipsed the airplane’s contribution to 
 
 In the 3rd Eugen Sänger Memorial Lecture in 968, John Becker stated that 09 flights exceeded Mach 5. A 
reevaluation of the flight data shows that only 08 actually did. See Becker, “The X-5 Program in Retrospect,” 
p. 3 for Becker’s original numbers.
5 Despite all that is written, the program held very few “official” records, mainly because it seldom invited the FAI out 
to witness the flights. In fact, it appears that the 3,750-foot altitude record set by Bob White is the only official 
record ever set by the program.
1 .
2 .
3 .
4 .
5 .
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weightless research. The program ultimately achieved a velocity of 6,629 fps (with 
X-15A-2), 354,200 feet altitude, 1,350°F, and dynamic pressures over 2,200 psf.6 
 With 40 years of hindsight, it is apparent that the most important lessons to be 
learned from the X-15 concern not the hardware, but the culture. The world was 
different during the 1950s, certainly within the government-contracting environ-
ment. The military and NACA initiated and funded the X-15 program without 
congressional approval or oversight, although this was not an effort to hide the 
program or circumvent the appropriations process. The military services had con-
tingency funds available to use as they saw fit. They ultimately needed to explain 
to Congress and the White House how they spent the funds, but there was little 
second-guessing from the politicians. This allowed the program to ramp up quick-
ly and absorb the significant cost overruns that would come. Following its likely 
origin in February 1954, the Air Force awarded the X-15 development contract 
in September 1955 and North American rolled out the first airplane in October 
1958. The maiden glide flight was in June 1959, just over five years from a gleam 
in John Becker’s eye to Scott Crossfield soaring over the high desert. It could not 
happen today.
 There is a story in the main text about a meeting Harrison Storms attended at 
Edwards, and some important words of wisdom: “[T]here is a very fine line be-
tween stopping progress and being reckless. That the necessary ingredient in this 
situation of solving a sticky problem is attitude and approach. The answer, in my 
opinion, is what I refer to as ‘thoughtful courage.’ If you don’t have that, you will 
very easily fall into the habit of ‘fearful safety’ and end up with a very long and 
tedious-type solution at the hands of some committee. This can very well end up 
giving a test program a disease commonly referred to as ‘cancelitis,’ which results 
in little or no progress.”7 
 Storms must have had a crystal ball. In today’s environment, the system will 
not allow programs to have problems. If the Air Force and NASA were trying to 
develop the X-15 today, Congress would cancel it long before the first flight. A 
series of configuration changes and production problems added weight and low-
ered the expected performance before the airplane flew. The XLR99 engine was 
tremendously behind schedule, so much so that the program selected interim en-
gines just to allow the airplane to begin flying. Ultimately, however, the airplane 
and the engine were hugely successful. Compare this to how the X-33 program 
reacted to issues with its composite propellant tanks.
 When Crossfield finally released from the carrier aircraft on the initial glide 
flight in X-15-1, his landing was less than ideal. In today’s world, the program 
would have stood down to work out this issue and assess the risk . In 1959 North 
6 Ronald G. Boston, “Outline of the X-5’s Contributions to Aerospace Technology,” 2 November 977. Unpub-
lished preliminary version of the typescript available in the NASA Dryden History Office. For those interested in 
Boston’s original paper, the easiest place to find a copy is in the Hypersonic Revolution, republished by the Air 
Force History and Museums program. It constitutes the last section in the X-5 chapter; Letter, William H. Dana, 
Chief, Flight Crew Branch, DFRC, to Lee Saegesser NASA History Office, transmitting a copy of the SETP paper 
for the file. A slightly rewritten (more politically correct) version of the paper was later published as The X-15 
Airplane—Lessons Learned (American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, a paper prepared for the 3st 
Aerospace Sciences Meeting, Reno Nevada, AIAA-93-0309, - January 993). Boston listed ,300°F as the 
maximum temperature, but Bill Dana reported ,350°F in his SETP and AIAA papers. Boston also listed the max-q 
as 2,000 psf, but in reality it was 2,202 psf on Flight -66-.
7 Storms, “X-5 Hardware Design Challenges,” pp. 32-33
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American made some adjustments and launched Crossfield again three months 
later. It was a short-lived reprieve. Less than 60 days later, Crossfield broke the 
back of X-15-2 during a hard landing that followed an in-flight abort. Instead of 
canceling the program, the X-15 went back to the factory for repair. Three months 
later Crossfield was flying again. 
 During the initial ground-testing of the ultimate XLR99 engine in X-15-3 
at Edwards, an explosion destroyed the airplane. Nobody was seriously hurt and 
North American subsequently rebuilt the airplane with an advanced flight control 
system intended for the stillborn X-20 Dyna-Soar. The program was flying two 
months later using X-15-1 and the rebuilt X-15-3 went on to become the high-
altitude workhorse .
 It was the same across the board. When Jack McKay made his emergency 
landing at Mud Lake that essentially destroyed X-15-2, the Air Force did not can-
cel the program. Five weeks later Bob White made a Mach 5.65 flight in X-15-3; 
McKay was his NASA-1. North American rebuilt X-15-2 and the airplane began 
flying again 18 months later. Jack McKay went on to fly 22 more X-15 flights, 
although the lingering effects of his injuries shortened his lifetime considerably. 
 In each case the program quickly analyzed the cause of the failure, insti-
tuted appropriate changes, and moved on. Always cautious, never reckless. No 
prolonged down times. No thought of cancellation. It would not happen that way 
today. One of the risks when extending any frontier is that you do not understand 
all the risks .
 Paul Bikle, the director of the Flight Research Center, had long warned that 
the flight program should end when it achieved the design speed and altitude. 
However, the X-15s provided an ideal platform for follow-on experiments that 
had little or nothing to do with the design aero-thermo research mission. The 
temptation was too great, and NASA extended the flight program several years. 
Bikle knew that eventually the odds would catch up with the program. The day 
they did, Mike Adams was at the controls of X-15-3, and the consequences were 
as bad as anything Bikle could have imagined. The crash killed Mike Adams and 
destroyed X-15-3. Even so, the program made sure it learned from the accident 
and was flying again less than four months later. This time, however, it would not 
be for long. Eight more flights were conducted before the program ended when 
funding expired at the end of 1968.
 John Becker, arguably the father of the X-15, once stated that the project 
came along at “the most propitious of all possible times for its promotion and 
approval.” At the time, it was not considered necessary to have a defined opera-
tional program in order to conduct basic research. There were no “glamorous and 
expensive” manned space projects to compete for funding, and the general feel-
ing within the nation was one of trying to go faster, higher, or further. In today’s 
environment, as in 1968 when Becker made his comment, it is highly unlikely that 
a program such as the X-15 could gain approval.8 
 Dill Hunley, a former DFRC historian, once opined that “This situation 
should give pause to those who fund aerospace projects solely on the basis of their 
presumably predictable outcomes and their expected cost effectiveness. Without 
8 Becker, “The X-5 Program in Retrospect,” pp. -2
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the X-15’s pioneering work, it is quite possible that the manned space program 
would have been slowed, conceivably with disastrous consequences for national 
prestige.” It is certain that the development of the Space Shuttle would have car-
ried a far greater risk if not for the lessons learned from the development and 
flight-testing of the X-15. Fifty years later, the X-15 experience still provides the 
bulk of the available hypersonic data available to aircraft designers.9  
 Perhaps we have not learned well enough.
Dennis R . Jenkins
Cape Canaveral, Florida
9 J. D. Hunley, “The Significance of the X-5,” 999, unpublished. Typescript available at the DFRC History Office.
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The first 50 years of powered human flight were marked by a desire to 
always go faster and higher. At first, the daredevils—be they racers or barnstorm-
ers—drove this. By the end of the 1930s, however, increases in speed and altitude 
were largely the province of government—the cost of designing and building the 
ever-faster aircraft was becoming prohibitive for individuals. As is usually the 
case, war increased the tempo of development, and two major conflicts within 30 
years provided a tremendous impetus for advancements in aviation. By the end of 
World War II the next great challenge was in sight: the “sound barrier” that stood 
between the pilots and supersonic flight.
 Contrary to general perception, the speed of sound was not a discovery of the 
20th century. Over 250 years before Chuck Yeager made his now-famous flight in 
the X-1, it was known that sound propagated through air at some constant veloc-
ity. During the 17th century, artillerymen determined that the speed of sound was 
approximately 1,140 feet per second (fps) by standing a known distance away 
from a cannon and using simple timing devices to measure the delay between the 
muzzle flash and the sound of the discharge. Their conclusion was remarkably 
accurate . Two centuries later the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics1 
 In an unusually far-sighted move, on 3 March 95 Congress passed a public law establishing an “Advisory Com-
mittee for Aeronautics.” As stipulated in the act, the purpose of this committee was “to supervise and direct the 
scientific study of the problems of flight with a view to their practical solution” and to “direct and conduct research 
and experiment in aeronautics.” 
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(NACA) defined the speed of sound as 1,117 fps on an ISO standard day, although 
this number is for engineering convenience and does not represent a real value.2
  The first person to recognize an aerodynamic anomaly near the speed of 
sound was probably Benjamin Robins, an 18th-century British scientist who in-
vented a ballistic pendulum that measured the velocity of cannon projectiles. As 
described by Robins, a large wooden block was suspended in front of a cannon 
and the projectile was fired into it. The projectile transferred momentum to the 
block, and the force could be determined by measuring the amplitude of the pen-
dulum. During these experiments, Robins observed that the drag on a projectile 
appeared to increase dramatically as it neared the speed of sound . It was an inter-
esting piece of data, but there was no practical or theoretical basis for investigat-
ing it further.3
 The concept of shock waves associated with the speed of sound also predated 
the 20th century. As an object moves through the atmosphere, the air molecules 
near the object are disturbed and move around the object. If the object passes at 
low speed (typically less than 200 mph), the density of the air will remain rela-
tively constant, but at higher speeds some of the energy of the object will com-
press the air, locally changing its density. This compressibility effect alters the 
resulting force on the object and becomes more important as the speed increases. 
Near the speed of sound the compression waves merge into a strong shock wave 
that affects both the lift and drag of an object, resulting in significant challenges 
for aircraft designers.4 
 Austrian physicist Ernst Mach took the first photographs of supersonic shock 
waves using a technique called shadowgraphy. In 1877 Mach presented a paper 
to the Academy of Sciences in Vienna, where he showed a shadowgraph of a 
bullet moving at supersonic speeds; the bow and trailing-edge shock waves were 
clearly visible. Mach was also the first to assign a numerical value to the ratio 
between the speed of a solid object passing through a gas and the speed of sound 
through the same gas. In his honor, the “Mach number” is used as the engineering 
unit for supersonic velocities . The concept of compressibility effects on objects 
moving at high speeds was established, but little actual knowledge of the phe-
nomena existed.5
 None of these experiments had much impact on the airplanes of the early 
20th century since their flight speeds were so low that compressibility effects 
2 John D. Anderson, Jr., “Research in Supersonic Flight and the Breaking of the Sound Barrier,” in From Engineer-
ing Science to Big Science: The NACA and NASA Collier Trophy Research Project Winners, edited by Pamela E. 
Mack, NASA publication SP-29 (Washington, DC: NASA, 998), p. 62.  The actual speed of sound depends on 
what model is used. It varied from ,6. fps in the 959 ARDC Model Atmosphere to ,6.9 fps in the 95 
ICAO Model Atmosphere. For more, see Pierre Simon Marquis de Laplace, “Sur la vitesse du son dans l’aire et 
dans l’eau,” Annales de Chimie et de Physique, 86, and “Minutes of the Meeting of Committee on Aerodynam-
ics, 2 October 93,” p. 9. 
3  John V. Becker, The High-Speed Frontier: Case Histories of Four NACA Programs, 1920–1950, NASA publication 
SP-5 (Washington, DC: NASA, 980), p. 3. The text is also located on the Web at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/of-
fice/pao/History/SP-445/contents.htm. For more on Robins’ work, see his New Principles of Gunnery published 
in 72. 
 John D. Anderson, Jr., Modern Compressible Flow: With Historical Perspective (Washington, DC: McGraw Hill 
Education, 990), pp. 92-95. An excellent example of a shock wave is the Prandtl-Glauert singularity. See http://
www.eng.vt.edu/fluids/msc/gallery/conden/pg_sing.htm for some excellent photographs illustrating this.
5 Anderson, “Research in Supersonic Flight and the Breaking of the Sound Barrier,” pp. 62-63; http://otokar.troja.
mff.cuni.cz/RELATGRP/Mach.htm (accessed 7 July 2002). This Web site has copies of the original shadow-
graphs taken in 877. 
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were effectively nonexistent. However, within a few years things changed. Although 
the typical flight speeds during World War I were less than 125 mph, the propeller tips, 
because of their combined rotational and translational motion through the air, some-
times approached the compressibility phenomenon.6
 To better understand the nature of the problem, in 1918 G. H. Bryan began a 
theoretical analysis of subsonic and supersonic airflows for the British Advisory Com-
mittee for Aeronautics at the Royal Aeronautical Establishment. His analysis was 
cumbersome and provided little data of immediate value. At the same time, Frank 
W . Caldwell and Elisha N. Fales from the Army Air Service Engineering Division at 
McCook Field in Dayton, Ohio, took a purely experimental approach to the problem.7 
To investigate the problems associated with propellers, in 1918 Caldwell and Fales 
designed the first high-speed wind tunnel built in the United States. This tunnel had a 
14-inch-diameter test section that could generate velocities up to 465 mph, which was 
considered exceptional at the time. This was the beginning of a dichotomy between 
American and British research. Over the next two decades the United States—primar-
ily the NACA—made most of the major experimental contributions to understanding 
compressibility effects, while the major theoretical contributions were made in Great 
Britain. This combination of American and British investigations of propellers con-
stituted one of the first concerted efforts of the fledgling aeronautical community to 
investigate the sound barrier . 8
 Within about five years, practical solutions, such as new thin-section propeller 
blades (made practical by the use of metal instead of wood for their construction) that 
minimized the effects of compressibility, were in place. However, most of the solution 
was to avoid the problem. The development of reliable reduction-gearing systems and 
variable-pitch, constant-speed propellers eliminated the problem entirely for airplane 
speeds that were conceivable in 1925 because the propeller could be rotated at slower 
speeds. At the time, the best pursuit planes (the forerunners of what are now called 
fighters) could only achieve speeds of about 200 mph, and a scan of literature from the 
mid-1920s shows only rare suggestions of significantly higher speeds in the foresee-
able future. Accordingly, most researchers moved on to other areas.9
 The public belief in the “sound barrier” apparently had its beginning in 1935 
when the British aerodynamicist W. F. Hilton was explaining to a journalist about 
6  Becker, The High-Speed Frontier, pp. 3-5. For more see John William Strutt (the Third Baron Rayleigh), The Theory 
of Sound, a landmark of acoustics originally published in 877. An online version is available at http://www.measure.
demon.co.uk/docs/Strutt.html. The book was republished in 976 by Dover Publications, Mineola, NY.
7  On 8 October 97, the U.S. Army established McCook Field outside Dayton as the military aviation research and 
development site, based largely on its proximity to the American aviation industry (i.e., the Wright brothers). However, 
within 0 years the facility had become too small and offered no room for expansion. The citizens of Dayton, not wanting 
to lose the activity, collected donations and purchased ,000 acres of land they subsequently donated to the govern-
ment. The Army dedicated the new Wright Field on 2 October 927. On  July 93, the portion of Wright Field east 
of Huffman Dam was redesignated Patterson Field in honor of Lieutenant Frank Stuart Patterson. Patterson Field was 
the home of Air Force logistics; Wright Field was the home of research and development. The adjacent Wright Field and 
Patterson Field were again joined on 3 January 98 to become Wright-Patterson AFB. However, most development 
activities continued on the “Wright Field” part of the base, and most contemporary literature (and official correspon-
dence) generally called it Wright Field until the late 950s.
8 G. H. Bryan, “The Effect of Compressibility on Streamline Motions,” R & M No. 555, Technical Report of the Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics, December 98; G. H. Bryan, “The Effect of Compressibility on Streamline Motions, Part 
II,” R & M No. 60, Technical Report of the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, April 99; Becker, The High-Speed 
Frontier, pp. 3-5. 
9 Becker, The High-Speed Frontier, pp. 6-7. Surprisingly, one 92 French document envisioned aircraft flying at Mach 
0.8 or more by 930, as well as the development of some wholly new but unspecified type of propulsion and appropriate 
new high-speed wind tunnels to support these developments. See the English translation of La Technique Aeronautica, 
December 92, by E. Huguenard, “High-Speed Wind Tunnels,” NACA Technical Memorandum 38, 925. 
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high-speed experiments he was conducting at the National Physical Laboratory. 
Pointing to a plot of airfoil drag, Hilton said, “See how the resistance of a wing 
shoots up like a barrier against higher speed as we approach the speed of sound.” 
The next morning, the leading British newspapers were referring to the “sound 
barrier,” and the notion that airplanes could never fly faster than the speed of 
sound became widespread among the public. Although most engineers refused 
to believe this, the considerable uncertainty about how significantly drag would 
increase in the transonic regime made them wonder whether engines of sufficient 
power to fly faster than sound would ever be available.10
 Since the beginning of powered flight, wind tunnels had proven to be useful 
tools, but it appeared in the 1930s that simulation of the transonic regime was not 
possible due to the physical characteristics of the test sections. However, the be-
ginning of the Second World War increased the urgency of the research. Therefore, 
on a spring morning in 1940, John V . Becker and John Stack, two researchers from 
the NACA Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory in Hampton, Virginia,11 
drove to a remote beach to 
observe a Navy Brewster 
XF2A-2 attempting to ob-
tain supercritical aerody-
namic data in free flight over 
Chesapeake Bay. After it 
reached its terminal velocity 
in a steep dive—about 575 
mph—the pilot made a pull-
up that was near the design 
load factor of the airplane . 
This flight did not encoun-
ter any undue difficulties 
and provided some data, but 
the general feeling was that 
diving an operational-type 
airplane near its structural 
limits was probably not the 
best method of obtaining re-
search information.12
0  W.F. Hilton, “British Aeronautical Research Facilities,” Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society, volume 70, 
Centenary Issue, 966, pp. 03-0.
  In July 98 the word “Memorial” was dropped and the facility became the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory. 
It would subsequently be renamed the Langley Research Center (LaRC) when NASA came into existence on  
October 958. John Stack (906-972) graduated from MIT in 928 and joined the Langley Aeronautical Labora-
tory as an aeronautical engineer. In 939 he became director of all high-speed wind tunnels and high-velocity 
airflow research at Langley. Three years later he became chief of the Compressibility Research Division there, was 
promoted to assistant chief of research in 97, and subsequently had that title changed to assistant director of 
the research center. He guided much of the research that paved the way for transonic aircraft, and in 97 he 
was awarded the Collier Trophy together with the pilot of the X- who broke the sound barrier (by then) Major 
Charles E. Yeager. He won the award again in 952 and later won the Wright Brothers Memorial Trophy, among 
other awards. From 96 to 962 he was director of aeronautical research at NASA Headquarters before retiring 
from NASA to become vice president for engineering at Republic Aircraft Corp. (later part of Fairchild Industries), 
from which he retired in 97. 
2  Becker, The High-Speed Frontier, p. 88.
John Stack, head of  the Compressibility Research Division 
at NACA Langley, was one of  the driving forces behind the 
original set of  experimental airplanes, such as the Bell X-1 and 
Douglas D-558 series. Although he lent expertise and advice to 
the groups developing the X-15, he remained in the background 
and did not repeat the pivotal roles he had played on earlier 
projects. (NASA)
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X-PLANES
 As it happened, John Stack had already considered other alternatives. The 
idea of a modern research airplane—one designed strictly to probe unknown flight 
regimes—came in a 1933 proposal by Stack. On his own initiative, Stack went 
through a preliminary analysis for “a hypothetical airplane which, however, is not 
beyond the limits of possibility” to fly well into the compressibility regime. Stack 
calculated that a small airplane using a 2,300-horsepower Rolls-Royce piston en-
gine could obtain 566 mph in level flight—far beyond that of any airplane flying 
at the time. Ultimately, the NACA did not pursue the suggestion, and it would be 
another decade before the idea would come of age.13
 Ezra Kotcher at the Army Air Corps Engineering School at Wright Field made 
the next proposal for a high-speed research airplane. In 1939 Kotcher pointed out 
the unknown aspects of the transonic flight regime and the problems associated 
with the effects of compressibility. He further discussed the limitations of existing 
wind tunnels and advised that a full-scale flight research program would be an 
appropriate precaution. By early 1941 John Stack had confirmed that data from 
wind tunnels operating near Mach 1 were essentially worthless because of a chok-
ing problem in the test section. He again concluded that the only way to gather 
meaningful data near the speed of sound would be to build a vehicle that could 
fly in that regime. Again, no action resulted from either Kotcher’s or Stack’s sug-
gestions and determining the effects of compressibility on airplanes remained a 
largely theoretical pursuit.14
 The real world intervened in November 1941 when Lockheed test pilot 
Ralph Virden died trying to pull a P-38 Lightning out of a high-speed dive that 
penetrated well into the compressibility regime. By 1942 the diving speed of the 
new generation of fighters exceeded the choking speed of the wind tunnels then 
in use. Researchers increasingly supported the idea of an instrumented airplane 
operating at high subsonic speeds. Those involved do not remember that any one 
individual specifically championed this idea, but John Stack soon became the 
chief Langley proponent.15
 Interestingly, there was little interest within the NACA in flying through 
the sound barrier. It appeared that one of the early turbojet engines could push 
a small airplane to about Mach 0.9, but the only near-term way to go faster was 
to use a rocket engine—something that was considered too risky by the NACA. 
The Army, however, wanted a supersonic airplane and appeared willing to accept 
rocket propulsion . In fact, Ezra Kotcher had listed this as an option in his 1939 
 
 
3  John Stack, “Effects of Compressibility on High Speed Flight,” Journal of the Aeronautical Sciences, January 
93, pp. 0-3; James R. Hansen, Engineer in Charge: A History of the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 
1917–1958, NASA publication SP-305 (Washington, DC: NASA, 987), p. 256. 
  Hansen, Engineer in Charge, p. 259. Choking was primarily a transonic issue, since even a small model in the test 
section could act as an obstruction that prevented the calculated mass of air from flowing through. Some models also 
produced shock waves that extended almost perpendicular to the flow, reflecting off the tunnel walls and impinging 
back on the model or instrumentation. Such an effect meant that data from the tests were largely worthless.
5  Jay D. Pinson, ed., Diamond Jubilee of Powered Flight: The Evolution of Aircraft Design (New York: American 
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 978), pp. 5-6; Becker, The High-Speed Frontier, pp. 89-90; tele-
phone conversation, John V. Becker with Dennis R. Jenkins,  April 2002.
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proposal, and it became increasingly obvious that a rocket engine represented the 
only hope for achieving supersonic speeds in level flight in the near future.16
 Possible Navy interest in the undertaking also appeared during 1942–1944. 
However, significant differences of opinion came to the forefront during a 15 
March 1944 meeting of Army, NACA, and Navy personnel. The NACA thought of 
the airplane as a facility for collecting high-subsonic speed aerodynamic data that 
were unobtainable in wind tunnels, while the Army thought it was a step toward 
achieving a supersonic combat aircraft. The Navy supported both views, wanting 
to dispel the myth of the impenetrable sound barrier, but was also interested in 
gathering meaningful high-speed data. Despite the NACA’s concerns, the Army 
soon announced its intention to develop a rocket-powered research airplane .17
 As John Becker remembers, “The NACA continued to emphasize the as-
sumed safety aspects and relatively long-duration data-gathering flights possible 
with a turbojet engine compared to the short flights of any reasonably sized rocket 
plane. Furthermore, the turbojet would have obvious applicability to future mili-
6 Becker, The High-Speed Frontier, pp. 90–9; telephone conversation, John V. Becker with Dennis R. Jenkins,  
April 2002. 
7 Becker, The High-Speed Frontier, pp. 9–92.
A posed group portrait of  early X-planes at the NACA High-Speed Flight Station in August 1953. 
Clockwise from the bottom are the Douglas D55-1, Douglas D-558-2, Northrop X-4, Convair 
XF-92A, and Bell X-5. This group represents a wide variety of  research programs, and only the 
D558-2 was a true high-speed airplane. (NASA)
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tary aircraft while the rocket propulsion system might not. This apparently irrec-
oncilable difference was easily resolved; the Army was putting up the money and 
they decided to do it their way.”18 
 The beginning of supersonic flight research likely occurred when Robert J . 
Woods from Bell Aircraft met with Ezra Kotcher at Wright Field on 30 November 
1944. After they discussed the basic specifications, Kotcher asked Woods if Bell 
was interested in designing and building the airplane. Woods said yes, and in late 
December Bell began contract negotiations with the Army to build the rocket-
powered XS-1 research airplane .19
 Melvin N. Gough, the chief test pilot at Langley, dismissed the rocket-plane 
concept: “No NACA pilot will ever be permitted to fly an airplane powered by a 
damned firecracker.” When it became clear in early 1944 that the Army was going 
to insist on rocket propulsion, John Stack began lobbying the Navy to procure the 
type of airplane the NACA wanted. The Navy was more receptive to the turbojet-
powered airplane, and the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer) began negotia-
tions with Douglas Aircraft for the D-558 Skystreak in early 1945.20
 These were the beginnings of the cooperative research airplane program. In 
reality, until the advent of the X-15 there were two distinct programs: one with 
the Army and one with the Navy. Just because the NACA did not agree with the 
path the Army had elected to pursue did not mean the Agency would not cooper-
ate fully in the development of the XS-1. The Navy enjoyed the same level of 
cooperation for the D-558 . John Stack noted in 1951 that “the research airplane 
program has been a cooperative venture from the start…. The extent of the co-
operation is best illustrated by the fact that the X-1, sponsored by the Air Force, 
is powered with a Navy-sponsored rocket engine, and the D-558-1, sponsored by 
the Navy, is powered with an Air Force-sponsored turbojet engine.” 21 
WHAT WAS ACHIEVED?
 Initially the primary justification for a manned research airplane was the 
choking problems of the wind tunnels, but, as it turned out, this limitation dis-
appeared prior to the beginning of high-speed flight tests. Although this largely 
eliminated the need for the X-planes, it is unlikely that the progress in developing 
transonic ground facilities would have occurred without the stimulus begun by 
the X-1 and D-558. Clearly, there was an important two-way flow of benefits. 
8 Ibid. The quote was slightly edited by John Becker during the preparation of this manuscript. 
9 Richard P. Hallion, Supersonic Flight (New York: Macmillan, 972), p. 3; Becker, The High-Speed Frontier, pp. 
9-92. Woods worked at Langley during 928–929 but he left the NACA and in 935 teamed with Lawrence D. 
Bell to form the Bell Aircraft Corporation in Buffalo, New York. The original designation of the X- and X-2 was 
“XS” for “experimental supersonic.” This was subsequently simplified to just “X” for “experimental.”
20 Becker, The High-Speed Frontier, pp. 92-93. Ironically, it was the turbojet-powered D-558- that ultimately killed 
NACA pilot Howard C. Lilly due to engine failure. With further irony, it was the supersonic flights of the rocket-
powered X- that brought John Stack and the NACA a share of the Collier Trophy.
2 John Stack, “Methods for Investigation of Flows at Transonic Speeds” Aeroballistics Research Facilities Dedica-
tion Symposium, 27 June– July 99. See also an updated version presented at the 3rd International Aero 
Conference, London, 7– September 95. The XS- was powered by a Reaction Motors XLR rocket engine, 
which was a redesignated version of the LR8 developed for the Navy. An Air Force-funded Allison J35-A- tur-
bojet powered the D-558-. The United States Air Force superseded the Army Air Forces by virtue of the National 
Security Act of 97, which became law on 26 July 97. 
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Stimulated by the problems encountered by the research airplanes during flight, 
researchers created new ground facilities and techniques that in turn provided the 
data necessary to develop yet faster airplanes. Comparing the results of flight tests 
at ever-increasing speeds allowed the wind tunnels to be refined, producing yet 
better data . It was a repetitive loop .22
 The programs proceeded remarkably rapidly, and the first supersonic flights 
showed nothing particularly unexpected, much to the relief of the researchers. 
The most basic result, however, was dispelling the myth of the “sound barrier.” 
The fearsome transonic zone became an ordinary engineering problem, and al-
lowed the designers of operational supersonic aircraft to proceed with much 
greater confidence.23
 When people think of X-planes, record-setting vehicles like the X-1 generally 
come to mind. In reality, most X-planes investigated much more mundane flight 
regimes, and there were only a handful of high-speed manned experimental air-
craft, built mainly during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Specifically, there were 
five designs (only three of which carried X” designations) intended for the initial 
manned assault on high-speed flight: the Bell X-1 series, the Bell X-2, the Douglas 
D-558-1 Skystreaks, the Douglas D-558-2 Skyrockets, and the North American 
X-15. Of the five, one probed high subsonic speeds, two were supersonic, and one 
pushed the envelope to Mach 3. The fifth design would go much faster.24
 The X-planes gave aviation its first experience with controlled supersonic 
flight. On 14 October 1947, Air Force Captain Charles E. Yeager became the first 
human to break the sound barrier in level flight when the XS-1 achieved Mach 
1.06 at 43,000 feet. It took six additional years before NACA test pilot A . Scott 
Crossfield exceeded Mach 2 in the D558-2 Skyrocket on 20 November 1953. The 
Bell X-2 proved to be the fastest and highest-flying of the “round one” X-planes 
and the most tragic, with the two X-2s logging only 20 glide and powered flights 
between them. Nevertheless, Captain Iven C . Kincheloe, Jr., managed to take one 
of the airplanes to 126,200 feet on 7 September 1956. Twenty days later, Captain 
Milburn G. Apt was killed during his first X-2 flight after he reached Mach 3.196 
(1,701 mph), becoming the first person to fly at three times the speed of sound, 
albeit briefly.25
 The contributions of the early high-speed X-planes were questionable, and 
the subject of great debate within the NACA and the aircraft industry. Opinions 
on how successful they were depend largely on where one worked. The academ-
ics and laboratory researchers, and a couple of aerospace-industry designers, are 
on record indicating the contributions of the X-planes were minimal. On the other 
side, however, many of the hands-on researchers and pilots are certain the pro-
22  Becker, The High-Speed Frontier, pp. 93-9. General hypothesis confirmed by John Becker in a telephone con-
versation with Dennis R. Jenkins on 2 March 2002.
23  Becker, The High-Speed Frontier, pp. 93-9.
2  For a look at all of the X-planes, please see Jay Miller, The X-Planes: X-1 to X-45 (Hinckley, England: Midland 
Publishing, 200). Miller is currently working on a companion volume for the same publisher that will deal with 
experimental aircraft not directly in the “X” designation category (such as the Douglas D-558). For a photo essay 
on the X-planes, see X-planes Photo Scrapbook, compiled by Dennis R. Jenkins (North Branch, MN: Specialty 
Press, 200). See also American X-Vehicles: X-1 through X-50, NASA monograph SP-2000-538 (Washington, 
DC: NASA, September 2003). 
25  The X-Planes: X-1 to X-45, pp. 9–; Richard P. Hallion, On The Frontier, NASA publication SP-303 (Washing-
ton, DC: NASA, 98). 
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grams provided solid, real-world data that greatly accelerated progress in the de-
sign and manufacture of the Mach 1 and Mach 2 combat aircraft that followed.26
 For instance, the X-1 was the first aircraft to purposely break the sound 
barrier in level flight, but other aircraft were doing so in shallow dives soon 
afterwards .27  The first combat type designed from the start as a supersonic fight-
er—the Republic XF-91 “Thunderceptor”—made its maiden flight only 19 months 
after Yeager’s flight. How much the X-1 experience contributed to Alexander 
Kartveli’s design is unknown.28  The same thing happened at Mach 2. By the time 
Scott Crossfield took a D-558-2 to twice the speed of sound, Kelly Johnson at 
Lockheed had already been developing what would become the F-104 Starfighter 
for over a year. It is unlikely that the rocket-powered X-planes actually assisted 
Johnson much—something he would make clear during later deliberations.29
 The X-1E complemented the heating research undertaken by the X-1B, but 
the F-104 was already flying and could more easily acquire data at Mach 2. Even 
at the Flight Research Center (FRC), there was debate over how appropriate this 
exercise was. FRC research engineer Gene Matranga later recalled, “We could 
probably fly the X-1E two or three times a month, whereas Kelly [Johnson] was 
flying his F-104s two or three times a day into the same flight regimes, so it really 
didn’t make sense for us to be applying those kinds of resources to [obtain] that 
kind of information.” However, it is unfair to judge the X-1E program too harshly 
since its major purpose was simply to keep a cadre of rocket-powered experience 
at the FRC in anticipation of the upcoming X-15.30
 Even John Becker recognized the dichotomy represented by the experience: 
“[T]he cooperative research-airplane program pursued by the Air Force, NACA, 
and Navy had not been an unqualified success.… Some had lagged so seriously in 
procurement that their designs had become obsolescent before they were flown. 
In a few cases tactical designs superior to the research aircraft were in hand before 
the research aircraft flew.” It was not anybody’s fault—technology was simply 
changing too fast. Trying to sort out the detailed story is nearly impossible and 
well beyond the scope of this book.31
  Nevertheless, although most believed that the concept of a dedicated research 
airplane still held promise, researchers decided that the next design would need 
to offer a significant increment in performance to leapfrog the combat types then 
in development. Chuck Yeager’s October 1947 assault on the sound barrier had 
26  Telephone conversations with Scott Crossfield and John Becker, various dates, plus writings in a multitude of 
books, letters, and memos. The debate is probably never ending and largely moot since what happened has 
already happened. 
27  The XP-86 officially broke the sound barrier in a shallow dive on 26 April 98. Some sources maintain that this 
event actually took place slightly before Yeager’s flight, and Scott Crossfield suggests—as do others—that the 
first Mach  dive by an F-86 occurred “within weeks” of Yeager’s first supersonic flight (telephone conversation, 
Scott Crossfield with Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 October 2002).
28  The XF-9 was hardly a successful attempt, although it did record the “first supersonic rocket-powered flight by 
a U.S. combat-type airplane” in December 952. A single General Electric J7-GE-9 jet engine and four Curtiss-
Wright XLR27-CW- rocket engines powered the aircraft. The Curtiss-Wright rockets were traded for a Reaction 
Motors XLR-RM-9 in the modified XF-9A that apparently was never tested.
29  The first flight of an XF-0 powered by a Wright XJ65-W-6 engine was on 7 February 956, but this prototype 
aircraft was only capable of Mach .79. The General Electric J79-GE-3-powered YF-0A exceeded Mach 2 on 
27 April 956.
30  Interview with Gene Matranga, 3 December 976, transcript in the files at the DFRC History Office; http://www.
dfrc.nasa.gov/History/Publications/SP-4303/ch4-6.html (accessed 8 July 2002).
3  John V. Becker, “The X-5 Project: Part —Origins and Research Background,” Astronautics & Aeronautics, 
February 96, pp. 53.
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ignited a billion-dollar race to build ever-faster aircraft, and directly affected ev-
ery combat aircraft design for the next two decades. However, a few aeronautical 
researchers had always been certain that the sound barrier was simply a challenge 
for the engineers, not a true physical limitation. The X-1 had proven it was pos-
sible for humans to fly supersonically. The next goal was so much faster.
HYPERSONICS
Hypersonic. Adj. (1937). Of or relating to velocities in excess of five times the 
speed of sound.32
  
 Between the two world wars, hypersonics was an area of great theoretical 
interest to a small group of aeronautical researchers, but little progress was made 
toward defining the possible problems, and even less in solving them. The major 
constraint was power. Engines, even the rudimentary rockets then available, were 
incapable of propelling any significant object to hypersonic velocities. Wind tun-
nels also lacked the power to generate such speeds. Computer power to simulate 
the environment had not even been imagined. For the time being, hypersonics was 
something to be contemplated, and little else.
 By the mid-1940s it was becoming apparent to aerodynamic researchers in 
the United States that it might finally be possible to build a flight vehicle capable 
of achieving hypersonic speeds. It seemed that the large rocket engines developed 
32 Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, 986).
The X-1E was the last rocket-powered X-plane at the NACA High-Speed Flight Station until the 
arrival of  the three X-15s. There is considerable debate over the economics of  flying the X-1E given 
that some jet-powered aircraft could attain the same velocities, but the primary purpose of  the X-1E 
was to maintain a cadre of  rocket experience at the HSFS pending the arrival of  the X-15. (NASA)
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in Germany during World War II might allow engineers to initiate development 
with some hope of success. Indeed, the Germans had already briefly toyed with a 
potentially hypersonic aerodynamic vehicle, the winged A-4b version of the V-2 
rocket. The only “successful” A-4b flight had managed just over Mach 4 (about 
2,700 mph) before apparently disintegrating in flight.33  Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
in the immediate post-war period most researchers believed that hypersonic flight 
was a domain for unmanned missiles.34
 When the U.S. Navy BuAer provided an English translation of a technical pa-
per by German scientists Eugen Sänger and Irene Bredt in 1946, this preconcep-
tion began to change. Expanding upon ideas conceived as early as 1928, Sänger 
and Bredt concluded in 1944 that they could build a rocket-powered hypersonic 
aircraft with only minor advances in technology. This concept of manned aircraft 
flying at hypersonic velocities greatly interested researchers at the NACA. Nev-
ertheless, although there were numerous paper studies exploring variations of the 
Sänger-Bredt proposal during the late 1940s, none bore fruit and no hardware 
construction was undertaken .35 
 One researcher who was interested in exploring the new science of hyperson-
ics was John V . Becker, the assistant chief of the Compressibility Research Divi-
sion at the NACA Langley Aeronautical Laboratory in Hampton, Virginia.36  On 
3 August 1945, Becker proposed the construction of a “new type supersonic wind 
tunnel for Mach number 7.” Already a few small supersonic tunnels in the United 
States could achieve short test runs at Mach 4, but the large supersonic tunnels 
under construction at Langley and Ames had been designed for Mach numbers 
no higher than 2. Information captured by the Army from the German missile 
research facility at Peenemünde had convinced Becker that the next generation of 
missiles and projectiles would require testing at much higher Mach numbers.37
 As the basis for his proposed design, Becker extrapolated from what he al-
ready knew about supersonic tunnels. He quickly discovered that the compress-
ible-flow theory for nozzles dictated a 100-fold expansion in area between Mach 1 
and Mach 7. Using normal shock theory to estimate pressure ratio and compressor 
requirements, Becker found that at Mach 7 the compressor system would have to 
grow to impractical proportions.38 
 Hope for alleviating the compressor problem had first appeared in the spring 
of 1945 when Becker gained a fresh understanding of supersonic diffusers from 
33  Supersonic velocities are usually expressed as “Mach numbers,” a term honoring Austrian mathematician and 
physicist Ernst Mach, who was the first to assign a numerical value to the ratio between a solid object passing 
through a gas and the speed of sound through the same gas. The speed of sound varies with atmospheric condi-
tions (temperature and pressure) and hence is different at every altitude on every day. At sea level on a standard 
day the speed of sound is 76.6 miles per hour. By convention, at altitudes of above 0,000 feet the speed of 
sound is a constant 660. miles per hour.
3  Despite this apparent success, most engineers on the program believed that heat transfer problems would 
ultimately doom the A-b; there were no provisions for cooling the airframe, and little was understood about po-
tential heating effects. For further information, see Michael Neufeld’s interview of Karl Werner Dahm, 25 January 
990. In the files at the National Air and Space Museum.
35  Becker, “The X-5 Program in Retrospect,” p. .
36  The Compressibility Research Division was created in July 93 as one of the first steps toward breaking the 
sound barrier. The division included all of the high-speed wind tunnels at Langley and a small section under Arthur 
Kantrowitz that studied fundamental gas dynamics.
37  Letter, John V. Becker to the Langley Chief of Research, subject: Proposal for new type of supersonic wind tunnel 
for Mach number 7.0, 3 August 95. In the Becker Archives, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Blacksburg, Virginia; 
letter, John V. Becker to Dennis R. Jenkins, 29 July 2002.
38  Letter, John V. Becker to Dennis R. Jenkins, 29 July 2002. 
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a paper by Arthur Kantrowitz and Coleman duPont Donaldson.39  The paper fo-
cused on low-Mach-number supersonic flows and did not consider variable ge-
ometry solutions, but it was still possible to infer that changing the wall contours 
to form a second throat might substantially reduce the shock losses in the diffuser. 
Unfortunately, it appeared that this could only be accomplished after the flow had 
been started, introducing considerable mechanical complexity. The potential ben-
efits from a variable-geometry configuration were inconsequential at Mach 2, but 
Becker determined that they could be quite large at Mach 7. In the tunnel envi-
sioned by Becker, the peak pressure ratios needed to start the flow lasted only a few 
seconds and were obtained by discharging a 50-atmosphere pressure tank into a 
vacuum tank. Deploying the second throat reduced the pressure ratio and power re-
quirements, allowing the phasing-in of a continuously running compressor to pro-
vide longer test times. It was a novel concept, but a number of uncertainties caused 
Becker to advise the construction of a small pilot tunnel with an 11 by 11-inch test 
section to determine experimentally how well the scheme worked in practice.40
  Not everybody agreed that such a facility was necessary. The NACA chair-
man, Jerome C. Hunsaker,41  did not see any urgency for the facility, and Arthur 
Kantrowitz, who designed the first NACA supersonic wind tunnel, did not be-
lieve that extrapolating what little was known about supersonic tunnels would 
allow the development of a hypersonic facility. The most obvious consequence 
39  Arthur Kantrowitz and Coleman duP. Donaldson, “Preliminary Investigation of Supersonic Diffusers,” NASA war-
time report L73, May 96 (originally published as L5D20, 95). Becker was serving as the chairman of the 
technical editorial committee when he first read the paper. 
0  Letter, John V. Becker to Dennis R. Jenkins, 29 July 2002.
  Hunsaker was chairman of the NACA from 9 to 956. Among the notable achievements in a long and ac-
complished career, his work in aircraft stability was published as NACA Technical Report No.  in 95.
John V. Becker was the lead of  the NACA Langley team that accomplished much of  the preliminary 
work needed to get a hypersonic research airplane approved through the NACA Executive Committee 
and Department of  Defense. Becker continued to play an import role with the X-15 throughout the 
development and flight programs. (NASA)
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of the rapid expansion of the air necessary for Mach 7 operation was the large 
drop in air temperature below the nominal liquefaction value. At the time, there 
was no consensus on the question of air liquefaction, although some preliminary 
investigations of the condensation of water vapor suggested that the transit time 
through a hypersonic nozzle and test section might be too brief for liquefaction to 
take place . Nevertheless, Kantrowitz, the head of Langley’s small gas-dynamics 
research group, feared that “real-gas effects”—possibly culminating in liquefac-
tion—would probably limit wind tunnels to a maximum useful Mach number of 
about 4 .5 .42
  Nevertheless, Becker had his supporters . For instance, Dr. George W. 
Lewis,43  the Director of Aeronautical Research for the NACA, advised Becker, 
“Don’t call it a new wind tunnel. That would complicate and delay funding,” so for 
the next two years it was called “Project 506.” The estimated $39,500 cost of the 
pilot tunnel was rather modest, and given Lewis’s backing, the facility received 
quick approval.44
 In September 1945 a small staff of engineers under Charles H . McLellan began 
constructing the facility inside the shop area of the old Propeller Research Tunnel . 
They soon discovered that Kantrowitz’s predictions had been accurate—the job 
required more than extrapolation of existing supersonic tunnel theory. The pilot 
tunnel proposal had not included an air heater, since Becker believed he could add 
it later if liquefaction became a problem. As work progressed, it became increas-
ingly clear that the ability to control air temperature would greatly improve the 
quality and scope of the research, and by the end of 1945 Becker had received ap-
proval to include an electric heater. This would maintain air temperatures of about 
850°F, allowing Mach 7 temperatures well above the nominal liquefaction point.45
 The first test of the “11-inch” on 26 November 1947 revealed uniform 
flow at Mach 6.9, essentially meeting all of the original intents. An especially 
satisfying result of the test was the performance of the variable-geometry diffuser. 
McLellan and his group had devised a deployable second throat that favored 
mechanical simplicity over aerodynamic sophistication, but was still very 
effective. The benefit appeared as an increased run duration (in this case an in-
crease from 25 seconds to over 90 seconds).46 
 For three years the 11-inch would be the only operational hypersonic tunnel 
in the United States and, apparently, the world. Several basic flow studies and 
aerodynamic investigations during this period established the 11-inch as an effi-
cient tool for general hypersonic research, giving Langley a strong base in the new 
field of hypersonics. Without this development, Langley would not have been 
2  John V. Becker, “Results of Recent Hypersonic and Unsteady Flow Research at the Langley Aeronautical Labora-
tory,” Journal of Applied Physics, volume 2, number 7, July 950, pp. 69-628; letter, John V. Becker to Dennis 
R. Jenkins, 29 July 2002.
3  In 99 Lewis became the first executive officer of the NACA; in 92 he received the title of director of aeronautical 
research, which he kept until 97. Lewis died at his summer home at Lake Winola, Pennsylvania, on 2 July 98.
  Letter, John V. Becker to Dennis R. Jenkins, 29 July 2002. The $39,500 estimate contained in the 3 August 95 
memo seems ridiculous by today’s standards. However, it did not include any NACA overhead costs, and con-
struction would take place in NACA shops using NACA personnel. Adding the heater increased the expenditure 
to over $200,000.
5  Letter, John V. Becker to Dennis R. Jenkins, 29 July 2002. 
6  Becker, “Results of Recent Hypersonic and Unsteady Flow Research,” pp. 69-628; letter, John V. Becker to 
Dennis R. Jenkins, 29 July 2002. 
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able to define and support a meaningful hypersonic research airplane concept in 
1954. Throughout the entire X-15 program, the 11-inch would be the principal 
source of the necessary hypersonic tunnel support.47 
 Despite the fact that it was a pilot facility, the 11-inch hypersonic tunnel oper-
ated until 1973, resulting in over 230 publications from tests and related analysis 
(about one paper every 5 weeks for its 25 years of operations). Few major wind 
tunnels have equaled that record. After it was decommissioned, NASA donated 
the tunnel to the Virginia Polytechnic Institute in Blacksburg, Virginia.48
 As the 11-inch tunnel at Langley was demonstrating that it was possible to 
conduct hypersonic research, several other facilities were under construction. 
Alfred J. Eggers, Jr., at the NACA Ames Aeronautical Laboratory at Moffett 
Field, California,49  began to design a 10 by 14-inch continuous-flow hypersonic 
tunnel in 1946, and the resulting facility became operational in 1950. The first hy-
personic tunnel at the Naval Ordnance Facility, constructed largely from German 
material captured from the uncompleted Mach 10 tunnel at Peenemünde, also 
became operational in 1950.50
7 Letter, John V. Becker to Dennis R. Jenkins, 29 July 2002. For an example of the investigations made during this 
period, see Charles H. McLellan, “Exploratory Wind Tunnel Investigations of Wings and Bodies at M=6.9,” Journal 
of the Aeronautical Sciences, volume 8, number 0, October 95, pp. 6-68.
8  Hansen, Engineer in Charge, p. 37.
9 The Ames Aeronautical Laboratory became the Ames Research Center when NASA came into being on  Octo-
ber 958.
50 Hansen, Engineer in Charge, p. 560.
The 11-inch at NACA Langley was intended as a pilot tunnel for a larger hypersonic wind tunnel when it 
opened in 1947. However, it proved so useful that it stayed in service until 1973, and the research documented 
in it resulted in over 230 publications. Much of  the early work on what became the X-15 was accomplished 
in this wind tunnel. (NASA)
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 Interestingly, NASA did not authorize a continuously running hypersonic 
tunnel that incorporated all of the features proposed in the 1945 Becker memo 
until 1958. Equipped with a 1,450°F heater, the design velocity increased from 
Becker’s proposed Mach 7 to 12. As it ended up, although the tunnel attained 
Mach 12 during a few tests, severe cooling problems in the first throat resulted in a 
Mach 10 limit for most work. The enormous high-pressure air supply and vacuum 
tankage of the Gas Dynamics Laboratory provided blow-down test durations of 
10–15 minutes. Together with improved instrumentation, this virtually eliminated 
the need to operate the tunnel in the “continuously running” mode, and nearly all 
of Langley’s “continuous-running” hypersonic tunnel operations have been con-
ducted in the “blow-down” mode rather than with the compressors running.51
THE MISSILE INFLUENCE 
 Not surprisingly, during the early 1950s the top priority for the hypersonic 
tunnels was to support the massive development effort associated with the inter-
continental missiles then under development. Initially it was not clear whether 
the resulting weapon would be a high-speed cruise missile or an intercontinen-
tal ballistic missile (ICBM), so the Air Force undertook programs to develop 
both. Much of the theoretical science necessary to create a manned hypersonic 
research airplane would be born of the perceived need to build these weapons . 
 Long-range missile development challenged NACA researchers in a number 
of ways. The advancements necessary to allow a Mach 3 cruise missile were rela-
tively easily imagined, if not readily at hand. The ballistic missile was a different 
story. A successful ICBM would have to accelerate to 15,000 miles per hour at an 
altitude of perhaps 500 miles, and then be guided to a precise target thousands of 
miles away. Sophisticated and reliable propulsion, control, and guidance systems 
were essential, as was keeping the structural weight at a minimum. Moreover, 
researchers needed to find some method to handle aerodynamic heating. As the 
missile warhead reentered the atmosphere, it would experience temperatures of 
several thousand °F. The heat that was generated by shock-wave compression 
outside the boundary layer and was not in contact with the structure would dis-
sipate harmlessly into the surrounding air. However, the part that arose within the 
boundary layer and was in direct contact with the missile structure would be great 
enough to melt the vehicle. Many early dummy warheads burned up because the 
engineers did not yet understand this.
 During this time, H. Julian Allen was engaged in high-speed research at Ames 
and found what he believed to be a practical solution to the aerodynamic heating 
problems of the ICBM. In place of the traditional sleek configuration with a sharply 
pointed nose (an aerodynamic concept long since embraced by missile designers, 
mostly because the V-2 had used it), Allen proposed a blunt shape with a rounded 
bottom. In 1951 Allen predicted that when the missile reentered the atmosphere, 
5 Letter, John V. Becker to Dennis R. Jenkins, 29 July 2002. 
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its blunt shape would create a powerful bow-shaped shock wave that would deflect 
heat safely outward and away from the structure of the missile. The boundary layer 
on the body created some frictional drag and heating, but this was only a small 
fraction of the total heat of deceleration, most of which harmlessly heated the at-
mosphere through the action of the strong shock wave. As Allen and Eggers put it, 
“not only should pointed bodies be avoided, but the rounded nose should have as 
large a radius as possible.” Thus the “blunt-body” concept was born.52
 Allen and Eggers verified the blunt-body concept by studying the aerody-
namic heating of miniature missiles in an innovative supersonic free-flight tunnel, 
a sort of wind-tunnel-cum-firing-range that had become operational at Ames in 
1949. The researchers published their classified report on these tests in August 
1953, but the Air Force and aerospace industry did not immediately embrace the 
concept since it ran contrary to most established ideas. Engineers accustomed to 
pointed-body missiles remained skeptical of the blunt-body concept until the mid-
to-late-1950s, when it became the basis for the new ICBM warheads and all of the 
manned space capsules.53
 In the meantime, Robert J. Woods, designer of the Bell X-1 and X-2 re-
search airplanes, stirred up interest in hypersonic aircraft. In a letter to the NACA 
52 H. Julian Allen and Alfred J. Eggers, Jr. “A Study of the Motion and Aerodynamic Heating of Ballistic Missiles En-
tering the Earth’s Atmosphere at High Supersonic Speeds,” NACA confidential research memorandum A53D28, 
August 953. The NACA published updated versions of the same report as TN07 and TR38 in 958; Edwin 
P. Hartmann, Adventures in Research: A History of the Ames Research Center, 90–965, NASA publication 
SP-302 (Washington, DC: NASA, 972), pp. 26-28. Allen had worked at Langley in Eastman Jacobs’s Vari-
able-Density Tunnel group between 936 and 90 before joining the team on the West Coast. As told by John 
Becker, Allen’s given name was “Harry,” but he disliked the name and always used “H. Julian” instead. Occasion-
ally he used “Harvey” as a nickname, leading to the use of that name in many publications. 
53 Allen and Eggers, “A Study of the Motion and Aerodynamic Heating;” Hartmann, Adventures in Research, pp. 28.
In 1951, NACA Ames researcher H. Julian Allen postulated the concept of  a “blunt body” reentry vehicle 
for intercontinental missiles. Pushing the shock wave away from the missile body removed most of  the aerody-
namic heating from being in direct contact with the structure. The reentry profiles developed at NASA Langley 
used the idea of  “sufficient lift,” which were a new manifestation of  the blunt-body concept. (NASA)
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Committee on Aerodynamics54 dated 8 January 1952, Woods proposed that the 
committee direct some part of its research to address the basic problems of hy-
personic and space flight. Accompanying the letter was a document from Dr. 
Walter R . Dornberger, former commander of the German rocket test facility at 
Peenemünde and now a Bell employee, outlining the preliminary requirements of 
a hypersonic aircraft. The “ionosphere research plane” proposed by Dornberger 
was powered by a liquid-fueled rocket engine and capable of flying at 6,000 feet 
per second (fps) at an altitude of 50–75 miles.55 It was apparent that the concept 
for an “antipodal” bomber proposed near the end of the war by his colleagues 
Eugen Sänger and Irene Bredt still intrigued Dornberger.56 According to the Sän-
ger-Bredt study, this aircraft would skip in and out of the atmosphere (called 
“skip-gliding”) and land halfway around the world.57 Dornberger’s enthusiasm 
for the concept had captured Woods’s imagination, and he called for the NACA 
to develop a manned hypersonic research airplane in support of it. At the time, 
the committee declined to initiate the research advocated by Woods, but took the 
matter under advisement.58 
 At the 30 January 1952 meeting of the Committee on Aerodynamics, Woods 
submitted a paper that noted growing interest in very-high-speed flight at altitudes 
where the atmospheric density was so low as to eliminate effective aerodynamic 
control. Since he believed that research into this regime was necessary, Woods 
suggested that “the NACA is the logical organization to carry out the basic stud-
ies in space flight control and stability” and that the NACA should set up a small 
group “to evaluate and analyze the basic problems of space flight.” Woods went 
on to recommend that the NACA “endeavor to establish a concept of a suitable 
manned test vehicle” that could be developed within two years. Again, the NACA 
took the matter under advisement.59 
 Smith J. DeFrance, an early Langley engineer who became the director of 
NACA Ames when it opened in 1941, opposed the idea for a hypersonic study 
group because “it appears to verge on the developmental, and there is a question 
5 The NACA received its direction via a committee system. The committees and their subcommittees were com-
posed of representatives from industry, the military, and NACA scientists and engineers. A subcommittee that 
had the most direct contact with the “real world” might recognize a new area of research and pass a resolution 
recommending further efforts. The overarching committee would then take up the resolution and, after discussion 
at a higher level in the food chain, either table it or pass its own resolution. This in turn would pass to the executive 
committee, which was composed of distinguished members of industry, high-ranking military officers, and gov-
ernment officials appointed by the president. If the executive committee endorsed the resolution, it would direct 
the NACA laboratories (Ames, Langley, and Lewis) and stations (the Auxiliary Flight Research Station and later 
the High-Speed Flight Station) to conduct the research. Usually, funding came from the various military services, 
although the NACA also had a separately appropriated budget.
55 The accepted standard at the time was to report extreme altitudes in statue miles; this equated to 26,000–
396,000 feet, almost exactly foretelling the performance ultimately obtained by the X-5.
56 According to Webster’s—antipodal: of or relating to the antipodes; specif: situated at the opposite side of the 
Earth. Or, points on opposite sides of a sphere. The original Sänger concept was that the Silverbird would land 
on the opposite side of the Earth from where it took off, dropping its bombs midway through the mission.
57 Eugen Sänger, Rocket Flight Engineering, NASA translation TTF-223 (Washington, DC: NASA, 965). Sänger’s 
concepts for skip-glide aircraft date back as far as his doctoral thesis of 928, and formed the basis for several 
postwar American projects, such as BoMi and RoBo. His “dynamic-soaring” terminology for this flight path also 
inspired the name “Dyna-Soar” given to the Step III hypersonic research program, and later the X-20 vehicle. 
58 Letter, Robert J. Woods to the NACA Committee on Aerodynamics, “Establishment of a Study Group on Space 
Flight and Associated Problems,” 8 January 952. A few weeks later, Dornberger outlined an even more ambi-
tious version of the aircraft launched from a B-7 and capable of 6,20 fps (,250 mph) and 56,000 feet. It was, 
for all intents, a version of the A-b or A-9 investigated by the Germans at Peenemünde during the war. See a 
letter from Walter R. Dornberger to Robert J. Woods of 8 January 952. In the files at the NASA History Office. 
59 Minutes of the Meeting, NACA Committee on Aerodynamics, 30 January 952. In the files at the NASA History Office. 
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as to its importance. There are many more pressing and more realistic problems 
to be met and solved in the next ten years.” DeFrance concluded in the spring 
of 1952 that “a study group of any size is not warranted.” This reflected the posi-
tion of many NACA researchers who believed the committee should only under-
take theoretical and basic research, and leave development projects to the military 
and industry.60
 Further discussion ensued during the 24 June 1952 meeting of the Committee 
on Aerodynamics. Other factors covered at the meeting included Allen’s unan-
ticipated discovery of the blunt-body concept and a special request from a group 
representing 11 missile manufacturers. 
 The NACA Subcommittee on Stability and Control had invited the same 
manufacturers to Washington in June 1951 to present their ideas “on the direction 
in which NACA research should move for greatest benefit in missile develop-
ment.” In this case the weapons in question were more often than not air-to-air 
and surface-to-air missiles rather than ICBMs. During this meeting, Maxwell W. 
Hunter, an engineer who was developing the Sparrow and Nike missiles at the 
Douglas Aircraft Company, suggested that the NACA should begin to explore 
the problems missiles would encounter at speeds of Mach 4 to Mach 10. Hunter 
pointed out that several aircraft designers, notably Alexander Kartveli at Repub-
lic, were already designing Mach 3+ interceptors.61  For an air-to-air missile to be 
effective when launched from an aircraft at Mach 3, the missile itself would most 
probably need to be capable of hypersonic speeds.62 
 Hunter and Woods repeated their requests during the June 1952 meeting of 
the Committee on Aerodynamics. In response, the committee passed a resolution 
largely penned by Air Force science advisor Albert Lombard. The resolution rec-
ommended that “(1) the NACA increase its program dealing with the problems 
of unmanned and manned flight in the upper stratosphere at altitudes between 12 
and 50 miles, and at Mach numbers between 4 and 10, and (2) the NACA devote 
a modest effort to problems associated with unmanned and manned flight at alti-
tudes from 50 miles to infinity and at speeds from Mach number 10 to the veloc-
ity of escape from Earth’s gravity.” The NACA Executive Committee ratified the 
resolution on 14 July. NACA Headquarters then asked the Ames, Langley, and 
60 Memorandum, Smith J. DeFrance, Director, Ames Aeronautical Laboratory, to NACA, subject: Report on Re-
search of Interest to Committee on Aerodynamics, 29 May 952.
6 In early 98 Alexander Kartveli at Republic Aviation began designing the Mach 3 AP-A all-weather high-alti-
tude defense fighter, less than a year after the first XS- supersonic flight. Republic sent preliminary data to the 
Air Force in January 95, and in September received a phase I development contract for the WS-20A. Although 
the entire aircraft was extremely futuristic, perhaps its most notable feature was the Wright J67 dual-cycle turbojet 
engine. The engine installation provided a large bypass duct that fed air directly into the afterburner, allowing it 
to function as a ramjet at high speed. An 8-month extension of the phase I contract provided further studies 
of titanium fabrication, high-temperature hydraulics, escape capsules, and periscopic sights. The Air Force con-
tinued to fund the program despite a variety of technical problems. By July 95 the program had advanced to 
the point where the Air Force awarded Republic a contract to manufacture three prototypes. However, technical 
problems continued, and a low funding level made it difficult to apply sufficient resources to overcome them. In 
early 957 the Air Force reduced the program to a single prototype and two flight engines, but little progress had 
been made by 2 August 957 when the Air Force canceled the XF-03 and Wright engine entirely. The program 
had cost $0 million over nine years.
62 Joseph Adams Shortal, A New Dimension: Wallops Island Flight Test Range—The First Fifteen Years, NASA 
publication SP-028 (Washington DC: NASA, 978), p. 238. 
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Lewis63  laboratories for comments and recommendations concerning the imple-
mentation of this resolution.64
 This resolution had little immediate effect on existing Langley programs, with 
the exception that it inspired the Pilotless Aircraft Research Division (PARD)65  to 
evaluate the possibility of increasing the speeds of their test rockets up to Mach 
10. Nevertheless, the resolution did have one very important consequence for the 
future: the final paragraph called for the laboratories “to devote a modest effort” 
to the study of space flight.66
 The concepts and ideas discussed by Dornberger, Hunter, and Woods inspired 
two unsolicited proposals for research aircraft. The first, released on 21 May 
1952, was from Hubert M. “Jake” Drake and L. Robert Carman of the NACA 
High-Speed Flight Research Station (HSFRS) and called for a two-stage system 
in which a large supersonic carrier aircraft would launch a smaller, manned re-
search airplane . The Drake-Carman proposal stated that by “using presently avail-
able components and manufacturing techniques, an aircraft having a gross weight 
of 100,000 pounds could be built with an empty weight of 26,900 pounds. Using 
liquid oxygen and water-alcohol propellants, this aircraft would be capable of 
attaining Mach numbers of 6.4 and altitudes up to 660,000 feet. It would have 
duration of one minute at a Mach number of 5.3. By using this aircraft, an air-
craft of the size and weight of the Bell X-2 could be launched at Mach 3 and an 
altitude of 150,000 feet, attaining Mach numbers up to almost 10 and an altitude 
of about 1,000,000 feet. Duration of one minute at a Mach number of 8 would be 
possible.” The report went into a fair amount of detail concerning the carrier air-
craft, but surprisingly little toward describing the heating and structural problems 
expected for the smaller research airplane.67
 David G . Stone, head of the Stability and Control Branch of the PARD, re-
leased the second report in late May 1952. This report was somewhat more con-
servative and proposed that the Bell X-2 itself could be used to reach speeds 
approaching Mach 4.5 and altitudes near 300,000 feet if it were equipped with 
two JPL-4 Sergeant solid-propellant rocket motors. Stone also recommended the 
formation of a project group that would work out the details of actual hardware 
development, flight programs, and aircraft systems. Langley director Henry J. E. 
 
63 The Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory was founded on 23 June 9 in suburban Cleveland, Ohio. In April 
97 it was renamed the Flight Propulsion Research Laboratory, and a year later it was renamed the Lewis Flight 
Propulsion Laboratory. When NASA came into being on  October 958, the laboratory was renamed the Lewis 
Research Center (abbreviated LeRC to differentiate it from the Langley Research Center (LaRC)). On  March 
999 it was renamed the John H. Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field.
6 Minutes of the Meeting, Committee on Aerodynamics, 2 June 952. In the files at the NASA History Office.
65 The PARD was established in June 96 at the Auxiliary Flight Research Station (AFRS) on Wallops Island, off 
the eastern shore of Virginia. This group had been set up during World War II to launch “pilotless aircraft” (the 
military’s name for all guided missiles of the time) to obtain research data on them. On  July 95, the AFRS 
launched its first test vehicle, a small two-stage, solid-fuel rocket, to check out the installation’s instrumentation. 
At the end of the war, a typical model weighed about 0 pounds and could attain a maximum speed of Mach . 
before it crashed into the Atlantic Ocean. The instrumented models provided telemetry back to the ground during 
their flights. Despite the fact that PARD launched 386 models from 97 to 99, the “real” researchers in the 
Langley wind tunnels never believed that the operation obtained much useful data. Nevertheless, the PARD con-
tinued and soon began launching large-scale models of aircraft on top of its rockets, obtaining data at speeds the 
wind-tunnel operators could only dream of at the time. Many types of aircraft were evaluated; for instance, tests 
of the Convair F-02 Delta Dagger helped verify the effectiveness of Richard T. Whitcomb’s area rule principle.
66 Hansen, Engineer in Charge, pp. 350-35.
67 Hubert M. Drake and L. Robert Carman, “A Suggestion of Means for Flight Research at Hypersonic Velocities and 
High Altitudes,” unpublished, 2 May 952. In the files at the Dryden History Office.
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Reid and John Stack generally supported this approach, but believed that further 
study of possible alternatives was required.68 
 Meanwhile, in response to the 1952 recommendation from the NACA Com-
mittee on Aerodynamics, Henry Reid set up a three-man study group consisting of 
Clinton E. Brown (chairman) from the Compressibility Research Division, William 
J. O’Sullivan, Jr., from the PARD, and Charles H. Zimmerman from the Stability 
and Control Division. Curiously, none of the three had any significant background 
in hypersonics. Floyd L. Thompson, who became associate director of Langley in 
September 1952, had rejected a suggestion to include a hypersonic aerodynamicist 
or specialist in thermodynamics in the study group. Thompson’s plan was to bring 
together creative engineers with “completely fresh, unbiased ideas.” The group 
was to evaluate the state of available technology and suggest possible programs 
that researchers could initiate in 1954, given adequate funding.69  
 This group reviewed the ongoing ICBM-related work at Convair and RAND,70 
and then investigated the feasibility of hypersonic and reentry flight in general 
terms. Not surprisingly, the group identified structural heating as the single most 
important problem. The group also reviewed the earlier proposals from Drake-
Carman and Stone, and agreed to endorse a version of Stone’s X-2 modification 
with several changes. In the Langley concept, the vehicle used a more powerful 
internal rocket engine instead of strap-on solid boosters, with the goal of reaching 
Mach 3 .7 velocities . Dr . John E. Duberg, the chief of the Structural Research Di-
vision, noted, however, that “considerable doubt exists about the ability of the X-2 
airplane to survive the planned trajectory because of the high thermal stresses.” 
The study group released its report on 23 June 1953, and in a surprisingly conser-
vative vein, agreed that unmanned missiles should conduct any research in excess 
of Mach 4 .5 .71 
 Originally, the plan was to have an interlaboratory board review the findings 
of the study group, but this apparently never happened. Nevertheless, hypersonic 
specialists at Langley frequently had the opportunity to talk with the group, and 
heard Brown formally summarize the findings at a briefing in late June 1953. 
While listening to this summary, the specialists “felt a strong sense of déja-vu,” 
68 Letter, David G. Stone to Chief of Research, subject: Preliminary study of the proposal for the flight of manned 
vehicles into space, 2 May 952. In the files at the Dryden History Office. The High-Speed Flight Research Sta-
tion (HSFRS) became the High-Speed Flight Station (HSFS) on  July 95, the Flight Research Center (FRC) on 
27 September 959, and the Hugh L. Dryden Flight Research Center (usually abbreviated DFRC) on 26 March 
976. On  October 98, it was administratively absorbed into the Ames Research Center and its name was 
changed to the Ames-Dryden Flight Research Facility (DFRF). It reverted to Center status on  March 99 and 
again became DFRC. At some point between 95 and 959, the hyphen between “High” and “Speed” seems to 
have been dropped, but no official evidence of this could be found.
69 Clinton E. Brown, William J. O’Sullivan, and Charles H. Zimmerman, “A Study of the Problems Relating to High-
Speed, High-Altitude Flight,” 25 June 953. Copy in the Langley Technical Library under code CN-,50; Lloyd 
S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury, 
NASA publication SP-20 (Washington DC: NASA, 966), p. 57.
70 E. P. Williams, et al., RAND report 7, “A Comparison of Long-Range Surface-to-Surface Rocket and Ram-Jet 
Missiles,” May 950. From http://rand.org/about/history/: “On  October 95, General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold 
and Donald Douglas set up Project RAND (‘research and development’) under special contract to the Douglas 
Aircraft Company. However, this arrangement was not ideal, and in February 98 the chief of staff of the newly 
created United States Air Force wrote to Donald Douglas approving the evolution of RAND into a nonprofit cor-
poration, independent from Douglas. On  May 98, RAND incorporated as a nonprofit corporation under the 
laws of the State of California. RAND’s charter was remarkably brief: ‘To further and promote scientific, educa-
tional, and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare and security of the United States of America.’” 
7 Brown et al., “A Study of the Problems Relating to High-Speed, High-Altitude Flight.” The Duberg quote is in Ap-
pendix VI. 
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especially on hearing Brown’s pronouncement that “the main problem of hyper-
sonic flight is aerodynamic heating.” They disagreed, however, with the group’s 
conclusion that the NACA would have to rely on flight-testing, rather than on 
ground-based approaches, for research and development beyond Mach 4.72
 Brown, O’Sullivan, and Zimmerman found it necessary to reject the use of 
traditional ground facilities for hypersonic research because they were “entirely 
inadequate” in accounting for the effects of high temperatures.73  John Becker lat-
er wrote that “much of the work of the new small hypersonic tunnels was viewed 
with extreme skepticism” because they could not simulate the correct tempera-
tures and boundary-layer conditions. The Brown study anticipated there would 
be significant differences between the “hot” aerodynamics of hypersonic flight 
and the “cold” aerodynamics simulated in ground facilities. The study concluded 
that “testing would have to be done in actual flight where the high-temperature 
hypersonic environment would be generated” and recommended extending the 
PARD rocket-model testing technique to much higher speeds. This would also 
mean longer ranges, and the study suggested it might be possible to recover the 
test models in the Sahara Desert of northern Africa.74 
 This was another case of the free-flight-versus-wind-tunnel debate that had 
existed at Langley for years. Ground facilities could not simulate the high-tem-
perature environment at very high Mach numbers, admitted the hypersonics 
specialists, but facilities like the pilot 11-inch hypersonic tunnel at Langley and 
the 10-by-14-inch continuous-flow facility at Ames had proven quite capable of 
performing a “partial simulation.” Selective flight-testing of the final article was 
desirable—just as it always had been—but, for the sake of safety, economy, and 
the systematic parametric investigation of details, the hypersonics specialists ar-
gued that ground-based techniques had to be the primary tools for aerodynamic 
research. Similar debates existed between the wind-tunnel researchers and the 
model-rocket researchers at PARD.75 
 Although Langley had not viewed their May 1952 proposal favorably, in Au-
gust 1953 Drake and Carman wrote a letter to NACA Headquarters calling for a 
five-phase hypersonic research program that would lead to a winged orbital vehi-
cle. Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, the director of the NACA, and John W. “Gus” Crowley, 
the associate director for research at NACA Headquarters, shelved the proposal 
as being too futuristic.76  Nevertheless, in its bold advocacy of a “piggyback” 
two-stage-to-orbit research vehicle, the Drake-Carman report presented one of the 
earliest serious predecessors of the Space Shuttle .
 
72 John V. Becker, “Development of Winged Reentry Vehicles, 953-963,” unpublished, dated 23 May 983, p. 30. 
In the Becker Archives at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Blacksburg, Virginia.
73 Shortal, A New Dimension, p. 208.
7 Becker, “Development of Winged Reentry Vehicles, 953-963,” p. 30. 
75 Hansen, Engineer in Charge, p. 353.
76 Dr. Dryden resigned from the Bureau of Standards to become director of aeronautical research at the NACA in 
97, and two years later became the director of the 8,000-person agency.
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MILITARY SUPPORT
 At the October 1953 meeting of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board 
(SAB) Aircraft Panel, Chairman Clark B. Millikan asked panel members for 
their ideas on future aircraft research and development programs. The panel de-
cided that “the time was ripe” for another cooperative (USAF-NACA) research 
airplane project to further extend the frontiers of flight. Millikan released a 
statement declaring that the feasibility of an advanced manned research aircraft 
“should be looked into.” The panel member from NACA Langley, Robert R . 
Gilruth, would later play an important role in coordinating a consensus between 
the SAB and the NACA .77 
 Contrary to Sänger’s wartime conclusions, by 1954 most experts within the 
NACA and industry agreed that hypersonic flight would not be possible without 
major advances in technology. In particular, the unprecedented problems of aero-
dynamic heating and high-temperature structures appeared to be a potential “bar-
rier” to sustained hypersonic flight. Fortunately, the perceived successes enjoyed 
by the X-planes led to increased political and philosophical support for a more ad-
vanced research aircraft program. The most likely powerplant for the hypersonic 
research airplane was one of the large rocket engines from the missile programs. 
Most researchers now believed that manned hypersonic flight was feasible, but 
it would entail a great deal of research and development. Fortunately, at the time 
there was less emphasis than now on establishing operational requirements prior 
to conducting basic research, and, perhaps even more fortunately, there were no 
large manned space programs that would compete for funding. The time was fi-
nally right.78
 The hypersonic research program most likely originated during a meeting of 
the NACA Interlaboratory Research Airplane Projects Panel held in Washington, 
D.C., on 4–5 February 1954. The panel chair, Hartley A. Soulé, had directed the 
NACA portion of the cooperative USAF-NACA research airplane program since 
1946. In addition to Soulé, the panel consisted of Lawrence A. Clousing from 
Ames, Charles J. Donlan from Langley, William A. Fleming from Lewis, Walter 
C. Williams from the HSFS, and Clotaire Wood from NACA Headquarters. Two 
items on the agenda led almost directly to the call for a new research airplane. The 
first was a discussion concerning Stone’s proposal to use a modified X-2, with the 
panel deciding that the aircraft was too small to provide meaningful hypersonic 
research. The second was a proposal to develop a new thin wing for the Douglas 
D-558-2. This precipitated a discussion on the “advisability of seeking a com-
pletely new research airplane and possible effects on such a proposal on requests 
for major changes to existing research airplanes.” The panel concluded that the 
research utility of the D-558-2 and X-2 was largely at an end, and instead recom-
mended that NACA Headquarters request detailed goals and requirements for an 
 
 
77 The NACA actually had two cooperative efforts under way in the early 950s, and Soulé was involved with both. 
The first was testing the Bell X-, X-2, X-5, etc., in cooperation with the Air Force. The other was testing the 
Douglas D-558 series in cooperation with the Navy.
78 Becker, “The X-5 Program in Retrospect,” p. 2.
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entirely new vehicle from each of the research laboratories. This action was, in 
effect, the initial impetus for what became the X-15.79
 On 15 March 1954, Bob Gilruth sent Clark Millikan a letter emphasizing that 
the major part of the research and development effort over the next decade would 
be “to realize the speeds of the existing research airplanes with useful, reliable, 
and efficient aircraft under operational conditions” (i.e., developing Mach 2–3 
combat aircraft). Gilruth further noted that a “well directed and sizeable effort will 
be required to solve a number of critical problems, by developing new materials, 
methods of structural cooling and insulation, new types of structures, and by ob-
taining a thorough understanding of the aerodynamics involved.” Because many 
of the problems were not then well defined, “design studies should be started 
now for manned research aircraft which can explore many of these factors during 
high-speed flight” and which would be capable of “short excursions into the upper 
atmosphere to permit research on the problems of space flight and reentry.” It was 
a surprising statement.80 
 During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the overwhelming majority of re-
searchers thought very little about manned space flight. Creating a supersonic air-
plane had proven difficult, and many researchers believed that hypersonic flight, 
if feasible at all, would probably be restricted to missiles. Manned space flight, 
with its “multiplicity of enormous technical problems” and “unanswered ques-
tions of safe return” would be “a 21st Century enterprise.”81 
 Within a few years, however, the thinking had changed. By 1954 a growing 
number of American researchers believed that hypersonic flight extending into 
space could be achieved much sooner, although very few of them had the foresight 
to see it coming by 1960. Around this time, the military became involved in sup-
porting hypersonic research and development with a goal of creating new weapons 
systems. During 1952, for example, the Air Force began sponsoring Dornberger’s 
manned hypersonic boost-glide concept at Bell as part of Project BoMi .82  
 BoMi (and subsequently RoBo) advanced the Sänger-Bredt boost-glide 
concept by developing, for the first time, a detailed thermal-protection concept. 
Non-load-bearing, flexible, metallic radiative heat shields (“shingles”) and wa-
ter-cooled, leading-edge structures protected the wings, while passive and active 
cooling systems controlled the cockpit temperature. NACA researchers, including 
the Brown study group, read the periodic progress reports of the Bell study—clas-
sified Secret by the Air Force—with great interest. Although most were skeptical, 
79 Minutes of the Meeting, Interlaboratory Research Airplane Projects Panel, NACA headquarters, -5 February 
95; letter, John W. Crowley to distribution, subject: Request for comments on possible new research airplane, 
9 March 95. The Research Airplane Projects Panel was formed by NACA Associate Director for Research Gus 
Crowley in September 98 to coordinate the efforts of Ames, Langley, Lewis, Wallops Island, and the HSFS. 
Each laboratory reported quarterly to the panel detailing what research was being performed in support of each 
specific airplane, and the outcome of the research. The panel met in formal session annually. This was different 
from the Research Airplane Program Committee headed by Langley’s John Stack, which included representatives 
from the Army Air Forces and the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics.
80 Letter, Robert R. Gilruth to Dr. Clark B. Millikan, subject: Air Force Research and Development Effort for the Next 
Decade in the Field of the Aircraft Panel, 5 March 95. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research Agency. 
John Becker remembers that at the time the consensus was that “space” began where the dynamic pressure 
was less than one pound per square foot. See the interview of John V. Becker by J. D. Hunley, 3 October 2000, 
written transcript in the files at the DFRC History Office.
8 Becker, “Development of Winged Reentry Vehicles, 953-963.” 
82 BoMi was an acronym for “Bomber-Missile,” and RoBo stood for “Rocket-Bomber.” Both would be consolidated 
into the HYWARDS program that later evolved into the Boeing X-20 Dyna-Soar.
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a few thought that the project just might work. The Air Force would also fund 
similar studies by other contractors, particularly Convair and, later, Boeing.83  
 In response to the recommendation of the Research Airplane Projects Pan-
el, NACA Headquarters asked its field installations to explore the requirements 
for a possible hypersonic research aircraft. Based on the concerns of the 1952 
Langley study group, as well as data from Bell regarding BoMi research, it was 
obvious that a primary goal of any new research airplane would be to provide 
information about high-temperature aerodynamics and structures. The missile 
manufacturers concurred.84 
 In response to NACA Headquarters’ request, all of the NACA laboratories set 
up small ad hoc study groups during March 1954. A comparison of the work of 
these different NACA groups is interesting because of their different approaches 
and findings. The Ames group concerned itself solely with suborbital long-range 
flight and ended up favoring a military-type air-breathing (rather than rocket-
powered) aircraft in the Mach 4–5 range. The HSFS suggested a larger, higher-
powered conventional configuration generally similar to the Bell X-1 or Douglas 
D-558-1 research airplanes. The staff at Lewis questioned the need for a piloted 
airplane at all, arguing that ground studies and the PARD rocket-model operation 
could provide all of the necessary hypersonic information at much less cost and 
risk. Lewis researchers believed that possible military applications had unduly 
burdened previous research airplane programs, and there was no reason to think 
anything different would happen in this case.85 
 On the other hand, Langley chose to investigate the problem based largely 
on the hypersonic research it had been conducting since the end of World War II. 
After the 11-inch hypersonic tunnel became operational in 1947, a group headed 
by Charles McLellan began conducting limited hypersonic research. This group, 
which reported to John Becker, who was now the chief of the Aero-Physics Divi-
sion, provided verification of several newly developed hypersonic theories while 
it investigated phenomena such as the shock–boundary-layer interaction. Langley 
also organized a parallel exploratory program into materials and structures opti-
mized for hypersonic flight. Perhaps not surprisingly, Langley decided to deter-
mine the feasibility of a hypersonic aircraft capable of a 2- to 3-minute excursion 
out of the atmosphere to create a brief period of weightlessness in order to explore 
the effects of space flight. Hugh Dryden would later liken this excursion to the 
leap of a fish out of water, and coined a new term: space leap .86  
  
 
83 Becker, “Development of Winged Reentry Vehicles, 953-963.” The quotes are Becker’s recollections of how 
other engineers felt at the time, not his personal feelings on the subjects.
8 John E. Duberg, “Remarks on the Charts Presenting the Structural Aspect of the Proposed Research Airplane,” 
9 July 95. In the files at the NASA History Office.
85 Letter, Floyd L. Thompson/Langley to NACA, 3 May 95, enclosing a copy of a memo from John V. Becker titled 
“Research Airplane Study;” letter, HSFS to NACA, 5 May 95, enclosing an informal report titled “Suggested 
Requirements for a New Research Airplane”; letter, Ames to NACA, no subject, 7 May 95; memorandum from 
Lewis/Associate Director to NACA, 7 May 95 (actually written 27 April 95); Hansen, Engineer in Charge, p. 
357. According to Hard D. Wallace, Jr., Wallops Station and the Creation of an American Space Program, NASA 
publication SP-3 (Washington, DC: NASA, 997) p. 9, note : “Note that unlike the earlier X-series aircraft, 
no models of the X-5 appear to have been tested at Wallops.”
86 Letter, John V. Becker to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 June 999; Becker, “Development of Winged Reentry Vehicles, 
953-963,” p. 30. 
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 Langley’s ad hoc hypersonic aircraft study group consisted of John Becker 
(chairman); Maxime A. Faget,87  a specialist in rocket propulsion from the Perfor-
mance Aerodynamics Branch of PARD; Thomas A. Toll, a control specialist from 
the Stability Research Division; Norris F. Dow, a hot-structures expert from the 
Structures Research Division; and test pilot James B. Whitten. Unlike the earlier 
Brown study group, this group intentionally included researchers with previous 
experience in hypersonics.88
 The group reached a consensus on the objectives of a hypersonic research 
aircraft by the end of its first month of study. Although one of the original goals 
was to investigate the effects of weightlessness, the members soon realized “that 
the problems of attitude control in space and the transition from airless flight to 
atmospheric flight during reentry were at least equally significant.” The group 
also began to consider the dynamics of the reentry maneuvers and the associated 
problems of stability, control, and heating as the most pressing research need. 
However, another objective would come to dominate virtually every other aspect 
of the aircraft’s design: research into the related fields of high-temperature aero-
87 Max Faget would be instrumental in the mid-to-late 960s in defining the configuration of the Space Shuttle orbiter.
88 Letter, John V. Becker to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 June 999; Hansen, Engineer in Charge, p. 357.
Three men that played important parts in the X-15 program. On the right is Walter C. Williams, the head of  
the High-Speed Flight Station and a member of  the Research Airplane Projects panel that guided the X-15 
through its formative stages. In the middle, Hugh L. Dryden, the Director of  the NACA. At left is Paul F. 
Bikle, who came late to the X-15, but guided it through most of  its flight program as the director of  the Flight 
Research Center. (NASA)
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dynamics and high-temperature structures. Thus, it would become the first aircraft 
in which aero-thermo-structural considerations constituted the primary research 
problem, as well as the primary research objective.89
 Eventually, Becker and the group selected a goal of Mach 7, noting that this 
would permit investigation of “extremely wide ranges of operating and heating 
conditions.” By contrast, a Mach 10 vehicle “would require a much greater ex-
penditure of time and effort” yet “would add little in the fields of stability, control, 
piloting problems, and structural heating.” Considering that no human had yet 
approached Mach 3, even Mach 7 seemed a stretch.90
 By the end of April 1954, Becker’s group had completed a tentative design 
for a winged aircraft and an outline of proposed experiments. The group kept the 
configuration as conventional as possible to minimize the need for special low-
speed and transonic developments without compromising its adequacy as a hy-
personic, aerodynamic, and structural research vehicle. However, acknowledging 
what would become a continuing issue; the group did not consider any of the large 
rocket engines then under development entirely satisfactory for the airplane. In the 
absence of the rapid development of a new engine, the group hoped a combination 
of three or four smaller rocket motors could provide hypersonic velocities.91
 At this point Floyd Thompson, by now the associate director at Langley, in-
fluenced the direction of the Becker study. He made a suggestion that echoed John 
Stack’s 1945 recommendation that the Bell XS-1 transonic research airplane use 
a 12% thick wing that would force it to encounter the compressibility efforts that 
aerodynamicists were most interested in studying. Since the hypersonic airplane 
would be the first in which aero-thermal-structural considerations constituted the 
primary research problem, Thompson argued that the aim of the aircraft “should 
be to penetrate as deeply as possible into the region of [high aerodynamic] heat-
ing and to seek fresh design approaches rather than makeshift modifications to 
conventional designs.” His suggestion became policy.92 
 Wind-tunnel testing began in mid-1954 and continued through the end of 
1955 using the basic Becker design. David E. Fetterman, Jr., Jim A. Penland, and 
Herbert W. Ridyard led the tests, mainly using the 11-inch tunnel at Langley. The 
researchers noted that previous hypersonic designs had “been restricted mainly to 
missile types which were not required to be able to land and which, therefore, had 
relatively small wings or wings of very low aspect ratio.” The researchers concen-
trated on extrapolating existing data to the Becker design while making sure the 
concept would be acceptable for a manned aircraft, including the ability to land.93 
89 Letter, John V. Becker to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 June 999.
90 Letter, Floyd L. Thompson/Langley to NACA, 3 May 95, enclosing a copy of a memo from John V. Becker titled 
“Research Airplane Study.” The quotes are from the attached memo.
9 Although it had always been assumed that air-drop would be the preferred launch method, the original “Research 
Airplane Study” did not specifically mention any launch method.
92 Letter, John V. Becker to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 June 999; Hansen, Engineer in Charge, p. 357.
93 A variety of reports came from these tests. See, for example, Jim A. Penland et al., “Lift, Drag, and Static Lon-
gitudinal Stability Data from an Exploratory Investigation at a Mach Number of 6.86 of an Airplane Configuration 
Having a Wing of Trapezoidal Plan Form,” NACA research memorandum L5L03b, 8 January 955; Herbert 
W. Ridyard et al., NACA research memorandum L55A2a, “Static Lateral Stability Data from an Exploratory In-
vestigation at a Mach Number of 6.86 of an Airplane Configuration Having a Wing of Trapezoidal Plan Form,” 5 
February 955; Jim A. Penland et al., “Static Longitudinal and lateral Stability and Control Characteristics of an 
Airplane Configuration Having a Wing of Trapezoidal Plan Form with Various Tail Airfoil Sections and Tail Arrange-
ments at a Mach Number of 6.86,” NACA research memorandum L55F7, 5 August 955.
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 One particular feature, however, differed from later concepts. The initial 
wind-tunnel tests used a design that incorporated relatively large leading-edge 
radii for both the wing and vertical stabilizer. The large radii were believed nec-
essary to keep the heat transfer rates within feasible limits. Eventually the re-
searchers discovered the beneficial effects of a leading-edge sweep and found 
materials capable of withstanding higher temperatures. These allowed smaller 
radii, resulting in less drag and generally better aerodynamic characteristics. Al-
though the baseline design changed as a result, by this time the researchers were 
concentrating on evaluating various empennage configurations and elected not to 
change the wing design on the wind-tunnel models to avoid invalidating previ-
ous results .94
 While performing the original heating analysis of the proposed reentry from 
the “space leap,” Becker and Peter F . Korycinski from the Compressibility Re-
search Division ran head-on into a major technical problem. At Mach 7, reentry 
at low angles of attack appeared impossible because of disastrous heating loads. 
In addition, the dynamic pressures quickly exceeded, by large margins, the limit 
of 1,000 pounds per square foot (psf) set by structural demands. New tests of the 
force relationships in the 11-inch tunnel provided Becker and Korycinski with a 
surprising solution to this problem: if the angle of attack and the associated drag 
were increased, deceleration would begin at a higher altitude. Slowing down in 
the thinner (lower-density) atmosphere made the heat-transfer problem much less 
severe . In other words, Becker and Korycinski surmised, by forcing decelera-
tion to occur sooner, the increased drag associated with the high angle of attack 
would significantly reduce the aircraft’s exposure to peak dynamic pressure and 
high heating rates. Thus, by using “sufficient lift,” the Langley researchers found 
a way to limit the heat loads and heating rates of reentry. Interestingly, this is the 
same rationale used 15 years later by Max Faget when he designed his MSC-002 
(DC-3) space shuttle concept at the Manned Spacecraft Center .95 
 On reflection, it became clear to the Becker group that the sufficient-lift con-
cept was a “new manifestation” of Allen’s blunt-body theory and was as appli-
cable to high-lift winged reentry as to the non-lifting missile warheads studied at 
Ames during 1952. As the group increased the angle of attack to dissipate more 
of the kinetic energy through heating of the atmosphere (and less in the form 
of frictional heating of the vehicle itself), the configuration became increasingly 
“blunt.” Some form of speed brakes, again in accord with Allen’s concept, could 
increase drag and further ease the heating problem.96
 Throughout 1954 the heating problems of high-lift, high-drag reentry came 
under increasing scrutiny from key Langley researchers. However, another prob-
lem soon outweighed the heating consideration: making the configuration stable 
and controllable at the proposed high-angle-of-attack reentry attitude. Because 
they were venturing into a new flight regime, the researchers could not determine 
9 Penland, “Static Longitudinal and Lateral Stability and Control Characteristics.”
95 Unpublished paper, “-Inch Tunnel Contributions to the X-5,” no author (probably Becker), no date. In the 
Becker Archives at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Blacksburg, Virginia; Becker, “Development of Winged Reentry 
Vehicles, 953-963,” p. 0. For a detailed look at Faget’s design, including some of his rationale for slowing 
down at high altitude, see Dennis R. Jenkins, Space Shuttle: The History of the National Space Transportation 
System – The First 100 Missions (North Branch, MN: Specialty Press, 200), pp. 02-08.
96 Hansen, Engineer in Charge, p. 359.
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the exact hypersonic control properties of such a configuration. Nor were they 
certain they could devise a structure that would survive the anticipated 2,000°F 
equilibrium temperatures.97 
 The HSFS had forewarned Langley about potential hypersonic stability 
problems. In December 1953, Air Force Major Chuck Yeager had pushed the Bell 
X-1A far beyond its expected speed range. As the aircraft approached Mach 2.5, 
it developed uncontrollable lateral oscillations that nearly proved disastrous.98 
While Yeager frantically tried to regain control, the airplane tumbled for over 
a minute, losing nearly 10 miles of altitude. At subsonic speed, the aircraft fi-
nally entered a conventional spin from which Yeager managed to recover. This 
incident led to a systematic reinvestigation of the stability characteristics of the 
X-1A. By mid-1954, findings indicated that the problem that had almost killed 
Yeager was the loss of effectiveness of the X-1A’s thin-section horizontal and 
vertical stabilizers at high speed. The HSFS was not equipped to conduct basic 
research into solutions, but it coordinated with Langley in an attempt to over-
come this problem. At the same time, Langley and the HSFS began investigating 
the inertial-coupling phenomenon encountered by the North American F-100A 
Super Sabre .99  
 The Becker group faced a potential stability problem that was several times 
more severe than that of the X-1A. Preliminary calculations based on data from 
X-1A wind-tunnel tests indicated that the hypersonic configuration would require 
a vertical stabilizer the size of one of the X-1’s wings to maintain directional 
stability—something that was obviously impractical. Stumped by this problem, 
Becker sought the advice of his 11-inch hypersonic tunnel researchers. The con-
sensus, reached by wind-tunnel testing and evaluating high-speed data from ear-
lier X-planes, was that an extremely large vertical stabilizer was required if the 
thin-section stabilizers then in vogue for supersonic aircraft were used. This was 
largely because of a rapid loss in the lift-curve slope of thin airfoil sections as 
the Mach number increased. In a radical departure, however, Charles McLellan 
suggested using a thicker wedge-shaped section with a blunt trailing edge. Some 
time before, McLellan had conducted a study of the influence of airfoil shape 
on normal-force characteristics, and his findings had been lying dormant in the 
NACA literature. Calculations based on these findings indicated that at Mach 7 the 
wedge shape “should prove many times more effective than the conventional thin 
shapes optimum for the lower speed.” By modifying the proposed configuration 
 
 
97 John V. Becker, “The X-5 Project, Part I: Origins and Research Background,” Astronautics and Aeronautics, 
February 96, p. 56; letter, John V. Becker to Dennis R. Jenkins, 29 July 2002. The temperatures in the bound-
ary layer at Mach 7 exceed 3,000°F. The 2,000°F “equilibrium” temperature is the surface temperature of the 
underside of the wing where heat loss due to radiation away from the surface balances the imposed heating. 
Although the angle of attack was between  and 26 degrees, the reentry flight path was generally around –32 
degrees, meaning that the airplane was actually flying between 2 and 6 degrees nose-down. 
98 The wind-tunnel tests of the X-A had extended only to Mach 2.
99 Arthur Henderson, Jr., “Wind Tunnel Investigation of the Static Longitudinal and Lateral Stability of the Bell X-A 
at Supersonic Speeds,” NACA research memorandum L55I23, October 955; and Hubert M. Drake and Wendell 
H. Stillman, “Behaviors of the X-A Research Airplane During Exploratory Flights at Mach Numbers Near 2.0 and 
at Extreme Altitudes,” NACA research memorandum H55G26, October 955; Herman O. Ankenbruck and Ches-
ter H. Wolowicz, “Lateral Motions Encountered With the Douglas D-558-2 All-Rocket Research Airplane During 
Exploratory Flights to a Mach Number of 2.0,” NACA research memorandum H5I27, December 95.
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to include the wedge-shaped vertical stabilizer, McLellan believed that a reason-
ably sized vertical stabilizer could correct most directional instability.100
 A new series of experiments in the 11-inch tunnel verified that a vertical sta-
bilizer with a 10-degree wedge angle would allow the proposed aircraft to achieve 
the range of attitudes required by heating considerations for a safe high-drag, 
high-lift reentry. Further, it might be possible to use a variable-wedge vertical sta-
bilizer as a means of restoring the lift-curve slope at high speeds, thus permitting 
much smaller surfaces that would be easier to design and would impose a smaller 
drag penalty at lower speeds. McLellan calculated that this wedge shape should 
eliminate the disastrous directional stability decay encountered by the X-1A.101 
 Becker’s group also included speed brakes as part of the vertical stabilizers 
to reduce the Mach number and heating during reentry. Interestingly, the speed 
brakes originally proposed by Langley consisted of a split trailing edge; very sim-
ilar to the one eventually used on the space shuttles. As the speed brakes opened, 
they effectively increased the included angle of the wedge-shaped vertical stabi-
00 Becker, “The X-5 Project, Part I,” p. 56. Charles H. McLellan had outlined the findings of his original study in an 
“Investigation of the Aerodynamic Characteristics of Wings and Bodies at a Mach Number of 6.9,” a paper pre-
sented at an NACA conference on supersonic aerodynamics held at Ames in early 950. A version of this paper 
appeared in the October 950 edition of the Journal of the Aeronautical Sciences, volume 8, number 0, pp. 
6-68. In 963 McLellan received a $2,000 award for the development of “wedge tails for hypersonic aircraft” 
under Section 306 of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 958 (see Jane Van Nimmen and Leonard C. 
Bruno with Robert L. Rosholt, NASA Historical Data Book Volume I: NASA Resources 1958-1968, NASA publica-
tion SP-02, Washington, DC, 988, p. 556).
0 Charles H. McLellan, “A Method for Increasing the Effectiveness of Stabilizing Surfaces at High Supersonic Mach 
Numbers,” NACA research memorandum L5F2, August 95.
Charles H. McLellan at NACA Langley, one of  the researchers that defined much of  the X-15 configura-
tion, proposed the use of  a split training edge on the vertical stabilizer to form speed brakes. Perhaps even more 
importantly, these could also be opened to form a variable-wedge vertical stabilizer as a means of  restoring the 
lift-curve slope at high speeds, thus permitting much smaller surfaces that were easier to design and imposed a 
smaller drag penalty at lower speeds. The ultimate X-15 configuration did not incorporate the split trailing 
edge, but the much-later space shuttles did. (NASA)
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lizer, and variable deflection of the wedge surfaces made it possible to change the 
braking effect and stability derivatives through a wide range. The flexibility this 
made possible could be of great value because a primary use of the airplane would 
be to study stability, control, and handling characteristics through a wide range of 
speeds and altitudes. Furthermore, the ability to reenter in a high-drag condition 
with a large wedge angle greatly extended the range of attitudes for reentry that 
were permissible in view of heating considerations.102
 Up until this time, the designers of supersonic aircraft had purposely located 
the horizontal stabilizer well outside potential flow interference from the wings. 
This usually resulted in the horizontal stabilizer being located partway up the 
vertical stabilizer, or in some cases (the F-104, for example) on top of the verti-
cal stabilizer. However, researchers at the HSFS suspected that this location was 
making it difficult, or at times impossible, for aircraft to recover from divergent 
maneuvers. The same investigations at Langley that verified the effectiveness of 
the wedge-shape also suggested that an X-shaped empennage would help the air-
craft to recover from divergent maneuvers.103
 The Becker group recognized that the change from a conventional “+” em-
pennage to the “X” configuration would present at least one major new problem: 
the X-shape empennage projected into the high downwash regions above and 
below the wing plane, causing a potentially serious loss of longitudinal effec-
tiveness. Researchers at Langley looked for solutions to this new problem. By 
late 1954 they had an unexpected answer: locate a conventional “+” horizontal 
stabilizer in the plane of the wing, between the regions of highest downwash. 
This eliminated the need to use an X-shaped empennage, allowing a far more 
conventional tail section and control surfaces .104 
 Although it would come and go from the various preliminary designs, the use 
of a ventral stabilizer was beginning to gain support. Charles McLellan observed, 
“At high angles of attack, the effectiveness of the upper and lower vertical stabi-
lizers were markedly different. Effectiveness of the upper tail decreases to zero 
at about 20 degrees angle of attack. The lower tail exhibits a marked increase in 
effectiveness because of its penetration into the region of high dynamic pressure 
produced by the compression side of the wing. Assuming the wing is a flat plate 
and the flow is two-dimensional, the dynamic pressure below the wing increases 
with angle of attack. Since only a part of the lower tail is immersed in this region 
its gain in effectiveness is, of course, less rapid, but the gain more than offsets the 
loss in effectiveness of the upper tail.”105
  
02 John V. Becker, “Review of the Technology Relating to the X-5 Project,” a paper presented at the NACA Confer-
ence on the Progress of the X-5 Project, Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 25-26 October 956, pp. -5.
03 McLellan, “A Method for Increasing the Effectiveness of Stabilizing Surfaces at High Supersonic Mach Numbers.” 
0 Becker, “The X-5 Project, Part I: Origins and Research Background,” p. 56-57. Downwash is a small velocity 
component in the downward direction that is associated with the production of lift, as well as a small component 
of drag. At hypersonic speed, the flow behind a wing is characterized by a shock pattern. Immediately behind the 
shock is a region of high dynamic pressure and high downwash, which intersected the lower tail surfaces of the 
original X-tail concept. The upper tails were in a region of low dynamic pressure and low downwash. This situation 
had the adverse effect of greatly increasing the yaw (or side-to-side movement) of the lower tails relative to the 
upper tails, causing directional instability. See McLellan, “A Method for Increasing the Effectiveness of Stabilizing 
Surfaces at High Supersonic Mach Numbers.” 
05 McLellan, “A Method for Increasing the Effectiveness of Stabilizing Surfaces at High Supersonic Mach Numbers.” 
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 On the structural front, the Becker study evaluated two basic design ap-
proaches. In the first, a layer of assumed insulation protected a conventional low-
temperature aluminum or stainless steel structure. The alternative was an exposed 
“hot structure.” This design approach and the materials used permitted high struc-
tural temperatures without insulation.106
 Analysis of the heating projections for various trajectories showed that the 
airplane would need to accommodate equilibrium temperatures of over 2,000°F 
on its lower surface. Unfortunately, no known insulating technique could meet 
this requirement. Bell was toying with a “double-wall” concept in which a high-
temperature outer shell and a layer of insulator would protect the underlying low-
temperature structure. This concept would later undergo extensive development, 
and several contractors proposed it during the X-15 competition, but in 1954 it 
was in an embryonic state and not applicable to the critical nose and leading-edge 
regions. However, the Becker group believed that the possibility of local failure 
of any insulation scheme constituted a serious hazard, as was later tragically 
demonstrated on the Space Shuttle Columbia. Finally, the problem of accurately 
measuring heat-transfer rates—one of the primary objectives of the new research 
 
 
06 Becker, “The X-5 Project, Part I: Origins and Research Background,” p. 56-57. These same trade studies would 
be repeated many times during the concept definition for the Space Shuttle.
Surprisingly, the temperatures expected on the high-altitude “space leap” were significantly higher 
than for the basic hypersonic research flights. Establishing a design that could withstand the 2,000°F 
equilibrium temperature was a challenge, and ultimately resulted in the hot-structure concept shown on 
the lower line of  this chart. (NASA)
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aircraft program—would be substantially more difficult to accomplish with an 
insulated structure .107  
 At the start of the study, it was by no means obvious that the hot-struc-
ture approach would prove practical either. The permissible design temperature 
for the best available material was about 1,200°F, which was far below the esti-
mated equilibrium temperature of 2,000°F. It was clear that some form of heat 
dissipation—either direct internal cooling or absorption into the structure it-
self—would be necessary. It was thought that either solution would bring a heavy 
weight penalty.
 The availability of Inconel X and its exceptional strength at extremely high 
temperatures made it, almost by default, the structural material preferred by Lang-
ley for a hot-structure design.108 In mid-1954, Norris Dow began an analysis of 
an Inconel X structure while other researchers conducted a thermal analysis. In a 
happy coincidence, the results showed that the skin thickness needed to withstand 
the expected aerodynamic stresses was about the same as that needed to absorb the 
thermal load. This meant that it was possible to solve the structural problem for this 
transient condition of the Mach 7 research aircraft with no serious weight penalty 
for heat absorption . This was an unexpected plus for the hot structure. Together 
with the fact that none of the perceived difficulties of an insulated-type structure 
(particularly the difficulty of studying structural temperatures) were present, this 
led the study group to decide in favor of an uninsulated hot-structure design. 
 Unfortunately, it later proved that the hot structure had problems of its own, 
especially in the area of non-uniform temperature distribution. Detailed thermal 
analyses revealed that large temperature differences would develop between the 
upper and lower wing skins during the pull-up portions of certain trajectories, 
resulting in intolerable thermal stresses in a conventional structural design. To 
solve this new problem, researchers devised wing shear members that did not 
resist unequal expansion of the wing skins. The wing thus was essentially free 
to deform both span-wise and chord-wise with asymmetrical heating. Although 
this solved the problem for gross thermal stresses, localized thermal-stress prob-
lems still existed near the stringer attachments. The study indicated, however, that 
proper selection of stringer proportions and spacing would produce an acceptable 
design that would be free of thermal buckling.109 
 The analyses produced other concerns as well. Differential heating of the 
wing leading edge resulted in changes to the natural torsional frequency of the 
wing unless the design used some sort of flexible expansion joint. The hot leading 
edge expanded faster than the remaining structure, introducing a compression that 
destabilized the section as a whole and reduced its torsional stiffness. To negate 
these phenomena, researchers segmented and flexibly mounted the leading edge 
to reduce thermally induced buckling and bending. Similar techniques found use 
on the horizontal and vertical stabilizers. 
07 Ibid. Possible insulators included water, several different liquid metals, air, and various fibrous batt materials. The 
liquids would require active pumps and large reservoirs, making them exceptionally heavy concepts. 
08 Inconel X® is a temperature-resistant alloy whose name is a registered trademark of Huntington Alloy Products 
Division, International Nickel Company, Huntington, West Virginia. It is, for all intents, an exotic stainless steel. 
Inconel X is 72.5% nickel, 5% chromium, and % columbium, with iron making up most of the balance.
09 Becker, “The X-5 Project, Part I: Origins and Research Background,” p. 57-58. 
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 Perhaps more worrisome was the question of potential propulsion systems. 
The most promising configuration was found to be four General Electric A1 or A3 
rocket engines, due primarily to the “thrust stepping” this configuration provid-
ed .110  At the time, rocket engines could not be throttled (even today, most rocket 
engines cannot be). Several different techniques can be used to throttle a rocket 
engine, and each takes its toll in mechanical complexity and reliability. However, 
a crude method of throttling did not actually involve changing the output of the 
engine, but rather igniting or extinguishing various numbers of small engines. 
For instance, in a cluster of three 5,000-lbf engines, the available thrust levels 
(or “steps”) would be 5,000, 10,000, and 15,000 lbf. Since most rocket engines 
were not restartable (again, the concept adds considerable mechanical complexity 
to the engine), once an engine was extinguished it could not be restarted. Thrust 
 
 
 
0 The General Electric A and A3 engines powered the Hermes A-3, also designated XSSM-A-6, which was designed 
as a tactical surface-to-surface missile capable of carrying a ,000-pound warhead 50 miles. Project Hermes was 
the first major U.S. ballistic missile program. It encompassed several different configurations and tested both liquid 
and solid-fuel rockets, and ramjet propulsion systems. Hermes began in 9 as an Army effort to study the German 
V-2 rocket. The project soon led to hardware development, and the first of five Hermes A-s was launched at the 
White Sands Proving Grounds on 9 May 950. The program was canceled on 3 December 95.
Langley evaluated many materials for the proposed hypersonic research airplane, but the availability of  
Inconel X and its exceptional strength at extremely high temperatures, made it, almost by default, the 
preferred material for a hot-structure design. Coincidently, the researchers at NACA Langley discov-
ered that the skin thickness needed to withstand aerodynamic stress was about the same as the amount 
of  structure needed to absorb the thermal load from the high-altitude mission. (NASA)
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stepping or throttling allowed a much more refined flight profile, and largely de-
fined the propulsion concept for the eventual X-15.111
 At this stage of the study, the vehicle concept itself was “little more than an 
object of about the right general proportions and the correct propulsive character-
istics” to achieve hypersonic flight. However, in developing the general require-
ments, the Langley group envisioned a conceptual research aircraft that would 
serve as a model for the eventual X-15. The vehicle they conceived was “not 
proposed as a prototype of any of the particular concepts in vogue in 1954…[but] 
rather as a general tool for manned hypersonic flight research, able to penetrate 
the new regime briefly, safely, and without the burdens, restrictions, and delays 
imposed by operational requirements other than research.” 112
 Although the Becker group was making excellent progress, their continued 
investigation of the “space leap” caused considerable controversy. The study 
called for two distinct research profiles. The first–the basic hypersonic research 
flights—consisted of a variety of constant angle-of-attack, constant-altitude 
flights to investigate aero-thermodynamic characteristics. However, the second 
flight profile explored the problems of future space flight, including investigations 
into “high-lift and low-L/D [lift over drag] during the reentry pull-up maneuver.” 
Researchers recognized that this was one of the principal problems for manned 
space flight from both a heating and piloting perspective.113
 This brought yet more concerns: “As the speed increases, an increasingly 
large portion of the aircraft’s weight is borne by centrifugal force until, at satellite 
velocity, no aerodynamic lift is needed and the aircraft may be operated com-
pletely out of the atmosphere. At these speeds the pilot must be able to function 
for long periods in a weightless condition, which is of considerable concern from 
the aeromedical standpoint.” By employing a high-altitude ballistic trajectory to 
roughly 250,000 feet, the Becker group expected that the pilot would operate in 
an essentially weightless condition for approximately 2 minutes. Attitude control 
was another problem since traditional aerodynamic control surfaces would be use-
less at very high altitudes. To solve this problem, the group proposed using small 
hydrogen-peroxide thrusters for attitude control outside the sensible atmosphere.
 While the hypersonic research aspect of the Langley proposal enjoyed virtu-
ally unanimous support, it is interesting to note that in 1954 most researchers 
viewed the space-flight aspect with, at best, cautious tolerance. There were few 
who believed that any space flight was imminent, and most believed that manned 
space flight in particular would not be achieved until many decades in the future, 
probably not until the 21st century. For instance, John Becker remembers that 
even the usually far-sighted John Stack was “not really interested in the reen-
try problem or in space flight in general.” Several researchers opined that the 
 
 Thrust stepping was not a new idea. The XLR used on the X- and other early X-planes had four “chambers” 
that could be started and extinguished individually. This allowed the thrust to be tailored for any given flight to 
one of four levels. There was an ongoing effort to develop a throttleable engine for the Bell X-2 research airplane. 
Originally assigned to Bell, the contract was moved to Curtiss-Wright. The resulting engine was the XLR25-CW-
 which was continuously variable from 2,500 to 5,000 lbf. Unfortunately, the engine fell significantly behind 
schedule and proved to be unsatisfactory.
2 Becker, “The X-5 Program in Retrospect,” p. 2.
3 Ibid.
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space-flight research was premature and recommended it be eliminated. Fortu-
nately, it remained.114
 Langley’s work throughout 1954 demonstrated one thing: the need for flex-
ibility. Since their inceptions, the Brown and Becker groups had run into one 
technical problem after another in the pursuit of a conceptual hypersonic aircraft 
capable of making a space leap. Conventional wisdom had provided experimental 
and theoretical guidance for the preliminary design of the configuration, but had 
fallen far short of giving final answers. Contemporary transonic and supersonic 
aircraft designs dictated that the horizontal stabilizer should be located far above 
or well below the wing plane, for example, but that was wrong. Ballistics experts 
committed to pointy-nosed missiles had continued to doubt the worth of Allen’s 
blunt-body concept, but they too were wrong. Conversely, the instincts of Floyd 
Thompson, who knew very little about hypersonics but was a 30-year veteran of 
the vicissitudes of aeronautical research, had been sound. The design and research 
requirements of a hypersonic vehicle that could possibly fly into space were so 
radically new and different, Thompson suggested, that only “fresh approaches” 
could meet them. He was correct.
A CONVINCING CASE
 After three months of investigations, the Becker group believed that the devel-
opment of a Mach 7 research aircraft was feasible. Those at NACA Headquarters 
who followed the progress of their work, as well as the parallel work on hypersonic 
aircraft concepts at the other NACA laboratories, agreed. It was time to formally 
present the results to the NACA upper echelon and the Department of Defense.115
 The preliminary specifications for the research airplane were surprisingly 
brief: only four pages of requirements, plus six additional pages of supporting 
data . As John Becker subsequently observed, “it was obviously impossible that 
the proposed aircraft be in any sense an optimum hypersonic configuration.” Nev-
ertheless, Langley believed the design would work. At the same time, a new sense 
of urgency was present: “As the need for the exploratory data is acute because of 
the rapid advance of the performance of service [military] aircraft, the minimum 
practical and reliable airplane is required in order that the development and con-
struction time be kept to a minimum.” In other versions of the requirements, this 
was even more specific: “It shall be possible to design and construct the airplane 
within 3 years.” The researchers were nothing if not ambitious.116  
 On 4 May 1954, Hugh Dryden sent a letter to Lieutenant General Donald L . 
Putt at Air Force Headquarters stating that the NACA wanted to initiate a new 
manned hypersonic research aircraft program. The letter suggested a meeting 
between the NACA, Air Force Headquarters, and the Air Force Scientific Advi-
 Hugh L. Dryden, “Toward the New Horizons of Tomorrow,” st von Kármán Lecture, Astronautics, January 963; 
James R. Hansen, Spaceflight Revolution: NASA Langley Research Center from Sputnik to Apollo, NASA publica-
tion SP-308 (Washington DC: NASA, 995), p. 98.
5 Letter, Hartley A. Soulé to NACA, no subject, 3 June 95.
6 Becker, “The X-5 Program in Retrospect,” p. 2; “Preliminary Outline Specification for High-Altitude, High-Speed 
Research Airplane,” NACA Langley, 5 October 95; “General Requirements for a New Research Airplane,” 
NACA Langley,  October 95.
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sory Board to discuss the project. Putt responded favorably and recommended 
inviting the Navy as well. The general also noted that “the Scientific Advisory 
Board has done some thinking in this area and has formally recommended that 
the Air Force initiate action on such a program.” On 11 June 1954, Dryden sent 
letters to the Air Force and Navy inviting them to a meeting on 9 July 1954 at 
NACA Headquarters.117 
 Attendees included Clark Millikan, Ezra Kotcher from the WADC, and a 
variety of Air Force and Navy technical representatives. The Air Research and 
Development Command (ARDC) and Air Force Headquarters also sent policy 
representatives. During the meeting, Hartley Soulé and Walt Williams reviewed 
the history of previous research airplanes. Hugh Dryden reported the reasons why 
the NACA believed a new research aircraft was desirable, and said the time had 
come to determine whether an agreement existed on the objectives and scope of 
such a project. Dryden emphasized the need for information on full-scale struc-
tural heating and on stability and control issues at high speeds and high altitudes. 
He also indicated that the NACA thought that actual flight-testing combined with 
theoretical studies and wind-tunnel experiments produced the best results. The 
Langley study became the starting point for further discussions since it was the 
most detailed available, with John Becker and John Duberg, who was substituting 
for Norris Dow, leading the discussions.118  
 Those in attendance were in general agreement that a new project was fea-
sible . However, Hugh Dryden, reflecting what John Becker described as “his 
natural conservatism,” stated that the fact it was feasible to build such a research 
airplane did not necessarily make it worth building; he wanted further study be-
fore deciding. The Navy representative indicated that some “military objective” 
should be included in the program, but Clark Millikan stressed the need for a 
dedicated research airplane rather than any sort of tactical prototype. The group 
agreed the performance parameters discussed by the Langley study represented 
an adequate increment over existing research airplanes, and that a cooperative 
program would be more cost-effective and more likely to provide better research 
data at an earlier time. The meeting closed with an agreement that the military 
would continue studying the NACA proposal, and that Hugh Dryden would seek 
Department of Defense approval for the project.119  
 
7 Letter, Hugh L. Dryden to USAF Headquarters, no subject,  May 95; letter, Lieutenant General Donald L. Putt 
to Dryden, no subject, 26 May 95; letter, Hugh L. Dryden to USAF Headquarters (invitation),  June 95; 
letter, Hugh L. Dryden to Navy Bureau of Aeronautics (invitation),  June 95. Donald L. Putt (905-988) 
was a career U.S. Air Force officer who specialized in the management of aerospace research and development 
activities. Trained as an engineer, he entered the Army Air Corps in 928 and worked in a series in increasingly 
responsible posts at the Air Materiel Command and Air Force Headquarters. From 98 until 952 he was direc-
tor of research and development for the Air Force, and between 952 and 95 he was first vice commander 
and then commander of the Air Research and Development Command. Thereafter, until his retirement in 958 he 
served as deputy chief of the development staff at Air Force Headquarters. 
8 Memorandum for the files (NACA Headquarters), subject: Minutes of joint USAF-USN-NACA new research air-
plane briefing, 3 September 95. In the files at the NASA History Office.
9 Memorandum for the files, John V. Becker, subject: Note on the July 9, 95 Meeting, no date; Hugh L. Dryden, 
“General Background of the X-5 Research Airplane Project,” a paper presented at the NACA Conference on the 
Progress of the X-5 Project, Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 25-26 October 956, pp. xvii-xix; memorandum, 
J. W. Rogers, Liquid Propellant and Rocket Branch, Rocket Propulsion Division, ARDC, to Lieutenant Colonel L. 
B. Zambon, Power Plant Laboratory, WADC, no subject, 3 July 95. In the files at the AFMC History Office. 
The difference between the Air Force and NACA budgets showed why DoD support was necessary. In fiscal year 
955 the NACA was appropriated $56 million; the Air Force received $6,600 million.
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 Unexpectedly, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) announced at the meet-
ing that it had already contracted with the Douglas Aircraft Company to inves-
tigate a manned vehicle capable of achieving 1,000,000 feet altitude and very 
high speeds. The configuration evolved by Douglas “did not constitute a detailed 
design proposal,” but was only a “first approach to the problem of a high-altitude 
high-speed research airplane.” Representatives from the NACA agreed to meet 
with their ONR counterparts on 16 July to further discuss the Douglas study.
THE DOUGLAS MODEL 671
 The “High Altitude and High Speed Study” by the El Segundo Division of 
the Douglas Aircraft Company had been funded by the ONR as a follow-on to 
the D-558 research aircraft that loosely competed with the Air Force X-1 series . 
Duane N. Morris led the study under the direction of the chief of the Aerodynamic 
Section, Kermit E. Van Every. Although the concept is generally mentioned—
briefly—in most histories of the X-15, what is almost always overlooked is how 
insightful it was regarding many of the challenges that would be experienced by 
the X-15 a few years later.120 
 By the spring of 1954, when the X-15 approval process began, Douglas had 
not accomplished a detailed design for a new airplane, but recognized many of 
the same problems as John Becker and the researchers at Langley. The Douglas 
engineers also examined peripheral subjects—carrier aircraft, landing locations, 
etc.—that the initial Langley studies did not address in any detail.121 
 One interesting aspect of the Douglas Model 671 was that the contractor and 
the Navy had agreed that the aircraft was to have two mission profiles: high speed 
and high altitude (with the emphasis on the latter). This was in distinct contrast to 
the ongoing Langley studies that eventually led to the X-15. Although the Becker 
team at Langley was interested in research outside the sensible atmosphere, there 
was a great deal of skepticism on the part of others in the NACA and the Air 
Force. Douglas did not have this problem—the ONR strongly supported potential 
high-altitude research.
 Excepting the Langley work, the Douglas study was probably the first 
serious attempt to define a hypersonic research airplane. Most of the other com-
panies investigating hypersonics were oriented toward producing operational ve-
hicles, such as the ICBMs and BoMi. Because of this, they usually concentrated 
on a different set of problems, frequently at the expense of a basic understanding 
 
20 Office of Naval Research contract Nonr-266(00). The “D-558-3” designation was never used in any of the official 
reports describing the concept, although it was widely used in the more popular press and most historical works.
2 Several reports on the Douglas study were published. See, for instance, Douglas report ES-7657, “High Altitude 
and High Speed Study,” 28 May 95; and Douglas report ES-7673, “Technical Report on High Altitude and 
High Speed Study,” 28 May 95; One of the few contemporary articles about the concept was written by Irwin 
Stambler in the May 959 Aircraft & Missile Engineering Journal, pp. 20-2 and 77-79. Copies supplied by Bob 
Bradley, San Diego Aerospace Museum. For a slightly more in-depth look at the Douglas Model 67, see Dennis 
R. Jenkins, “Douglas D-558-3,” Aerospace Projects Review, volume 3, number 6, November-December 200, 
pp. -27.
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of the challenges of hypersonic flight. The introduction from the Douglas study 
provides a good background:122
The purpose of the high altitude study…is to establish the feasi-
bility of extending human flight boundaries to extreme altitudes, 
and to investigate the problems connected with the design of an 
airplane for such flights.
The project is partially a result of man’s eternal desire to go 
higher, faster, or further than he did last year. Of far more im-
portance, however, is the experience gained in the design of 
aircraft for high-speed, high-altitude flight, the collection of 
basic information on the upper atmosphere, and the evaluation 
of human tolerance and adaptation to the conditions of flight at 
extreme altitudes and speeds.
 
The design of an airplane for such a purpose cannot be based 
on standard procedures, nor necessarily even on extrapolation 
of present research airplane designs. Most of the major prob-
lems are entirely new, such as carrying a pilot into regions of 
the atmosphere where the physiological dangers are completely 
unknown, and providing him with a safe return to Earth. The 
type of flight resembles those of hypersonic, long-range, guided 
missiles currently under study, with all of their complications 
plus the additional problems of carrying a man and landing in 
a proper manner.
The study consists of a first approach to the design of a high-
altitude airplane. It attempts to outline most of the major  
problems and to indicate some tentative solutions. As with any 
preliminary investigation into an unknown regime, it is doubt-
ful that adequate solutions have been presented to every prob-
lem of high-altitude flight, or even that all of the problems have 
been considered. It would certainly appear, however, that the 
major difficulties are not insurmountable.
 
 The Model 671 was 41.25 feet long (47.00 feet with the pitot boom), spanned 
only 18 feet with 81 square feet of area, and had an all-up weight of 22,200 
pounds. In many respects, it showed an obvious family lineage to the previous 
D-558s. The fuselage consisted of a set of integral propellant tanks, and dive 
brakes were located on each side aft, as in most contemporary fighters. 
 
A conventional configuration was deliberately chosen for the 
study, and no benefits have yet been discovered for any uncon-
ventional arrangement. Actually, for the prime objective of at-
22 “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed Study,” p. 6.
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taining very high altitudes, the general shape of the airplane is 
relatively unimportant. Stability and control must be provided, 
and it must be possible to create sufficient lift for the pullout 
and for landing; but, in contrast to the usual airplane design, 
the reduction of drag is not a critical problem and high drag is 
to some extent beneficial. The planform of the wing is unim-
portant from an aerodynamic standpoint at the higher super-
sonic Mach numbers. Therefore, it was possible to select the 
planform based on weight and structure and landing conditions. 
These considerations led to the choice of an essentially unswept 
wing of moderate taper and aspect ratio.123
 
  The empennage of the Model 671 was completely conventional and looked 
much like that of the Mach 2 D-558-2 that preceded it. However, Douglas realized 
that the design of the stabilizers was one of the greater unknowns of the design. 
“The tail surfaces are of proper size for stability at the lower supersonic Mach 
numbers, but there is some question of their adequacy at very high supersonic 
speeds. Further experimental data in this speed range are necessary before modi-
fications are attempted. In addition, it may be possible to accept a certain amount 
of instability with the proper automatic servo controls.” Unlike the Becker group, 
Douglas did not have access to a hypersonic wind tunnel.124 
 Nevertheless, preliminary investigations at Douglas indicated that “extremely 
large tail surfaces, approaching the wing area in size, are required to provide com-
plete stability at the maximum Mach number of about 7.” Engineers investigated 
several methods to improve stability, with the most obvious being to increase the 
size of the vertical stabilizer. However, placing additional area above the fuselage 
might introduce lateral directional dynamic stability problems “due to an unfavor-
able inclination in the principle axis of inertia and the large aerodynamic rolling 
moment due to sideslip (the dihedral effect).” The preferred arrangement was to 
add a ventral stabilizer and keep the ventral and dorsal units as symmetrical as 
possible. However, Douglas recognized that a large ventral stabilizer would pres-
ent difficulties in ground handling and during landing. The engineers proposed 
that the fin should be folded on the ground, unfold after takeoff, and then be jet-
tisoned just before touchdown. Alternately, Douglas believed that some sort of 
autopilot could be devised that would allow the use of more conventional-sized 
control surfaces .125  
 Douglas conducted an evaluation of available power plants, and reached much 
the same conclusions the X-15 program would eventually come to. The desired en-
gine should produce about 50,000 lbf with a propellant consumption of about 200 
pounds per second. The only powerplant that met the requirements was the Reac-
23 “High Altitude and High Speed Study,” p. 7; “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed Study,” p. 7.
2 “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed Study,” p. 7. The wedge principle that would play such an 
important role in the X-5 design was still languishing in the archives, and the Bell X-2 had not provided its own 
contribution to understanding “high speed instability.” 
25 “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed Study,” p. 0; “High Altitude and High Speed Study,” pp. 8-
9. The eventual X-5 design took a somewhat similar approach, at least for the ventral stabilizer. By the 970s, 
of course, augmentation systems were finally beginning to allow inherently unstable aircraft to fly—the Space 
Shuttle being a prime example.
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tion Motors XLR30-RM-2 rocket engine, which used liquid oxygen and anhydrous 
ammonia propellants. The high (245 lbf-sec/lbm) specific impulse (thrust per fuel 
consumption) was desirable since it provided “a maximum amount of energy for a 
given quantity of propellant.” The high density of the propellants allowed a small-
er tank size for a given propellant weight, allowing a smaller airframe. However, 
the researchers worried that since the original application was a missile, it would 
be difficult to make the engine safe enough for a manned aircraft.126
 Douglas had some interesting observations about drag and power-to- 
weight ratios:127
 
The function of drag in the overall performance must be re-
considered. The effect of drag is practically negligible in the 
power-on ascending phase of flight (for a high altitude launch), 
because of the very large thrust to weight ratio. Throughout the 
vacuum trajectory, the aerodynamic shape of the airplane is 
completely unimportant. During the descending phase of flight, 
a large drag is very beneficial in aiding in the pullout, and the 
highest possible drag is desired within the limits of the pilot 
and the structure. In fact, during the pullout it has been assumed 
that drag brakes would be extended in order to decelerate as 
soon as possible . However, because of excessive decelerative 
forces acting upon the pilot, it is necessary to gradually retract 
the brakes as denser air is entered, until they are fully retracted 
in the later stages of flight.
For a given propulsion unit (i.e., fixed thrust and fuel consump-
tion), the overall performance of the present design [Model 
671] is much more dependent upon the ratio of fuel weight to 
gross weight that it is upon the minimum drag or the optimum 
lift-drag ratio. Even though the fuel is expended in approxi-
mately the first 75 seconds of flight (a relatively small fraction 
of the total flight time), the ultimate performance as measured 
by the maximum altitude is affected to a great extent by small 
changes in the fuel to gross weight ratio. As an example, an 
increase in fuel weight/gross weight from 0.65 to 0.70 results in 
an increase in peak altitude of about 35% for a typical vertical 
flight trajectory, other parameters remaining constant.
 To better understand the nature of the various propellants then available for 
rocket engines, engineers reviewed numerous reports by the Caltech Jet Propul-
sion Laboratory, the NACA, and RAND. Only two oxidizers—oxygen and either 
red fuming or white fuming nitric acid—seemed to offer any increase in perfor-
mance. Douglas was seeking better propellants than the liquid oxygen and alcohol 
26 “High Altitude and High Speed Study,” pp. -. Reaction Motors, Inc., began operations near Danville, New 
Jersey, in December 9, only a few months before the founding of Aerojet on the West Coast in March 92.
27 “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed Study,” p. 5.
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used in the Reaction Motors LR8, effectively ruling out nitric acid since it was 
less dense than oxygen. The available fuels were alcohol (CH3OH or C2H5OH), 
anhydrous ammonia (NH3), hydrazine (N2H4), and gasoline. Alcohol offered no 
improvement, and hydrazine was too expensive and too difficult to handle safely, 
narrowing the choice to anhydrous ammonia and gasoline. Interestingly, Douglas 
ruled out liquid hydrogen because “on the basis of density, hydrogen is seen to 
be a very poor fuel.” It would be 20 years before the Centaur upper stage would 
prove them wrong.128 
 An auxiliary power unit (APU) rated at about 8 horsepower was necessary 
to support the electrical requirements of the instruments, controls, and radio. 
Investigation showed that the lightest alternative would be a small turbine gen-
erator using hydrogen peroxide or ethylene oxide monopropellant. The Walter 
Kidde Company and American Machine and Foundry Company were develop-
28 “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed Study,” pp. 6-65. The history of JPL dates to the 930s 
when Caltech professor (and head of the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory) Theodore von Kármán began 
experimenting with rocket propulsion. Von Kármán persuaded the Army Air Corps to fund the development of 
“jet-assisted take-off” rockets to help underpowered aircraft get off the ground. This was the beginning of the 
laboratory’s rocket-related work for the Army Ordnance department, helping to explain the names of early JPL 
rockets (Private, Corporal, and Sergeant). By 95, the JPL had a staff approaching 300 people. JPL was largely 
responsible for the flight and ground systems of Explorer I successfully launched on 3 January 958. On 3 
December 958, the laboratory was transferred from Army control to the newly formed NASA.
The Douglas Model D-671 was a proposed follow-on to the successful D-558 series of  research 
airplanes developed under Navy auspices and flown at the High-Speed Flight Station. Preliminary 
investigation showed the concept was capable of  roughly the same performance as the eventual X-15, 
but the Navy declined further development of  the Douglas concept when it joined the X-15 program in 
late 1954. (Douglas Aircraft Company)
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ing units that could satisfy the requirements. Both companies claimed they could 
develop a 10-horsepower hydrogen peroxide unit that weighed about 56 pounds, 
including propellants for 30-horsepower-minutes. Given the trouble of the future 
X-15 APUs, perhaps North American should have better reviewed this part of the 
Douglas report.129 
 Douglas recognized that high temperatures would be a major design problem, 
although they indicated that “it is impractical in the present study to make a com-
plete survey of the temperatures expected on the airplane [since] the calculations 
are quite complicated and tedious to obtain reasonable estimates.” They continued 
that “it is unfortunate that the largest contributing factor to the high temperatures 
of reentry, the convective heating from the boundary layer, is the one about which 
there is the least knowledge.” Nevertheless, they took some educated guesses.130 
 The expected average heat level approached 1,400°F, with peak temperatures 
above 3,300°F on the wing leading edges and nose. Douglas believed “it would 
be impossible to design a structure for this temperature [1,400°F] which satisfies 
both the stress and weight requirements….” To overcome this, engineers recom-
mended the use of some as-yet-undeveloped “good insulating material” with a 
density of 20 pounds per cubic foot and an insulating value of 0.20 British Ther-
mal Units (Btu) per pound. For the purposes of the study, Douglas used a C-110M 
titanium-alloy structure and skin protected by an unspecified ablative coating. 
Water sprayed into stainless-steel sections of the wing leading edges and nose 
area allowed superheated steam to remove unwanted heat, keeping these areas 
below their melting points. Alternately, Douglas investigated injecting cool gas 
(bottled oxygen) into the boundary layer to provide cooling. The study noted, 
however, that “none of these systems have yet been proven by practical applica-
tion.” The designers protected only a few areas, such as the cockpit, with batt in-
sulation since the study assumed no heat transfer to the interior of the aircraft.131
 Not surprisingly, Douglas chose an air-launch configuration. What is interest-
ing is that the launch parameters were Mach 0.75 at 40,000 feet—well beyond 
the capabilities of anything except the Boeing B-52, which was still in the early 
stages of testing. Douglas summarized the need for an air launch by noting that 
“[t]he performance is increased, but the prime reason for the high altitude launch 
is the added safety which 40,000 feet of altitude gives the pilot when he takes 
over under his own rocket power.” Trade studies conducted by Douglas indicated 
that an increase in launch altitude from sea level to 40,000 feet would result in a 
200,000-foot increment in maximum altitude on a typical high-altitude mission. 
Additional benefits of a higher launch altitude diminished rapidly above 40,000 
feet since most of the initial improvement was due to decreasing air density.132 
 Engineers spent a great deal of time studying possible flight paths, but “no at-
tempt has been made in the present study to determine an absolute optimum flight 
29 “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed Study,” p. 65.
30 “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed Study,” pp. 5 and 58. In 95 calculations of this nature 
normally were done by hand since general-purpose electronic computers were not widely available, and were 
quite slow in any case.
3 “High Altitude and High Speed Study,” pp. - and 20-2; “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed 
Study,” pp. 55-57. 
32 “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed Study,” pp. 7 and 5-6. Over half the atmosphere lies below 
0,000 feet.
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path, because of the large number of variables involved.” The designers noted 
that the airframe and propulsion systems could theoretically support a maximum 
altitude in excess of 1,130,000 feet; however, based on a conservative pullout 
altitude of 30,000 feet, the vehicle was more realistically limited to 770,000 feet. 
The pullout altitude (and the limiting decelerations, which were really the issue) 
was “directly traceable to the single limiting factor of the presence of a human 
pilot.” The 770,000-foot, 84-degree profile resulted in a 10-g pullout maneuver, 
about the then-known limit of human tolerance.133 
 Some thought was given to using a “braking thrust,” which would allow a 
small amount of propellant to be saved and used during reentry. Either a mechani-
cal thrust reverser would be installed on the rocket engine, or the airplane would 
reenter tail-first. This technique would have allowed slightly higher flights by 
reducing the stresses imposed by the pullout maneuver, although less propellant 
would be available for the ascent. The designers did not pursue this concept since 
entering tail-first involved undesirable risks, and the mechanical complexity of a 
thrust reverser seemed unnecessary, at least initially.134 
 The theoretical maximum performance was 6,150 mph and 190,000 feet for 
the speed profile, and 5,200 mph and 1,130,000 feet for the altitude profile (but 
limited, as discussed above). Landings would be made at Edwards AFB because 
of its “long runways and considerable latitude in the choice of direction and po-
sition of touchdown.” The study noted that there would be little opportunity to 
33 “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed Study,” pp. 6-8.
3 “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed Study,” pp. 8-9.
Like the NASA Langley concept, the Douglas D-671 had two separate research flight profiles – one for 
maximum velocity and one for maximum altitude. Douglas and the Navy were particularly interested in the 
high-altitude research and at one point estimated the D-671 could reach 1,000,000 feet altitude. Although 
Douglas only conducted a minimal amount of  research into the concept before it was cancelled, they foresaw 
many of  the issues that would ultimately confront the X-15 development effort. (Douglas Aircraft Company)
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control either the range or the heading by any appreciable amount after engine 
burnout. “Since the airplane must land without power at a specified landing site, 
it is obvious that it must be aimed toward the landing site at launch.” Douglas 
estimated that a misalignment of 5 degrees in azimuth at burnout would result in 
a lateral miss of over 45 miles.135 
 One of the concerns expressed by Douglas was that “rocket thrust will not be 
sufficiently reproducible from flight to flight, either in magnitude or in alignment.” 
Engineers estimated a thrust misalignment of less than one-half of a degree could 
impart 500 pounds of side force on the aircraft, causing it to go significantly off 
course. Researchers investigated several possible solutions to thrust misalignment, 
including using a larger rudder, using the auxiliary reaction control system, install-
ing movable vanes in the exhaust,136  performing gas separation in the nozzle,137 
and mounting the rocket engine on a gimbal. All of these methods contained vari-
ous problems or unknowns that caused the engineers to reject them. Further con-
sideration showed that thrust misalignment was largely a non-issue since early 
low-speed flights would uncover any deficiencies, allowing engineers to correct 
them prior to beginning high-speed flights.138 
 The estimated landing speed was 213 mph, with a stall speed of 177 mph. 
Engineers accepted this relatively high speed “given the experimental nature of 
the aircraft and the high skill level of the pilots that will be flying it.” The study 
noted that the slower speeds were possible if high-lift leading-edge devices were 
used or the area of the wing was increased. However, the increased weight and/or 
the resulting complications in the leading-edge cooling system appeared to make 
these changes undesirable.139 
 The high-altitude profile would use “flywheels, gyroscopes, or small auxil-
iary jets” for directional control outside the atmosphere, with Douglas favoring 
hydrogen peroxide jets in the wing tips and at the rear of the fuselage. Flywheels 
were rejected because they were too complex (for a three-axis system), and gy-
roscopes were too heavy. Each of the hydrogen peroxide thrusters would gener-
ate about 100 lbf and use 1 pound of propellant per second of operation . The 
engineers arbitrarily assumed that a 25-pound supply of propellant was required 
since no data existed on potential usage during flight. A catalyst turned the liquid 
hydrogen peroxide to steam at 400-psi pressure.140 
  The projected performance of the airplane caused Douglas engineers to inves-
tigate escape capsules for the pilot: “Because of the high altitude and high speed 
performance of the aircraft, it is believed that all ordinary bailout procedures, 
such as escape chutes and ejection seats, are of no value to the pilot.” At the time, 
Douglas believed that ejection seats were only “suitable up to a Mach number of 
35 “High Altitude and High Speed Study,” pp. 5-7 and 23; the quote is from “Technical Report on High Altitude 
and High Speed Study,” p. 37.
36 The same technique used by the V-2 and several other early rockets.
37 This involves injecting a small amount of gas along one wall of the exhaust nozzle, causing a flow separation that 
results in slightly asymmetrical thrust. The solid rocket motors for the Titan III/IV launch vehicle later used the 
same technique.
38 “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed Study,” pp. 37-39.
39 “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed Study,” p. 2.
0 “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed Study,” pp. 2-3. In 95, manned space flight was still 
seven years in the future, and no airplane had yet flown above the sensible atmosphere. This made it impossible 
to guess accurately how much control a pilot would want, or need, at extremely high altitudes.
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approximately one at sea level, with somewhat higher speeds being safe at higher 
altitudes.” Instead, the engineers decided to jettison the entire forward section 
of the fuselage, including the pilot’s compartment, much like the Bell X-2 . The 
total weight penalty for the capsule was about 150 pounds. The study dismissed 
pressure suits, stating that “it is very doubtful that sufficient pressurization equip-
ment could be carried by the pilot during…ejection…to sustain suit pressurization 
from the maximum altitude to a safety zone within the earth’s lower atmosphere.” 
Douglas stated flatly that “an ejection seat or other ordinary bailout techniques 
will be inadequate in view of the problem of high speeds and high altitudes.” Scott 
Crossfield would later disagree.141 
 In order to withstand the reentry temperatures, the cockpit windscreen used 
two 0.5-inch layers of quartz with a 0.25-inch vented air gap between them. This 
would keep the inner windscreen below 200°F. A thin sheet of treated glass placed 
inside the inner quartz layer reduced ultraviolet and other harmful radiation. Al-
though the potential dangers of radiation above the atmosphere were largely un-
known, Douglas predicted that little harm would come from the short flights (a 
few minutes) envisioned for the D-558-3. However, “proper precautions to pre-
vent any one pilot from making too many successive flights in a weeks or months 
time interval should be taken….”142
 One of the technical innovations of the eventual X-15 program was the “ball 
nose” that sensed the angle of attack and angle of sideslip during high-speed and 
high-altitude flight. The Douglas study foresaw the need for a new pitch and yaw 
sensor “capable of sensing exceedingly low forces or pressures, but capable of 
withstanding the maximum dynamic pressures encountered during the complete 
pullout.” However, Douglas thought that “the instrument need not be precise, 
for it is only to serve as a guide for pointing the nose into the wind at heights 
where a pilot might otherwise lose all sense of orientation.” Four possible solu-
tions emerged:143
A weathervane, either direct or remote-reading
A pitch or yaw indicator that measured the relative Mach 
number or pressure ratio on opposite sides of a symmetri-
cal sphere, cone, or other convenient shape
A vane inside a conventional instrument case that indicat-
ed the direction of the resultant momentum from two jets 
of air brought in by a pair of symmetrical external tubes
A device similar to the Reichardt gage
 Douglas dismissed the first two (although the second one is what was eventu-
ally built for the X-15) since they did “not seem very satisfactory.” The external 
weathervane would need to feature rugged construction to resist the high aero 
loads and would therefore be too insensitive at high altitudes. Douglas discount-
 “High Altitude and High Speed Study,” p. 28; quotes from “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed 
Study,” pp. 79-80. Most subsequent analyses estimated that an escape capsule would impose a much larger 
weight penalty than 50 pounds.
2 “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed Study,” p. 77.
3 Ibid, pp. 5-6.
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ed the sensing sphere since engineers doubted they could construct one rugged 
enough to survive reentry. The third alternative was satisfactory, although the is-
sue of how to protect the system from reentry heat appears to have been ignored. 
Ultimately, Douglas decided the fourth idea was best. Here is the description of 
their modified Reichardt gage:144
 
Air is picked up by the yawed total head tubes and carried into 
the two chambers L [left] and R [right] of the meter. The cham-
bers are separated by a pivoted flat plate [shown on the accom-
panying drawing as the vane and pointer] which has a small 
clearance on all four sides so that it is completely free to pivot. 
The pivot is quite free and without any spring restraint. When 
the pressure is higher at R than L the needle will move to the left 
to allow more air to flow through the porous or perforated plate. 
The complete flow system has been analyzed, and the equations 
show that the needle position will be a function only of the ratio 
of the pressure rises, independent of the dynamic pressure. The 
needle fluctuation is almost proportional to the pressure ration. 
The vane system used can be very sensitive…since there is nei-
ther torque nor load on the vane, it should be satisfactory at very 
high indicated speeds.
 Considering the short time they had to work on the study, the engineers con-
sidered a wide variety of details. For instance, they considered the chances of a 
meteor hitting the aircraft: “For a projected area of 225 square feet, the chances of 
being hit by a meteor capable of penetrating more than 0.08-inches of aluminum 
are about one in 450,000 in any one flight.” Given that there were no data on the 
number or size of high-altitude micrometeorites at the time, exactly how the engi-
neers arrived at this probability is uncertain.145 
 Nevertheless, despite the seemingly thorough study, Douglas noted that there 
were many uncertainties since they were entering previously unknown areas of 
aeronautical science. Highlighting this, the final report contained statements such 
as “[t]here is no method available for the calculation of the supersonic, zero-lift, 
pressure drag of a finite wing with a laminar flow airfoil section” and “no theo-
retical methods have been devised for the calculation of the theoretical supersonic 
section drag coefficient of a blunt nose airfoil.” It was all very speculative.146 
 Other areas of concern were calculating (or even understanding) the com-
pressibility effects of turbulent flow at high speeds. The compressibility effects in 
laminar flow were calculated using factors corresponding to the results of Crocco 
and Van Driest, but engineers noted that the corresponding correction for turbu-
lent flow was “difficult to determine.” At the time there were a number of different 
theories for the turbulent corrections, all of which appeared equally valid but led 
 Ibid, pp. -6.
5 “High Altitude and High Speed Study,” p. 26. At the time, almost no data actually existed on the number or size 
of micrometeorites, or the likelihood of their striking an orbiting object.
6 “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed Study,” pp. -2.
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to widely divergent results when extended to higher Mach numbers. The proper 
choice of a compressibility correction was important because between Mach num-
bers 3 and 10 the uncorrected skin friction accounted for 40–50% of the total zero-
lift drag. Douglas chose to use the Van Driest results that predicted a relatively 
large decrease in turbulent skin friction as Mach numbers increased, although the 
engineers noted that the results “may be somewhat optimistic.” These were many 
of the same problems investigated by John Becker, Charles McLellan, and others 
at Langley.147 
 According to the Douglas representative at the 16 July meeting with the 
NACA and ONR, the next step would be a more detailed study that would cost 
$1,500,000 and take a year to complete. Given that a new joint project was about 
to be undertaken, the ONR declined to further fund the Douglas study, and the 
company began to concentrate its high-speed efforts on the Model 684 that would 
be proposed to the Air Force for Project 1226 .
 Overall, Douglas anticipated many of the problems that were ultimately en-
countered during the development of the eventual hypersonic research airplane. It 
would not have surprised any of the engineers working on the Douglas study that 
the solutions they proposed for some of the problems were not the ones that were 
ultimately implemented. Still, they touched on almost all of the pitfalls that would 
hamper the development of the eventual X-15. It is difficult to say whether Doug-
las could have done the job better, faster, or cheaper (to use a much later vernacu-
lar). It is likely, however, that they ultimately would have succeeded in building a 
useful research aircraft if the government had continued down that road.
7 Ibid, p. 3. Luigi Crocco and E. R. Van Driest had conducted a great deal of research into boundary-layer com-
pressibility at North American Aviation. See, for instance: Luigi Crocco, North American report CF-038, “The 
Laminar Boundary Layer in Gases,” December 96; Luigi Crocco, NACA technical note 232, “Transformations 
of the Hodograph Flow Equation and the Introduction of Two Generalized Potential Functions,” August 95; and 
E. R. Van Driest, NACA technical note 2597, “Investigation of the Laminar Boundary Layer in Compressible Fluids 
Using the Crocco Method,” January 952.


A Hypersonic Research  
Airplane
The 9 July 1954 meeting at NACA Headquarters and the resulting release 
of the Langley study served to announce the seriousness of the hypersonic research 
airplane effort. Accordingly, many government agencies and aircraft manufacturers 
sent representatives to Langley to examine the project in detail. On 16 July three 
representatives from the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC)—the 
Air Force organization that would be responsible for the development of the air-
plane—visited John Becker to acquaint themselves with the NACA presentation 
and lay the groundwork for a larger meeting of NACA and ARDC personnel.1  
 Independently of any eventual joint program, approval for the first formal 
NACA research authorization was granted on 21 July 1954. This covered tests 
of an 8-inch model of the Langley configuration in the 11-inch hypersonic tunnel 
to obtain six-component, low-angle-of-attack and five-component, variable-angle-
of-attack (to about 50 degrees) data up to Mach 6.86.2  Research authorizations 
were the formal paperwork that approved the expenditure of funds or resources on 
a research project. At the time, it was not unusual—or worthy of comment—for 
the NACA laboratories to conduct research without approval from higher head-
quarters or specific funding. This type of oversight would come much later. 
 
 Memorandum for the files (Langley), subject: minutes of the meeting with ARDC representatives, 6 July 95.
2 Letter, NACA Headquarters to Langley, subject: research authorization, 2 July 95.
CHAPTER 2
0 Chapter 2: A Hypersonic Research Airplane
 During late July, Richard V. Rhode from NACA Headquarters visited Robert 
R . Gilruth to discuss the proposed use of Inconel X in the new airplane . Rhode 
indicated that Inconel was “too critical a material” for structural use, and the pro-
gram should select other materials more representative of those that would be in 
general use in the future. Rhode later put this in writing, although Langley ap-
pears to have ignored the suggestion. This harkened back to the original decision 
that the research airplane was not meant to represent any possible production 
configuration (aerodynamically or structurally), but instead was to be optimized 
for its research role .3 
 On 29 July, Robert J . Woods and Krafft A. Ehricke from Bell Aircraft visited 
Langley as part of the continuing exchange of data with the industry. On 9 Au-
gust, the Wright Air Development Center (WADC) sent representatives from the 
Power Plant Laboratory to discuss rocket engines, in particular the Hermes A1 
that Langley had tentatively identified for use in the new research airplane. The 
3 Letter, Richard V. Rhode, NACA Headquarters, to Robert R. Gilruth, Langley, no subject,  August 95; tele-
phone conversation, John V. Becker with Dennis R. Jenkins, 7 March 2002.
The overall configuration of  the airplane conceived by NACA Langley in 1954 bears a strong resem-
blance to the eventual X-15. This configuration was used as a basis for the aerodynamic and thermody-
namic analyses that took place prior to the contract award to North American Aviation. This drawing 
accompanied the invitation-to-bid letters during the airframe competition, although it was listed as a 
“suggested means” of  complying with the requirements. (NASA)
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WADC representatives went away unimpressed with the selection. The next day 
Duane Morris and Kermit Van Every from Douglas visited Langley to exchange 
details of their Model 671 (D-558-3) study with the Becker team, providing a 
useful flow of information between the two groups that had conducted the most 
research into the problem to date.4
 The Power Plant Laboratory emphasized that the proposed Hermes engine 
was not a man-rated design, but concluded that no existing engine fully satisfied 
the NACA requirements. In addition, since the Hermes was a missile engine, it 
could only operate successfully once or twice, and it appeared difficult to incor-
porate the ability to throttle or restart during flight. As alternatives to the Hermes, 
the laboratory investigated several other engines, but suggested postponing the 
engine selection until the propulsion requirements were better defined.5  
 The Hermes engine idea did not die easily, however. As late as 6 December 
1954, K . W . Mattison,6 a sales engineer from the guided-missile department of 
the General Electric Company, visited John Becker, Max Faget, and Harley Soulé 
at Langley to discuss using the A1 engine in the new airplane. Mattison was in-
terested in the status of the project (already approved by that time), the engine 
requirements, and the likely schedule. He explained that although the Hermes 
engines were intended for missile use, he was certain that design changes would 
increase the “confidence level” for using them in a manned aircraft. He was not 
sure, however, that General Electric would be interested in the idea .7
DEVELOPING A CONSENSUS
 The WADC evaluation of the NACA proposal arrived at ARDC Head-
quarters on 13 August. Colonel Victor R. Haugen, director of the WADC 
laboratories, reported that his organization believed the proposal was tech-
nically feasible. The only negative comment referred to the absence of a 
suitable engine. The WADC estimated that the development effort would 
cost $12,200,000 and take three or four years. The cost estimate in-
cluded $300,000 for studies, $1,500,000 for design, $9,500,000 for the 
development and manufacture of two airplanes, $650,000 for engines and other 
government-furnished equipment, and $250,000 for modifications to a carrier 
 Memorandum for the files (Langley), subject: new research airplane visits, 8 August 95.
5 Letter, Colonel Paul F. Nay, Acting Chief, Aeronautics and Propulsion Division, Deputy Commander of Techni-
cal Operations, ARDC, to Commander, WADC, subject: New Research Aircraft, 29 July 95. In the files at the 
AFMC History Office; memorandum, E. C. Phillips, Chief, Operations Office, Power Plant Laboratory, to Director 
of Laboratories, WADC, subject: NACA Conference on 9 July 95 on Research Aircraft-Propulsion System, 5 
August 95; letter, Colonel Victor R. Haugen, Director of Laboratories, WADC, to Commander, ARDC, subject: 
new research aircraft, 3 August 95. In the files at the ASD History Office; memorandum, J. W. Rogers, Liquid 
Propellant and Rocket Branch, Rocket Propulsion Division, Power Plant Laboratory, to Chief, Non-Rotating En-
gine Branch, Power Plant Laboratory, WADC, subject: conferences on 9 and 0 August 95 on NACA Research 
Aircraft-Propulsion System,  August 95. In the files at the AFMC History Office.
6 It was common practice in the 950s to record only the last name and initials for individuals on official corre-
spondence. First names are provided whenever possible, but in many cases a first name cannot be definitively 
determined from the available documentation.
7 Memorandum, John V. Becker to the Associate Director/Langley, subject: new rocket engines, 8 December 95.
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aircraft. Somewhat prophetically, one WADC official commented informally: 
“Remember the X-3, the X-5, [and] the X-2 overran 200% . This project won’t 
get started for twelve million dollars.”8  
 A four-and-a-half-page paper titled “NACA Views Concerning a New Re-
search Airplane,” released in late August 1954, gave a brief background of the 
problem and attached the Langley study as a possible solution. The paper listed 
two major problems: “(1) preventing the destruction of the aircraft structure by 
the direct or indirect effects of aerodynamic heating; and (2) achievement of sta-
bility and control at very high altitudes, at very high speeds, and during atmo-
spheric reentry from ballistic flight paths.” The paper concluded by stating that 
the construction of a new research airplane appeared to be feasible and needed to 
be undertaken at the earliest possible opportunity.9
 A meeting between the Air Force, NACA, Navy, and the Office of the As-
sistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development took place on 31 
August 1954. There was general agreement that research was needed on aero-
dynamic heating, “zero-g,” and stability and control issues at Mach numbers 
between 2 and 7 and altitudes up to 400,000 feet. There was also agreement that 
a single joint project was appropriate. The group believed, however, that the 
selection of a particular design (referring to the Langley proposal) should not 
take place until mutually satisfactory requirements were approved at a meeting 
scheduled for October .10
 Also on 31 August, and continuing on 1 September, a meeting of the NACA 
Subcommittee on High-Speed Aerodynamics was held at Wallops Island . Dr . 
Allen E. Puckett from the Hughes Aircraft Company was the chair. John Stack 
from Langley gave an overview of the proposed research airplane, including a 
short history of events. He reiterated that the main research objectives of the new 
airplane were investigations into stability and control at high supersonic speeds, 
structural heating effects, and aeromedical aspects such as human reactions to 
weightlessness. He also emphasized that the performance of the new airplane 
must represent a substantial increment over existing research airplanes and the 
tactical aircraft then under development. In response to a question about whether 
an automatically controlled vehicle was appropriate, Stack reiterated that one of 
the objectives of the proposed program was to study the problems associated with 
humans at high speeds and altitudes. Additionally, the design of an automatically 
controlled vehicle would be difficult, delay the procurement, and reduce the value 
of the airplane as a research tool .11  
 The subcommittee subsequently recommended that the project begin as soon 
as practical, but recognized that the preliminary Langley concept might not prove 
to be the best solution. It also recommended the “skill of all the principle design 
teams in the country be brought to bear in the design of the airplane” and that the 
8 A published summary of the 9 July NACA presentations did not appear until  August; letter, Colonel Victor R. 
Haugen to Commander, ARDC, no subject, 3 August 95; memorandum, R. L. Schulz, Technical Director of 
Aircraft, to Chief, Fighter Aircraft Division, WADC, no subject, not dated (presumed about 3 August 95). Both 
in the files at the AFMC History Office. Budget quote from Houston, Section I.
9 “NACA Views Concerning a New Research Airplane,” August 95. In the files at the NASA History Office.
0 Memorandum, Thomas C. Muse to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D), no subject,  September 
95. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research Agency.
 Minutes of the Meeting of the NACA Subcommittee on High-Speed Aerodynamics, 3 August- September 95.
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establishment of a design competition was the most desirable course of action. 
The subcommittee forwarded the recommendation to the Committee on Aerody-
namics for further consideration.12  
 Major General Floyd B. Wood, the ARDC deputy commander for techni-
cal operations, forwarded an endorsement of the NACA proposal to Air Force 
Headquarters on 13 September 1954, recommending that the Air Force “initi-
ate a project to design, construct, and operate a new research aircraft similar to 
that suggested by NACA without delay.” Wood reiterated that the resulting ve-
hicle should be a pure research airplane, not a prototype of any potential weapon 
system or operational vehicle. The ARDC concluded that the design and fabrica-
tion of the airplane would take about 3.5 years. In a change from how previous 
projects were structured, Wood suggested that the Air Force should assume “sole 
executive responsibility,” but the research airplanes should be transferred to the 
NACA after a short Air Force airworthiness demonstration program.13 
 During late September, John R. Clark from Chance-Vought met with Ira H. 
Abbot at NACA Headquarters and expressed interest in the new project. He indi-
cated that he personally would like to see his company build the aircraft. It was 
ironic since Chance-Vought would elect not to submit a proposal when the time 
came. Many other airframe manufacturer representatives would express similar 
thoughts, usually with the same results. It was hard to see how anybody could 
make money building only two airplanes.14 
 The deputy director of research and development at Air Force Headquarters, 
Brigadier General Benjamin S. Kelsey, confirmed on 4 October 1954 that the 
new research airplane would be a joint USAF-Navy-NACA project with a 1-B 
priority in the national procurement scheme and $300,000 in FY55 funding to 
get started.15  
 At the same time, the NACA Committee on Aerodynamics met in regular 
session on 4 October 1954 at Ames, with Preston R. Bassett from the Sperry 
Gyroscope Company as chairman. The recommendation forwarded from the 
31 August meeting of the Subcommittee on High-Speed Aerodynamics was the 
major agenda item. The following day the committee met in executive session 
at the HSFS to come to some final decision about the desirability of a manned 
hypersonic research airplane. During the meeting, various committee mem-
bers, including De Elroy Beeler, Walt Williams, and research pilot A. Scott 
Crossfield, reviewed historic and technical data. Williams’s support was crucial. 
Crossfield would later describe Williams as “the man of the 20th Century who made 
more U.S. advanced aeronautical and space programs succeed than all the others 
together.… He was a very strong influence in getting the X-15 program launched 
in the right direction.” Williams would later do the same for Project Mercury.16 
2 Ibid.
3 Letter, Major General Floyd B. Wood, Deputy Commander of Technical Operations, ARDC, to Director of R&D, 
USAF, subject: new research aircraft, 20 September 95. In the files at the ASD History Office.
 Memorandum for the files (NACA Headquarters), from Ira H. Abbott, no subject,  October 95. Scott Crossfield 
remembers that none of the contractors were thrilled with the prospects of a two-airplane contract. Unlike today, com-
panies generally made little money on research and development; the profits came from large production quantities.
5 Letter, Brigadier General Benjamin S. Kelsey, Deputy Director of R&D DCS/D, to Commander, ARDC, subject: 
new research aircraft,  October 95. In the files at the AFMC History Office.
6 Letter, Scott Crossfield to Dennis R. Jenkins, 30 June 999. Largely because he wanted to become more in-
volved in the X-5 development, Crossfield would leave the NACA in 955 to work for North American Aviation.
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 The session at the HSFS stirred more emotion than the earlier meeting in 
Washington. First, Beeler discussed some of the more general results obtained 
previously with various research airplanes. Then Milton B. Ames, Jr., the com-
mittee secretary, distributed copies of the NACA “Views” document. Langley’s 
associate director, Floyd Thompson, reminded the committee of the major conclu-
sion expressed by the Brown-O’Sullivan-Zimmerman study group in June 1953: 
that it was impossible to study certain salient aspects of hypersonic flight at alti-
tudes between 12 and 50 miles in wind tunnels due to technical limitations of the 
facilities. Examples included “the distortion of the aircraft structure by the direct 
or indirect effects of aerodynamic heating” and “stability and control at very high 
altitudes at very high speeds, and during atmospheric reentry from ballistic flight 
paths.” The study admitted that the rocket-model program at Wallops Island could 
investigate aircraft design and operational problems to about Mach 10, but this 
program of subscale models was not an “adequate substitute” for full-scale flights. 
Having concluded that the Brown group was right, and that the only immediate 
way known to solve these problems was to use a manned aircraft, Thompson 
said that various NACA laboratories had then examined the feasibility of design-
ing a hypersonic research airplane. Trying to prevent an internal fight, Thompson 
explained that the results from Langley contained in the document Milton Ames 
had just distributed were “generally similar” to those obtained in the other NACA 
studies (which they were not), but were more detailed than the other laboratories’ 
results (which they were).17 
 Williams and Crossfield followed with an outline of the performance required 
for a new research airplane and a discussion of the more important operational as-
pects of the vehicle . At that point, John Becker and Norris Dow took over with a 
detailed presentation of their six-month study. Lively debate followed, with most 
members of the committee, including Clark Millikan and Robert Woods, strongly 
supporting the idea of the hypersonic research airplane. 
 Surprisingly, Clarence L. “Kelly” Johnson, the Lockheed representative, op-
posed any extension of the manned research airplane program. Johnson argued 
that experience with research aircraft had been “generally unsatisfactory” since 
the aerodynamic designs were inferior to tactical aircraft by the time research 
flights began. He felt that a number of research airplanes had developed “startling 
performances” only by using rocket engines and flying essentially “in a vacuum” 
(as related to operational requirements). Johnson pointed out that “when there 
is no drag [at high altitude], the rocket engine can propel even mediocre aero-
dynamic forms to high Mach numbers.” These flights had mainly proved “the 
bravery of the test pilots,” Johnson charged. The test flights generated data on 
stability and control at high Mach numbers, Johnson admitted, but aircraft manu-
facturers could not use much of this information because it was “not typical of 
airplanes actually designed for supersonic flight speeds.” He recommended that 
they use an unmanned vehicle to gather the required data instead of building a 
new manned airplane. If aeromedical problems became “predominant,” Johnson 
 
 
7 “Minutes of the Meeting, Committee on Aerodynamics,” -5 October 95. In the files at the NASA History Office.
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said, a manned research airplane could then be designed and built, and it should 
have a secondary role as a strategic reconnaissance vehicle.18 
Various members of the committee took issue with Johnson. Gus Crowley 
from NACA Headquarters explained that the NACA based its proposal on the 
X-1 concept “to build the simplest and soundest aircraft that could be designed 
on currently available knowledge and put into flight research in the shortest time 
possible.” In comparing manned research airplane operations with unmanned, au-
tomatically controlled vehicles, Crowley noted that the X-1 and other research air-
8 Ibid, Appendix I, p. 2. Johnson is one of the modern legends in the aerospace community. Founder of the Lockheed 
“Skunk Works,” Johnson was largely responsible for such landmark designs as the P-80, U-2, F-0, and SR-7.
Clarence L. “Kelly” Johnson, the legendary founder of  the Lockheed Skunk Works, 
was the only representative on the NACA Committee on Aerodynamics to vote 
against proceeding with the development of  the X-15. Previous X-plane experience 
had left Johnson jaded since the performance of  the research airplanes was not signifi-
cantly advanced from operational prototypes. As it turned out, the X-15 would be the 
exception, since no operational vehicle, except the Space Shuttle, has yet approached the 
velocity and altitude marks reached by the X-15. (Lockheed Martin)
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planes had made hundreds of successful flights despite numerous malfunctions.19 
In spite of the difficulties—which, Crowley readily admitted, had occasionally 
caused the aircraft to go out of control—research pilots had successfully landed 
the aircraft an overwhelming percentage of the time. In each case the human pilot 
permitted further flights to explore the conditions experienced, and in Crowley’s 
opinion, automated flight did not allow the same capabilities.20 
 After some further discussion, and despite Johnson’s objections, the 
committee passed a resolution recommending the construction of a hypersonic 
research aircraft:21 
 The “requirements” of the resolution conformed to the conclusions from 
Langley, but were sufficiently general to encourage fresh approaches. Appended 
to the specification under the heading of “Suggested Means of Meeting the Gen-
eral Requirements” was a section outlining the key results of the Becker study.22  
 Kelly Johnson was the only member to vote nay. Sixteen days after the meet-
ing, Johnson sent a “Minority Opinion of Extremely High Altitude Research Air-
9 If Crowley was talking about high-speed X-planes, he was stretching the point. By the end of 95, the high-
speed research airplanes had barely made 200 flights and, excluding the X-5, would never get to 300 flights. 
20 “Minutes of the Meeting, Committee on Aerodynamics,” -5 October 95. 
2 Resolution, 5 October 95. In the files at the NASA History Office.
22 Hugh L. Dryden, “General Background of the X-5 Research Airplane Project,” a paper presented at the NACA Con-
ference on the Progress of the X-5 Project, Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 25-26 October 956, pp. xvii-xix.
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plane” to Milton Ames with a request that it be appended to the majority report, 
which it was .23  
 On 6 October 1954, Air Force Headquarters issued Technical Program Re-
quirement 1-1 to initiate a new manned research airplane program “generally in 
accordance with the NACA Secret report, subject: ‘NACA Views Concerning a 
New Research Aircraft’ dated August 1954.” The entire project was classified 
Confidential. The ARDC followed this on 26 October with Technical Require-
ment 54 (which, surprisingly, was unclassified).24 
 In the meantime, Hartley Soulé and Clotaire Wood held two meetings in 
Washington on 13 October. The first was with Abraham Hyatt at the Navy Bu-
reau of Aeronautics (BuAer) to obtain the Navy’s recommendations regarding 
the specifications. The only significant request was that provisions should exist to 
fly an “observer” in place of the normal research instrumentation package. This 
was the first (and nearly the only) official request from the Navy regarding the 
new airplane, excepting the engine. In the second meeting, Soulé discussed the 
specifications with Colonel R. M. Wray and Colonel Walter P. Maiersperger at the 
Pentagon, and neither had any significant comments or suggestions.
 With an endorsement in hand, on 18 October Hugh Dryden conferred with 
Air Force (colonels Wray and Maiersperger) and Navy (Admiral Robert S . Hatch-
er from BuAer and Captain W. C. Fortune from the ONR) representatives on 
how best to move toward procurement. The parties agreed that detailed technical 
specifications for the proposed aircraft, with a section outlining the Becker study, 
should be presented to the Department of Defense Air Technical Advisory Panel 
by the end of the year. The Navy reiterated its desire that the airplane carry two 
crew members, since the observer could concentrate on the physiological aspects 
of the flights and relieve the pilot of that burden. The NACA representatives were 
not convinced that the weight and cost of an observer could be justified, and pro-
posed that the competing contractors decide what was best. All agreed this was 
appropriate. Again, the Air Force requested little in the way of changes.25 
 Hartley Soulé met with representatives of the various WADC laboratories on 
22 October to discuss the tentative specifications for the airplane. Perhaps the ma-
jor decision was to have BuAer and the Power Plant Laboratory jointly prepare 
a separate specification for the engine. The complete specification (airplane and 
engine) was to be ready by 17 November. In effect, this broke the procurement into 
two separate but related competitions: one for the airframe and one for the engine. 
 During this meeting, John B. Trenholm from the WADC Fighter Aircraft 
Division suggested building at least three airplanes, proposing for the first time 
more than the two aircraft contained in the WADC cost estimate. There was also 
a discussion concerning the construction of a dedicated structural test article. It 
seemed like a good idea, but nobody could figure out how to test it under mean-
ingful temperature conditions, so the group deferred the matter.
23 Letter, Clarence L. Johnson to Milton B. Ames, secretary, Committee on Aerodynamics, subject: Minority Opinion 
of Extremely High Altitude Research Airplane, 2 October 95.
2 USAF Technical Program Directive -, 6 October 95; ARDC Technical Requirement 5, 26 October 95. 
Both in the files at the Air Force Historical Research Agency.
25 Memorandum for the files (NACA Headquarters), from Clotaire Wood, 26 October 95; invitations from NACA to 
Colonel Wray, Colonel Maiersperger, Admiral Hatcher, and Captain Fortune dated  October 95.
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 Also on 22 October, Brigadier General Benjamin Kelsey and Dr. Albert 
Lombard from Air Force Headquarters, plus admirals Lloyd Harrison and Robert 
Hatcher from BuAer, visited Hugh Dryden and Gus Crowley at NACA Headquar-
ters to discuss a proposed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for conducting 
the new research airplane program. Only minor changes to a draft prepared by 
Dryden were suggested.26  The military representatives told Dryden that a method 
of funding the project had not been determined, but the Air Force and Navy would 
arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement for financing the design and develop-
ment phases. During the 1940s and 1950s it was normal for the military services 
to fund the development and construction of aircraft (such as the X-1 and D-558, 
among others) for the NACA to use in its flight research programs. The aircraft 
resulting from this MoU would be the fastest, highest-flying, and by far the most 
expensive of these joint projects .
 The MoU provided that technical direction of the research project would 
be the responsibility of the NACA, acting “with the advice and assistance of a 
Research Airplane Committee” composed of one representative each from the 
Air Force, Navy, and the NACA. The New Developments Office of the Fighter 
Aircraft Division at Wright Field would manage the development phase of the 
project. The NACA would conduct the flight research, and the Navy was essen-
tially left paying part of the bills with little active roll in the project, although 
it would later supply biomedical expertise and a single pilot. The NACA and 
the Research Airplane Committee would disseminate the research results to the 
military services and aircraft industry as appropriate based on various security 
considerations. The concluding statement on the MoU was, “Accomplishment of 
this project is a matter of national urgency.”27  
 The final MoU was originated by Trevor Gardner, Air Force Special Assistant 
for Research and Development, in early November 1954 and forwarded for the 
signatures of James H. Smith, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, and 
Hugh L. Dryden, director of the NACA, respectively. Dryden signed the MoU on 
23 December 1954 and returned executed copies to the Air Force and Navy.28  
 John Becker, Norris Dow, and Hartley Soulé made a formal presentation to 
the Department of Defense Air Technical Advisory Panel on 14 December 1954. 
The panel approved the program, with the anticipated $12.2 million cost coming 
from Department of Defense contingency funds as well as Air Force and Navy 
research and development funds.29  
  
26 Memorandum of Understanding, signed by Hugh L. Dryden, Director of NACA, James H. Smith, Jr., Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy (Air), and Trevor Gardner, Special Assistant for R&D, USAF, subject: Principles for the 
Conduct by the NACA, Navy, and Air Force of a Joint Project for a New High-Speed Research Airplane, 23 
December 95. In the files at the NASA History Office; Walter C. Williams, “X-5 Concept Evolution,” a paper in 
the Proceedings of the X-15 30th Anniversary Celebration, Dryden Flight Research Facility, Edwards, California, 
8 June 989, NASA report CP-305, p. .
27 System Development Plan, X-5 Research Aircraft, Supporting Research System Number 7L, 22 March 956, 
In the files at the AFFTC History Office; Memorandum of Understanding for the X-5. The Research Airplane Com-
mittee was separate from the Research Airplane Projects Panel or the Research Airplane Program Committee.
28 Memorandum of Understanding for the X-5; letter, James H. Smith Jr. Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Air), 
to Hugh L. Dryden, Director of NACA, 2 December 95; letter, Hugh L. Dryden to Trevor Gardner returning a 
signed copy of the MoU, 23 December 95. In the files at the NASA History Office.
29 Memorandum, A. L. Sea, Assistant Chief, Fighter Aircraft Division, to Director of Weapons Systems Office, WADC, 
subject: new research aircraft, 29 December 95. In the files at the ASD History Office.
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 After the Christmas holidays, on 30 December, the Air Force sent invita-
tion-to-bid letters to Bell, Boeing, Chance-Vought, Convair, Douglas, Grumman, 
Lockheed, Martin, McDonnell, North American, Northrop, and Republic. Inter-
ested companies were asked to attend the bidders’ conference on 18 January 1955 
after notifying the procurement officer no later than 10 January. An abstract of the 
NACA Langley study was attached with a notice that it was “representative of 
possible solutions” but not a requirement to be satisfied.30  
 This was undoubtedly the largest invitation-to-bid list yet for an X-plane, but 
many contractors were uncertain about its prospects. Since it was not a production 
contract, the potential profits were limited. Given the significant technical chal-
lenges, the possibility of failure was high. Of course, the state-of-the-art experi-
ence and public-relations benefits were potentially invaluable. It was a difficult 
choice even before Wall Street and stock prices became paramount. Ultimately, 
Grumman, Lockheed, and Martin expressed little interest and did not attend the 
bidders’ conference, leaving nine possible competitors. At the bidders’ conference, 
representatives from the remaining contractors met with Air Force and NACA per-
sonnel to discuss the competition and the basic design requirements. The list of 
participants read like a Who’s Who of the aviation world . Robert Woods and Walter 
Dornberger from Bell attended. Boeing sent George Martin, the designer of the 
B-47 . Ed Heinemann from Douglas was there. Northrop sent William Ballhaus.31 
 During the bidders’ conference the Air Force announced that each compa-
ny could submit one prime and one alternate proposal that might offer an un-
30 Letter, Colonel Carl F. Damberg, Chief, Aircraft Division, Air Materiel Command, to Bell Aircraft Corporation et 
al., subject: competition for new research aircraft, 30 December 95; memorandum, A. L. Sea, to Director of 
WSO, WADC, no subject, 29 December 95; letter, John B. Trenholm, Chief, New Development Office, Fighter 
Aircraft Division, WADC, to Commander, ARDC, subject: New Research Aircraft, 3 January 955. In the files at 
the AFMC History Office.
3 Minutes from the X-5 Bidder’s Conference, 8 January 955. The attendance sheet was attached as an exhibit. 
In the files at the AFMC History Office.
Also accompanying the invitation-to-bid letters was a simple chart that showed the expected flight trajec-
tory for the new research airplane. It was expected that each flight would provide about 130 seconds of  
good research data after engine burnout. This performance was almost exactly duplicated by the X-15 
over the course of  the flight program. (NASA)
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conventional but potentially superior solution. The Air Force also informed the 
prospective contractors that an engineering study only would be required for a 
modified aircraft in which an observer replaced the research instrumentation, per 
the stated Navy preference. A significant requirement was that the aircraft had to 
be capable of attaining a velocity of 6,600 fps and altitudes of 250,000 feet. Other 
clarifications included that the design would need to allocate 800 pounds, 40 cu-
bic feet, and 2 .25 kilowatts of power for research instrumentation. A requirement 
that would come back to haunt the procurement was that flight tests had to begin 
within 30 months of contract award.
ENGINE OPTIONS
 The engine situation was somewhat more complicated. Given that everybody 
now agreed that the General Electric A1 (Hermes) engine was unacceptable, the 
Power Plant Laboratory listed the Aerojet XLR73, Bell XLR81, North American 
NA-5400, and Reaction Motors XLR10 as engines the airframe contractors could 
use. The four engines were a diverse collection.32  
 The Aerojet XLR73-AJ-1 had a single thrust chamber that used white fum-
ing nitric acid and jet fuel as propellants. As it then existed, the engine developed 
10,000 lbf at sea level, but a new nozzle was available that raised that to 11,750 
lbf. The engine was restartable in flight by electric ignition and was infinitely vari-
able between 50% and 100% thrust. A cluster of several engines was necessary 
to provide the thrust needed for the new research airplane. At the time the Power 
Plant Laboratory recommended the engine, it had passed its preliminary flight 
rating qualification, with a first flight scheduled for April 1956.33  
 The development of the Bell XLR81-BA-1, usually called the Hustler en-
gine, was part of Project MX-1964—the Convair B-58 Hustler . The B-58 was a 
supersonic bomber that carried its nuclear weapon in a large external pod, and the 
XLR81 was supposed to provide the pod with extra range after it was released 
from the bomber. The engine was a new design based on the engine used in the 
GAM-63 RASCAL missile. A single thrust chamber used red, fuming nitric acid 
and jet fuel to produce 11,500 lbf at sea level and 15,000 lbf at 70,000 feet . Suf-
ficient thrust for the hypersonic research airplane would come from a cluster of 
at least three engines. The existing XLR81 was not throttleable or restartable in 
flight. Since ignition occurred after the B-58 dropped the weapons pod, the engine 
included a minimum number of safety components to save weight. At the time the 
32 Memorandum, J. W. Rogers to Chief, Power Plant Laboratory,  January 955. In the files at the AFMC History 
Office; WADC report 5MCP-9932, Confidential, no date. In the files at the AFFTC History Office. Discussions 
concerning the Reaction Motors LR8 and XLR get confusing. They were essentially identical engines, both 
based on the Reaction Motors 6000C. Within each family some variants used turbopumps, while others relied 
on pressurized propellant tanks. All of the engines provided “thrust stepping” by igniting and extinguishing various 
combinations of the four thrust chambers. The Air Force evaluated the XLR since they had that engine under 
contract; the results were equally applicable to the LR8. At the time, Navy rocket engines used even numbers in 
the designations, and Air Force engines used odd numbers.
33 WADC confidential report 5MCP-9932, no title, no date, no page numbers. In the files at the AFFTC His- 
tory Office.
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Power Plant Laboratory recommended the engine, it had passed its preliminary 
flight rating qualification, with a first flight scheduled for January 1957.34 
 Although the Power Plant Laboratory included the engine on its list of candi-
dates, and history papers often mention it, the NA-5400 apparently had little to of-
fer the program. North American was using the effort as the basis for component 
development, with no plans to assemble a complete engine. If they had, it would 
only have developed 5,400 lbf at sea level (hence its company designation). The 
turbopump assembly was theoretically capable of supporting engines up to 15,000 
lbf, and the power plant proposed for the new research airplane consisted of three 
separate engines arranged as a unit. The engine was restartable in flight using a 
catalyst ignition system. The propellants were hydrogen peroxide and jet fuel, 
with the turbopump driven by decomposed hydrogen peroxide.35 
 The Reaction Motors XLR10 Viking engine presented some interesting op-
tions, although Reaction Motors had already abandoned further development in 
favor of the more powerful XLR30 “Super Viking” derivative. As it existed, the 
XLR10 produced 20,000 lbf at sea level using liquid oxygen and alcohol propel-
lants . The XLR30 then under development produced 50,000 lbf using liquid oxy-
gen and anhydrous ammonia. The Power Plant Laboratory preferred to connect two 
XLR10 thrust chambers to a single XLR30 turbopump, believing this arrangement 
took better advantage of well-developed components and lowered the risk. The 
fact that the XLR10/XLR30 discussion used over two pages of the four-and-a-half-
page engine report showed the laboratory’s enthusiasm. Interestingly, as designed, 
the engine was not throttleable or restartable in flight, nor was it man-rated.36 
 In response to one contractor’s comment that three of the four engines ap-
peared unsuitable because they lacked a throttling capability, the government in-
dicated it would undertake any necessary modifications to the engine selected by 
the winning airframe contractor.37 
 Between the time of the airframe bidders’ conference and the 9 May sub-
mission deadline, Boeing, Chance-Vought, Grumman, and McDonnell notified 
the Air Force that they did not intend to submit formal proposals. This left Bell, 
Convair, Douglas, North American, Northrop, and Republic. It would seem that 
Bell and Douglas would have the best chances, given their history of developing 
X-planes. The Navy D-558-3 study would also appear to provide a large advantage 
to Douglas. On the other hand, although Convair, North American, and Republic 
had no particular experience in developing X-planes, they were in the process of 
either studying or developing high-speed combat aircraft or missiles. Northrop 
had little applicable experience of any sort, but had a long history of producing 
innovative designs.
  
3 Bell report 02-95-06, “Project 226: X-5 Liquid Rocket Engine Proposal,” Secret, 25 February 955. Courtesy 
of Benjamin F. Guenther; WADC confidential report 5MCP-9932.
35 WADC confidential report 5MCP-9932.
36 WADC confidential report 5MCP-9932; Reaction Motors report TR-905-C, “Rocket Engine for New Re-
search Airplane,” Secret, 26 February 955. Courtesy of Benjamin F. Guenther. This was the engine used by the 
Martin Viking sounding rocket, which eventually formed the first stage of the Vanguard launch vehicle. Reaction 
Motors had begun developing the engine for this vehicle on  October 96, and the first launch was on 3 May 
99. Fourteen Vikings were launched at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.
37 Letter, Colonel Carl F. Damberg, Chief, Aircraft Division, AMC, to Bell et al., subject: Project 226 competition, 2 
February 955. In the files at the AFMC History Office.
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 During this period, representatives from the airframe contractors met with 
NACA personnel on numerous occasions and reviewed technical information on 
various aspects of the forthcoming research airplane. The NACA also provided 
data from tests in the Ames 10-by-14-inch and Langley 11-inch tunnels . Coordi-
nation on the NACA side became easier when Arthur W. Vogeley, an aeronauti-
cal research scientist from the Flight Research Division at Langley, became the 
NACA project engineer on 10 January 1955. Vogeley would act as a single point 
of contact for the NACA, with offices at both Langley and Wright Field.38 
 On 17 January 1955, NACA representatives met with Wright Field personnel 
and were informed that the research airplane was identified as Air Force Project 
1226, System 447L, and would be officially designated the X-15.39  The Fighter 
Aircraft Division of the WADC managed the project since the requirements for 
the aircraft most closely resembled those for a contemporary jet fighter. In reality, 
except for some procurement and oversight functions, the division would have 
little to do because the X-15 Project Office and the Research Airplane Commit-
tee actually controlled most aspects of the project. The X-15 enjoyed a national 
priority of 1-B, with a category of A-1. The Air Force also announced that the 
WADC project engineer would be First Lieutenant (soon to be Captain) Chester E. 
McCollough, Jr. BuAer subsequently selected George A. Spangenberg40 as the 
Navy project engineer.41 
 Early in March the NACA issued a research authorization (A73L179) that 
would cover the agency’s work on Project 1226 during the design competition 
and evaluation. The contractors concentrated on preparing their proposals and 
frequently consulted with both the NACA and WADC. For instance, on 15 April 
John I. Cangelosi from Republic called John Becker to obtain information on the 
average recovery factors used for swept-wing heat transfer. Later that day Becker 
transmitted the answer to NACA Headquarters, which then forwarded it to each 
of the competing contractors on 26 April.42  
 The Air Force and the NACA also were working on the procedures to evalu-
ate the proposals. During March the NACA Evaluation Group was created with 
Hartley Soulé (research airplane project leader), Arthur Vogeley (executive secre-
tary), John Becker (Langley), Harry J. Goett (Ames), John L . Sloop (Lewis), and 
Walt Williams (HSFS) as members.
 In early February, ARDC Headquarters sent a letter to all parties emphasizing 
that the evaluation was a joint undertaking, and the ultimate selection needed to 
satisfy both the military and the NACA. The evaluation involved the X-15 Project 
 
38 Letter, Clotaire Wood to Ames, Lewis, Langley, HSFS, NACA Liaison Office, no subject, 2 February 955.
39 Interestingly, the designation was “Confidential” until after the mockup was approved.
0 Spangenberg joined the Naval Air Factory in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in 935. In 939 he transferred to the 
then Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer) in Washington, DC, and became director of the Evaluation Division of the 
Naval Air Systems Command in 957, serving in that position until his retirement in 973.
 R&D Project card, DD-EDB(A)8, Project 226, 7 March 955. In the files at the AMC History Office; A “rewritten” 
project card dated 22 March 956 can be found in the AFFTC History Office. The latter card lists the requirements 
as “to provide exploratory data on the aerodynamic, structural, and physiological problems of manned flight at 
speeds up to 6,600 fps [Mach 6.0] and at altitudes up to 250,000 feet.”
2 Letter, Clotaire Wood to Bell, Convair, Douglas, North American, Northrop, and Republic, no subject, 26 April 
955. It is normal in competitive environments for the contractors to ask questions to clarify various points of the 
competition. Under the procurement rules, the government must make the answers to all questions available to 
every contractor in order to keep the playing field level.
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Office, the WADC laboratories, and the NACA, while the Air Materiel Command 
and Navy played subordinate roles. The four evaluation areas were the capability 
of the contractor, the technical design, the airplane performance, and the cost.43 
 The Research Airplane Committee would begin evaluating the proposals 
when it met on 17 May at Wright Field. Slightly complicating matters, the Air 
Force raised the security classification on most X-15-related activities from Con-
fidential to Secret. This restricted access to the evaluation material by some en-
gineers and researchers, but mostly placed additional controls on the physical 
storage locations for the material.44 
THE COMPETITION
The airframe proposals from Bell, Douglas, North American, and Republic 
arrived on 9 May 1955. Convair and Northrop evidently decided they had little to 
offer the competition. Two days later the various evaluation groups (the WADC, 
NACA, and Navy) received the technical data, and the results were due to the 
X-15 Project Office by 22 June.45  
 In mid-May, Soulé, as chair of the NACA evaluation group, sent the evalu-
ation criteria to the NACA laboratories . The criteria included the technical and 
manufacturing competency of each contractor, the schedule and cost estimates, 
the design approach, and the research utility of each airplane. Each NACA labora-
tory had specific technical areas to evaluate. For instance, Ames and Langley were 
assigned to aerodynamics; Ames, the HSFS, and Langley to flight control; HSFS 
to crew provisions and carrier aircraft; and the HSFS and Lewis to the engine and 
propulsion system. Soulé expected all the responses no later than 13 June, giving 
him time to reconcile the results before submitting a consolidated NACA position 
to the Air Force on 22 June. Later arrangements ensured that engine evaluations, 
also coordinated among the WADC, NACA, and Navy, would be available to the 
 
3 Letter, Brigadier General Donald R. Ostrander, Director of Development, Deputy Commander of Technical Opera-
tions, ARDC, to Commander, WADC, subject: X-5 Special Research Airplane, 2 February 955. letter, Brigadier 
General Donald R. Ostrander to Commander, WADC, no subject, 2 February 955; letter, Brigadier General 
Howell M. Estes, Jr., Director of WSO, WADC, to Commander, ARDC, subject: X-5 research aircraft,  April 
955. Both in the files at the AFMC History Office; letter, Brigadier General Howell M. Estes, Jr., to Commander, 
ARDC, no subject,  April 955. In the files at the ASD History Office. At first the X-5 was coordinated by the 
WADC Project Office staff since it was not yet an officially-funded program. Once Project 226 was created as its 
own entity, the X-5 Project Office was created within Detachment One of the WADC Project Office to oversee the 
new research airplane. On 2 April 95, a collection of independent Air Force laboratories located at Wright Field 
were consolidated to form the WADC. When the WADC became the Wright Air Development Division (WADD) on 
5 December 959, the WADC Project Office became the Weapon System Project Office (WSPO) and reported 
to ARDC Headquarters. The X-5 entity was renamed the X-5 WSPO. Some of the WSPOs became system 
program offices (SPOs) on 9 January 96, but the X-5 office does not appear to have been one of these. When 
the Aeronautical Systems Division came into being on 7 March 96, the X-5 WSPO again became the X-5 
Project Office and moved under the Deputy for Systems Management, Defense Systems Program Office (ASZDX). 
For simplicity, this text uses X-5 Project Office throughout.
 Letter, Colonel Paul F. Nay, Chief, Aeronautics and Propulsion Division, Deputy Commander of Technical Operations, 
ARDC, to Commander, WADC, subject: X-5 research aircraft, 26 April 955. In the files at the ASD History Office.
5 Letter, Hugh L. Dryden, Director of NACA, to Deputy Director of R&D DCS/D, USAF, no subject, 20 May 955; 
letter, Rear Admiral Robert S. Hatcher, Assistant Chief of R&D, BuAer, USN, to Commander, WADC, subject: 
Agreements Reached by ‘Research Airplane Committee’ on Evaluation Procedure for X-5 Research Airplane 
Proposals, 3 May 955. In the files at the Navy History Center.
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Research Airplane Committee on 12 July. The final evaluation would take place 
during a meeting at Wright Field on 25 July.46 
 Given the amount of effort that John Becker and the Langley team had 
put into their preliminary configuration, one might have thought that all of the 
contractors would use it as a starting point for their proposals. This was not 
necessarily the case. The Air Materiel Command had made it clear from the be-
ginning that the Becker concept was “representative of possible solutions.” Beck-
er agreed with this; he in no way thought that his was an optimal design, and the 
bidders were encouraged to look into other configurations they believed could 
meet the requirements.47  
 As it turned out, each of the four proposals represented a different approach to 
the problem, although to the casual observer they all appeared outwardly similar. 
This is exactly what the government had wanted—the industry’s best responses 
on building the new airplane. Two of the bidders selected the Bell XLR81 engine, 
and the other two chose the Reaction Motors XLR30 . Despite this, all of the air-
planes were of approximately the same size and general configuration. In the end, 
the government would have to evaluate these varied designs and determine which 
would most likely allow the desired flight research.
The Bell Proposal
Bell would have seemed a logical choice to develop the new research air-
plane since the company had developed the X-1 series and X-2 high-speed re-
search aircraft that had ushered in a new era of flight research. They were also 
doing studies on much faster vehicles in search of the BoMi boost-glide bomb-
er. The company had direct experience with advanced heat-resistant metals and 
with the practical issues of powering manned aircraft using liquid-fueled rocket 
engines. In fact, Bell had an in-house group that built rocket engines, includ-
ing one under consideration for the X-15. Lawrence Bell, Robert Woods, and 
Walter Dornberger were already legends. Somehow, all of this was lost in 
the proposal .48  
 Unsurprisingly, Bell engineers decided the Bell-manufactured XLR81 was 
the most promising engine, and it became the baseline; however, the XLR30 of-
fered certain advantages and Bell proposed the alternative D-171B variant using 
this engine. The design had three XLR81s arranged in a triangular pattern with 
one engine mounted above the others, much like the later Space Shuttle Orbiter . 
Bell believed that the ability to operate a single XLR81 at its 8,000-lbf “half-
thrust” setting was an advantage, based on a reported comment from the NACA 
6 Suborder, John B. Trenholm, Chief, New Development Office, Fighter Aircraft Division, to Chief, Rocket Section, 
Power Plant Laboratory, WADC, subject: X-5 Research Aircraft, 20 June 955. In the files at the ASD History Of-
fice; memorandum, Brigadier General Howell M. Estes, Jr., Director of WSO, to Director of Laboratories, WADC, 
subject: X-5 Evaluation, 28 June 955. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research Agency. 
7 Dryden, “General Background” pp. xvii-xix; letter John V. Becker to Dennis R. Jenkins, 29 June 2003.
8 Author’s note. Reading the Bell proposal and accompanying data, it is easy to see why the company was scored 
low in the evaluation. Although it was readily apparent that Bell had a great deal of talent, the proposal never of-
fered the reader a sense that the Bell representatives had their hands wrapped around the problem of building a 
hypersonic research aircraft. Almost every innovation they proposed was hedged in such a manner as to make the 
reader doubt that it would work. The proposal itself seemed rather poorly organized, and was internally inconsistent 
(i.e., weights and other figures frequently differed between sections). The design appeared to be an attempt to build 
an operational aircraft instead of one intended to do research into the high-temperature structural environment.
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that “a high percentage of the flight testing would be conducted in the lower speed 
and altitude ranges.” Bell did not record who made the comment, but given that 
only 36 of the eventual 199 X-15 flights were below Mach 3, it was obviously 
incorrect. Unfortunately, it seemed to influence the Bell proposal throughout.49 
 A throttle lever controlled engine thrust by actuating a series of switches 
arranged so that thrust increased as the pilot pushed the lever forward in the con-
ventional manner. The initial switch fired the first engine at its 8,000-lbf half- 
power setting. The second switch caused this engine to go to 14,500-lbf full power. 
The next switch fired the second engine at its 14,500-lbf setting, resulting in a 
29,000-lbf thrust. The last switch started the third engine, resulting in a full thrust 
of 43,500 lbf. The engineers did not consider the slightly asymmetrical thrust 
provided by the triangular engine to be a problem.50  
 The selection of a conventional aerodynamic configuration simplified the ar-
rangement of the fuselage and equipment systems. The fuselage had six major 
sections. The forward section contained the pilot’s compartment, nose gear, and 
research instrumentation, followed by the forward oxidizer tank. A center section 
housed the wing carry-through, main landing skids, and pressurization systems, 
followed by the aft oxidizer tank and fuel tank. The aft section contained the 
engine and empennage. A pressurized area just behind the cockpit contained the 
hydraulic and electrical systems, environmental control equipment, and research 
instrumentation. The hydrogen peroxide supply, the main landing gear, and the 
structure for suspending the research airplane from the carrier aircraft were locat-
ed in the center of the fuselage between the two oxidizer tanks. A flush-mounted 
canopy minimized drag and avoided discontinuities in the airflow that could result 
in thermal shocks on the glass.51 
 One of the unfortunate consequences of selecting the XLR81 was that the red, 
fuming nitric acid required a large storage volume, which caused the oxidizer to be 
stored in two tanks (one on either side of the wing carry-through). This was neces-
sary to maintain the center of gravity within acceptable limits, but complicated the 
attachment of the wing to the fuselage. Bell investigated bolting the wing directly 
to the oxidizer tank or passing the structure through the tank. This, however, was 
not considered ideal “since it would present a hazard in the form of a possible 
fatigue failure as the result of the combination of localized wing loads and tank 
pressurization loads.” The 61S-T aluminum propellant tanks were generally simi-
lar to those used on the Bell MX-776 (GAM-63) RASCAL missile program.52 
 The wing had a leading-edge sweep of 37 degrees to moderate center-of-
pressure shifts at subsonic and transonic speeds. Engineers had discovered that 
higher sweep angles resulted in pitch-up and damping-in-roll difficulties that Bell 
wanted to avoid. At the same time, researchers found that the aspect ratio was 
not particularly important, so it was set to provide decent subsonic and landing 
 
 
9 Bell report D7-95-00, “X-5 Research Airplane Proposal Aircraft Design Report,” 6 May 955, pp. -2; 
Bell report D7-95-003, “X-5 Airplane Proposal Summary Report,” 5 May 955, p. 8.
50 “X-5 Airplane Proposal Summary Report,” p. 8.
5 “X-5 Research Airplane Proposal Aircraft Design Report,” pp. 5-6. 
52 “X-5 Airplane Proposal Summary Report,” pp. 9-0. 
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attitudes. The total wing area was 220 square feet, allowing a reasonable landing 
speed of 170 mph.53 
 Approximately one-third of the vertical stabilizer area was located under the 
fuselage to maintain high-speed stability. This ventral stabilizer was added “to 
provide sufficient directional stability to M=7.0. This lower surface is very effec-
tive at high Mach numbers because of the compressive flow field below the wing.” 
Bell attempted to provide as much area as possible while still maintaining suffi-
cient clearance for the D-171 to be loaded into the carrier aircraft without resorting 
to a folding or retractable design. Before the airplane could land, the pilot would 
jettison the ventral stabilizer to provide sufficient clearance for the landing gear. A 
parachute lowered the ventral to a safe landing, although Bell noted that deleting 
the parachute would save a little weight, with the ventral becoming expendable.54 
 Landing skids were a logical choice to save weight but the exact nature of 
these skids was the subject of some study. A two-skid arrangement—one forward 
and one aft—was considered too unstable during landing, although a drag chute 
could be used to overcome this, as was done on the SM-62 Snark missile. Still, 
the arrangement was undesirable. A nose wheel with a single aft skid was stati-
cally stable, but model tests showed that it was dynamically unstable. A good pilot 
could land the aircraft with this arrangement, but Bell rejected the configuration 
because it placed too placed a great burden on the pilot. Two forward skids and a 
single aft skid offered neutral stability, but experience with the Sud-Est SE5003 
Baroudeur showed that it still placed a high burden on the pilot. Bell finally se-
lected a conventional tricycle arrangement with a nose wheel and two main skids 
located midway aft on the fuselage. Both the nose gear and skids were retractable 
and covered with doors, unlike the eventual X-15 where the rear skids did not 
retract inside the fuselage.55 
 The fully loaded airplane weighed 34,140 pounds at launch, including 21,600 
pounds of propellants. The estimated landing weight was 12,595 pounds. Based 
on a launch at Mach 0.6 and 40,000 from a B-36 carrier aircraft, Bell estimated 
that the D-171 could exceed the basic performance requirements. The projected 
maximum altitude during the “space leap” was 400,000 feet. At altitudes between 
85,000 and 165,000 feet, the velocity was in excess of 6,600 fps, with a maximum 
of 6,850 fps at 118,000 feet .56 
 A set of reaction controls used eight hydrogen peroxide thrusters: one pointed 
up and another down at each wing tip for roll control, one up and one down at the 
tail for pitch control, and one pointing left and one right at the tail for yaw control. 
A single control stick in the cockpit controlled the thrusters and aerodynamic 
control systems. Bell noted that “no criteria are available for the design of such 
53 Ibid, p. . 
5 Ibid, p. 5. 
55 Ibid, p. 3. The Baroudeur was a small lightweight fighter designed by the French during the early 950s. The 
nationalized SNCASE Company (later shortened to Sud-Est, a predecessor of Aerospatiale) set out to produce 
a conventional, swept-wing, transonic fighter that could operate out of pastures and plowed fields that were too 
rough for most other aircraft. The resulting aircraft took off using a rocket-propelled sled and recovered using 
a skid landing gear consisting of two forward units and another built into its ventral stabilizer. The prototype SE 
5000 first flew on  August 953. The results were encouraging enough that the French government ordered 
three pre-production SE 5003 aircraft. The SE 5003s passed their initial operational tests, but a combination of 
political and budget problems forced the cancellation of the program before production began.
56 “X-5 Airplane Proposal Summary Report,” 5 May 955, p. 6.
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controls,” so the company arbitrarily assumed that aerodynamic controls would be 
ineffective at dynamic pressures below 10 psf. Bell expected the X-15 to operate 
in flight regimes that required reaction controls for about 115 seconds per high-
altitude mission, and provided 550 pounds of hydrogen peroxide. Operating all of 
the thrusters for the entire 115-second flight (something that obviously would not 
happen) used only 49% of the available propellant.57 
 The researchers at Bell did not believe the hot-structure data provided by the 
NACA from the Becker studies. This may have reflected a bias on the part of Bell 
engineers who had been working on alternate high-speed structures for several 
years. The Bell proposal contained a detailed discussion on why conventional or 
semi-conventional structures would not work, and the hot-structure concept fell 
into the latter category.
 A survey of available materials showed that Inconel X was the best avail-
able high-temperature alloy for a conventional structure—the same conclusion 
reached at Langley. Bell estimated that an Inconel X airframe would weigh ap-
proximately 180% as much as an equivalent structure made from aluminum 
75S-T. Bell noted that the “usual expedient” of adding additional material would 
not relieve all of the thermal stresses unless sufficient material were added to 
absorb the entire expected heat load, leading to a structure that would be too 
57 Ibid, pp. 7-8.
The Bell entry in the X-15 competition bore a subtle resemblance to their X-2 research airplane 
that had such an unhappy career. Bell had considerable theoretical experience with thermal protection 
systems as part of  its ongoing work on the Air Force BoMi and RoBo programs, and much practical 
experience with high-speed X-planes such as the X-1 and X-2. Ultimately, the Bell proposal finished 
third in the competition. (Bell Aircraft Company)
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heavy to accomplish its assigned mission. The Bell engineers also thought 
that “the stresses and deformations produced by temperature gradients cannot 
generally be reduced by the simple addition of more material.”58  
 The second approach was to use what Bell called semi-conventional struc-
tures. In addition to adding sufficient material to absorb the heat load, the design-
ers attempted to develop structures that would be free to warp and bend as they 
heated. Bell believed that all of the design approaches they tried would fail in 
operation. For instance, Bell designers decided it would be impossible to use in-
tegral propellant tanks in a hot-structure airframe because “no suitable structural 
arrangement has been found for attaching propellant tank ends and baffles to the 
outer shell without introducing serious thermal stresses.” When they investigated 
the use of separate tanks, they found the weight penalty to be severe. 
 Bell also briefly investigated actively cooled structures, such as the “water 
wall” concept developed early in the BoMi studies. The basic structure weighed lit-
tle more than a conventional aluminum airframe, but including the weight of cool-
ant and pumping equipment resulted in the concept being 200–300% heavier.59
 In a fuzzy look at things to come for the Space Shuttle, Bell investigated a 
structure protected by external insulation and concluded that “[c]eramic materials 
would seem attractive for insulation, except that the present state of development 
for this application is not well enough advanced….”60  
 As it turned out, Bell had an alternative, developed during the ongoing BoMi 
studies. This unique double-wall structure used air as an insulator, permitting 
heat transfer by radiation in addition to conduction. The outer wall consisted of a 
0 .005-inch-thick Inconel X skin panel, approximately 4 inches long and 8 inches 
wide, welded to a corrugated sheet of Inconel X. The corrugations were 0.3125 
inch deep with 0.3125-inch spacing. An outside retaining strip of Inconel X (ap-
proximately 1.25 inches wide and 0.056 inch thick), running along each edge, 
held each panel in place. The edges of the corrugations, top and bottom, were jog-
gled 0.056 inch so that the outer surface was flush. In the bottom, joggled portion 
of each of the corrugations, 0.015-inch-deep protruding dimples provided support 
for the outer wall panels to the inner structure. The combination of the dimple and 
joggle raised the outer wall panel to a height slightly over 0.375 inch from the in-
ner structure, providing the necessary air space for insulation. The retaining strip 
was broken into 4-inch lengths to permit expansion relative to the inner structure, 
and two screws and two floating inverted-type anchor nuts held each retaining 
strip to the structure. These provided the required air space between the inner and 
outer walls to minimize heat conduction into the inner structure. Narrow strips of 
fibrous insulation located beneath the retaining strips prevented boundary air 
from leaking between the outer panels and their retaining strips.61 
 This arrangement allowed the outer wall panels to expand in the direction 
parallel to the corrugations simply by sliding further under the retaining strips. 
Separating the skin into elements only 4 inches wide accommodated the thermal 
58 Ibid, pp. 20-23.
59 Ibid, pp. 9-23.
60 Ibid, p. 23.
6 Ibid, pp. 23-2.
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expansion of the outer skin of the outer wall . In order to prevent the parallel, free 
edges of this very thin skin from lifting due to aerodynamic forces, “Pittsburgh” 
joints interconnected the edges of adjacent panels. This is a standard sheet-metal 
joint, but in this application “considerable clearance” was used so that the adjacent 
panels were free to move relative to one another to permit thermal expansions.62
 Two pins set in the basic structure restrained each of the 4-by-8-inch outer 
wall panels against lateral movement. One of these pins fit snugly into a hole in 
a small square plate welded to the bottom of two adjacent corrugations, thus pre-
venting any translations. The other pin fit into a slotted hole, permitting expansion 
but preventing rotation. Thus the outer wall had complete freedom of expansion 
relative to the underlying aluminum alloy structure. Its shallow depth (0.3125 
inch) and uniformity minimized thermal gradients through the wall. Although 
they cost considerably more to manufacture, Bell proposed using Haynes 188 or 
similar alloys in areas where temperatures exceeded the capability of Inconel X . 
Researchers expected that ceramic panels or various sandwich materials could 
eventually replace the Inconel outer wall.63 
 The primary advantage of the double-wall system was that it weighed some 
2,000 to 3,000 pounds less than an Inconel X hot structure . The double-wall con-
struction also minimized development time, according to Bell, since the primary 
structure of the airframe was conventional in every way, including its use of alu-
minum alloys. This limited, in theory, any development problems for the outer 
wall. Interestingly, Bell believed that the double-wall construction provided an 
advantage when it came to research instrumentation. Since the outer panels were 
easily removable, it greatly simplified the installation of thermocouples, strain 
gages, pressure orifices, and other sensors.64
 The wing and empennage used the same double-wall construction, but the 
leading edges were of unique construction. Bell noted that “it cannot be assumed 
that the optimum design has been selected since the evaluation…requires a great-
er time than afforded in this proposal period.” Bell engineers did not believe they 
could accurately predict the heat transfer coefficients, but noted that the equilib-
rium temperature of the leading edges could approach 2,500°F. At this tempera-
ture, Bell was not sure that any metallic alloy would be sufficient, or whether a 
ceramic was necessary instead. Nevertheless, Bell proposed a metal heat sink. A 
0 .040-inch-thick Inconel X shell formed the desired leading-edge shape with a 
chord-wise dimension of approximately 6.5 inches (normal to the leading edge). 
Properly spaced, welded ribs provided attachment fittings, and intermediate ribs 
provided support to ensure that air pressure would not deform the shell. Lithium, 
beryllium, magnesium, or sodium (listed in descending order of preference) filled 
the leading edge shell as a heat sink.65 
 All of the leading edges were easily removable, facilitating the substitution 
of various types of leading-edge designs for flight research and evaluation. The 
62 Ibid, p. 23. Essentially, a “Pittsburgh” joint is made by folding a length of the edge of two pieces of sheet metal 
back upon itself (bending the sheet 80 degrees), and then with one sheet upside down relative to the other, 
sliding the folds together.
63 Ibid, pp. 23-25.
6 Ibid, p. 25.
65 Ibid, pp. 27-30.
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wing leading edges were single-piece structures on each side of the airplane. The 
inboard attachment was fixed, but the other attach points were designed to allow 
span-wise motion to accommodate differences in linear expansion between the 
wing structure and the leading edge.66  
 At first, Bell selected a Boeing B-50 Superfortress for its carrier aircraft, 
mainly because it had experience with this type of airplane from the X-1 and X-2 
programs. It soon became apparent, however, that the B-50 did not have the capa-
bility to carry the D-171 and its support equipment to the altitudes required. At-
tention then turned to the Convair B-36. A comparison of the two aircraft showed 
that the B-36 had a much better rate of climb, and could launch the D-171 at Mach 
0.6 and 40,000 feet compared to Mach 0.5 and 30,000 feet for the B-50.67  
 The basic installation in the B-36 was straightforward, and Convair already 
had data on the B-36 carrying large aircraft in its bomb bays from Project Fighter 
Conveyer (FICON).68 Loading the D-171 was the same as loading the X-1 or 
X-2: a pair of hydraulic platforms under the B-36 main landing gear allowed 
the ground crew to tow the research airplane underneath the raised bomber. Al-
ternately, the bomber straddled an open pit in the ground and crews raised the 
research airplane into the bomb bays. The D-171 took up the forward three of the 
four B-36 bomb bays in order to keep the mated center of gravity at an acceptable 
position. This also minimized B-36 control problems when the D-171 dropped 
away from the bomber.69 
 As had been the case with previous research airplanes, the mated pair would 
take off with the research airplane pilot in the carrier aircraft—not in the D-171 . 
As the carrier climbed through 15,000 feet, the pilot would climb into the research 
airplane and the canopy would close. Equipment checks of the research airplane 
would begin as the carrier climbed through 35,000 feet. When the checks were 
completed, the carrier aircraft would drop the research airplane.70  
 Along with the baseline D-171 design, Bell proposed two slight variations. 
The D-171A two-seat version was a required response to the government request 
for proposal. Bell noted that that since the equipment compartment had a dif-
ferential pressure of 2.5 psi to support the instrumentation, a small increase in 
structural weight would allow the higher pressure differential necessary to carry a 
second crew member. The observer would be seated on an upward-firing ejection 
seat and have two small side windows in a separate canopy. The gross weight was 
unchanged at 34,140 pounds since the weight of the observer and the ejection seat 
exactly matched the research instrumentation load normally carried. Performance 
was also unaffected because the propellant load was identical .71  
66 Ibid, pp. 30-3.
67 Ibid, p. 5.
68 Beginning in January 95 Convair had modified 0 GRB-36Ds to carry a Republic RF-8K Thunderflash recon-
naissance fighter in their bomb bays as part of Project FICON. This was a method of extending the range of 
the B-36 and presenting a smaller target to the Soviets for reconnaissance or strike missions against heavily 
defended targets. The program progressed with little difficulty, but was operational for only a short time during 
the late 950s before being phased out in favor of the Lockheed U-2 spy plane. For further details on the B-36 
and FICON, see Dennis R. Jenkins, Magnesium Overcast: The Story of the Convair B-36, (North Branch, MN: 
Specialty Press, 200).
69 “X-5 Airplane Proposal Summary Report,” 5-53.
70 Ibid, pp. 5-53.
7 Ibid, pp. 63-6.
X-15: EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
 The second variant was the D-171B powered by a Reaction Motors XLR30 
“Super Viking” engine. Although Bell preferred to use three XLR81 engines, it 
realized that the XLR30 offered some advantages. The D-171B had an empty 
weight about 200 pounds more than the baseline configuration, but a launch 
weight of some 1,000 pounds less. Bell listed the fact that the XLR30 used liq-
uid oxygen as its oxidizer as its greatest disadvantage since this would require a 
top-off system in the carrier aircraft, which Bell believed would add “consider-
able greater weight” to the B-36.72 Bell also thought that the minimum thrust 
capability of the XLR30 (13,500 lbf) was unsatisfactory compared to the Hustler 
engine (8,000 lbf). On the positive side, the internal propellant tank arrangement 
for the XLR30-powered airplane was superior because only a single oxidizer tank 
would be needed, greatly simplifying propellant management for center-of-grav-
ity control. Bell agreed that the single XLR30 thrust chamber (versus three for the 
XLR81 installation) was also an advantage. Although no two-seat XLR30 aircraft 
was described in the proposal, it is easy to imagine a two-seat variant since the 
forward fuselage was identical to that of the D-171 .73  
 Bell expected to have the basic design established six months after the con-
tract was signed, and to finalize the design after 18 months. The first airplane 
would be available for ground tests 34 months after the start of the contract. 
Bell indicated that they attempted to compress the schedule into the required 30 
months, but were unable to do so. It would take 40 months to get to the first glide 
flight, and six additional months before the first powered flight. Bell expected 
the government to provide a complete test engine in the 27th month, and a final 
propulsion system had to be delivered to Bell simultaneously with the first aircraft 
entering ground tests.74
The Douglas Proposal
 The Model 684 was a conceptual follow-on to the successful 
D-558-1 and D-558-2 research airplanes that Douglas had built under 
Navy sponsorship beginning in 1944. It also benefited from the experience 
Douglas gained from investigating the Model 671, which is generally referred 
to as the D-558-3, during the “High Altitude and High Speed Study.”75 
 Douglas took a unique approach to designing the structure of the Model 
684, somewhat following the hot-structure concept developed at NACA Langley, 
but adding several new twists. The most obvious was that instead of Inconel X, 
Douglas chose a magnesium alloy “of sufficient gage that the structure [sic] tem-
72 Exactly why Bell thought carrier aircraft weight was an issue is not clear. The B-36 had a maximum bomb capacity 
of 8,000 pounds, not including several tons of 20-mm cannon and ammunition, plus military electronics (radar, 
ECM, etc.), all of which would have been removed. The 3,000-pound research airplane, with or without a liquid-
oxygen top-off system, was hardly pushing the lifting ability of the bomber.
73 “X-5 Airplane Proposal Summary Report,” pp. 65-66.
7 Ibid, pp. 57-58.
75 The information presented here came from the various Douglas proposal documents. See, for example, Douglas 
report ES-7926, “USAF Project 226, Douglas Model 68 High Altitude Research Airplane,” 20 May 955; 
Douglas report ES-798, “Strength Analysis and Criteria,” 29 April 955; Douglas report 9720, “Estimated 
Weight and Balance, Substantiation of Weights, and Moment of Inertia,” 29 April 955. All were originally clas-
sified Secret and provided courtesy of Benjamin F. Guenther. For a slightly more in-depth look at the Douglas 
Model 68, see Dennis R. Jenkins, “The X-5 Research Airplane Competition: The Douglas Aircraft Proposal,” 
Aerospace Projects Review, volume , number 2, March-April 2002, pp. 0-23.
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perature will not exceed 600°F.” The use of copper for the leading edges per-
mitted temperatures approaching 1,000°F. All of the proposed structure could be 
manufactured using conventional methods .76  
 The Model 684 weighed only 25,300 pounds fully loaded and had a landing 
weight of 10,450 pounds, making it the lightest of the competitors. The single 
Reaction Motors XLR30 allowed the airplane to exceed the performance speci-
fications, with a maximum 6,655 fps velocity at 110,000 feet altitude expected. 
Douglas noted that it appeared “possible to explore altitudes up to approximately 
375,000 feet without exceeding the structural limits of the airplane or the physi-
ological limits of the pilot.”77  
 The most controversial aspect of the Douglas proposal was the material se-
lected for the hot structure. In advance, Douglas defended this action: “a careful 
study was made of all the various metals that have satisfactory strength proper-
ties at elevated temperatures.” During this study Douglas eliminated everything 
except Inconel X and a thorium-zirconium alloy of magnesium called HK31 .78 
  
76 “USAF Project 226, Douglas Model 68 High Altitude Research Airplane,” no page numbers.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid. Interestingly, thorium is slightly radioactive, and in 2006 the U.S. Air Force decided that objects constructed 
from the various thorium-magnesium alloys could no longer be displayed in public museums.
Oddly, Douglas did not just dust off  the work it had accomplished for the Navy on the D-671 and 
submit it for the X-15 competition. The D-684 was a much different design that intrigued many of  the 
evaluators during the competition, and Douglas ultimately lost largely because the Inconel X hot-struc-
ture on the North American entry better supported thermal research. The Douglas proposal finished 
second in the competition. (Douglas Aircraft Company)
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 Douglas noted that the structural properties of Inconel X and HK31 fell off 
rapidly as the temperature approached 1,200°F and 600°F, respectively, and ob-
served that “[s]ince we are concerned with heating of short duration, not with sta-
bilized temperature, the specific heat79 of the material becomes a very important 
factor.” The study showed that HK31 had twice the specific heat of Inconel X . 
Since the strength-to-weight ratios of the two metals were roughly equal, Douglas 
believed the magnesium alloy was a better choice. “One must realize that less 
heat will be re-radiated by magnesium because of its lower temperature,” allow-
ing less internal insulation around critical components such as the instrumentation 
and pilot .80  
 Inconel X is difficult to machine, making Douglas engineers skeptical they 
could provide the exact thickness for a specific heat region. The magnesium alloy, 
on the other hand, was easy to machine, “so that the minimum required thickness 
at each point on the structure could be attained.” Douglas also found that less 
internal structure was required to support the magnesium skin. Combined with 
the ability to machine the metal more precisely, Douglas estimated that a magne-
sium airframe would weigh approximately 25% less than an equivalent Inconel X 
airframe. The weight of the Model 684 seemed to confirm this.81 
 The choice of magnesium was not a surprise, since Douglas had manufac-
tured the fuselage for both the D-558-1 and D-558-2 from a similar alloy. Never-
theless, it was a departure from the C-110M titanium-alloy structure investigated 
for the earlier Model 671. Of course, that airplane would have required an ablative 
coating—something that was not desirable on the X-15 because of the desire to do 
research into high temperature structures.82
 
 Douglas summarized the advantages of HK31 as follows:83
 
There will be far fewer parts due to the greater skin thick-
ness and all of the parts can be manufactured and as-
sembled with existing manufacturing facilities. An Inco-
nel airplane would require special tooling and techniques 
[further details omitted].
The reduction in the required amount of internal structure 
provides greater access to all control and instrumentation 
equipment, wiring, hydraulic actuators and piping, and al-
lows better placing of this equipment.
The 600°F temperature limit for the magnesium greatly 
eases the temperature problem for the pilot and equipment 
in the airplane. This should result in less design time.
A psychological advantage in favor of magnesium might 
79 The heat required to raise one unit of mass one degree of temperature. 
80 “USAF Project 226, Douglas Model 68 High Altitude Research Airplane,” no page numbers.
8 Ibid.
82 Ibid; Douglas report ES-7657, “High Altitude and High Speed Study,” Navy contract Nonr-266(00), 28 May 
95, pp. - and 20-2; Douglas report ES-7673, “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed Study,” 
Navy contract Nonr-266(00), 28 May 95, pp. 55-57.
83 “USAF Project 226, Douglas Model 68 High Altitude Research Airplane,” no page numbers.
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be that the pilot would prefer to fly in a gray airplane at 
600°F rather than in one that is glowing red at 1200°F.
 The last point was probably questionable, but the reduction in internal struc-
ture was striking. Photographs accompanying the proposal showed a typical wing 
panel constructed of each material. The HK31 panel used skin almost 0.5 inch thick 
and needed support only along the four edges of the panel. The Inconel X structure, 
on the other hand, used skin only 0.1 inch thick and needed support across its entire 
surface. Both samples could withstand the same aero and thermal loads.84  
 The HK31 skin was thick throughout the vehicle. Skin gages on the upper half 
of the fuselage varied from 0.38 inch near the nose to 0.12 inch at the end of the 
ogive. On the lower surface, the gage varied from 0.92 inch near the nose to 0.25 
inch at the end of the ogive on the bottom centerline. The skin on the upper surface 
of the wing was 0.35 inch thick over the entire exposed area, and 0.25 inch thick 
where the wing crossed inside the fuselage. The lower surface of the wing tapered 
from 0.64 inch near the leading edge to 0.43 inch 4 feet aft of the leading edge.85 
 The wing used seven truss-type spars that ran continuously through the fu-
selage. The skin used thick, tapered sheets stiffened by the spars and truss-type 
chord-wise ribs. Increasing the skin thickness at the wing-fuselage intersection 
created heat sinks to absorb the heating load. All of the leading edges (wing, em-
pennage, and canopy frame) were made of copper that extended far enough aft to 
conduct the extremely high temperatures in the stagnation areas away to cooler 
areas of the airframe.86 
 The forward part of the fuselage consisted of the pressurized instrumentation 
compartment and the cockpit. If desired, the airplane could carry an observer in 
lieu of the normal research instrumentation, although the accommodations were 
cramped, and the observer had no visibility and sat in an awkward position. An-
other small, pressurized compartment (2.5-psi differential) was located in the aft 
fuselage to contain the gyros, accelerometers, and other subsystems.87 
 In case of an emergency, the entire forward fuselage separated from the rest of 
the airplane via explosive bolts and a JATO bottle located near the center of grav-
ity of the nose section. Afterwards, a 5-foot-diamter metal drogue chute would 
deploy in the reefed position. When the load reached a predetermined level, the 
reefing device would automatically release and the metal drogue chute would ful-
ly open. A 50-foot-diamter fabric main parachute deployed when the load on the 
open drogue chute dropped below a predetermined value or the altitude reached 
15,000 feet .88  
 Douglas hedged its bets slightly: “It is too early to determine whether this 
escape system will be satisfactory in the event of an emergency at extremely high 
altitudes, but no other system will be as good.… The jettisonable nose will be the 
most satisfactory system for escape under the high Mach number, high Q, and 
high G conditions at which this airplane is most likely to get into trouble.” As 
8 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid; Douglas report ES-798, “Strength Analysis and Criteria,” 29 April 955, p. 3.
87 “USAF Project 226, Douglas Model 68 High Altitude Research Airplane,” no page numbers.
88 Ibid.
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events with the Bell X-2 would later show, the capsule concept did not signifi-
cantly alter the chance of survival. Of course, the Douglas system did have one 
advantage over the X-2: as proposed for the Model 684, the entire nose would 
descend to the ground, at which time the pilot would unbuckle and walk out of the 
capsule . In the X-2, the pilot had to unbuckle and jump out of the capsule after it 
separated but before it hit the ground. This assumed that the pilot had remained 
conscious during what was sure to be violent tumbling and accelerations during 
the escape. The pilot of the Model 684 had a small back-type parachute “in case 
he prefers to bail out in the conventional manner.” 89
 A liquid air supply provided a maximum differential pressure of 5 psi for the 
cockpit and instrumentation compartment. The pressurized areas were insulated 
from the structural heating by a 0.25-inch layer of high-temperature fiberglass in-
sulation located near the skin, followed by a light-gage stainless-steel radiant bar-
rier that was covered by another 1.5 inches of batt insulation. The liquid air also 
cooled a heat exchanged that conditioned the recirculated cockpit air to a constant 
80°F, and the instrumentation compartment to 150°F. There was sufficient liquid 
air for 30 minutes of full-load operation, and a warning system told the pilot to 
turn off the instrumentation if the liquid air supply ran low. The pilot’s pressure 
suit used air diverted from the cockpit supply, and a small electric heater warmed 
the air to maintain the pilot’s comfort.90 
 The windshield consisted of a 0.75-inch panel of high-temperature glass insu-
lated by a 0.25-inch air gap from a 0.25-inch safety glass panel on the inside of the 
cockpit. Douglas calculated that the outer panel would not exceed 500°F, which 
was well within the capabilities of the glass. The tinted inner panel resisted radiant 
heat and ultraviolet light. One of the items Douglas had trouble with was develop-
ing a canopy seal. The heat surrounding the cockpit structure made a normal in-
flated rubber seal impractical. Engineers discovered that the preferred Teflon seal 
gave off a “small quantity of fluorine” between 400°F and 600°F. This was con-
sidered toxic and corrosive, but might be tolerable given that the cabin pressure 
differential was in the right direction (i.e., fumes would be expelled overboard). If 
a Teflon seal was used, it would have to be replaced after every flight.91 
 Unlike the other competitors, Douglas proposed a conventional landing gear 
consisting of two main wheels, a nose wheel, and a tail wheel. The nose gear was 
located far back on the fuselage (behind the cockpit), while the main gear retract-
ed into compartments under the wing. The ventral stabilizer housed the tail wheel, 
which was needed because of the relatively high approach attitude of the research 
airplane. Ground-clearance issues during takeoff dictated that the ventral and tail 
wheels be retracted on the ground prior to loading in the carrier aircraft. They 
automatically rotated into the proper position for flight when the pilot started the 
auxiliary power units prior to launch.92 
 A single liquid-oxygen tank was located forward of the wing, but to maintain 
the correct center of gravity there were two ammonia tanks: one in the upper fu-
89 Ibid. For additional information of the Bell X-2 see Jay Miller, The X-Planes: X-1 to X-45, (Hinckley, England: Mid-
land Publishing, 200).
90 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
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selage over the wing carry-through and another behind the wing. All of the main 
propellant tanks were integral parts of the structure. Three hydrogen peroxide 
tanks were located under the wing carry-through between the main gear wells. 
A single 62-gallon tank powered the XLR30 turbopump, and two smaller tanks 
supplied the reaction control system. The Douglas proposal noted that the com-
partment that contained these tanks “must be kept clean to prevent combustion in 
the event of fuel spillage and it is therefore sealed, vinyl coated and vented to an 
adjacent compartment through a filter that will prevent dirt contamination.”93 
 Two completely independent power systems each used a separate Wal-
ter Kidde ethylene-oxide auxiliary power unit with sufficient propellant for a 
30-minute flight. Each auxiliary power unit drove a hydraulic pump and an AC/
DC generator, and operated simultaneously, although either could provide all the 
required power.94 
 The flight controls were completely conventional, with the all-moving hori-
zontal stabilizer, rudder, and ailerons all being power-boosted. Hydraulically 
operated two-position speed brakes located in the extreme aft end of the fuse-
lage provided a constant deceleration of 1.5-g when opened. The speed brakes 
automatically closed at pressures above 1,000 psf.95 
 The Douglas proposal acknowledged that “there are many formidable prob-
lems in the design of an airplane to operate over the wide Mach number and alti-
tude ranges encountered by this airplane.” Douglas embraced the wedge principle 
developed by Charles McLellan at Langley, and used the shape for the vertical 
and horizontal stabilizers. Douglas also flared the aft fuselage to provide addi-
tional stability at high Mach numbers.96 
 “Flight out of the atmosphere is another new problem” that caused Douglas 
to provide a reaction control system with 12 hydrogen peroxide thrusters, two in 
each direction about each axis. Two completely independent systems were pro-
vided (hence the two thrusters at each location), and either system was capable of 
maneuvering the airplane. The thrusters were powerful enough to rotate (and stop) 
the airplane through an angle of 90 degrees in 14 seconds when both systems were 
operational. The pitch and yaw thrusters were rated at 50 lbf each, while the roll 
thrusters were rated at 12.5 lbf each. Because of the large uncertainties involved, 
Douglas provided 640% of the amount of propellant estimated necessary for a 
single flight. In a note of caution, Douglas “recommended that a device be con-
structed for the purpose of training the pilot in this type of flight.”97
 The Model 684 was light enough that a Boeing B-50 Superfortress was a sat-
isfactory carrier aircraft. This seemingly ignored the maintenance problems and 
low in-service rate of the B-29 and B-50 carrier aircraft experienced at Edwards, 
and was a radical step backwards from the apparent use of a B-52 in the earlier 
D-558-3 study. Surprisingly, the existing X-2 carrier aircraft required very little 
 
 
93 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
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modification to accommodate the Model 684—mainly the front and rear bomb 
bay openings had to be made a little larger.98 
 Douglas conducted preliminary wind-tunnel tests on the Model 684 on 
21-22 April 1955 in the company-owned facility in El Segundo. Normally, 
Douglas would have used the more elaborate tunnel at the Guggenheim 
Aeronautical Laboratory at the California Institute of Technology (GALCIT), 
but there was insufficient time to build the more sophisticated model required at 
GALCIT. The El Segundo tunnel had a test cell that measured 30 by 45 inches and 
could generate a dynamic pressure of 60 psf. The tests did not generate any truly 
useful data, but demonstrated that the 6.5% scale model was reasonable stable at 
low speeds .99  
The North American Proposal
 North American seemed to be at a disadvantage, having never built an 
X-plane of any description. The company, however, did have a great deal of ex-
perience in building early missile prototypes. Their Missile Development Divi-
sion conducted Project NATIV experiments during the late 1940s using captured 
German V-2 rockets, and then built major parts of similar vehicles itself. The 
company had almost completed the design of the Navaho, a large intercontinental 
cruise missile designed to fly at Mach 3. In addition, the company had developed 
what were arguably the three highest-performance fighters of their eras: the P-51 
Mustang of World War II; the F-86 Sabre, which made its mark in Korea; and 
the F-100 Super Sabre, the first operational supersonic aircraft. North American 
was also involved in studies that would eventually lead to the fastest and most 
advanced bomber ever built: the XB-70A Valkyrie. They were on a roll, and the 
designers embraced the idea of building a hypersonic aircraft.100 
 Unlike the other competitors, who went in their own directions, Hugh Elkin 
and the North American Advanced Design Group stayed fairly true to the con-
figuration that John Becker and the team at Langley had proposed; in fact, the 
resemblance was striking. Their goal was also similar: “the design objective must 
be to provide a minimum practical and reliable vehicle capable of exploring this 
regime of flight. Limiting factors are time, safety, state of the art, and cost.”101 
  
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
00 The information presented here came from the various North American proposal documents. See, for example: 
North American report NA-55-22, “X-5 Advanced Research Airplane Design Summary,” 9 May 955; North 
American report NA-55-223, “Preliminary Structural Data for a X-5 Research Aircraft, Project 226 (NAA Des-
ignation ESO-787), 3 May 955; North American report NA-55-22, “Aerodynamic Characteristics Report for 
a X-5 Research Aircraft, Project 226 (N.A.A. ESO-787),” 9 May 955; North American report NA-55-226, 
“Ground Handling Equipment and Procedures for a X-5 Research Aircraft, Project 226 (NAA Designation ESO-
787),” 9 May 955; North American report NA-55-227, “Carrier Modification Data for a X-5 Research Aircraft, 
Project 226 (NAA Designation ESO-787),” 9 May 955; North American report NA-55-228, “Alighting Gear 
Data for a Research Airplane X-5 (NAA Designation ESO-787),” 9 May 955; North American report NA-55-
229, “Space Control System Data for the X-5 Research Airplane (NAA Designation ESO-787),” 9 May 955; 
North American report NA-55-57, “Propulsion System Operation for a X-5 Research Aircraft, Project 226 
(NAA Designation ESO-787),” 9 May 955; North American report NA-55-577, “Structure Thermal Suitability 
Data for a X-5 Research Aircraft, Project 226 (NAA Designation ESO-787),” 9 May 955. All were originally 
classified Secret and provided courtesy of Benjamin F. Guenther.
0 “X-5 Advanced Research Airplane Design Summary,” pp. -2.
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 North American truly grasped what the government was trying to accomplish 
with the project. The other competitors—even Douglas, who otherwise came 
closest—worked at designing an airplane that met the performance requirements. 
North American, on the other hand, “determined that the specification perfor-
mance can be obtained with very moderate structural temperatures; however, the 
airplane has been designed to tolerate much more severe heating in order to pro-
vide a practical temperature band within which exploration can be conducted.” 
Put another way, “This performance is attained without recourse to untested or 
complicated solutions to design problems. This should allow the major effort to 
be expended on obtaining the desired research information.” This was, after all, 
the point of the whole exercise .102 
 North American engineers spent a great deal of time talking to the research-
ers and other personnel at Edwards, recognizing that “a secondary, but important, 
factor considered in preliminary design is the desirability of meshing with the 
present operational pattern for research aircraft. By following the established pat-
tern of operations, a considerable saving in learning time should be achieved.” 
Given the significant increase in performance promised by the X-15, this was not 
completely possible, but it showed that North American was attempting to elimi-
nate as many variables as possible. Along the same lines, North American did not 
attempt to design an operational aircraft, recognizing that a “compromise in favor 
of extreme simplicity in order to assure a high degree of ruggedness and reliabil-
ity” would go a long way toward improving the aircraft’s research utility.103 
 An interesting passage from the proposal, especially considering the current 
trend toward trying to eliminate all programmatic risk, is found in the summary: 
“Detailed definition and solution of all problems which will be encountered in this 
program are believed impossible for a proposal of this scope; indeed, if this were 
possible, there would be little need for a research airplane.” Nevertheless, North 
American attempted to mitigate the inherent risk “by allowing for easy modifica-
tion of critical areas if the need arises,” again showing an understanding of the 
fundamental intent of the program. An example was that the forward nose section, 
the leading edges, and the wing tips were made easily replaceable “to allow panel 
structures and aerodynamic shapes to be tested economically.” Unfortunately, 
some of these innovations would never make it off the drawing board.104  
 All of the bidders, as well as the NACA and Air Force, recognized that struc-
tural heating would be the major design problem. “At a Mach number of 7, the 
boundary layer recovery temperature will be on the order of 3,499°F and the skin 
equilibrium temperature, where heat input is balanced by radiation output, will 
exceed 1,200°F even at altitudes above 100,000 feet.” North American noted that 
this approached the upper limits of Inconel X, but believed the conditions were 
02 Ibid. Authors’ note: As an engineer for several large aerospace companies working on NASA contracts, I both 
wrote and reviewed too many proposals over the years. Reading through the X-5 proposals, two things struck 
me. The Bell proposal (as mentioned in that section) was terrible—you walked away not entirely sure that Bell had 
committed themselves to the project. The opposite was true of the North American proposal. From the opening 
page, you knew that North American understood the goals of the X-5 program and would attempt to design an 
airplane that would help accomplish the task, not just meet the performance specifications (which did not fully 
describe the intent of the program).
03 North American report NA-55-22, “X-5 Advanced Research Airplane Design Summary,” p. 2.
0 Ibid, pp. 2 and 6.
X-15: EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
survivable “if flight duration is low and the skins are thick enough to form a heat 
sink of sufficient capacity.”105  
 North American noted that the wing leading edges might experience temper-
atures of 1,400°F during extreme conditions, well beyond the ability of Inconel. 
To allow this without causing permanent damage to the aircraft, the company pro-
posed to use a laminated glass cloth that would “melt or burn locally during these 
extreme cases.” The flight-test group could replace the leading-edge sections after 
each flight, and alter the shape and material as desired or necessary.106  
 The North American design was structurally similar to the one developed at 
Langley. Fabricating the basic wing as a complete semi-span assembly ensured 
rigidity, and fuselage ring frames transferred the wing skin loads across the fuse-
lage. The ring frames were made of titanium alloy with numerous web beads to 
minimize thermal stresses. The wing structural box extended from the 25% chord 
line to the 75% chord line, and a span-wise series of shear beams made from cor-
05 Ibid, pp. 6-7.
06 Ibid, p. 7.
The North American Aviation entry in the competition bore the greatest overall resemblance to the original 
NACA Langley study, but the company had refined the concept into a vehicle that would support all of  the 
required research without compromising the safety of  the pilot. The North American proposal placed first in 
the evaluation. (North American Aviation)
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rugated 24S-T aluminum and titanium-manganese alloy attach points provided 
the support for the taper-milled Inconel X skins. The spar corrugations resisted the 
normal crushing loads and served to relieve thermal stresses. The relatively low 
modulus of elasticity of the titanium-manganese attach angles reduced the thermal 
stresses induced from the hot Inconel X skins. The skin panels varied from 0.060 
inch thick at the tips to 0.125 inch thick at the fuselage fairing intersection.107  
 One controversial aspect of the North American design was the use of 
large fuselage side fairings to carry propellant lines, control cables, and wiring 
around the integral propellant tanks. Oddly, a similar fairing located on top of the 
Douglas Model 684 received much less comment from the government. Insula-
tion was required around the liquid-oxygen tank to keep the cold temperatures out 
of the tunnel, and all along the outer skin to protect against the hot temperatures. 
Segmenting the Inconel X fairings every 20 inches reduced the thermal deflections 
and stresses .108  Initially the government was concerned about possible aero- and 
thermodynamic effects of the tunnels, but early wind-tunnel studies helped North 
American reshape them slightly and they actually ended up providing beneficial 
07 Ibid, p. 9.
08 Ibid, pp. 0 and 2.
North American met the required performance requirements with an anticipated maximum altitude 
of  250,000 feet and a velocity of  7,000 fps. In reality, the eventual X-15 would greatly exceed the 
predicted altitude, while not quite meeting the velocity estimate. Still, the slight performance short-
fall did not compromise the research data and the airplane met the expectations of  the researchers. 
(North American Aviation)
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lift. It was later determined that the panels were susceptible to hypersonic panel 
flutter, and additional stiffeners were added during the flight program.
 Unlike Bell, which did not believe that a hot structure was compatible with 
integral propellant tanks, North American proposed such an arrangement from 
the beginning. The liquid-oxygen and anhydrous-ammonia tanks each consisted 
of four sections (top, bottom, and beaded sides) welded together with intermedi-
ate Inconel X bulkheads and end-dome bulkheads. Beading the sides of the liq-
uid-oxygen tank reduced stress in areas shielded from the temperature of the air 
stream by the fuselage side tunnels. One bulkhead in each tank had a manhole that 
allowed access to the tank for maintenance.109  
 In the sections of the fuselage that were not part of the propellant tanks, 
North American decided to use a series of bulkheads spaced 25 inches apart as the 
primary support for a semi-monocoque structure. The bulkheads used a series of 
radial beads to stiffen them and reduce thermal stresses. Engineers worried that 
using conventional longerons and stiffeners would lead to unwanted temperature 
gradients that would cause the structure to warp or fail, so they avoided this tech-
nique. Instead, thick Inconel skins covered a simple Inconel X structure .110  
 The pressurized areas used an aluminum-alloy inner shell to retain compart-
ment pressurization. The canopy seal was isolated from the hot skins, permitting 
the use of a conventional “blow-up” seal operated by nitrogen. This was in con-
trast to the problems Douglas expected with their Teflon canopy seal. The wind-
shield consisted of heavy fused silica or Pyrex outer panes and stretched acrylic 
inner panes. The inner low-temperature panels provided the normal pressure seal. 
All of the panes were flat to simplify fabrication and eliminate distortion.111 
 Although it was a landmark preliminary design, the Langley study intention-
ally ignored many of the details necessary to build an airplane. One such detail 
was keeping the internal temperatures at an acceptable level for the pilot and 
instrumentation. North American noted that “the lack of any convenient source 
of large quantities of either compressed air or ram air, such as is associated with 
conventional jet aircraft, requires that a new and different approach be taken to the 
solution of pressurization and cooling.” The company’s approach—using com-
pressed gas (in this case nitrogen)—was hardly unique, being similar to that taken 
by the other competitors. The cryogenic nitrogen, plus the available heat absorp-
tion inherent in its vaporization, formed the necessary heat sink for refrigeration. 
The resulting gaseous nitrogen served as the atmosphere and pressurizing agent 
for the cockpit and equipment compartments.112  
 This led directly to one North American proposal that occupied quite a bit of 
discussion after contract award. The company also wanted to pressurize the pilot’s 
full-pressure suit with nitrogen, providing breathing oxygen to the pilot through 
a separate inner breathing mask.113 Done partly for simplicity, engineers believed 
that keeping oxygen exposure to the minimum was the simplest method to guard 
09 North American report NA-55-577, “Structure Thermal Suitability Data for an X-5 Research Aircraft, Project 226 
(NAA Designation ESO-787),” 9 May 955, pp. 30-3.
0 North American report NA-55-22, “X-5 Advanced Research Airplane Design Summary,” p. 0.
 Ibid, p. .
2 Ibid, p. 8.
3 Ibid, p. 8.
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against fire in the cockpit or suit. Many within the NACA and the Air Force dis-
agreed with this approach, and discussions surrounding the full-pressure suits (and 
the use of a neck seal or a face seal) would come up many times during the first year 
of development, with Scott Crossfield leading the charge for North American.
 Like the choice of a face-mask oxygen system, North American’s decision 
to provide a simple ejection seat and a full-pressure suit for the pilot would later 
prove controversial. This combination resulted in “minimum weight and complex-
ity” and exceeded the survival probabilities of “any capsule of acceptable weight 
which could be developed within the allowable time period.” North American 
went on:114 
In the event the pilot is required to bail out, the normal procedure 
will be to use the ejection seat. The design dynamic pressures 
encountered are not higher than those assumed for present-day 
high performance aircraft, so the pilot in his seat should be able 
to clear the aircraft satisfactorily at any altitude. The protec-
tion afforded by the pressure suit will probably conserve body 
heat and provide sufficient oxygen for a free fall from very high 
altitudes. However, the two relatively unknown effects of high 
stagnation temperatures attained on the exterior of the suit upon 
entering the atmosphere after falling through space, and the 
possible high rates of angular rotation of the pilot’s body during 
free fall will have to be studied in detail to determine the maxi-
mum altitudes at which it is feasible to bail out. Current devel-
opments at NAA [North American Aviation] indicate that with 
the protection against the air stream afforded by a full pressure 
suit, a suitably stabilized ejection seat may be designed which 
will assure escape under extreme conditions.
 The wedge principle developed at Langley was evident in the vertical stabi-
lizer proposed by North American. The dorsal stabilizer had a 10% wedge sec-
tion; the ventral used a 15-degree wedge. Like the Douglas entry, the vertical was 
nominally a double-edge shape with the thickest part at 50% chord. A split trailing 
edge could open to form a “relatively obtuse blunt wedge” that greatly increased 
the lift curve slope at high Mach numbers and provided “sufficient directional 
stability without actual increase of tail area.”115 
 Another innovative feature that was the subject of some debate after the con-
tract was awarded was the use of all-moving “rolling” horizontal stabilizers instead 
of conventional ailerons and elevators .116  These operated symmetrically for pitch 
control and differentially for roll control. “Available aerodynamic data indicates 
that the configuration presented is reasonable when the complete speed range is 
considered. The all-movable surfaces for pitch, roll, and directional control are 
 Ibid, pp.  and 0.
5 Ibid, p. .
6 Other competitors bid all-moving horizontal stabilizers, but only North American proposed to operate them dif-
ferentially (“rolling”) for roll control instead of providing conventional ailerons. 
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known to be satisfactory at the higher Mach numbers. Negative dihedral is incor-
porated on the horizontal tail to lessen abrupt trim changes due to shock impinge-
ment or wake immersion.” There was an all-moving dorsal stabilizer that provided 
directional control, and a smaller fixed smaller ventral stabilizer. Split speed brakes 
were located on the sides of both the dorsal and ventral stabilizers.117  
 A separate “space control system” for use outside the atmosphere used Re-
action Motors XLR32-RM-2 thrusters (four 90-lbf units in a cruciform arrange-
ment at the nose, and one 17-lbf thruster at each wing tip). Unlike several of 
the other competitors that used the same control stick for the aerodynamic and 
reaction systems, North American used a separate lever on the right console. The 
amount of propellant for the reaction controls seemed low by comparison with 
the other competitors: whereas Bell provided 47 gallons of hydrogen peroxide 
and Douglas provided nearly the same amount, North American provided only 
3.15 gallons (36.2 pounds). The company expected this to be sufficient for “five 
gross attitude changes about each axis at approximately 6 degrees per second.”118 
This shows the amount of uncertainty that existed regarding the amount of use 
the reaction controls would receive—the first manned space flight was still six 
years away.
 Like Douglas (and the alternate, Bell), North American chose the Reaction 
Motors XLR30 engine, but stated that “it appears feasible to use any engine or 
engines in the same performance category.” Propellants would be stored in seam-
welded Inconel X tanks, with the liquid-oxygen and main ammonia tanks being 
integral parts of the fuselage. A smaller, nonstructural ammonia tank slightly in-
creased the fuel supply. Helium for propellant system pressurization was stored 
at 3,000 psi and –300°F in an Inconel X tank located on the centerline inside the 
liquid-oxygen tank. Surprisingly, there were only sufficient pressurizing gas and 
igniter propellants for three starts.119 
 Electrical and hydraulic power came from a pair of Reaction Motors 
X50AP-1 monopropellant gas turbine auxiliary power units in the aft fuselage. 
The systems were redundant, and either could provide sufficient power to operate 
the airplane. North American used two bladder-type tanks for both the APU and 
reaction control propellant, with 68 .5% allocated to the APUs .120 
 North American believed it had a handle on the problem of acquiring air data 
in the hypersonic flight regime, and that “development time for this system will be 
minimized.” The multipurpose air data system used existing components to mea-
sure pitot-static pressures, differential dynamic pressures due to angle of attack 
and angle of sideslip, and air-stream temperatures. North American never stated 
 
 
7 North American report NA-55-229, “Space Control System Data for the X-5 Research Airplane (NAA Designa-
tion ESO-787),” 9 May 955, pp. -5; North American report NA-55-22, “X-5 Advanced Research Airplane 
Design Summary,” 9 May 955, pp. 2 and 9; Bell report D7-95-003, “X-5 Airplane Proposal Summary 
Report,” 5 May 955, pp. 9-0;
8 Ibid.
9 North American report NA-55-57, “Propulsion System Operation for a X-5 Research Aircraft, Project 226 
(NAA Designation ESO-787),” 9 May 955, pp. 2-5; North American report NA-55-22, “X-5 Advanced Re-
search Airplane Design Summary,” 9 May 955, p. 2 and 22.
20 North American report NA-55-22, “X-5 Advanced Research Airplane Design Summary,” 9 May 955, p. 6.
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exactly where the pressure data would be sensed, although two devices originally 
designed for the Navaho missile program were the basis for the system.121 
 The landing gear consisted of two strut-mounted skids that retracted against 
the outside of the fuselage beneath the wing leading edge and a two-wheel nose 
gear located far forward. The pilot deployed the landing gear via a manual cable 
release of the uplocks, with gravity and a bungee spring taking care of the rest. A 
small “tail bumper” skid in the aft edge of the ventral stabilizer protected the aft fu-
selage during landing. North American solved the problem of developing a landing 
system that was compatible with the large ventral stabilizer “by simply allowing the 
airplane to touch down and ‘rotate in’ about the tail bumper and providing adequate 
energy absorption in the main and nose gears.” No retraction mechanisms existed, 
and the ground crew manually retracted the landing gear after each flight.122  
 North American chose the skids as much because they saved space inside the 
relatively small airframe as for any other reason: “the stowage of a wheel would 
2 Ibid, p. 25. The two Navaho devices would be the North American static error compensator (NASEC) and the 
North American rate of descent indicator (NARODI). Each of these instruments was meant for fast-moving ve-
hicles, and was believed to be accurate up to 00,000 feet (well beyond the operating altitude of the Navaho). 
Given the failure of the Navaho flight program, neither device received much actual flight testing.
22 North American report NA-55-228, “Alighting Gear Data for a Research Airplane X-5 (NAA Designation ESO-
787),” 9 May 955, pp. -2; “X-5 Advanced Research Airplane Design Summary,” pp. 2 and 23.
The temperature-versus-time estimates generated by North American essentially agreed with those made earlier 
at NACA Langley. The North American proposal used the same non-insulated Inconel X hot-structure air-
frame conceived at Langley, and this was one of  the primary criteria that resulted in North American winning 
the competition. (North American Aviation)
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not adapt itself to the configuration of the airplane without increasing the cross 
section area and wetted area.” The friction between the skid and the ground ac-
complished braking, and the estimated landing rollout was 8,000 feet, well within 
the limits of the dry lakes at Edwards.123  
 In order to accommodate ease of maintenance, North American attempted 
to “incorporate the absolute minimum of systems and components which require 
servicing.” Access to most wiring, cables, and hydraulic lines was gained through 
the easily removable side fairing panels. The research instrumentation was con-
centrated in a single equipment compartment equipped with large doors on each 
side. The fuselage panels around the engine were removable for service and in-
spection. All hydraulic components were concentrated in the aft fuselage.124 
 As required by the government, North American performed an engineering 
study on a two-seat X-15 to meet the Navy’s desire to “provide an observer.” A 
second cockpit and ejection seat took the place of the research instrumentation, 
and an entirely new one-piece clamshell canopy covered both cockpits and faired 
into the upper fuselage further back than the normal canopy. The observer had 
large flat-pane side windows, an intercom, and “an abbreviated presentation of 
flight and research data.” The engineers estimated that “inasmuch as the launch 
and burn-out weights and airplane drag are identical to those of the single-place 
version, no change in performance will result.”125 
 The proposal and its included reports contained an extensive discussion on 
carrier aircraft. Of course, North American was the only company without some 
directly related experience with carrier aircraft. Bell and Douglas had both built 
research airplanes that were air launched, while Republic was manufacturing the 
RF-84Ks that were carried in the bomb bay of Convair GRB-36Ds as part of the 
FICON project .
 North American chose a B-36 mostly because the only other available air-
craft—the Boeing B-50 Superfortress—could not lift the X-15 above 25,000 
feet, and North American wanted a higher launch altitude. From a modification 
perspective, the B-36 appeared to be excellent; only one bulkhead needed to be 
replaced, and the FICON project had already accomplished the basic engineering. 
The flight profiles developed by North American assumed a launch at Mach 0.6 
and 30,000 feet, but the proposal suggested that the B-36 could actually achieve 
38,000 feet with no difficulty. North American expected the separation character-
istics to be excellent .126
The Republic Proposal
 Republic also seemed at a disadvantage in the X-15 competition, for many of 
the same reasons North American was. However, the company was working on a 
Mach 3+ interceptor, the XF-103, and had developed the first supersonic combat-
23 “Alighting Gear Data for a Research Airplane X-5 (NAA Designation ESO-787),” pp. -2; “X-5 Advanced Re-
search Airplane Design Summary,” pp. 2 and 23.
2 “X-5 Advanced Research Airplane Design Summary,” pp. 33-35.
25 Ibid, pp. -5.
26 Ibid, p. 39; North American report NA-55-227, “Carrier Modification Data for an X-5 Research Aircraft, Project 
226 (NAA Designation ESO-787),” 9 May 955, pp. -2.
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type aircraft, the experimental XF-91. With the XF-91, the company had gained 
experience in integrating a liquid-fueled rocket engine into a manned aircraft. The 
XF-103 was providing a wealth of experience (most of it unhappy), including 
information concerning the effects of high-speed heating on aircraft structures. 
In addition, Republic had Alexander Kartveli, one of the most innovative aircraft 
designers in the world.127  
 The Republic AP-76 was the heavyweight of the competitors, with a launch 
weight of 39,099 pounds. Nevertheless, Republic expected the design to exceed 
very slightly the speed specification at 6,619 feet per second, although it fell 
somewhat short of the altitude requirement at only 220,000 feet.128 
 Like Bell, Republic opted for XLR81-BA-1 engines, although the heavy-
weight AP-76 used four of them. Each of the engines produced 14,500 lbf, so a 
total of 58,000 lbf was available at 40,000 feet. Republic justified their choice by 
noting that “a sacrifice in weight was made in order to use these four units in place 
of a single thrust chamber engine. The increased safety of numbers as well as the 
increased reliability of starting one or more units influenced this choice.” The 
engines used a fuel called JP-X that consisted of 40% unsymmetrical dimethylhy-
drazine (UDMH) and 60% jet fuel. The oxidizer was red, fuming nitric acid. The 
combination was hypergolic, so no ignition system was required. The thrust line 
of each engine chamber passed through the center of gravity of the airplane, elimi-
nating any directional component of single- or multiple-chamber operations.129 
 A switch panel at the normal throttle location on the left console controlled 
the engines, based on experience gained on the XF-91 interceptor. The XF-91 had 
both switches and a conventional throttle quadrant, but the pilots preferred using 
the switches. A fixed handgrip next to the switches ensured that the pilot’s hand 
would be near the switches at all times. There were nine two-position switches on 
the panel: a “master arm” switch, four individual “arm” switches, and four “on” 
switches. Igniting varying numbers of the engines varied the thrust, just as it had 
on the X-1 and D-558. Republic did not seem to incorporate the ability to use the 
“half-thrust” feature of the XLR81.130 
 Much like the XF-103, Republic eliminated the conventional canopy enclo-
sure and submerged the pilot inside the fuselage. Three glass panels on each side 
of the fuselage provided side vision from launch until the airplane had descended 
to approximately 25,000 feet. Once the AP-76 had slowed to Mach 0.7, a hatch 
on the upper surface of the cockpit raised 13 degrees at its leading edge to expose 
a mirror system that provided forward vision during approach and landing. The 
27 The information presented here came from the various Republic proposal documents. See, for example: Republic 
report ED-AP76-0, “Static and Dynamic Stability and Control for the Republic AP-76 Airplane,” 6 May 955; 
Republic report ED-AP76-200, “Estimated Weight and Balance and Mean Aerodynamic Chord for AP-76,” 6 
May 955; Republic report ED-AP76-900, “Summary of Engineering Data for Republic AP-76 Research Airplane 
Under Project 226 Competition,” 6 May 955; Republic report 55WCS-923-A, “AP-76: Project 226 Summary 
Brochure,” 6 May 955; Republic report 55WCS-923-AA, “Preliminary Model Specification (ES-38): Republic 
Model AP-76 Research Airplane,” 6 May 955. All were originally classified Secret and provided courtesy of Ben-
jamin F. Guenther. For an slightly more in-depth look at the Republic AP-76, see Dennis R. Jenkins, “The X-5 
Research Airplane Competition: The Republic Aviation Proposal,” Aerospace Projects Review, volume , number 
3, May-June 2002, pp. 3-9.
28 “AP-76: Project 226 Summary Brochure,” p. 6.
29 Ibid, p. 0.
30 “Preliminary Model Specification (ES-38): Republic Model AP-76 Research Airplane,” pp. 7-75; “AP-76: Project 
226 Summary Brochure,” p. .
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system used two mirrors—one in the front of the hatch reflected an image down-
ward to a second mirror on top of the instrument panel. The pilot looked at the 
second image. This system was similar to the one that had been developed for 
the XF-103 and had received favorable comments from the pilots during simula-
tions. Surprisingly, the system offered good depth perception and minimal loss of 
brightness. Republic chose this unique system “because the problem of protecting 
the pilot from the high temperatures and, if need be, from cosmic radiation in a 
[conventional] canopy arrangement seem almost impossible.” The cockpit and 
forward instrument compartment used gaseous nitrogen to maintain 40–100°F at 
a 5-psi differential, while the aft compartment had a 2.5-psi differential.131 
 To assist the pilot in flying the predetermined trajectory, Republic proposed 
installing a “flight program indicator.” This display presented the pilot with a sec-
ond-by-second trace that showed the proper speed, altitude, angle of attack, and 
path angle during powered flight. The pilot simply guided the airplane to match 
the cues on the display. It would have been a useful tool.132 
 Normal Air Force fighter standards (+7.33/–3.00 g at burnout weight, but a 
great deal lower at full gross weight) provided the structural requirements for the 
AP-76, in contrast to the other competitors that only stressed their designs for 
+5 g. To accomplish this, and to withstand the expected heating environment, 
Republic proposed a novel structure for the fuselage. The main structure consisted 
3 “Summary of Engineering Data for Republic AP-76 Research Airplane Under Project 226 Competition,” pp. 0-
; “AP-76: Project 226 Summary Brochure,” pp. 6-7 and 20.
32 “Summary of Engineering Data for Republic AP-76 Research Airplane Under Project 226 Competition,” p. 86.
The Republic AP-76 was large, heavy, and although Republic indicated it could slightly exceed the velocity 
requirements, it fell about 15 percent short of  the desired altitude capability. In reality, very few believed it 
could attain the performance numbers generated by Republic, especially given the weight gains that seem to occur 
during any development exercise. The Republic entry placed last in the evaluation. (Republic Aviation)
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of longitudinal titanium “Z” stringers. The structural titanium skin attached to 
the inner leg of the stringers, and the outer leg held a series of 0.020-inch-thick 
corrugated Inconel X shingles that formed a heat shield. The corrugations were 
very mild, with a 0.08 depth-to-length ratio, and permitted circumferential growth 
resulting from high transient temperatures. In between the heat shield and inner 
skin were 0.5-inch-thick blocks of Marinite insulation made by the Johns Man-
ville Company. The 2-foot-wide Inconel outer skin sections stretched over three 
frames and used elongated attachment holes that allowed the sheets to expand 
and contract without warping. With the Inconel outer skin at its full 1,200°F, the 
interior titanium structure would never exceed 300°F.133  
 Aft of the rear instrument compartment were two nitric acid tanks, separat-
ed by the wing carry-through structure. In the space above and below the carry-
through structure were two hydrogen peroxide tanks to power the APUs and the 
reaction control system. Liquid nitrogen pressurized all of the propellant tanks, and 
storage bottles were located below the wing carry-through structure. To the rear of 
the second nitric acid tank was the JP-X tank. The titanium oxidizer and fuel tanks 
were an integral part of the fuselage, but because nitric acid reacts with titanium at 
elevated temperatures, the acid tanks had removable aluminum liners.134 
 The trapezoidal wing used a slightly rounded leading edge with a flat airfoil 
between the 20% and 80% chord lines and a blunt trailing edge. Unlike the fuse-
lage, Republic did not attempt to insulate the wing structure, and designed it to 
carry the design loads at elevated temperatures without developing high thermal 
stresses. The wing used three main sections: 1) the main wing structure, 2) the 
leading edge, and 3) the trailing edge, which consisted of a conventional sin-
gle-slotted landing flap and a conventional aileron. The primary load-carrying 
structure was a tapered multi-cell box that ran from tip to tip and attached to the 
fuselage at four points (two per side). Intermediate spars were located on 5.5-inch 
centers with 15 spars at the root and four at the tip . The Inconel X skins were on 
average 0.10 inch thick. The leading edges were made of kentanium (a titanium 
carbide alloy) castings segmented into six parts per wing.135  
 The vertical and horizontal stabilizers were “of conventional size made pos-
sible by the use of double wedge type sections with rounded leading edges.” The 
included angles were 10 and 12 degrees, respectively. The horizontal surfaces 
were all moving, but the airplane used conventional ailerons instead of the dif-
ferentially moving horizontals found on the North American design. The vertical 
surfaces consisted of a dorsal stabilizer and a jettisonable ventral stabilizer. Wind-
tunnel data from the XF-103 provided data for the rudder design, although the 
overall shape was different . The rudder consisted of the upper 46% of the surface 
and the entire trailing edge aft of the 70% chord line. Spilt flaps, consisting of 
the trailing 30% and 35% of the vertical and horizontal stabilizers, respectively, 
opened through a maximum angle of 50 degrees to increase drag and reduce the 
speed of the aircraft during reentry. Like the ailerons, these split flaps were each 
33 “Summary of Engineering Data for Republic AP-76 Research Airplane Under Project 226 Competition,” pp. 2-
3; “AP-76: Project 226 Summary Brochure,” pp. 20-2.
3 “AP-76: Project 226 Summary Brochure,” pp. 7 and 2-23.
35 “Summary of Engineering Data for Republic AP-76 Research Airplane Under Project 226 Competition,” p. ; 
“AP-76: Project 226 Summary Brochure,” pp. 6 and 23.
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divided into three sections to permit operation while under thermal stresses. The 
stabilizers were generally of the same construction as the wings, and, like the 
wing, the leading edges of the empennage were made of cast kentanium.136 
 The landing gear consisted of two main skids and one tail skid. The 48-by-5-inch 
main skids, installed externally on the side of the fuselage bottom just ahead of 
the center of gravity, extended 18.5 inches using pneumatic shock absorbers. Just 
before landing, the tail skid automatically extended when the pilot jettisoned the 
ventral stabilizer. The landing gear could accommodate descent velocities of only 
6 feet per second, considerably less than the 9 fps that tactical aircraft were design 
to absorb. The rationale was that “highly experienced pilots only are expected to 
fly this airplane.” In fairness to Republic, the NACA had conducted an analysis of 
earlier research airplane landings and found that the majority were well below the 
6-fps figure.137  
 Two hydrogen peroxide auxiliary power units each drove an alternator and 
hydraulic pump. A 60-gallon supply of the monopropellant could drive the power 
units for 30 minutes and operate the reaction control system for 3 continuous 
minutes. The reaction control system used six 90-lbf thrusters (one on each wing 
tip and four at the rear of the fuselage). Republic linked the thrusters to the same 
control column that the aerodynamic controls used, and a switch in the cockpit 
activated them when necessary. At the time of the proposal, the thrusters were 
throttleable, but Republic noted that “studies of a ‘bang-bang’ system, that is ‘full-
on’ or ‘full-off’…appear very promising.”138 
 Given the amount of effort committed to developing an encapsulated escape 
system during the protracted XF-103 program, it is surprising that Republic opted 
for a simple ejection seat for the AP-76. “Consideration was given to the use of a 
pilot’s escape capsule in the AP-76. It was found to be extremely difficult to de-
sign a capsule which would have the necessary stability characteristics in the low 
density air of the high altitudes attained by the AP-76.” Similarly, Republic found 
it was almost impossible to provide drag devices that would retard the capsule’s 
descent to the degree necessary to prevent excessive skin temperatures. In its 
place was an escape seat with leg (but no arm) restraints; the pilot would rely on 
his partial-pressure suit for protection during ejection.139 
 Not surprisingly, given the weight of the AP-76, Republic chose a Convair 
B-36 bomber as the carrier aircraft. Republic had some experience in using the 
B-36 since the company manufactured the RF-84K parasite fighter used in the 
FICON project. The AP-76 was sufficiently large that it took up the majority of all 
four B-36 bomb bays. The lifting frame and main attach points were mounted on 
the B-36 wing box and attached to the AP-76 on top of the fuselage over its wing. 
It was necessary to modify two main bomb bay frames on the B-36 to clear the 
36 “Summary of Engineering Data for Republic AP-76 Research Airplane Under Project 226 Competition,” p. 6; 
“AP-76: Project 226 Summary Brochure,” p. 6.
37 “Summary of Engineering Data for Republic AP-76 Research Airplane Under Project 226 Competition,” pp. 7 
and 68; for the landing data, see Wendell H. Stillwell, NACA Research Memorandum H5K2, “Results of Mea-
surements Made During the Approach and Landing of Seven High-Speed Research Airplanes,  February 955; 
“Preliminary Model Specification (ES-38): Republic Model AP-76 Research Airplane,” p. 23.
38 “Summary of Engineering Data for Republic AP-76 Research Airplane Under Project 226 Competition,” pp. 0-
; “AP-76: Project 226 Summary Brochure,” p. .
39 “AP-76: Project 226 Summary Brochure,” pp. 7-8.
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research airplane, and to add sway braces to “suitable strong points on the lower 
longerons of the bomb bay truss.” A fairing with a soft gasket sealed the bomb bay 
when the B-36 was carrying the AP-76.140  
 Unfortunately, Republic appears to have misread the intentions of NACA and 
the Air Force, and its proposal stated that “the achievement of the speed [6,600 
fps] is paramount whereas flight at very high altitudes has a secondary role.” 
Because of this, Republic concentrated on designing an aircraft that would be 
capable of meeting the velocity requirement, while ignoring the altitude require-
ment to some degree. Although the proposal listed 220,000 feet as the maximum 
altitude of the aircraft, other data submitted with the proposal indicated that the 
company believed the aircraft could achieve almost 300,000 feet if necessary.141 
 The typical high-speed flight profile for the AP-76 began with the airplane be-
ing carried aloft by a B-36H142 carrier from Edwards AFB . The research airplane 
pilot would be riding in the comparative comfort of the pressurized compartment 
of the bomber. The B-36 would carry the AP-76 to a predefined release point 
approximately 540 miles from Edwards and launch the airplane at an altitude of 
40,000 feet and a true air speed of 350 knots . After the AP-76 dropped clear of the 
B-36, the pilot would ignite all four rocket engines and pull into a 20-degree climb 
before running out of propellants after 105 seconds at approximately 140,000 
feet. The AP-76 would then continue a free-flight trajectory to a peak altitude of 
220,000 feet about 69 seconds after burnout. During the climb through 100,000 
feet, the pilot would activate the switch that armed the reaction control system; 
thereafter, the movement of the control column and/or rudder pedals would 
activate the thrusters in addition to the now-useless aerodynamic controls. 
 The airplane would continue on a ballistic trajectory until it reached an al-
titude of 150,000 feet, where the aerodynamic controls would regain effective-
ness. The airplane would go through a series of pull-ups and glides while the 
pilot maintained the angle of attack at a constant 6 degrees. The speed brakes on 
the horizontal and vertical stabilizers would open as needed. When the descent 
reached 25,000 feet and the speed reduced to Mach 0 .7, the pilot would jettison 
the ventral stabilizer since it was no longer required for directional stability, and 
raise the hatch to expose the mirror system to provide forward visibility. Finally, 
the airplane would glide to a landing on its skids on Rogers Dry Lake.143 
 The Republic approach to the required two-seat engineering study was a little 
different from and decidedly more useful than the other proposals. All of the other 
competitors had simply deleted all of the research instrumentation and installed 
accommodations for an observer, although North American, at least, had provided 
a proper canopy arrangement. Republic, however, stretched the constant-section 
of the fuselage just ahead of the forward propellant tank by 29 inches. On the 
single-seat aircraft, two compartments held the research instrumentation (550 
pounds ahead of the pilot and 250 pounds behind the pilot) . For the two-seat 
0 Ibid, pp. 50-53.
 Ibid, pp. 0 and .
2 Republic was the only competitor to specify an explicit model for the carrier aircraft. Given the priorities in the Stra-
tegic Air Command at the time of the proposals, it is unlikely that an H-model (which was the latest in the inventory) 
would have been made available. More likely, it would have been a D-model similar to the FICON GRB-36Ds.
3 “AP-76: Project 226 Summary Brochure,” pp. 0 and 5.
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airplane the 250 pounds in the rear compartment were deleted, and, combined 
with the 29-inch extension, this provided a full-size cockpit for the observer. The 
airplane could still carry the other 550 pounds of instrumentation—in fact, it was 
the only proposed two-seat aircraft that could carry any. The empty weight of 
the airplane increased 380 pounds and the launch weight increased 610 pounds, 
resulting in a degradation of performance of 170 fps.144 
 Ibid, pp. 52-53.
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Comparison of Physical Characteristics
Bell Douglas NAA Republic
D-171 Model 684 ESO-7487 AP-76
Fuselage:
Length (feet): 44 .42  46 .75 49 .33 52 .58 
Frontal area (square feet): 25 .00 21 .00 ? ? 
Maximum diameter (feet): 5 .15 5 .16 4 .50 5 .00 
Fineness ratio: 8 .62 9 .06 ? 10 .5 
Wing:
Airfoil: biconvex (mod) Clark Y (mod)  66005 (mod) hexagonal
Span (feet): 25 .67 19 .50 22 .36 27 .66 
Root section (percent): 5 .0 7 .0 5 .0 5 .0
Tip section (percent): 6 .0 4 .5 1 .0 7 .5
Root chord (feet): 13 .16 10 .40 10 .80 16 .00
Tip chord (feet): 3 .86 2 .75 3 .00 2 .25
Area (square feet): 220 .0 150 .3 200 .0 254 .0 
Flap area (square feet): 15 .25 14 .44 ? 28 .80 
Aileron area (square feet): 16 .00 9 .88 n/a 15 .80 
Angle of incidence (degrees): 0 0 0 0
Dihedral (degrees): 0 0 0 0
Aspect ratio: 3 .00 2 .53 2 .50 3 .00 
Taper ratio: 0 .30 0 .22 ? 0 .14 
Aileron deflection (degrees): ±15 ±20 n/a +17/–12 
Flap deflection (degrees): –45 –45 –40 –38 
Leading-edge sweep 
(degrees):
37 .0 40 .0 25 .0 38 .4 
MAC (inches): 112 .50 105 .26 123 .23 130 .87 
Horizontal Stabilizer:
Airfoil: biconvex (mod) 5° wedge 66005 (mod) 10° wedge
Span (feet): 13 .75 11 .83 17 .64 15 .70 
Root chord (feet): 7 .05 7 .66 7 .02 7 .08
Tip chord (feet): 2 .11 1 .66 2 .10 1 .83
Area (square feet): 63 .00 55 .20 51 .76 69 .70 
Aspect ratio: 3 .00 2 .54 2 .81 3 .48 
Taper ratio: 0 .30 0 .22 0 .22 0 .26 
Leading-edge sweep 
(degrees):
35 .5 40 .0 45 .0 22 .3 
Deflection (degrees): +10/–20 +5/–20 +15/–45 +7/–20 
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Bell Douglas NAA Republic
D-171 Model 684 ESO-7487 AP-76
Dorsal Stabilizer:
Airfoil: biconvex (mod) diamond 
(mod)
10° wedge 12° wedge
Area (square feet): 45 .30 39 .25 38 .14 47 .60 
Rudder area (square feet): 13 .5 7 .85 ? 32 .0 
Aspect ratio: 0 .8 1 .277 1 .25 1 .6 
Leading-edge sweep 
(degrees):
45 .0 40 .0 52 .0 27 .9 
Rudder deflection (degrees): ±20 ±30 ±45 ±20 
Ventral Stabilizer:
Airfoil: 10° diamond 7° edge 15° wedge 10° wedge
Area (square feet): 22 .70 12 .08 11 .42 12 .30 
Leading-edge sweep 
(degrees):
45 .0 60 .0 52 .0 45 .0 
Weights:
Launch (pounds): 34,140 25,300 27,722 39,099 
Burnout (pounds): 12,942 10,600 10,433 15,300 
Landing (pounds): 12,595 10,450 10,200 14,800 
Empty (pounds): 11,964 9,208 9,959 14,388 
Propellants (pounds): 21,600 14,700 16,410 23,660 
Propulsion:
Number of engines: 3 1 1 4
Engine type: XLR81 XLR30 XLR30 XLR81
Total thrust (lbf): 43,500 57,000 57,000 58,000
Fuel type: JP-X NH3 NH3 JP-X
Fuel quantity (gallons): 704 1,142 1,239 710
Oxidizer type: RFNA LOX LOX RFNA
Oxidizer quantity (gallons): 1,358 816 907 1,430
Performance (estimated):
Maximum speed (fps): 6,850 6,655 6,950 6,619
Maximum altitude (feet): 400,000 375,000 800,000 220,000
Cost and Schedule:
R&D plus three aircraft 
(millions):
$36.3 $36.4 $56.1 $47.0
Estimated First flight: Jan . 59 Mar . 58 Nov . 57 Feb . 58
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THE AIRFRAME EVALUATION
 The airframe evaluation process lasted from mid May until late July, with the 
Air Force, NACA, and Navy conducting independent evaluations based on a num-
ber of preestablished criteria. The preliminary NACA evaluation of the proposals 
consumed the better part of three weeks before each of the laboratories forwarded 
preliminary results to Hartley Soulé. On 3 June 1955, Ames tentatively ranked 
the submissions as 1) Douglas, 2) North American, 3) Bell, and 4) Republic. The 
Douglas ranking resulted from “the completeness and soundness of design study, 
awareness of factors in speed and altitude regime, and relative simplicity of ap-
proach.” Ames, however, expressed skepticism over the Douglas magnesium hot-
structure wing because it would preclude the study of problems associated with 
insulated-type structures that would potentially be used in future aircraft intended 
for greater flight duration. This seemed to be a major disconnect between Ames 
and Langley. It appears that Ames wanted to test a structure that would be repre-
sentative of some future production aircraft; Langley just wanted to test a structure 
that would survive. Another problem that worried the Ames evaluators was the 
flammability of magnesium. It seemed that “only a small area raised to the ignition 
temperature would be sufficient to destroy the aircraft.” The researchers at Ames 
held that if Douglas should win the competition, the company should build two 
aircraft with the proposed HK31 structure, but a third aircraft “should have a wing 
based upon the alternative higher temperature insulated type of design approach.” 
The Ames report continued to stress the need for a wing of greater leading-edge 
sweep angle (at least 53 degrees) “for the purpose of minimizing the rate of heat 
transfer to the leading edge.”145 
 At Langley, on 6 June, researchers rated the North American proposal 
number one, followed by Douglas, Bell, and Republic. According to the Lang-
ley assessment, led by John Becker, the research utility of the North American 
hot-structure approach outweighed the advantages of the simplicity of the magne-
sium structure proposed by Douglas. Slightly rebuffing Ames, Langley noted that 
the 21% reduction in heat transfer gained by increasing the leading-edge sweep 
from the proposed 40 degrees to 53 degrees did not seem to justify the alteration 
of the planform. This was particularly true because the structure appeared capable 
of handling the heat load.146 
 In a reminder to the evaluation teams, also on 6 June, Arthur Vogeley and 
Captain McCollough reiterated that the purpose of the evaluation was “to select 
a contractor rather than a particular design.” Although certain features of the 
winning design could be unsatisfactory, it was the basic design approach as de-
scribed in the proposal that might best be relied upon to produce an acceptable 
research airplane .147 
  
5 Letter, Harry J. Goett/Ames Evaluation Group to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, no subject, 
3 June 955.
6 Letter, John V. Becker/Langley Evaluation Group, to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, no sub-
ject, 6 June 955.
7 Memorandum, William J. Underwood to the Director/NACA, no subject, 6 June 955.
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 On 10 June 1955, the HSFS sent its airframe results to Soulé, detailing the 
design approach and research utility aspects of the airframe, flight control sys-
tem, propulsion unit, crew provisions, handling and launching, and miscellaneous 
systems. Researchers at the HSFS ranked the proposals as 1) Douglas, 2) North 
American, 3) Bell, and 4) Republic, although the proposals from Douglas and 
North American were essentially equal.148 
 The final evaluation by Ames, on 10 June, ranked the proposals as 1) North 
American, 2) Douglas, 3) Bell, and 4) Republic. This represented a change from 
the earlier Ames evaluation, based largely on researchers considering the North 
American structure superior in terms of research utility—an opinion voiced ear-
lier by Langley. The Ames evaluators had apparently changed their minds about 
wanting to test a production-representative structure. The laboratory had also fi-
nally given up on advocating an insulated structure since no serious support for 
their earlier recommendation of equipping the third aircraft with a different wing 
structure had materialized (sufficient funds to construct an alternate wing were 
simply not available).149 
 The final evaluation from Langley on 14 June ranked the proposals as 
1) North American, 2) Douglas, 3) Republic, and 4) Bell. Although researchers 
at Langley thought the magnesium wing structure of Douglas was feasible, they 
feared that local hot spots caused by irregular aerodynamic heating could weaken 
or destroy the structure. The use of Inconel X by North American presented an 
advantage with regard to thermal limits—not only from the standpoint of margins 
for maneuverability within the design temperatures, but also from a safety view-
point if the airplane ever exceeded its design temperature.
 A few days after receiving all of the final evaluations, Soulé sent cop-
ies of each to the WADC Project Office, along with a consolidated result. 
The final NACA ranking was (points based on a scale of 100) as follows:150 
Design Approach Research Utility
B D N R B D N R
Airframe 70 80 85 75 70 80 90 80
Flight controls 70 80 75 70 70 75 75 75
Propulsion 80 80 90 30 75 40 40 75
Crew provisions 55 85 80 40 55 85 80 35
Handling/launching 95 65 75 65 90 70 70 70
Miscellaneous 70 85 70 70 70 85 70 70
Average 73 79 79 58 72 73 71 68
8 Letter, Walter C. Williams/HSFS Evaluation Group, to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, 0 June 
955. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
9 Letter, Harry J. Goett/Ames Evaluation Group to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, no subject, 
0 June 955.
50 Letter, Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader to NACA Liaison Officer at Wright-Patterson AFB, 7 
June 955. The average scores shown were not broken out in the letter, but are shown here to ease understand-
ing of the ultimate ratings.
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Oddly, the final order representing the overall NACA evaluation was 1) North 
American, 2) Douglas, 3) Bell, and 4) Republic, despite the fact that Douglas 
scored slightly more points in the evaluation (152 versus 150 for North Ameri-
can). Soulé pointed out that although Ames, Langley, and the HSFS did not rank 
the four proposals in the same order, the final ranking did represent an overall 
NACA consensus . All of the laboratories involved in this portion of the evaluation 
considered both the Douglas and North American proposals to be much superior 
to those submitted by Bell and Republic. While researchers preferred the Inconel 
X structure of the North American proposal, the design was not without fault. For 
instance, the NACA thought that the landing-gear arrangement was undesirable, 
the differentially-operated horizontal stabilator design in lieu of ailerons was an 
overly complicated arrangement, and (at least at Langley) the replaceable fiber-
glass leading edges were unacceptable.
 John Becker wrote to Hartley Soulé on 16 June attempting to clarify why the 
North American design was superior to that of Douglas. The letter listed the ther-
mal limits expected for the new aircraft, and showed that the Inconel X structure 
on the North American design was “impressively superior” to the magnesium 
alloy used by Douglas. The data were shown for three categories: 1) performance 
within the design temperature limits in terms of allowable velocity, altitude, and 
dependence on speed brakes; 2) reserve heat capacity (in case the design tem-
peratures were exceeded by a moderate margin) such that the structure would 
still have a fair possibility of remaining intact; and 3) the possibility of melting or 
burning in case the design temperatures were greatly exceeded in local hot spots. 
There appears to be no further correspondence on this subject, so Becker’s expla-
nation seems to have answered whatever unasked questions existed.151 
 During the first two weeks in July, the WADC evaluation teams sent their 
final reports to the WADC Project Office. As with the NACA evaluations, the Air 
Force found little difference between the Douglas and North American designs, 
point-wise, with both proposals considered significantly superior to those of Bell 
and Republic . 
 George Spangenberg was in charge of the Navy evaluations, which got 
off to a late start and ended up being cursory. In the end, the Navy found much 
the same thing as the NACA and ranked the airframe proposals as 1) Douglas, 
2) North American, 3) Republic, and 4) Bell. Given the Navy’s long—and suc-
cessful—association with Douglas airplanes, the order was not surprising. Most 
Navy concerns centered on the selection of an engine. As Clotaire Wood ex-
plained, “the airframe-engine combination was to be evaluated and not the engine 
alone, since it had been agreed that the engine of the winning design would be 
the engine supported by the special development program.” This was not how the 
Power Plant Laboratory saw the process, but it seemed to put the Navy at ease. 
 
 
 
5 Memorandum, John V. Becker to John W. Crowley, no subject, 6 June 955. In the Becker Archives, Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute, Blacksburg, VA. John Becker has no specific memory of why he wrote this letter, but as-
sumes that Harley Soulé wanted technical justification for North American being considered better than Douglas, 
despite the point system.
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In addition, Wood indicated that “it would be of real value to have the Bureau’s 
[BuAer] recommendations regarding an engine development program once the 
winner of the competition is determined.”152  
 In early July the Navy began to raise questions about the various airframe 
proposals. For instance, the BuAer electronics group did not believe the Bell de-
sign had a satisfactory electrical power system, and Navy researchers rated the 
North American design last from an equipment (e.g., life support) perspective. 
The Douglas and Republic designs had the best potential flying qualities, and 
BuAer researchers felt that North American had incorrectly assumed laminar flow 
over much of their design, and had therefore underestimated the heating values. 
It was a bit late to be raising concerns, but most of the issues were minor and did 
not materially affect the outcome of the competition. After conferring with his 
Air Force and NACA counterparts, on 15 July George Spangenberg finalized the 
Navy’s position as Douglas, North American, Republic, and Bell.153  
 On 26–28 July, the Air Force, NACA, and Navy evaluation teams met at 
Wright Field to select an airframe contractor. George Spangenberg stated that it 
was unfortunate that the point system used in the evaluation “appeared to give no 
conclusive winner,” since a contractor could score highly in one area and low in 
another yet still have a winning score, while another that was satisfactory in all 
areas would be rated lower. He also indicated that the goals of the project seem to 
have shifted somewhat, resulting in a “firm requirement” for 1,200°F skin tem-
perature research instead of the previous “desire” for high temperatures.154  
 Presaging events to come, discussions ensued concerning the amount of work 
recently awarded to North American and Republic, and whether additional awards 
would spread their engineering groups too thin. Other discussions included the 
possibility of selecting Douglas but directing it to redesign its aircraft using an 
Inconel hot structure instead of magnesium. In the end, the Air Force and the 
NACA concluded that the North American proposal best accommodated their re-
quirements. The Navy did not want to cast the only dissenting vote and, after short 
deliberation, agreed to go along with the decision.155  
 During the week of 1–5 August 1955, the WADC Project Office prepared the 
final evaluation summary and oral presentation: “the evaluation of the proposals 
submitted in competition was made in five areas: performance, technical design, 
research suitability, development capability, and cost.” It is interesting to note 
that this competition was not about the “lowest bidder,” and none of the propos-
als were anywhere near the original $12.2 million estimate. The results of these 
evaluations were as follows:156
 
 
52 Letter, Clotaire Wood to George A. Spangenberg, no subject, 9 June 955. In the files at the Naval History Center.
53 Letter, Clotaire Wood to Langley, no subject, 3 July 955; memorandum, George A. Spangenberg to the BuAer 
assistant chief for R&D, no subject, 5 July 955; Memorandum, George A. Spangenberg to the BuAer assistant 
chief for R&D, no subject, 5 July 955. Both in the files at the Naval History Center.
5 Memorandum, George A. Spangenberg to the BuAer assistant chief for R&D, no subject,  August 955. In the 
files at the Naval History Center.
55 Ibid.
56 Air Force report RDZ-280, “Evaluation Report on X-5 Research Aircraft Design Competition,” 5 August 955, no 
page numbers. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research Agency.
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Performance: The performance evaluation consisted of a 
check of the probability of the different designs, considering 
present uncertainties, of meeting the specified speed and alti-
tude requirements. The probabilities were calculated to be best 
for the North American proposal, equal for the Bell and Doug-
las proposals, and least for the Republic proposal; but because 
of the assumptions of the analysis, all designs were judged able 
to meet the requirements.
Technical Design: This factor was judged on the awareness 
shown by the contractor of the problems of high-speed, high-
altitude flight and of the means, as indicated by the airplane de-
signs, the contractor proposed for exploring and studying these 
problems. The general design competency of the contractor also 
was judged from the designs submitted: North American 81.5 
points; Douglas 80.1 points; Bell 75.5 points; and Republic 
72.2 points. No design, as submitted, was considered safe for 
the use intended. The Douglas design was considered best in 
this regard, but did not include adequate margins for ignorance 
factors and operational errors .
Research Suitability: In this area, the fundamental differences 
in the proposed structures were examined and rated because of 
their decisive importance in the research uses of this aircraft. 
North American was rated acceptable because of the Inconel X 
“hot-structure” heat-sink, which was most suitable for research 
and which was potentially the simplest to make safe for the mis-
sion. Republic and Bell were considered unsatisfactory because 
of the hazardous aspects associated with the insulated structures 
used, and Douglas was considered unsatisfactory because of the 
low safety margins available and because of the limited future 
usefulness of the “cool” magnesium heat-sink principle.
Development Capability: Ratings were based on the physi-
cal equipment and manpower the contractor had available for 
pursuing the project, and the resulting time proposed for de-
velopment. Evaluation of this factor resulted in the following 
ratings: (1) Douglas was acceptable; (2) North American was 
acceptable; (3) Bell was less acceptable; (4) Republic was less 
acceptable. North American, Republic, and Douglas estimated 
that the first flight date would be within 30 months, but the 
Republic estimate was not believed to be credible, hence their 
lower score. Bell promised a first flight date within 40 months.
Costs: Costs for three aircraft plus static test article, engines, 
and spares as adjusted by AMC to a comparable basis are: Bell, 
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$36.3 million; Douglas, $36.4 million; Republic, $47.0 million; 
and North American, $56.1 million.
 On 9 August, Captain McCollough presented the results of the evaluation to 
Brigadier General Howell M. Estes, then chief of the Weapons Systems Division, 
under whose jurisdiction the WADC Project Office fell, and a select group of 
senior Air Force officers. McCollough made a second presentation in Baltimore 
on 11 August for Generals John W. Sessums and Marvin C. Demler, who were 
the commanders of the WADC and ARDC, respectively, and Hartley Soulé from 
the NACA .157 
 The final briefing to a combined meeting of Air Force, NACA, and Navy 
personnel was at NACA Headquarters on 12 August. The attendees included 
Hugh Dryden, Gus Crowley, Ira Abbott, Richard Rhode, and Hartley Soulé from 
the NACA; Brigadier General Kelsey, Colonel Donald H. Heaton, Lieutenant 
Colonels Gablecki and Maiersperger, and Major Heniesse from the Air Force; 
and Captain R . E . Dixon, Abraham Hyatt, and George Spangenberg from BuAer. 
Following this, the Research Airplane Committee met, accepted the findings of 
the evaluation groups, and agreed to present the recommendation to the Depart-
ment of Defense.158 
 Because the estimated costs submitted by North American were far above 
the amount tentatively allocated for the project, the Research Airplane Commit-
tee included a recommendation for a funding increase before signing the final 
contract. A further recommendation—one that would later take on greater im-
portance—called for relaxing the proposed schedule by up to 18 months. The 
committee approved both recommendations and forwarded them to the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Development.
SECOND THOUGHTS
 Events took an unexpected twist on the afternoon of 23 August 1955 when 
the North American representative in Dayton verbally informed the WADC 
Project Office that his company wished to withdraw its proposal. Captain 
McCollough notified Hartley Soulé, Air Force Headquarters, and BuAer of this 
decision, touching off a series of discussions concerning future actions. Within 
a week the Air Force asked North American to reconsider its decision. The Air 
Materiel Command recommended that Douglas be declared the winner if North 
American did not reconsider. The Research Airplane Committee, however, cau-
tioned that the Douglas design would require considerable modification before 
57 Memorandum, Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader to the Members of Project 226 Evaluation 
Group, 23 September 955. In the files at the NASA History Office. The ARDC was activated in April 95 from 
the engineering assets of the Air Materiel Command at Wright-Patterson AFB, and in June 95 it moved its new 
headquarters to Baltimore, MD. In January 958 the ARDC moved to Andrews AFB, MD, and was redesignated 
the Air Force Systems Command in 96.
58 Dryden, Kelsey, and Dixon were members of the Research Airplane Committee. Captain Dixon had replaced Rear 
Admiral Robert Hatcher when he retired.
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it satisfied Air Force and NACA requirements. On 30 August, North American 
sent a letter to the Air Force formally withdrawing its proposal because sufficient 
resources were not available to complete the X-15 program within the 30- 
month schedule.159 
 On 1 September Hugh Dryden informed Soulé that he and General Kelsey 
had decided to continue the procurement, pending receipt of official notification 
from North American. The letter arrived sometime later in the week, and on 7 
September, Soulé contacted Dryden and recommended that the Research Airplane 
Committee consider the second-place bidder. Dryden responded that he wanted to 
reopen the competition rather than award the contract to Douglas.
 Despite North American’s request to withdraw, the procurement process con-
tinued . A presentation to the Defense Air Technical Advisory Panel on 14 Septem-
ber presented the selection of North American for formal approval. Naturally, the 
Air Force recommended approval, but the Army representative to the panel flatly 
opposed the project if it required more Department of Defense funds than previ-
ously discussed. This prompted the Air Force to reduce project costs below earlier 
estimates. The panel was also concerned that the program could not be completed 
in 30 months, and concurred with the earlier Research Airplane Committee rec-
ommendation that the schedule be relaxed.160  
 By 21 September the Department of Defense had approved the selection of 
North American, with a caveat: a reduction in annual funding. The same week 
General Estes met with John Leland “Lee” Atwood, the president of North Ameri-
can, who announced that an extended schedule would allow North American to 
reconsider its position .161 
 Two days later, the vice president and chief engineer for North American, 
Raymond H. Rice, explained that the company had decided to withdraw from the 
competition because it had recently won new bomber (WS-110A) and long-range 
interceptor (WS-202A) studies, and had increased activity relating to its ongoing 
YF-107 fighter program. Having undertaken these projects, North American said 
it would be unable to accommodate the fast engineering labor build-up that would 
be required to support the desired 30-month schedule. Rice went on to say that 
“due to the apparent interest that has subsequently been expressed in the North 
American design, the contractor [North American] wishes to extend two alternate 
courses which have been previously discussed with Air Force personnel. The en-
gineering man-power work load schedule has been reviewed and the contractor 
wishes to point out that Project 1226 could be handled if it were permissible 
to extend the schedule…over an additional eight month period. In the event the 
 
 
 
 
59 Letter, North American to Commander, ARDC, no subject, 6 September 955. In the files at the Boeing Archives.
60 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 22 September 955; Interview, William J. Underwood, NACA Liaison Officer, 
 October 955, by Robert L. Perry, Chief, History Branch, WADC. In the files at the AFMC History Office.
6 John Leland Atwood began work as an aeronautical engineer for Douglas in 930, and moved to North American 
in 93. He became assistant general manager in 938, and in 9 was named North American’s first vice 
president. He became president in 98 and served continually until he retired in 970.
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above time extension is not acceptable and in the best interest of the project, the 
contractor is willing to release the proposal data to the Air Force at no cost.”162  
 The approval granted by the Research Airplane Committee and the Defense 
Air Technical Advisory Panel to extend the schedule allowed North American to 
retract its previous decision to withdraw from the competition once the Air Force 
notified the company of its selection. Accordingly, on 30 September, Colonel Carl 
F . Damberg, chief of the Aircraft Division at Wright Field, formally notified North 
American that the company had won the X-15 competition. The company retract-
ed its letter of withdrawal, and the Air Force thanked the other bidders for their 
participation. In the competitive environment that exists in the early 21st century, 
this course of events would undoubtedly lead to protests from the losing contrac-
tors, and possibly congressional investigations and court actions. However, as 
business was conducted in 1955, it was not considered cause for comment and the 
award went forward uncontested .163 
 Within North American, the program had also been the subject of discus-
sions of which the government was probably unaware. The internal concerns were 
much the same as those related to the government, but they showed a marked 
divide between technical personnel and corporate management. Harrison Storms, 
who would be the chief engineer for the North American Los Angeles Division 
during the design of the X-15, remembers:164
 
My position at that time was that of manager of research and 
development for the Los Angles Division.… I was told that top 
corporate management wanted to reject the [X-15] program 
since it was small and they were concerned that too many of 
the top engineering personnel would be absorbed into the pro-
gram and not be available for other projects that they consid-
ered more important to the future of the corporation. There was 
considerable objection to this position in the technical area . I 
was finally called into Mr. Rice’s office, the then chief engineer, 
and told that we could have the program on the condition that 
none of the problems were ever to be brought into his office. He 
further elaborated that it would be up to me to seek all the solu-
tions and act as the top NAA representative for the program. 
This was fine with me.
 Funding was another issue, and on 5 October 1955 a meeting was held at 
Wright Field to discuss how to pay for the program. The Defense Coordinating 
62 Letter, Raymond H. Rice, Vice President and Chief Engineer, North American Aviation, to Commander ARDC, 
no subject, 23 September 955. In the files at the Boeing Archives. The WS-0A and WS-202A studies would 
eventually become the B-70 and F-08 programs. In addition, North American was in the midst of a major Navy 
competition that eventually resulted in the North American A3J (A-5) Vigilante. The YF-07A program had started 
as an improved F-00 Super Sabre in October 953, and nine prototypes were ordered in August 95. Only 
three were ever completed. The first YF-07A (55-58) would not make its maiden flight until 0 September 
956, and the program was canceled in February 957.
63 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 22 September 955; letter, Colonel Carl F. Damberg, Chief, Aircraft Division, 
AMC, to North American Aviation, subject: X-5 Competition, 30 September 955. In the files at the Air Force 
Historical Research Agency; letters, from Colonel Carl F. Damberg to Bell, Douglas, and Republic, no subject, 30 
September 955.
6 Storms, “X-5 Hardware Design Challenges,” p. 33.
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Committee for Piloted Aircraft had tentatively allocated $30,000,000 to the pro-
gram from the Department of Defense general contingency fund, with an expected 
burn rate of approximately $10,000,000 per year. The problem was that the new 
program estimate was $56,100,000, including a first-year expenditure of almost 
$26,000,000. The X-15 Project Office began to reduce expenditures by eliminat-
ing the static-test article (nobody was sure how to test it in any case), reducing 
the modifications to the B-36 carrier aircraft, and eliminating some previously 
required studies and evaluations. The agreed-upon eight-month extension also 
eased the peak annual expenditures somewhat. After some juggling, the revised 
cost estimates were $50,063,500–$38,742,500 for the airframes, $9,961,000 for 
the engine, and $1,360,000 for the new flight test range at Edwards. The peak 
expenditure ($16,600,000) would occur in the third year of the project.165 
 Contract negotiations followed. The Air Materiel Command took revised bud-
get figures to a meeting on 11 October at the Pentagon. By that time, the reduced 
estimate was approximately $45,000,000 and the maximum annual expenditure 
was less than $15,000,000. The Air Force presented these figures to the Defense 
Coordinating Committee for Piloted Aircraft on 19 October. Support for the project 
was reconfirmed, although no additional funds were allocated. Nevertheless, the 
Department of Defense released funds to continue the procurement process.166  
 The AMC Directorate of Procurement and Production drafted a $2,600,000 
letter contract for North American on 7 November 1955. Higher headquarters 
approved the letter contract on 15 November, and North America returned a 
signed copy on 5 December. The detailed design and development of the hyper-
sonic research airplane had been under way for just under a year at this point. 
Reaction Motors returned a signed copy of its $2,900,000 letter contract on 14 
February 1956.167
At this point, the X-15 program budget was (in millions):168
FY56 FY57 FY58 FY59 FY60 Total
Airframe 6 .0 10 .3 13 .9 6 .9 0 .6 37 .7
Engine 2 .9 2 .8 0 .5 0 .0 0 .0 6 .2
Range 0 .4 0 .9 0 .1 0 .0 0 .0 1 .4
Total 9 .3 14 .0 14 .5 6 .9 0 .6 45 .3
65 Memorandum, Arthur W. Vogeley to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, no subject, 3 October 
955; letter, Major General Howell M. Estes, Jr., Assistant Deputy Commander for Weapons Systems at ARDC 
to Brigadier General J. Stanley Holtoner, Commander AFFTC, no subject, 0 May 957. In the files at the AFFTC 
History Office.
66 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 3 October; 20 October; 27 October; and 5 December 955; memoran-
dum, Colonel Bruce C. Downs, Chief, Fighter Branch, to Chief, Aircraft Division, Director of Procurement and 
Production, AMC, 7 November 955, subject: Request for permission to negotiate a CPFF [cost-plus-fixed-fee] 
type contract P. R. No. 63637 and 98558; Letter, N. Shropshire, Director of Contract Administration, North 
American Aviation, to Commander, AMC, subject: Letter Contract AF33(600)-3693, 8 December 955. In the 
files at the ASD History Office.
67 Ibid; memorandum, Colonel B. C. Downs to Chief, Aircraft Division, no subject, 7 November 955. In the files at 
the ASD History Office; Memorandum, Captain Chester E. McCollough, Jr., X-5 Project Officer, ARDC, to Chief, 
Non-Rotating Engine Branch, Power Plant Laboratory, Director of Laboratories, WADC, subject: Engine for X-5, 
 December 955; letter contract AF33(600)-3228,  February 956. 
68 Memorandum, Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader to Members of the Project 226 Evaluation 
Group, no subject, 2 October 955.
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However, the available funds were only (in millions):169 
FY56 FY57 FY58 FY59 FY60 Total
Air Force 9 .5 8 .0 4 .0 3 .0 0 .0 24 .5
Navy 0 .5 1 .8 1 .7 1 .0 0 .0 5 .0
Total 10 .0 9 .8 5 .7 4 .0 0 .0 29 .5
Surplus/Deficit 0 .7 –4.2 –8.8 –2.9 –0.6 –15.8
There was still less than $30,000,000 available for the project, and an ad-
ditional $16,000,000 needed to be found. In reality, this amount would become 
trivial as the project progressed.
 The Air Force completed the definitive $5,315,000 contract for North Ameri-
can on 11 June 1956 . The contract included three X-15 research airplanes, a 
full-scale mockup, various wind-tunnel models, propulsion system test articles, 
preliminary flight tests, and the modification of a B-36 carrier aircraft. The costs 
did not include government-furnished equipment, such as the engine, research 
instrumentation, fuel, and oil, or expenses to operate the B-36. The delivery date 
for the first X-15 was 31 October 1958.170  
 All parties signed the final contract for the major piece of government-
furnished equipment, the Reaction Motors engine, on 7 September 1956. The 
“propulsion subsystem” effort became Project 3116, which was carried on the 
books separately from the Project 1226 airframe. The final $10,160,030 contract, 
plus a fee of $614,000, required Reaction Motors to deliver one engine and a 
full-scale mockup. Amendments to the contract would cover the procurement of 
additional engines.171 
69 Ibid.
70 Air Force contract AF33(600)-3693.
7 Air Force contract AF33(600)-3228; System Development Plan, X-5 Research Aircraft, Supporting Research 
System Number 7L, 22 March 956. In the files at the AFFTC History Office. As events later demonstrated, 
even this erred badly on the side of underestimation. The final fee paid to Reaction Motors was greater than the 
original estimate for the total engine development program. The definitive contract exceeded more than 20 times 
the original estimate, and more than twice the original total program approval estimate.
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Conflict and Innovation
Although it gave the appearance of having a rather simple configuration, 
the X-15 was perhaps the most technologically complex single-seat aircraft yet 
built. The airplane would require the development of the largest and most sophis-
ticated man-rated rocket engine yet, and a heated debate took place regarding the 
escape system for the pilot. Given the extreme environment in which it was to oper-
ate, engineers had to either invent or reinvent almost every system in the airplane. 
North American’s Harrison A. “Stormy” Storms, Jr., and Charles H. Feltz had a 
difficult job ahead of them. Both men were widely admired by their peers, who 
considered them among the best in the business (a fact confirmed much later when 
both men played key roles during the development of the Apollo spacecraft).
 Harrison Storms had studied aeronautical engineering under Theodore von 
Kàrmàn at the California Institute of Technology during the 1940s before joining 
North American Aviation. He was chief engineer for the entire Los Angeles divi-
sion, and although he was greatly interested in the X-15 he had other responsibili-
ties that precluded daily contact with the X-15 program. Nevertheless, he would 
be a powerful ally when bureaucratic hurdles had to be overcome or the customer 
needed to be put at ease .1 
 Scott Crossfield, Always Another Dawn: The Story of a Rocket Test Pilot, (New York: The World Publishing Com-
pany, 960), pp. 29-22; letter, Scott Crossfield to Dennis R. Jenkins, 30 June 999. Crossfield’s book was later 
republished, without change (North Stratford, NH: Ayer Company Publishers, 999).
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      Feltz had joined the company in 
1940, working on the P-51 Mustang 
and B-25 Mitchell during World War 
II, and later the B-45 Tornado and 
F-86 Sabre. As the X-15 project engi-
neer, Feltz would lead the day-to-day 
activities of the design team. In those 
days at North American, the project 
engineer was in charge of the entire 
work force assigned to his airplane. 
Surprisingly, the 39-year-old Feltz had 
never heard of the X-15 until Storms 
pulled him off the F-86 program to be 
the project engineer, meaning that he 
had not been involved in the proposal 
effort and needed to catch up . Fortu-
nately, Storms and Crossfield were 
there to help .2 
Directly assisting Storms and 
Feltz was the already legendary NACA 
test pilot A . Scott Crossfield, who had 
joined North American specifically 
to work on the X-15 . Crossfield had 
been a Navy instructor pilot stationed 
at Corpus Christi, Texas, during World 
War II before receiving a bachelor of 
science degree in aeronautical engi-
neering and a master’s in aeronauti-
cal science from the University of Washington. Crossfield describes Storms as “a 
man of wonderful imagination, technical depth, and courage…with a love affair 
with the X-15. He was a tremendous ally and kept the objectivity of the program 
intact….” According to Crossfield, Charlie Feltz was “a remarkable ‘can do and 
did’ engineer who was very much a source of the X-15 success story.” In 2001, 
Crossfield called Feltz “the flywheel of common sense engineering who educated 
the world with the X-15, Apollo, and the Space Shuttle.”3
 The day Crossfield reported for work at North American, he defined his future 
role in the program. As he recounted in his autobiography, “I would be the X-15’s 
chief son-of-a-bitch. Anyone who wanted Charlie Feltz or North American to ca-
priciously change anything or add anything…would first have to fight Crossfield 
and hence, I hoped, would at least think twice before proposing grand inventions.” 
He played an essential role, for instance, in convincing the Air Force that an en-
capsulated ejection system was both impractical and unnecessary. His arguments 
2 Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, pp. 29-22; telephone conversation, Charles H. Feltz with Dennis R. Jenkins, 
 June 999.
3 Letter, Scott Crossfield to Dennis R. Jenkins, 30 June 999; “flywheel” quote from the foreword to, Dennis R. 
Jenkins and Tony R. Landis, Hypersonic: The Story of the North American X-15, (North Branch, MN: Specialty 
Press, 200).
Charles H. Feltz had joined North American 
Aviation just before the beginning of  World War 
II and had worked on several high-profile projects 
prior to being assigned as the lead of  the X-15 
development effort. Feltz would go on to lead North 
American’s Apollo Command and Service Module 
and Space Shuttle efforts. (Boeing)
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in favor of an ejection seat capable of permitting safe emergency egress at speeds 
between 80 mph and Mach 4, and altitudes from sea level to 120,000 feet saved 
significant money, weight, and development time. Crossfield also championed the 
development of a full-pressure suit for the X-15 pilot .4 
 There has been considerable interest in whether Crossfield made the right de-
cision in leaving the NACA, since it effectively locked him out of the high-speed, 
high-altitude portion of the X-15 flight program. Crossfield had no regrets: “I made 
the right decision to go to North American. I am an engineer, aerodynamicist, and 
designer by training…While I would very much have liked to participate in the flight 
research program, I am pretty well convinced that I was needed to supply a lot 
of the impetus that allowed the program 
to succeed in timeliness, in resources, 
and in technical return.… I was on the 
program for nine years from concep-
tion to closing the circle in flight test. 
Every step: concept, criteria, require-
ments, performance specifications, 
detailed design, manufacturing, qual-
ity control, and flight operations had all 
become an [obsession] to fight for, pro-
tect, and share—almost with a passion.” 
Crossfield seldom lacked passion.5 
 Essential members of the North 
American team included assistant proj-
ect engineers Roland L. “Bud” Benner, 
George Owl, and Raun Robinson . Others 
included powerplant engineer Robert E . 
Field, regulators and relief-valve expert 
John W. Gibb, chief of aerodynamics 
Lawrence P. Greene, project aerody-
namicist Edwin W. “Bill” Johnston, 
and test pilot Alvin S. White. Storms 
remembers that “Al White went through 
all the required training to be the backup 
pilot to Crossfield and trained for sever-
al years—and was not even allowed one 
flight; that’s dedication!” In addition, L. 
Robert Carman, who (along with Hubert 
Drake) developed one of the earliest 
NACA ideas for a hypersonic airplane, 
had left the NACA and joined North 
American to work on the X-15.6 
 The quote is from Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, p. 225. 
5 Letter, Scott Crossfield to Dennis R. Jenkins, 30 June 999.
6 Telephone conversation, Alvin S. White with Dennis R. Jenkins, 8 April 200; Harrison A. Storms, “X-5 Hardware 
Design Challenges,” a paper in the Proceedings of the X-15 30th Anniversary Celebration, Dryden Flight Research 
Facility, Edwards, CA, 8 June 989, NASA CP-305, p. 33.
A. Scott Crossfield resigned as a NACA test 
pilot and joined North American Aviation spe-
cifically to work on the X-15 project. Although 
an accomplished test pilot with many rocket-
powered flights under his belt, Crossfield was 
primarily an engineer and wanted to apply what 
he had learned to the most advanced research 
airplane of  the era. Crossfield led the charge 
on keeping the escape system simple and the air-
plane reliable, and later proved his mettle by 
flying the X-15’s first flights. (NASA)
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 Years later Storms remembered his first verbal instructions from Hartley 
Soulé: “You have a little airplane and a big engine with a large thrust margin. We 
want to go to 250,000 feet altitude and Mach 6. We want to study aerodynamic 
heating. We do not want to worry about aerodynamic stability and control, or the 
airplane breaking up. So, if you make any errors, make them on the strong side. 
You should have enough thrust to do the job.” Added Storms, “And so we did.”7 
 Soon after the contract was awarded, Storms and Soulé began to know each 
other much better as North American and NACA began to interact in technical and 
management meetings. Storms insisted that the contractor team members stay in 
their own area of responsibility and not attempt to run each other’s areas. Soulé 
agreed with the approach and directed the NACA members similarly. At least ini-
tially, Storms and Feltz were somewhat surprised that Soulé insisted on frequent 
meetings between small groups—seldom more than 10 to 12 people. Nevertheless, 
Storms remembers, “[S]urprisingly, we managed to get much accomplished, and 
we all left the meetings with a good concept of what had to be accomplished and 
when.” In later years, Storms was appreciative of the work done by Soulé, and in 
1989 commented that “I can’t say enough about how well, in my opinion, Hartley 
did his job. He was a very outstanding program manager and has been greatly 
neglected in recognition.”8 
 When North American signed the final contract, the X-15 was some three 
years away from its first flight. Although most of the basic research into the materi-
als and structural science was complete, largely thanks to the researchers at Lang-
ley, a great deal of work remained. This included the development of fabrication 
and assembly techniques for Inconel X and the new hot-structure design. North 
American and its subcontractors met the challenge of each problem with a practi-
cal solution that eventually consumed some 2,000,000 engineering man-hours. 
These included 4,000 hours logged in 15 different wind tunnels that provided more 
than 2 million data points.9 
 The Air Materiel Command had excluded the Langley study as a requirement 
in the invitation-to-bid letter circulated to the airframe contractors. Nevertheless, 
the influence of the Becker study was evident in North American’s winning pro-
posal. The North American vertical stabilizers used the thick-wedge airfoil devel-
oped by Charles McClellan, and the dihedral in the horizontal stabilizer had been 
a feature of the Langley configuration. In addition, North American used Inconel 
X and a multi-spar wing with corrugated webs.
 One major difference between the Becker study and that of North American 
was that the latter used all-movable horizontal stabilizers, resulting in the elimina-
tion of separate elevators and ailerons. The “rolling tail” allowed the horizontal 
stabilizers to deflect differentially to provide roll control, or together for pitch con-
trol. During the proposal evaluation the government considered this a “potential 
risk,” and several evaluators believed that it represented an overly complicated 
approach . However, the rolling tail allowed North American to eliminate the pro-
7 Storms, “X-5 Hardware Design Challenges,” p. 27.
8 Ibid, pp. 27 and 33.
9 Harrison Storms, “The X-5 Rollout Symposium,” 5 October 958. Released statements in the files at the AFFTC 
History Office.
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tuberances covering the aileron actuators in the thin wing, and allowed a generally 
simpler structure for the entire wing. Although the additional drag of the protuber-
ances was of little concern, they would have created another heating problem.10  
 Another significant difference between the two designs was that North Ameri-
can chose to use tunnels on the fuselage sides to house the various propellant 
lines and wiring ordinarily located inside the fuselage. This was because North 
American used full-monocoque propellant tanks instead of the separate tanks in-
side a semi-monocoque fuselage envisioned by Langley. The monocoque tanks 
were lighter and stronger than separate tanks, but challenged the designers to find 
ways to route plumbing, wiring, and control cables—hence the tunnels.11  
 In mid-October 1955, both Ames and the HSFS sent comments to Hartley 
Soulé expressing concerns about the North American design. Ames wanted to 
change the structure of the wing leading edge, the fuselage nose, and the ventral 
stabilizer, as well as to add an augmentation system to help control longitudinal 
damping. Ames also suggested additional study into the overall shape of the fu-
selage and the location of the horizontal stabilizer. Further, as they had during the 
proposal evaluation, researchers at Ames continued to believe that North Amer-
ican had overly simplified the heat transfer analysis. The HSFS recommended 
changing the design dynamic pressure, the load factors, the wing leading edge, the 
aerodynamic and ballistic control systems, the propellant system, the landing pro-
cedure, and various crew provisions. Engineers at the HSFS took this opportunity, 
again, to recommend using an interim LR8 engine during the early flight tests.12 
 These and other concerns about the North American configuration prompted 
a meeting at Wright Field on 24–25 October 1955 that was attended by representa-
tives from North American, Reaction Motors, the Air Force, and the NACA. The 
Navy did not attend. Subsequent meetings at the North American Inglewood plant 
took place on 27–28 October and 14–15 November; again, the Navy was not in 
attendance. Major discussion items included the fuselage tunnels and rolling tail. 
NACA researchers worried that vortices created by the side tunnels might interfere 
with the vertical stabilizer, and suggested making the tunnels as short as possible. 
North American agreed to investigate the tunnels’ effects during an early wind-
tunnel model-testing program. The company also assured the government that the 
rolling tail had proven effective in wind-tunnel testing and appeared to offer sig-
nificant benefits with few, if any, drawbacks.13  
 In early November, Bill Johnston and members of the North American aero-
dynamic staff met with John Becker, Arthur Vogeley, and Hartley Soulé to discuss 
0 Research Airplane Committee Report on the Conference on the Progress of the X-15 Project, a compilation of 
the papers presented at the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 25-26 October 956, pp. 23-3 (hereafter called 
the 1956 Research Airplane Committee Report); letter, Colonel Carl F. Damberg to Bell, no subject, 30 December 
95. In the files at the ASD History Office. 
 1956 Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 23-3; letter, Colonel Carl F. Damberg to Bell, no subject, 30 
December 95.
2 Letter, Harry J. Goett/Ames to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, no subject, 9 October 955; 
memorandum, HSFS to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, no subject, 20 October 955.
3 Memorandum, Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader to Members of the Project 226 Evaluation 
Group, no subject, 0 November 955; memorandum, Arthur W. Vogeley to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane 
Project Leader, no subject, 20 October 955; North American report NA-55-237, “Supplementary Data X-5 
Technical Evaluation Meeting,” 22 November 955. Eventually, an Air Force-NACA study team journeyed to 
France to study the prototype Sud-Ouest Trident interceptor, which also used a rolling tail. For more information 
on the airplane, see “Beyond the Frontiers, Sub-Quest Trident: Mixed-Powerplant Fighter,” Wings of Fame, Aero-
space Publishing Ltd. London, volume 0, p. 32. 
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NACA wind-tunnel support for the X-15. North American proposed acquiring 
data at Mach numbers between 0.7 and 3.5 with a 1/10-scale model in the Ames 
Unitary Tunnel. High-speed information, obtained between Mach numbers 3.0 
and 6.3, would come from a 1/50-scale model in the Ames 10 by 14-inch hy-
personic tunnel. The use of Ames was logical because it was nearer to the North 
American facilities than Langley, and in the days of travel by car or piston-pow-
ered airliners, distance counted . John Becker and his staff believed that more tests 
were required, and proposed two different programs depending upon which facili-
ties were available:14 
Plan A: Mach Number Laboratory Facility Scale
0.6–1.4 Langley 8-foot transonic tunnel 1/15
1.4–5.0 Langley 4x4-foot unitary complex 1/15
3.0–6.3 Ames 10x14-inch hypersonic tunnel 1/50
6 .9 Langley 11-inch hypersonic tunnel 1/50
Plan B: 0.6–1.4 Langley 8-foot transonic tunnel 1/15
1 .6, 1 .8, 2 .0, 2 .2 Langley 4x4-foot supersonic  
pressure tunnel
1/15
2 .5, 3 .0, 3 .5, 4 .0 Langley Mach 4 jet facility 1/50
3.0–6.3 Langley 10x14-inch hypersonic tunnel 1/50
6 .9 Langley 11-inch hypersonic tunnel 1/50
 Not surprisingly, these tests were concentrated in Langley facilities. The 
meeting also covered dynamic stability tests, but researchers agreed that the 
desirability of such tests would be determined after information from Mach 5 
flights at the PARD was evaluated. Two models would be tested—one based on 
the original Langley configuration, and the other based on the North American 
configuration. North American wanted to obtain the 1/50-scale results quickly to 
incorporate them into the 1/15-scale model used to test speed brake and control 
surface hinge moments.15 
 The new rocket engine also came under scrutiny. Meetings held during early 
November among the HSFS, Lewis, and Reaction Motors included discussions 
about converting the XLR30 from anhydrous ammonia to a hydrocarbon fuel (JP-
4 or kerosene). An earlier analysis had allowed Lewis to determine that the thrust 
and specific impulse would be almost identical between the two fuels. Lewis 
pointed out that pressure gages containing copper consistently failed within six 
months when used in a test cell with anhydrous ammonia, even though the gages 
were never in direct contact with the fuel. Researchers suggested converting the 
XLR30 to JP-4 to eliminate the perceived toxicity, corrosion, and handling prob-
lems entailed by the use of ammonia. Lewis also recommended that North Ameri-
can actively participate in the engine development program to ensure airframe 
 Memorandum, Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader to Members of the Project 226 Evaluation 
Group, no subject, 0 November 955.
5 Ibid; memorandum, Harry J. Goett/Ames to the Ames director, 23 November 955.
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compatibility. The researchers further suggested that a large number of engine 
parameters in the aircraft and on the ground should be recorded during each flight, 
and the engine should not be throttled below 50%.16 
 At the same time, John Sloop at Lewis wrote to Hartley Soulé seconding the 
HSFS’s recommendation to use the LR8 as an interim engine for the initial flight 
tests. It was already evident that the airframe would be ready long before the en-
gine. For its part, Reaction Motors believed that using the LR8 made a great deal 
of sense since the early flights would need little power, and it might be difficult to 
throttle the larger engine to such low levels.17  
 On an almost humorous note, it appears that when the issuing agency wrote 
the contracts for North American and Reaction Motors, it did not understand 
that North American had proposed to use integral propellant tanks for their X-15 
design. The contracts stated that the engine manufacturer would supply the en-
tire propulsion system, including the necessary propellant tanks. This resulted 
in some initial concerns over what parts of the propulsion system would be pro-
vided by which contractor. It obviously made no sense for Reaction Motors to 
provide major structural pieces of the airframe. A meeting on 7 November re-
sulted in North American agreeing to furnish all of the tanks for the propulsion 
system, while Reaction Motors would supply all of the necessary valves and 
regulators. At the same meeting, everybody agreed that Reaction Motors would 
supply 12 engines for the program, subject to a contract modification from the 
Air Force to provide funds. Of these, two would be used for testing (one a spare), 
and one equivalent engine would be used as component spares, leaving nine en-
gines for the flight program. As it turned out, the government later purchased a 
few more.18
CHANGES
 The engineers never expected that the design proposed by North American 
would be the one actually built—it seldom works that way even for operational 
aircraft, much less research vehicles. True to form, the design evolved substan-
tially over the first year of the program, and on 14-15 November 1955 researchers 
gathered in Inglewood to resolve several issues. For instance, the North American 
proposal used 1,599 psf for the minimum design dynamic pressure, while the 
NACA wanted at least 2,100 psf and preferably 2,500 psf. It would take 100 
pounds of additional structure to accommodate the higher pressure. On the other 
hand, increasing the design load factor from 5.25 g to 7.33 g would cost another 
135 pounds, but everybody agreed that raising the design dynamic pressure was a 
better use of the weight. Nevertheless, as built, the X-15 was rated at 7.33 g, and 
6 Memorandum, John L. Sloop/Lewis to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project leader, no subject, undated 
(received at Langley on 7 November 955).
7 Memorandum, Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader to Members of the Project 226 Evaluation 
Group, no subject, 0 November 955.
8 Ibid.
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the change was incorporated when it became obvious that the additional weight 
was rather trivial after various other upgrades were incorporated.19 
 Researchers also spent considerable effort on evaluating the structural ma-
terials proposed by North American, but a lack of detailed information made it 
impossible to reach a final decision on the wing leading-edge material. The group 
discussed various ceramic-metallic (cermet), copper, fiberglass, plastic, and tita-
nium carbide materials without conclusion. North American had proposed a wing 
leading edge that was easily detachable, and the researchers considered this a 
desirable capability even though it drove a slightly more complex structure and a 
little additional weight. A weight increase of 13 pounds allowed the use of Inco-
nel X sandwich construction for the speed brakes and provided additional speed 
brake hinges to handle the higher dynamic pressure already approved. The use 
of 0.020-inch titanium alloy for the internal structure of the wings and stabilizers 
instead of 24S-T aluminum gained support, although it involved a weight increase 
of approximately 7 pounds. 
 Other structural discussions included changing the oxygen tank to Inconel X 
due to the low-impact strength of the original titanium at cryogenic temperatures. 
At the same time, researchers reviewed the need to include a pressurization sys-
tem to stabilize the propellant tanks. Initially the engineers had considered this 
undesirable, and North American had not provided the capability in the original 
design. However, the additional stresses caused by increasing the design dynamic 
pressure made it necessary to accept a large increase in structural weight or in-
clude a pressurization system, and the attendees endorsed the latter. In fact, dur-
ing the flight program, pilots routinely repressurized the propellant tanks after 
they jettisoned any remaining propellants to provide an extra margin of structural 
strength while landing.20  
 When the researchers considered a random-direction, 1-inch thrust misalign-
ment, it became obvious that the original large dorsal vertical stabilizer was un-
satisfactory for the altitude mission profile. Based on experience with the X-1, the 
researchers knew that an installed engine could be a couple of degrees out of per-
fect alignment, although aerodynamic trim easily corrected this. However, in the 
case of the X-15, the thrust of the engine and the extreme velocities and altitudes 
involved made the issue a matter of some concern, and the government and North 
American agreed to include provisions correcting potential thrust misalignment. 
Along with several other issues, this caused engineers to modify the configuration 
of the vertical stabilizer.21 
 Researchers also concluded that the design would suffer from some level 
of roll-yaw coupling, and agreed upon acceptable limits. The government also 
pointed out the need for a rate damping (stability augmentation) system in pitch 
9 Memorandum for the engineering files (HSFS), Walter C. Williams, 8 November 955; memorandum, Hartley 
A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader to the Members of the Project 226 Evaluation Group, no subject, 7 
December 955; North American report NA-55-237, “Supplementary Data X-5 Technical Evaluation Meeting,” 
22 November 955. 
20 Ibid. 
2 Lawrence P. Greene and Rolland L. Benner, “X-5 Experience from the Designer’s Viewpoint,” a paper in the 1956 
Research Airplane Committee Report, p. 32; memorandum for the engineering files (HSFS), Walter C. Williams, 
8 November 955; memorandum, Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader to the Members of the 
Project 226 Evaluation Group, 7 December 955; North American report NA-55-237, “Supplementary Data 
X-5 Technical Evaluation Meeting,” 22 November 955, no page numbers.
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and yaw for a weight increase of 125 pounds. The need to make the dampers re-
dundant would be the subject of great debate throughout the development phase 
and early flight program, with the initial decision being not to. Attendees also 
decided the ballistic control system did not require a damping system, something 
that would change quickly during the flight program.22  
 North American agreed to provide redundant ballistic control systems and to 
triple the amount of hydrogen peroxide originally proposed. Engineers agreed to 
provide separate sources of peroxide for the ballistic controls and auxiliary power 
units (APUs) to ensure that the power units always had propellant. These changes 
added about 117 pounds .23  
 The configuration of the pilot’s controls was finally established. A conven-
tional center stick mechanically linked to a side-controller on the right console 
operated the aerodynamic control surfaces, while another side-controller on the 
left console above the throttle operated the ballistic control system. These were 
among the first applications of a side-stick controller, although these were me-
chanical devices that bore little resemblance to the electrical side-sticks used in 
the much later F-16.24  
 In an unusual miscommunication, the attendees at the November meeting be-
lieved the WADC had already developed a stable platform and would provide this 
to North American as government-furnished equipment. Separately, the NACA 
agreed to supply a “ball nose” to provide angle-of-attack and angle-of-sideslip 
data . The ball nose, or something functionally similar, was necessary because 
the normal pitot-static systems would not be reliable at the speeds and altitudes 
envisioned for the X-15. Although North American proposed a system based on 
modified Navaho components, the NACA believed that the ball nose represented 
a better solution .25  
 Per a recent service-wide directive, the Air Force representative had assumed 
that the X-15 would be equipped with some sort of encapsulated ejection system. 
On the other hand, North American had proposed a rather simple ejection seat . 
The company agreed to document their rationale for this selection and to provide 
a seat capable of meaningful ejection throughout most of the expected flight enve-
lope, although all concerned realized that no method offered escape at all speeds 
and altitudes .26  
 The November meetings ended with a presentation by Douglas engineer Leo 
Devlin detailing their second-place proposal. A presentation on the advantages of 
HK31 magnesium alloy for structural use was interesting but provided no com-
pelling reason to switch from Inconel X . Afterwards, Rocketdyne presented a 
50,000-lbf rocket engine concept based on the SC-4 being designed for a high-
22 North American report NA-55-237.
23 Memorandum for the engineering files (HSFS), Walter C. Williams, 8 November 955; memorandum, Hartley 
A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader to the Members of the Project 226 Evaluation Group, 7 December 
955; “Supplementary Data X-5 Technical Evaluation Meeting.”
2 Memorandum for the engineering files (HSFS), Walter C. Williams, 8 November 955; memorandum, Hartley 
A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader to the Members of the Project 226 Evaluation Group, 7 December 
955; North American report NA-55-237.
25 “Supplementary Data X-5 Technical Evaluation Meeting.” A stable platform is a gyroscopically stabilized mecha-
nism that aligns itself to the local vertical to provide a reference plane that can be used for the derivation of altitude, 
attitude, velocity, and rate-of-climb information. In essence, it was an early form of an inertial measurement unit.
26 “Supplementary Data X-5 Technical Evaluation Meeting.”
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altitude missile; this was a matter of only passing interest, given that a modi-
fied XLR30 was already under contract. Separately, Hartley Soulé and Harrison 
Storms discussed the proposed wind-tunnel program, attempting again to agree 
on which facilities would be used and when .27  
 The research instrumentation for the X-15 was the subject of a two-day meet-
ing between personnel from Langley and the HSFS on 16-17 November. The 
group concluded that strain gauges would be required on the main wing spars for 
the initial flights, where temperatures would not be extreme, but that wing pres-
sure distributions were not required. The HSFS wanted to record all data in the 
aircraft, while Langley preferred to telemeter it to the ground. Unfortunately, a 
lack of funds prevented the development of a high-speed telemetry system. The 
day following the NACA meeting, representatives from North American drove to 
the HSFS and participated in a similar meeting. Charlie Feltz, George Owl, and 
D. K. Warner (North American chief of flight test instrumentation) participated 
along with Arthur Vogeley, Israel Taback, and Gerald M. Truszynski from the 
NACA. The participants quickly agreed that the NACA would provide the instru-
ments and North American would install them. The first few flights would use a 
more or less standard NACA airspeed boom on the nose of the X-15 instead of the 
yet-to-be-completed ball nose. North American desired to have mockups of the 
instrumentation within nine months to facilitate the final design of the airplane, 
and the NACA indicated this should be possible .28 
 The debate regarding engine fuels flared up again briefly at the end of No-
vember when John Sloop at Lewis wrote to Captain McCollough recommending 
the use of a hydrocarbon fuel instead of ammonia. Lewis had concluded that it 
would be no more difficult to cool a hydrocarbon fuel than ammonia, and the 
fuel would be cheaper, less toxic, and easier to handle. No information was avail-
able on repeated starts of a JP-4-fueled rocket engine, but researchers at Lewis 
did not expect problems based on recent experience with a horizontally mounted 
5,000-lbf engine. The researchers repeated their warning that anhydrous ammonia 
would attack copper, copper alloys, and silver, all of which were standard ma-
terials used in research instrumentation. At the same time, the HSFS wrote that 
tests exposing a standard NACA test instrument to anhydrous ammonia vapor had 
proven disastrous. Both NACA facilities repeated their request for a change to a 
hydrocarbon fuel.29 
 Later the same day, Captain McCollough notified Hartley Soulé that the 
Power Plant Laboratory had reviewed the data submitted by Reaction Motors on 
the relative merits of substituting a hydrocarbon fuel for ammonia. The labora-
tory concluded that Reaction Motors had grossly underestimated the development 
27 Memorandum, Arthur W. Vogeley to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, subject: Project 226 
meetings to discuss changes in the North American Proposal—Wright-Patterson Air Force Base meeting of 2-25 
October, and North American Aviation meetings in Inglewood on 27-28 October and -5 November 955, 30 
November 955. In the files at the NASA History Office. Rocketdyne was a division of North American that was 
set up to develop rocket engines for the Navaho missile program; the company went on to develop many suc-
cessful rocket engines, including the Space Shuttle main engines.
28 Memorandum for the files (Langley), Israel Taback, no subject, 9 December 955; letter, Hartley A. Soulé/Research 
Airplane Project Leader to the NACA Liaison Officer at WPAFB, no subject, 2 December 955. Even if Northrop 
had completed the ball nose in time for the first flights, it is likely the instrumentation boom would have been used 
since it provided a well-established reference for airspeed and attitude. 
29 Letter, John L. Sloop/Lewis, to Captain Chester E. McCollough, Jr., no subject, 28 November 955; letter, HSFS 
to Commander WADC, no subject, 28 November 955.
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time for conversion, and recommended the continued use of anhydrous ammonia 
as the most expeditious method of meeting the schedule. A meeting on 1 Decem-
ber at Wright Field brought all of the government representatives together to final-
ize the fuel issue. The conclusions were that 1) one fuel had no obvious advantage 
over the other insofar as performance was concerned, 2) the corrosive character of 
anhydrous ammonia was annoying but tolerable, 3) it would take 6 to 12 months 
to switch fuels, and 4) the engine development program should continue with an-
hydrous ammonia. This finally put the issue to rest, although the NACA facilities 
still believed the requested change was justified.30 
 November also saw an indication that Inconel might have unforeseen prob-
lems. A test of the tensile strength of the alloy was published by Langley, and the 
results differed significantly (in the wrong direction) from the specifications pub-
lished by the International Nickel Company, the manufacturer of Inconel. NACA 
Headquarters asked Langley to explain the discrepancies. The reason was unknown, 
but researchers though it could be related to variations in the material, milling pro-
cedures, heat treatment, or testing procedures. Fortunately, further testing revealed 
that the results from the first test were largely invalid, although researchers never 
ascertained the specific reasons for the discrepancy. Still, the episode pointed out 
the need to precisely control the entire life cycle of the alloy.31 
 In December, North American engineers visited both Ames and Langley 
to work out details of the wind-tunnel program. The participants agreed that 
Langley would perform flutter tests on the speed brakes using the 1/15-scale 
model. The PARD would make a second flutter investigation, this one of the 
wing planform, since North American required data from a large-scale model 
at Mach 5 and a dynamic pressure of 1,500 psf—something no existing tunnel 
could provide. North American was supplied with additional requirements for a 
rotary-derivative model to be tested at Ames, and NACA personnel suggested 
that two 1/50-scale models be constructed—one for testing at Ames and one for 
Langley. The North American representatives agreed to consider the suggestion, 
but pointed out that no funds existed for two models. Ames also announced that 
they would take the 10 by 14-inch hypersonic tunnel out of service on 1 May for 
several months of modifications. The location was important since the tunnels 
were not identical and researchers could not directly compare the results from the 
two facilities .32 
 Ultimately, funds were found to build two 1/50-scale models—one for use at 
Langley in the 11-inch hypersonic and 9-inch blowdown tunnels, and one for the 
North American 16-inch wind tunnel. It was decided not to use the Ames tunnel 
prior to its closing. Langley also tested a 1/15-scale high-speed model while Ames 
tested a rotary-derivative model. The wind-tunnel investigations included evalu-
ating the speed brakes, horizontal stabilizers, vertical stabilizer, fuselage tunnels, 
and rolling-tail. Interestingly, the tests at Langley confirmed the need for control 
30 Memorandum, Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader to the Members of the Project 226 Evaluation 
Group, no subject, 7 December 955.
3 Philip J. Hughes, John E. Inge, Stanley B. Prosser. NACA technical note 335, “Tensile and compressive stress-
strain properties of some high-strength sheet alloys at elevated temperatures,” November 95; various corre-
spondence between NACA Headquarters and Langley between 5 November and 30 November 955.
32 Memorandum, Harry J. Goett/Ames to the Ames Director, no subject,  December 955; North American report 
NA-55-26-, “Proposed Wind Tunnel Test Program, X-5 Research Airplane, Project 226,”  December 955.
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system dampers, while North American concluded they were not necessary. This 
was not the final answer, and researchers would debate the topic several more 
times before the airplane flew.33 
 North American had based its design surface temperatures on achieving lam-
inar flow during most of the flight profile. However, most of the heat-transfer 
theories in general use at the time assumed fully turbulent flow on the fuselage. 
Researchers had previously raised the same issue with no particular solution. Ul-
timately, researchers used the Unitary Plan tunnel at Langley and the Air Force 
Arnold Engineering Development Center at Tullahoma, Tennessee, to resolve the 
discrepancy. These tests provided heat-transfer coefficients that were even higher 
than the theoretical values, particularly on the lower surface of the fuselage. Be-
cause of these results, the Air Force directed North American to modify the design 
to withstand the higher temperatures. This proved particularly costly in terms of 
weight and performance, adding almost 2,000 pounds of additional heat-sink ma-
terial to the airframe. This is when the program changed its advertising. Instead 
of using 6,600 fps (Mach 6.5) as a design goal, the program began talking about 
Mach 6; it was obvious to the engineers that the airplane would likely not attain 
 
33 North American report NA-55-26-, “Proposed Wind Tunnel Test Program, X-5 Research Airplane, Project 
226,”  December 955.
Various wind tunnels around the country participated in the X-15 development effort. This 1956 photo 
shows an original “high tail” configuration. Note the shock waves coming off  the wing leading edge 
and a separate showck wave just behind it coming off  the front of  the landing skid. Very soon, this 
configuration would change substantially as the fuselage tunnels were made shorter, the vertical surfaces 
reconfigured, and the skids moved further aft. (NASA)
X-15: EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
the original goal. Later, measurements from the flight program indicated that the 
skin temperatures of the primary structural areas of the fuselage, main wing box, 
and tail surfaces were actually several hundred degrees lower than the values 
predicted by the modified theory; in fact, they were below predictions using the 
original theories. However, resolving these types of uncertainties was part of the 
rationale for the X-15 program in the first place.34 
 By January 1956, North American required government guidance on several 
issues. A meeting on 18 January approved the use of a removable equipment rack 
in the instrument compartment. North American would still permanently mount 
some instrumentation and other equipment in the fuselage tunnels, but everybody 
agreed that a removable rack would reduce the exposure of the majority of re-
search instruments and data recorders to ammonia fumes during maintenance.35  
 It soon became evident, contrary to statements at the November meeting, that 
no suitable stable platform existed, although the WADC had several units under 
development. It was a major blow, with no readily apparent solution.36  
 Other topics discussed at the 18 January meeting included the speed brake 
design and operation. Full extension of the speed brakes at pressures of 2,500 psf 
would create excessive longitudinal accelerations, so North American revised the 
speed brakes to open progressively while maintaining 1,500-psf pressure until 
they reached the full-open position. All in attendance thought that this was an ap-
propriate solution .37  
 Pilot escape systems came up again during a 2-3 May 1956 meeting at Wright 
Field among Air Force, NACA, Navy, and North American personnel. WADC 
personnel pointed to a recent Air Force policy directive that required an encapsu-
lated escape system in all new aircraft. Researchers from the WADC argued that 
providing some sort of enclosed system would comply with this policy and allow 
the gathering of research data on such systems. (This seemed an odd rationale in 
that it appeared to assume that the pilot would use the capsule at some point—an 
entirely undesirable possibility.) Those opposed to the Air Force view objected to 
any change because it would add weight and delay development. The opposing 
group, including Scott Crossfield, believed that the safety features incorporated 
in the X-15 made the ejection seat acceptable. After the meeting, the Air Force 
directed North American to justify its use of an ejection seat, but did not direct the 
company to incorporate a capsule.38 
 During a 24 May meeting at Langley, representatives from Eclipse-Pioneer 
briefed researchers from the NACA, North American, and the WADC on a stable 
3 Joseph Weil, NASA technical note D-278, “Review of the X-5 Program,” June 962, p. 7; telephone conversa-
tion, Charlie H. Feltz with Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 May 2002; telephone conversation, Scott Crossfield with Dennis 
R. Jenkins, 8 August 2002.
35 Memorandum, Walter C. Williams/HSFS to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, subject: Visit to 
North American Aviation, Inc. to discuss Project 226, 27 January 956. 
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 In reality, very few U.S. aircraft were ever designed with encapsulated escape systems. The Convair B-58 Hustler 
and General Dynamics F- were the only two that made it to operational service. In addition, the two North 
American XB-70A prototypes and first three B-As were so equipped (but the fourth B-A and production B-Bs 
were not). Capsules were also investigated for the Republic XF-03, North American XF-08, and were even 
toyed with for advanced models of the Lockheed F-0 Starfighter and Republic F-05 Thunderchief, but these 
did not materialize. The X-2 and D-558s used partial escape capsules (the forward fuselage separated from the 
remainder of the airplane, but the pilot had to jump clear and parachute to a landing).
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platform that weighed 65 pounds and could be ready in 24 months. Later events 
would show that these estimates were hopelessly optimistic.39 
 On 11 June 1956, the government approved a production go-ahead for the 
three X-15 airframes, although North American did not cut metal for the first 
aircraft until September. Four days later, on 15 June 1956, the Air Force assigned 
three serial numbers (56-6670 through 56-6672) to the X-15 program. The Con-
tract Reporting and Bailment Branch furnished this data by phone on 28 May and 
confirmed it in writing on 15 June.40
THE FIRST INDUSTRY CONFERENCE (1956)
 The public law that established the NACA required the agency to dissem-
inate information to the industry and the public. One of the methods used to 
accomplish this was to hold periodic conferences with representatives of the in-
dustry to discuss the results of research into specific areas. By the beginning of 
July, Hugh Dryden concluded there had been sufficient progress on the develop-
ment of the X-15 to hold an industry conference at one of the NACA facilities 
in October .41 
 Langley hosted the first Conference on the Progress of the X-15 Project on 
25-26 October 1956, providing an interesting insight into the X-15 development 
effort. There were 313 attendees representing the Air Force, NACA, Navy, vari-
ous universities and colleges, and most of the major aerospace contractors. Ap-
proximately 10% of the attendees were from various Air Force organizations, with 
the WADC contributing over half. Oddly, however, Air Force personnel made 
none of the presentations at the conference. The majority of the 27 authors of the 
18 technical papers came from various NACA organizations (16), while the rest 
were from North American (9) and Reaction Motors (2). The papers confirmed a 
considerable amount of progress, but made it clear that a few significant problems 
still lay ahead.42 
 Another paper summarized the results of tests in eight different wind tunnels. 
These tests were conducted at velocities between low subsonic speeds to Mach 
6.9, somewhat in excess of the projected maximum speed of the airplane. One of 
the surprising findings was that the controversial fuselage tunnels generated near-
ly half of the total lift at high Mach numbers. However, another result confirmed 
the NACA prediction that the original fuselage tunnels would cause longitudinal 
 
 
39 Memorandum, Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, subject: Project 226—Progress report for 
month of May 956, 7 June 956. In the files at the NASA History Office.
0 Memorandum, M. A. Todd, Acting Chief, Contractor Reporting and Bailment Branch, Support Division, to Chief, 
Fighter Branch, Aircraft Division, Director Procurement and Production, AMC, subject: Confirmation of Serial 
Numbers Assigned, 5 June 956. In the files at the AFMC History Office.
 Letter, Hugh L. Dryden, Director of NACA, to Chief, Fighter WSPO, ARDC, no subject, 6 July 956. In the files at 
the NASA History Office.
2 956 Research Airplane Committee Report, passim.
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instability. In subsequent testing, researchers shortened the tunnels ahead of the 
wing, greatly reducing the problem.43 
 One of the more interesting experiments was “flying” small (3- to 4-inch) 
models in the hypervelocity free-flight facility at Ames. The models, which were 
made of cast aluminum, cast bronze, or various plastics, were fragile. Despite this, 
the goal was to shoot the model out of a gun at tremendous speeds in order to ob-
serve shock-wave patterns across the shape . As often as not, what researchers saw 
were pieces of X-15 models flying down the range sideways. Fortunately, enough 
of the models remained intact for them to acquire meaningful data.44 
 Other papers dealt with the ability of the pilot to fly the airplane. Pilots had 
flown the preliminary exit and reentry profiles using fixed-base simulators at 
Langley and North American. Alarmingly, the pilots found that the airplane was 
nearly uncontrollable without damping and only marginally stable during some 
maneuvers with dampers. A free-flying model program at the PARD showed that 
3 Herbert W. Riyard, Robert W. Dunning, and Edwin W. Johnston, “Aerodynamic Characteristics From Wind Tunnel 
Studies of the X-5 Configuration,” a paper in the 1956 Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 39-56. The 
list of wind tunnels included the North American 8.75 by -foot tunnel, the Langley 8-foot transonic tunnel, the 
North American 6-inch tunnel, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology supersonic tunnel, the Langley 9 by 
9-inch Mach  blowdown jet, the Ames 0 by -inch tunnel, and the Langley -inch hypersonic tunnel.
 Dale L. Compton, “Welcome,” a paper in the Proceedings of the X-15 30th Anniversary Celebration, Dryden Flight 
Research Facility, Edwards, CA, 8 June 989, NASA CP-305, p. 3. The free-flight tunnel at Ames was conceived 
by H. Julian Allen and opened in 99 at a cost of about $20,000. Its test section was 8 feet long,  foot wide, 
and 2 feet high. By forcing a draft through the tunnel at a speed of about Mach 3 and firing a model projectile 
upstream, one could simulate velocities of up to Mach 8. Schlieren cameras were set up at seven locations 
along the test section (three on the side and four on the top) to make shadowgraphs that showed the airflow over 
the models. The facility proved to be an important tool not only for the X-5 but also for Project Mercury.
The hypervelocity free-flight facility at NACA Ames fired small (3-4-inch-long) models of  the X-15 
to observe shock-wave patterns. It was more of  an art than a science to get the models to fly forward 
and not break apart, but enough survived to gain significant insight into shock patterns surrounding 
the X-15. (NASA)
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low-speed stability and control were adequate. Since some aerodynamicists had 
questioned the use of the rolling tail instead of ailerons, free-flying models had 
investigated that feature, proving that the rolling tail would provide the necessary 
lateral control .45 
 Researchers also reported on the state of the structural design. Preliminary 
estimates showed that the airplane would encounter critical loads during the ini-
tial acceleration and during reentry, but would experience maximum temperatures 
only during the latter. Because of this, the paper primarily dealt with the load-
temperature relationships anticipated for reentry. The selection of Inconel X was 
justified based on its strength and favorable creep characteristics at 1,200°F. The 
leading edge would use a bar of Inconel X, since that portion of the wing acted 
as a heat sink. This represented a radical change from the fiberglass leading edge 
originally proposed by North American. In another major change, the leading 
edge of the wing was no longer easily removable, although this fact seemed to 
escape the attention of most everybody in attendance, particularly Harry Goett 
from Ames.46  
 The main landing gear brought its own concerns. Originally, it consisted of 
two narrow skids attached to the fuselage under the front part of the wing and 
stowed externally along the side tunnels during flight. When unlocked, the skis 
fell into the down position, with help from airflow and a bungee. Further analysis 
indicated that the X-15 would land more nose-high than expected, and that the 
rear fuselage would likely strike the ground before the skids. A small tail-skid 
had been proposed, but this was found to be inadequate. In its place, engineers 
moved the skids aft to approximately the leading edge of the vertical stabilizers, 
solving the ground-strike problem. However, the move introduced a new concern. 
Now the nose-down rotation after main-skid contact would be particularly jar-
ring, placing a great deal of stress on the pilot and airframe. In fact, it would lead 
directly to one early landing accident and be a source of problems throughout the 
flight program. Nobody had a suitable solution.47 
 The expected acceleration of the X-15 presented several unique human-factor 
concerns early in the program. It was estimated that the pilot would be subjected 
to an acceleration of up to 5 g. Because of this, North American developed a side-
stick controller that used an armrest to support the pilot’s arm while still allowing 
full control of the airplane . Coupled with the fact that there were two separate at-
titude-control systems on the X-15, this resulted in a unique control-stick arrange-
ment. A conventional center stick, similar to that installed in most fighter-type 
aircraft of the era, operated the aerodynamic control surfaces through the newly 
required stability augmentation (damper) system. Mechanical linkages connected 
a side-stick controller on the right console to the same aerodynamic control sur-
faces and augmentation system. The pilot could use either stick interchangeably, 
although the flight manual described the use of the center stick “during normal 
periods of longitudinal and vertical acceleration.” Another side-stick controller 
5 Herbert W. Riyard, Robert W. Dunning, and Edwin W. Johnston, “Aerodynamic Characteristics From Wind Tunnel 
Studies of the X-5 Configuration,” a paper in the 1956 Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 39-56.
6 Richard L. Schleicher, “Structural Design of the X-5 Research airplane,” a paper in the 1956 Research Airplane 
Committee Report, pp. 3-6.
7 Wendell H. Stillwell, X-15 Research Results, NASA publication SP-60 (Washington, DC: NASA, 965).
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above the left console operated the ballistic control system that provided attitude 
control at high altitudes. Describing one of the phenomena soon to be discovered 
in space flight, the flight manual warned that “velocity tends to sustain itself after 
the stick is returned to the neutral position. A subsequent stick movement opposite 
to the initial one is required to cancel the original attitude change.” Isaac Newton 
was correct after all .48 
 Engineers had not firmly established the design for the X-15 side-stick 
controller, but researchers discussed previous experience with similar control-
lers in the Convair F-102, Grumman F9F, Lockheed TV-2, and North American 
YF-107A, as well as several ground simulators. The pilots who had used these 
controllers generally thought that the engineers needed to provide a more “natu-
ral” feel for the controllers.49 
 Based largely on urgings from Scott Crossfield, the Air Force agreed to allow 
North American to use an ejection seat instead of a capsule system. The company 
8 Sigurd A. Sjoberg, “Some Experience With Side Controllers,” a paper in the 1956 Research Airplane Commit-
tee Report, pp. 67-7; X-5 Interim Flight Manual, FHB-23-, 8 March 960, changed 2 May 96. At the 
time the terms “ballistic control system” (BCS) and “reaction control system” (RCS) were used interchangeably; 
however, since “ballistic” seemed to show up in more of the documentation, that is what will be used here.
9 Sjoberg, “Some Experience With Side Controllers,” pp. 67-7. 
From the left, North American test pilot Alvin S. White, Air Force X-15 Project Pilot Captain Iven 
C. Kinchloe, and Scott Crossfield discuss the design of  the side stick controller for the new research 
airplane. The design of  these controllers caused quite a bit of  controversy early in the program, but 
the pilots generally liked them once they acclimated.  Crossfield’s influence on the program showed early 
in the flight program when some pilots complained the configuration of  the cockpit was tailored to 
Crossfield’s size and was not sufficiently adjustable to accommodate other pilots. Later modifications 
solved these issues. (Alvin S. White Collection)
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had investigated four escape systems in depth, including cockpit capsules, nose 
capsules, a canopy-shielded seat, and a stable-seat with a pressure suit. Engineers 
had tried capsule-like systems before, most notably in the X-2, where the entire 
forward fuselage could be detached from the rest of the aircraft. Douglas had 
opted for this approach in all of the D-558s and their X-15 proposal . Model tests 
showed that these were unstable and prone to tumble at a high rate of rotation, and 
they added weight and complexity to the aircraft. Their potential success rate was 
unknown at the time.50 
 Surprisingly, an analysis by North American showed that only 2% of the acci-
dents would occur at high altitude or speed. Because engineers expected most po-
tential accidents to occur at speeds less than Mach 4, North American had decided 
to use a stable-seat with a pressure suit. The perceived benefits of this combina-
tion were its relative simplicity, high reliability, and light weight. North American 
 
50 Walter C. Williams, “X-5 Concept Evolution” a paper in the Proceedings of the X-15 30th Anniversary Celebra-
tion, Dryden Flight Research Facility, Edwards, CA, 8 June 989, NASA CP-305, p. 3. On 27 September 956, 
Captain Milburn G. Apt lost control of the X-2 on its first Mach 3 flight (Mach 3.96 was achieved at 70,000 feet). 
The escape capsule successfully separated at approximately 0,000 feet, but apparently Apt was unable to jump 
clear of the capsule before it impacted the desert. (The capsule was meant to get the pilot away from the aircraft 
and to a survivable altitude and speed. Then the pilot needed to jump from the capsule and use his backpack 
parachute for the final descent.) Apt was killed, and the X-2 program was terminated.
North American performed a seemingly endless series of  analyses to support their selection of  an ejection seat 
over an encapsulated system. The company determined there was only a 2-percent likelihood of  an accident 
occurring at high altitude or high speed, eliminating much of  the perceived need for the complicated and heavy 
encapsulated system. The stabilized ejection seat, coupled with the David Clark Company full-pressure suit, 
provided meaningful ejection up to Mach 4 and 120,000 feet. (North American Aviation)
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acknowledged that the seat did not provide meaningful escape at altitudes above 
120,000 feet or speeds in excess of Mach 4. However, the designers (particularly 
Scott Crossfield) believed that when the seat-suit combination was inadequate, 
the safest course of action was for the pilot to simply ride the airplane down to an 
altitude and velocity where the ejection seat could function successfully.51  
 Lawrence P. Greene, the chief of aerodynamics at North American, presented 
the final paper at the 1956 industry conference. This was an excellent summary 
of the development effort to date and a review of the major known problems. 
Researchers considered flutter to be a potential problem, largely because little ex-
perimental data regarding flutter at hypersonic Mach numbers were available, and 
there was a lack of basic knowledge on aero-thermal-elastic relationships. Greene 
pointed out that engineers had derived the available data on high-speed flutter 
from experiments conducted at less than Mach 3, and not all of it was applicable 
to the X-15. As it turned out, the program did encounter panel flutter during the 
early flights, leading to a change in the design criteria for high-speed aircraft.52  
 Inconel X also presented a potential problem because fabrication techniques 
for large structures did not exist. By using various alloys of titanium, North 
American saved considerable weight in parts of the internal structure that were 
not subject to high temperatures. Titanium, while usable to only about 800°F, 
weighed much less than Inconel X. Ultimately, the requirements for processing 
and fabricating these materials influenced some aspects of the structural design. 
Inconel X soon stopped being a laboratory curiosity as the X-15 program devel-
oped techniques to form, machine, and heat-treat it.53  
 Overall, the conference was a success and disseminated a great deal of infor-
mation to the industry, along with frank discussions about unresolved issues and 
concerns. It also provided a short break for the development team that had been 
working hard to meet an extremely ambitious schedule.
MOCKUP INSPECTION
 The previous year had resulted in some major configuration changes to the 
X-15. The wing size and shape were similar to those proposed by North Ameri-
can, but engineers increased the leading-edge radius (along with the radius on the 
empennage and nose) to satisfy aerodynamic heating concerns. The leading edge 
was also changed from replaceable fiberglass to a nearly solid piece of Inconel X . 
NASA had always harbored concerns about the use of ablative materials on the 
leading edge, but this change also eliminated the removable-leading-edge concept 
5 Memorandum, Arthur W. Vogeley, to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, subject: Project 226 
meetings to discuss changes in the North American Proposal—Wright-Patterson AFB meeting of 2-25 October, 
and North American Aviation meetings in Inglewood on 27-28 October and -5 November 955, 30 November 
955; Scott Crossfield, “X-5 Crew Provisions and Escape,” a paper in the 1956 Research Airplane Committee 
Report, pp. 93-22.
52 Lawrence P. Greene, “Summary of Pertinent Problems and Current Status of the X-5 Airplane,” a paper in the 
1956 Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 93-22.
53 Stillwell, X-15 Research Results; Greene, “Summary of Pertinent Problems,” pp. 239-258.
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that was highly prized by Ames. The final configuration also increased the diam-
eter of the fuselage by about 6% in order to increase the propellant capacity.54 
 A revised landing gear eliminated tail-strikes during landing and improved 
directional stability during slide-out. The side fairings, always a point of conten-
tion between North American and the NACA, were shortened ahead of the wing. 
The horizontal stabilizer was moved rearward 5.4 inches, the wing was moved 
forward 3.6 inches, and the center of gravity was brought forward 10 inches to 
improve longitudinal stability. However, perhaps the most visible change was that 
the area of the vertical stabilizers was increased from 50 square feet to 75 square 
feet. Full 10-degree wedge airfoils replaced the original double-wedge configura-
tion for the vertical stabilizers. The area for the verticals was also redistributed 
(55% for the dorsal stabilizer and 45% for the ventral, instead of the original 
73/27 configuration). In addition, both the dorsal and ventral stabilizers now had 
rudders that were nearly symmetrical and operated together at all times (except 
after the ventral had been jettisoned during landing). Originally, only the dorsal 
stabilizer had a rudder.55 
 The development engineering inspection (DEI) took place in Inglewood fa-
cility on 12-13 December 1956. In the normal course of development, the Air 
Force inspected full-scale mockups to ensure the design features were satisfactory 
before construction of the first airplane began. Of the 49 people who took part in 
the inspection, 34 were from the Air Force, with the WADC contributing 22. The 
inspection committee consisted of Major E. C. Freeman from the ARDC, Mr. F . 
Orazio of the WADC, and Lieutenant Colonel Keith G . Lindell from Air Force 
Headquarters. The NACA and the Navy each contributed a single voting member. 
Captain Chester E. McCollough, Jr., from the X-15 Project Office, Captain Iven 
C . Kincheloe, Jr. (already selected as the first Air Force X-15 pilot), and three 
NACA researchers served as technical advisors .56  
 The inspection resulted in 84 requests for alterations, of which the board re-
jected 12 and deferred 22 others for further study. Surprisingly, the board rejected 
some of the more interesting of the proposed changes. These included suggestions 
that the aerodynamic center stick should be capable of controlling the ballistic 
controls at the press of a switch, the motions of the aerodynamic and ballistic 
side sticks should be similar, or a third controller that combined both functions 
should be installed on the right console. The committee rejected these suggestions 
since it seemed inappropriate to make decisions on worthwhile improvements or 
combinations before evaluating the controllers already selected under actual flight 
conditions. Given that two of the three controller suggestions came from future 
X-15 pilots (Iven Kincheloe and Joseph A. Walker), it appeared that improve-
ments were necessary.57  
  
5 Benjamin F. Guenther, “X-5 Research Airplane,” an unpublished manuscript written in 982, no page numbers. 
Supplied by Ben Guenther at LaRC.
55 Guenther, “X-5 Research Airplane.” 
56 Air Force report (no numbers), “Development Engineering Inspection of the X-5 Research Aircraft – 3 De-
cember 956,” Director of Systems Management, ARDC. A “request for alteration” is the form used to request 
changes as the result of a mockup or engineering inspection within the Air Force.
57 Air Force report, “Development Engineering Inspection” Director of Systems Management, ARDC.  
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 An even more surprising rejection occurred concerning changeable leading 
edges. North American had disclosed at the 1956 industry conference six weeks 
earlier that the leading edges were no longer removable, with little comment. 
Nevertheless, Harry Goett from Ames did not agree with the change. Goett want-
ed to widen the front spar lower flange and locate the ballistic roll thrusters at the 
back of the same spar. In addition, Goett argued that North American had initially 
proposed providing interchangeable wing leading edges. In spite of these logical 
arguments, the inspection committee decided the required changes would add 3 
pounds to the design and rejected the request. At least one participant opined that 
deleting this feature would significantly decrease the value of the hypersonic re-
search airplane .58  
 Additional wind-tunnel testing resulted in modifications to the vertical 
stabilizer, but North American essentially built the configuration inspected in 
mockup form during December 1956. However, while the design and construc-
tion of the airframe progressed relatively smoothly, other systems were running 
into serious difficulties.
58 Ibid.
The X-15 mockup as it was inspected in December 1956. At this point, the airplane looked substan-
tially as it would in final form with short fuselage tunnels and shorter vertical surfaces. This inspection 
cleared the way for North American to produce the final manufacturing drawings and begin to cut 
metal. (U.S. Air Force)
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STRUCTURAL FABRICATION
 The X-15 was breaking new ground when it came to structural materials, since 
it was obvious from the start that most of the wetted surface would be subjected to 
temperatures up to 1,200°F. Exotic materials made from the rare elements had not 
advanced sufficiently to permit quantity production of these expensive alloys, so 
the list of candidate materials was narrowed to corrosion resistant steels, titanium, 
and nickel-base alloys (“stainless steels”). The following table shows the strength 
properties of the candidate materials at room temperature; various aluminum al-
loys are included as a comparison. All properties are for bare sheet stock, except 
for the AM-355 bar stock. Materials marked with an asterisk were heat-treated.59
 
Material Ultimate 
Tensile 
Strength 
(ksi)
Yield 
Tensile 
Strength 
(ksi)
Com-
pressive 
Yield 
(ksi)
Ultimate 
Shear 
Strength 
(ksi)
Bearing 
Yield 
(ksi)
Modu-
lus 
(x1000 
psi)
Nickel 
base
Inconel X * 155 100 105 018 186 31 .0
Inconel 80 30 32 56 – 31 .0
Corrosion-
resistant 
steel
AM-350 CRES * 185 150 164 125 268 28 .7
AM-355 CRES * 200 165 178 131 295 28 .7
A-286 CRES * 150 95 99 91 136 29 .0
4130 
(HT125-Mo)
125 103 113 82 180 29 .0
Titanium 8-Mn 120 110 115 79 180 15 .5
5A1-2 .5Sn 115 110 110 72 175 15 .5
6A1-4V * 160 145 145 99 230 16 .3
Aluminum 2024-T4 * 62 40 40 37 63 10 .5
7075-T6 * 78 69 70 47 110 10 .3
6061-T6 * 42 36 35 27 58 10 .2
 Although 6A1-4V titanium and AM-350 CRES had good strength efficiencies 
over a wide temperature range, both of the alloys tended to fall off rapidly above 
800°F. Inconel X, on the other hand, had only a gradual drop in strength up to 
1,200°F. Because of this stability, North American chose Inconel X for the outer 
skin for the entire airplane. Regular Inconel (as opposed to Inconel X) was not 
heat-treatable, but it could be welded and was used in locations where high strength 
was not of paramount importance or where final closeout welds were necessary 
following heat treatment of the surrounding structures. To accomplish this, Inconel 
lands were incorporated into Inconel X structures prior to final heat treatment, and 
access-hole cover plates made from Inconel were welded to these lands.60 
59 Richard L. Schleicher, “Structural Design of the X-5,” North American Aviation, 963, pp. 3-. In the files at the 
San Diego Aerospace Museum. In the U.S. system in place at the time, material strengths were measured in kips 
per square inch (ksi). A kip (9) was a unit of measure equal to ,000 pounds used to express deadweight load. 
60 Schleicher, “Structural Design of the X-5,” pp. 3-.
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 North American used high-strength aluminum (2024-T4) to form the inner 
pressure shell of the cockpit and part of the instrumentation bay. As a relief from 
high thermal stresses, the company used titanium for the structure of the fuselage 
and wings. Originally, the company used two titanium alloys: 8-Mn, which was 
the highest strength alloy then available but was not recommended for welding, 
and 5A1-2.5Sn, which had acceptable strength and was weldable. Later, North 
American began using a high-strength and weldable alloy, 6A1-4V, in some ar-
eas. To combat the high concentrated loads from the engine, most of the aft fu-
selage structure used titanium framing. The majority of the structure used fusion 
welding, although the company also used a limited amount of resistance welding. 
North American radiographically inspected all critical welds to ensure quality.61 
 The material that presented the most problems was probably the 5Al-2.5Sn 
titanium, which proved to have inconsistent tensile properties that made it dif-
ficult to work with. It also exhibited low ductility and notch sensitivity, and had a 
poor surface condition. These problems existed in both rolled and extruded forms 
of the metal. The surface condition was the most important factor governing the 
formability of titanium, so North American had to remove all oxygen contamina-
tion, inclusions, and grind marks by machining, polishing, or chemically milling 
the metal prior to the final finishing. As a result, North American procured tita-
nium extrusions for the X-15 with sufficient extra material in all dimensions to 
allow technicians to machine all surfaces prior to use.62  
 The limited amount of stretch and shrink that was possible with a titanium 
extrusion during stretch wrapping presented a different problem when North 
American went to form the side fairing frames. Each frame was composed of four 
titanium 5Al-2.5Sn extrusions. One of the problems was that the inside flanges 
were located in areas that had small bend radii, and it was necessary to prevent 
compression failure. The small bend radii were “relieved” (some material was re-
moved prior to bending), and a gusset was later welded in to fill the relieved area. 
The alternative would have been to reduce compression by increasing the pull on 
the forming machine, thus shifting the bend axis closer to the inboard edge. This, 
however, would have resulted in a tension failure on the outboard flange.63 
 North American found that one of the more interesting aspects of titanium 
was that a formed part was prone to crack until the residual stresses resulting 
from the forming had been removed. This delayed cracking could occur within 
a few minutes, or it might not become evident until weeks later. In response, 
North American initiated a process that provided stress relief for all parts except 
“slightly” formed parts, such as skin panels, since they exhibited few problems.64 
 Forming the seven different pressure vessel configurations in the X-15 pre-
sented its own problems. When compatibility with the contained fluid permitted, 
titanium was the first choice of material. North American used a 26-inch Cincinnati 
Hydroform for the hemispherical ends of the 14-inch cylindrical nitrogen tanks 
6 Richard L. Schleicher, “Structural Design of the X-5,” p. . 
62 I. J. Wilson, North American report NA58-973, “Forming and Fabrication Methods for the X-5 Airplane,” 8 July 
958, no page numbers; confirmed by telephone conversation between Charles H. Feltz and Dennis R. Jenkins 
on 23 May 2002.
63 “Forming and Fabrication Methods for the X-5 Airplane.”
6 Ibid.
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with little difficulty. The company also attempted to form the 16-inch hemispheres 
for the helium tanks on this machine, but the optimum blank size was greater 
than the maximum machine capacity of 26 inches. Using a smaller-than-optimum 
blank required excessive hold-down pressure that resulted in small surface cracks. 
The alternative was to “spin form” the hemispherical ends. Engineers heated the 
blanks to approximately 1,600°F and used an internally heated spinning chuck to 
shape the disc. Unfortunately, this resulted in a surface with significant oxygen 
contamination, so North American used thicker parts and machined them to the 
correct thickness to eliminate the contamination. Machining was also required to 
match the hemispheres for each end of the tank prior to welding.65 
 Finding the correct material for the main propellant tanks, especially the 
liquid-oxygen tank, took some investigation. Most steel and common heavy 
structural alloys gain strength but lose ductility when operated at low tempera-
tures, although Inconel proved to be relatively insensitive to this. The martensitic 
alloys, such as heat-treated 4130 low-alloy steel and AM-350 CRES precipita-
tion-hardened corrosion-resistant steel, followed predictable curves that showed 
severe ductility loss as the temperature decreased below –100°F. A titanium alloy 
containing 5% aluminum and 2.5% tin handled the low temperatures well, but 
did not have the requisite strength at 1,200°F. North American finally decided to 
manufacture the primary barrels of the tanks from Inconel X .66 
 Initially, engineers used AM-350 CRES, formed on a 7,000-ton hydraulic 
press using a deep-draw process, for the 32-inch hemispheres of the main pro-
pellant tanks. Excessive thinning occurred until the optimum pressure on the 
press draw ring was determined. Even then, North American encountered some 
difficulty due to uneven forces from the pressure pins used to secure the 
blanks, resulting in non-uniformity around the periphery of the hemisphere. 
The engineers subsequently decided to discard the CRES hemispheres and to 
remanufacture them from Inconel X .67 
 Inconel X proved to be remarkably easy to work with considering its hard-
ness, although the engineers had to make severely formed parts in multiple stages, 
with annealing accomplished between each stage. Nevertheless, problems arose. 
One of the first concerned fabricating the large Inconel propellant tank hemi-
spheres. The propellant tanks comprised a large portion of the fuselage and were 
composed of an outer cylindrical shell and an inner cylinder. Inconel X semi-torus 
hemispheres at each end of the tank joined these two parts. The hemispheres were 
formed in two segments, with the split located midway between the inner and out-
er cylinders. Technicians welded the inner torus segment to the inner cylinder, and 
the outer torus segments to the outer tank, before joining the two assemblies.68 
 After initial attempts to spin the bulkheads from a single, heated Inconel X 
blank were unsuccessful, the technicians built up the cones by welding smaller 
pieces together, and performed a complete X-ray inspection of each weld. After 
65 Ibid.
66 F. R. Kostoch, “X-5 Material and Process Development,” a paper in the Research Airplane Committee Report on 
the Conference on the Progress of the X-15 Project, A Compilation of the Papers presented in Los Angeles, CA, 
28-30 July 958, p. 259 (hereafter called the 1958 Research Airplane Committee Report).
67 “Forming and Fabrication Methods for the X-5 Airplane.”
68 Ibid.
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the cones were formed to the approximate size, they went through several stages 
of spinning, with a full annealing process performed after each stage. The first 
spin blocks used for the hemispheres were made from hardwood, and cast iron 
was used for the final sizing. A problem developed when transverse cracks began 
to appear during the spinning of the hemispheres.69  
 Both North American and the International Nickel Company investigated the 
cracks, but determined that the initial welds were nearly perfect and should not have 
contributed to the problem. Nevertheless, engineers tried different types of welding 
69 Ibid.
Fabricating the X-15 gave North American engineers some of  the first large-scale experience with 
the newest high-strength alloys of  titanium and stainless steel. The main propellant tanks formed an 
integral part of  the fuselage, and after a great deal of  investigation, North American manufactured the 
barrels from Inconel X. The experience gained from building the X-15 provided lessons used during the 
construction of  the Apollo capsules and space shuttle orbiters. (North American Aviation)
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wire, and varied the speed, feed, and pressure of the spinning lathe, but the welds 
continued to crack. It was finally determined that the welds were—ironically—too 
good; they needed to be softer. North American developed a new process that re-
sulted in slightly softer but still acceptable welds, and the cracking stopped.70  
 North American gained experience in manufacturing the propellant tanks 
and fuselage structure long before it manufactured the first flight airplane. The 
company constructed three partial fuselages as ground-test articles for the rocket 
engines. Reaction Motors at Lake Denmark received two of these, while the third 
went to the Rocket Engine Test Facility at Edwards. Although not intended as 
“practice,” they did allow the workers in Inglewood to gain a certain level of 
expertise on a less-critical assembly before building the real flight articles.71 
 Forming the ogive section of the forward fuselage also presented some prob-
lems for North American. The usual method to construct such a structure was to 
form four semicircular segments of skin and weld them together. However, due 
to the size of the structure and the need to maintain a precise outer mold line, the 
engineers decided that the most expedient production method was to make a cone 
and bulge-form it into the final shape in one operation. The initial cone was made 
from four pieces of Inconel X welded together and carefully inspected to ensure 
the quality of the welds. It was then placed in a bulge-form die and gas pressure 
was applied that forced the part to conform to the shape of the die. This process 
worked well, with one exception. For reasons that were never fully understood, 
one of the four pieces of Inconel X used for one cone had a tensile strength about 
28,000 psi greater than the others. During formation this piece resisted stretching, 
causing the welds to distort and creating wrinkles. North American eventually 
discarded the piece and made another one using four different sheets on Inconel; 
that one worked fine.72 
 Both titanium and Inconel were hard metals, and the tools used to form and 
cut them tended to wear out faster than equivalent tools used in the production of 
steel or aluminum parts. In addition, it took considerably longer to cut or polish 
compared to other metals. For instance, it took approximately 15 times longer to 
machine Inconel X than aluminum. This did not lead to any particular problems 
during the manufacture of the X-15 (unlike some of the tool contamination issues 
faced by Lockheed on the Blackbird), but it did slow progress and force North 
American to rethink issues such as machining versus polishing.73 
 The windshield glass originally installed on the X-15 was soda-lime-tempered 
plate glass with a single outer pane and double inner panes. Engineers had based 
this choice on a predicted maximum temperature of 740°F. Data obtained on early 
flights indicated that the outer face would encounter temperatures near 1,000°F, with 
a differential temperature between panes of nearly 750°F. It was apparent that soda-
lime glass would not withstand these temperatures. The engineers subsequently se-
lected a newly developed alumino-silicate glass that had higher strength and better 
thermal properties as a replacement. The 0.375-inch-thick alumino-silicate outer 
70 Ibid.
7 Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, p. 292.
72 “Forming and Fabrication Methods for the X-5 Airplane.”
73 “Forming and Fabrication Methods for the X-5 Airplane,” I. J. Wilson, “X-5 Forming and Fabrication Methods,” 
a paper in the 1958 Research Airplane Committee Report, p. 29.
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pane withstood temperatures up to 1,500°F during one test. The next test subjected 
the glass to a surface temperature of 1,050°F with a temperature gradient from the 
outer to inner surface of 790°F without failure. In actuality, the thermal environ-
ment on the X-15 glass was more complicated, although slightly less severe. The 
outer surface could reach 800°F, while the inner surface could reach 550°F; how-
ever, the inner temperature lagged behind the outer temperature. During rapid heat 
build-up on high-speed missions, the maximum temperature differential reached 
480°F at a time when the outer glass was only 570°F. At this point, both the outer 
and inner panes began to rise in temperature rapidly.74 
 Technicians at the Flight Research Center installed the alumino-silicate glass 
in the outer pane of all three X-15s, although they continued to use soda-lime plate 
glass for the inner panes until the end of the program. Corning Glass Company 
supplied all of the glass. The thermal qualification test was interesting. Corning 
heated an 8.4 by 28-inch panel of the glass to 550°F in a salt bath for 3 minutes, 
and then plunged it into room-temperature tap water. If it did not shatter, it passed 
the test .75 
 Harrison Storms summed up the North American efforts during the X-15 roll-
out ceremony: “Inconel X was considered a weldable alloy; however no detailed 
experience with it, as a weldable structure, was available. The development had to 
be done by North American Aviation in forming, welding, and otherwise joining 
this material to make a practical machine.” Storms described special techniques 
for contouring the skins that involved hot machining, cold machining, ovens, 
freezers, cutters, slicers, and rollers. For instance, one special tool fixture needed 
to control the contour during a heat-treating cycle of the wing skin weighed 4,300 
pounds, while the skin it held weighed only 180 pounds. Despite the publicity 
normally associated with the use of Inconel X, Charlie Feltz remembered that 
titanium structures gave North American the most trouble. Fortunately, the use of 
titanium on the X-15 was relatively small, unlike what Lockheed was experienc-
ing across town on the Blackbird.76
HIGH-ALTITUDE GIRDLES
 Pressure suits, more often called “space suits” by the public, are essentially 
taken for granted today. Fifty years ago they were still the stuff of science fiction. 
These suits serve several necessary purposes, with supplying the correct partial 
pressure of oxygen being the most obvious (although masks or full-face helmets 
can also accomplish this). The most important purpose, however, is to protect the 
pilot against the increasingly low atmospheric pressures encountered as altitude 
7 Kordes et al., “Structural Heating Experiences of the X-5,” pp. 33-3; Greene and Benner, “X-5 Experience 
from the Designer’s Viewpoint,” pp. 38-39.
75 Richard L. Schleicher, “Structural Design of the X-5,” North American Aviation, 963, pp. 37-38. Copy provided 
courtesy of Gerald H. Balzer Collection.
76 Storms, “The X-5 Rollout Symposium;” telephone conversation, Charles H. Feltz with Dennis R. Jenkins, 9 
February 2002.
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increases—pressures that reach essentially zero above about 250,000 feet. At high 
altitudes, the blood and water in the human body want to boil—not from heat, but 
from the pressure differential between the body and the environment.77 
 A distant precursor of the full-pressure suit was, arguably, the dry suits used 
by turn-of-the-century commercial salvage divers, complete with their ported 
brass helmets and valve fittings. In 1920, renowned London physiologist Dr. 
John Scott Haldane apparently was the first to suggest that a suit similar to the 
diver’s ensemble could protect an aviator at high altitudes. There appeared, how-
ever, to be little immediate need for such a suit. The normally aspirated piston- 
powered airplanes of the era were incapable of achieving altitudes much in excess 
of 20,000 feet, and the major concern at the time was simply keeping the pilot 
warm. However, the increasing use of supercharged aircraft engines during the 
late 1920s led to the first serious studies into pressure suits. Suddenly, aircraft 
could fly above 30,000 feet and the concern was no longer how to keep the aviator 
warm, but how to protect him from the reduced pressure.78 
 During the early 1930s Mark E. Ridge determined that a suitably constructed 
pressurized suit would allow him to make a record-breaking altitude flight in an 
open balloon. His efforts to interest the United States military in this endeavor 
failed, and instead he contacted John Haldane in London for help. At the time, 
Haldane was working with Sir Robert Davis of Siebe, Gorman & Company to de-
velop deep-sea diving suits. Together, Haldane and Davis constructed a hypobaric 
protection suit for Ridge. For a number of reasons, Ridge was never able to put the 
suit to actual use, although he tested it in a pressure chamber at simulated altitudes 
up to 90,000 feet .79 
 In 1934 famed aviator Wiley Post commissioned the B. F. Goodrich Com-
pany to manufacture a pressure suit of his own design. Unfortunately, the rubber-
ized fabric suit did not work all that well. The basic design was modified by B. F. 
Goodrich engineer Russell Colley, and after some trial and error, Post was able to 
use it successfully on several record-breaking flights to altitudes of 50,000 feet.80 
 While work on derivatives of the Ridge-Haldane-Davis suit continued in 
England, the U.S. Army Air Corps finally recognized, somewhat belatedly, the 
need for a pressurized protective garment for military aviators and started the 
classified MX-117 research program in 1939. This drew several companies into 
pressure-suit development, including B. F. Goodrich (with Russell Colley), Bell 
Aircraft, the Goodyear Rubber Company, the U.S. Rubber Company, and the 
National Carbon Company. From 1940 through 1943, engineers produced a 
number of designs that all featured transparent dome-like plastic helmets and 
airtight, rubberized fabric garments that greatly restricted mobility and range 
of motion when fully pressurized. The development of segmented, bellows-like 
joints at the knees, hips, and elbows improved mobility, but still resulted in an 
77 Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, p. 236. Crossfield gives an interesting look at his involvement (which was great) 
in early pressure-suit development in the chapter titled, “Girdles, Brassieres, Shattered Sinuses.”
78 Christopher T. Carey, “Supporting Life at 80,000 feet: Evolution of the American High Altitude Pressure Suit.” 
http://www.lanset.com/aeolusaero/Articles/SSuits.htm. Accessed on 9 April 2002.
79 Ibid. A suit based upon the Ridge-Haldane-Davis design was eventually flown to a British altitude record of 
50,000 feet in 936.
80 Ibid.
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extremely clumsy and uncomfortable ensemble. The striking visual aspect of 
these suits resulted in their being called “tomato worm suits,” after the distinc-
tive tomato hornworm.81 
 By 1943 the Army Air Corps had largely lost interest in the concept of a 
full-pressure suit. The newest long-range bomber, the Boeing B-29 Superfortress, 
was pressurized and seemed less likely to require the suits than earlier aircraft. As 
Scott Crossfield later opined, “During World War II the armed services, absorbed 
with more vital matters, advanced the pressure suit not a whit.”82 
 After the war, Dr . James P. Henry of the University of Southern California 
began experimenting with a new concept in aircrew protection. The capstan-type 
partial-pressure suit operated by imposing mechanical pressure on the body di-
rectly, compressing the abdomen and limbs much like the anti-g suits then enter-
ing service. The compression was applied by inflatable bladders in the abdominal 
area and pneumatic tubes (capstans) running along the limbs. A tightly fitting, 
rubber-lined fabric hood that was fitted with a neck seal and a transparent visor 
fully enclosed the head.83  
 In Worcester, Massachusetts, a small company named after its founder, 
David Clark, produced anti-g suits for the Air Force and experimental pressure 
suits for the Navy. Scott Crossfield described Clark as “one of the most interest-
ing men I have ever met in the aviation world.” Although Henry had approached 
the David Clark Company for assistance in developing his suit concept, con-
tracts for anti-g suits between David Clark and the U.S. government made direct 
cooperation appear to be a conflict of interest. Instead, Clark sent materi-
als and an experienced seamstress, Julia Greene, to help Henry continue his 
development in California. Just after the war, the Air Force asked Clark to ob-
serve a test of the Henry partial-pressure suit in the altitude chamber at Wright 
Field. Henry demonstrated the suit to a maximum altitude of 90,000 feet, and 
remained above 65,000 feet for more than 30 minutes; everybody was suitably 
impressed. The Air Force asked David Clark to produce the Henry design, and 
all parties soon reached an agreement that included Julia Greene returning to 
Worcester . David Clark produced the first suit for Jack Woolams, a Bell test 
pilot scheduled to fly the XS-1, and made additional suits for Chalmers “Slick” 
Goodlin and a little-known Air Force captain named Chuck Yeager.84 
 These early partial-pressure suits did, in fact, work. On 25 August 1949, 
Major Frank K. “Pete” Everest was flying the first X-1 on an altitude flight when 
the canopy cracked and the cockpit depressurized. The laced partial-pressure 
suit automatically activated, squeezing Everest along the torso, arms, and legs, 
supporting his skin and keeping his blood from boiling. He landed, uncomfort 
able but unhurt. This was the first recorded use of a partial-pressure suit under 
emergency conditions.85 
8 Ibid.
82 Quote is from Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, p. 237.
83 Corrections to the Henry suit description supplied by Jack Bassick at the David Clark Company in a letter to 
Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 June 2002.
8 David M. Clark, The Development of the Partial Pressure Suit, (Worcester, MA: David Clark Company, 992), pp. 
68-69. The Crossfield quote is from Always Another Dawn, p. 239.
85 Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, pp. 237-238; Jay Miller, The X-Planes: X-1 to X-45, (Hinckley, England: Midland 
Publishing, 200), pp. 3-32.
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 Continued improvements resulted in the T-1 suit, the first standardized par-
tial-pressure suit used by the Air Force. The Air Force used the T-1 suit in a va-
riety of aircraft, including the stripped-down “featherweight” versions of the 
Convair B-36 intercontinental bomber that frequently flew missions lasting in 
excess of 24 hours at altitudes above 50,000 feet. Unfortunately, the T-1 suit was 
not a particularly comfortable garment.86  
 The discomfort of the so-called “Henry suit” was an unfortunate aspect of 
the fundamental design of partial-pressure suits. This was at least partially elimi-
nated in the subsequent MC-1, MC-3, and MC-4 series (the MC-2 suit was an 
experimental full-pressure suit to be discussed later) by the placement and adjust-
ment of panels during customized fitting. However, the suits did accomplish their 
main purpose: to protect the wearer from the effects of emergency decompression 
at altitude .87  
 Taking a different route, after the war the U. S. Navy began investigating the 
possibility of developing a full-pressure suit in cooperation with B . F . Goodrich 
and Russell Colley. This led to a progressive series of refinements of the basic 
design that resulted, in the early 1950s, in the first practical U.S. full-pressure 
suit. At the same time, the David Clark Company was also experimenting with 
full-pressure suits under Navy auspices. On 21 August 1953, Marine Corps 
Lieutenant Colonel Marion E . Carl took one of the D-558-2 aircraft to an 
unofficial record altitude of 83,235 feet while wearing a David Clark full- 
pressure suit .88 
 The Navy’s adventures in full-pressure suit development took some intrigu-
ing turns, and Scott Crossfield covers them well in his autobiography. The Navy 
ended up concentrating on the Goodrich designs. One of these was the Model H, 
an early developmental suit that the Navy considered unacceptable for operational 
use but showed a great deal of promise. Consequently, in a perfect example of 
interservice rivalry, the Air Force and Navy began separate development efforts—
both based on the Model H—to perfect an operational full-pressure suit. By the 
early 1960s the Navy had progressed through a series of developmental models 
to the Mark IV, Model 3, Type 1, a production suit that Navy aircrews wore on 
high-altitude flights for several years.89 
 Air Force experience at high altitudes in the B-36 confirmed the need for a 
full-pressure suit to replace the partial-pressure suits used by the bomber crews. In 
response, the Air Force drafted a requirement for a suit to provide a minimum of 
12 hours of protection above 55,000 feet. The goal was to construct a “fully mo-
bile suit” that would weigh less than 30 pounds, operate with an internal pressure 
of 5 psi, and provide the user with sufficient oxygen partial pressure for breathing, 
adequate counterpressure over the body, and suitable ventilation.90  
  
86 Carey, “Supporting Life at 80,000 feet.”
87 Ibid; amplification of the T- suit development supplied by Jack Bassick at the David Clark Company in a letter to 
Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 June 2002.
88 Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, pp. 20-2; http://www.nasm.edu/nasm/aero/aircraft/douglas_D-558.htm, 
accessed on 2 April 2002.
89 Carey, “Supporting Life at 80,000 feet.”
90 Edwin G. Vail and Richard G. Willis, “Pilot Protection for the X-5 Airplane,” a paper in the 1958 Research Airplane 
Committee Report, pp. 7-8.
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 Whatever the political nuances involved, in 1955 the Air Force issued a re-
quest for proposals for a full-pressure suit . Several contracts were awarded and 
the two leading designs were designated the XMC-2-ILC (International Latex 
Corporation) and the XMC-2-DC (David Clark Company). The ILC approach 
resulted in an unwieldy garment that used convoluted metal joints and metal bear-
ing rings, and had limited mobility under pressure; it was known, however, to 
provide the required pressure protection. Unfortunately, the joint bearings pro-
duced painful pressure points on the body and were hazardous during bailout or 
ejection—hardly an ideal solution.91  
 On the other hand, the David Clark suit featured a major breakthrough in suit 
design with the use of a new “distorted-angle fabric,” called Link-Net, to control 
inflation and enhance range of motion. This eliminated the need for the tomato-
worm bellows at the limb joints. David Clark had been developing this same basic 
suit with the Navy before that service opted to go with the Goodrich design. The 
Air Force selected the David Clark suit for further development.92 
 The new Link-Net fabric was the result of an intensive effort by the company 
to develop a new partial-pressure suit fabric using both Navy and company mon-
ey. Originally, David Clark had constructed several torso mockups using different 
unsupported sheet-rubber materials, but quickly discarded these when it became 
evident that a rupture in the material could cause the entire suit to collapse. The 
company began looking for a supported-rubber material that would meet the seal-
ing requirements but would not collapse when punctured. Ultimately, David Clark 
selected a neoprene-coated nylon. A puncture in this material would result in a 
small leak, but not a sudden expulsion of gas.93 
 The enormous advantages offered by the Link-Net fabric were hard to grasp. 
Coupled with advances in regulators and other mechanical pieces, David Clark 
could now produce a workable full-pressure suit that weighed about 35 pounds. 
Previously, during the early X-15 proposal effort, North American had estimated 
a suit would weigh 110 pounds.94  
 Further tests showed that two layers of nylon marquisette arranged with op-
posite bias provided the maximum strength in high-stress areas. This improved 
Link-Net material consisted of a series of parallel cords that looped each other 
at frequent intervals. The loops were interlocked but not connected so that the 
cords could slide over each other and feed from one section of the suit to another 
to allow the suit to deform easily as the pilot moved. The main characteris-
tic required of the Link-Net was the lowest possible resistance to bending and 
twisting, but the elasticity had to be minimal since the suit could not increase 
appreciably in volume while under pressure. The use of a relatively non-elastic 
cord in the construction of Link-Net made it possible to satisfy these seemingly 
 
 
 
9 Ibid. The use of the XMC-2 designation for multiple designs was unusual and confusing.
92 Ibid. Link-Net is a trademark of the David Clark Company.
93 Air Force report ASD-6-6, “Development of a Full Pressure Suit System,” May 96, p. . Supplied by Jack 
Bassick at the David Clark Company. 
9 Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, pp. 253-25.
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contradictory requirements. Clark chose nylon for the Link-Net because of its 
high tensile strength, low weight, and low bulk ratio.95 
 The first prototype David Clark Model S794 suit provided a learning experi-
ence for the company. For instance, the initial anti-g bladders were fabricated 
using neoprene-coated nylon, but failed during testing. New bladders incorpo-
rated a nylon-oxford restraint cover, and these passed the pressure tests. Materials 
evaluated for the gloves included leather/nylon, leather/nylon/Link-Net, and all 
leather. Eventually, the company found the best combination was leather covering 
the hand, a stainless-steel palm restrainer stitched inside nylon tape supported by 
nylon tape around the back, Link-Net from the wrist up to the top zipper, and a 
black cabretta top seam. However, pilots quickly found that gloves constructed in 
the straight position made it impossible to hold an object, such as a control stick, 
for more than 15–20 minutes while the glove was pressurized. When the company 
used a natural semi-closed position to construct the glove, the pilots could hold an 
object for up to 2 hours without serious discomfort. Perhaps the most surprising 
95 “Development of a Full Pressure Suit System,” pp. -2. The nylon marquisette had a tensile break strength of 6 
psi on the fill and 30 psi on the warp.
The X-15 provided the first impetus to develop a workable full-pressure suit, and Scott Crossfield 
and Dr. David M. Clark were instrumental in the effort. The first X-15 full-pressure suit, the 
XMC-2 (S794-3C) was demonstrated by Scott Crossfield in the human centrifuge at the Aero 
Medical Laboratory on 14 October 1957. Two 15-second runs were made at 7 g , and the fol-
lowing day an additional 23 tests were conducted to demonstrate the anti-g capability of  the suit. 
(U.S. Air Force)
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material used in the prototype suit was the kangaroo leather for the boots, which 
turned out to be soft and comfortable as well as sufficiently durable.96 
 The construction of two “production” full-pressure suits (S794-1 and 
S794-2) followed. These suits were an improvement in terms of production and 
mobility but were, in reality, still prototypes. One of the major changes was ex-
tending the use of Link-Net material further from the joints to increase the amount 
of “draw” and provide additional mobility. Eventually David Clark concluded that 
the entire suit should use Link-Net . David Clark delivered these two suits to the 
Aero Medical Laboratory at Wright Field for testing and evaluation, and used the 
lessons learned to construct the first X-15 suit for Scott Crossfield.97
 Crossfield’s Crusade
 By the beginning of the X-15 program, the WADC Aero Medical Laboratory 
had only partly succeeded in developing a full-pressure suit, almost entirely with 
the David Clark design. This led to a certain amount of indecision regarding the 
type of garment needed for the X-15. However, North American proposed the use 
of a full-pressure suit as a means to protect the pilot during normal operations and 
emergency escape. 
 Despite the early state-of-development of full-pressure suits, Scott Crossfield 
was convinced they were necessary for the X-15. Crossfield also had great confi-
dence in David Clark—both the company and the man. In fact, the detail specifi-
cation of 2 March 1956 required North American to furnish just such a garment, 
and the company issued a specification for a full-pressure suit to the David Clark 
Company on 8 April 1956. Less than a month later, however, the X-15 Project 
Office, on advice from the Aero Medical Laboratory, advised North American to 
plan to use a partial-pressure suit. It was the beginning of a heated debate.98  
 North American, and particularly Scott Crossfield, refused to yield, and dur-
ing a meeting in Inglewood on 20-22 June 1956 the Air Force began to concede. 
David Clark demonstrated a full-pressure suit, developed for the Navy, during 
preliminary X-15 cockpit mockup inspection. Although the suit was far from 
perfected, the Aero Medical Laboratory believed that “the state-of-the-art of full 
pressure suits should permit the development of such a suit satisfactory for use in 
the X-15.”99  
 During a meeting on 12 July 1956, representatives from the Air Force, Navy, 
and North American reviewed the status of full-pressure suit development, and the 
Aero Medical Laboratory committed to make the modifications necessary to sup-
port the X-15. The North American representative, Scott Crossfield, agreed that the 
Aero Medical Laboratory should provide the suit for the X-15. Crossfield insisted 
96 “Development of a Full Pressure Suit System,” pp. 3-. At rest, the human hand tends to be in a semi-closed 
position as the muscles relax. The kangaroo leather boots eventually gave way to standard flying boots that were 
modified to interface with the pressure suit. The Hyde Athletic Shoe Company provided the model Z00 boots.
97 “Development of a Full Pressure Suit System,” pp. -5. 
98 North American Aviation detail specification NA5-07, 8 April 956. In the files at the Boeing Archives; memo-
randum, Lieutenant Colonel K. F. Troup, Chief, Aircrew Effectiveness Branch, Aero Medical Laboratory, to Chief, 
New Development WSPO, Fighter Aircraft Division, ARDC, no subject,  May 956. In the files at the Air Force 
Historical Research Agency; telephone conversation, Scott Crossfield with Dennis R. Jenkins, 5 June 2000.
99 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 28 June 956. 
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that the laboratory design the garment specifically for the X-15 and make every 
effort to provide an operational suit by late 1957 to support the first flight. The 
X-15 Project Office accepted responsibility for funding the development program. 
Crossfield could not legally change the suit from a contractor-furnished item to 
government-furnished equipment, but agreed to recommend that North American 
accept such a change. There was little doubt that Charlie Feltz would concur.100  
 Although the 12 July agreement effectively settled the issue, the paperwork to 
make it official moved somewhat more slowly. The Air Force did not change the 
suit from contractor-furnished to government-furnished until 8 February 1957. At 
the same time, the Aero Medical Laboratory issued a contract to the David Clark 
Company for the development of a full-pressure suit specifically for the X-15.101  
 The first X-15 suit was the S794-3C, which incorporated all of the chang-
es requested after a brief period of evaluating the first two “production” S794 
suits. The complete suit with helmet, boots, and back kit weighed just 37 pounds. 
David Clark shipped this third suit to Inglewood for evaluation in the X-15 cockpit 
mockup from 7-13 October 1957. While at North American, the suit underwent 
pressure checks, X-15 cockpit compatibility evaluations, ventilation checks, and 
altitude-chamber runs. Unfortunately, the altitude-chamber runs proved pointless 
since the North American chamber only went to 40,000 feet and the suit controller 
had been set to pressurize above 40,000 feet.102 
 The suit was then taken to the Aero Medical Laboratory for evaluation, 
and on 14 October was demonstrated in the Wright Field centrifuge during two 
15-second runs at 7 g. The following day, 23 more centrifuge runs demonstrated 
the anti-g capability of the suit, which proved satisfactory. On 16 October, the 
suit underwent environmental testing at temperatures up to 165°F. The ventilation 
of the suit at these temperatures was unsatisfactory, but David Clark engineers 
understood the issue and the government did not consider it significant. Mobility 
tests were conducted in the centrifuge on 17 October at flight conditions up to 
5 g with satisfactory results, and altitude chamber tests ended at 98,000 feet for 45 
minutes. As a result of these evaluations, the Air Force requested numerous minor 
modifications for subsequent suits, but the Aero Medical Laboratory formally ac-
cepted the S794-3C on 12 November 1957.103 
 The list of modifications required for the S794-4 suit took four pages, but 
they were mostly minor issues and did not represent a significant problem for the 
David Clark Company, although the resulting suit was almost 3 pounds heavier. 
Scott Crossfield demonstrated this suit during a cockpit inspection on 2 Decem-
ber 1957 when he put the suit on, inflated it to 3 psi, walked from one end of the 
00 AMC Form 52 (Record of Verbal Coordination), 2 July 956, subject: Personal Equipment for X-5 Weapons 
System; telephone conversation, Scott Crossfield with Dennis R. Jenkins, 5 June 2002. 
0 Letter, R. L. Stanley, Deputy Chief, Fighter Aircraft Branch, Aircraft and Missiles Division, Director of Procurement 
and Production, AMC, to Air Force Plant Representative, North American Aviation, subject: Contract AF33(600)-
3693, X-5 Airplane—ECPs NA-X5-, NA-X5-7, NA-X5-8, NA-X5-2,6 January 957. In the files at the 
Air Force Historical Research Agency; letter, S. C. Hellman, Manager, Contracts and Proposals, North American 
Aviation, to Commander, AMC, subject: Contract AF33(600)-3693 (X-5) NA-20 Contractual Document—Re-
quest for Full Pressure Pilot’s Suit—Change from CFE to GFAE, ECP NA-X-5-8, 8 February 957. In the files at 
the Boeing Archives; Air Force report ASD-6-6, pp. 7-8. The David Clark contract was AF33(66)-3903 as 
part of Project 6333. The effort was subsequently transferred to Project 6336.
02 “Development of a Full Pressure Suit System,” pp. 5-6.
03 Ibid. Between 8 September and 26 November the S79-3C suit spent 66 hours and 0 minutes pressurized 
without failure at David Clark Company, Firewel Company, North American, and Wright Field.
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room to the other (a distance of some 100 feet), and then entered the X-15 cockpit 
without assistance. Those in attendance were favorably impressed.104 
 On 16 December 1957, David Clark took the S794-4 suit to Wright Field 
for further evaluation, and then to NADC Johnsville for centrifuge testing on 
17-18 December. These centrifuge tests were much more realistic than the limited 
evaluations conducted at Wright Field on the previous suit, and included complete 
simulated X-15 flights. After some minor modifications, the Aero Medical Labo-
ratory formally accepted the suit on 20 February 1958.105  
 The S794-5 suit, the first true “production MC-2,” incorporated 34 changes. 
The Air Force sent the completed suit to Wright Field on 17 April 1958, and then 
to Edwards for flight evaluations. Personnel at Edwards had modified the back 
cockpits of a T-33 and F-104B to accommodate the suit for the tests. The first 
flight in the T-33 on 12 May 1958 resulted in several complaints, primarily citing 
a lack of ventilation because no high-pressure air source was available. Initial 
concerns about a lack of mobility eased after the third flight as the pilot became 
more familiar with the suit. The suit seemed to offer adequate anti-g protection up 
to the 5-g limit of the T-33. Tests in the F-104B proved to be more comfortable, 
primarily because high-pressure air was available for suit ventilation, but also 
because the cockpit was somewhat larger, improving mobility even further. The 
pilots suggested various improvements (many concerning the helmet and gloves) 
after these flights, but overall the comments were favorable. The suit accumulated 
8.25 hours of flight time during the tests.106 
 The Aero Medical Laboratory advised the X-15 Project Office on 10 April 
1958 that David Clark would deliver the first suit for Scott Crossfield on 1 June 
1958. The laboratory cautioned, however, that the X-15 project would receive 
only four suits under the current contract. The laboratory would receive other 
full-pressure suits for service testing in operational aircraft, but these were not 
compatible with the X-15 cockpit. If additional suits were required, the X-15 
Project Office would need to provide the Aero Medical Laboratory with 
additional funds .107  
 Given the lack of funds for additional suits, the X-15 Project Office investi-
gated the feasibility of using a seat kit instead of the back kit used on the first four 
suits. This would allow the use of suits designed for service testing, and allow 
X-15 pilots to use the suits in operational aircraft. The benefits of using a common 
suit would have been substantial, but by May 1958 it was too late since the X-15 
design was too far along to change. Although the X-15 Project Office continued 
to pursue the idea, the X-15 suit remained different from similar suits intended for 
 
0 Ibid, pp. 8-2. 
05 Ibid, p. 3; X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 30 October 957; “Full Pressure Suit Assembly,” Physiology 
Branch, Aero Medical Laboratory, WADC,  January 958; memorandum, G. Kitzes, Assistant Chief, Physiol-
ogy Branch, Aero Medical Laboratory, WADC, to Chief, Fighter Aircraft Division, ARDC, subject: Status of MC-2 
Full Pressure Altitude Suits for the X-5 Research Aircraft, 0 April 958. In the files at the Air Force Historical 
Research Agency; Air Force report ASD-6-6, p. 3. 
06 “Development of a Full Pressure Suit System,” pp. 3-7. 
07 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 30 October 957; “Full Pressure Suit Assembly,” Physiology Branch, Aero 
Medical Laboratory, WADC,  January 958; memorandum, G. Kitzes, Assistant Chief, Physiology Branch, Aero 
Medical Laboratory, WADC, to Chief, Fighter Aircraft Division, ARDC, subject: Status of MC-2 Full Pressure Alti-
tude Suits for the X-5 Research Aircraft, 0 April 958. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research Agency.
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operational aircraft . The X-15 Project Office subsequently found funds for two 
more suits.108  
 On 3 May 1958, the configuration of the suit to be delivered to Crossfield was 
frozen during a meeting in Worchester among representatives of the Air Force, 
David Clark, and North American. The decision was somewhat premature since 
the suit configuration was still in question during a meeting three months later at 
Wright Field. This indecision had already resulted in a two-month delay, and the 
need for further tests was apparent .109 
 The X-15 Project Office advised the newly assigned chief of the Aero 
Medical Laboratory, Colonel John P. Stapp, that the suit delays might postpone 
the entire X-15 program. To maintain the schedule, the X-15 project needed to 
receive Crossfield’s suit by 1 January 1959, a second suit by 15 February, and 
the remaining four suits by 15 May. Simultaneously, the X-15 Project Office 
informed Stapp of the growing controversy concerning the use of a face seal 
(actually a separate oral-nasal mask inside the pressurized helmet) instead of the 
neck seal preferred by the Aero Medical Laboratory.110  
 North American believed the pilot should be able to open the face-
plate on his helmet, using the face seal as an oxygen mask. The Aero Medical 
Laboratory disagreed. Since the engineers had long since agreed to pressurize 
the X-15 cockpit with nitrogen to avoid risks associated with fire, a neck seal 
meant that the pilot could never open his faceplate under any conditions. North 
American and the NACA had already ruled out pressurizing the cockpit with 
oxygen, for safety reasons. Eventually, the program adopted a neck seal for 
the MC-2 suit, although development of the face seal continued for the highly 
successful A/P22S-2 suit that came later.111  
 Crossfield finally received his MC-2 pressure suit on 17 December 1958. In 
a report dated 30 January 1959, the X-15 Project Office attributed much of the 
credit for the successful development of the full-pressure suit to Crossfield.112  
 David Clark tailored the resulting MC-2 suits for the individual pilots. 
Each suit consisted of a ventilation suit, upper and lower rubber garments, and 
upper and lower restraint garments. The ventilation suit also included a po-
rous wool insulation garment. The edges of the upper and lower rubber gar-
ments were folded together three times to form a seal at the waist. The lower 
half of the rubber garment incorporated an anti-g suit that was similar in design 
08 Interview of Captain Jerry E. Schaub X-5 WSPO, Director of Systems Management, ARDC, 28 May 959, by 
Robert S. Houston, History Branch, WADC. Written transcript in the files at the AFMC History Office. X-5 WSPO 
Weekly Activity Report, 2 May 958. In a seat kit the pilot sits on the controller unit, parachute, and survival kit, 
whereas in a back kit these items are located (naturally enough) on his back. This necessitates different seat 
configurations, which can have a major impact on the design of the ejection seat and supporting equipment.
09 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 9 May 958; Lieutenant Colonel Burt Rowen, “Biomedical Monitoring of the 
X-5 Program,” AFFTC report TN-6-, May 96, p. 2. Attendees included representatives of the Aero Medical 
Laboratory, X-5 Project Office, WADC Crew Station Office, North American, The David Clark Company, Bill Jack 
Scientific Company, and Firewel Company.
0 Memorandum, Lieutenant Jerry E. Schaub, X-5 WSPO, to Chief, Aero Medical Laboratory, WADC, 9 August 
958, subject: X-5 Full Pressure Suit Program. In the files at the AFMC History Office; X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity 
Report, 5 September 958 and 7 November 958; Lieutenant Colonel Burt Rowen, “Human-Factors Support of 
the X-5 Program,” Air University Quarterly Review, Air War College, volume X, number , Winter 958-59, p. 38.
 Report, “Survey of the X-5 Research Aircraft, 30 September-7 October 958,” ARDC Inspector General, not 
dated. In the files at the ASC History Office.
2 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 2 November and 5 December 958, and 9 January, 30 January, and 3 April 
959; memorandum, Colonel F. A. Holm to Chief, Programs and Evaluations Office, ARDC Inspector General, 3 Feb-
ruary 958. In the files at the AFMC History Office; Rowen, “Biomedical Monitoring of the X-5 Program,” pp. 2-3. 
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to standard Air Force-issue suits and provided protection up to about 7 g. The 
X-15 provided gaseous nitrogen to pressurize the portion of the suit below the rub-
ber neck seal. The suit accommodated in-flight medical monitoring of the pilot.113 
 The outer garment was not actually required for altitude protection. An alu-
minized reflective outer garment contained the seat restraint, shoulder harness, 
and parachute attachments; protected the pressure suit during routine use; and 
served as a sacrificial garment during high-speed ejection. It also provided a small 
measure of additional insulation against extreme temperature. This was the first 
of the silver “space suits” that found an enthusiastic reception on television and at 
the movies.114 
    The X-15 supplied the modified MA-3 helmet with 100% oxygen for 
breathing, and the same source inflated the anti-g bladders within the suit during 
accelerated flight. The total 
oxygen supply was 192 cu-
bic inches, supplied by two 
1,800-psi bottles located 
beneath the X-15 ejection 
seat during free flight. The 
NB-52 carrier aircraft sup-
plied the oxygen during 
ground operations, taxiing, 
and captive flight. A rotary 
valve located on the ejection 
seat selected which oxy-
gen source (NB-52 or X-15 
seat) to use. The suit-helmet 
regulator automatically de-
livered the correct oxygen 
pressure for the ambient 
altitude until the absolute 
pressure fell below 3 .5 psi 
(equivalent to 35,000 feet), 
and the suit pressure then 
stabilized at 3.5 psi abso-
lute . Expired air vented into 
the lower nitrogen-filled 
garment through two one-
way neck seal valves and 
then into the aircraft cockpit 
through a suit pressure-con-
trol valve. During ejection 
the nitrogen gas supply to 
the suit below the helmet 
3 “Biomedical Monitoring of the X-5 Program,” pp. 2-3; Edwin G. Vail and Richard G. Willis, “Pilot Protection for 
the X-5 Airplane,” a paper in the 1958 Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 7-8.
 Vail and Willis, “Pilot Protection for the X-5 Airplane,” p. 9.
Here Scott Crossfield sits in a thermal-vacuum chamber during tests 
of  a prototype XMC-2 (S794-3C) suit. These tests used tempera-
tures as high as 165°F and the initial suits suffered from inad-
equate ventilation at high temperatures. Production versions of  this 
suit were used for 36 early X-15 flights, and in a number of  other 
high-altitude Air Force aircraft. (Boeing)
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was stopped (since the nitrogen source was on the X-15), and the suit and helmet 
were automatically pressurized for the ambient altitude by the emergency oxygen 
supply located in the backpack.115 
 Despite the fact that it worked reasonably well, the pilots did not particularly 
like the MC-2 suit. It was cumbersome to wear, restricted movement, and al-
lowed limited peripheral vision. It was also mechanically complex and required 
a considerable amount of maintenance. Nevertheless, there was only one serious 
deficiency noted in the suit: the oxygen line between the helmet and the helmet 
pressure regulator (mounted in the back kit) caused a delay in oxygen flow such 
that the pilot could reverse the helmet-suit differential pressure by taking a quick, 
deep breath. Since the helmet pressure was supposed to be greater than the suit 
pressure to prevent nitrogen from leaking into the breathing space, this pressure 
reversal was less than ideal, but no easy solution was available.116
 Improved Girdles for the Masses
 Fortunately, development did not stop there, and the first of the improved 
A/P22S-2 (David Clark Model S1023) full-pressure suits arrived at Edwards on 
27 July 1959. The development by the David Clark Company of a new method to 
integrate a pressure-sealing zipper made it possible to incorporate all of the lay-
ers of the MC-2 suit into a one-piece garment, significantly simplifying handling 
and maintenance. A separate aluminized-nylon outer garment protected the suit 
and provided mounting locations for the restraint and parachute harness. A face 
seal that was more comfortable and more robust replaced the neck seal, which 
had proven relatively delicate and subject to frequent damage. A modified helmet 
mounted the oxygen pressure regulator inside the helmet, eliminating the undesir-
able time delay in oxygen flow. This time David Clark mounted the suit pressure 
regulator in the suit to eliminate some of the plumbing.117 
 The consensus among X-15 pilots was that the A/P22S-2 represented a huge 
improvement over the earlier MC-2. However, it would take another year be-
fore the Aero Medical Laboratory delivered fully qualified versions of the suit 
to the X-15 program. By July 1960, the A/P22S-2 pressure suits started arriving 
at Edwards and familiarization flights in the JTF-102A began later in the year, 
along with additional X-15 cockpit mockup evaluations and simulator runs. North 
American also subjected the first suit to wind-tunnel tests in the company facility 
in El Segundo.118 
 Joe Walker made the initial attempt at using the A/P22S-2 in the X-15 on 21 
March 1961; unfortunately, telemetry problems forced Walker to abort the flight 
(2-A-27). Nine days later Walker made the first flight (2-14-28) in the A/P22S-2 . 
 
5 Ibid, pp. 9-20. The MC-2 was pressurized in the X-5 in a slightly different manner compared to MC-2 suits 
used in other aircraft.
6 Bratt, “Biomedical Aspects of the X-5 Program, 959-96,” pp. 6-7. 
7 Ibid, pp. 7-8. Corrections to the A/P22S-2 description supplied by Jack Bassick at the David Clark Company in 
a letter to Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 June 2002
8 James E. Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” not dated, p. 3. In the files at the DFRC 
History Office. Pressure suit designations continued to be misleading. For instance, the A/P22S-2 was a David Clark 
Company suit, but the A/P22S-3 was a completely different suit manufactured by the B. F. Goodrich Company. 
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Walker reported that the new suit represented an improvement in comfort and vi-
sion over the MC-2. By the end of 1961, the A/P-22S-2 had a combined total of 
730 hours in support of X-15 operations; these included 18 X-15 flights, 171 flight 
hours in the JTF-102A, and 554 hours of ground time.119 
 The A/P22S-2 was clearly superior to the earlier MC-2, particularly from the 
pilot’s perspective. The improvements included the following:120
 
Increased visual area—The double curvature faceplate in 
the A/P22S-2, together with the use of a face seal in place 
of the MC-2 neck seal, allowed the face to move forward 
in the helmet so that the pilot had a lateral vision field of 
approximately 200 degrees. This was an increase of ap-
proximately 40 degrees over the single contoured lens in 
the MC-2 helmet, with an additional increase of 20 percent 
in the vertical field of view.
Ease of donning—The MC-2 was put on in two sections: 
the lower rubberized garment and its restraining coverall, 
and the upper rubberized garment and its restraining cov-
erall . This was a rather tedious process and depended on 
folding the rubber top and bottom sections of the suit to-
gether to retain pressure. The A/P22S-2 was a one-piece 
garment with a pressure-sealing zipper that ran around the 
back portion of the suit and was zippered closed in one op-
eration. It took approximately 30 minutes to properly don 
an MC-2; only 5 minutes for the newer suit.
Removable gloves—In the MC-2 the gloves were a fixed 
portion of the upper rubberized garment. The A/P22S-2 had 
removable gloves that contributed to general comfort and 
ease of donning. This also prevented excessive moisture 
from building up during suit checkout and X-15 preflight 
inspections, and made it easier for the pilot to remove the 
pressure suit by himself if that should become necessary. 
Another advantage was that a punctured glove could be 
changed without having to change the entire suit.
 The A/P22S-2 also featured a new system of biomedical electrical connectors 
installed through a pressure seal in the suit, avoiding the snap-pad arrangement 
used in the MC-2 suit. The snap pads had proven to be unsatisfactory for continued 
use, since after several operations the snaps either separated or failed to make good 
 
9 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 5 July 960, p. 6; 29 July 960 p. 
7; and 3 April 96, pp. 3-. In the files at the DFRC History Office; Lieutenant Colonel Burt Rowen, Major 
Ralph N. Richardson, and Garrison P. Layton, Jr., “Bioastronautics Support of the X-5 Program,” a paper in the 
Research Airplane Committee Report on the Conference on the Progress of the X-15 Project, a compilation of 
the papers presented at the Flight Research Center, 20-2 November 96, p. 255 (hereafter called the 96 
Research Airplane Committee Report). A slightly expanded version of this paper was subsequently republished 
as AFFTC technical report FTC-TDR-6-6, “Bioastronautics Support of the X-5 Program,” December 96.
20 Rowen et al., “Bioastronautics Support of the X-5 Program,” pp. 255-256.
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contact because of metal fatigue. This resulted in the loss of biomedical data dur-
ing the flight. In the new suit, biomedical data were acquired through what was es-
sentially a continuous electrical lead from the pilot’s body to the seat interface.121 
 The number of details required to develop a satisfactory operational pressure 
suit was amazing. Initially the A/P22S-2 suit used an electrically heated stretched 
acrylic visor procured from the Sierracin Corporation. The visors were heated 
for much the same reason a car windshield is: to prevent fogging from obscuring 
vision. Unfortunately, on the early visors the electrical coating was applied to 
only one side of the acrylic and the coating was not particularly durable, requir-
ing extraordinary care during handling. Polishing would not remove scratches, 
so the Air Force had to replace the scratched visors . David Clark solved this with 
the introduction of a laminated heated visor in which the electrical coating was 
sandwiched between two layers of acrylic. This required a new development ef-
fort since nobody had laminated a double-curvature lens, although a Los Angeles 
company called Protection Incorporated had done some preliminary work on the 
idea at its own expense . The David Clark Company supplied laminated visors 
with later models of the A/P22S-2 suit .122 
 Initially, the MC-2 suit used visors heated at 3 W per square inch, but the 
conductive film overly restricted vision. The Air Force gradually reduced the re-
quirement to 1 W in an attempt to find the best compromise between heating the 
visor and allowing unimpeded vision. Tests in the cold chamber at the Aerospace 
Medical Center during late January 1961 established that the 1-W visors were 
sufficient for their expected use.123 
 Another requirement came from an unusual source. Researchers evaluating 
the effects of the high-altitude free fall during Captain Joseph Kittinger’s record 
balloon jump realized that the X-15 pilot would need to be able to see after eject-
ing from the airplane. This involved adding a battery to the seat to provide electri-
cal current for visor heating during ejection.124 
 Like the MC-2 before them, the A/P22S-2 suits were custom made for each 
X-15 pilot, necessitating several trips to Worcester. It is interesting to note that 
although the X-15 pilots were still somewhat critical of the lack of mobility af-
forded by the full-pressure suits (particularly later pilots who had not experienced 
the MC-2); this was only true on the ground. When the suits occasionally inflated 
for brief periods during flight, an abundance of adrenaline allowed the pilot to 
easily overcome the resistance of the suit. At most, it rated a slight mention in the 
post-flight report. 
 As good as it was, the A/P22S-2 was not perfect, and David Clark modified 
the suit based on initial X-15 flight experience. The principle modifications in-
cluded rotating the glove rings to provide greater mobility of the hands; improved 
2 Ibid, pp. 256-257.
22 Minutes of Meeting, X-5 Human Factors Subcommittee, 30 December 960.
23 Ibid.
2 Minutes of Meeting, X-5 Human Factors Subcommittee, 28 March 96. Joseph W. Kittinger, Jr., was appointed 
test director of Project Excelsior to investigate escape from high altitude. During this project, three high-altitude 
jumps were made from a balloon-supported gondola. The first was from 76,00 feet on 6 November 958, the 
second from 7,700 feet 25 days later, and the third from 02,800 feet on 6 August 960, the highest altitude 
from which man had jumped. In free-fall for .5 minutes at speeds up to 7 mph and temperatures as low as 
–9°F, Kittinger opened his parachute at 8,000 feet. In addition to the altitude record, he set records for the 
longest free-fall and fastest speed achieved by a man (without an aircraft!). 
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manufacturing, inspection, and assembly techniques for the helmet ring to lower 
the torque required to connect the helmet to the suit, and the installation of a re-
dundant (pressure-sealing) restraint zipper to lower the leak rate of the suit. Other 
changes included the installation of a double face seal to improve comfort and 
minimize leakage between the face seal and suit, and modifications to the tailor-
ing of the Link-Net restraint garment around the shoulders to improve comfort 
and mobility. David Clark also solved a weak point involving the stitching in the 
leather glove by including a nylon liner that relieved the strain on the stitched 
leather seams.125 
 Ultimately, only 36 X-15 flights used the MC-2 suit; the remainder used the 
newer A/P22S-2. Variants of the A/P22S-2 would become the standard opera-
tional full-pressure suit across all Air Force programs.
 
25 Rowen et al., “Bioastronautics Support of the X-5 Program;” “Biomedical Aspects of the X-5 Program: 959-
96,” pp. 8-9. 
The MC-2 suit led to the David Clark Company A/P22S suit that became the standard military and 
NASA high-altitude suit. The A/P22S and its variants have had a long career, and were used by 
SR-71 and U-2 pilots, as well as space shuttle astronauts. Here, NASA test pilot Joseph A. Walker 
stands in front of  an X-15 after a flight. (NASA)
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Post X-15
 The X-15 was not the only program that required a pressure suit, although it 
was certainly the most public at the time. The basic MC-2 suit underwent a num-
ber of one-off “dash” modifications for use in various high-performance aircraft 
testing programs. Many of the movies and still photographs of the early 1960s 
show test pilots dressed in the ubiquitous aluminized fabric-covered David Clark 
MC-2 full-pressure suits . 
 The A/P22S-2 suit evolved into a series of variants designated the A/P22S-4, 
A/P22S-6, and A/P22S-6A (David Clark models S1024, S1024A, and S1024B, 
respectively) for use in most high-altitude Air Force aircraft, including the SR-71. 
Regardless of the success of the A/P22S-2 suit and its modifications for Air Force 
use, the cooperation between the Navy and Russell Colley at Goodrich continued. 
The Navy full-pressure suits included the bulky Mark I (1956); a lighter, slightly 
reconfigured Mark II; an even lighter Mark III (some versions with a gold lamé 
outer layer) with an improved internal ventilation system; and three models of the 
final Mark IV, which went into production in 1958 as the standard Navy high-al-
titude suit .126  
 The original Mercury space suits were reworked Mark IV suits that NASA 
designated XN-1 through XN-4, but the engineers usually referred to them as the 
“quick-fix” suits. The A/P22S-2 formed the basis for the Gemini suits, and ILC re-
turned to the fray to produce the EVA suits used for Apollo. In March 1972, the Air 
Force became the lead service (the Life Support Special Project Office (LSPRO)) 
for the development, acquisition, and logistics support efforts involving pressure 
suits for the Department of Defense. This resulted in the Navy agreeing to give up 
the Mark IV full-pressure suit and adopt versions of the A/P22S-4/6. Today, the 
standard high-altitude, full-pressure suits used for atmospheric flight operations 
(including U-2 missions), as well as those used during space shuttle ascent and 
reentry, are manufactured by the David Clark Company.127
ESCAPE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
 The development of an escape system had been the subject of debate since 
the beginning of the X-15 program. North American’s decision to use a combina-
tion of an ejection seat and a full-pressure suit was a compromise based largely 
on the ejection seat being lighter than the other alternatives. It was also heavily 
lobbied for by Scott Crossfield.
 The Aero Medical Laboratory had recommended an escape capsule, as pre-
scribed by existing Air Force regulations, as early as 8 February 1955. However, 
the laboratory admitted that an escape capsule would require a long development 
period and would probably be unacceptably heavy. The laboratory’s alternative 
26 Carey, “Supporting Life at 80,000 feet.”
27 Ibid.
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was an ejection seat with limb restraints used together with a full-pressure suit . 
Meetings held during October and November 1955 resulted in a direction to North 
American to develop an ejection seat that would incorporate head and limb re-
straints. The Air Force also told North American to document the rationale for 
adopting such a system.128  
 Privately, Scott Crossfield had already decided he did not like capsule de-
signs. Part of this came from experience with the Douglas D-558-2 program. Ac-
cording to Crossfield, “We had a capsule nose on the Skyrocket but knew from 
the wind-tunnel data that if you separated the nose from the fuselage, the g-force 
would be so great it could kill you. I made up my mind I would never use the 
Skyrocket capsule. I would ride the ship down and bail out.” Later events with a 
similar system on the X-2 would prove this fear correct .129 
 The North American analysis of potential accidents that could cause the 
pilot to abandon the X-15 produced some surprising results. Despite the high-al-
titude and high-speed nature of the mission profiles, North American determined 
that 98% of potential accidents were likely to occur at dynamic pressures below 
1,500 psi, Mach numbers below 4.0, and altitudes less than 120,000 feet. Us-
ing these as criteria, North American investigated four potential escape systems: 
fuselage-type capsules, cockpit capsules, encapsulated seats, and open ejection 
seats. The comparison included such factors as cockpit mobility, escape potential, 
mechanical reliability, post-separation performance, and airframe compatibility. 
This effort took some 7,000 man-hours to complete. The results showed that 
an open ejection seat imposed the fewest performance penalties on the aircraft 
and took the least time to develop. The estimates from North American showed 
that a satisfactory escape capsule would add 9,000 pounds to the 31,000-pound 
airplane. Just as importantly, North American—and Scott Crossfield, who would 
be making the first flights in the airplane—believed the ejection seat offered a 
better alternative in the event of an emergency, mainly due to its relative me-
chanical simplicity.130 
 Despite the report, the Air Force was not completely convinced. During a 
meeting at Wright Field on 2-3 May 1956, the laboratory again emphasized the per-
ceived limitations of ejection seats. Primarily due to the efforts of Scott Crossfield, 
the Air Force finally agreed that “the X-15 was probably its own best capsule.” The 
meeting also resulted in another action for North American, once again, to docu-
ment its rationale for selecting the stable-seat and full-pressure suit combination.131 
 North American held the first formal cockpit inspection in July 1956 at its 
facility in Inglewood. This inspection featured a fully equipped cockpit mockup, 
complete with instruments, control sticks, and an ejection seat . The seat was a 
custom design that featured a new type of pilot restraint harness and small sta-
28 Memorandum, H. E. Savely, Chief, Biophysics Branch, Aero Medical Laboratory, WADC, to Chief, New De-
velopment Office, Fighter Aircraft Division, 8 February 955, subject: Acceleration Tolerance and Emergency 
Escape. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research Agency; memorandum, Arthur W. Vogeley, to Hartley A. 
Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, no subject, 30 November 955. In the files at the NASA History Office.
29 Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, p. 23; telephone conversations, Scott Crossfield with Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 
July,  July, 20 July, and  August 200.
30 J. F. Hegenwald, “Development of X-5 Escape System,” a paper in the 1958 Research Airplane Committee 
Report, p. 29; Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, p. 232.
3 Memorandum, Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader to Members of the NACA Research Airplane 
Project Panel, 7 June 956. In the files at the NASA History Office.
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bilizers to “weather-vane” it into the wind blast and prevent fatal tumbling or 
oscillation. A solid rocket motor provided about 3,000 lbf to ensure that the seat 
would clear the X-15. Despite Air Force policy to the contrary, nobody raised any 
objections about the seat during the inspection. By default, it became part of the 
official design.132 
 By November 1956, North American had tested a 0.10-scale isolated pilot-
seat model of its design in the Naval Supersonic Laboratory wind tunnel at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Although the seat seemed to stabi-
lize randomly in different orientations, the results were generally encouraging. In 
itself, this did not represent a serious problem, although all participants wanted 
to understand the dynamics involved. North American conducted additional tests 
in the Southern California Co-Operative Wind Tunnel in Pasadena to develop the 
final stabilization system configuration and determine the influence of the forward 
fuselage without the cockpit canopy.133  
 The debate over the X-15 ejection seat intensified on 27 September 1956 
when Captain Milburn G . Apt was killed in the X-2 . However, the accident also 
weakened the case for an escape capsule . The X-2 used a semi-encapsulated sys-
tem whereby the entire nose of the aircraft, including the cockpit, was blown free 
of the main fuselage in an emergency. Unfortunately, Bell engineers had expected 
the pilot to be able to unbuckle his seat straps and manually bail out of the cap-
sule after it separated, something Apt was unable to do. It demonstrated that an 
encapsulated system was not necessarily the best solution, but then neither was an 
ejection seat. Almost by definition, piloting X-planes was—and would remain—a 
dangerous occupation.134 
 During early 1958, researchers began testing the X-15 ejection seat on the 
rocket sleds at Edwards, with the preliminary runs concluding on 22 April. The 
series got off to a good start, with the first test seat ejected at 230 knots and the 
parachute successfully opening at 120 feet, lowering the anthropomorphic dum-
my gently to the ground. The dummy was equipped with telemetry that relayed 
data from rate gyros, accelerometers, and pressure transducers. The second test, 
this one at 620 knots and a dynamic pressure of 1,130 psf, also went well. The 
third test, under similar conditions, was again satisfactory. However, during the 
fourth run the shock-wave generator catapult exploded at Mach 1.26 and 2,192 
psf. The accident damaged the seat, suit, and anthropomorphic dummy beyond 
repair. Engineers fired another seat during a static test on 24 April, but the post-
ejection operation failed because of a mechanical problem in the initiation hard-
ware. During the second static test on 14 May 1958, the parachute and parachute 
lines became tangled with the seat. In all, the test series provided mixed results. 
North American made several minor modifications in preparation for a second 
series of tests scheduled for June .135  
32 Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, pp. 232-233.
33 Memorandum, Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, to Members of the NACA Research Airplane 
Project Panel, NACA, subject: Project 226—Progress Report for months of September and October 956, 5 
November 956; J. F. Hegenwald, “Development of X-5 Escape System,” a paper in the 1958 Research Airplane 
Committee Report, pp. 29-30.
3 Miller, The X-planes, pp. 62-67.
35 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 2 May and 2 May 958; Hegenwald, “Development of X-5 Escape Sys-
tem,” pp. 36-37.
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 The high cost of the rocket-sled runs, coupled with the damaged seat hard-
ware, was quickly exceeding the budget for the escape-system tests. Because of 
this, the X-15 Project Office decided to conduct only two tests, at 125 psf and 
1,500 psf. Despite the earlier difficulties, Air Force and North American engineers 
believed these two tests could adequately demonstrate seat reliability.136  
 The Air Force conducted the test at 125 psf on 4 June 1958, and the results 
appeared to be satisfactory. Three successful tests took place during June, but the 
fourth test, on 3 July, revealed serious stability problems. North American dis-
continued further tests until it 
could determine a cause for the 
failures. A detailed analysis re-
vealed that the seat would need 
several major modifications.137  
 The Air Force conducted 
the first test of the revised North 
American seat on 21 November 
1958, but several of the sled 
rockets failed to ignite and re-
duced the desired 1,500-psf 
pressure to about 800 psf . Two 
tests during December also suf-
fered from the failure of sled 
rockets. The only test conducted 
during January failed when the 
right-hand boom and fin failed 
to deploy. The leg restraints also 
failed during the test, but North 
American believed an instabili-
ty caused by the boom malfunc-
tion caused this . The parachute 
failed to open until just before 
the test dummy hit the ground, 
causing significant damage to 
the dummy.138  
 The schedule was getting 
tight since the X-15 was nearly 
ready to begin captive-carry 
flights. On 12 January, the Air-
craft Laboratory verbally ap-
proved the seat for the initial 
captive and glide flights between 
36 Ibid.
37 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report,  June,  July, 3 October 958. The Convair “B” seat was designed by the 
Industry Crew Escape Committee and initially manufactured by Stanley. For a variety of reasons, the manufactur-
ing contract was later moved to Aircraft Mechanics, Inc. The seat was used in the Convair F-06 Delta Dart, was 
capable of zero-zero operation (zero speed at zero altitude), and provided meaningful ejection up to 790 knots 
and about 60,000 feet.
38 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 7 November 958, 28 November 958, 9 January 959, and 6 February 959. 
The ejection seat for the X-15 was a remarkable engineer-
ing achievement, and was the most sophisticated ejection 
seat yet developed at the time of  the first X-15 flight. Still, 
it was much simpler than an encapsulated ejection system 
would have been. (U.S. Air Force)
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Mach 0.377 and Mach 0.720 at dynamic pressures between 195 and 715 psf. 
The X-15 Project Office considered this satisfactory given the inability of the 
NB-52 to go much faster.139  
 Because of the unsuccessful January test, North American carefully re-
checked and strengthened the booms and pressure-tested the seat’s gas system. 
The Air Force conducted the final sled-test on 3 March 1959 at Mach 1.15 and 
1,600 psf—conditions somewhat in excess of requirements. Despite the failure of 
the leg manacles, the test was the most successful to date. North American pro-
39 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 6 January 959. 
As developed by North American, the ejection seat contained provisions to restrain the pilot’s arms and 
legs to keep them from flailing in the airstream after leaving the aircraft, and also booms and canards 
to stabilize the seat during separation. After the seat left the aircraft, the pilot unbuckled and jumped 
from the seat, coming down on his own parachute. (North American Aviation)
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posed additional tests and a parachute program in April 1959, but the X-15 Project 
Office was happy with the results of the tests already run and declined. The X-15 
finally had an ejection seat .140  
 The pilot used a backpack-type parachute after he separated from the seat. 
However, because of the design of the pressure suit, seat, and cockpit, neither the 
Air Force nor North American considered the standard quarter-deployment bag 
and 28-foot-diameter C-9 parachute acceptable. Instead, North American pro-
duced a special 24-foot-diameter chute and “skirt bag” specifically for the X-15. 
The company extensively tested this combination on a whirltower to verify the 
design of the skirt bag, the optimum pilot-parachute bridle length, and the effect of 
having the seat headrest permanently attached to the pilot chute. The tests in early 
1958 included opening speeds up to 300 knots, and subsequent free-fall tests with 
an anthropomorphic dummy released from a Fairchild C-119 Flying Boxcar over 
the National Parachute Range in El Centro, California. During the initial tests, the 
C-119 released the dummy in a head-down attitude at 125 knots and 1,200 feet. 
These tests were unsuccessful because the pilot chute deployed into a low-pressure 
zone in the wake of the dummy and was not capable of pulling the main chute from 
the pack. North American extended the bridle length to 70 inches, allowing the pi-
lot chute to escape the low-pressure area, and subsequent tests were successful.141 
 Initially North American used the 24-foot diameter chute because it was the 
largest they could easily accommodate in the backpack and the engineers thought 
it would open more quickly, allowing safe ejection at lower altitudes. However, 
several flight surgeons had concerns that it would allow too high a descent rate for 
the pilot, and urged the certification of a larger parachute for use on the X-15. Dur-
ing October 1960, North American tested a repackaged 28-foot-diameter para-
chute at the National Parachute Range. These tests were successful and indicated 
no significant difference in opening time between the smaller and larger chutes. It 
became policy that each pilot could select whichever size parachute he wished to 
use . Most continued to use the 24-foot chute because the reduced thickness of the 
backpack made it more comfortable to sit on in the cockpit.142 
 In June 1965, NASA authorized North American to purchase five new 
28-foot parachutes to replace the 24-foot units that had reached their 7-year ser-
vice limit. The new chutes had a disconnect device that allowed the pilots to 
release one-half of the shroud lines during descent. They were less comfortable 
because they were thicker than the original parachutes, but as personnel at Ed-
wards discarded the smaller units, they became standard.143 
 Despite the confidence Scott Crossfield and the North American engineers 
had in the ejection seat, apparently it was not universal. Pete Knight once com-
mented, “They tell me that the seat is good for Mach 4 and 120,000 feet. I take it 
with a grain of salt, but I think the safest place to be is inside the airplane until we 
get to a more reasonable environment.… If you had to, as a last resort certainty 
you would take the chance, but I think most of the pilots have felt that we…would 
0 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 3 February 959, 3 March 959, and 7 April 959. 
 Hegenwald, “Development of X-5 Escape System,” p. 32.
2 Minutes of Meeting, X-5 Human Factors Subcommittee, 30 December 960.
3 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 2 June 965, p. 7.
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stay with [the airplane] as long as possible.” At least everybody agreed that the 
cockpit was a safe place. Crossfield demonstrated that when the X-15-3 exploded 
on the ground while he was testing the XLR99 engine.144
STABLE PLATFORM DEVELOPMENT
 Another major piece of government-furnished equipment was the all-attitude 
inertial system, called a “stable platform” at the time. Early on, researchers real-
ized the performance of the research airplane required a new method to determine 
altitude, speed, and attitude information. The original Langley study, as well as 
each of the contractor proposals, had suggested the use of a stable platform. Un-
fortunately, such as system was not readily available. 
 A meeting held at Wright Field on 14–15 November 1955 implied that the 
WADC would furnish the stable platform. Arthur Vogeley, the NACA representa-
 Major William J. “Pete” Knight, “Increased Piloting Tasks and Performance of X-5A-2 in Hypersonic Flight,” 
The Aeronautical Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society, volume 72, September 968, p. 799 (derived from a 
lecture given to the Test Pilot’s Group of the Society on 30 January 968); general thoughts confirmed with Pete 
Knight in a telephone conversation with Dennis R. Jenkins, 27 September 2002.
The X-15 ejection seat, like all other seats of  the era, was tested on the rocket sled track at Edwards 
AFB, California. The sled test results were mixed, with many failures of  both the sled and the seat 
for various reasons, but ultimately the Air Force, NASA, and North American were satisfied that the 
seat would work as advertised. (U.S. Air Force)
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tive, assumed that the Air Force had already developed a suitable device since his 
report stated that a newly developed Bendix platform weighed only 28 pounds 
and occupied less than a cubic foot of volume. Others within the NACA and North 
American were not as certain. During a meeting with North American personnel, 
Walt Williams specifically asked who was responsible for the stable platform, and 
no answer was immediately forthcoming.145  
 Researchers apparently did not discuss the requirements for a stable platform 
until 24 May 1956 during a meeting at Langley. In attendance were representatives 
from Eclipse-Pioneer (a division of Bendix), the NACA, North American, and the 
WADC. This group discussed the platform mentioned at the November 1955 meet-
ing, and Eclipse-Pioneer acknowledged that it was only a conceptual design and 
not a forthcoming product. Nevertheless, the meeting attendees thought that devel-
opment of a suitable platform would take only 24 months. Since the platform pro-
vided research data in addition to flight data, the NACA agreed to charge 40 pounds 
of the estimated 65-pound weight against research instrumentation. There was no 
mention as to why the original 28-pound estimate had grown to 65 pounds.146  
 Despite its early participation, Eclipse-Pioneer did not exhibit any further 
interest, so the Flight Control Laboratory asked the Sperry Gyroscope Company 
if it was interested. By August 1956, Sperry had prepared a preliminary proposal, 
and on 4 October the X-15 Project Office held a technical briefing for Sperry at 
Wright Field.147  
 On 26 December 1956, the Flight Control Laboratory began the process to 
procure eight inertial flight data systems (six “Type A” units for the X-15 and two 
“Type B” units for ground research). The laboratory recommended awarding the 
$1,030,000 contract to the Sperry Gyroscope Company.148  
 For unexplained reasons, the Air Materiel Command did not take immediate 
action and did not release a formal request for proposal to Sperry until 6 Feb-
ruary 1957. Two weeks later Sperry replied, and the Flight Control Laboratory 
approved the technical aspects of the proposal on 28 March. In the meantime, 
however, a controversy had developed over contracting details. The negotiations 
reached a deadlock on 11 April 1957 and the Air Materiel Command informed the 
X-15 Project Office that it intended to find another contractor. The Flight Control 
Laboratory and X-15 Project Office argued that Sperry was the only company that 
stood a chance of meeting the X-15 flight schedule, but procurements were the 
domain of the Air Materiel Command and the warnings fell on deaf ears.149  
 It was evident that the issue was rapidly exhausting the patience of all con-
cerned. On 22 April 1957, the director of development at the WADC, Brigadier 
5 Memorandum, Arthur W. Vogeley to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, no subject, 30 November 
955; memorandum, Walter C. Williams to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, no subject, 27 
January 956. In the files at the NASA History Office.
6 Memorandum, Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader to Members of the NACA Research Airplane 
Project Panel, no subject, 7 June 956. In the files at the NASA History Office.
7 Proposal number A. E. 752, “Development of Flight Research Stabilized Platform,” Sperry Gyroscope Co. Au-
gust 956; Memorandum, Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader to Members of the NACA Research 
Airplane Project Panel, 5 November 956. In the files at the NASA History Office. 
8 Memorandum, M. L. Lipscomb, Instrumentation Branch, Flight Control Laboratory, WADC, to Chief, Accessories 
Development Section, Accessories Branch, Aerospace Equipment Division, AMC, no subject, 26 December 956.
9 Letter, H. L. Kimball, Chief, Accessories Development Section, Accessories Branch, Aerospace Equipment Divi-
sion, AMC, to Sperry Gyroscope Company, no subject, 6 February 957; negotiation summary, C. E. Deardorff, 
Accessories Development Section, Accessories Branch, Aerospace Equipment Division, AMC, 25 April 956.
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General Victor R. Haugen, informed the Air Materiel Command that Sperry was 
the only company capable of developing the stable platform within the schedule 
constraints of the X-15 program. Having a general officer intervene was apparent-
ly the answer, and a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract signed on 5 June 1957 provided 
$1,213,518.06 with an $85,000 fee.150  
 Because of the contracting delays, the expected December 1958 delivery of 
the initial Sperry unit would not support the first flight of the X-15. This was not 
a significant problem since the initial X-15 flights would be low and slow enough 
to use a standard NACA flight test boom to provide the data ultimately supplied 
by the stable platform and ball nose. In fact, the NACA would likely have used 
the flight test boom even if the other instruments had been available, since it pro-
vided a known, calibrated source for acquiring initial air data. Most experimental 
aircraft use similar booms during early testing.151  
 More disturbing, however, was that it quickly became apparent that the 
weight of the stable platform had been seriously underestimated. In May 1958, 
Sperry undertook a weight-reduction program that, unfortunately, was particularly 
unsuccessful. By August, Sperry was reporting that the weight was approximately 
twice the original specification.152  
 It was just the beginning of serious trouble. By June 1958, the estimated cost 
was up to $2,741,375 with a $105,000 fee. Less than a year later the cost reached 
$3,234,188.87 with an $119,888 fee, mostly due to efforts to reduce the weight of 
the stable platform.153  
 The Air Materiel Command asked Sperry for additional data on their weight-
reduction exercise on 7 August 1958. Sperry replied that with a shock mount 
capable of meeting the vibration specification, the system weighed 185.25 pounds. 
An alternate shock mount that did not meet the requirements but was probably ac-
ceptable brought the weight down to 165.25 pounds. Interestingly, Sperry admit-
ted it had known about the weight problem for some time, but did not explain why 
it had not brought the issue to the government’s attention at an earlier date.154  
 Sperry defended its actions by listing the changes it had made to eliminate 
excess weight. These included substituting aluminum for stainless steel in some 
locations, reducing the thickness of various covers, and reducing component 
weight wherever practical. The need to include power supplies not anticipated in 
the original proposal also increased the weight of the system. Finally, Sperry also 
concluded that the stable platform was lighter and more accurate than any com-
50 Memorandum, Brigadier General Victor R. Haugen, WADC, to Chief, Aerospace Equipment Division, Director of 
Procurement and Production, AMC, subject: Flight Data System for the X-5, 22 April 957; purchase request 
DE-7-S-8. In the files at the AFMC History Office; Contract AF33(600)-35397, 5 June 957. In the files at the 
Air Force Historical Research Agency.
5 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 2 May 958. 
52 Memorandum, W. W. Bailey, Programming Branch, Flight Control Laboratory, WADC and Captain Chester E. 
McCollough, Jr., Assistant Chief, X-5 WSPO, to Chief, Flight Data Section, Accessories Branch, Aerospace 
Equipment Division, AMC, no subject, 5 August 958. 
53 Supplemental Agreements  through 0, Contract AF33(600)-35397, 5 June 957 and subsequent. In the files at 
the ASC History Office.
5 Memorandum, W. W. Bailey, Programming Branch, Flight Control Laboratory, WADC and Captain Chester E. 
McCollough, Jr., Assistant Chief, X-5 WSPO, to Chief, Flight Data Section, Accessories Branch, Aerospace 
Equipment Division, AMC, no subject, 5 August 958. In the files at the AFMC History Office; letter, J. J. Slamer, 
Deputy Chief, Flight Data Section, Accessories Branch, Aerospace Equipment Division, AMC, to AFPR, Sperry 
Rand Corporation, subject: Letter Contract AF33(600)-35397, 7 August 958. In the files at the Air Force Histori-
cal Research Agency. 
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peting system. Apparently, Sperry’s justification was satisfactory since the X-15 
Project Office accepted that the system was going to remain overweight and took 
no further action on the subject .155 
 As finally delivered, the stable platform was an Earth-slaved, Schuler-tuned 
system aligned in azimuth to a guidance vector coincident with X-15 centerline. 
The unit provided attitude, velocity, and altitude to the pilot with reference to these 
coordinate systems. There were three major components to the stable platform: 
the stabilizer, computer, and displays. Together they weighed approximately 165 
pounds, occupied about 3 cubic feet of volume, and required a peak electrical 
load of 600 W. The stabilizer used three self-balancing accelerometers and three 
single-degree-of-freedom gyroscopes. A four-gimbal system provided complete 
attitude freedom in all axes. An analog computer computed velocity and posi-
tion data, and applied the necessary acceleration corrections. The computer was 
shock-mounted and shaped to conform to the contours of the X-15 instrumentation 
compartment. Gaseous nitrogen from the X-15 cooled the stabilizer and computer 
to counteract the internal heat generated by the units, and the extreme external 
temperatures. The system was “designed to operate over a limited portion of the 
Earth’s surface.” Specifically, it could accept a launch point anywhere within a 
275-mile-wide corridor extending 620 miles uprange and 205 miles downrange 
from Edwards AFB .156  
 Sperry shipped the first stabilizer and computer to Edwards in late January 
1959, and the Air Force intended to use the NB-52 carrier aircraft as a test vehicle . 
This was delayed for unknown reasons, so the Air Force made a KC-97 that was 
already being used for similar purposes by the Convair B-58 program available to 
the X-15 project. The first flights in the KC-97 took place in late April, but were 
of limited value given the low speed of the piston-powered Stratocruiser. In June 
1959, North American successfully installed the Sperry system in X-15-3 prior to 
its delivery to Edwards. By the end of May 1960, there were four complete stable 
platforms at Edwards: one in X-15-1, one in X-15-3, one spare, and one undergo-
ing repair.157  
  
  
 
55 Letter, G. W. Schleich, Aerospace Equipment Division, Sperry Gyroscope Company, to Commander, AMC, sub-
ject: Contract AF33(600)-35397,  September 958. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research Agency. 
56 M. L. Lipscomb and John A. Dodgen, “All-Attitude Flight-Date System for the X-5 Research Airplane,” a paper 
in the 1958 Research Airplane Committee Report, p. 6; Jay V. Christensen and John A. Dodgen, “Flight Experi-
ence with X-5 Inertial Data System,” a paper in the 1958 Research Airplane Committee Report, p. 20. Quote 
from the 958 paper; Jack Fischel and Lannie D. Webb, NASA technical note D-207, “Flight-Informational Sen-
sors, Display, and Space Control of the X-5 Airplane for Atmospheric and Near-Space Flight Missions,” August 
96, p. 5; Kenneth C. Sanderson, NASA technical memorandum X-56000, “The X-5 Flight Test Instrumenta-
tion,” 2 April 96, pp. 0-. The 965 flight manual says that the corridor was 20 miles wide and 720 miles 
long. This probably represents the design for the improved FRC-66 or IFDS system, although the documentation 
is unclear.
57 NASA technical note D-207, p. 5; X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 23 January, 3 March, and  May 959; 
interview, Lieutenant Ronald L. Panton, X-5 WSPO Director of Systems Management, ARDC,  June 959, 
by Robert S. Houston, History Branch, WADC. Written transcript in the files at the Air Force Museum archives; 
James E. Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” not dated, p. 20. In the files at the 
DFRC History Office; X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 5 May 960, p. 
7. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
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 As delivered, the stable platforms could provide the following data:158 
Measurement Range Accuracy (rms) Display Record
Pitch angle (degrees) unlimited 0 .5 √ √
Roll angle (degrees) unlimited 0 .5 √ √
Yaw angle (degrees) unlimited 0 .5 √ √
Altitude (feet) 0–500,000 5,000 √
Total velocity (fps) ±7,000 70 √
Downrange velocity (fps) ±7,000 50 √
Crossrange velocity (fps) ±3,000 50 √
Vertical velocity (fps) ±5,000 20 √
 However, Sperry had made several compromises during the development of 
the X-15 stable platform, either to meet schedule or reduce weight. The designers 
knew that 300 seconds after launch (i .e ., as the airplane decelerated to land) the 
pressure instruments would be adequate for vehicle altitude and velocity data, and 
that a system capable of operating from carrier aircraft takeoff to X-15 landing 
would be too heavy and bulky for the X-15. The final design had a very limited 
operating duration. The pilot aligned the system just before the X-15 separated 
from the NB-52, and the stable platform provided just 300 seconds of velocity 
and altitude data, along with 20 minutes of attitude data. This limited operating 
duration provided some relief for the weight problem.159  
 As it turned out, the lighter shock mount developed by Sperry was not ad-
equate for the X-15. It performed fine during the XLR11 flights, but vibration tests 
in October 1960 prior to the beginning of XLR99 tests showed that the mount 
would not withstand more than 1.5 g at 110 cycles. North American redesigned 
the mount, since by this time saving weight had become a non-issue for the most 
part; having a reliable airplane was worth more than the few miles per hour the 
weight cost.
 Over the course of the flight program, the stable platform was the subject of 
several other changes that greatly improved its reliability. Many of these were 
the result of suggestions from John Hursh at the MIT Instrumentation Laboratory 
and Dr . Allen Smith from Ames, both of whom spent a great deal of time at the 
Flight Research Center during late 1960 working on the problems. As an example 
of these changes, NASA changed all critical germanium transistor amplifiers to 
silicon during November 1960. NASA also made changes to operating procedures 
as well as to hardware. Initially, a gyroscope failure required that the entire stable 
platform be returned to Sperry for repair, taking the unit off flight status for three 
to six weeks. In response, the FRC developed an in-house repair capability that 
significantly shortened turnaround times. Even better, during late 1960 NASA 
 
58 Lipscomb and Dodgen, “All-Attitude Flight-Date System for the X-5 Research Airplane,” p. 59; Christensen and 
Dodgen, “Flight Experience with X-5 Inertial Data System,” pp. 203 and 209.
59 Christensen and Dodgen, “Flight Experience with X-5 Inertial Data System,” pp. 203-20.
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substituted a higher-quality gyroscope manufactured by Minneapolis-Honeywell, 
which resulted in fewer failures .160  
 In retrospect, the performance specifications established in 1956 were well 
beyond the state of the art with respect to available gyros, accelerometers, tran-
sistors, and circuit techniques. However, the system as originally built was able 
to perform at levels that, although marginal or subpar compared to the original 
specification, still allowed the X-15 to realize its full performance capabilities. 
Compared to modern laser-ring-gyro and GPS-augmented systems, the X-15 
stable platform was woefully inaccurate, but it routinely bettered its 70-fps error 
specification for velocity. Initially its altitude-measuring ability was somewhat 
substandard, averaging about 2,200 feet (rms) uncertainty. The requirement was 
2,000 feet, but the system eventually improved and met its specification. Reliabil-
ity was initially poor, but by mid-1961 the overall reliability was approaching the 
high 90th percentile, with the altimeter function proving to be the most unreliable. 
Unfortunately, this improved reliability proved to be short-lived.161 
 The initial operational experience with the stable platform showed that it had 
a large error potential that grew as time passed from the initial alignment due to 
drift and integration noise. The unit integrated velocities to provide distance (X, 
Y, and Z) and specifically altitude, which had even more error buildup with time. 
60 Ibid, pp. 20-207; X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters,  November and 
5 November 960. In the files at the DFRC History Office. Sperry provided spares and support under contract 
AF33(600)-35397.
6 Christensen and Dodgen, “Flight Experience with X-5 Inertial Data System,” pp. 209-23.
The X-15 was one of  the first aircraft to require what is today called an inertial measurement unit, or stable-
platform. Gyroscopes of  the era were large, heavy, and consumed a considerable amount of  power. This model 
shows the three interlocked rings required to determine position in three dimensions. (NASA)
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Early flight tests showed that the displayed velocities were marginal even after the 
90-second engine burn, and that the altitude was undependable for determining 
peak altitude or reentry setup. Because of this, the flight planners and pilots began 
to consider two other sources for controlling the energy imparted to the airplane: 
1) engine burn time, as measured by a stopwatch in the NASA-1 control room, 
and 2) radar-measured velocity, as displayed in the control room.162  
 For the first government flight (2-13-26) with the XLR99 engine, the flight 
planners decided to use radar velocity as the primary indication with a radio call 
to Bob White at the desired engine shutdown condition. After the successful flight, 
researchers calculated that the airplane had exceeded the intended speed by about 
half a Mach number. Further analysis showed that the radar velocity display in the 
control room incorporated considerable smoothing of the data to provide a readable 
output. This introduced a lag of 4 seconds between the actual speed and the dis-
played speed, thus accounting for the overshoot. For the next few flights, NASA-1 
started a stopwatch in the control room at the indication of chamber pressure on the 
telemetry, and radioed the pilot when it was time to shut down the engine.163  
 Using a stopwatch to measure powered flight time proved to be the simplest 
and yet most accurate method of controlling energy, so a stopwatch was installed 
in the cockpit of all three airplanes. A signal from the main propellant valves 
started and stopped the stopwatch so that it displayed the total burn time even 
after shutdown. The pilot could then assess whether he had more or less energy 
than planned, and evaluate his energy condition and best emergency lake in the 
event of a premature shutdown. Although the reliability of the stable platform 
increased considerably during the course of the program and was eventually op-
erating within its design specifications, the pilots continued to use the stopwatch 
(with a backup stopwatch in the control room) for most flights. It was cheap and 
easy, and almost never failed.164  
 By 1963 an increasing number of stable platform failures began to occur—
some because of design deficiencies, others simply due to component deteriora-
tion. This led to NASA placing a new set of restrictions on X-15 flights, keeping 
them below 160,000 feet. Progress by Sperry to resolve the issues was slow, so an 
analysis was undertaken at the FRC to determine what in-house efforts could be 
made to bolster system performance and improve reliability.165 
 Beginning in late 1963, the FRC began redesigning critical components to 
improve both accuracy and reliability. Eventually, NASA engineers redesigned 
some 60% of the subassemblies in the stable platform. Overall, the volume used 
by the accelerometers, accelerometer electronics, and power supplies was reduced 
over 50%, and an accompanying reduction in power and cooling requirements 
was also realized. Although some of the improvements resulted from correcting 
deficiencies in the original design, most were achieved because the state of the 
art had improved considerably in the four years since work had begun. NASA 
62 Letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 20 May 2002.
63 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
65 Melvin E. Burke and Robert J. Basso, “Résumé of X-5 Experience Related to Flight Guidance Research,” a 
paper in the Progress of the X-15 Research Airplane Program, a compilation of the papers presented at the Flight 
Research Center, 7 October 965, NASA publication SP-90, (Washington, DC: NASA, 965), pp. 75-76. 
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completed the initial redesign efforts on the accelerometer loops and power sup-
plies during the summer of 1964, and the first flight of the new components was 
in X-15-2 on 14 August 1964 (2-33-56). Technicians subsequently installed the 
revised components in X-15-3 also. This system allowed NASA to cancel the 
160,000-foot altitude restriction on the airplanes .
 Although the initial performance of the revised components was a little erratic, 
the increase in accuracy was substantial. For instance, 400 seconds into the flight 
the original system would have a +8,000-foot error in altitude; the revised system 
generally had a –1,000-foot error. (In both cases the specification required a less 
than –5,000-foot error; nothing on the positive side was satisfactory.) Eventually 
the engineers tuned the erratic performance out of the system. By May 1966, com-
ponents designed at the FRC had essentially replaced the entire Sperry stable plat-
form, and the system was redesignated the “FRC-66 Analog Inertial System.”166 
 At the same time, NASA began making plans to replace the stable platform 
with surplus Honeywell digital inertial guidance systems from the now-canceled 
X-20. This inertial flight data system (IFDS) consisted of an inertial measurement 
unit, a coupler electronics unit, a digital computer, and a set of pilot displays. This 
system was even smaller and required less power and cooling than the redesigned 
FRC-66 analog system. In addition, the X-20 IFDS could automatically erect it-
self and perform an alignment cycle on the ground while the NB-52 was taxiing, 
and completely eliminated the need for information from the N-1 compass and 
APN-81 Doppler radar on the NB-52. This made it somewhat easier to pilot the 
carrier aircraft as the X-15 approached the launch position; the APN-81 took 90 
seconds to stabilize after even a gentle turn, requiring the NB-52 pilot to think well 
ahead of the drop time. To improve accuracy, however, the IFDS altitude loop was 
synched to the NB-52 pressure altimeter until 1 minute before launch.167 
 The inertial measurement unit was a gyrostabilized, four-gimbaled platform 
that maintained local vertical orientation throughout the flight. The inner plat-
form contained three pendulous accelerometers that formed an orthogonal triad. 
The coupler electronics unit contained the power supplies and interface equip-
ment, and a dual-function digital computer performed all computations. NASA 
first checked out the digital system in X-15-1 on 15 October 1964 (1-50-79), with 
satisfactory results.168 
 The overall performance of the IFDS during its first 16 flight attempts was 
excellent, with only two failures. However, problems with the IFDS caused two 
attempted launches in a row (1-A-105 and 1-A-106) to abort during June 1966. 
After the first abort, technicians replaced a relay and fixed a loose wire, but the 
second flight attempt a week later ended the same way. Engineers from Autonet-
ics (a division of North American), Honeywell, the FRC, and Wright Field began 
66 James E. Love and Jack Fischel, “Status of X-5 Program,” a paper in the Progress of the X-15 Research Airplane 
Program, p. 6; Burke and Basso, “Résumé of X-5 Experience Related to Flight Guidance Research,” pp. 76-77 
and 83; X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  May and 2 July 966. The 
new designation was simply the abbreviation for the Flight Research Center (FRC) and the year the work was 
completed (66).
67 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 3 April 96, p. 0; Love and Fischel, 
“Status of X-5 Program,” p. 6; and Burke and Basso, “Résumé of X-5 Experience Related to Flight Guidance 
Research,” pp. 77-78 and 8. 
68 Burke and Basso, “Résumé of X-5 Experience Related to Flight Guidance Research,” pp. 77-78 and 8; X-5 
Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 2 January and  February 965. 
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investigating the problem. The failures were determined to be the result of yet 
more wiring problems, all easily corrected.169 
 At the same time, the installation in X-15-3 was not going as well as it had 
in X-15-1. On 6 January 1965, representatives from Honeywell met with FRC 
personnel to discuss problems with the installation. There were four primary con-
cerns: cooling and thermal conditions, space availability, cabling, and the interface 
to the MH-96 adaptive control system. This latter issue was surprising since the 
X-20 also used a version of the MH-96. Also discussed was the relative accuracy 
expected from the new system versus data from the ball nose . It was pointed out 
by the Honeywell representative that at low velocities there would be a significant 
difference between the IFDS-computed angle of sideslip and that sensed by the 
ball nose, but at high velocities the difference should be small.170 
 By April 1965 the FRC had made little progress installing the system in 
X-15-3, and only X-15-1 was flying with the Honeywell inertial system. Fortu-
nately, by this time the modified Sperry systems were proving to be reliable, and 
no substantial problems had been experienced by X-15-2 or X-15-3 since De-
cember 1964. Engineers finally installed the Honeywell IFDS in X-15-3 during a 
weather-induced down period at the end of 1965 .171 
  
69 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 2 July 966, p. 5. 
70 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  February 965, p. 6. 
7 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  April 965 and 3 January 966. 
Because of  limitations in both the gyroscopes and onboard computers, the X-15 stable platform could 
only function for a limited amount of  time in a 275-mile-wide corridor extending 620 miles uprange 
and 205 miles downrange from Edwards AFB. Later modifications to the system were more reliable 
and versatile, and at the end of  the program, two of  the X-15s were using digital inertial flight data 
systems developed for the Air Force Dyna-Soar program. (NASA)
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 Although the Honeywell IFDS was considered an improvement over the 
modified Sperry stable platform, the FRC decided that the FRC-66 system was 
preferred for the Mach 8 flights in the modified X-15A-2, so that airplane never 
received an IFDS. By the end of 1965, engineers had modified one of the Sperry 
computers to have Mach 8 scaling coefficients in preparation for the X-15A-2 
envelope-expansion program.172 
 The improvements did not stop there. Eventually the FRC modified X-15-3 
to include an Ames-developed guidance system that was applicable to future aero-
space vehicles. This system coupled the IFDS inertial system, MH-96 adaptive 
control system, and ball nose to an Alert digital computer to investigate boost 
guidance command techniques. The navigation functions continued to be per-
formed by the inertial system while the Alert computer handled the research ob-
jectives, including providing new displays to the pilot. This program allowed the 
pilot to fly a velocity-altitude window during boost, a bounded corridor during 
hypersonic cruise, and a precise corridor during reentry. It was an advanced sys-
tem, and one that Space Shuttle only duplicated in its waning years.173
BALL NOSE DEVELOPMENT
 The heating rates and low pressures encountered by the X-15 ruled out the 
use of traditional vane-type sensors to measure angle of attack (α) and sideslip 
(β). Based on a preliminary design completed by Langley in June 1956, NASA 
awarded a contract to the Nortronics Division of Northrop Aircraft Corporation for 
the detailed design and construction of a prototype and five production ball noses. 
The sensor and its supporting, sealing, and hydraulic-actuating mechanisms were 
an integral assembly mounted in the extreme nose of the X-15. The afterbody 
located behind the sphere contained the electronic amplifiers, power supplies, and 
control valves, with the electrical, hydraulic, and pneumatic connections between 
the sphere and the afterbody passing through a single supporting member. Rotary 
hydraulic actuators provided the required two degrees of freedom.174 
 Officially called the “high-temperature flow-direction sensor,” the device was 
16.75 inches long with a base diameter of 13.75 inches. The total weight of the 
ball nose was 78 pounds, half of which was contributed by the thick Inconel X 
72 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 3 January 966, p. 3. 
73 Burke and Basso, “Résumé of X-5 Experience Related to Flight Guidance Research,” pp. 79-80.
7 Israel Taback and Gerald M. Truszynski, “Instrumentation for the X-5,” a paper in the 1956 Research Airplane 
Committee Report, pp. 83-92; memorandum, Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, subject: 
Project 226—Progress report for month of May 956, 7 June 956; William D. Mace and Jon L. Ball, “Flight 
Characteristics of X-5 Hypersonic Flow-Direction Sensor,” a paper in the 1961 Research Airplane Committee 
Report, pp. 96-97; Nortronics report NORT-60-6, pp. 3-6. Unfortunately the copy of the report in the DFRC 
History Office is missing the first two pages, so the title and exact date (the “60” in the report number probably 
establishes 960 as the year) could not be ascertained; Kenneth C. Sanderson, NASA technical memorandum X-
56000, “The X-5 Flight Test Instrumentation,” 2 April 96, pp. 8-9. The ball nose was also known, somewhat 
inaccurately, as the “Q-ball”; some documentation also called it the “hot nose,” “flow direction sensor,” or “NACA 
nose.” A gimbal is a device that allows a body to incline in predefined directions. In this case, the sphere could 
move both left–right and up–down in relation to the nose. Hydraulic servomotors (servos) provided the power to 
move the sphere as necessary. 
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outer skins of the lip, cone, and sphere. In addition, 13 chromel-alumel thermo-
couples were located within the sphere to measure skin temperature during flight, 
and five other thermocouples measured selected internal temperatures. Nitrogen 
gas from the aircraft supply cooled the sensor. The ball nose was physically inter-
changeable with the standard NACA flight-test boom nose, and all connections to 
the sensor were made through couplings that automatically engaged when the ball 
nose (or boom) was mounted to the aircraft.175 
 The core of the ball nose consisted of a 6.5-inch-diameter Inconel X sphere 
mounted on the extreme tip of the X-15 nose. The sphere contained two pairs of 
0.188-inch diameter orifices (one pair in the vertical plane (α orifices) and one 
pair in the horizontal plane (β orifices)), each 42 degrees from the stagnation 
point. Two functionally identical hydraulic servo systems, powered by the normal 
X-15 systems, rotated the sphere about the α and β axes to a position such that 
the impact pressures seen by all sensing orifices were equal. When this condi-
tion existed, the sphere was oriented directly into the relative wind. Two synchro 
transducers detected the position of the sphere with respect to the airframe, and 
this signal fed the various instruments in the cockpit and the recorders and telem-
etry system. Since the dynamic pressure during flight could vary between 1 psf 
and 2,500 psf, a major gain adjustment was required in the servo loop to main-
75 Mace and Ball, “Flight Characteristics of X-5 Hypersonic Flow-Direction Sensor,” pp. 96-97; Nortronics report 
NORT-60-6, pp. 3-6. 
The ball nose, or more officially, the high-temperature flow-direction sensor, was mounted on the nose of  
the airplane and provided angle of  attack and angle of  sideslip information to both the pilot and the 
research instrumentation. This elaborate mechanism was required since the pressure and temperature 
environment encountered by the X-15 ruled out more conventional vane-type sensors. (NASA)
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tain stability and accuracy. Measuring the pressure difference between the total- 
pressure port and one angle-sensing port provided a signal that adjusted the gain 
of the sphere-positioning loop. The ball nose could sense angles of attack from 
–10 to +40 degrees, and angles of sideslip within ±20 degrees. The unit was capa-
ble of continuous operation at a skin temperature of 1,200°F. A 0.5-inch-diameter 
orifice located at the sphere stagnation point provided a total pressure source for 
the aircraft. Based on ground tests, the angular accuracy of the sensor was within 
±0.25 degree for dynamic pressures above 10 psf.176 
 In early 1960 the FRC developed a simple technique for thermal testing the 
newly delivered ball noses: expose them to the afterburner exhaust from a North 
American F-100 Super Sabre. This seemed to work well until one of the noses suf-
fered a warped forward lip during testing. Engineers subsequently determined the 
engine was “operated longer than necessary,” resulting in temperatures in excess 
of 2,400°F instead of the expected 1,900°F. Ultimately, the FRC tested the ball 
nose “many consecutive times” 
with “satisfactory results.”177 
 The ball nose performed sat-
isfactorily throughout the flight 
program, encountering only oc-
casional minor maintenance 
problems. Late in the program, 
various parts began to wear out, 
however, and the need to replace 
some of them presented difficul-
ties . For instance, the procurer of 
replacement dynamic-pressure 
transducers found that the origi-
nal vendor was not interested 
in fabricating new parts, and no 
suitable alternate vendor could 
immediately be located. Eventu-
ally NASA found a new vendor, 
but this illustrates that the “van-
ishing vendor” phenomenon fre-
quently encountered during the 
early 21st century is not new.178 
As the modified X-15A-2 was 
being prepared for flight, how-
ever, there began a concern over 
whether the Inconel X sphere in the 
original ball noses could handle 
76 Jack Fischel and Lannie D. Webb, NASA technical note D-207, “Flight-Informational Sensors, Display, and 
Space Control of the X-5 Airplane for Atmospheric and Near-Space Flight Missions,” August 96, p. 5; Nor-
tronics report NORT-60-6, pp. 3-0. 
77 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 5 May 960, p. 8; X-5 Status Report, 
Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters,  June 960, p. 0. 
78 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 6,”  November 966, p. 5.
The sphere mounted on the extreme nose of  the ball 
nose was machined from Inconel X to very precise tol-
erances. The X-15 was manufactured before the advent 
of  modern computer-controlled milling machines, so such 
precise work was accomplished by human operators on 
traditional lathes and drill presses. The ball noses for the 
X-15A-2 were manufactured from TAZ-8A cermet 
since the temperatures in the Mach 8 environment were 
even more severe. (NASA)
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the additional heat generated at Mach 8. Researchers at NASA Lewis developed a  
TAZ-8A cermet that Rohr Corporation used to manufacture a new sphere spe-
cifically for the X-15A-2. This sphere was delivered in mid-1966, but did 
not initially pass its qualification test due to a faulty braze around the beta 
pressure port. Rohr subsequently repaired the sphere and it passed its quali-
fication test. Interestingly, the FRC tested this new sphere (and the for-
ward lip of the cone, which was also manufactured from TAZ-8A) in much 
the same way as the original ball noses were qualified—this time in the 
afterburner exhaust of a General Electric J79 engine at 1,850°F. During No-
vember 1966, the FRC tested the new sphere, as well as a slightly modified 
housing necessary to accommodate the ablative coating on the fuselage, in the 
High-Temperature Loads Calibration Laboratory. NASA installed the new nose on 
X-15A-2 to support flight 2-52-96 on 21 August 1967.179 
 The ball nose only provided angle of attack, angle of sideslip, and total pres-
sure; like all aircraft, the X-15 needed additional air data during the landing phase. 
79 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 6,”  November 966, p. 5; X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. 
Martin/NASA Headquarters, 5 May 967, p. 0; telephone conversation, Rodney K. Bogue/DFRC with Dennis 
R. Jenkins, 6 June 2002. The status report says that the new nose was tested in the exhaust of a Lockheed F-
0 Starfighter, but photographic evidence shows it was just a J79 engine (probably from an F-0) on the test 
stand.
The ball nose had to withstand pressures up to 2,500 psf  and temperatures up to 1,200°F. NASA 
researchers developed a relatively straight-forward heating test using the afterburned exhaust of  a jet 
engine on the ramp at the Flight Research Center. The original ball noses were tested using Pratt & 
Whitney J57 engines from North American F-100 Super Sabres, while the later X-15A-2 noses used 
General Electric J79 engines from Lockheed F-104 Starfighters. (NASA)
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North American had installed a total-head tube (also called the alternate probe) 
ahead of the canopy to provide the total pressure during subsonic flight, and static 
pressure ports were located on each side of the fuselage 1 inch above the aircraft 
waterline at station 50 .180  
     A different pitot-static system was required for the X-15A-2 since the 
MA-25S ablator would cover the normal static locations. Engineers chose a vent-
ed compartment behind the canopy as the static source, and found it to be suitable 
during flight tests on the X-15-1. The standard dogleg pitot tube ahead of the 
canopy was replaced by an extendable pitot because the temperatures expected 
at Mach 8 would exceed the thermal limits of the standard tube. The retractable 
tube remained within the fuselage until the aircraft decelerated below Mach 2; the 
pilot then actuated a release mechanism and the tube extended into the airstream. 
This was very similar in concept to the system eventually installed on the space 
shuttle orbiters .181
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS
 One of the unique items included in the X-15 design was a side-stick control-
ler. Actually, the airplane included two side sticks: one on the right console for the 
aerodynamic controls, and one on the left console for the ballistic controls. The 
right and center controllers were linked mechanically and hydraulically to provide 
simultaneous movement of both sticks; however, the side stick required only one-
third as much movement to obtain a given stabilizer motion.182 
 NASA had installed a similar side stick in one of the North American 
YF-107A aircraft to gain experience with the new controller. A review of early 
X-15 landing data (using the side-stick) revealed a “striking similarity” with land-
ings made in the YF-107. Despite large differences in speed and L/D ratios, the 
variations in angle of attack, normal acceleration, pitching velocity, and horizon-
tal stabilizer position exhibited the same tendencies for the pilot to over-control 
the airplane using the side stick. During the YF-107 program, several flights were 
generally required before a pilot became proficient at using the controller and 
could perform relatively smooth landings; the same was true of the X-15.183 
 Regarding the side-stick controller, Bob White commented that “the side 
aerodynamic control stick designed for the X-15 has received the usual critical 
analysis associated with a departure from the conventional.” As pilots reported 
their experiences using the side stick, North American began making minor modi-
80 “Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” 7 November 
96, pp. 3-. In the files at the AFFTC History Office.
8 Johnny G. Armstrong, AFFTC technology document FTC-TD-69-, “Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 
Envelope Expansion Program,” July 969, p. 26; X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Head-
quarters, 2 July 966, p. 9. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
82 Gene J. Matranga, “Analysis of X-5 Landing Approach and Flare Characteristics Determined from the First 30 
Flights,” NASA technical note D-057, July 96, pp. -5. 
83 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 5 August 960, p. 3. In the files at the 
DFRC History Office
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fications to correct undesirable characteristics. In the end, the company found that 
most of the initial design features were satisfactory. The most frequent complaint 
was the location of the stick in relation to the pilot’s arm, since the stick had been 
located based on Scott Crossfield’s input, and other pilots differed in size and pro-
portions. However, Crossfield was a strong proponent of the side stick and North 
American soon devised a way to adjust the stick into one of five different fore-aft 
locations prior to flight based on individual pilot preference. After this, the side 
stick gained favor rather quickly.184 
 The all-moving horizontal stabilizers deflected symmetrically for longitudi-
nal control (elevators) and differentially for lateral control (ailerons). The roll-
ing tail that had caused so much controversy within the government early in the 
program proved to be quite satisfactory in operation. According to Bob White, 
“the pilot is not aware of what specific type of lateral control is allowing the roll 
motion. His only concern is in being able to get the aircraft response he calls for 
when deflecting the control stick.… From experience to date [after 45 flights], 
the rolling tail has provided a good rolling control for the X-15, and there have 
been no undesirable aircraft motions coupled in any axis because of lateral-con-
trol deflection.”185  
 Conventional rudder pedals actuated the movable portions of the dorsal and 
ventral vertical stabilizers. Just prior to the landing flare, the pilot would jettison 
the lower portion of the dorsal stabilizer to provide sufficient ground clearance; 
otherwise, the dorsal rudder would contact the ground before the landing skids. 
Speed brakes were located on each side of the fixed portion of the dorsal and ven-
tral stabilizers. Irreversible hydraulic actuators actuated all of the aerodynamic 
control surfaces .186  
 The aerodynamic controls were effective up to about 150,000 feet. Neverthe-
less, many X-15 pilots manually used the ballistic control system in addition to 
the aerodynamic controls above 100,000 feet, and the MH-96 on X-15-3 automat-
ically began blending in the ballistic control system thrusters above 90,000 feet. 
As Neil Armstrong, who was a principle engineer on the MH-96, commented, 
“a rule of thumb is that when dynamic pressure on control surfaces reduces to 
50 psf, there should be a switchover from aerodynamic to reaction control.” 
Despite some early concerns about controlling a vehicle above the sensible atmo-
sphere, in practice it quickly became routine.187 
 The Westinghouse-manufactured stability augmentation system (SAS) damp-
ened the aerodynamic controls in all three axes. The system consisted of three rate 
gyros, two pitch-roll servocylinders, one yaw servocylinder, and various electron-
ics, displays, and controls. Essentially, the system included a channel for each 
axis that sensed the aircraft rate of change in pitch, roll, and yaw, and automati-
8 Major Robert M. White, Glenn H. Robinson, and Gene J. Matranga, “Résumé of X-5 Handling Qualities,” a paper 
in the 1961 Research Airplane Committee Report, p. 20; telephone conversation, Alvin S. White with Dennis R. 
Jenkins, 3 June 2002.
85 White et al., “Résumé of X-5 Handling Qualities,” p. 32.
86 Gene J. Matranga, “Analysis of X-5 Landing Approach and Flare Characteristics Determined from the First 30 
Flights,” NASA technical note D-057, July 96, pp. -5; Lawrence W. Taylor, Jr., and George B. Merrick, “X-5 
Augmentation System;” White et al., “Résumé of X-5 Handling Qualities,” pp. 8-9.
87 Interview with Neil A. Armstrong and James E. Love by Scholer Bangs, “X-5 pilot evaluates hydraulic system 
performance,” Hydraulics & Pneumatics, December 962, pp. 82-8.
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cally provided signals to the respective servocylinders to move the horizontal and 
vertical stabilizers to oppose the airplane angular inputs. An additional intercon-
nect damper, called “yar,” provided a crossfeed of the yaw-rate signal to the roll 
damper. This interconnection was necessary for stability at high angles of attack, 
primarily because of the high roll input of the lower rudder. The yar interconnect 
was disabled when the lower rudder was removed during later flights. The author-
ity of the SAS was equal to the pilot’s authority in pitch and yaw, and to twice the 
pilot’s authority in roll. The pilot could turn dampening on or off for each indi-
vidual axis, and select the damping gain for each axis. Originally, the SAS gyro 
package was located in the instrument compartment behind the pilot. However, 
a vibration at high gains reported by Scott Crossfield during the first X-15 cap-
tive flight resulted in North American moving the gyros to the center of gravity 
compartment under the wings, thus removing the gyro from a point influenced by 
fuselage bending.188 
 The SAS caused numerous pilot comments. During early flights below Mach 
3.5, the dampers used moderate gains and the pilots quickly expressed a desire 
for “a stiffer aircraft,” particularly in pitch and roll. North American subsequently 
increased the gain, resulting in generally favorable pilot opinions. It is interesting 
to note that at angles of attack above 8 degrees with low damper gain or with the 
roll damper off, pilots had great difficulty in controlling the lateral and directional 
motions to prevent divergence. This was primarily because of an adverse dihe-
dral effect that was present above Mach 2.3. Although this was of some concern 
to the pilots, and the subject of a great deal of investigation by the researchers, 
the airplane exhibited acceptable handling characteristics as long as the damp-
ers were functioning. In general, the airplane exhibited about the same handling 
qualities expected based on extensive simulations at Ames, and the pilots thought 
88 Robert A. Tremant, “Operational Experiences and Characteristics of the X-5 Flight Control System,” NASA 
technical note D-02, December 962, pp. 5 and 0; Euclid C. Holleman, “Summary of High-Altitude and Entry 
Flight Control Experience With the X-5 Airplane,” a proposed technical memorandum, 23 December 965, p. 3. 
Typescript available in the AFFTC Access to Space Office Project Files.
North American incorporated two side-stick controllers in the X-15 cockpit. The controller on the right console 
operated the aerodynamic flight control systems while the controller on the left operated the ballistic control system 
thrusters. The aerodynamic controller was mechanically linked to the conventional center stick. In X-15-3, the 
MH-96 adaptive flight control system automatically blended the ballistic thrusters in when needed, eliminating 
the need for the pilot to use the left side-controller. (NASA)
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the damper-off handling was slightly better than the simulator predicted, but still 
considered the natural stability to be marginal.189 
 The SAS was unique for the time because it provided 10 pilot-selectable gain 
rates for each axis. However, the system experienced some annoying problems 
during development and early operations. During the first studies using the fixed-
base simulator, the dampers sustained unwanted limit cycles (or continuous oscil-
lations) from linkage lags and rate limiting. Pilots later observed the phenomenon 
in flight. The frequency of the limit cycle was about 3.2 cycles per second, result-
ing in changes in bank angle of about 1 degree. This limit cycle was not constant, 
changed due to control input, and had a tendency to “beat.” North American was 
unable to identify a way to eliminate the limit cycles, but modified the electronic 
filter to reduce its lag. This greatly lowered the amplitude of the limit cycles, and 
the pilots found the results acceptable .190 
 Although the modified filter greatly improved the issue with the limit cycles 
in roll, a new problem soon arose. It became apparent during ground tests that it 
89 White et al., “Résumé of X-5 Handling Qualities,” pp. 8-9.
90 Taylor and Merrick, “X-5 Augmentation System,” pp. 73-7.
The X-15 made extensive use of  a stability augmentation system to dampen the aerodynamic controls in 
all three axes. The SAS was unique for the time since it provided ten pilot-selectable gain rates for each 
axis via rotary switches in the cockpit. Flight simulations showed that it would be nearly impossible for 
a pilot to control the X-15 in some flight regimes without the SAS. (NASA)
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was possible to excite and sustain a SAS-airplane vibration at 13 cycles per sec-
ond with the modified filter. A breadboard of the modified filter was flown (flight 
2-12-23) at higher damper gains, but Scott Crossfield failed to excite the vibration . 
During the rollout after landing, however, Crossfield encountered a severe vibra-
tion that required disabling the SAS. This experience led to the mistaken belief 
that the vibration could only occur on the ground. To prevent a recurrence, North 
American installed a switch that automatically lowered the gain whenever the 
pilot extended the landing gear. However, five flights later (2-14-28), Joe Walker 
encountered a 13-cps vibration during reentry from 169,600 feet. After the flight, 
Walker reported that the vibration was the most severe he had ever encountered 
(or ever wanted to). The shaking was triggered by pilot inputs at 130 psf dynamic 
pressure and continued until the damper gain was reduced and the dynamic pres-
sure climbed above 1,000 psf. Fortunately, the amplitude of the shaking was con-
strained by the rate limits of the control surface actuators. North American and 
NASA began investigating the problem again.191 
 The problem was that the lightly damped horizontal stabilizers were excited 
at their natural frequency (13 cps) by pilot inputs to the control system. The gyro 
9 Joseph A. Walker, “Pilot Report for Flight 2--28,” 3 April 96; Taylor and Merrick, “X-5 Augmentation Sys-
tem,” pp. 73-7.
Failures of  the stability augmentation system contributed to the maintenance woes suffered by the X-15 
early in the flight program, but oddly, most of  the failures were on the ground; the system seldom failed 
in flight. Nevertheless, an auxiliary stability augmentation system was added to the first two airplanes 
as insurance against an SAS failure. The X-15-3 did not carry an SAS or ASAS since the mH-96 
adaptive flight control system performed both functions. (NASA)
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picked up this vibration and the dampers were able to sustain the vibration with 
input to the control surfaces. Engineers also found a second natural frequency for 
the stabilizers at 30 cps. North American subsequently installed notch filters in 
the SAS and pressure feedback valves in the control surface actuators, eliminat-
ing the vibrations.192 
 The SAS proved to be unreliable in the beginning, but fortunately most fail-
ures occurred during ground testing. The program recorded only seven in-flight 
failures during the first 78 flights (defined as NB-52 takeoff to X-15 landing). Of 
these failures, one was an electronic module, three were malfunctioning cockpit 
gain switches, and three were broken wires in the X-15. Engineers ultimately 
traced all except the failed electronics module to human error.193
LANDING GEAR EVOLUTION
 The X-15 landing gear was somewhat unusual, both in its approach and in 
its simplicity. The system consisted of a dual nose wheel and a pair of aft skids. 
Initially the cast magnesium nose wheels were fitted with standard aircraft tires 
pressurized with 240-psi nitrogen. The skids consisted of a 4130-steel skid and an 
Inconel X strut that was attached to the fuselage by trunnion fittings and through 
bell crank arms that were attached to shock struts inside the aft fuselage. The 
skids were free in pitch and roll, but fixed in yaw for parallel alignment. Drag 
braces attached to the fuselage ahead of the trunnion fittings and to the skids at 
the strut attachment pin. Bungee springs kept the skid in a nose-up position just 
before landing. Instead of retracting inside the fuselage, the skids and struts folded 
forward against the outside of the fuselage when retracted. The pilot lowered the 
landing gear by pulling a handle in the cockpit that attached via cable to the up-
lock hooks and released the gear. North American designed the landing gear for 
an 11,000-pound airplane with a sink rate of 9 fps, touching down between 190 
and 230 mph at an angle of attack of approximately 6 degrees.194 
 Three major test series of the landing-gear system were conducted prior to 
the first glide flights: 1) a dynamic-model test of stability during the landing run, 
2) nose-wheel shimmy tests using the actual nose gear, and 3) full-scale skid tests 
at the lake-bed landing site.195 
 North American used the model tests to investigate the stability of the tri-
cycle arrangement. Engineers constructed a 1/10-scale model that accurately re-
flected the size, weight, and mass moments of inertia for yaw and roll, but did 
92 Taylor and Merrick, “X-5 Augmentation System,” pp. 7-75.
93 Ibid, pp. 72-73.
9 James M. McKay and Eldon E. Kordes, “Landing Loads and Dynamics of the X-5 Airplane,” a paper in the 
1961 Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 6-62; Schleicher, “Structural Design of the X-5,” pp.  and 
33. It should be noted that the main gear touched down at roughly 9 fps; by the time the large moment arm was 
factored in, the nose gear touched down at 8 fps, providing a somewhat jarring landing (about 3.9-g vertical) for 
the pilots.
95 L. L. Rhodes, “Landing-Gear Design and Development Testing for the X-5 Airplane,” a paper in the 1958 Re-
search Airplane Committee Report, pp. 3-36.
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not simulate the aerodynamic characteristics of the X-15. Scale-size metal skids 
were manufactured so that they could be installed in either the original mid- 
fuselage location proposed by North American, or the aft fuselage location even-
tually built. North American catapulted the model along a concrete runway using 
a 100-foot length of 0.625-inch-diameter shock cord. High-speed movie cameras 
on overhead towers recorded each run. The tests revealed some minor nose-wheel 
instability, which the company subsequently corrected.196 
 Researchers at Langley then tested the revised full-scale nose gear using the 
landing-loads track facility at speeds up to 125 mph. These tests evaluated the 
nose gear on smooth concrete, uneven concrete, wet pavement, sandy pavement, 
uneven tire pressure, one flat tire, and unbalanced wheels. Given that the X-15 
was to land only on dry lake beds, some of the tests seemed extreme. Through-
out the tests the co-rotating wheel arrangement proved extremely stable, with no 
tendency to shimmy. Researchers, therefore, concluded the shimmy damper and 
torque links were unnecessary and North American subsequently removed them, 
saving 25 pounds.197 
 North American conducted the landing-gear-skid tests on Rogers Dry Lake 
during April 1958. For these tests, researchers mounted the complete main gear 
on a two-wheel trailer vehicle and towed it behind a truck at speeds up to 70 mph. 
After the truck reached full speed, an electric switch actuated a bomb-release 
solenoid that dropped a 6,000-pound load on the skid landing gear. Instruments 
on the gear recorded vertical and drag loads, and shock-strut position. High-speed 
cameras mounted in the truck and trailer recorded the motion of the gear and 
skids. Test runs included straight-line landing on smooth lake surfaces, “fishtail” 
runs on rutted and bumpy areas near the edges of the lake, and one landing on the 
concrete runway just to make sure. The results of all the tests were satisfactory. 
Skid wear on the lake beds was light, and engineers determined that the skids 
would last for three or four landings. The tests revealed that the X-15 should leave 
depressions approximately 0.03 inch deep in the lake bed. As expected, wear on 
the concrete runway was severe, but the tests showed the X-15 could land on 
concrete if necessary.198 
 Despite all the tests, the first four actual landings pointed out several deficien-
cies in the landing gear, mainly because the aircraft was heavier than anticipated 
and sink rates were slightly higher. North American replaced the shock struts with 
higher-capacity units, and strengthened some of the structure inside the fuselage. 
The fourth landing resulted in X-15-1 breaking in half. This was not strictly a de-
sign error; Scott Crossfield had been unable to fully jettison the propellants prior 
to an emergency landing, and the airplane was significantly overweight. However, 
the landing gear contributed because the gas and oil mixture in the shock strut 
foamed, keeping the rear skids from absorbing as much of the impact as they 
should have. This forced a higher than normal load on the nose gear, aggravating 
the structural problem caused by being overweight.199 
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 McKay and Kordes, “Landing Loads and Dynamics of the X-5 Airplane,” pp. 6-62
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 In addition, during some of the early landings, engineers found that the nose 
wheel tire marks left on the dry lake bed were not continuous. After initial contact, 
the tire marks became very faint or disappeared for short distance and then reap-
peared. This puzzled the engineers since all of the early drop tests of the landing 
gear had been satisfactory.200  
 The engineers became concerned that the nose-gear extension mechanism 
was not working properly. Normally, technicians manually retracted the nose gear 
after attaching the X-15 to the NB-52, and then they pumped dry nitrogen gas 
into the shock strut to preload it to 1,404 psi. Charlie Feltz had suggested this 
method as a way to minimize the size and weight of the nose gear compartment. 
What the engineers discovered was that upon lowering the landing gear, an orifice 
200 Schleicher, “Structural Design of the X-5,” pp. 35-36. 
The X-15 was unique, even among X-Planes, in using a landing gear consisting of  rear skids and a 
nose wheel. The skids solved several problems for designers since they were relatively small and could be 
stowed mostly outside the airframe. Interestingly, the X-15 landing gear was lowered by the pilot pulling 
a mechanical handle that was connected to a cable that released the uplock hooks and allowed a bungee 
to extend the skids. A similar system would have been used on the X-20 Dyna-Soar if  that program 
had not been cancelled. (NASA)
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in the strut trapped the nitrogen gas below it and most of the shock-absorption 
oil above it. The design of the metering valve was such that it prevented a rapid 
change in position of the oil and nitrogen in the 10 seconds between gear extension 
and wheel touchdown. To better understand the problem, engineers conducted ad-
ditional dynamic tests using the original test apparatus. Initial tests operated the 
apparatus with the nose gear serviced in the extended position, as had been done in 
the original tests. The performance appeared normal. The engineers then modified 
the test rig to allow the gear to be serviced in the retracted position, as was done on 
the airplane. A delay of 10 seconds was introduced between the gear being lowered 
and touching down, and the abnormal behavior was reproduced almost exactly.201 
 At first, engineers modified the orifice in the shock, but this failed to resolve 
the problem. After additional tests, the engineers determined that they could not 
pressurize the strut in its retracted (compressed) position. Unfortunately, the nose 
wheel compartment was not large enough to allow the nose gear to be retracted in 
its extended position. The final solution was to mount redundant nitrogen bottles 
on the gear strut itself. When the gear reached its fully extended position, a valve 
actuated and released the nitrogen to pressurize the strut. This worked and the 
first modified nose gears were available in July 1960. However, the engineers 
kept evaluating the problem and, later in the program, changed the design again. 
This time they installed a floating piston inside the strut that kept the oil and gas 
separated. Technicians could now pressurize the strut in the compressed position 
before flight, allowing the removal of the nitrogen bottles.202 
    During 1961, engineers instrumented the skids to gather additional data on skid 
landing gear in support of the Dyna-Soar program and possible future vehicles, 
such as the space shuttle. Standard NASA instrumentation was used to provide 
airplane upper-mass response, shock-strut force and displacement, main- and nose-
gear drag forces, nose-gear vertical force, horizontal- and vertical-stabilizer set-
ting, horizontal stabilizer load, airplane angle of attack, and airplane pitch velocity 
during the impact and slideout portion of a landing. Tests were conducted at the 
end of normal research flights while the pilots landed normally and performed spe-
cific control movements during slideout. Phototheodolite cameras on the ground 
furnished data for landing coordinates, airplane altitude, flight-path velocity, and 
vertical velocity at touchdown. The instrumentation remained on all three airplanes 
for the remainder of the flight program to monitor the severity of each landing.203 
 Landing-gear loads continued to be high, despite the minor modifications 
made early in the flight program. An analytical study of the landing dynamics 
showed that several important parameters affecting the landing loads were ac-
tually aerodynamic factors. One of the primary culprits was a down-load from 
the horizontal stabilizer caused by both the pilot and SAS. Immediately prior to 
touchdown, the stabilizer trim position was set to between 4 and 5 degrees with the 
leading edge down. If the pilot pulled back on the stick and put the leading edge 
further down, the landing loads increased. If the pilot pushed the stick forward 
20 Ibid, pp. 36-37. 
202 Ibid; X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters,  July 960, p. 7. In the files at the 
DFRC History Office.
203 James E. Love (manager), “X-5 Program,” NASA FRC, October 96. pp. 29-30. In the AFFTC Access to Space 
Office Project Files.
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to get the leading edge up, the loads 
decreased . Another factor affect-
ing the gear loads was lift from 
the wing. Unfortunately, the severe 
nose-down angle of the X-15 after 
nose-gear touchdown effectively 
pushed the airplane into the ground, 
further increasing the stress on the 
landing gear. Unfortunately, this 
was an unchangeable consequence 
of the airplane configuration, and 
a similar problem occurred on the 
space shuttle orbiters .204 
    The most severe problem, how-
ever, was weight. The design 
landing weight had been 11,000 
pounds. The initial landing weight 
of the airplane was 13,230 pounds, 
and by 1965 this had crept up to 
15,500 pounds on a routine basis . 
Emergency landings with a partial 
propellant load could be as high as 
17,000 pounds. The only way to 
execute safely a landing at 17,000 
pounds was for the pilot to perform 
an active push maneuver to obtain 
low horizontal stabilizer settings. 
This would still exceed the design 
load on the airplane, but would most probably be below the yield (destructive) 
limit.205 
      By 1965 the problem was no longer one of understanding the nature of the 
loads, but rather one of how best to reduce them. North American introduced a 
near-constant series of minor modifications to the skids, their struts, and the sur-
rounding structure in an effort to provide additional margin for the landing gear. 
Of all the factors that affected gear loads, the most difficult to control—without re-
stricting the research role of the airplane—was weight. Engineers determined they 
could reduce landing gear loads if they prevented the stabilizer angle from moving 
in the leading-edge-down direction during landings. Training the pilots to perform 
a push maneuver during landing accomplished this. In addition, North American 
installed a switch in the cockpit that disengaged the SAS at main gear touchdown 
to prevent the dampers from forcing the stabilizer leading edge down. Experience 
showed that under normal circumstances the pilots were efficient at pushing the 
stick at the right moment, even though the maneuver had to occur within 0.4 sec-
20 James M. McKay and Richard B. Noll, “A Summary of the X-5 Landing Loads,” a paper in the Progress of the 
X-15 Research Airplane Program, A Compilation of the Papers presented at the Flight Research Center, 7 Octo-
ber 965, NASA publication SP-90, (Washington, DC: NASA, 965), pp. 36-38.
205 Ibid, pp. 37-38. 
The nose gear was more conventional, consisting of  a 
pair of  wheels and tires. Note how short the nose gear 
strut is, resulting in severe loads during landing. The 
length of  the nose strut was largely dictated by the 
amount of  room available to stow it when retracted. 
Space shuttle orbiters suffer from a similarly short 
nose gear strut. (NASA)
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ond after main gear touchdown to be effective in reducing gear loads. However, 
this maneuver was unnatural for the pilots, who tended to revert to habits formed 
through long hours of previous experience during emergencies and pull back on 
the stick. For this reason, the FRC began developing an automatic stick-kicker .206 
 In fact, this very condition occurred during the Jack McKay’s accident in 
X-15-2. The airplane was 1,000 pounds heavy with residual propellants, and as he 
landed, McKay pulled back on the stick, driving the stabilizer leading edge down 
to its maximum value. As it happened, the flaps failed on this flight and resulted 
in a down-load on the main wing, and therefore on the main landing gear. The 
combined resulted was a severely overstressed gear that, of course, failed.207 
 Following the accident with X-15-2, engineers considered designing a new 
landing gear for the modified X-15A-2. The original location of the nose gear was 
approximately 23 feet ahead of the center of gravity, and moving the landing gear 
back could significantly reduce main-gear loads, with the forward bulkhead of the 
liquid-oxygen tank representing the rear-most location in the existing airframe. 
One of the ideas engineers investigated was moving the nose landing gear rear-
ward to the instrumentation compartment behind the pilot. The nose gear would 
occupy the lower half of the compartment, with most of the instrumentation that 
normally resided there being moved forward to the old nose-gear compartment 
ahead of the pilot .208 
 However, fiscal and schedule constraints involved with repairing the aircraft 
precluded such major modifications, and the existing gear locations were reused 
on the modified airplane. Nevertheless, engineers made some basic changes, such 
as increasing the shock strut stroke from 3.66 inches to 5.03 inches, and modify-
ing the relief valve setting from 17,000 pounds to 22,000 pounds. North American 
manufactured two sets of strengthened struts—one set that was the same length 
as the original units, and another set that was lengthened from 53.6 inches to 59.0 
inches. The longer units provided sufficient ground clearance to land with the 
functional ramjet sill attached to the ventral, but it appears that all flights of the 
X-15A-2 used the shorter units. Engineers also lengthened the skid 6.75 inches. 
In addition, engineers made some changes to the nose gear, primarily increas-
ing the shock strut stroke to accommodate the increased length of the airplane. 
North American lowered the trunnion 9 inches to allow an attitude at nose-gear 
touchdown similar to that of the basic X-15. Despite these changes, the landing 
dynamics of the new gear were not appreciably changed, and X-15A-2 inherited 
most of the deficiencies of the basic system.209 
 In addition, during the first part of 1965, North American investigated in-
creasing the capability of the X-15A-2 gear. NASA wanted the maximum landing 
weight with the “short” main landing gear to increase to 16,374 pounds normal 
and 18,519 pounds emergency. The “long” gear used with the ramjet would in-
crease to 17,855 pounds normal and 20,000 pounds emergency. A preliminary 
206 Richard B. Noll, Calvin R. Jarvis, Chris Pembo, Wilton P. Lock, and Betty J. Scott, NASA technical note D-2090, 
“Aerodynamic and Control-System Contributions to the X-5 Airplane Landing-Gear Loads,” October 963; 
McKay and Noll, “A Summary of the X-5 Landing Loads,” pp. 37-38. 
207 McKay and Noll, “A Summary of the X-5 Landing Loads,” p. 38. 
208 Ibid, pp. 39-0. 
209 Ibid, pp. 39-0; Adkins and Armstrong, “Development and Status of the X-5A-2 Airplane,” p. . 
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analysis indicated that incorporating the stick-kicker and changing the shock-strut 
relief valve setting would allow these increases. However, at 20,000 pounds there 
were concerns about whether the fuselage structure just behind the cockpit would 
be strong enough.210 
 Researchers installed a prototype stick-kicker in the FRC fixed-base simula-
tor in May 1965 to determine the optimum stick forces. Subsequently, engineers 
installed the first stick-kicker in X-15-3 during the weather down period at the be-
ginning of 1966, and in X-15-1 by the end of that year. Apparently, NASA never 
installed the stick-kicker in X-15A-2. An emergency landing at 17,700 pounds, 
the highest landing weight yet encountered by the program, illustrated the effec-
tiveness of the stick-kicker .211  
 North American also conducted an investigation during early 1965 to de-
termine the modifications needed to increase the landing weight of X-15-1 and 
X-15-3 to 16,000 pounds normal and 17,000 pounds emergency. The analysis 
included the use of the stick-kicker to rotate the horizontal stabilizer at landing to 
reduce main skid loads, although this would not eliminate the need to modify the 
skids for the higher weights. Preliminary studies showed that relocating the nose 
gear trunnion (as done on X-15A-2) would appreciably reduce landing loads on 
the other two airplanes, even without the addition of a stick-kicker .212  
 At the same time, engineers studied the feasibility of incorporating a third 
main skid attached to the fixed portion of the ventral stabilizer. This third skid 
could redistribute the landing loads and relieve the critically stressed gear compo-
nents, particularly if either the stick-kicker of the landing flaps failed to operate. 
NASA installed the skid on X-15-3 in time for flight 3-52-78 on 18 June 1966, 
and by the end of 1966 it had used the third skid for four landings. These land-
ings, however, were not at a sufficient weight to require the skid, and during the 
slideout the third skid contacted the lake surface with little or no load applied to it . 
Nevertheless, the third skid seemed like a good idea and NASA modified X-15-1 
in time for flight 1-71-121 on 22 March 1967. NASA did not install the third skid 
on X-15A-2 since it would have interfered with the ramjet installation.213 
 The X-15A-2 experienced some of the more bizarre problems with landing 
gear. On the second flight (2-33-56) of the modified aircraft, after obtaining a max-
imum Mach number of 5.23, the nose gear unexpectedly extended as the airplane 
decelerated below Mach 4 .2 . William P. Albrecht, the X-15 project engineer for the 
flight, wrote that “[u]pon arrival in the Edwards area, chase aircraft confirmed that 
the nose gear was extended fully, and that the tires appeared badly burned, although 
still inflated. Major Rushworth elected to land the X-l5, and skillfully did so. The 
tires remained intact on touchdown but disintegrated after approximately 300 feet 
of rollout, the remainder of the 5,630 foot rollout being taken by the magnesium 
rims of the nose wheels.” Considering the circumstance, it was a good landing.214 
20 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,”  April 965, pp. 0-.
2 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 2 June 965 and  March 966; letter, 
William J. Knight to Dennis R. Jenkins,  August 2002.
22 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,”  April 965, p. 0.
23 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 6,”  November 966, p. ; McKay and Noll, “A Summary of the X-5 
Landing Loads,” pp. 39-0. 
2 William P. Albrecht/X-5 Project Engineer, “X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight 2-33-56,” 9 August 96.
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 The subsequent investigation revealed that the nose-gear uplock hook was 
severely bent, the point of the hook having opened by approximately 0.25 inches. 
However, engineers determined the hook had not bent far enough to release the 
gear without the occurrence of some other deflection. The pilot lowered the X-15 
landing gear via a simple cable arrangement that connected the landing gear ex-
tension handle in the cockpit to the uplock hook. Engineers measured the slack 
in the landing gear actuating cable (used to compensate for fuselage expansion 
due to heating effects) at 1.18 inches after the flight, within the specified limits. 
However, an analysis by North American indicated that the thermal growth of the 
fuselage was approximately 1.90 inches for this flight. This pointed out that the 
slack allowance was inadequate. Since the same mechanism operated all three 
landing gear components, it could not be ascertained in advance which of the 
three landing gears (left main, right main, or nose) would be first affected by par-
tial actuation of the extension system, since that one with the least cable loading 
(due to friction, air loads, etc.) would tend to operate first. NASA duplicated the 
failure in the High-Temperature Loads Calibration Laboratory by simulating the 
fuselage expansion and applying heat to the nose-gear door. As Albrecht observed 
afterward, “Needless to say some modification to the landing gear mechanism 
seems to be in order.”215 
 North American modified the cable to provide 2.25 inches of slack to com-
pensate for thermal expansion. Although the engineers did not believe the prob-
lem affected the other two airplanes, they also received the modification. The only 
major drawback to this modification was that the pilot now had to pull the gear 
handle through almost 14 inches of travel to release the landing gear, which led 
to several complaints. Subsequently, engineers at the FRC designed a differential 
pulley that shortened the pull to 11 inches.216 
 These modifications, however, did not totally fix X-15A-2. During the next 
flight (2-34-57) on 29 September 1964, Bob Rushworth experienced a similar, 
but less intense, noise and aircraft trim change at Mach 4.5: the small nose-gear 
scoop door opened. This had already happened several times during the flight 
program on all three airplanes, fortunately without disastrous results. There were 
two initial thoughts on how to fix the problem. The first was to eliminate scoop 
door altogether; except for inspection and servicing, the door would be bolted 
shut prior to flight. Alternately, engineers could design a new uplock for the scoop 
door that featured a positive retention of the door roller on the uplock hook . In the 
end, NASA selected the second route and installed a new uplock hook, scoop door 
hook, and associated bell cranks .217 
 NASA conducted two captive-carry flights of X-15A-2 to verify proper de-
ployment of the redesigned nose scoop door and nose landing gear after cold 
soak. During flight 2-C-58 the nose gear required approximately 5.4 seconds to 
25 Johnny G. Armstrong, AFFTC technology document FTC-TD-69-, “Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 
Envelope Expansion Program,” July 969, p. 0; William P. Albrecht/X-5 Project Engineer, “X-5 Operations 
Flight Report for Flight 2-33-56,” 9 August 96. 
26 William P. Albrecht/X-5 Project Engineer, “X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight 2-35-60,” 2 December 96. 
27 Vincent N. Capasso/X-5 Project Engineer, “X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight 3-36-59,”  November 96; 
Major Robert A. Rushworth, “Pilot Report for Flight 2-3-57,” 29 September 96; William P. Albrecht/X-5 Proj-
ect Engineer, “X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight 2-3-57,”  October 96; William P. Albrecht/X-5 Project 
Engineer, “X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight 2-35-60,” 2 December 96. 
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lock down—an unacceptably long time. Subsequent inspection showed that an 
incorrect orifice had been installed in the nose-gear snubber (which controlled the 
deployment rate). NASA installed the correct orifice, and the deployment time on 
flight 2-C-59 was an acceptable 2.7 seconds. Researchers collected data on both 
these captive flights data regarding the scoop door hook position and scoop door 
roller loads. Hook movement was negligible (less than 1/16 inch) and NASA sub-
sequently modified the other two airplanes as well. Jack McKay took X-15A-2 on 
a perfect flight (2-35-60) on 30 November 1964.
 However, it did not end there . Rushworth was in the cockpit again for the 
next fight (2-36-63) of X-15A-2 on 17 February 1965 when the right main skid 
Like the rear skids, the nose wheel was lowered by the pilot pulling a handle that was connected to a 
cable that released the uplocks. On two separate flights, the nose gear extended while Major Robert A. 
Rushworth was flying the X-15A-2 above Mach 4, resulting in some interesting flying characteristics 
and two sets of  burned tires. Researchers finally deduced that the fuselage of  the airplane was expand-
ing due to heat, and that the landing gear release cable did not have enough slack to compensate. North 
American increased the slack in the cable, but the pilots now had to pull the release handle more than 
14 inches to get the landing gear to deploy. (NASA)
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extended at Mach 4.3 and 85,000 feet. The chase pilot was able to verify that 
the gear appeared structurally sound, and Rushworth managed to make a normal 
landing. Investigation of the right-hand main skid uplock revealed that thermally 
induced bowing of the main strut 
caused excessive loading of the 
main uplock hook. Ground heating 
tests of the main-gear struts during 
a “hot-flight” profile caused bend-
ing of the hook and release of the 
gear. Consequently, NASA modi-
fied the main-gear uplock to include 
a stronger hook, a Belleville washer 
mounting system to accommodate 
approximately 0.14 inch bowing 
of the strut, and a stronger support 
structure . In addition, it was nec-
essary to reinforce the sheet-metal 
fuselage longeron structure around 
the main-gear drag-brace anchor fit-
tings. While the repair itself was not 
complicated, access was extremely 
difficult since it required much of 
the hydraulic plumbing in the lower 
engine bay to be removed.218 
 This ended the significant prob-
lem with the landing gear on the 
X-15A-2 (and the other airplanes), 
although the ever-increasing land-
ing weight continued to be a concern and a set of small modifications (such as 
stronger struts) continued to be implemented until the end of the flight program.
THE SECOND INDUSTRY CONFERENCE (1958)
 As North American was completing assembly of the first X-15, the Research 
Airplane Committee held the second X-15 industry conference at the IAS Build-
ing in Los Angeles on 28-29 July 1958. Forty-three authors (15 from North Amer-
ican, 14 from Langley, 6 from the High Speed Flight Station, 3 from the WADC, 
2 from Ames, and 1 each from the AFFTC, Reaction Motors, and the Naval Avia-
tion Medical Acceleration Laboratory at NADC Johnsville) presented 28 papers. 
28 Major Robert A. Rushworth, “Pilot Report for Flight 2-36-63,” 7 February 965; AFFTC technology document 
FTC-TD-69-, p. 0; Milton O. Thompson, At the Edge of Space: The X-15 Flight Program, (Washington and 
London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 992), p. 237; Adkins and Armstrong, “Development and Status of the X-
5A-2 Airplane,” p. 07; “The Pilot’s Panel,” a paper in the Proceedings of the X-15 30th Anniversary Celebration, 
Dryden Flight Research Facility, Edwards, CA, 8 June 989, NASA CP-305, p. 9; William P. Albrecht/X-5 
Project Engineer, “X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight 2-37-6,”  May 965. 
To test the hypothesis that the fuselage expanded more 
than the release cable, researchers at the Flight Research 
Center heated one of  the X-15 forward fuselages using 
heat lamps. The test confirmed the theory. (NASA)
0 Chapter 3: Conflict and Innovation
There were 443 registered participants representing all of the military services 
and most of the major (and many minor) aerospace contractors. Interestingly, 
there was no university participation this time. Notable attendees included Dr. 
David Myron Clark from the David Clark Company, Dr. Charles Stark Draper, 
and all of the original X-15 pilots. It is interesting to note how at least one of 
the participants registered; for instance, Harrison Storms listed his affiliation as 
“NACA Committee on Aircraft, Missile, and Spacecraft Aerodynamics” instead 
of “North American Aviation.”219 
 The 1958 conference began, appropriately, where the 1956 conference had 
ended . Lawrence P. Greene from North American, who had presented the closing 
paper at the first conference, gave the technical introduction. One of his first state-
ments summed up the progress: “It can be positively said that through the efforts 
of all concerned, the development of the X-15 research system has been success-
fully completed.”220  
 The airplane North American was building was the “Configuration 3” that had 
been inspected by the Air Force in mockup form. Configuration 1 was the initial 
North American proposal, while Configuration 2 was the one presented during the 
1956 industry conference. Greene highlighted the important changes:221
 
The side fairings were shortened ahead of the wing to im-
prove longitudinal stability.
The horizontal stabilizer was moved 5.4 inches rearward, 
although the original fuselage location of the hinge line 
was retained. This modification moved the hinge line from 
the 37% to the 25% mean aerodynamic chord of the ex-
posed horizontal stabilizer. Although flutter requirements 
dictated the change, this, combined with a 3.6-inch forward 
wing movement and the side-fairing changes, provided ad-
equate longitudinal stability near zero lift at the maximum 
Mach number. 
The vertical stabilizer area was increased to provide ad-
equate directional stability with the speed brakes retracted 
and a 10-degree full wedge section was found to be op-
timum. The planform was then made nearly symmetrical 
(dorsal and ventral) for dynamic-stability considerations in 
the exit phase of the mission, since thrust asymmetry con-
siderations in the zero to moderate angle-of-attack range 
necessitated a reduction in roll due to yaw.
Asymmetrical thrust effects also indicated the need for a 
29 1958 Research Airplane Committee Report, from the Table of Contents and List of Conferees.
220 Lawrence P. Greene, “X-5 Research Airplane Development Status,” a paper in the 1958 Research Airplane 
Committee Report, pp. -2. The final load limits were set at +.0/-2.0 g at full gross weight and +7.33/-3.0 g at 
30% propellants remaining. However, the increase came with restrictions. To avoid a serious increase in weight, 
pull-outs at 7.33 g at maximum dynamic pressure could only be made once per reentry. During this maneuver 
the aircraft slowed down appreciably but heated up rapidly. If another pull-up was required, it had to be accom-
plished at a lower acceleration (g) or lower dynamic pressure (q) to avoid overheating the airframe. See Richard 
L. Schleicher, “Structural Design of the X-5,” a paper presented to the Royal Aeronautical Society on 8 April 
963, and printed in the Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society, volume 67, October 963, pp. 68-636. 
22 Greene, “X-5 Research Airplane Development Status,” pp. 2-3.
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low value of roll-due-to-yaw control in the low angle-of-
attack region. For this purpose, an all-movable directional 
control was incorporated on the outer span of both the up-
per and lower vertical stabilizers. Incorporating the con-
trol in the lower vertical stabilizer was equally necessary 
for providing directional control at high angles of attack at 
high speed because of the ineffectiveness of the upper sur-
face at these conditions. This, in turn, dictated some added 
complexity in the damper system. 
In order to avoid compound flutter problems, the speed 
brakes were reduced in size and relocated on the inboard or 
fixed parts of the vertical stabilizers.
 Although initially it had been decided not to increase the load factor of the 
airplane from 5 g to 7.33 g, sometime in the intervening two years the change 
had been made, much to the relief of the pilots and researchers at the HSFS. In 
mid-1957 the NACA had asked the Air Force to double the amount of research 
instrumentation carried by the X-15. This became a major design driver. In order 
to keep the airplane weight (and hence performance) from being too seriously 
degraded, numerous details were redesigned to save weight. The two areas that 
received the most rework were the propellant system plumbing and the nose 
gear. This is when Charlie Feltz came up with the idea of keeping the nose-gear 
strut compressed when it was stored, allowing a much more compact and light-
weight installation.222 
 Changes in configuration also brought changes in weight. To support the addi-
tional loads, North American strengthened the structure of the wing, fuselage, and 
empennage. This resulted in a revised specification that showed an airplane that 
was 765 pounds heavier than originally expected (184 pounds in empty weight and 
581 pounds in useful load; this included the pilot, propellants, and gasses, but not 
research instrumentation). However, by the time North American began building 
the airplanes, even this had changed. The empty weight had increased by only 61 
pounds (instead of 184), but the useful load had decreased by 196 pounds. The 
research instrumentation, on the other hand, had increased by 522 pounds. The 
empty weight increases were the result of the following changes:223
 
The wing was changed from 7 to 15 intermediate spars, 
the skin gage was reduced, and the heat-sink material was 
changed from titanium carbide with a nickel binder to In-
conel X, resulting in a net decrease of 131 pounds.
A 17-pound net increase in the empennage resulted from 
a 58-pound increase to meet thermal requirements and a 
reduction of 41 pounds for changing the leading-edge  
 
222 Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, pp. 263-26; telephone conversation, Charles H. Feltz with Dennis R. Jenkins, 
2 May 2002.
223 Gerald H. Johnson, “X-5 Structural Loads,” a paper in the 1958 Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 97-205.
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heat-sink material from titanium carbide with a nickel 
binder to Inconel X .
Chem-milling pockets in the skin and reducing the skin 
gage by adding Z-stiffeners and substituting aluminum for 
Inconel X in a portion of the intermediate fuel- and oxidiz-
er-tank bulkheads saved 102 pounds in the body ground, 
but a 15-pound increase was caused by the additional 
structure to accommodate the engine weight increase. The 
net fuselage change was a decrease of 87 pounds.
The landing gear group was reduced by 73 pounds by elim-
inating the shimmy damper on the nose wheel and reduc-
ing the gage of the main-landing gear skids.
A reduction of 12 pounds in surface controls was realized 
by changing from four direct-acting speed-brake actuators 
to two actuators with a linkage arrangement.
The engine dry weight increased 296 pounds.
The addition of an engine purge system increased the pro-
pulsion group by 67 pounds. However, this was partially 
offset by a reduction in the internal liquid oxygen system 
plumbing of 29 pounds, giving a net propulsion system in-
crease of 38 pounds .
The 4-pound increase in the auxiliary powerplant group 
was due to an increase in the weight of the APUs.
Changes in the fixed equipment resulted in a net increase 
of 9 pounds, consisting of a 76-pound increase in the ejec-
tion seat, an 11-pound increase in instruments, a 34-pound 
decrease in the nitrogen system, and a 44-pound decrease 
in the air-conditioning system.
3 .
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5 .
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This is the configuration of  the X-15 presented at the 1958 Industry Conference, and largely represents 
the airplane as built. The major components are annotated. The large area immediately behind the 
cockpit was the primary location for the research instrumentation recorders and other equipment that 
required a controlled environment. (NASA)
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 Changes made in the useful load included the following:
The turbopump monopropellant was reduced by 196 
pounds .
Trapped propellants in the engine increased 70 pounds.
The helium required to pressurize the propellant tanks in-
creased 13 pounds .
The nitrogen required to pressurize the cockpit was re-
duced by 82 pounds.
 All of this resulted in an airplane that had an empty weight of 10,635 pounds, 
versus an original specification weight of 10,390 pounds and a revised specifi-
cation of 10,574 pounds. The total gross weight was 31,662 pounds, versus the 
original target of 30,510 pounds and a revised specification of 31,275 pounds. For 
high-speed missions, NASA could remove 370 pounds of altitude-related instru-
mentation, resulting in a gross weight of 31,292 pounds—only 17 pounds over the 
revised specification.224 
 Perhaps the most notable (though hardly unexpected) item to come out of the 
second industry conference was that the XLR99 was significantly behind sched-
ule, and initial flight-testing of the airplane would be undertaken using two interim 
XLR11-RM-5 engines.225 
22 Johnson, “X-5 Structural Loads,” pp. 97-205.
225 De E. Beeler and Thomas A Toll, “Status of X-5 Research Program,” a paper in the 1961 Research Airplane 
Committee Report.
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The Million-Horsepower  
Engine
Although the hypersonic research airplane concept developed at Lang-
ley had met with almost unanimous endorsement by the Air Force, the lack of a 
suitable powerplant was a major shortcoming in the eyes of the WADC Power 
Plant Laboratory. The Langley study had determined that an engine (or engines) 
that could produce roughly 50,000 lbf was needed for the research airplane. The 
flight profiles developed by John Becker and his researchers showed that the abil-
ity to vary the thrust during flight would provide much better data and allow pilots 
to repeat maneuvers with some precision. The laboratory thought the Hermes A1 
engine used in the Becker study was not capable of evolving into a man-rated en-
gine, and suggested several engines it believed were “more suitable” for a manned 
aircraft. Despite these suggestions, however, the laboratory believed further study 
was required before any engine could be selected.1  
 By October 1954, researchers from the Air Force, Navy, and the NACA had 
selected four existing or proposed power plants for possible use in the X-15. 
These included the Aerojet XLR73, Bell XLR81, North American NA-5400, and 
Reaction Motors XLR10 . Despite the tentative selections, the Power Plant Labo-
ratory thought that any engine would require major modifications to meet the 
 Memorandum, E. C. Phillips to Director of Laboratories, 5 August 95; memorandum, J. W. Rogers to Chief, 
Non-Rotating Engine Branch, no subject,  August 95; memorandum, T. J. Keating to Chief, New Develop-
ment Office, no subject, 5 November 95; Letter, Colonel Carl F. Damberg, Chief, Aircraft Division, AMC, to Bell 
et al., Subject: Project 226 Competition, 2 February 955. 
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needs of the X-15. The laboratory also believed the Air Force needed to “accept 
responsibility for development of the selected engine and…provide this engine to 
the airplane contractor as government furnished equipment.” The primary con-
sideration, for both the laboratory and the NACA, was that the engine be able to 
operate safely under any condition (acceleration in any axis) the X-15 was likely 
to experience. Maintenance and reliability (as defined by time between overhauls) 
did not need to be up to production standards .2  
 The 30 December 1954 invitation-to-bid letter from the Air Materiel Com-
mand included summaries of the four engines recommended by the Power Plant 
Laboratory. However, although the stated preference to use one of these engines 
did not forbid bidders from using other engines, it did require the bidder and 
engine manufacturer to justify the selection. The bidder needed to present the 
justification to the X-15 Project Office for approval. 
 The powerplant that was ultimately selected for the X-15 was not one of the 
four recommended ones, but became known during discussions with Reaction 
Motors concerning the XLR10 from the Viking missile. During a meeting with 
the Air Force, the company promoted “a larger version of the Viking engine” that 
was under development for the Navy as the XLR30 . After these discussions, the 
Power Plant Laboratory estimated that Reaction Motors could develop the XLR30 
into a suitable engine for less than $5,000,000 in approximately two years. It was 
not even close .3  
 On 25 January 1955, the Air Force requested additional information from 
Reaction Motors. The company replied on 3 February 1955 with details on the 
XLR10 and XLR30, and recommended four possible combinations for the X-15 
program. These included an oxygen-ethanol XLR10, an oxygen-ammonia XLR30, 
an oxygen-hydrocarbon XLR30, and an oxygen-ethanol engine using two XLR10 
chambers fed by a single XLR30 turbopump. Each of the engines used hydrogen 
peroxide to drive the turbopump. After it was briefed on the Becker study, Reac-
tion Motors doubted that a single XLR10 was “adequate to perform the objectives 
of this type of aircraft.”4  
 Although it suggested a combination of XLR10 thrust chambers and an 
XLR30 turbopump, Reaction Motors believed this engine would be overly com-
plicated and predicted it would weigh 815 pounds (compared to 420 pounds for 
either of the XLR30 configurations). The company suggested that relatively minor 
modifications to the XLR30 would allow throttling between 17,000 and 57,000 
lbf with a specific impulse of 278 seconds. The XLR30 installation required a 
2 Memorandum, T. J. Keating to Chief, New Development Office, no subject, 5 November 95. The XLR99 was 
popularly considered to be a million-horsepower engine. According to Webster’s, the horsepower of a rocket 
engine is determined by multiplying the thrust (in pounds) times the speed (in mph), divided by 375. Therefore, 
the XLR99 would be 57,000 lbf * ,520 mph / 375 = 687,00 hp (not quite a million, but still impressive for a 
900-pound engine).
3 Letter, Colonel Carl F. Damberg to Bell Aircraft, 30 December 95. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research 
Agency; memorandum, T. J. Keating to Chief, New Development Office, no subject, 5 November 95. In the 
files at the AFMC History Office. In fairness to the laboratory, it must be admitted that such estimates were ac-
companied by a statement that “less confidence in these estimates exists because the XLR30 engine is at present 
in a much earlier stage of development.” This qualification was justified by later events.
 Letter, Warren P. Turner to Commander, AMC, no subject, 3 February 955. In the files at the ASC History Office.
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The Reaction Motors XLR30-RM-2 liquid-propellant rocket engine was the leading candidate for 
the X-15 powerplant. The XLR30 had been developed from the XLR10 that powered the Viking 
sounding rocket developed for the Naval Research Laboratory. Twelve Vikings were launched between 
1949 and 1955. (Reaction Motors Inc.)
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space 70 inches long and 30 inches in diameter, considerably less than that 
required for the larger XLR10-XLR30 combination.5  
 Independently, Reaction Motors determined that the two most important safety 
requirements were the propellant combination and the means of achieving com-
bustion during ignition and shutdown. The company reviewed seven propellant 
combinations in depth, and eventually narrowed the choices to liquid oxygen and 
anhydrous ammonia. Reaction Motors based this choice largely on its significant 
experience with this combination, which had shown that ammonia had fewer critical 
starting characteristics than most hydrocarbon fuels. Additionally, the propellants 
were ideal for the regenerative cooling of the proposed engine’s thrust chamber.
 The Air Force, however, was still more interested in the XLR10, and on 4 
February 1955 it asked Reaction Motors for additional information on that engine. 
On the same day, however, Reaction Motors and the X-15 Project Office held a 
meeting during which the company detailed a significant development program to 
man-rate the XLR-10 for the X-15. Given the development effort required for ei-
ther engine, the company believed the XLR30 would ultimately be a better engine. 
After a meeting between the Air Materiel Command and the X-15 Project Office, 
the government advised Reaction Motors to “make all further estimates on the 
basis of the XLR30’s development.” 6 
 Concurrently, the Air Materiel Command had also been in discussions with the 
other three engine manufacturers. The fact that the other manufacturers showed a 
somewhat lower level of interest than Reaction Motors is understandable–after all, 
Reaction Motors engines had powered most of the rocket-equipped X-planes since 
the original XS-1. In fact, by this time North American had already requested that 
the Air Force withdraw the NA-5400 from consideration. On 18 March 1955, the 
Air Force supplied the prospective airframe contractors with the specifications on 
the three remaining engines. The Air Force expected that a flight engine would be 
available to the winning contractor within 30 months.7  
 The X-15 Project Office released its analysis of the data provided by the en-
gine manufacturers on 22 March 1955. One of the comments was that generat-
ing the necessary 50,000 lbf would require multiple Bell and Aerojet engines. The 
X-15 Project Office made clear that the final engine was not a production item, and 
that the amount of available propellants was the only limit to the operating time of 
the engine.8  
 After much discussion, the Air Force decided to release a request for pro-
posal for the X-15 engine that was separate from the airframe competition. On 26 
April, Headquarters ARDC requested that “the engine program be subjected to a 
final critical review apart from, but concurrent with the evaluation of the airframe 
proposals.” The Power Plant Laboratory, NACA, and Navy would complete their 
engine evaluations by 12 July. The evaluation was to come to one of three con-
clusions: 1) that one engine was so superior to the others that its use would be 
5 Ibid.
6 Letter, Roger W. Walker to Reaction Motors, no subject,  February 955; letter, Lieutenant Colonel W. K. Ashby, 
Chief, Power Plant Branch, Aeronautical Equipment Division, AMC, to Reaction Motors, Subject: Power Plant for 
New Research Airplane, 2 February 955. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research Agency.
7 Letter, John B. Trenholm to Bell et al., no subject, 22 March 955. 
8 Ibid. 
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mandated, 2) that one engine was so inferior that its use would be forbidden, or 
3) that all of the engines were so nearly comparable that the choice would be left to 
the airframe contractor. The WADC scheduled the final engine evaluation meeting 
for 28 June, although this later slipped to 6–7 July.9
ENGINE PROPOSALS
 Three companies–Aerojet, Bell, and Reaction Motors–submitted propos-
als for the X-15 engine on 9 May 1955, the same day as the airframe compet-
itors. North American had already asked the Air Force and NACA to dismiss 
the NA-5400 as an alternative. A copy of the Aerojet XLR73 proposal could not 
be located .
 Bell was conservative in its engine proposal and stated that “modifications 
have been limited to those necessary to permit the engine to be used in a piloted 
aircraft.” The changes to the XLR81 were made primarily in the starting and con-
trol systems, mostly to provide additional safety margins. The modified engine 
would be capable of multiple starts with a safety system based on a similar device 
provided for use during ground testing. The modifications provided an engine that 
could operate at an 8,000-lbf thrust level in addition to the normal 14,500-lbf full 
thrust. The modifications included the addition of a propellant bypass valve just in 
front of the injector so that, at the reduced thrust level, approximately one-half of 
the propellants would return to the tanks instead of being injected into the thrust 
chamber. This eliminated the need to change the pump discharge pressures, and 
allowed the same amount of propellants to flow through the cooling system. Only 
one engine in each airplane would have the capability to provide the 8,000-lbf 
level, although this reflected the removal and capping of the bypass valve and 
not any major change in engine configuration. Bell also proposed changing the 
fuel as a safety measure. In an attempt to minimize the risk of mixed propellants 
accumulating and exploding, Bell wanted to exchange the jet fuel normally used 
in the XLR81 with a mixture of 40% unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) 
and 60% jet fuel (Bell called this combination “JP-X”). This would make the two 
propellants hypergolic, eliminating the hazard. Bell also pointed out that these 
propellants would not need to be topped off from the carrier aircraft, since neither 
had an appreciable vaporization rate. Bell noted that “since tests of the major com-
ponents of the XLR81-BA-1 engine have been successful, extensive development 
tests of these components will not be required for the X-15 engine program.”10  
 Like the Bell proposal, the proposal from Reaction Motors was brief (Bell 
used 15 pages, and Reaction Motors used just 14). The XLR30 would be modi-
9 Letter, Colonel Paul F. Nay to Commander, WADC, no subject, 26 April 955. In the files at the Air Force Historical 
Research Agency; memorandum, John B. Trenholm to Chief, Rocket Section, no subject, 20 June 955. In the 
files at the AFMC History Office; letter, Arthur W. Vogeley to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, 
no subject, 7 June 955.
0 Bell report 02-95-06, “Project 226: X-5 Liquid Rocket Engine Proposal,” Secret, 25 February 955. Courtesy 
of Benjamin F. Guenther.
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fied to “1) emphasize safety and minimum development time, 2) start, operate and 
shutdown at all altitudes and attitudes, and 3) be capable of at least five successive 
starts without servicing or manual attention other than cockpit controls.” Instead 
of the thrust-stepping proposed by Bell, Reaction Motors offered an infinitely 
variable thrust ranging from 13,500 to 50,000 lbf at sea level. Reaction Motors be-
lieved that “the highly developed state of the major engine components, i.e., tur-
bopump, thrust chamber and control valves allows RMI to meet the schedule….” 
Unlike Bell, which extensively discussed the modifications required to make its 
engine meet the X-15 requirements, Reaction Motors instead gave a technical 
overview of the XLR30, and it was not possible to determine what the modifi-
cations were. Nevertheless, the overall impression was that the state of XLR30 
development was far along.11
THE ENGINE EVALUATION
 On 8 June, John Sloop at Lewis submitted the preliminary NACA engine re-
sults to Hartley Soulé. The rankings were 1) XLR81, 2) XLR30, and 3) XLR73 . 
Lewis also commented on various aspects of the airframe proposals, including 
propellant systems, engine installation, reaction controls, APUs, and fire extin-
guishing systems, although it drew no conclusions and did not rank the airframe 
competitors. The airframe manufacturers had concentrated on two of the pos-
sible engines: Bell and Republic opted for the Bell XLR81, while Douglas and 
North American used the Reaction Motors XLR30 . Bell had also included an 
alternate design that used the XLR30 engine. Nobody had proposed using the 
Aerojet XLR73 .12  
 The Power Plant Laboratory believed that minimum thrust was a critical fac-
tor. Reaction Motors indicated that its engine was infinitely variable between 30% 
and 100% thrust. The Bell engine, however, only had thrust settings of 8,000 and 
14,500 lbf. However, since the Bell engine had to be used in multiples to provide 
sufficient thrust for the research airplane, this meant that the equivalent minimum 
thrust was 18% for the Bell design (which used three engines) and 14% for the Re-
public airplane (four engines). Initially, the engine evaluation set the desired lower 
thrust figure at 25%, resulting in a lower score for the Reaction Motors engine. 
The X-15 Project Office subsequently raised the lower throttle setting to 30%, and 
the evaluators then ranked the Reaction Motors engine as slightly better.13  
 During the initial evaluation the Power Plant Laboratory found little differ-
ence between the Bell and Reaction Motors proposals except for the throttling 
limits, but the report left the impression that the Air Force favored the Bell design. 
 Reaction Motors report TR-905-C, “Rocket Engine for New Research Airplane,” Secret, 26 February 955. 
Courtesy of Benjamin F. Guenther.
2 Letter, John L. Sloop/Lewis Evaluation Group to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, no subject, 
8 June 955.
3 Letter, John L. Sloop/Lewis Evaluation Group to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, no subject, 
 June 955.
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Statements such as “the Bell engine would have potential tactical application for 
piloted aircraft use whereas no applications of the RMI engine are foreseen,” and 
“in the event that the XLR73 development does not meet its objectives, the Bell 
engine would serve as a ‘backup’ in the Air Force inventory” made the laborato-
ry’s feelings clear.14  Of course, the idea that rocket engines potentially could be 
used in operational manned aircraft quickly waned as jet engines became more 
powerful, and this became a moot point.
 The final meeting at Wright Field on 14-15 June finalized the ground rules 
for the engine evaluation. The engine companies attended the early portion of 
the meeting to present preliminary results from their proposals. The ground rules 
established by the Air Force, Navy, and NACA representatives included three 
major areas of consideration: 1) the development capability of the manufacturer, 
2) the technical design (including the design approach and the research utility), and 
3) the cost .15  
 On 24 June 1955, NACA Lewis issued a revised ranking of the engine com-
petitors. From a technical perspective (not considering management and other 
factors), the Lewis rankings were now 1) XLR30, 2) XLR81, and 3) XLR73 . The 
reason given for reversing the rankings of the XLR30 and XLR81 was a shift 
in the engine-evaluation ground rules. Previously researchers rated the XLR30 
lower because of its unsatisfactory throttling limits, but new ground rules relaxed 
the requirements and elevated the engine’s ranking. 
 There still seemed to be some confusion over the engine-evaluation process, 
and yet another meeting at NACA Headquarters on 27 June attempted to ensure 
that everybody was on the same page. The meeting ended with an understanding 
that the engine evaluation should determine whether any of the engines was un-
suitable for use in the airplane, or whether any engine was so clearly superior that 
it should be selected regardless of the choice of the winning airframe contractor. If 
neither of these conditions existed, then whichever engine the airframe contractor 
selected would be chosen. This was the same conclusion reached previously on 
14-15 June, and all of the attendees appeared to be satisfied with the result.16 
 On 1 July, the HSFS sent its engine evaluation to Hartley Soulé, ranking 
the power plants as 1) XLR30, 2) XLR73, and 3) XLR81. The transmittal letter, 
however, expressed concern about “the lack of development of all three of the 
proposed engines.” Walt Williams again strongly recommended an interim engine 
for the initial flights of the new research airplane (he suggested the Reaction Mo-
tors LR8 based on previous HSFS experience). Since the early flights would be 
primarily concerned with proving the airworthiness of the airplane, they would 
not need the full power provided by the final engine. The HSFS believed that the 
development of the new engine would take longer than most expected, and using 
an interim engine would allow the flight-test program to begin at an earlier date. 
To minimize the hazards to personnel and instruments, researchers at the HSFS 
 This indicated that the funded Aerojet engine and the Bell engine could substitute for each other in operational 
aircraft if needed, while the much more powerful Reaction Motors engine was in a class by itself and would have 
little operational potential. See Air Force report (unnumbered), “Evaluation of Engines–Project 226,” 5 July 
955, Power Plant Laboratory. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research Agency. 
5 Letter, Arthur W. Vogeley to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, no subject, 7 June 955.
6 Letter, John L. Sloop/Lewis Evaluation Group to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, no subject, 
2 June 955; Letter, Clotaire Wood to William J. Underwood, no subject, 29 June 955.
 Chapter 4: The Million-Horsepower Engine
also recommended that Reaction Motors change the fuel for the XLR30 from 
anhydrous ammonia to gasoline or jet fuel .17 
 The Air Force evaluation group pointed out that using two fuels interchange-
ably in the Bell gas generator systems would overly complicate the fuel system. 
The use of a separate system to meet the restart requirement was also expected to 
create safety and reliability problems. On the other hand, although the Reaction 
Motors engine was more orthodox than the Bell design, the company had not yet 
performed many tests on it, and the evaluators correctly predicted that it would 
have a difficult development. The evaluators noted that both engines would need 
substantial development being man-rated.18  
 A meeting at Wright Field on 6-7 July attempted to sort out the engine selec-
tion . De Beeler, John Sloop, and Arthur Vogeley represented the NACA, Oscar 
Bessio represented the Navy, and Joseph Rogers led the Air Force contingent. 
The representatives from the Power Plant Laboratory indicated a preference for 
the XLR73, with the XLR81 as their second choice, but the NACA participants 
argued that finishing the development of the Aerojet engine would consume a 
great deal of time. The Navy considered the XLR30 the best (not surprisingly, 
since it was a Navy engine), followed by the XLR81. The XLR73 was not consid-
ered worthy of further consideration because of unspecified “extremely difficult 
development problems.” 
 The final evaluation report stated that none of the engines was clearly su-
perior or deficient, and therefore the airframe contractor would select the most 
advantageous engine. The XLR73 was effectively eliminated from the competi-
tion since none of the airframe proposals used it, although the Power Plant Labo-
ratory supported the continued development of the XLR73 for other uses. The 
elimination of the XLR73 was ironic because, of the engines under consideration, 
only the Aerojet XLR73 was a fully funded development engine, and it was the 
only one that, theoretically at least, would not have entailed additional costs. The 
evaluators felt that the development timeline of the Bell engine better matched 
the program schedule by a small margin. The Bell cost estimate was $3,614,088 
compared to $2,699,803 for Reaction Motors. Both were hopelessly optimistic.19 
 In the last portion of the report, the Power Plant Laboratory presented its 
minority opinion justifying its choice of the XLR73 rocket engine, and the NACA 
included a recommendation to use an interim powerplant, specifically the Reac-
tion Motors LR8-RM-8, for the initial X-15 flight program until the final power-
plant was ready.20
 
7 Letter, Walter C. Williams/HSFS Evaluation Group, to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, no 
subject, 5 July 955.
8 Ibid.
9 Letter, Clotaire Wood to Langley, no subject, 3 July 955.
20 Air Force report RDZ-280, “Evaluation Report on X-5 Research Aircraft Design Competition,” 5 August 955, no 
page numbers. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research Agency.
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ENGINE AWARD
 During late October 1955, the Air Force notified Reaction Motors that the 
winning North American entry in the airframe competition was the one that used 
the XLR30. On 1 December, the New Developments Office of the Fighter Air-
craft Division directed the Power Plant Laboratory to prepare a $1,000,000 let-
ter contract with Reaction Motors. However, at the same time the Power Plant 
Laboratory was further questioning the desirability of the Reaction Motors en-
gine. During preliminary discussions with Reaction Motors, researchers from the 
NACA expressed concern that anhydrous ammonia would adversely affect the 
research instrumentation, and again brought up the possibility of converting to a 
hydrocarbon fuel. The Power Plant Laboratory did not support the change. Even 
during the initial evaluation the laboratory had not really believed the 2.5-year 
development estimate, and thought that was at least 6 months short. Changing the 
propellants would cost at least another year. The laboratory felt that if a 4-year 
development period was acceptable, the competition should be reopened, since 
anything over 2.5 years had been penalized during the original evaluation.21  
 To complicate matters further, the end of 1955 saw the Air Force and Navy 
in disagreement over which agency should control the engine development effort. 
The BuAer assistant chief for research and development, Rear Admiral William 
A . Schoech, sent a letter to Air Force Headquarters proposing to develop the X-15 
engine as a continuation of the three years already spent on the XLR30 . The ad-
miral believed this arrangement would expedite development, especially since the 
Navy already had a satisfactory working relationship with Reaction Motors. The 
Navy could also make the Reaction Motors test stands at Lake Denmark available 
to the X-15 program.22  
 On 9 December, Air Force Headquarters forwarded the letter to General 
Marvin C. Demler, commander of the ARDC. Demler forwarded the Navy re-
quest to the Power Plant Laboratory and X-15 Project Office for comment. On 29 
December, ARDC Headquarters and the X-15 Project Office held a teletype con-
ference (the predecessor of today’s conference call) to develop arguments against 
BuAer retaining the engine program. Demler summarized these and forwarded 
them to Air Force Headquarters on 3 January 1956. The ARDC rejected the Navy 
position because it felt a single agency should have management responsibility for 
the entire X-15 program. The Air Force argued that it was already familiar with 
 
2 Letter, Lieutenant Hugh J. Savage, Non-Rotating Engine Branch, Power Plant Laboratory, WADC, to Reaction 
Motors, Subject: Engine for the X-5 Airplane, 26 October 955. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research 
Agency; memorandum for files, Captain Chester E. McCollough to Chief, Non-Rotating Engine Branch,  De-
cember 955. In the files at the AFMC History Office; letter, Roger W. Walker, Chief, Power Plant Development 
Section, Power Plant Branch, Aeronautical Equipment Division, AMC, to Reaction Motors, Subject: Request for 
Proposal X-5 Aircraft Engine Development, 8 December 955. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research 
Agency; Memorandum, T. J. Keating, Chief, Non-Rotating Engine Branch, Power Plant Laboratory, WADC, to 
Project Officer, New Development Office, Fighter Aircraft Division, Director of Systems Management, ARDC, Sub-
ject: The X-5 Airplane Engine, 5 December 955. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research Agency. Oddly, 
it was the Power Plant Laboratory that first suggested (in July 955) that Reaction Motors switch from ammonia 
to a hydrocarbon fuel. No record of which engines these might have been could be found.
22 Letter, Rear Admiral William A. Schoech, Assistant Chief for Research and Development, BuAer, to the Air Force 
Chief of Staff, Subject: Cognizance over development of rocket powerplant for NACA X-5 research airplane, 28 
November 955. In the files at the Naval History Center.
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the XLR30 and was well experienced in the development of man-rated rocket 
engines, such as the XLR11 (ignoring the fact that it was a derivative of the Navy 
XLR8). The Air Force also pointed out that it was already using the Reaction Mo-
tors at Lake Denmark. These arguments apparently put the matter to rest, since no 
additional correspondence on the subject seems to exist.23  
 Reaction Motors submitted this technical proposal on 24 January 1956, fol-
lowed by the cost proposal on 8 February. The company expected to deliver the 
first engine “within thirty (30) months after we are authorized to proceed.” Reac-
tion Motors assigned the new engine the TR-139 company designation. The Air 
Force also realized the engine needed a new designation, and on 21 February it 
formally requested assignment of the XLR99-RM-1 designation. This became 
official at Wright Field on 6 March and received Navy approval on 29 March. 
The Reaction Motors cost proposal showed that the entire program would cost 
$10,480,718 through the delivery of the first flight engine.24  
 During all of this, the NACA was becoming increasingly worried over the 
seemingly slow progress of the procurement negotiations. On 15 February, the 
deputy commander for development at the WADC, Brigadier General Victor R . 
Haugen, wrote to reassure Hugh Dryden that the process was progressing smooth-
ly. Haugen reminded Dryden that one month of delay had been caused by the 
necessary studies associated with the NACA’s suggestion to change from anhy-
drous ammonia to a hydrocarbon fuel. Haugen assured Dryden that the procure-
ment agency would issue a letter contract no later than 1 March. As it turned out, his 
letter was sent the day after the Reaction Motors letter contract had been signed.25
THE TR-139
 The TR-139 engine proposed by Reaction Motors was an extensively modi-
fied version of the Navy-developed XLR30-RM-2 . Reaction Motors liked to call 
it a “turborocket” engine because it used turbopumps to supply its propellants, a 
relatively new concept. The XLR30 dated back to 1946 when Reaction Motors 
initiated the development of a 5,000-lbf engine to prove the then-new concepts 
of high-pressure combustion, spaghetti-tube construction, and turbine drive us-
ing main combustion propellants. By 1950, engineers believed these principles 
were sufficiently well established to initiate the development of a 50,000-lbf 
engine. The turbopump and its associated valves completed approximately 150 
23 Letter, Colonel Donald H. Heaton, Chief, Aeronautical Division, Director for R&D DCS/D, USAF, to Commander 
ARDC, Subject: Cognizance Over Development of Rocket Power Plant for NACA X-5 Research Airplane, 9 
December 955; teletype conference between personnel of Director of Systems Management and Headquarters, 
ARDC, 29 December 955, Subject: BuAer Letter on the XLR30; Letter, Colonel E.N. Ljunggren, Assistant for Air-
craft Systems, ARDC, to Director for R&D, USAF, Subject: Cognizance Over Development of Rocket Power Plant 
for NACA X-5 Research Airplane, 3 January 956. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research Agency. 
2 Letter, Warren P. Turner, Manager, Customer Relations and Contracts Division, Reaction Motors, to Commander, 
AMC, Subject: Rocket Engine System for X-5 Research Aircraft, 7 February 956. In the files at Thiokol Corpora-
tion. The new engine used an “odd” Air Force designation to replace the “even” Navy designation.
25 Letter, Brigadier General Victor R. Haugen to NACA-Washington, 5 February 956; Letter Contract AF33(600)-
3228,  February 956. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research Agency. 
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tests, and Reaction Motors considered it fully developed, with the exception of 
additional malfunction-detection and environmental tests that were required be-
fore a flight-approval test could be undertaken. The evaluation of a “breadboard” 
engine had demonstrated safe and smooth thrust-chamber starting, achieved 
93–94% of the theoretical specific impulse, and shown satisfactory characteristics 
using film cooling.26 
 The engine consisted of a single thrust chamber and a turbopump to supply 
the liquid oxygen and liquid anhydrous ammonia propellants from low-pressure 
tanks on the aircraft. These propellants had boiling points of –298°F and –28°F, 
respectively. That meant that after the propellants were loaded into the X-15 
tanks, they would immediately begin to boil off at rates that were dependent upon 
the nature of the tank design and ambient conditions. In an uninsulated tank, liq-
uid oxygen has a boil-off rate of approximately 10% per hour on a standard day. 
Even the crudest insulation significantly lowers this, and a well-insulated tank can 
experience less than 0 .5% per hour of boil-off . Reaction Motors pointed out that 
insulating a tank usually required a great deal of volume, and that the airframe 
manufacturer would need to conduct a trade study to find the best compromise 
between volume and boil-off. Since the B-36 carrier aircraft had sufficient volume 
to carry additional liquid oxygen to top off the X-15, this was not a major issue. 
Anhydrous ammonia, on the other hand, has a relatively high boiling point and 
very low evaporation losses. Simply sealing the tank by closing the vent valve 
would minimize losses to the point that the ammonia would not have to be topped 
off before launch .27  
 Reaction Motors did have some cautions regarding the hydrogen peroxide 
that powered the TR-139 turbopump and the X-15 ballistic control system. It was 
necessary to maintain the propellant below 165°F to prevent it from decompos-
ing, and Reaction Motors believed that it would be necessary to insulate all the 
valves, lines, and tanks. North American thought that only the main storage tank 
required insulation, because of the relatively short exposure to high temperatures. 
However, not insulating the entire system allowed small quantities of propellant 
(such as found in the lines supplying the reaction control system) to potentially 
reach elevated temperatures. To counter this, Reaction Motors recommended in-
stalling a continuous-circulation system whereby the propellant was kept moving 
through the lines in order to minimize its exposure to high compartment tem-
peratures, particularly in the wings. If the engineers found the circulation system 
26 Robert W. Seaman, H. A. Barton, V. Cortese, Reaction Motors report TR-905-E, “Rocket Engine for New Re-
search Airplane,” 3 February 956, pp. -2. In the files at the AFFTC History Office. The use of turbopumps on 
early rocket engines was somewhat unusual because it was much easier to simply pressurize the propellant tanks 
and let a combination of pressure and gravity feed the propellants into the combustion chambers. Of course, this 
did not work well if the vehicle was not going more or less straight up, or when it was maneuvering. It was also 
much less efficient in terms of the thrust that could be provided by the engine and required heavy propellant tanks 
to provide adequate pressure. Nevertheless, turbopumps tend to be one of the more difficult items to develop on 
a rocket engine because they operate under extreme pressures and temperatures. As late as the development of 
the Space Shuttle Main Engines, thought was given to using pressure-fed engines instead of turbopumps. Given 
the problems experienced by the Space Shuttle Program with the development of its advanced turbopumps, 
sometimes it seems it might have been a wiser decision. Many of the early engines that did use turbopumps 
used a separate propellant (usually a monopropellant such as hydrogen peroxide) to drive the turbopumps. Most 
modern engines decompose one of the normal main propellants into steam to drive the turbopump, eliminating 
the need to carry a separate propellant.
27 Seaman et al., “Rocket Engine for New Research Airplane,” pp. 3-5. Interestingly, North American included provi-
sions for an ammonia top-off system until an agreement was reached that the ammonia vent valve could simply 
be closed after fueling, and the tank would be allowed to stabilize at the vapor pressure of ammonia.
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to be insufficient, it was possible to install a rudimentary cooling system on the 
main tank.28 
 Engineers considered the TR-139 thrust chamber very lightweight at 180 
pounds. Furthermore, it used an assembly of “spaghetti tubes” as segments of 
the complete chamber, and, as it turned out, the spaghetti tubes would prove to 
be one of the more elusive items during engine development. The thrust chamber 
used ammonia as a regenerative coolant, but the exhaust nozzle was uncooled and 
configured to optimize thrust at high altitude. Reaction Motors expected to use a 
slightly altered XLR30 thrust chamber. The modifications included the incorpora-
tion of a liquid propellant igniter (for restarts) and derating to operate at 600 psia 
instead of 835 psia. The lower chamber pressure was desired to improve local 
cooling conditions at low thrust levels.29 
 In order to improve safety, Reaction Motors proposed the simplest igniter the 
engineers could think of. The igniter was located along the centerline at the top 
of the chamber and had two sections. The first section contained a catalyst bed 
that used activated silver screens to decompose hydrogen peroxide into steam 
and oxygen at 1,360°F. The second section consisted of a ring of orifices where 
28 Seaman et al., “Rocket Engine for New Research Airplane,” pp. 5-6. 
29 Ibid.
The final Reaction Motors contract called for an engine capable of  being throttled between 15,000 lbf  and 
50,000 lbf, although this was later raised to 57,000 lbf. Some engines actually produced more than 60,000 
lbf. The engine needed to operate for 90 seconds at full power or 249 seconds at 15,000 lbf. (NASA)
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fuel was injected; when the fuel and superheated oxygen mixed, they combusted. 
The resulting flame was used to ignite the propellants in the combustion chamber. 
Reaction Motors believed this simple igniter would not be subject to the kind of 
failures that could occur in electrical ignition systems. Despite the apparent desir-
ability of this arrangement,  a more traditional electrical ignition system was used 
in the final engine.30 
 The XLR30 turbopump was a two-stage, impulse-type turbine driving fuel and 
oxidizer pumps. The turbine operated at a backpressure of 45 psia at full thrust. The 
designers matched the pump characteristics to allow varying engine thrust over a 
wide range of thrust simply by varying the power input to the turbine. Varying the 
flow of hydrogen peroxide to a gas generator controlled the speed of the turbine. 
The gas generator consisted of a simple catalyst bed that decomposed the hydrogen 
peroxide into steam. Reaction Motors expected that the engine would need only 
2.5 seconds to go from ignition to maximum thrust, and only 1 second to go from 
minimum to maximum thrust. On the other side, it would take about 1 second to go 
from maximum to minimum thrust, and not much more to complete a shutdown.31 
 However, using a single turbine to drive both the fuel and oxidizer pumps 
resulted in the XLR30 liquid-oxygen pump operating at too high a speed for the 
new XLR99 . Haakon Pederson, who became the principal designer of the XLR99 
turbopumps, modified the original XLR30 oxidizer pump section to have a sin-
gle axial inlet impeller operating in conjunction with a directly driven cavitating 
inducer. This required a new impeller design, new casting patterns, a new inducer, 
and a new pump case. Essentially, this was a new liquid-oxygen pump, and it be-
came one of the major new developments necessary for the XLR99 .32 
 At this point, Reaction Motors expected to take 24 months to develop the new 
engine, followed by six months of testing and validation. The company would 
deliver the first two production engines in the 30th month, and manufacture 10 
additional engines at a rate of one per month.33 
 All parties finally signed the Reaction Motors contract on 7 September 
1956, specifying that the first flight-rated engine was to be ready for installation 
two years later. The Air Force called the “propulsion subsystem” Project 3116 
and carried it on the books separately from the Project 1226 airframe. The final 
$10,160,030 contract authorized a fee of $614,000 and required that Reaction 
Motors deliver one engine and a mockup, as well as various reports, drawings, 
and tools. The 50,000-lbf engine would be throttleable between 30% to 100% 
of maximum output. The 588-pound engine had to operate for 90 seconds at full 
power or 249 seconds at 30% thrust .34 
30 Ibid.
3 Preliminary Model Specification for the TR-39 Turborocket Engine, Reaction Motors Specification No. 9, Febru-
ary 956, p. 5; Seaman et al., pp. 7-8. 
32 Seaman et al., pp. 7-8; Paul Gwozdz, Reaction Motors report TR-085-, “A Study to Determine Modifications 
Which Extend the Low and High Thrust Range of the YLR99 Turborocket Engine,” undated (but signed on  
October 966), p. 3. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
33 Seaman et al., p. 36. 
3 Air Force contract AF33(600)-3228, 7 September 956. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research Agency; 
System Development Plan, X-5 Research Aircraft, Supporting Research System Number 7L, 22 March 956. 
In the files at the AFFTC History Office. As events later demonstrated, even this erred badly on the side of un-
derestimation. The final fee paid to Reaction Motors was greater than the original estimate for the total engine 
development program. The definitive contract exceeded the original estimate by more than 20 times, and more 
than doubled the original total program approval estimate.
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 Less than two months after the Air Force issued the letter contract, the NACA 
began to question the conduct of Reaction Motors. On 11 April 1956, John Sloop 
from Lewis visited the Reaction Motors facilities and reported a multitude of po-
tential development problems with the ignition system, structural temperatures, 
and cooling. Sloop reported that approximately 12 engineers were working on 
the engine, and that Reaction Motors expected to assemble the first complete en-
gine in May 1957. However, Sloop believed that the Reaction Motors effort was 
inadequate and questioned whether the appropriate test stands at Lake Denmark 
would be available in late 1956. Sloop suggested that the company needed to as-
sign more resources to the XLR99 development effort.35  
 Despite the issues raised by Sloop, the Air Force did not seem to be concerned 
until 1 August 1956, when the Power Plant Laboratory inquired why scheduled 
tests of the thrust chamber had not taken place. It was not explained why four 
months had elapsed before the Air Force questioned the schedule slip.36  
 Reaction Motors explained that much of the delay was due to the fact that 
other projects were taking longer than originally anticipated. The company 
also admitted delaying hardware manufacturing until a series of design studies 
were completed, believing that these studies were important for maintaining the 
schedule. Reaction Motors also attributed part of the delay to modifications of two 
available test chambers to accommodate the high-powered engine.37
THE 1956 INDUSTRY CONFERENCE
 The XLR99 presented several unique challenges to Reaction Motors. Perhaps 
the major one was that the engine was being developed for a manned vehicle, 
which entailed more safety and reliability requirements than unmanned missiles. 
However, perhaps even more challenging were the requirements to be able to 
throttle and restart the engine in flight–something that had not yet been attempted 
with a large rocket engine. The Reaction Motor representative at the 1956 industry 
conference concluded his presentation with the observation that developing the 
XLR99 was going to be challenging. Subsequent events proved this correct.38  
 Robert W. Seaman from Reaction Motors presented preliminary specifica-
tions for the XLR99-RM-1 at the conference. The oxygen-ammonia engine could 
vary its thrust from 19,200 lbf (34%) to 57,200 lbf at 40,000 feet, and had a spe-
cific impulse between 256 seconds and 276 seconds depending on the altitude and 
throttle setting. The engine fit into a space 71.7 inches long and 43.2 inches in di-
35 Memorandum, John L. Sloop, Chief, Rocket Branch, Lewis Laboratory, to Headquarters, NACA, 6 April 956, 
Subject: Visit to Reaction Motors, Incorporated, re: Powerplant for the X-5. In the files at the NASA History Office. 
36 Letter, H. P. Barfield, Assistant Chief, Non-Rotating Engine Branch, Power Plant Laboratory, WADC, to Reaction Mo-
tors,  August 956, Subject: Contract AF33(600)-3228. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research Agency. 
37 Letter, A. G. Thatcher, Manager, Division Engineering, Reaction Motors, to Commander, WADC, 7 August 956, 
Subject: Contract AF33(600)-3228. In the files at Thiokol Corporation.
38 Some smaller rocket engines could be throttled. The most significant was the man-rated Curtiss-Wright XLR25-
CW- being developed for the Bell X-2. This engine used two separate thrust chambers (one producing 5,000 lbf 
and the other producing 0,000 lbf) and was continuously variable from 2,500 to 5,000 lbf. Unfortunately, the 
engine fell significantly behind schedule and proved to be very unsatisfactory in service.
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ameter. At this point, Reaction Motors was predicting a 618-pound dry weight and 
a 748-pound gross weight. A two-stage impulse turbine drove the single-inlet oxi-
dizer pump and two-inlet fuel pump. The hydrogen-peroxide-driven turbopump 
exhausted into the thrust chamber. Regulating the amount of hydrogen peroxide 
that was decomposed to drive the turbopump provided the throttle control.39  
 Engineers decided to control thrust by regulating the speed of the turbopump 
because the other possibilities resulted in the turbopump speeding up as pressure 
decreased, resulting in cavitation. Controlling the propellant to the turbopump 
also required fewer controls and less instrumentation. However, varying the fuel 
flow led to other issues, such as how to provide adequate coolant (fuel) to the 
thrust chamber.40  
 The engineers also had to give engine compartment temperatures more con-
sideration than they did for previous engines due to the high heat transfer ex-
pected from the X-15 hot-structure. This was one of the first instances in which 
the surrounding airframe structure would be hotter than the engine. Since North 
39 William P. Munger and Robert W. Seaman, “XLR99-RM- Rocket Engine for the X-5,” a paper in the 1956 Research 
Airplane Committee Report, pp. 25-235. The engine was eventually to undergo numerous changes of detail, but its 
basic design, as described to the 956 industry conference (excepting its weight), was not greatly altered.
0 Ibid, pp. 25-22. 
Although not the most powerful rocket engine of  its era, the XLR99 was the most advanced and used a 
sophisticated turbopump to supply liquid oxygen and anhydrous ammonia propellants to the combustion 
chamber. The engine was capable of  being restarted in flight, an unusual feature for the time (or even to-
day) and numerous safety systems automatically shut down the engine in the event of  a problem. (NASA)
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American was designing the hot structure of the X-15 to withstand temperatures 
well in excess of those the engine produced, the engineers were not planning to 
insulate the engine compartment.41  
 Another paper discussed engine controls and instruments, accessory installa-
tion, and various propellant system components. The 1,000-gallon liquid-oxygen 
tank was located just ahead of the aircraft center of gravity, and the 1,400-gallon 
anhydrous-ammonia tank was just behind it. A 3,600-psi helium supply tube with-
in the liquid-oxygen tank supplied the gas to pressurize both tanks. A 75-gallon 
hydrogen-peroxide tank behind the ammonia tank provided the monopropellant 
for the turbopump, using a small, additional supply of helium.42  
 The liquid-oxygen and ammonia tanks had triple compartments arranged to 
force the propellants toward the center of gravity during normal operations and 
during jettisoning. The design needed to compensate for the acceleration of the 
X-15, which tended to force propellants toward one end of the tanks or the other . 
Further complicating the design of the tanks was the necessity for efficient loading 
and minimizing the remaining propellant after burnout or jettisoning. Fortunately, 
the tanks did not present any insurmountable problems during early tests.43  
 Because the engineers did not yet fully understand the vibration characteris-
tics of the XLR99, they designed a rigid engine mount without any special vibra-
tion attenuation. The engine-mount truss attached to the fuselage at three fittings, 
and by adjusting the lower two fittings the engineers could tailor the thrust vector 
of the engine. Three large removable doors in the aft fuselage provided access to 
the engine and allowed closed-circuit television cameras to observe the engine 
during ground testing. Ultimately, this mounting technique would also make it 
much easier to use the interim XLR11 engines.44
MORE PROBLEMS
 However, North American was becoming concerned about the engine de-
velopment effort, echoing many of the same concerns expressed by John Sloop 
at the NACA. At the 1956 industry conference, North American vice president 
Raymond H. Rice announced that the XLR99 was four months behind schedule. 
On 1 February 1957, Rice asked the ARDC assistant deputy commander, Major 
General Howell M. Estes, Jr., to investigate the apparent delays.45  
 The Air Force and Reaction Motors held meetings on 12 and 18 February, 
and the Air Force, the NACA, North American, and Reaction Motors met on 19 
February. Data presented at these meetings confirmed that the engine was approx-
 Ibid. 
2 Bruce O. Wagner, “X-5 Airplane Engine Installation,” a paper in the 956 Research Airplane Committee Report, 
pp. 225-235. 
3 Ibid. 
 Ibid. 
5 Letter, Raymond H. Rice, Vice President and General Manager, North American Aviation, to Assistant Deputy 
Commander for Weapons Systems, ARDC, no subject,  February 957. In the files at the Boeing Archives. 
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imately four months behind schedule and overweight. Although the performance 
estimates were decreasing, the deterioration appeared to be relatively minor. Gen-
eral Estes wrote Hugh Dryden (and copied Rice) that “every effort will be ex-
pended to prevent further engine schedule slippage.”46  
 The NACA’s reaction to the February meeting was different. Hartley Soulé 
reported that the Air Force accepted the four-month delay, but that Reaction Mo-
tors would deliver two engines by 1 September 1958 instead of one. The Air 
Force also accepted a decrease from 241 to 236 seconds of specific impulse, and 
a weight increase from 588 to 618 pounds. Soulé pointed out that Reaction Mo-
tors had not yet conducted any thrust-chamber tests, and expressed doubt that the 
revised schedule was achievable . He also noted that the Air Force had scheduled 
additional engine progress meetings for June and September. On the other hand, 
the NACA agreed to help Reaction Motors optimize the engine nozzle for high-
altitude operations in an attempt to recover some performance. Separately, on 29 
March 1957 the X-15 Project Office reported that engine costs had increased to an 
estimated $14,000,000, plus fee.47  
 Unfortunately, Hartley Soulé’s premonitions proved correct. Reaction Motors 
informed the Air Force on 10 July 1957 that a nine-month schedule slip would be 
necessary to meet the February specifications. In addition, the development would 
cost $21,800,000–a 50% increase in only 100 days. Alternately, for $17,000,000 
Reaction Motors could develop a compliant engine within the established sched-
ule if the weight could be increased to 836 pounds from the original 618 pounds. 
Representatives from the Air Force, the NACA, North American, and Reaction 
Motors met at Wright Field on 29 July to discuss alternatives. The participants 
generally considered the performance penalty a lesser concern than the increased 
cost and schedule slip needed to develop the “specification” engine, and the Air 
Force elected to pursue the heavier engine. Reaction Motors mitigated some con-
cerns when it subsequently reported that the turbopump was exceeding its perfor-
mance goals, allowing a 197-pound reduction in hydrogen-peroxide propellant. In 
effect, this resulted in an engine that was only 51 pounds heavier than the original 
588-pound specification. 
 Unfortunately, serious problems arose during development of the thrust cham-
ber and injector assemblies. Primarily, the oxidizer tubes of the spaghetti-type 
injector tended to burn through at low thrust levels. The Air Force encouraged the 
company to redouble its efforts, but agreed to raise the minimum thrust require-
ment if necessary. The Air Force and Reaction Motors also discussed changing to 
a spud-type injector, but did not reach a final decision.48  
 Despite the increase in weight, the engine program continued to fall behind. 
On 11 December 1957, during a meeting at the newly formed Propulsion Labo-
6 Letter, Major General Howell M. Estes, Jr., Assistant Deputy Commander for Weapons Systems, ARDC, to NACA, 
no subject, 7 March 957. In the files at the NASA History Office.
7 Report, Hartley A. Soulé, Research Airplane Project Leader, to Members, NACA Research Airplane Project Panel, 
Subject: Project 226–Progress report for months of January and February 957, 9 March 957. In the files at 
the NASA History Office; ARDC Form  (Management Report), Project 36, Subject: X-5 Propulsion Sub-
system, 29 March 957. In the files at the AFMC History Office. The 68-pound figure had been reported at the 
industry conference the previous October.
8 Memorandum, Arthur W. Vogeley to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, subject: X-5 Airplane–
Discussions at Air Research and Development Command, Detachment #, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 
Dayton, OH, 29-30 July 957, 3 August 957. In the files at the NASA History Office.
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ratory, the company reported an additional six-month delay.49  Reaction Motors 
attributed this to an explosion that destroyed the first developmental engine, and 
a series of turbopump failures. The company also confirmed that it had failed to 
develop a spaghetti-type injector that met the performance and reliability require-
ments. Overall, the picture was rather bleak.
 The spaghetti-type injector consisted of bundled tubing, with each metal tube 
going to an individual fuel injector. However, Lieutenant K . E . Weiss, the XLR99 
project engineer for the Power Plant Laboratory, designed a spud-type injector 
that used small, perforated disks instead of tubes. Wright Field machine shops 
built several of the Weiss designs, and researchers ran preliminary tests in early 
1958. By March, Reaction Motors was investigating using the spud-type injector 
on the XLR99 . 
 The mounting engine delays were beginning to threaten the entire X-15 proj-
ect. In response, WADC commander Major General Stanley T. Wray and Briga-
dier General Haugen ordered an investigation of the technical and managerial 
problems. On 7 January 1958, the Air Force asked Reaction Motors to provide 
a revised schedule and explain how it would correct the various problems. The 
company submitted the schedule in mid-January, showing a new five-month delay 
and an increase in costs to $34,400,000–nearly double the July estimate.50  
 Accompanied by personnel from the X-15 Project Office and Propulsion 
Laboratory, generals Haugen and Wray visited Reaction Motors on 28 January 
1958 to discuss the various concerns. Haugen commented on the company’s poor 
record of accomplishment up to that time, which was especially troubling given 
the importance of the X-15 project. Reaction Motors admitted to its “past defi-
ciencies” and assured the generals that it could meet the current cost and schedule 
estimates. Haugen and Wray left only partly convinced.51 
 The Propulsion Laboratory and the X-15 Project Office reported their recom-
mendations to the ARDC and WADC commanders in mid-February, and to the 
director of research and development in Air Force Headquarters, Major General 
Ralph P. Swofford, Jr., on 21 February 1958. These recommendations included 
continuing the Reaction Motors development program, using XLR11 engines for 
initial X-15 flights, approving overtime, assigning the project a top Department 
of Defense priority (DX rating), establishing a Technical Advisory Group, and 
initiating an alternate engine development program. 
 Of these recommendations, the Air Force approved the use of XLR11 en-
gines, an increased Reaction Motors effort, additional funds to cover the increased 
effort, and the establishment of the advisory group. The XLR11 decision hardly 
came as a surprise to the engineers at the HSFS and Lewis–they had suggested the 
same thing nearly three years earlier, as had some at Wright Field. Officials at Air 
Force headquarters denied the request for a top priority, although they approved 
a slightly improved priority. The X-15 Project Office postponed the decision con-
cerning the development of an alternate engine, and made it clear that there was a 
9 The Power Plant Laboratory and Propeller Laboratory were combined into the Propulsion Laboratory on 7 
June 957. 
50 Report, Status of XLR99-RM-, 9 January 958 through 27 June 958, prepared by Propulsion Laboratory, 
WADC. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research Agency.
5 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 29 January 958. 
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clear distinction between proposals for an interim engine for the initial flight tests 
and an alternate engine to replace the XLR99 in the final X-15.52 
 North American had already investigated the idea of installing a pair of 
XLR11s at the suggestion of L. Robert Carman. Scott Crossfield was not im-
pressed with the idea and said, “I think we’d be making a big mistake.” Crossfield 
was afraid that once the Air Force approved the change, the troublesome larger 
engine would never be installed, leaving the X-15 a Mach 3+ airplane instead 
of one twice that fast. Charlie Feltz and Harrison Storms, however, thought the 
concept had merit. The XLR11 used liquid oxygen, like the XLR99, so the oxi-
dizer tank required no changes. The smaller engine used alcohol instead of am-
monia, but the two liquids were roughly comparable and only minor changes 
were necessary. Feltz, for one, was slightly relieved: “I’ve been a little concerned 
about busting into space all at once with a brand-new airplane and a brand-new 
untried engine…. We’re trying to crack space, with a new pressure suit, reentry, 
new metal, landing—everything at once. I’ve got a real good buddy [Crossfield] 
who’s going to be flying that airplane for the first time, and I’d just as soon have 
him around for a while.” After a few weeks, even Crossfield came around: “We 
should learn to crawl before we enter the Olympic hundred-yard dash.” Once the 
government approved the concept of using XLR11s, the technicians at Edwards 
began assembling a dozen XLR11s from pieces and parts of various XLR11 and 
LR8 engines left over from previous programs.53 
 The recommendations also resulted in the establishment of a Technical 
Advisory Group consisting of representatives from the ARDC, BuAer, NACA, 
and WADC. The first meeting was held at the Reaction Motors facility on 24 
February 1958, and the group immediately determined that the thrust chamber 
was the item that could benefit the most from this advice, since it represented the 
greatest risk.54  
 In addition to the Technical Advisory Group, the government enlisted the help 
of other rocket engineers to develop an alternate thrust chamber. North American, 
which owned Rocketdyne, was reluctant to become involved given its role as 
the X-15 airframe contractor. Eventually, however, generals Wray and Haugen 
convinced Lee Atwood to allow Rocketdyne to assist Reaction Motors and begin 
development of an alternate thrust chamber and injectors. Once North American 
overcame its corporate reluctance, Rocketdyne immediately began adapting the 
thrust chamber and injector from the Atlas ICBM XLR105-NA-1 sustainer engine 
to the XLR99 .55  
  
52 Interview, Captain Chester E. McCollough, Jr., Assistant Chief, X-5 WSPO, Director of Systems Management, 
ARDC,  May 959, by Robert S. Houston, History Branch, WADC. In the files at the Air Force Historical Re-
search Agency.
53 Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, pp. 292-296. The government got its money’s worth from these engines, many 
of which went on to power the various lifting bodies that came after the X-5. Confirmed in phone calls with 
Charlie Feltz and Scott Crossfield, 9 June 2002.
5 Report, Status of XLR99-RM-, 9 January to 27 June 958. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research 
Agency; Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, p. 295.
55 Letter, Major General Stanley T. Wray, Commander, WADC, to Commander, ARDC, no subject, 7 June 958; 
report, Status of XLR99-RM-, 9 January to 27 June 958. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research 
Agency. Interestingly, a similar event occurred during the service life of the Space Shuttle main engine. Continuing 
difficulties with the Rocketdyne-designed turbopumps led NASA to contract with Pratt & Whitney to design and 
build alternate turbopumps that ultimately proved to be much simpler and vastly superior in terms of reliability.
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 An additional complication soon developed, although it apparently did not 
significantly affect the development effort; Reaction Motors and the Thiokol 
Chemical Corporation began merger negotiations in the early part of 1958. Dur-
ing this period the anticipated reorganization undoubtedly created a distracting 
uncertainty among Reaction Motors management and employees. Reaction Mo-
tors Incorporated (RMI) stockholders approved the merger on 17 April 1958, and 
the company subsequently became the Reaction Motors Division (RMD) of Thio-
kol Chemical Corporation.56  
 The Air Force decision to bring Rocketdyne into the fray motivated Reac-
tion Motors to consider alternate designs. However, by the end of April the Air 
Force acknowledged there were not sufficient funds to develop alternate designs 
from Rocketdyne and Reaction Motors. Believing that the Rocketdyne XLR105 
derivative offered the best chance of success, the Powerplant Laboratory urged 
Reaction Motors to subcontract with Rocketdyne for its development. Reaction 
Motors evaluated which design offered the most promise and presented the results 
at a meeting of Reaction Motors, Rocketdyne, NACA, and WADC representatives 
on 27 May 1958 at Wright Field. The participants concluded that the Reaction 
Motors concentric shell thrust chamber would not solve the chamber burnout is-
sue, and Reaction Motors did not believe it could complete the design in time to 
support the flight program in any case. Since this was obviously not acceptable, 
all parties agreed that Reaction Motors should discontinue its efforts and subcon-
tract with Rocketdyne for the XLR105 derivative. Two days later the Air Force 
officially transmitted the 27 May decisions to Reaction Motors.57  
 The next day Reaction Motors and Rocketdyne agreed that $500,000 would 
fund the development effort through mid-July. Rocketdyne estimated it would cost 
$1,746,756 to develop the alternate thrust chamber. Producing 14 chambers for ini-
tial testing would cost $811,244, and 14 flight chambers would add $657,300.58  
 Despite the appearance of progress, neither the Air Force nor the NACA was 
completely happy with the progress of the engine development effort. The Propul-
sion Laboratory prepared two letters intended to provide additional motivation for 
Reaction Motors. The first was from General Wray to General Anderson, dated 
17 June 1958:59 
 
For some time, General Haugen and I have been concerned by 
the poor progress made by Reaction Motors Division on the 
development of the XLR99 rocket engine for the X-15 airplane 
program. This engine was one that had been recommended…on 
the strength of a supposed advanced state of development of 
the LR30 rocket engine.… In spite of this state of development, 
56 Letter, Lieutenant Colonel L. Schaffer, ARDC New York Regional Office, to Commander, ARDC, Subject: Manage-
ment Changes at Reaction Motors, Incorporated, Danville, NJ, 7 March 958. In the files at the Air Force Historical 
Research Agency; John Sherman Porter, editor, Moody’s Industrial Manual for 1958 (New York: D. F. Shea, 958).
57 Report, Status of XLR99-RM-, 9 January to 27 June 958; Letter, F. W. Tangeman, Deputy Chief, Power Plant 
Development Section, Power Plant Branch, AMC, to Reactions Motors Division, subject: Contract AF33(600)-
3228, XLR99-RM- Back-up Chamber Development, 29 May 958. In the files at the Air Force Historical Re-
search Agency.
58 Report, Status of XLR99-RM-, 9 January to 27 June 958. 
59 Letter, Major General Stanley T. Wray to Commander, ARDC, no subject, 7 June 958. In the files at the Air Force 
Historical Research Agency.
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Reaction Motors Division has experienced continual schedule 
slippage and financial overruns.… It is by their own admission, 
as well as the conclusions of our project engineers, that Reac-
tion Motors Division has used poor judgment and management 
during the early stages of the engine development program. 
Inability to meet performance and original Preliminary Flight 
Rating Test initiation date, which was a contractor deficiency, 
has resulted in submission of supplemental proposals. This by 
acceptance or rejection has placed the Air Force in the unde-
sirable position of making program decisions which we would 
have preferred the contractor, through better management, to 
have made at a much earlier date.
 Wray also wrote a second letter addressed to Thiokol president Joseph W . 
Crosby, but felt it would have more impact if Anderson signed it. Anderson short-
ened the four-page draft to two pages before he sent it to Crosby on 27 June. An-
derson had tempered Wray’s adversarial tone somewhat, but still left little doubt 
that the Air Force was upset. The letter implied, but never explicitly stated, that 
cancellation of the entire contract for nonperformance was an option. In retro-
spect, it was high unlikely that the Air Force would ever have taken such drastic 
action since it likely would have spelled the end of the X-15 program as well.60  
 It is difficult to determine whether the letters, or even the implied threat to can-
cel the Reaction Motors contract, had any effect on the program. Regardless, things 
began to improve. Test engines at Lake Denmark accumulated more firing time 
during the first two weeks of July than during the entire program to date. The tests 
showed that performance was somewhat low, but by 7 August 1958, engine perfor-
mance increased to within 2.5% of the specification. Of course, the “specification” 
had and would change over the course of the contract, as illustrated below:61 
Proposal Specification 91F Specification 91M
February 
1956
June 1958 March 1961
Maximum thrust at 45,000 feet (lbf) 57,000 57,000 57,000
Minimum thrust at 45,000 feet (lbf) 19,500 19,500 31,500
Specific impulse at sea level (sec) 241 238 230
Specific impulse at 45,000 feet (sec) 278 272 265
Engine dry weight (pounds) 540 856 910
Engine wet weight (pounds) 625 990 1,025
60 Letter, Lieutenant General Samuel E. Anderson, Commander, ARDC, to President, Thiokol Chemical Corporation, 
no subject, 27 June 958; letter (draft), Commander, ARDC, to Thiokol Chemical Corporation, no subject, ap-
proximately 7 June 958, (used to compose the letter of 27 June 958, but not actually sent to addressee). In 
the files at the AFMC History Office.
6 Red Flag Report, X-5 Powerplant XLR99-RM-, D. McKee, Non-Rotating Engine Branch, Propulsion Laboratory, 
WADC, 8 July 958. In the files at the AFMC History Office; Richard G. Leiby, Donald R. Bellman, and Norman 
E. DeMar, “XLR99 Engine Operating Experience,” a paper in the 1961 Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 
27 and 222.
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 Although the maximum thrust remained constant, the decrease in specific 
impulse along with the increased weight had serious performance implications 
for the X-15. The change in the minimum thrust had less effect, and greatly sim-
plified the development effort, but even so, the flight program seldom used low 
throttle settings.
 By August it was obvious that Rocketdyne had been rather optimistic. At 
this point the Reaction Motors subcontract with Rocketdyne had already cost 
$3,125,000–almost double the original estimate. The Propulsion Laboratory be-
lieved this was unreasonable given that the original premise was that the XLR105 
was a well-established design that needed only minor changes to adapt it to the 
XLR99 . There had been so little progress that the Propulsion Laboratory sug-
gested the Rocketdyne effort be canceled “as soon as possible.”62  
 A meeting held at Reaction Motors on 15 August 1958 included Hartley 
Soulé, Brigadier General Haugen, Brigadier General Waymond A. Davis, and 
representatives from Air Force Headquarters, the ARDC, and the WADC. Reac-
tion Motors and Rocketdyne provided briefings on the status of their respective 
efforts, and the participants agreed to freeze the engine design using the Reac-
tion Motors thrust chamber. Reaction Motors was encouraged to continue mak-
ing minor changes to the injector in an attempt to improve performance, but was 
cautioned not to delay the schedule or to sacrifice reliability. Surprisingly, given 
the Propulsion Laboratory’s recommendation, the group postponed making any 
decision on the Rocketdyne effort until October.63  
 Reaction Motors made encouraging progress during September as the com-
pany continued to test the engine and injectors. The Rocketdyne program, how-
ever, failed to make any significant contributions, primarily because the company 
could not figure out how to mate its thrust chamber with the Reaction Motors 
ignition system. The X-15 Project Office conceded that the Rocketdyne effort was 
an “expensive and apparently fruitless” activity.64  
 On 7 October 1958, the Technical Advisory Group reviewed the engine 
programs and concluded that although the Rocketdyne effort might offer higher 
performance at some point in the future, Reaction Motors was well on its way to 
producing an acceptable engine that would be available sooner. As a result, on 
10 October 1958 the Propulsion Laboratory again recommended terminating the 
Rocketdyne effort, but this time Headquarters WADC and the X-15 Project Office 
agreed. Reaction Motors subsequently terminated the Rocketdyne subcontract.65  
 Development progress continued at a reasonable pace during the remainder 
of 1958, despite several failures . For instance, Reaction Motors traced a destruc-
tive failure on 24 October to components that had already been recognized as 
 
 
62 Red Flag Report, Engine Testing of the XLR-99, Prepared in Non-Rotating Engine Branch, Propulsion Laboratory, 
WADC, 7 August 958; interview, Major Arthur Murray, Chief, X-5 WSPO, Director of Systems Management, 
ARDC, 8 July 959, by Robert S. Houston, History Branch, WADC. Written transcript in the files at the AFMC 
History Office.
63 Memorandum, Colonel J. M. Silk, Chief, Propulsion Laboratory, to Commander, WADC, 20 August 958, subject: 
XLR99 Engine for X-5 Aircraft. In the files at the AFMC History Office.
6 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 5 September, 3 September, 9 September, and 26 September 958. 
65 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 3 October, 0 October, 7 October, and 2 October 958. 
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inadequate. Since Reaction Motors was already redesigning the parts, the Air 
Force did not consider the failure significant.66  
 Despite the best efforts of all concerned during 1958, problems remained 
at the beginning of 1959. At a 20 January meeting of the Technical Advisory 
Group, Reaction Motors admitted the engine still suffered from injector failures 
at low power settings, excessive heat buildup during idle, and minor leakage from 
various components. A few days later, on 23 January, excessive vibration in a test 
engine at Lake Denmark resulted in a fuel-manifold failure. Despite the seem-
ingly long list of deficiencies, it was apparent that the development effort would 
ultimately produce an acceptable engine.67 
 Static testing of prototype XLR99s and associated systems took place at the 
Reaction Motors facility in Lake Denmark, New Jersey. The test program used 
four test stands: three at Lake Denmark and stand E1 at the Picatinny Arsenal. The 
largest stand (R2 at Lake Denmark) was set up to test a complete aircraft system, 
including a structurally accurate aft fuselage, at all attitudes. Stands R2W and R3 
at Lake Denmark were capable of horizontal firing only. The former was used for 
durability testing and environmental testing, and the latter was used for delivery 
acceptance tests because it was equipped with an elaborate thrust-vector mount. 
The test area at Lake Denmark contained support facilities with a storage capacity 
of 30,000 gallons of liquid oxygen, 18,000 gallons of anhydrous ammonia, and 
4,000 gallons of hydrogen peroxide.
 Reaction Motors began engine-system testing during the fall of 1958, and by 
the beginning of 1959 eight flight-representative engines were undergoing some 
level of testing. Engine run time progressed consistently, and the engines accu-
mulated approximately 340 minutes of operation during the first quarter of 1959. 
Various components logged even greater run times, with the thrust chamber ac-
cumulating nearly 1,800 minutes and the turbopump over 4,200 minutes. The 
oxidizer pump, loosely based on the oxidizer pump used on the XLR30, operated 
at approximately 13,000 rpm. The fuel pump operated at 20,790 rpm and was 
essentially identical to the XLR30 unit. Each pump generated nearly 1,500 horse-
power and had an output pressure of approximately 1,200 psi. The combined oxi-
dizer/fuel flow rate at maximum thrust was 13,000 pounds per minute, exhausting 
the 18,000-pound propellant supply in 85 seconds.
 The company finally reached a long-sought goal on 18 April 1959 when the 
first XLR99 completed its factory acceptance tests. This was the engine scheduled 
for use in the formal preliminary flight rating test (PFRT), which was based on 
an MIL-E-6626 modified to include “man-rating” requirements,. The completion 
of the PFRT series formed the basis of the engine’s approval for use in the X-15. 
The PFRT began the same day the factory acceptance tests were completed, and 
ran through 5 May 1960. The tests used four engines on test stands R2 and R3 
at Lake Denmark, and E1 at Picatinny. Additional component tests took place at 
the Reaction Motors Component Laboratories and the Associated Testing Labo-
ratories in Cadwell, New Jersey. Reaction Motors personnel conducted all of the 
 
66 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 3 October,  November, and 28 November 958. 
67 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 30 January 959. 
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tests under the watchful eye of Air Force engineers and inspectors. Captain K. E. 
Weiss, the XLR99 project engineer, was present for about half of the tests.68  
 In order to obtain a high level of confidence in the service life of the engine, 
the Air Force required two engines to each accumulate 60 minutes of operational 
time. Some of the tests were challenging: “[T]he engine shall be run at thrust 
levels of 50,000, 37,500, and 25,000 pounds for the corresponding durations of 
87, 110, and 156 seconds. In addition, one run will be made at 90% of minimum 
thrust for 170 seconds duration and one run at 110% of maximum thrust for 80 
seconds duration.” In addition, to demonstrate the “all attitude” capability, an en-
gine performed a series of tests while being fired with the thrust vector 90 degrees 
up and also 30 degrees down.69 
 Unfortunately, the PFRT got off to a somewhat less than ideal start. The PFRT 
began with engine 012 performing the attitude test series. After it successfully 
completed nine 90-degree tests, Reaction Motors repositioned the engine for the 
68 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 2 April 959; Captain K. E. Weiss and First Lieutenant R. G. Leiby, Air Force 
report AFFTC-TR-60-36, “Preliminary Flight Test Rating Test XLR99-RM- Rocket Engine,” October 960. In the 
files at the AFFTC Access to Space Office Project Files. The engines used in the PFRT were serial numbers 0, 
02, 0, and 02.
69 Weiss and Leiby, “Preliminary Flight Test Rating Test XLR99-RM- Rocket Engine,” pp. 9-0.
The XLR99 was a great deal more complicated than the XLR11 engines used in most other X-planes. 
Reaction Motors conducted training classes for the Air Force and NASA personnel who would be 
responsible for operating and maintaining the engines at Edwards AFB. This was long before computer-
aided instruction had even been dreamed of, and the classes were conducted using mimeographed course 
material and chalkboards. (U.S. Air Force)
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30-degree nose-down test. After several runs, a faulty weld in the second-stage 
igniter liquid-oxygen feed line developed a leak that resulted in a fire. The dam-
age to the engine caused Reaction Motors to withdraw it from the test program for 
extensive repairs. To prevent further occurrence of this type of failure, engineers 
redesigned the igniter line to eliminate the weld, and the company revised its weld 
inspection program. The redesigned igniter line subsequently accumulated 1 hour 
of operation in engines 012 and 102 without incident. Since the original engine 
had not completed the 30-degree test series, all of those tests were repeated using 
engine 102.70 
 Another problem was more serious, and continued throughout the flight pro-
gram. During the PFRT, approximately 80 square inches of the Rokide Z71  ceramic 
coating used to insulate the firing chamber peeled off from engine 014. A heat-
transfer analysis indicated that the loss of the Rokide coating would not produce 
a chamber burn-through, but the engineers did not understand why it came off. 
However, the engine successfully completed its 1 hour of operation, so Reaction 
Motors revised the acceptable Rokide loss specification based on this performance. 
Other problems included a transient vibration problem during start that could not 
be isolated. Fortunately, the built-in vibration cutoff circuit demonstrated that it 
would shut down the engine before a hazardous condition developed, and restart-
ing the engine after the cutoff was usually successful. The test series experienced 
a variety of other minor problems, mostly resulting from faulty welds in various 
components, such as the turbine inlet and exhaust cases. The Air Force did not be-
lieve any of these were serious enough to terminate the tests or reject the engine.72 
 Reaction Motors conducted over 200 successful firings during the test pro-
gram, accumulating 146 minutes of main chamber operation. In the end, one en-
gine ran for 64 minutes and 100 starts; another ran for 65 minutes and 137 starts. 
The 231 seconds of specific impulse was 7 seconds below specification, but the 
engine met all other requirements. Engineers explained the low specific impulse 
by noting that “to expedite the development program, injector design was frozen 
before the optimum design was achieved.” However, nobody expected the slight 
reduction in specific impulse to have any particular effect on the X-15 program.73 
 Reaction Motors subsequently demonstrated the engine’s durability by ac-
cumulating more than 60 minutes of operating time on two different engines. One 
engine fired 108 times without having any more than routine maintenance. In ad-
dition, a series of 93 tests demonstrated that the engine would react safely under 
imposed malfunction conditions, and 234 engine tests demonstrated performance 
and safety requirements. Of these, 192 were full engine-firing demonstrations, 
and the remaining 42 were safety-limit tests that did not require thrust-chamber 
operation. The PFRT cleared the engine to operate between 50% and 100% of full 
70 Ibid, pp. 0-. 
7 Rokide is a registered trademark of the Norton Company Corporation and licensed to Plasma-Tec Incorporated.
72 Weiss and Leiby, “Preliminary Flight Test Rating Test XLR99-RM- Rocket Engine,” p. . Cutoffs immediately 
after launch happened several times during the flight program. The engine would be started after the airplane 
dropped from the NB-52, only to be automatically shut down because of excessive vibration. The pilot would 
then immediately initiate a restart, which would be successful and the flight would continue normally, albeit from 
a slightly lower altitude than planned.
73 Weiss and Leiby, “Preliminary Flight Test Rating Test XLR99-RM- Rocket Engine,” p. 0; Richard G. Leiby, 
Donald R. Bellman, and Norman E. DeMar, “XLR99 Engine Operating Experience,” a paper in the 1961 Research 
Airplane Committee Report, p. 27.
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thrust. Testing continued, however, and the Air Force subsequently cleared the en-
gine to operate at 30% of full thrust, meeting the initial contract specification.74 
 It is interesting to note that early in the proposal stage, North American de-
termined that the aerodynamic drag of the X-15 was not as important a design 
factor as was normally the case with contemporary jet-powered fighters.75  This 
was largely due to the amount of excess thrust expected to be available from the 
engine. Engineers considered weight the largest driver in the overall airplane de-
sign. Only about 10% of the total engine thrust was necessary to overcome drag, 
and another 20% was required to overcome weight. The remaining 70% of engine 
thrust was available to accelerate the X-15 .76 
 At the time it was built, the XLR99 was the largest man-rated rocket engine 
yet developed. Of course, this would soon change as the manned space program 
accelerated into high gear. The 915-pound XLR99 could produce 50,000 pounds 
of thrust (lbf) at sea level, 57,000 lbf at 45,000 feet, and 57,850 lbf at 100,000 
feet. The nominal oxidizer-to-fuel ratio was 1.25:1, and the engine had a normal 
chamber pressure of 600 psi. Playing with the oxidizer-to-fuel ratio could slightly 
increase the thrust, and the amount of thrust varied somewhat among engines be-
cause of manufacturing tolerances. Some engines produced over 61,000 lbf at spe-
cific altitudes. The engine had a specific impulse of 230-lbf-sec/lbm at sea level 
and 276-lbf-sec/lbm at 100,000 feet. The engine was throttleable from 30% to 
100%, although the first couple of engines were limited to 50% on the low end un-
til early 1962. Even after Reaction Motors modified the engines and the Air Force 
approved the use of 30% thrust, a high vibration level meant that they were opera-
tionally restricted to no less than 40% thrust. The amount of available propellant 
was all that limited the duration of any given run. Reaction Motors estimated the 
service life (mean time between overhaul) of the engine at 1 hour or 100 starts.77
ROCKETS IN THE HIGH DESERT
 In June 1959, the $450,000 Rocket Engine Test Facility at Edwards AFB 
came on line to provide local testing of the XLR99, although it would be almost 
a year before an XLR99 was available to use in it. This test facility provided a 
capability for engine checkout and pilot and maintenance-crew familiarization, as 
well as limited development firings. There were two test areas with a large block-
house between them that contained various monitoring equipment and provided 
safe shelter for the ground crew during engine runs. During the early portion of 
7 Weiss and Leiby, “Preliminary Flight Test Rating Test XLR99-RM- Rocket Engine,” p. 0; Leiby et al., “XLR99 
Engine Operating Experience,” p. 27; C. Wayne Ottinger and James F. Maher, “YLR99- Rocket Engine Oper-
ating Experience in the X-5 Research Aircraft,” a proposed, but apparently unpublished, NASA technical note 
prepared during May 963. Typescript in the files at the DFRC History Office.
75 All of the airframe competitors had noted this, as had Douglas in the D-558-3 study.
76 Charles H. Feltz, “Description of the X-5 Airplane, Performance, and Design Mission,” a paper in the 1956 Re-
search Airplane Committee Report, pp. 28.
77 Weiss and Leiby, “Preliminary Flight Test Rating Test XLR99-RM- Rocket Engine;” Leiby et al., “XLR99 Engine 
Operating Experience,” p. 26; Ottinger and Maher, “YLR99- Rocket Engine Operating Experience in the X-5 
Research Aircraft.”
X-15: EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
the program, Reaction Motors used one area to test uninstalled engines, while the 
Air Force fired engines installed in one of the X-15s in the other area. Several 
“pillboxes” were also located near each area that provided shelter for other ground 
crews so that they could observe the operation of the engine.78 
 In December 1959, the Air Force formally approved the XLR99 for flight in 
the X-15. Reaction Motors delivered a ground-test engine to Edwards at the end 
of May 1960, and the first flight engine at the end of July. Initially, the Air Force 
procured 10 flight engines, along with six spare injector-chamber assemblies. 
Later, the Air Force procured one additional flight engine. However, in January 
1961, shortly after the first XLR99 test flight, only four engines were available to 
the flight program while Reaction Motors was assembling four others for delivery 
later in 1961. Reaction Motors continued to use four engines for ground tests, in-
cluding two flight engines. Three of these engines were involved in tests to isolate 
and eliminate vibrations at low power levels, while the fourth investigated extend-
ing the Rokide loss that was affecting the life of the thrust chamber.79
78 System Package Program, System 653A, 8 May 96, p. 7-; Leiby et al., “XLR99 Engine Operating Experi-
ence,” pp. 26-27; e-mail, Bill Arnold (former Reaction Motors engineer) to Dennis R. Jenkins, various dates 
in September 2002. North American operated the PSTS until it turned over the last XLR99-equipped airplane to 
the government. At that time the AFFTC Rocket Engine Group, under the Maintenance Division, took over the 
operation and maintenance of the PSTS and all engine maintenance and overhaul. NASA performed all engine 
operations, including minor engine maintenance, while the engine was installed in the airplanes.
79 James E. Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” not dated, p. 8; X-5 Status Report, 
Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 30 December 960, pp. 5-6. Serial numbers 006 and 02 
were the dedicated ground-test engines; flight engines were serial numbered 0–, although 0 and 02 
were never flown and were always used as ground-test engines. Engine 05 was destroyed in the explosion that 
damaged X-5-3 on the PSTS, and engine  was lost with Mike Adams on flight 3-65-97.
In preparation for the X-15 program, the Air Force constructed the Rocket Engine Test Facility at Ed-
wards AFB to provide local testing of  the XLR99. There were two test areas, each capable of  supporting 
an X-15 during engine tests. For most of  the flight program, the XLR99 had to be fired prior to every flight 
attempt, leading several engineers to complain they were testing the engines to death. Later in the program an 
engine could fly a second flight if  no anomalies had occurred on the first. (U.S. Air Force)
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CONTINUING CHALLENGES
 Unfortunately, the reliability demonstrated during the PFRT program did not 
continue at Edwards. Early in the flight program, vibrations, premature chamber 
failures, pump seal leaks, and corrosion problems plagued operations. Potentially 
the most serious problem was a 1,600-cycle vibration. Fortunately, the natural fre-
quencies of the engines dampened the vibration below 100 g. However, between 
100 and 200 g, the vibration could be dampened or could become divergent, de-
pending on a complex set of circumstances that could not be predicted in advance, 
and the vibration always diverged above 200 g.80  
 The vibrations caused a great deal of concern at Edwards. On 12 May 1960, as 
the program was trying to get ready for the first XLR99 flight, the Air Force called 
a meeting to discuss the problem. Although Reaction Motors had experienced 
only one vibration shutdown every 50 engine starts at Lake Denmark, personnel 
at Edwards reported that there had been eight malfunction shutdowns out of 17 
attempted starts. The vibration began when the main-propellant valves opened for 
final chamber start, although the engines had not experienced vibrations during 
the igniter phase. Since the demonstrated rate of occurrence had jumped from 2% 
at Lake Denmark to 47% at Edwards, nobody could ignore the problem. Engi-
neers discovered that the 1,600-cycle vibration corresponded to the engine-engine 
mount resonant frequency, and that Reaction Motors had not seen the vibration 
using the earlier non-flight-rated engine mounts at Lake Denmark. As a temporary 
expedient, Reaction Motors installed an accelerometer that shut the engine down 
when the vibration amplitude reached 120 g, a move the company believed would 
permit flight-testing to begin.81 
 The engine (serial number 105) used at Edwards differed only slightly in 
configuration from those used at Lake Denmark; for example, it used an oxidizer-
to-fuel ratio of 1.15:1 instead of 1.25:1. The desired operating ratio at altitude was 
1.25:1, and this is what Reaction Motors had used during their tests. However, to 
simulate the 1.25:1 ratio on the ground, the engine had to run at 1.15:1 to compen-
sate for atmospheric and propellant density differences at the lower altitude. Reac-
tion Motors had tested this reduced oxidizer-to-fuel ratio only twice at Lake Den-
mark, and had not encountered vibrations either time. The company recommended 
a series of actions, including checking for purge gas leaks at the PSTS, changing 
the propellant ratio back to 1.25:1, and performing more engine test firings.82 
 By the beginning of June 1960, the problem did not seem to be getting any 
better. The Air Force conducted two tests with 17 starts on engine 105 at Edwards, 
with two vibration shutdowns using the ground orifice (1.15:1 ratio). When en-
gineers reinstalled the flight orifice (1.25:1 ratio), three of five starts resulted in 
vibration shutdowns. Reaction Motors conducted 18 starts on engine 104, and 
 
 
80 Leiby et al., “XLR99 Engine Operating Experience,” pp. 28-29.
8 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 5 May 960, pp. 5-6. 
82 Ibid; e-mail, Bill Arnold (Reaction Motors) to Dennis R. Jenkins, various dates in September 2002.
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three of the four initial starts resulted in vibration shutdowns, but all restarts 
were successful .83 
 A series of minor changes made to engine 104 by Reaction Motors seemed to 
ease the problem, and between the middle of July and the middle of August 1960, 
the engine accumulated 25 starts at Edwards without any vibration-induced shut-
downs. In fact, only a single malfunction shutdown of any type was experienced, 
which was attributed to a severe “throttle chop” that the turbopump governor could 
not keep up with. Other XLR99s had experienced similar problems, and Reaction 
Motors warned the pilots to move the throttle slowly to avoid the situation.84 
 Still, as late as the meeting of the Technical Advisory Group on 9-10 Novem-
ber 1960, the vibration problem persisted and the Air Force launched an effort to 
solve the problem. This program used two engines (006 and 012) at Lake Den-
mark and completed a series of baseline tests by the end of November that showed 
a 30% incidence rate of vibration shutdowns with the flight orifices installed. Re-
action Motors found that modifying the liquid-oxygen inlet substantially lowered 
83 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters,  June 960, p. 8-9. 
8 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 5 August 960, pp. 5-6. 
The Propulsion System Test Stand was the unlikely name for a non-flight X-15 fuselage that was used to test 
rocket engines. At least two of  the fuselages were manufactured, one for Reaction Motors and one for Edwards 
AFB. Here technicians install an XLR99 in the PSTS in preparation for a test. (NASA)
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the incident rate of vibration shutdowns. Since this modification did not seem to 
have any other noticeable effect on the engine, the Air Force adopted it as a tem-
porary fix.85 
 Separately, Reaction Motors determined that o-ring deterioration at the cas-
ing joint caused fuel pump seal leaks. Replacing the o-ring was difficult because 
it took technicians two or three shifts to remove the turbine exhaust duct, stator 
blades, rotor, and inlet housing; just to remove the exhaust duct necessitated the 
removal and re-safety-wiring of 60 bolts. Thus, although the o-ring failure itself 
was not serious, since it simply resulted in a steam leak, the repair required re-
moving the engine from the aircraft, performing a time-consuming engine disas-
sembly, and revalidating the engine installation. This process directly contributed 
to early flight delays using the XLR99.86 
 Ironically, the corrosion problem appeared to be the result of the unusually 
long engine life. With a few exceptions, the materials used by Reaction Motors for 
the turbopump were compatible with the various propellants, but those in contact 
with the hydrogen peroxide were experiencing more corrosion than desired. There 
were also some instances of galvanic action between the magnesium pump case 
and steel parts with decomposed peroxide as an electrolyte. As one researcher 
noted, “the only thing really compatible with peroxide is more peroxide.” There 
were no obvious fixes, so the program lived with the problem.87 
 The premature failure of the thrust chambers was of more concern. To insulate 
the stainless-steel cooling tubes from the 5,000°F flame, Reaction Motors used a 
0.005-inch-thick, flame-sprayed Nichrome®88   undercoat with 0.010 inch of oxy-
gen-acetylene flame-sprayed Rokide Z zirconia as an insulating, erosion-resistant 
top coating. In service, the Rokide coating began to spall or flake due to thermal 
cycling from the large number of engine starts, and from vibration effects from an 
unstable flame. For instance, by January 1961 about 50 square inches of Rokide 
coating had peeled off engine 108 at Edwards, including 14 inches during a single 
vibration shutdown. The loss of the coating exposed the cooling tubes to the heat 
and erosive effects of the flame, overheating the ammonia coolant within the tubes 
and reducing the amount of cooling available. The superheated ammonia vapors 
also attacked the stainless steel and formed a very brittle nitrided layer. At the 
same time, the combustion gases began to melt and erode the tube surface. As this 
condition continued, the effective thickness of the tube wall gradually decreased 
until it burst. Raw ammonia then leaked into the chamber, causing more hot spots 
and eventually the complete failure of the chamber.89  
 In January 1961 the X-15 Project Office and the Materials Central Division 
of the Aeronautical Systems Division at Wright Field initiated a study of methods 
to improve the chamber life of the XLR99. Two possible approaches were to 
85 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 5 November, 30 November, and 5 
December 960. 
86 Leiby et al., “XLR99 Engine Operating Experience,” pp. 28-29.
87 Ibid, p. 29.
88 Nichrome is a registered trademark of D. H. Alloys, Inc.
89 Lawrence N. Hjelm and Bernard R. Bornhorst, “Development of Improved Ceramic Coatings to Increase the Life 
of the XLR99 Thrust Chamber,” a paper in the 1961 Research Airplane Committee Report, p. 227; X-5 Status 
Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters,  February 96, p. 6. In the files at the DFRC His-
tory Office. At the time, the acceptable limit was a loss of 2 square inches; this was raised to 68 square inches 
based on a 350°F cooling limit.
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attempt to improve the Rokide coating system, or to develop an improved coat-
ing. The Air Force contract with Reaction Motors already included an effort to 
improve the Rokide coating, but researchers expressed little faith that this would 
achieve any measurable results. This resulted in the Air Force initiating a program 
to develop an alternate coating. In the meantime, engineers at the NASA Flight 
Research Center (FRC) surveyed other rocket engine manufacturers to find out 
whether they had developed workable processes. Both Rocketdyne and Aerojet 
were doing extensive laboratory testing of ceramics applied with plasma-arc de-
vices, but neither had put the process into production. Both companies indicated 
that their experience with flame-sprayed alumina and zirconia had been unsatis-
factory. Instead, Rocketdyne was working on metal-ceramic graduated coatings, 
and Aerojet was investigating the use of refractory metal (molybdenum and tung-
sten) overcoats on top of ceramics.90  
 At the time, the Air Force already had a contract with the Plasmakote Cor-
poration to study graduated coatings in general, and this contract was reoriented 
to solving the XLR99 problem specifically. A second contract, this one with the 
University of Dayton, was reoriented to provide realistic techniques for labora-
tory evaluations of the coatings.91  
 A graduated coating consisted of sprayed layers of metal and ceramic; the 
composition changed from 100% metal at the substrate to 100% ceramic at the 
top surface. This removed the traditionally weak, sensitive interface between the 
metal and ceramic layers. Researchers produced the coatings by spraying mixed 
powders with an arc-plasma jet and gradually changing the ratio of metal and 
ceramic powders, with most of the coatings using combinations of zirconia with 
Nichrome, molybdenum, or tungsten. The FRC recommended adopting the new 
technique immediately as a way to repair damaged chambers at Edwards. They 
noted that engine 101 had been patched using Rokide coating, but the engine 
would soon need to be repaired again since the coating was not lasting. The Air 
Force and NASA decided that the next patch on engine 101 would use the new 
process, and NASA built a special fixture at the FRC to allow the chamber of a 
fully assembled engine to be coated.92 
 Before the new coating was applied, NASA tested an existing Rokide cham-
ber for 5.5 minutes, and 25 square inches of Rokide coating was lost during the 
test. Engineers then applied a graduated coating segmented into areas using sev-
eral different top coats, including tantalum carbide, titanium carbide, titanium 
nitride, zirconia with 10% molybdenum, and zirconia with 1% nickel. This cham-
ber ran for 5.75 minutes, and only 3 square inches of the new coatings were lost. 
However encouraging, the tests were of relatively short duration and researchers 
did not consider them conclusive. One thing that became apparent during the tests 
90 Letter, Donald R. Bellman, M. Alan Covington, and C. Wayne Ottinger/FRC to Paul Bikle/FRC, subject: Ceramic 
Coatings for the XLR99, 6 February 96; Hjelm and Bornhorst, “Development of Improved Ceramic Coatings 
to Increase the Life of the XLR99 Thrust Chamber,” pp. 229-230.
9 Hjelm and Bornhorst, “Development of Improved Ceramic Coatings to Increase the Life of the XLR99 Thrust 
Chamber,” pp. 227-228. Plasmakote was operating under Air Force contract number AF33(66)7323. The Uni-
versity of Dayton was operating under Air Force contract number AF33(66)7838.
92 Letter, Donald R. Bellman, M. Alan Covington, and C. Wayne Ottinger/FRC to Paul Bikle/FRC, 6 February 96, 
subject: Ceramic Coatings for the XLR99; Hjelm and Bornhorst, “Development of Improved Ceramic Coatings to 
Increase the Life of the XLR99 Thrust Chamber,” pp. 229-230.
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was that it would be extremely difficult or impossible to reclaim failed chambers 
if the coating wore thin or was lost, since the internal damage to the tube might be 
sufficient to cause it to fail with no visible damage.93 
 The Technical Advisory Group met on 11–12 January 1961 at the Reaction 
Motors facility at Lake Denmark. All in attendance agreed that chamber durability 
needed to be increased, and supported the development of a quick-change orifice 
to simplify ground runs. The group also recommended that the X-15 Project Of-
fice initiate the procurement of six spare chambers and sufficient long-lead ma-
terial to construct six more. It could not be determined whether these chambers 
were actually procured.94 
 Some documentation indicates that the XLR99 was redesignated YLR99 on 
29 December 1961, although nothing appears to have changed on the engines 
93 Hjelm and Bornhorst, “Development of Improved Ceramic Coatings to Increase the Life of the XLR99 Thrust 
Chamber,” pp. 230-232.
9 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters,  February 96, p. 5. 
One of  the most significant issues experienced by the XLR99 during the flight program was the 
premature failure of  the thrust chambers. Researchers eventually traced this to the spalling or flaking 
of  the Rokide Z zirconia coating that had been applied to the inside of  the chamber as an insulator. 
Although improved coatings were eventually developed, the Flight Research Center also developed an in-
house capability to recoat the chambers when necessary, resulting in a significant cost savings compared 
to sending the chambers back to Reaction Motors or procuring new chambers. (NASA)
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themselves. The original source documentation from the period is inconsistent in 
its use of XLR99 or YLR99; this history will use XLR99 throughout simply to 
avoid confusion .95 
 By March 1962, technicians at the FRC had the necessary equipment and 
training to recoat the chambers as needed. The cost of the tooling had come to 
almost $10,000, but the cost to recoat a chamber was only about $2,000–much 
less than the cost of procuring a new chamber from Reaction Motors. The coating 
finally approved for use consisted of 30 mils of molybdenum primer in the throat 
and 10 mils elsewhere, followed by 6 mils of a graduated Nichrome-zirconia coat-
ing and then 6 mils of a zirconia topcoat. NASA used this coating process for the 
duration of the flight program with generally satisfactory results.96 
 As is the case with almost any new technology, some things can never be fully 
understood. One of the harder things to grasp when dealing with complex me-
chanical devices is component matching (or mismatching), i.e., why some items 
will work in a particular assembly and other seemingly identical items will not. 
For example, during the initial checkout of engines 108 and 111 at Edwards, both 
engines exhibited excessive vibrations. NASA replaced the igniter in engine 108 
with a spare that reduced the vibration to acceptable levels. The igniter that had 
been removed from 108 was then installed in 111 and its vibration was reduced to 
acceptable levels. Compatibility was not a particular problem, but scenarios such 
as this did point out some puzzling inconsistencies.97
RETROSPECT
 After the first 50 flights with the XLR99 engine, researchers at the FRC took 
a step back and reflected on the problems they had experienced. Excepting the 
single incident on the ground that gave Scott Crossfield his wild ride at the Rocket 
Engine Test Facility, the engine had proved to be remarkably safe during opera-
tion. Although there had been a multitude of problems, large and small, the pro-
gram described itself as “engine safe.”98 
 One of the major factors in successful engine operation in the X-15 after 
launch was the amount of checkout the engine went through on the ground before-
hand. This had its drawbacks, however, since “operating cycles on the hardware 
for ground assurance checks take a relatively large portion of the hardware life,” 
according to C. Wayne Ottinger and James F. Maher. Illustrating this is the fact 
that 350 ground runs, including 100 with the XLR99 installed in the X-15, had 
been necessary to achieve the first 50 flights. For the first dozen flights, the FRC 
conducted a test of the engine installed in the X-15 before each mission. After the 
95 System Package Program, System 653A, 8 May 96, p. 6-, In the files at the DFRC History Office.
96 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 2 January 962, p. . 
97 Leiby et al., “XLR99 Engine Operating Experience,” p. 29.
98 C. Wayne Ottinger and James F. Maher, “YLR99- Rocket Engine Operating Experience in the X-5 Research 
Aircraft,” a proposed, but apparently unpublished, NASA technical note prepared during May 963, no page 
numbers. Typescript in the files at the DFRC History Office.
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12th flight, a flight attempt could follow a successful flight without a test firing–a 
process that saved 18 ground runs during the next 38 missions.99 
 Between the conclusion of the PFRT and May 1963, 90 modifications were 
made to the engine configuration. In order to meet the safety criteria imposed 
by the Air Force, Reaction Motors used the “single-malfunction” concept, i.e., 
it designed the engine so that no single malfunction would result in a hazardous 
condition. The company used a dual-malfunction concept with regard to structural 
failure, meaning that if one member failed, another would carry its load. The 
PFRT series of tests convincingly demonstrated these capabilities, since 47 differ-
ent malfunctions resulted in a safe shutdown.100 
 Despite all of the effort that went into developing a restartable engine, this 
capability was not used during the first 50 flights, except for four flights on which 
it was used to start an engine that had failed on the first attempt. However, another 
feature proved to be a welcome addition: the ability to operate the pump and both 
igniter stages while the research airplane was attached to the carrier aircraft. This 
allowed verification of over 90% of the moving components in the engine before 
the research airplane was dropped .101 
 When the engines first arrived at Edwards, several components (particularly 
leaking pumps and malfunctioning hydrogen-peroxide metering valves) account-
ed for an abnormally high percentage of the flight delays. Relaxing the operating 
requirements regarding certain pump leaks and limiting the duration of the pump 
run time did as much to reduce pump delays as did the ultimate fixes themselves. 
NASA also noted that “excessive time lag in obtaining approval for correction” 
and “excessive time required to develop the correction and complete flight hard-
ware incorporation of fixes after approval” were significant contributors to the 
delays caused by the XLR99.102 
 The control box was the heart of the engine and was responsible for the control 
and sequencing of the engine. This was not a computer by the modern definition of 
the term, but rather a mechanical sequencer with some electronic components. The 
major problem experienced by this device during the first 50 flights was the failure 
of pressure switches due to ammonia corrosion of the silver contacts–echoes of 
the original warnings on the effects of ammonia exposure. Reaction Motors finally 
eliminated this problem by switching to gold contacts. In addition, there were ran-
dom wiring discrepancies, servo amplifier failures, and timer failures.103 
 During the latter part of 1962, several in-flight oxidizer depletion shutdowns 
resulted in second-stage igniter damage because reduced liquid-oxygen injector 
pressure allowed the reverse flow of ammonia into the oxidizer inlet. The subse-
quent minor explosion either bulged the igniter inlet manifold or blew the face 
off the second-stage igniter. Reaction Motors installed an auxiliary purge system 
to correct the problem. In addition, several sensing-line detonations had defied 
correction throughout the summer of 1963. These occurred in the second-stage 
99 Leiby et al., “XLR99 Engine Operating Experience,” pp. 26-27; Ottinger and Maher, “YLR99- Rocket Engine 
Operating Experience in the X-5 Research Aircraft.”
00 Ottinger and Maher, “YLR99- Rocket Engine Operating Experience in the X-5 Research Aircraft.”
0 Ibid.
02 Ibid.
03 Ibid.
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chamber sense line during any thrust decrease when unburned combustible gas 
from the previous increasing pressure cycle entered the sense line. Interestingly, 
engineers initially attributed this problem to a lubricant used in the main pro-
pellant valve. They believed that the “liquid-oxygen safe” lubricant was impact- 
sensitive and responsible for the second-stage igniter explosions. Although further 
investigation later proved this theory incorrect, analysis of the lubricant revealed 
that some batches were out of specification on impact sensitivity.104 
 The hydrogen-peroxide system that powered the turbopump experienced 
several problems, including erratic metering valve operation, catalyst-bed de-
terioration, seal failures, and corrosion. Engineers corrected the metering valve 
problem by increasing the clearance around the valve. The substitution of elec-
trolytically produced hydrogen peroxide for organically produced product solved 
the catalyst-bed deterioration, although it technically violated the engine qualifi-
cation since the PFRT had been run with electrolytically produced hydrogen per-
oxide. The development of improved gaskets and seals relieved the seal failures 
and solved most of the corrosion problems. The turbopump itself suffered only 
minor problems, mainly steam and propellant leaks. The lowering of specifica-
tions governing the allowable leakage rate provided the most progress in working 
with the problem.105 
 The oxidizer system also created some headaches, even though it was largely 
a copy of the original XLR30 system. The major problems were propellant valve 
leakage and the need for a quick-change orifice. Improved lip and shaft seals 
initially helped control the leakage, and eventually Reaction Motors introduced 
a redesigned valve that eliminated the problem. Prior to the incorporation of the 
quick-change orifice, it was necessary to remove the engine from the aircraft in 
order to change the oxidizer-to-fuel ratio. Engineers changed the ratio based on 
the proposed altitude for the next flight to maximize the performance of the en-
0 Ibid.
05 Ibid.
The XLR99s were extensively tested, especially early in the flight program. For the first 53 XLR99 
flights, the engines were tested for 188 minutes before being flown for 75 minutes, more than two min-
utes of  testing for each minute of  flight. (NASA)
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gine. Once Reaction Motors incorporated the quick-change modification, engi-
neers at Edwards could insert different-sized probes into the orifice while the 
engine was in the aircraft. This eliminated the need to conduct a ground run after 
reinstalling the engine. Tailoring the oxidizer-to-fuel ratio actually allowed the 
engine to produce slightly over 61,000 lbf at some altitudes.106  
 Although nearly everybody considered the XLR99 a good research airplane 
engine, the engine was far from perfect. Milt Thompson observed that “the LR99 
was amazingly reliable if we got it lit, and if we did not move the throttle while it 
was running.” Joe Vensel, the director of FRC flight operations echoed the advice: 
“[I]f you get the engine lit, leave it alone, don’t screw with it.” This is perhaps 
overstating the case, but not by much. During the early part of the flight program, 
the XLR99 had a remarkably poor record of starting when the pilot wanted. Part 
of the problem was that the early flight rules said to start the engine at minimum 
throttle (50% for the very early engines, and 30% for the later ones). The engine 
simply did not like to start at those throttle settings. After the program decided to 
start the engine at 100% throttle, things got much better.107 
 Still, even after the engine lit, it did not particularly like to throttle. As a re-
sult, Joe Vensel directed the pilots not to throttle the engine until after the X-15 
had sufficient energy to make it back to Edwards. Milt Thompson talked him into 
changing his mind for one flight (3-29-48) in order to accommodate a research 
request, and Thompson ended up on Cuddeback Lake when the engine quit as he 
throttled back 42 seconds after launch. After that, the restriction was rigorously 
enforced: no throttle movement until the airplane could glide back to Edwards. 
Although the lower throttle limit on later engines was 30%, the program decided 
not to go below 40% because of the persistent vibration problem. The pilots also 
learned to move the throttle slowly to minimize the chances of the engine quitting. 
It mostly worked, and flight planner Bob Hoey does not remember any significant 
problems occurring later in the program.108 
 During the flight program, eight in-flight propulsion problems resulted in 
emergency landings. These included one due to no ignition, one because the en-
gine hung at 35% thrust, one shutdown when the throttle was retarded, two due 
to low fuel-line pressures, one turbopump-case failure, one ruptured fuel tank, 
and one due to a perceived lack of fuel flow from the external tanks on X-15A-2. 
Overall, it was not a bad record for a state-of-the-art engine over the course of 
199 flights. 
 Although 11 flight engines were manufactured, only eight were avail-
able to the flight program. One (s/n 105) was lost in the ground explo-
sion that seriously damaged the X-15-3 before the XLR99 had even flown, 
and two other flight engines were dedicated to the ground-test program.
Making 199 flights on eight engines was an outstanding achievement. 
 
 
06 Ibid.
07 Milton O. Thompson, At the Edge of Space: The X-15 Flight Program, (Washington and London: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 992), p. 22.
08 E-mail, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 5 July 200.
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XLR99 Flight Engine Run Time Summary (Minutes per Year)
Year s/n 
103
s/n 
104
s/n 
106
s/n 
107
s/n 
108
s/n 
109
s/n 
110
s/n  
111
No. of 
flights
Pre Del 13 .47 31 .23 7 .90 8 .63 6 .29 4 .64 4 .45 4 .43 –
1960 11 .42 5 .88 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
1961 16 .66 0 12 .05 4 .78 13 .34 5 .98 1 .53 5 .75 13
1962 8 .72 6 .13 7 .02 18 .32 5 .77 9 .45 11 .75 11 .87 30
1963 1 .43 8 .52 0 16 .27 5 .58
2 .55
(9 .10)* 11 .22 6 .32 21
1964 12 .03 11 .05 6 .08 6 .52 7 .68 6 .58
0
(6 .33)*
3 .24
(20 .03)* 27
1965 12 .03 7 .86 3 .26 14 .22 15 .10 7 .73 8 .40 5 .93 32
1966 2 .72 0 15 .07 9 .98 0 .52 2 .37 8 .85 4 .65 20
1967 11 .45 3 .98 1 .23 2 .63 5 .50 2 .72 4 .72 2 .30 15
1968 3 .80 3 .60 2 .60 0 .70 3 .63 3 .25 1 .22 Lost+ 8
Total 73 .73 78 .25 55 .21 82 .05 63 .41 45 .77
(54 .87)*
52 .14
(58 .49)*
44 .49
(64 .52)
169
*Additional time used for ground testing of second-stage igniter purge modification. 
+Lost in X-15-3 .
Data courtesy of Robert G. Hoey.
 
 As was done for most components on the X-15, all XLR99 maintenance was 
performed at Edwards using a local, depot-level maintenance approach. With few 
exceptions, the engines ran for a brief period in the PSTS before NASA installed 
them in one of the X-15s or stored them for future use. Since the X-15 maintenance 
philosophy was to provide sufficient spare engines and maintenance personnel to 
ensure 100% flight engine availability, it was normal to have a backlog of engines 
in flight-ready storage (essentially spares). The engine activity was divided into 
three categories: 1) installed in an X-15, 2) active maintenance, and 3) flight-ready 
storage. Early in the program, NASA conducted one or more ground engine runs 
(leak checks) after installing the engine in the airplane and before every flight. 
This requirement for an aircraft engine run between flights was relaxed later in the 
program, assuming there were no engine problems on the previous flight.109  
09 Robert G. Hoey, in excerpts from a term paper submitted in January 976, provided to the author.
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 The staff of the AFFTC Rocket Engine Maintenance Shop from 1961 to 1968 
in support of the XLR99 averaged about 37 people. Interestingly, in 1965 these 
technicians made about $4 per hour on average. This shop was responsible for all 
maintenance of all uninstalled XLR99s; the FRC handled minor repairs of installed 
engines. Every 30 operating minutes, on a test stand or in the airplane, each XLR99 
had to undergo a “30-minute” inspection that took just over two weeks to com-
plete. The Air Force overhauled the engines when needed, a process that took just 
over a month. Recoating the thrust chamber, done by the FRC, took a few days.110 
 Unlike many rocket engines of that era, the XLR99 was equipped with a 
malfunction-detection and automatic-shutdown system. For most engines, reli-
ability is based on the number of start attempts. However, since one of the primary 
features of the XLR99 was its ability to restart in flight, its total reliability was 
0 Ibid.
Milton O. Thompson had more than his fair share of  experience with the XLR99, and enjoyed sharing 
it during discussions with various groups after the X-15 program ended. One of  his favorite stories con-
cerned the emergency landing he had to make on Flight 3-29-48 when the XLR99 quit as he throttled 
back 42 seconds after launch. (NASA)
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defined as the number of successful engine operations per flight attempt, regard-
less of the number of start attempts. The resulting X-15 data and point estimates 
of reliability were as follows:111
 
XLR99/X-15 flight attempts112   169
Successful engine operations  165
Successful first-start attempts  159
Overall reliability   97.6%
First-start reliability   94.0%
 Over the course of the X-15 program, the flight engines accrued a total of 
550.53 minutes of run time, plus an undetermined amount on ground-test en-
gines. A total of 1,016 engine starts were recorded for the flyable engines (dedi-
cated ground-test engines incurred many more). Although there were numerous 
automatic shutdowns, there were no catastrophic engine failures. The safety of 
the XLR-99 engine (defined as the probability of non-catastrophic engine opera-
tion) may be conservatively estimated by dividing the number of successful starts 
(1,016) by the number of starts plus one (1,017) (assuming the next start to be 
catastrophic for the worst case). The resulting estimate of the probability of non-
catastrophic engine operation is approximately 0.99902.113 
 In retrospect, the engine still casts a favorable impression. The XLR99 pushed 
the state of the art further than any engine of its era, yet there were no catastrophic 
engine failures in flight or on the ground. There were, however, many minor de-
sign and manufacturing deficiencies, particularly with the Rokide coating on the 
thrust chamber. Surprisingly, the primary source of problems on most large rocket 
engines–the turbopump–proved to be remarkably robust and trouble free.
POST X-15
 Of the 11 XLR99 flight engines that were produced during 1958–1960 to 
support the flight program, one (s/n 105) was destroyed in the 1959 ground ac-
cident and another (111) was destroyed in the 1967 crash of the X-15-3. During 
September 1975, researchers at Edwards conducted an inventory of existing en-
gines and engine spares in anticipation that the engine might possibly be used in 
a future flight program. Seven flight-rated and one ground-test engine remained 
at Edwards, but the Air Force had already scrapped the others or given them to 
museums. Although the engineers thought most piece-parts were available from 
various sources, three high-cost spares (thrust chamber/injector assemblies, tur-
bopump cases, and igniters) were in short supply.114 
 Ibid.
2 This is the number of times an XLR99-equipped X-5 was dropped from one of the NB-52s.
3 Robert G. Hoey, in excerpts from a term paper submitted in January 976, provided to the author. Assuming that 
the next instance will be a failure is a standard statistical method of determining the probability of failure.
 Robert G. Hoey, in excerpts from a paper written in January 976, provided to Dennis R. Jenkins.
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 For instance, each thrust chamber/injector assembly cost $125,000 in 1965, 
and 17 were available in 1975. However, the X-15 flight program had gone 
through 18 similar units, usually because of cracks in the tubing or injector spud . 
Six pump cases ($12,000 each) had been replaced during the X-15 flight pro-
gram, mainly due to corrosion, and there were eight cases available for future 
use.  Only 10 igniters ($4,000) were available, but the flight program had used 
17, mainly due to detonation at shutdown–a condition that Reaction Motors had 
largely corrected.115 
 In addition to the possibility of using existing engines in another program, 
several proposals had been made for augmented or improved versions of the 
XLR99 to support various projects . The first serious effort was to support the 
hypersonic research engine (HRE) experiment on the X-15A-2. On 30 October 
1963, Douglas E. Wall, the project manager for airborne hypersonic research at 
the Aeronautical System Branch at the FRC, wrote to James E. Love, the NASA 
X-15 program manager, advising him that the X-15A-2 would likely fall far short 
of the performance requirements for the HRE program.116 
 The region of interest for supersonic combustion testing was from 7,000 to 
8,000 fps at dynamic pressures between 1,000 and 2,000 psf. Although Wall cau-
tioned that he could not ascertain the extent of the performance shortfall until after 
preliminary flight tests, at the time it looked like the X-15A-2 would fall approxi-
mately 1,000 fps short. At a meeting held at Wright-Patterson on 25 September 
1963, researchers recommended that the X-15 Project Office fund an upgrade to 
the XLR99, and the AFFTC and FRC representatives proposed three different 
modifications. The first was the use of an extended nozzle to increase perfor-
mance at the mid-altitudes (≈100,000 feet) for the expected ramjet experiments. 
The other modifications included a modified injector assembly and the use of a 
hydrazine fuel additive. Researchers expected that these modifications would take 
between 12 and 14 months to develop and implement. The X-15 Project Office 
agreed to look into the matter; however, there appears to be no record indicating 
that any action was taken.117 
 Nevertheless, Reaction Motors did conduct several studies during 1964–1965 
on possible improvements to the XLR99. At least one of these investigated the use 
of axisymmetric and two-dimensional nozzles, and another studied possible im-
provements to the thrust chamber. Reaction Motors engineers also kept up with 
the published reports from other rocket-engine manufacturers to see if any of their 
developments might be applicable to the XLR99.118 
  
5 Ibid. The 7 available thrust chambers consisted of four new, one rebuilt, five used assemblies in spares, and 
seven assemblies installed in the available engines. The eight pump cases consisted of one spare and seven 
installed in the engines. The 0 igniters included three spares and seven installed units.
6 Memorandum, Douglas E. Wall/FRC to James E. Love/X-5 Program Manager at the FRC, subject: Performance 
uprating of the YLR99 rocket engine in the X-5A-2 airplane for flight test of the USAF/NASA advanced ramjet 
engine, 30 October 963. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
7 Ibid.
8 For the Reaction Motors work, see, for example, Wolfgang Simon, Thiokol (RMD) internal report DS-00-2, 
“Nozzle Performance Program for Axisymmetrical and Two-Dimensional Contoured Nozzles,” 96; for examples 
of other reports looked at by Reaction Motors personnel, see, for example, a report by Aerojet General produced 
under NASA contract NAS7-36, “Study of High Effective Area Ratio Nozzles for Space Craft Engines,” June 
96.
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 The FRC already had some experience with increasing rocket-engine per-
formance by using nozzle extensions on the Douglas D-558-2. These extensions 
were small, radiation-cooled members that permitted the rocket exhaust gases to 
attain higher exit velocities by expanding within the nozzle to ambient pressures. 
Because of their small size, the extensions had no serious aerodynamic effect or 
structural design implications. It appeared to researchers at the FRC that a light-
weight, radiation-cooled nozzle extension could provide a desirable performance 
increase for the X-15A-2. The researchers admitted, however, that it would be 
more difficult to design such a nozzle for the XLR99 than for the XLR11 because 
of the former’s larger size and more severe operating environment. The size issue 
loomed largest because there was a possibility of adverse aerodynamic interfer-
ence with the afterbody flow.119  
 In order to evaluate this potential, researchers ran a series of wind-tunnel tests 
that used several different nozzle extension designs. The tests were quite exten-
sive and included various speed brake and horizontal stabilizer positions, ventral 
stabilizer shapes, and ramjet installations. Tests were conducted over free-stream 
Mach numbers from 2.3 to 8.0 using the Unitary Plan Tunnel at Langley (Mach 
numbers up to 4.63) and the von Kármán Gas Dynamics Facility Tunnel B at the 
Air Force Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC) at Mach numbers 
6.04 and 8.01. To withstand the high Mach numbers, researchers modified the 
1/15-scale model to withstand temperatures of 900°F for up to 30 minutes.120  
 The tests included nozzle extensions of various exit diameters and lengths 
representing expansion ratios of 22.1:1 to 33.6:1, along with various aerodynamic 
shrouds to reduce interference effects. In all, researchers investigated nine can-
didate nozzles, and the tests indicated that none of the nozzle extensions had any 
appreciable affect on overall drag or static margin, although the 22.2:1 nozzle was 
most suitable. The use of this nozzle increased the burnout velocity by 400 fps 
with no other changes to the airplane or engine.121  
 During January 1966, researchers at Langley ran more tests on the 1/15-
scale model of the X-15A-2 in the 4 by 4-foot unitary tunnel. These obtained data 
on various XLR99 nozzle extensions, including ones with area ratios of 11 .2:1, 
28.8:1, and 33.6:1 at Mach numbers up to 4.63. The X015 models used in the wind 
tunnels included various other modifications, including a redesigned aft fuselage 
boat-tail meant to smooth over the larger engine nozzle. All of the nozzle exten-
sions actually improved the base drag coefficients over the basic configuration, 
and all exhibited less drag than the boat-tail configurations. Despite the seemingly 
minor cost of the nozzle modifications, neither the Air Force nor NASA took any 
action to produce any hardware or perform actual engine or flight tests.122 
 In early 1967, Reaction Motors began another investigation of an improved 
nozzle for the XLR99 designed to increase thrust at high altitudes. The Air Force 
9 Earl J. Montoya and Jack Nugent, NASA technical memorandum X-759, “Wind-Tunnel Force and Pressure 
Tests of Rocket-Engine Nozzle Extensions on the 0.0667-Scale X-5A-2 Model at Supersonic and Hypersonic 
Speeds,” 5 November 968.
20 Conversations between Dr. Heibert, AEDC Historian, and Dennis R. Jenkins, 28 October 200; NASA technical 
memorandum X-759.
2 Montoya and Nugent, “Wind-Tunnel Force and Pressure Tests.”
22 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 2 February 966, p. 3 and attachments. 
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issued a work order for the study as an extension of the XLR99 engineering sup-
port contract, but did not record the exact reason for the study. The new nozzle 
had an expansion ratio of 22.5:1 instead of the 9.8:1 used on the existing XLR99s, 
resulting in an increase in vacuum thrust and vacuum-specific impulse of approxi-
mately 7% at a chamber pressure of 600 psi. Two percent of that improvement 
was the result of using a contoured nozzle instead of the 20-degree conical nozzle 
used on the original 9.8:1 extension.123 
 During the investigations of the new nozzle, all other parts of the engine 
remained unchanged, so it would have been easily possible to retrofit existing 
engines. The new engine produced a specific impulse of 298-lbf-sec/lbm and 
a thrust of 63,378-lbf in a vacuum. The new engine could be operated at sea 
level without flow separation, although its performance was somewhat below 
the standard XLR99 at low altitudes . The recommended nozzle design was an 
overturned bell nozzle composed of tangent circular arcs with a length and end 
diameter roughly equivalent to the normal 20-degree conical nozzle. The nozzle 
was designed with an exit angle of approximately 5 degrees rather than zero. This 
is because the last few degrees of wall-turning only added weight, since friction 
losses canceled out the theoretical thrust gain. Again, no further action resulted 
from the study.124 
 Perhaps the most ambitious upgrade was the one proposed to support the 
delta wing X-15 concept. One of the desired missions for the delta-wing airplane 
was a sustained 1-g Mach 7 cruise capability, and Reaction Motors sought a 
way to allow the XLR99 to act as a “sustainer” engine producing 8,000–10,000 
lbf for several minutes at a time. The company investigated two different pos-
sibilities to provide the sustainer capability. The first used the existing XLR99 
chamber to provide the same 57,000-lbf thrust and a separate, remotely located 
chamber to provide additional thrust during main engine operation and sustainer 
thrust during cruise. This was conceptually similar to the system used on the 
Atlas ICBM and the ill-fated Curtiss-Wright XLR25 in the Bell X-2 . The second 
idea was to modify the existing chamber to both provide increased thrust and 
allow the sustainer function, and to use the previously investigated 22.5:1 expan-
sion ratio nozzle. This second concept was similar to what the 1963 meeting at 
Wright-Patterson had recommended to fix the X-15A-2 performance shortfall. 
Reaction Motors estimated that it would take two years to develop and test the 
modified engine.125 
 Surprisingly, Reaction Motors preferred using a separate sustainer chamber 
since it presented less risk and required less development time. Throttling the main 
chamber produced between 26,000 and 62,000 lbf, and the remote chamber pro-
duced between 8,000 and 21,000 lbf. This would have provided an engine capable 
of infinite throttling between 8,000 and 83,000 lbf. The Air Force disagreed 
 
 
23 W. Simon, Reaction Motors report DS-00-2, “Performance Analysis: YLR99-RM- Turbo Rocket Engine with 
Increased Area Ratio (22.5:) Nozzle Extension (W.O. 807-39-3000),” 22 August 967, p. i. 
2 Simon, “Performance Analysis,” pp. , 0, , and 8. 
25 Paul Gwozdz, Reaction Motors report TR-085-, “A Study to Determine Modifications Which Extend the Low 
and High Thrust Range of the YLR99 Turborocket Engine,” undated (but signed on  October 966), p. 2. 
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with the risk assessment and considered the problem of integrating a second thrust 
chamber and nozzle into the X-15 too great, so the delta-wing program selected 
the single-chamber design despite the longer development time required.126 
 The major constraint imposed in considering the maximum thrust available 
from modifications to the XLR99 was the number of changes that had to be made 
to the turbopump. Unlike some other components of the XLR99, the turbopumps 
had been relatively trouble-free during development and operation. However, be-
cause of this lack of problems, nobody was thoroughly familiar with the pumps 
and their operation. To address this, Reaction Motors brought the original tur-
bopump engineer, Haakon Pedersen, out of retirement. Pedersen proposed rela-
tively modest changes to the turbopump that could provide a 40% increase in 
pumping capacity. The solution was deceptively simple: speed up the pump. This 
increased speed was not expected to “generate difficulties with the seals, bear-
ings, or critical speed” or to “affect cavitation adversely.” Pedersen did caution 
that he based these predictions on his own intuition since Reaction Motors had 
never tested the turbopumps at greater than 100% power. The increased speed, 
however, required a new turbine because the existing one could not accommodate 
the 72.5% increase in hydrogen-peroxide flow.127 
 There is no record that Reaction Motors ever accomplished any testing on 
the modified XLR99 or its components. Given that NASA terminated the delta-
wing X-15 project early in its development, it is likely that Reaction Motors never 
modified any hardware.
AEROJET LR91
 Although the XLR99 proved to be a remarkably capable research engine 
given its relatively short development period and limited operational experi-
ence, proposals were made from time to time to replace it. Usually these revolved 
around the idea of using a derivative of the Aerojet LR91 engine. In October 1966, 
Aerojet-General submitted an unsolicited proposal to North American that detailed 
the use of the LR91-AJ-7 engine in the X-15. Aerojet probably intended the pro-
posal to support the concept of using an LR91 in the delta-wing modification.128 
 The LR91 powered the Titan II ICBM, the Titan II Gemini Launch Vehicle, 
and the Titan III family of space launch vehicles. Aerojet had delivered over 180 
engines at the time of the proposal, and had run more than 1,400 engine tests. The 
engine was man-rated for the Gemini application and the Titan IIIM developed for 
 
 
26 Letter, Paul Gwozdz/RMD to O. E. Holt/RMD, subject: X-5 Sustainer Engine Studies, 8 September 966; Reac-
tion Motors report TR-085-, p. 2. At these thrust ratings and Mach 7, the XLR99 would have finally lived up to 
its media hype as a million-horsepower engine.
27 Reaction Motors report TR-085-, p. 2 and attachment (letter from Pedersen to Reaction Motors).
28 Aerojet-General proposal, “X-5 Application of Gemini Stage II Engine,” 28 October 966, no page numbers. 
Copy provided by Aerojet.
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the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL). The LR91-AJ-7 developed 100,000 lbf 
at 250,000 feet using nitrogen tetroxide and Aerozine-50 propellants.129 
 Aerojet believed that the engine offered several advantages for the X-15. The 
storable propellants provided a higher bulk density, allowing additional specific 
impulse to be stored in the same volume, although Aerojet suggested limiting the 
X-15 to 92 seconds of powered flight. The propellants also eliminated the liquid-
oxygen top-off system in the NB-52s since they had a very low boil-off rate and 
would not have to be replenished in flight. An autogenous pressurization system 
provided tank pressurization gases from the engine in proportion to propellant 
consumption, eliminating the need for separate pressurization gases and their me-
chanical systems (regulators, valves, etc.).130 
 Aerojet pointed out that since the engine was in large-scale (for a rocket 
engine) and continuous production, costs would be lower, and a continuous- 
improvement program was in place that could benefit the X-15 program. The 
major changes to the LR91 configuration for the X-15 included modifying it to 
operate in a horizontal attitude and strengthening the engine to allow it to be reus-
able. These changes (especially the one to allow horizontal operation) were not as 
straightforward as they might seem, and a simple description of them took several 
pages. The modifications to make the engine reusable also took several pages 
to describe. Nevertheless, Aerojet believed it could provide an engine quickly– 
beginning by July 1967 allowed the first X-15 flight in March 1969.131 
 The government did not take any action on this proposal or others made along 
similar lines. Although working with liquid oxygen and anhydrous ammonia pre-
sented some issues for the ground crews, it was decidedly simpler than dealing 
with the hypergolic propellants in the LR91. Moreover, nobody readily believed 
that the engine would be as reliable and reusable as the XLR99 without a major 
development effort, something the X-15 program could not afford. Although an 
additional 40,000 pounds of thrust would have more than restored the perfor-
mance lost due to the continual weight gains on the X-15, in the final analysis it 
just was not worth the time and money. Maybe it would have been worth it for the 
delta wing; but then, perhaps not.
 
 
29 These are considered hypergolic propellants because they ignite on contact with each other and do not require 
an ignition source. Nitrogen tetroxide (N2O) became the storable liquid propellant of choice after the late 950s. 
It consists principally of the tetroxide in equilibrium with a small amount of nitrogen dioxide (NO2). N2O has a 
characteristic reddish-brown color in both liquid and gaseous phases, and an irritating, unpleasant acid-like odor. 
It is a very reactive, toxic oxidizer that is nonflammable with air; however, it will inflame combustible materials. It 
is not sensitive to mechanical shock, heat, or detonation. Unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) became the 
storable liquid fuel of choice by the mid-950s. Aerojet used a variation called Aerozine-50 that was a 50-50 mix-
ture of hydrazine and UDMH developed for use in the Titan II. At some point North American had also proposed 
installing the YLR9 in the X-5A-2 as a means of increasing its performance. It should be noted that at ,000 
mph, the 00,000-lbf LR9 was truly a million-horsepower engine.
30 Aerojet-General proposal, “X-5 Application of Gemini Stage II Engine.” 
3 Ibid.
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REACTION MOTORS XLR11
 In order to get flight-testing under way, North American completed the first 
two aircraft with interim Reaction Motors XLR11-RM-5 engines. Two XLR11s 
were installed in each aircraft, producing a total of 11,800 lbf at sea level. These 
engines were quite familiar to personnel working in the experimental rocket air-
craft programs at Edwards, since the Bell X-1, Douglas D-558-2, and Republic 
XF-91 all used the same powerplant (or its XLR8 Navy equivalent).132 
 The basic XLR11 configuration was called G6000C4 by Reaction Motors 
and consisted of four thrust chambers producing 1,475 lbf each with a turbopump 
unit, valves, regulators, and controls mounted forward of the chambers. Other 
variants of the XLR8/XLR11 family used pressure-fed propellants instead of a 
turbopump. The four chambers were mounted on a support beam assembly that 
was the main structural member of the engine. A single turbopump provided the 
pressure to inject the liquid-oxygen and ethyl-alcohol-water propellants, while 
valves in the oxidizer and fuel lines controlled the flow of the propellants to the 
chambers. Each thrust chamber contained an igniter, and the pilot could ignite or 
shut down individual chambers in any sequence, allowing a measure of “thrust 
stepping.” However, once the pilot shut down a chamber, he could not restart that 
chamber. Fuel circulated through passages in each exhaust nozzle and around 
each combustion chamber individually for cooling, and then into the firing cham-
bers to be burned. Each engine weighed 345 pounds dry (including pumps) and 
was approximately 60 inches long, 36 inches high, and 24 inches wide. On paper 
each engine (including the turbopumps) cost about $80,000, although technicians 
at Edwards assembled all of the engines used in the X-15 program on site from 
components left over from earlier programs.133 
 It was surprisingly easy to install the XLR11 in the X-15, considering that the 
designers had not intended the aircraft to use the engine. Part of this was due to 
the mounting technique used for the XLR99: the engine was bolted onto a frame 
structure, which was then bolted into the engine compartment of the aircraft. 
A new frame was required to mount the two XLR11 engines, but the structural 
interface to the aircraft remained constant. However, the XLR11 used ethyl alcohol-
water for fuel instead of the anhydrous ammonia used in the XLR99. This necessi-
tated some modifications to the system, but none of them were major–fortunately, 
the two liquids had a similar consistency and temperature. Surprisingly, no doc-
umentation describing the changes seems to have survived; however, as Scott 
Crossfield remembers:134  
[S]ince the XLR11 engines were installed as two units includ-
ing their own fuel pumps, the X-15 needed only to supply the 
32 The reported thrust of these engines varied widely. The X-5 Interim Flight Manual (FHB-23-, 8 March 960, 
changed 2 May 96) listed a thrust of 5,900 lbf per engine, while other sources list 7,000 or 8,000 lbf.
33 “Handbook: Operation, Service, and Overhaul Instructions, with Parts Catalog, for Liquid Rocket Engines Model 
XLR,”  April 955; Purchase Order L-96-233(G), 6 October 96. Although called a purchase order, this was 
actually a disposal form that showed “unlisted excess experimental project support property.” Many of these 
XLR engines would go on to power the lifting bodies as they began their test program.
3 E-mail, Scott Crossfield to Dennis R. Jenkins, 7 February 2002.
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When it became obvious that the XLR99 would not be available for the initial flight tests, the Reaction 
Motors XLR11 was selected as an interim engine. The XLR11 had been used, in varying forms, in 
the Bell X-1 series, Douglas D558-2, and Republic XF-91 programs at Edwards AFB. All of  the 
engines used for the X-15 were made from leftover components from earlier programs. (NASA)
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tank pressures to meet the pumps inlet pressure requirement 
and the engines didn’t know what airplane they were in. There 
were, of course, structural changes, i.e., engine mounting and I 
believe some ballast but nothing very complex. That is a rela-
tive statement. The difference in mixture would make the ideal 
fuel/lox load different but I don’t remember that was a signifi-
cant problem.
 Charlie Feltz remembers that there were no modifications to the fuel tanks. 
North American had already built and sealed them by the time NASA decided to 
use the XLR11s. It was determined that both the metal and the sealant were com-
patible with alcohol, so there was no need to reopen the tanks. There were some 
minor changes to the plumbing and electrical systems to accommodate the new 
engines, along with cockpit modifications to provide the appropriate instrumenta-
tion and controls .135  Nevertheless, considering that North American had designed 
the airplane with no intention of installing anything but the XLR99, the changes 
were of little consequence and did not materially delay the program.136 
 In the final installation, the two engines were mounted on a single tubular-
steel mounting frame attached to the airplane at three points. The mount canted 
the upper engine slightly nose-down and the lower engine in a slightly nose-up 
attitude so that their thrust vectors intersected at the airplane’s center of gravity.137 
 After the last XLR11 flight, NASA placed the remaining engines, spare parts, 
and special tools into long-term storage. Despite being almost 20 years old, the 
engines later found their way into the heavyweight lifting bodies.138 
35 These were not so much modifications as an entirely new instrument panel and throttle quadrant. North Ameri-
can supplied two instrument panels for each airplane (one for the XLR flights and one for the XLR99 flights), 
although the X-5-3 never flew with the smaller engines.
36 Telephone conversation, Charles H. Feltz with Dennis R. Jenkins, 9 February 2002.
37 X-5 Interim Flight Manual, FHB-23-, 8 March 960, changed 2 May 96.
38 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 5 February 96, pp. 6.

High Range And Dry Lakes
There was never any doubt that the X-15 flight program would take place 
at Edwards AFB, California. However, Edwards would play a key role as in-
frastructure was developed to support the X-15.  The program was an involved 
undertaking, and the operational support required was extensive.  Logistically, 
Edwards would become the linchpin of the entire effort. 
MUROC TO EDWARDS
 The Mojave Desert–called the “high desert” because of its altitude–is ap-
proximately 100 miles northeast of Los Angeles, just on the other side of the San 
Gabriel Mountains. First formed during the Pleistocene epoch, and featuring an 
extremely flat, smooth, and hard surface, Rogers Dry Lake is a playa, or pluvial 
lake, that spreads out over 44 square miles of the Mojave, making it the largest 
such geological formation in the world. Its parched clay and silt surface undergoes 
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a cycle of renewal each year as desert winds sweep water from winter rains to 
smooth the lakebed out to an almost glass-like flatness.1  
 Lieutenant Colonel Henry H. “Hap” Arnold decided that Rogers Dry Lake 
would make a “natural aerodrome,” and in September 1933 the Army Air Corps 
established the Muroc Bombing and Gunnery Range as a training site for squad-
rons based at March Field near Riverside, California . It continued to serve in that 
capacity until 23 July 1942, when it became the Muroc Army Air Field. During 
World War II the primary mission at Muroc was to provide final combat training 
for aircrews before their deployment overseas.2  
 Until the beginning of World War II, the Army Air Corps conducted the ma-
jority of its flight-testing at Wright Field, Ohio. However, the immense volume of 
testing created by the war was one of the factors that led to a search for a new loca-
tion to test the first American jet fighter, the Bell XP-59A Airacomet. The urgent 
need to complete the program immediately dictated a location with year-round 
flying weather. In addition, the risks inherent in the radical new technology used 
in the aircraft dictated an area with many contingency landing areas, and one that 
minimized the danger of crashing into a populated area. After examining a number 
of locations around the country, the Army Air Forces selected a site along the north 
shore of Rogers Dry Lake about six miles away from the training base at Muroc.3 
 When Bell test pilot Robert Stanley arrived at the base in August 1942, he 
found just three structures: an unfinished hangar, a wooden barrack, and a water 
tower. Things would begin to change quickly as more than 100 people arrived at 
the base to support the project. On 2 October 1942, Stanley made the first “official 
flight” of the XP-59A (it had actually lifted off for the first time on the previous 
day during high-speed taxi tests), introducing flight-testing to the high desert. 
Only five years later, on 14 October 1947, Captain Charles E. “Chuck” Yeager 
became the first man to exceed (barely) the speed of sound in level flight when 
he achieved Mach 1.06 (approximately 700 mph) at 42,000 feet in the Bell XS-1 
research airplane. Muroc’s place in the history books was firmly established.4  
 However, with the arrival of the X-1, flight-testing at Muroc began to assume 
two distinct identities. The Air Force typically flew the research  airplanes, such 
as the X-3, X-4, X-5, and XF-92A, in conjunction with the NACA in a methodical 
fashion to answer largely theoretical questions. The bulk of the testing, however, 
focused on highly accelerated Air Force and contractor evaluations of prototype 
operational aircraft, and was often much less methodical as they tried to get new 
equipment to combat units as quickly as possible at the height of the Cold War.5  
 Not surprisingly, the rather informal approach to safety that prevailed during 
the late 1940s, and even into the 1950s, was one of the factors that contributed 
to a horrendous accident rate. There were, of course, a number of other factors. 
 Ibid. For additional history of the area see Michael H. Gorn, Expanding the Envelope: Flight Research at NACA 
and NASA, (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 200).
2 Ibid. Despite its usage, legal title for the land did not pass to the Army until 939.
3 http://www.edwards.af.mil/history/docs_html/center/pre-military_history.html, accessed 25 January 2002.The 
Army Air Forces had superseded the Army Air Corps on 20 June 9.
 http://www.edwards.af.mil/history/docs_html/center/flight_evolution.html, accessed 25 January 2002; Michael 
H. Gorn, Expanding the Envelope: Flight Research at NACA and NASA, (Lexington, KY: University Press of Ken-
tucky, 200), p. 8.
5 http://www.edwards.af.mil/history/docs_html/center/flight_evolution.html, accessed 25 January 2002.
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The corps of test pilots at Muroc remained small and commonly averaged more 
than 100 flying hours per month. They flew a wide variety of different types and 
models of aircraft, each with its own cockpit and instrument panel configuration. 
Chuck Yeager, for example, reportedly once flew 27 different types of airplanes in 
a single one-month period. The year 1948 was particularly tragic, with at least 13 
fatalities recorded at or near the base. One such fatality was that of Captain Glen 
W. Edwards, who was killed in the crash of a Northrop YB-49 flying wing on 4 
June 1948. In December 1949 the Air Force renamed the base in his honor, while 
other pilots have streets named after them.6  
 On 25 June 1951, the government established the Air Force Flight Test Center 
(AFFTC) at Edwards, and a $120 million master plan was unveiled for construc-
tion at the base. Part of the appropriation paid to remove the Atcheson, Topeka, 
and Santa Fe railroad from the northern portion of Rogers Dry Lake and bought 
out the silt mines that had been located along the route. However, the major un-
dertaking was to relocate the entire base two miles west of the original South 
Base location and construct a 15,000-foot concrete runway. With the increased 
number of flight test programs at the base, the natural surfaces of the Rogers and 
6 Ibid. Surprisingly, the surviving records are somewhat incomplete, and it is possible that other pilots were also 
killed during 98.
Edwards AFB, California, hosted the X-15 flight program. The “new” main base complex is located at the 
center left in this photo, with the NASA Flight Research Center being slightly above the main base on the 
edge of  the lakebed. Rogers Dry Lake was the planned site for all X-15 landings, and 188 times, it worked 
out that way. Two would land at Cuddeback, one at Delamar, four at Mud, one at Rosamond, one at Silver, 
and one at Smith Ranch; the X-15-3 broke up in flight and did not land on its last flight. (U.S. Air Force)
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Rosamond dry lakebeds took on even greater importance as routine and emer-
gency landing sites. The first AFFTC commander, Brigadier General Albert Boyd, 
later commented that the dry lakes were nothing less than “God’s gift to the U.S. 
Air Force.” That same year, the USAF Test Pilot School moved from Wright Field 
to the high desert.7
THE HIGH-SPEED FLIGHT STATION
 On 30 September 1946, Walter C. Williams and four other engineers from 
NACA Langley arrived at the Muroc Army Air Field to assist in flight-testing the 
XS-1. It was supposed to be a temporary assignment, and the group did not even 
have an official name, although they called themselves the NACA Muroc Flight 
Test Unit. This marked the beginning of the joint USAF-NACA research airplane 
program that would culminate with the X-15. The NACA Muroc Flight Test Unit 
received permanent status from Hugh Dryden on 7 September 1947, with Walt 
Williams named as head of a group that now numbered 27 people.8  
 By the time the NACA redesignated the unit the High-Speed Flight Re-
search Station (HSFRS) on 14 November 1949, roughly 100 people worked for 
Williams, who was named chief of the station. In February 1953, the Air Force 
formally leased 175 acres at the north end of the main taxiway to the NACA for 
a permanent installation.9 
 On 26 June 1954, the now-200-strong NACA contingent moved from its prim-
itive quarters on South Base to a new headquarters, located in Building 4800 on 
the north side of the new Edwards flight line. This building still serves as the core 
of the Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC). The new facility cost $3.8 million. 
In contrast to the small NACA station at Edwards, the Air Force contingent at the 
AFFTC numbered over 8,000. The NACA organization was renamed the High-
Speed Flight Station (HSFS) on 1 July 1954, with Williams still in charge.10 
 On 1 October 1958, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) replaced the NACA, and on 27 September 1959, NASA Headquarters 
redesignated the HSFS the Flight Research Center (FRC). By the time the sta-
7 http://www.edwards.af.mil/history/docs_html/center/lakebeds.html, accessed 25 January 2002; Gorn, Expand-
ing the Envelope, p. 20.
8 http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/Dryden/mistone.html accessed 25 January 2002. Many sources say that 3 personnel 
arrived on 30 September, but DFRC Historian J.D. Hunley says only five (Williams, Cloyce E. Matheny, William S. 
Aiken, George P. Minalga, and Harold B. Youngblood) arrived on this date and the total of 3 was not reached un-
til early December. The Muroc Flight Test Unit from Langley had been informally established by Walter C. Williams 
on 30 September 96 in support of testing the XS-, and achieved permanent status on 7 September 97. It 
was redesignated the High-Speed Flight Research Station (HSFRS) on  November 99, the High-Speed Flight 
Station (HSFS) on  July 95, the Flight Research Center (FRC) on 27 September 959, and the Hugh L. Dryden 
Flight Research Center (usually abbreviated DFRC) on 26 March 976. On  October 98 it was administratively 
absorbed into the Ames Research Center and changed its name to the Ames-Dryden Flight Research Facility 
(DFRF). It reverted to Center status on  March 99 and again became DFRC. At some point between 95 
and 959, the hyphen between “High” and “Speed” seems to have been dropped, but no official evidence of this 
could be found.
9 Jane Van Nimmen and Leonard C. Bruno, with Robert L. Rosholt, NASA Historical Data Book, 1958-1968, Vol-
ume I: NASA Resources 1958-1968, NASA publication SP-02 (Washington, DC: NASA, 988), pp. 297-298; 
http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/Dryden/milestone.html, accessed 25 January 2002.
0 http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/Dryden/milestone.html, accessed 25 January 2002.
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tion became a center, Williams was gone. At the behest of Hugh Dryden, on 14 
September 1959 he had joined Project Mercury (the first American manned space 
effort) as its operations director. In his place came Paul F . Bikle, a Pennsylva-
nian with long experience in flight-testing at the nearby AFFTC . Bikle replaced 
Williams on 15 September 1959, oversaw its transition to the FRC, and remained 
for the next 12 years. Bikle believed in doing things quietly and with a minimum 
of fuss and outside attention. “Under Paul Bikle,” one engineer recalled, “we 
were well aware that headquarters was 3,000 miles away.” Like Williams before 
him, Bikle impressed those who encountered him with his bluntness, drive, and 
engineering sense.11 
 The first challenge faced by Bikle was shifting from planning for the X-15 
program to conducting it. He needed people, and asked Ira Abbott at Headquar-
ters for authority to add 80 new positions to the rapidly growing X-15 team. The 
personnel and facilities at the FRC expanded throughout the 1960s, with the bud-
get going from $3.28 million in 1959 to $20.85 million in 1963, and to $32.97 
 Richard P. Hallion, On the Frontier: Flight Research at Dryden, 1946-1981, NASA publication SP-303, (Washing-
ton, DC: NASA, 98), p. 0; Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963, NASA publica-
tion SP-0 (Washington, DC: NASA, 966), p. 79. Within the NACA the pecking order was ) headquarters, 2) 
research laboratories, and 3) stations. NASA maintained a similar caste system, calling them centers and facilities 
instead. Paul F. Bikle (96-99) earned a B.S. in aeronautical engineering from the University of Detroit in 939 
and was employed by Taylorcraft Aviation Corp. for a year before working for the Air Corps and Air Force as a 
civilian from 90 to 959, both at Wright Field and at the Flight Test Center at Edwards AFB. At Edwards, he 
rose to the position of technical director of the center. In 959 he became director of the NASA Flight Research 
Center, a position he held until his retirement in 97. 
On 27 January 1953, a ground-breaking ceremony was held at the site of  the future NACA High-
Speed Flight Station on the new main base at Edwards AFB. Shown in the photo are (left to right) 
Gerald Truszynski, Head of  Instrumentation Division; Joseph Vensel, Head of  the Operations 
Branch; Walter Williams, Head of  the Station, scooping the first shovel full of  dirt; Marion Kent, 
Head of  Personnel; and California state official Arthur Samet. (NASA)
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million in 1968. The staff went from 292 to a peak of 669 in 1965; by the end of 
the X-15 program, the staff was down to 566.12
THE HIGH RANGE
 Previous rocket planes, such as the X-1 and X-2, had been able to conduct 
the majority of their flight research directly over Edwards and the lakebeds imme-
diately surrounding the base. The capabilities of the X-15, however, would need 
vastly more airspace. The proposed trajectories required an essentially straight 
flight corridor almost 500 miles long, and the need to acquire real-time data ne-
cessitated the installation of radar, telemetry, and communications sites along the 
entire path. There was also a need for suitable emergency landing areas all along 
the flight corridor. Fortunately, the high desert was an ideal location for such re-
quirements since many of the ancient lakes had long since vanished, leaving be-
hind dry and hard-packed contingency landing areas.13 
  
2 Van Nimmen et al., NASA Historical Data Book, 1958-1968, pp. 90-9. 
3 Stillwell, X-15 Research Results. Collectively, the land, equipment, and personnel that support this type of activity 
are known as a “range.” The High Range discussed in this chapter is just one of many test ranges operated by 
the United States for a variety of purposes–mainly military. The most visible ranges are the Eastern Range at Cape 
Canaveral, FL (stretching to Ascension Island in the South Atlantic), and the Western Range at Vandenberg AFB, 
CA. However, there are also major test ranges at Edwards AFB, NAS Pt. Mugu, Eglin AFB, the Utah Test and 
Training Range (UTTR), White Sands Missile Range, and a host of others.
The employees of  the NACA High-Speed Flight Station are gathered for a 1954 photo shoot on the 
front steps of  building 4800, the new NACA facility at Edwards AFB. This new building was consid-
erably larger than the earlier NACA buildings on South Base to support a staff  that had increased from 
132 in 1950 to 250 in 1954. As the workload increased and more research flights were completed the 
complement of  employees grew to 662 in 1966, largely the result of  the X-15 flight program. (NASA)
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 As early as 7 April 1955 Brigadier General Benjamin S. Kelsey wrote to 
Hugh Dryden (both were members of the Research Airplane Committee) sug-
gesting a cooperative agreement on the construction and operation of a new range 
to support the X-15 program. A range had been included in the initial Air Force 
cost estimates, with $1,500,000 budgeted for its construction. At a meeting of the 
Research Airplane Committee on 17 May 1955, the NACA agreed to cooperate 
with the WADC and AFFTC in planning the range: the Air Force would build and 
equip it, and the NACA would operate it after its completion. It was much the 
same agreement that governed the X-15 itself.14  
 However, this decision was not favorably received by AFFTC personnel, 
who felt they were “being relegated to the position of procurement agent” for the 
NACA. On 15 June, Walt Williams met with the AFFTC commander, Brigadier 
General J. Stanley Holtoner, to discuss the concept for the new X-15 range. 
Williams began by updating Holtoner on the status of the X-15 program since 
the general had not heard any details since the previous October. During this dis-
cussion, Holtoner indicated his willingness to cooperate in developing the range 
and agreed with Williams that the AFFTC should not become actively involved 
until the NACA was able to discuss “detailed items of hardware” and support. 
Nevertheless, he felt the AFFTC “should have a somewhat stronger position in 
the project.”15 
 Despite the apparent lack of enthusiasm for the arrangements within the 
AFFTC, on 28 July 1955 an amendment to the original X-15 development direc-
tive was issued that clearly established the AFFTC’s responsibilities for building 
the range. However, since neither document discussed which organization would 
operate the range, the AFFTC renewed its efforts to acquire this responsibility. 
 A conference at ARDC Headquarters in Baltimore on 15 September 1955 
set in place the basic architecture of the range. Technical personnel reviewed the 
availability of various types of radar and decided that all of the range stations 
should be similar and include telemetry receivers as well as radar equipment. 
Although no decision was made regarding the specific radar equipment, the choic-
es were narrowed to the AFMTC Model II used on the Atlantic Missile Range, 
and the Canoga Mod 3 used by North American at White Sands. On 13 October 
the HSFS proposed expanding the use of telemetry beyond that used on earlier 
X-planes. In addition to the normal engine-related information that was tradition-
ally monitored, the HSFS wanted to obtain aircraft information (structural, flight 
path, temperature, etc.), research data (cosmic ray concentrations, etc.), and pilot 
physiological effects. This was a stretch for the available technology.16 
 
 Letter, Brigadier General Benjamin S. Kelsey, Director for Research and Development DCS/D, USAF, to Director 
of the NACA, no subject, 7 April 955; letter, Hugh L. Dryden to Deputy Director for Research and Development, 
no subject, 20 May 955. In the files at the NASA History Office.
5 Memorandum for record, Major J. E. Downhill, Assistant Chief, Test Project Section, Aeronautics & Propulsion 
Division, ARDC, subject: Flight Test Range for the X-5, 28 July 955. In the files at the AFFTC History Office; 
memorandum, Walter C. Williams/HSFS to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, no subject, 5 
June 955.
6 Memorandum for the Files (HSFS), 3 October 955; transmitted to Langley on 8 October 955. In the files at 
the DRFC History Office; Gerald M. Truszynski and W. D. Mace, “Status of High-Range and Flow-Direction Sen-
sor,” a paper in the 1958 Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 5-52. This radar was also known as the 
PAFB (Patrick AFB) Mod 2.
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 Developing the final specifications for the new range was the subject of a 
meeting on 16 November 1955. This is when the AFFTC made its move for con-
trol, stating that the Air Force would like to operate and maintain the range on the 
condition that the NACA could also use it for the X-15. The NACA reminded the 
Air Force that the verbal agreement between Hugh Dryden and General Kelsey 
had already settled the issue. The NACA representatives also pointed out that 
the safe operation of the X-15 would depend heavily upon data acquired by the 
ground stations, and that a division of responsibility would not be desirable. The 
issue, however, would not go away, and on 2 December 1955 the AFFTC deputy 
chief of staff for operations at the AFFTC, Lieutenant Colonel Bentley H. Harris, 
Jr., wrote to the commander of ARDC formally requesting that his center “be as-
signed the responsibility for operating, as well as developing, the test range.” The 
ARDC reiterated that the NACA would operate the range, but the AFFTC could 
use it on a non-interference basis .17 
 Despite this contentious beginning, in the end the NACA and AFFTC co-
operated in planning and using the range. The HSFS instrumentation staff under 
Gerald M. Truszynski largely determined the requirements based on experience 
gained during prior research programs. In November 1955, Truszynski informed 
the Research Airplane Committee that the range should be at least 400 miles long, 
with three radar stations able to furnish precise data on aircraft position, reentry 
prediction, geometric altitude, and ground speed. The X-15 required a launch site 
located near an emergency landing area, intermediate landing sites, intermediate 
launch sites (for less than full-power/full-duration flights), airfields near the radar 
sites that could be used for support, and a “reasonably straight course” for the 
high-speed flight profile.18 
 Besides the technical issues, many other factors determined where the 
range and its associated ground facilities would be located. Because of the sonic 
booms, it was not desirable to have the X-15 fly over major metropolitan ar-
eas, at least not routinely. Avoiding commercial airline corridors would make 
flight planning easier, and avoiding mountains would make the pilots happier. 
Ground stations needed proper “look angles” so that at least one of them could 
“see” the X-15 at all times. Emergency landing sites had to be spaced so that the 
X-15 would always be within gliding distance of one of them. The parameters 
seemed endless.
 Truszynski and his staff concluded that the best course lay on a straight line 
from Wendover, Utah, to Edwards, with tracking stations near Ely and Beatty, 
Nevada, and at Edwards. The range would take the X-15 over some of the most 
beautiful, rugged, and desolate terrain in the Western hemisphere, flying high over 
 
7 Letter, Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, to NACA Liaison Officer, WPAFB, subject: Air Force-
North American-NACA conference on Project 226 Range, 20 December 955. In the files at the NASA History 
Office; letter, Lieutenant Colonel Bentley H. Harris, Jr., DCS/O, AFFTC, to Commander, ARDC, subject: X-5 
Research Aircraft, 2 December 955. In the files at the AFFTC History Office.
8 Letter, Gerald M. Truszynski to Dennis R. Jenkins, 9 May 2002; memorandum, John L. Sloop/HSFS to Hartley 
A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, no subject, 7 November 955; memorandum for the files (HSFS), 
unsigned, 0 November 955. Gerry Truszynski had arrived at Muroc in 97 and remained there until mid-960 
when he left to join the Office of Space Flight Operations in the Space Sciences Directorate at NASA Headquar-
ters. This organization later became the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition, with Truszynski as its chief; the 
group’s primary legacy was the development of the Mercury tracking and communications network.
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Death Valley before swooping down over the Searles basin to a landing on Rogers 
Dry Lake.19   
 All of this led to construction of the High Altitude Continuous Tracking 
Range, which is generally known simply as the High Range. Officially, the effort 
was known as Project 1876 . The Electronic Engineering Company (EECo) of Los 
Angeles accomplished the design and construction of the range under an Air Force 
contract awarded on 9 March 1956. The requirements noted that the “range will 
consist of a ground area approximately 50 miles wide and 400 miles long wherein 
a vehicle flying at altitudes up to 500,000 feet can be tracked continuously.”20 
 Despite the hopelessly optimistic original budget of $1,500,000, the three 
tracking stations did not come cheap–the more-sophisticated Edwards station cost 
$4,244,000, and the costs of the other two together were about the same. The 
Air Force spent another $3.3 million on initial High Range construction, and the 
NACA would spend a similar amount for improvements over the first few years 
of operations. An office at Patrick AFB, Florida, managed the procurement of the 
radar equipment under a modification to an existing contract for the Atlantic Mis-
sile Range (later the Eastern Range).21  
 The agreement between the NASA and the AFFTC stated that the Air Force 
would “retain title to the land, buildings, and equipment, except those physically 
located within NASA facilities.” In addition, “control, operation and support of 
High Range will revert to USAF upon the conclusion of X-15 Flight Research 
or earlier if the Research Airplane Committee judges that the National Situation 
so dictates.”22 
 Although Truszynski and his staff at the HSFS had developed the basic con-
figuration of the High Range, it was up to the EECo–with the advice and consent 
of the government–to select the actual sites for the tracking stations. Since the 
HSFS staff had already made rough site selections, the next step was developing 
a radar coverage map. This map showed considerations such as obstructions on 
the horizon, the curvature of the Earth, and the range in which a target could be 
“seen” by radar at specified altitudes. This map narrowed down the area that the 
EECo needed to investigate in detail. Next came a lot of field work.23 
  
9 Letter, Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Project Leader, to NACA Liaison Officer, WPAFB, subject: Air Force-North 
American-NACA conference on Project 226 Range, 20 December 955. In the files at the NASA History Office.
20 System Development Plan, X-5 Research Aircraft, Supporting Research System Number 7L, 22 March 956; 
Engineering Plan, Project High Range, Electronic Engineering Company of California, not dated (but probably 
late 956). In the files at the AFFTC History Office; Walter C. Williams, “X-5 Concept Evolution” a paper in the 
Proceedings of the X-15 30th Anniversary Celebration, Dryden Flight Research Facility, Edwards, CA, 8 June 
989, NASA CP-305, p. ; R&D Project Card, Project 876 (part of Project 226), 27 March 956. The EECo 
contract was AF0(6)-703. The range appears to have had two official names. The NACA called it the High 
Altitude Continuous Tracking Range, while the Air Force referred to it as the X-5 Radar Range. Fortunately, both 
agreed on the “short term” of High Range.
2 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 2 June 956; “Advanced development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, 
Advanced Technology Program 653A,” 7 November 96, pp. 9-20. In the files at the AFFTC History Office; 
Van Nimmen et al., NASA Historical Data Book, 1958-1968, p. 300. The Air Force paid for the construction of the 
physical facilities, radar equipment, roads, and the communication system; the NACA paid for procurement of the 
telemetry systems, consoles, recorders, strip charts, and other items of “instrumentation.” Ely cost $2,688,000, 
and Beatty cost $2,22,000 according to the Data Book.
22 “Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” 7 November 
96, pp. 9-20. In the files at the AFFTC History Office.
23 “Engineering Plan, Project High Range,” Electronic Engineering Company of California, not dated (but probably 
late 956), pp. 2- through 2-7. In the files at the AFFTC History Office; “X-5 Range Facility,” prepared by the 
NASA Flight Research Facility, November 959. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
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 Preliminary investigations by AFFTC, NACA, and EECo personnel indicat-
ed a possible site called VABM 8002 located 1.5 miles northwest of Ely, Nevada 
(the number referred to the site’s elevation: 8,002 feet above sea level). However, 
measurements and photographs from this site taken by EECo personnel indicated 
that it would not provide the required radar sight lines because of an extremely 
wide and high blockage angle almost directly downrange from the site. In addi-
tion, constructing an access road would have required a “considerable amount” of 
rock blasting. EECo ruled out using the site.24 
 An alternate site in Ely was on Rib Hill. This 8,062-foot-high location was 
a considerable improvement over VABM 8002 in terms of radar sight lines and 
the ability to build a road and construct the site itself. The downside was that it 
was adjacent to the Ruth Copper Pit, and the Kennecott Copper Corporation was 
already planning to extend the operation into the side of Rib Hill . Even if the hill 
went untouched, the mining operation would have created too much earth move-
ment for a precision radar installation, so again the EECo ruled out the site.25  
 Fortunately, while investigating the Rib Hill site, EECo personnel ventured 
to the south ridge of the Rib Hill range. This site was promising because the 
radar sight lines were excellent. The civil engineering firm of F . W . Millard and 
Son conducted a detailed land survey, mapping out the best location of the build-
ings and the access road. The EECo estimated that a 5.65-mile-long, 12-foot-wide 
road from U.S. Highway 50 to the site would cost approximately $72,400, which 
included installing culverts and drainage ditches, cutting and filling slopes, clear-
ing and compacting the base, and finishing the gravel road.26  The road would 
take advantage of southerly exposures to gain maximum natural snow removal, 
and arrangements with the White Pine County Road Department and the Nevada 
Highway Department provided additional mechanical snow removal. It was 10 
miles southeast to the town of Ely from the junction of the site access road and 
Highway 50. The Ely Airport, which was a scheduled stop for several commercial 
airlines, was five miles east of the town. There were some drawbacks, however. 
The Kennecott Copper Company offered to supply electricity for a nominal cost, 
but an evaluation of the mining company’s generators showed that the current 
could fluctuate ±10%, which was unacceptable for the sensitive electronic equip-
ment at the site. EECo estimated that voltage regulators and power lines would 
cost more than procuring primary and backup generators and generating the re-
quired power on-site. In addition, there was no water available at the site, so tank 
trailers would have to haul water from Ely and store it in a tank at the site.27 
 The site at Beatty was somewhat easier to locate. Preliminary investigations 
by the AFFTC and NACA resulted in the selection of a location approximately six 
miles northwest of Springdale, Nevada. Further investigation by EECo personnel 
substantiated this selection . The site was at an elevation of 4,900 feet, approxi-
mately three miles west of U.S. Highway 95. The radar sight lines were excellent, 
2 Engineering Plan, Project High Range,” p. 2-8. A vertical angle bench mark (VABM) is a USGS accuracy code 
that provides a standardization of observed gravity precision, elevation control, and latitude and longitude control. 
VABM was also the nearest name on the map to the desired location.
25 Engineering Plan, Project High Range,” pp. 2-8 and 2-9. 
26 The other mile and a half used an existing gravel road that exited Highway 50 at an opportune location.
27 Engineering Plan, Project High Range,” pp. 2-9 through 2-0, 3-, and 3-0 to 3-. 
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and the civil engineering firm of F. W. Millard and Son prepared a detailed survey 
of the area. Only 1.75 miles of new gravel road would be required to connect the 
site to Highway 95 at the cost of $30,500, including the installation of culverts 
and ditches. The site was 20 miles by road from Beatty, and an additional five 
miles to the Beatty airfield. No commercial power or water was available at the 
site, so the EECo again installed diesel generators. Water (at no cost, initially) 
from the Beatty city water supply was trucked to the site.28 
 The third site, an extension added to the back of the third floor of building 
4800 at the HSFS, was the easiest to select . The construction would extend the 
building toward the airfield ramp from the existing “Flight Control” room using 
the exterior doorway as the entrance to the new addition. Initial estimates indicated 
that 1,200 square feet would be adequate for the intended purpose, but further in-
vestigation showed that structural constraints required the addition of at least 1,500 
square feet. The additional 300 square feet was necessary to take advantage of the 
existing second-floor columns for greater support of the third-floor addition. After 
reviewing the plans, the Air Force and NACA requested that EECo further enlarge 
28 Ibid, pp. 2-0 through 2-. 
The High Range consisted of  three stations: one at Beatty, Nevada, one at Ely, Nevada, and the main 
station at the High-Speed Flight Station at Edwards. All three sites were interconnected by a sophis-
ticated (for 1955) communications network. Each of  the Nevada sites had a “local plot” that could 
track the course of  the X-15 if  needed. The general concept of  the High Range formed the basis of  
the later manned spaceflight control networks, not surprising since the same man – Gerald Truszynski 
– was responsible for the High Range and the initial Mercury network. (U.S. Air Force)
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the addition to 2,500 square feet, which was the maximum the building could ac-
commodate. The addition contained four rooms of roughly equal size: a monitor 
room with plotting boards, a radar room, a telemetry and communications room, 
and a utility/work area. No plumbing was required in the addition since the main 
building housed adequate restroom facilities and photographic dark rooms.29 
 EECo subcontracted the administration and supervision of the construction of 
the two remote sites and the modifications to the NACA building to F . W . Millard 
and Son. A local contractor selected by competitive bid would perform the actual 
construction after the Air Force secured the land for the two remote sites. For 
unexplained reasons, the acquisition was not as straightforward as expected. For 
instance, the original schedule showed completion of the access road to the Ely 
site by 15 December 1956, but the Air Force ran into unexpected difficulties in 
withdrawing the site from the public domain, which delayed construction. In the 
end, it was October 1957 before the road was completed.30 
 At both remote sites, a 100-by-100-foot area was graded and hard-surfaced 
with asphalt paving and a sealant coat. This graded area was large enough to ac-
commodate the radar shelter, vehicle parking area, and such items as the diesel 
generator, fuel tanks, etc. Because of the remote locations, officials decided to 
station permanently a Dodge Power Wagon four-wheel-drive truck at each site to 
provide transportation to the airfield. These trucks had sufficient towing capabil-
ity to haul the water trailers, and the four-wheel drive allowed access to the site 
during inclement weather.31 
 Interestingly, the way the Air Force had written the High Range contracts, 
EECo was responsible for constructing 800 square feet of each shelter to house 
the telemetry equipment and “housekeeping” rooms, but the Reeves Instrument 
Company was responsible for constructing another 800 square feet at each shelter 
to house the radar equipment. Smartly, in order to avoid too much duplication of 
effort and to ensure a uniform appearance, the companies decided that one or the 
other should build the entire shelter. Since Reeves was not interested in facility 
construction, the honor fell to EECo. This was probably not the optimum solution, 
however, since Reeves retained the responsibility to construct the radar pedestal 
itself (which was an integral part of the building structure) because the exact posi-
tion of the radar antenna was important to the final operation of the radar, and both 
contractors believed that the radar contractor should build the pedestal .32 
 EECo developed a generic 1,760-square-foot floor plan for the remote sites, 
although each would diverge somewhat from the ideal due to site-specific consid-
erations. In essence, each building consisted of four large rooms: a radar room, a 
telemetry room, a room for data transmitting and receiving equipment, and a utili-
ty/work area. The building also included a smaller telephone-equipment room and 
dark room, and even smaller restrooms and closets. Oddly, the telephone room 
could only be accessed from outside the building. EECo calculated that each site 
would use approximately 155 gallons of water per day (5 gallons for personnel 
29 Ibid, pp. 2-2 and 3-8 to 3-9. 
30 Ibid, pp. 3-3 and 3-. 
3 Ibid, pp. 3- and 3-5. 
32 Ibid, p. 3-5. 
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use, 50 for the dark room, and 100 gallons for the flush-type toilet). A 1,000-gal-
lon tank meant that each site would need weekly water deliveries if it was manned 
continuously. Extreme weather conditions at Ely dictated that the water be stored 
inside the shelter to keep it from freezing. The shelters consisted of a metal exte-
rior over an insulated framework and drywall interior, with a wooden false floor 
installed above a concrete slab to provide a location to run wires and cables .33 
 The Ely, Beatty, and Edwards tracking stations had radar and telemetry 
tracking with oscillograph recording, magnetic-tape data collection, and console- 
monitoring services. Especially early in the flight program, a backup “commu-
nicator” was located at each station in case the communication links went down. 
Each ground station overlapped the next, and communications lines allowed voice 
communication, timing signals, and radar data to be available to all. Each station 
recorded all acquired data on tape and film, and strip charts and plotting boards 
displayed some of the data locally for the backup communicator.34 
 The radar equipment ultimately selected for the High Range was a minor 
modification of equipment already used by the Atlantic Missile Range. The radars 
were World War II vintage SCR-584 units modified to improve their azimuth, 
elevation, and range accuracy. The Reeves Instrument Corporation modified the 
three Model II radars (generally called Mod II) and the Air Force supplied them 
to the EECo as government-furnished equipment. The radars had two selectable 
range settings: 768,000 yards (436 miles) and 384,000 yards (218 miles). The nor-
mal method for acquiring the initial target was to use a remote optical tracker. The 
antenna pedestal also had provisions for mounting an 80-inch boresight camera. 
Using a unique (for the period) range-phasing system, two or more Mod 2 radars 
could simultaneously track the same target without mutual interference.35 
 The radar used a 10-foot parabolic dish that transmitted a 2.5-degree wide 
beam. Peak power was 350 kilowatts with a pulse width of 0.8 microsecond and 
a selectable pulse-repetition frequency between 205 and 1,707 pulses per second. 
The maximum slewing rates were approximately 5 degrees per second in azi-
muth and 2.5 degrees per second in elevation. These were considered adequate 
for the X-15, although these limitations were considerations during the selection 
of launch and contingency landing lakes.36 
 Precision azimuth and elevation information was obtained from two optical en-
coders, and range data came from one electromechanical encoder attached directly to 
the radar. The optical encoders were 16-digit analog-to-digital converters produced 
by the Baldwin Piano Company that used coded glass disks to produce a reflected 
binary (Gray)37 code. The output of these units was a 16-digit parallel code pro-
duced by an internally synchronized flashlamp actuated 10 times per second by the 
master timing signal. This was the primary precision tracking information obtained 
33 Ibid, pp. 3-6 through 3-8. 
3 Hallion, On the Frontier, pp. 0-. 
35 “Engineering Plan, Project High Range,” p. 2-3; “X-5 Range Facility,” apparently unpublished typescript, pre-
pared in November 959, no page numbers. In the files at the DFRC History Office. 
36 “X-5 Range Facility.” 
37 The reflected binary code, also known as Gray code after Frank Gray who patented the concept in 97, is a 
binary numeral system where two successive values differ in only one digit. The code was originally designed to 
prevent spurious output from electromechanical switches. Today, Gray codes are widely used to facilitate error 
correction in digital communications such as digital terrestrial television and some cable TV systems.
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from the radar system, and an Ampex FR-114 magnetic tape recorder recorded it 
in digital format. In addition, a data camera photographed the selsyn dial indica-
tions of azimuth, elevation, and range for coarse trajectory information.38 
 The AFFTC Project Datum system at Edwards provided automated process-
ing for the radar and telemetry data recorded on the magnetic tapes. This was a 
general-purpose data-reduction computer system developed by the Air Force to 
accept a variety of input data tapes and generate output tapes compatible with 
the IBM 704 computers used for data processing. The IBM computer, in turn, 
provided data on factors such as the geometric altitude, plan position, trajectory 
position, and velocity. Project Datum was a post-test analysis tool, not a real-time 
system. Another IBM 704 computer was located at the FRC for processing the 
oscillograph data from the X-15. Operators transferred the raw data on the oscil-
lograph and photorecorders to IBM punched cards by using manually operated 
film recorders, and the punched cards generated magnetic tapes.39 
 Each of the three tracking sites had a “local” Electronic Associates Model 
205J plotting board that showed the position of the X-15 as reported by its local 
radar, and the station at Edwards had a “master” board that correlated all of the 
results and plotted the vehicle along the entire trajectory. The local boards at each 
site could alternately display parallax-corrected data from another station. It is in-
teresting to note that the technology of the day did not allow the parallax from the 
Ely station to be corrected digitally at Edwards because the results would cause 
the data receiver register to overflow (i.e., the resulting number would be too 
large for the available space). Since it was necessary to correct the parallax before 
displaying the data on the master plotting board, engineers devised a method to 
alter the analog voltage signals at the input to the polar-to-Cartesian coordinate 
converter. It was an innovative solution to a technological limitation. The coordi-
nate converter itself was an Electronics Associates Model 484A computer.40  
 The X-15 made extensive use (for that time) of telemetry data from the vehicle 
to the ground. As originally installed, the telemetry was a standard pulse duration 
modulation (PDM) system capable of receiving up to 90 channels of information in 
the FM frequency band. A servo-driven helical antenna was located at each range 
station to receive telemetry data. The antenna was slaved to the radar to track the 
vehicle, although it could also be positioned manually using a hand crank. Later 
in the program, NASA installed auto-tracking telemetry antennas at each site. Am-
pex FR-114 magnetic tape machines recorded 40 analog real-time outputs from 
an Applied Science Corporation Series M telemetry decommutator. Immediately 
after each flight, the receiving station processed the recorded information onto strip 
chart recorders. At the very end of the flight program, X-15-3 received a modern 
pulse-code modulation (PCM) telemetry system, and NASA modified the Ely and 
FRC sites to process the data (NASA had decommissioned Beatty by that time).41 
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid; Kenneth C. Sanderson, NASA technical memorandum X-56000, “The X-5 Flight Test Instrumentation,” 2 
April 96, pp. 6-7. 
0 “Engineering Plan, Project High Range,” pp. -2 through -23; “X-5 Range Facility.” 
 “X-5 Range Facility.” This is in direct contrast to planning for the X-33 program during the late 990s, when 
several thousand parameters at rates up to 0,000 samples per second were required. Still, the X-5 pushed its 
state of the art; the X-33 was within the capability of commercial off-the-shelf equipment. Forty years of technical 
progress showed.
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Engineers and researchers on the ground needed to look at some of the telem-
etry data in real time to assist the X-15 pilot if necessary. They could look at this 
information in various forms on the data monitor consoles located at all three sta-
tions, although Edwards generally conducted the critical analyses. All parameters 
were presented in the form of vertical bar graphs on two center-mounted oscil-
loscopes, which allowed rapid assessment of a group of parameters to determine 
whether the operation was within predetermined limits. Of the total parameters 
transmitted, researchers could look at any 40 at one time, and the strip charts 
could display an additional 12 channels.42 
 Standard military ground-to-air AN/GRC-27 UHF equipment provided voice 
communications with the X-15. Originally, the Air Force indicated that it would 
provide the radios as government-furnished equipment; however, the long lead 
times caused the AFFTC to ask EECo to bid on supplying them separately. EECo 
found a Collins unit with 1,750 channels that it could acquire within nine months. 
The radio was fully compatible with the AN/ARC-34 UHF transmitter-receiver 
set that North American would install in the X-15.43 
 To ensure positive contact between any of the tracking sites and the X-15 re-
gardless of its location over the High Range, EECo installed a network communi-
cations system. Each range station contained two UHF transmitters and receivers 
(one of each was a spare) and a specially designed communication amplifier and 
switching unit. When an operator keyed a transmitter at any location, all three sta-
tions transmitted the same information simultaneously. The receivers at all three 
stations fed their outputs onto a telephone line and, regardless of which station 
 
2 Ibid.
3 “Engineering Plan, Project High Range,” pp. 6- through 6-5; “X-5 Range Facility;” System Development 
Plan, X-5 Research Aircraft, Supporting Research System Number 7L, 22 March 956, p. 8. The ARC-3 
would be replaced by an AN/ARC-8 before the X-5 was actually built; this in turn was replaced by an AN/ARC-
5 during September-October 966.
When thinking about radar operators, generally a large “radarscope” comes to mind. However, that was not the 
case during the 1950s, and the output from a radar was generally a small set of  oscilliscopes as shown here on 
the Mod II unit. (It takes a computer to convert raw radar data into a plan-view for display on a radarscope, 
and such computers largely did not exist during the late 1950s.) For the most part, on the High Range the 
radar data was processed and displayed on a set of  large paper charts that traced the flight progress on a pre-
printed map. The position was plotted using one color of  ink for position and another for altitude. (NASA)
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received the information, all stations could hear the transmission. The EECo also 
installed dedicated station-to-station communications links.44 
 The development of the UHF communications system actually presented 
something of a challenge for the High Range team. The problem was that since all 
three stations transmitted the same data simultaneously, the airborne receiver ex-
perienced an “audible beat or tone” interference. The solution to this heterodyne 
interference problem was to offset each transmitter frequency by a small amount 
without drifting outside the frequency bandwidth of the receiver. Experimentation 
led the team to adopt offsets of 0.005–0.010% of the operating frequency as nearly 
ideal. It was also determined that each transmitter should be offset by an unequal 
amount to avoid creating a noticeable “beat” in the audio. In the end, technicians 
tuned the Edwards transmitter 22 kilocycles below the center frequency, while the 
Ely site transmitted at 14 kilocycles above the center frequency. Beatty, being in 
the middle, used the center frequency for its transmitter.45 
 Since a microphone at any one of the stations modulated all three transmit-
ters simultaneously, the signal arrived at the aircraft at slightly different times 
because of differing distances from the station to the aircraft. In addition, signals 
originating on the aircraft took slightly different times to reach each of the ground 
stations. Consequently, some slightly different delays affected each signal. Given 
that such signals travel at the speed of light (186,000 miles per second), the time 
difference for an actual transmission was a maximum of approximately 4 mil-
liseconds. A slightly longer delay was encountered in sending the keying signals 
between stations, resulting in a total delay of about 12 milliseconds between the 
two outermost sites (Edwards and Ely).46 
 It was found, however, that the time delay was not totally undesirable. The 
human voice contains a multitude of continuously varying harmonic frequencies. 
The time delay canceled out a small number of these frequencies since they were 
180 degrees out of phase with each other. The only effect this had was to introduce 
a slight flutter in the reproduced sound that did not seriously degrade speech intel-
ligibility. The second effect the time delay brought was a slight echo effect. Due 
to the acuity of the human ear, there must be a spacing of approximately 30 mil-
liseconds between signals for the ear to detect that an echo is present. Researchers 
discovered that a small echo effect actually increases the intelligibility of a voice 
because of the slight lengthening of word syllables. Analysis indicated that the 
maximum predicted 12-millisecond time delay would not be sufficient to cause 
undesirable effects, so the X-15 program elected to ignore the issue.47 
 In the course of determining solutions to the various communications 
challenges, EECo discovered that it was not the first to confront these issues. 
Commercial airlines had been using similar systems (operating in VHF instead 
of UHF) for approximately five years after they had installed communications 
networks under their frequently traveled routes to allow aircraft to be in constant 
 “Engineering Plan, Project High Range,” p. 6-3; “X-5 Range Facility.” 
5 “Engineering Plan, Project High Range,” pp. 6-5 through 6-6. Prior to the early 960s, scientific convention was 
to describe frequency in cycles per second (cps). During the mid-960s this was changed to Hertz (Hz) in honor 
of German physicist Heinrich Rudolph Hertz, who conducted research on electricity and electromagnetism.
6 Ibid, pp. 6-8 through 6-. 
7 Ibid, pp. 6-8 through 6-. 
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touch with their home offices. Each of these networks was composed of several 
transmitter-receiver sets that contained between two and six stations tied together 
by a transmission link. Several groups made up a complete network.48 
 United Airlines had designed a similar communications system and contract-
ed its operation to the Aeronautical Radio Company to make it available for other 
airlines. As Aeronautical Radio expanded and upgraded the original network, it 
contracted the work to Bell Telephone. Aeronautical Radio leased the system from 
Bell, and in turn leased the services to the airlines . Collins Radio worked with the 
service providers and airlines to create a series of radios specifically tailored to 
operate in the multiple-transmitter environment. Aeronautical Radio, Bell Tele-
phone, Collins Radio, and United Airlines all provided information and assistance 
to EECo at no charge.49 
 In order to evaluate a working communications system of this type before 
committing to the use of one on the High Range, EECo arranged for a demonstra-
tion using one of the airline VHF networks that ran in a line between Oceanside 
near San Diego to San Francisco, California. The NACA flew a Boeing B-47 Stra-
tojet from Los Angeles to San Francisco at an altitude of 15,000 feet, returning to 
Los Angeles at 40,000 feet. The pilot made contact with the ground at 10-minute 
intervals while Air Force, NACA, and EECo representatives located at the Los 
Angeles International Airport monitored the two-way communications.50 
 The network spanned a distance of 400 miles, but used six stations (instead 
of the three planned for the High Range) to provide communications down to an 
altitude of 1,000 feet. Coverage for the High Range was concentrated above 7,000 
feet, and one of the goals of the evaluation was to determine how the concept 
worked at high altitudes. On the return flight at 40,000 feet, it was likely that the 
B-47 received signals from all six ground stations, and that all six ground-stations 
received signals from the aircraft. Thus, potential interference was even greater 
than it would be with the three-station network planned for the High Range. The 
only effect noted during the evaluation was a flutter or warble at certain loca-
tions in the flight path. Researchers played tapes recorded during the flight for 
numerous pilots and ground personnel at Edwards, and nobody voiced any serious 
objections. This validated the concept for the High Range, and the EECo began 
procurement of the various radios, switching units, and other components.51 
 The three High Range stations could share radar and telemetry data to auto-
matically direct the next radar in line to the target, and to plot radar data from a 
remote station on a local plotting board if desired. It was necessary to convert the 
data from each station into the correct relative position using a set of fixed transla-
tion equations, which is one reason why the exact position of each radar antenna 
had to be precisely determined during construction.52 
  
 
 
8 Ibid, pp. 6-2 through 6-. 
9 Ibid, pp. 6-2 through 6-.
50 Ibid, pp. 6-2 through 6-. 
5 Ibid, pp. 6- through 6-7. 
52 X-5 Range Facility.” 
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 There were three likely ways to transmit data between the three sites: a leased 
wire facility, a scatter propagation system, or microwave transmission.53  The con-
tract with EECo specifically stated that “the contractor shall investigate the possi-
bility of using a microwave service link for radar data transmission originating at 
the Ely site, passing through the Beatty site, and terminating at Edwards Air Force 
Base.” To satisfy this requirement, EECo personnel discussed possible micro-
wave solutions with the Collins Radio, Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company 
(PT&T), Philco Corporation, and Raytheon Manufacturing. EECo also discussed 
the possibility of a scatter propagation system with the same companies, although 
only Collins provided any meaningful data.54 
 A typical solution to the microwave system provided three main terminals at 
Ely, Beatty, and Edwards linked together by 10 repeater stations located approxi-
mately 30 miles apart. Each location had complete standby power and radio fre-
quency (RF) equipment to ensure reliability. Engineers estimated the propagation 
delay from Ely to Edwards at 1.8 milliseconds. There were, however, substantial 
costs to build the system. For instance, each of the repeater sites needed power 
generators (at least primary, and probably backup). Then there was the cost to 
build roads to each repeater site; at an average cost of $3,000 per mile for an 
estimated three miles per site, this came to $90,000. The roads were to be of the 
53 In plain English, a “leased wire facility” is a group of telephone lines. Surprisingly, radar data between tracking 
sites on most of the major test ranges were transferred using standard 200- and 9600-baud telephone lines well 
into the 990s.
5 “Engineering Plan, Project High Range,” pp. 6-27 through 6-29. 
The High Range stations were positioned on top of  mountains to provide the best look angles for the 
radar and telemetry receivers. The Beatty, Nevada station was closed when the X-15 program ended 
and nothing remains at the site except for the concrete slabs where the buildings once stood. (NASA)
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same quality as a typical “pole maintenance” road not intended for regular vehicle 
traffic. The estimated cost of the microwave system was $396,000, and estimated 
operating expenses were $33,000 per year, not including amortization of the ini-
tial installation costs .55 
 The propagation scatter system would have involved placing 28-foot- 
diameter antennas at each of the three sites and bouncing signals off the tropo-
sphere . Collins Radio recommended using a UHF system for distances up to 350 
miles, and VHF for distances up to 1,200 miles. At the time, the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) had not made any licensing provisions for tropo-
spheric scatter systems since it appeared only the government would be interested 
in using them. Collins pointed out that each system was custom-made, and the 
only way to determine whether such a system would work between any two or 
more locations was to try a Collins Transhorizon System in a van setup between 
each of the sites . Collins estimated the original system cost at $287,600, not in-
cluding installation or spare parts. Collins also pointed out that the system was 
very susceptible to atmospheric disturbances and weather.56 
 The leased wire facility would provide telephone lines from Edwards through 
Los Angeles and Sacramento to Reno, Nevada. From Reno the lines would branch 
off through Tonopah, Nevada, to the Beatty site, and through Wendover, Utah, to 
the Ely site. The estimated propagation delay from Edwards to Ely was 10 milli-
seconds . The standard telephone facilities at Ely and Beatty would be “semi pub-
lic toll service stations,” meaning that they would be on a party-line hookup with 
the towns of Ely and Beatty. All calls from these telephones would be toll calls 
(10 cents minimum) with a minimum charge of $5.00 per month. The transmis-
sion links were semi-permanently connected lines that would not go through an 
operator’s patch panel, avoiding the chance of accidental disconnections. Pacific 
Telephone would provide all of the maintenance.57  
 Ma Bell, being Ma Bell, had charges for everything. The initial construc-
tion charge (running the necessary land lines and terminal equipment) would be 
$55,000, but there was also an “installation charge” of $95 per site to have a 
technician actually connect the equipment. The total annual operating costs would 
be $113,790, not including the cost of two standard telephones at Ely and Beatty, 
which would run an additional $5 each per month. Pacific Telephone also in-
formed the government that if it selected a microwave system, the telephone com-
pany would not find it profitable to provide only standard telephone service to the 
two remote sites–this would be economically practical only if Pacific Telephone 
provided the entire data transmission contract.58 
 Armed with this information, the AFFTC, NACA, and EECo compared the 
telephone and microwave systems to determine which was more practical. The 
group eliminated the scatter propagation system since it did not seem to offer any 
great cost advantage and represented a largely unknown operational quantity. The 
microwave system offered low annual operating costs, assuming the system con-
55 Ibid, pp. 6-27 through 6-29. 
56 Ibid, pp. 6-29 and 6-33 through 6-3. 
57 Ibid, pp. 6-29 and 6-3 through 6-36. 
58 “Engineering Plan, Project High Range,” p. 6-. 
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tinued to be used for at least six or seven years to amortize the installation costs. 
Additional channels were readily available with minor expenditures, and engineers 
considered the link more secure since it was unlikely anybody would attempt to 
“tap” it. The principal disadvantages of the microwave system were its high initial 
costs, the possibility that the repeater sites would be inaccessible during bad weath-
er, and  that maintenance was the responsibility of the end user (the NACA).59 
 On the other hand, leased telephone facilities offered high reliability and low 
initial costs, and the telephone company would provide all maintenance. Its prin-
cipal disadvantages were high annual operating costs and the inability to easily 
add more channels, particularly high-bandwidth ones.60  
 EECo conducted a cost analysis that included amortization of the initial costs 
over 5-, 10-, and 20-year periods. The results of this analysis for the “Cost per 
Channel per Mile per Year” were as follows:61 
Initial Cost 20-Year 10-Year 5-Year
Microwave 
(Philco)
$396,000 $21.90 $30.10 $46.60
Telephone 
(PT&T)
$55,000 $48.44 $49.57 $51.81
The total annual operating costs, also based on the three possible amortization 
options were:62 
20-Year 10-Year 5-Year
Microwave 
(Philco)
$52,825 $72,650 $112,299
Telephone 
(PT&T)
$118,680 $121,434 $126,947
 The microwave cost curve dropped sharply in the early years and then 
leveled off to some degree after 10 years. Additional channels, however, dropped 
the per-channel cost considerably. This was because the basic investment in a mi-
crowave system was in the initial installation; additional channels only required 
more relatively low-cost multiplex equipment. This reduction, however, only 
extended until expansion filled the full bandwidth of the microwave system. At 
this point, the cost would increase greatly because additional microwave equip-
ment would be required. This was not a major concern since the proposed system 
provided a bandwidth of 100 kilocycles, and the seven required channels only 
used 21 kilocycles.63 
 Nevertheless, the Air Force was in the position to make the final decision, 
and it selected the telephone system. There were four reasons for this choice: 
59 Ibid, pp. 6-36 through 6-37. 
60 This was decades before the advent of high-speed analog modems or DSL technology.
6 Ibid, pp. 6-36 through 6-37. 
62 Ibid, pp. 6-36 through 6-37. 
63 Ibid, p. 6-2. 
X-15: EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
1) the high reliability offered by a utility-maintained system, 2) the high initial 
cost of the microwave system, 3) the distance and inaccessibility of the micro-
wave repeater sites for maintenance, and 4) the fact that the telephone company 
maintained all telephone facilities. These reasons were unquestionably valid. 
However, in reality, the more likely rationale was the simple fact that although 
the Air Force was responsible for funding the installation of the chosen system, 
the NACA was responsible for maintaining the system once it was operational. 
The Air Force, therefore, chose the system that would cost it the least amount of 
up-front money, with little consideration given to future capabilities or operating 
costs. By March 1961, even before the Ely station came on line (in April 1961), 
NASA had opted to install a microwave system between the stations on the High 
Range. The microwave capability from Beatty was operational in June 1961, with 
Ely following in January 1962.64 
 A master timing system at Edwards provided a constant time reference for all 
the tracking stations using three separate timing signals: 1,000 parts per second 
(pps), 100 pps, and 10 pps. An operator at any station could record timing marks on 
recordings at all three stations to indicate a significant event for later reference.65 
 Early in the program, a pilot staffed each of the High Range sites in addition 
to the engineers and technicians necessary to run the equipment. The pilot at Be-
atty used the call sign NASA-2, and the one at Ely used NASA-3. For later flights, 
pilots often did not staff the remote sites as the communications links between the 
sites acquired more bandwidth and all involved gained more confidence in the 
reliability of the systems. Normally, important information from the control room 
passed to the pilot through the NASA-1 controller, who was usually another X-15 
pilot. However, other ground-control personnel had the capability to transmit di-
rectly to the pilot in the event of an emergency where there might be insufficient 
time to relay information through NASA-1, or, as happened on several occasions, 
the radio at Edwards did not work properly.66  
 Although they were not designed as part of the original control room, re-
searchers added various specialized devices during the flight program. For in-
stance, engineers programmed a small analog computer to take radar-derived 
altitude, velocity, and vertical velocity measurements and compute the resulting 
range footprint to assist ground personnel in understanding which contingency 
landing sites were available at every moment during the flight. A scope-type map 
display presented the data in the control room. The analog flight simulator gener-
ated the data to program this computer. The flight surgeons also gained a dedicated 
biomedical console.67 
  
6 Ibid, p. 6-2; Minutes of Meeting, X-5 Operations Subcommittee, 20 March 96. In the AFFTC Access to 
Space Office Project Files.
65 “Engineering Plan, Project High Range,” p. -22; “X-5 Range Facility.” During the late 950s, as each military 
range came on line, it seemed to reinvent the wheel when it came to things like distributing timing signals. In an 
early (and very successful) attempt to create standards, the Range Commanders Council (RCC) developed the 
Inter-Range Instrumentation Group (IRIG) standards. These defined formats and electrical properties for timing 
signals, telemetry, and radar which were subsequently adopted by all U.S. ranges and many foreign ones.
66 Milton O. Thompson, At the Edge of Space: The X-15 Flight Program, (Washington and London: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 992), p. 58; Robert G. Hoey and Richard E. Day, “X-5 Mission Planning and Operational 
Procedures,” a paper in the 1961 Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 60-6.
67 Hoey and Day, “X-5 Mission Planning and Operational Procedures,” p. 6.
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 The High Range underwent a series of modifications over the years. For 
instance, on 10 March 1967, NASA replaced the Mod II radar at Ely with an 
improved Reeves Instrument Corporation MPS-19C unit that became operational 
on 2 May. Wallops Island shipped another MPS-19C during March 1967 for in-
stallation at the FRC. At the FRC, the original Mod II had been located on top 
of building 4800, but engineers deemed this unacceptable because the increased 
accuracy of the new radar required a firmer base to eliminate vibration and flex. 
As a result, the new radar was installed a mile or so west, primarily in a new facil-
ity with a stiffer base. In addition, in early 1967 NASA upgraded the microwave 
relay system from Ely to Edwards to handle the higher-bandwidth PCM data from 
X-15-3. The first successful test (at 144 Kbs) was on 29 March 1967, and the sys-
tem successfully supported flight 3-58-87 on 26 April.68
 
68 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  April 967, p. 6 and 5 May 967, p. 
5; telephone conversation, Jack Kittrell with Dennis R. Jenkins,  August 2002; e-mail, Jack Kittrell to Dennis R. 
Jenkins, 9 August 2002. The MPS-9 at Ely was replaced by an FPQ-5 in the early 970s when the site was 
transferred to Air Force control.
The station at Ely was functionally identical to the one at Beatty, although the physical layout of  the 
two sites differed somewhat due to local environmental conditions. At the end of  the X-15 program, the 
Ely station reverted to the Air Force and continued to play a part in test operations until 1992 when 
it was finally closed. (NASA)
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DRY LAKES
 Although they had one of the most ideal test locations in the world, the Air 
Force and NACA could not simply go out and begin conducting X-15 operations. 
Several hurdles had to be overcome before the X-15 could ever do more than just 
conduct short flights over the Edwards reservation. 
 It had been recognized early during planning for the X-15 flights that suitable 
contingency landing locations would need to be found in the event of an abort af-
ter separation from the B-52 carrier aircraft, or if problems during the flight forced 
the pilot to terminate the mission before reaching Edwards. Since North American 
had designed the X-15 to land on dry lakebeds, the logical course of action was 
to identify suitable lakebeds along the flight path–in fact, these lakebeds had been 
one of the factors used to determine the route followed by the High Range. 
 The Air Force and NACA had to identify lakebeds that would enable the X-15 
to always be within gliding range of a landing site. In addition, the flight planners 
always selected a launch point that allowed the pilot a downwind landing pattern. 
Normally, the launch point was about 19 miles from the lakebed runway and the 
track passed the runway 14 miles abeam. To establish the proper launch point, 
flight planners used the fixed-base simulator to determine the gliding range of the 
airplane, including both forward glides and making a 180-degree turn and return-
ing along its flight path. Another consideration was that the flight planners needed 
to selected lakes that would provide an overlap throughout the entire flight.69 
 The first hurdle for the Air Force was to secure permission from the individu-
als and several government agencies that owned or controlled the lakebeds. Next 
was seeking permission from the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA–it became an 
administration later) to conduct flight operations over public land.
 Although responsibilities concerning the lakebeds continued throughout the 
life of the X-15 program, there were several spurts of activity (two major and 
one minor) concerning them. The first occurred, logically enough, just before the 
beginning of the flight program when efforts began to secure the rights to the 
lakebeds needed for the initial flight tests. The second involved securing the lakes 
needed for the higher-speed and higher-altitude flights made possible by the intro-
duction of the XLR99 engine. One final push later in the program tailored the set 
of lakes for the improved-performance X-15A-2 and its external tanks.
 Eventually, 10 different launch locations would be used, including eight dry 
lakes: Cuddeback supported a single launch; Delamar was the most used, with 62 
launches; Hidden Hills saw 50 launches; Mud hosted 34; Railroad was used for 
only 2; Rosamond was used for 17, Silver hosted 14, and Smith Ranch was used 
for 10 . In addition, the Palmdale VOR (OMNI) hosted eight launches, and a single 
flight originated over the outskirts of Lancaster. Hidden Hills was usually the 
intended site for the abortive 200th flight. The vast majority of these flights (188) 
would land on Rogers Dry Lake. Two would land at Cuddeback, one at Delamar, 
 
69 Hoey and Day, “X-5 Mission Planning and Operational Procedures,” pp. 55-57; letter, Johnny Armstrong to 
Dennis R. Jenkins, 5 July 2002.
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four at Mud, one at Rosamond, one at Silver, and one at Smith Ranch. The X-15-3 
broke up in flight and did not land on its last flight.70 
 Rosamond Dry Lake, several miles southwest of Rogers, offered 21 square 
miles of smooth, flat surface that the Air Force used for routine flight test and 
research operations and emergency landings. This dry lakebed had served as the 
launch point for many of the early rocket-plane flights at Edwards. It is also the 
first lakebed that most visitors to Edwards see, since the road from Rosamond 
(and Highway 14) to Edwards crosses its northern tip on its way to the main base 
area . Scott Crossfield would make the X-15 glide flight over Rosamond Dry Lake, 
and no particular permission was necessary to use Rosamond since the lakebed 
was completely within the restricted area that made up the Edwards complex. 
Unfortunately, the lake was only 20 miles away from the base, so it did not allow 
much opportunity for high-speed work.
 The Rogers and Rosamond lakebeds are among the lowest points in Antelope 
Valley, and they collect seasonal rain and snow runoff from surrounding hills and 
from the San Gabriel Mountains to the south and the Tehachapi Mountains to the 
west. At one time, the lakebeds contained water year-round, but changing geolog-
ical and weather patterns now leave them wet only after infrequent rain or snow. 
A survey of the Rosamond lakebed surface showed its flatness, with a curvature 
of less than 18 inches over a distance of 30,000 feet .71  
 Beginning in early 1957, North American, AFFTC, and NACA personnel 
conducted numerous evaluations of various dry lakes along the High Range route 
to determine which were suitable for X-15 landings. The initial X-15 flights re-
quired 10 dry lakes (five as emergency landing sites near launch locations, and 
five as contingency landing sites downrange) spaced 30–50 miles apart.72 
 The processes to obtain permission to use the various lakebeds outside the 
Edwards complex were as diverse as the locations themselves. For instance, per-
mission to use approximately 2,560 acres of land at Cuddeback Lake as an emer-
gency landing location was sought beginning in early 1957, with first use expected 
in January 1959. The lakebed was within the land area reserved for use by the Air 
Force at George AFB, California, but the Department of the Interior controlled 
the lakebed itself. Since the Air Force cannot acquire land directly, officials at the 
AFFTC contacted the Los Angeles District of the Army Corps of Engineers, only 
to find out that George AFB had already requested the Corps to withdraw the land 
from the public domain. The Bureau of Land Management controls all land in the 
public domain, although control may pass to other government agencies (such as 
70 For those who care about such things, the longitude and latitude of the lakes are as follows:
  Cuddeback Lake, California  7.5 W 35.3 N
  Delamar Dry Lake, Nevada  .9 W 37. N
  Hidden Hills, California   6.0 W 36.0 N
  Lancaster (Fox Field), California  8.2 W 3.8 N
  Mud Lake, California   7. W 37.9 N
  Palmdale OMNI, California   8. W 3.6 N
  Railroad Valley Lake, Nevada  6.0 W 38.0 N
  Rogers Dry Lake, California  7.8 W 3.9 N
  Rosamond Dry Lake, California  8. W 3.8 N
  Silver Lake, California   6. W 35.3 N
  Smith Ranch Lake, Nevada  7.5 W 39.3 N
7 http://www.edwards.af.mil/history/docs_html/center/lakebeds.html, accessed 25 January 2002.
72 Stillwell, X-15 Research Results.
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the military) as stipulated in various laws (U.S. Code Title 43, for example). At 
the time, the Corps of Engineers acted as the land management agent for the U.S. 
Air Force, and John J. Shipley was the chief of the real estate division for the Los 
Angeles District.
 Officials at George intended to use the lakebed as an emergency landing site. 
In turn, on 17 May 1957 the Corps wrote to the Bureau of Land Management 
on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force, requesting a special land-use permit 
for Air Force operations at the lake. When the Los Angeles District received the 
request from the AFFTC, Shipley contacted Lieutenant Colonel C. E. Black, the 
This map shows the general location of  the lakebeds as well as the radar coverage afforded by the three 
High Range stations. The two primary restricted airspace areas are shaded, although the entire flight 
path of  the X-15 was restricted on flight day. (Dennis R. Jenkins)
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installations engineer at George AFB, requesting that a joint-use agreement be set 
up that would permit sharing the lake with the AFFTC for X-15 operations .73 
 By the end of July 1959, the Bureau of Land Management had approved the 
permit, and George AFB had agreed in principle to the sharing arrangement. The 
special-use permit gave George AFB landing rights for several years, and permit-
ted the lakebed to be marked as needed to support flight operations. John Shipley, 
very intelligently, decided that the joint-use agreement between the AFFTC and 
George was an internal Air Force affair and bowed out of the process after the is-
suance of the Bureau of Land Management permit. Although there seemed to be 
no particular disagreement, the joint-use agreement had a long gestation period. 
The special-use permit was granted at the beginning of August, but at the end of 
September Colonel Carl A . Ousley, the chief of the Project Control Office at the 
AFFTC, questioned why a written joint-use agreement had not been signed. Ma-
jor Resiner at George replied on 14 October that he had received verbal approval 
from all parties, but written approval was required from two separate Air Force 
commands (the ARDC and the Tactical Air Command (TAC)), the Corps of Engi-
neers, and the Bureau of Land Management. He foresaw no difficulties in obtain-
ing the signatures, and apparently the process worked itself out within a suitable 
period since there appears to have been no further correspondence on the matter. 
The joint-use agreement with George AFB essentially stated that the AFFTC was 
responsible for any unique preparations and marking of the lakebed required to 
support X-15 operations, although George did offer to supply emergency equip-
ment and personnel as needed.74  
 Simultaneously with the request to use Cuddeback, the AFFTC issued a simi-
lar request for Jakes Lake and Mud Lake, both in Nevada. Originally, the X-15 
program had wanted to use Groom Lake, Nevada, as a launch site instead of Mud 
Lake. However, the security restrictions in place at Groom Lake (also known 
as “The Ranch”) to protect the CIA-Lockheed reconnaissance programs led the 
AFFTC and NASA to abandon plans to use this facility. Officials at Nellis sug-
gested Mud Lake as a compromise between the needs of the X-15 program and 
the highly classified CIA programs.75 
 The AFFTC asked for approximately 2,500 acres of land in the public domain 
at Jakes Lake; at Mud Lake, the request was for 3,088 acres. The indefinite-term 
special-use permits sought the right to install fencing to keep cattle from grazing 
in certain areas. Several ranchers had grazing rights on the public domain land, so 
this required modifying these agreements and compensating the ranchers with Air 
Force funds. In this case the Air Force did not want to remove the land from the 
73 The expected first-use date is contained in a letter, Colonel Carl A. Ousley, Chief of Project Control Office at AF-
FTC, to Richard J. Harer, AFFTC, 7 February 958; various letters from John J. Shipley, Chief of the Real Estate 
Division, Los Angles District of the Army Corps of Engineers, to the Commander, George AFB, the Bureau of 
Land Management, and the AFFTC, dated 7 and 20 May 957. All in the AFFTC Access to Space Office Project 
Files. The original public domain includes the land ceded to the federal government by the 3 original states, 
supplemented with acquisitions from native Indians and foreign powers. It encompasses major portions of the 
land area of 30 western states. 
7 Letter from Colonel Carl A. Ousley, Chief of Project Controls at AFFTC to distribution (internal AFFTC codes), 
7 February 958. In the AFFTC Access to Space Office Project Files; Disposition Form (DD96), Colonel Carl A. 
Ousley, AFFTC to Phyllis R. Actis, also at AFFTC, requesting she make contact with George AFB, 26 September 
957; Reply to Colonel Carl A. Ousley from Major John W. Young, Jr., AFFTC, 6 October 957. In the AFFTC 
Access to Space Office Project Files.
75 Memorandum for Record, Richard J. Harer, Chairman X-5 Operations Committee,  October 960.
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public domain, but it did want to use approximately 9,262 acres of land at Mud 
Lake that had already been withdrawn from the public domain for use as part of 
the Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery Range.76  
 These two areas were under the purview of the Sacramento District of the 
Army Corps of Engineers. The district began the process by preparing Real Estate 
Requirements Estimates for the two lakes detailing the anticipated costs, and for-
warding these to ARDC Headquarters on 15 October 1957 for approval and fund-
ing. By the end of January 1958, however, Lieutenant Colonel Donald J. Iddins at 
the AFFTC began to worry that the process was taking too long. The X-15 needed 
the lakes in July 1959, and there was no evidence of final action. Part of the 
problem was that land actions involving over 5,000 acres (which the two actions 
together did) required approval from the House Armed Services Committee. The 
AFFTC reminded the chief of engineers that they did not want to remove the land 
from the public domain, which seemingly eliminated the need for congressional 
approval, and brought the situation to the attention of the X-15 Project Office 
during a management review at Wright Field on 5 February 1958. The result was 
a renewed effort to ensure that all three lakes (Cuddeback, Jakes, and Mud) were 
available for X-15 use on schedule, including the right to build roads to the lakes, 
marking approach and landing areas, and fencing certain areas if necessary to 
ensure the safety of the X-15.77  
 On 14 February 1958, the chief of engineers responded that he had initiated 
the process to grant special-use permits, but had terminated the effort when he not-
ed that the AFFTC wanted to fence off the land. However, the law did not permit 
fencing to be erected on special-use permitted land. This meant that the land would 
have to be withdrawn from the public domain after all, or go unfenced. It appears 
that the answer to the problem was obtained by the AFFTC agreeing to a reduction 
in the Mud Lake acquisition to just under 2,500 acres (versus the original 3,088), 
bringing the total to under 5,000 and circumventing congressional approval. This 
allowed the land to be withdrawn from the public domain, and some of it was 
fenced as needed to keep stray cattle from wandering onto the marked runway.78  
 Simply getting access to the lakebeds was not always sufficient. For instance, 
Mud Lake was in the extreme northwest corner of Restricted Area R-271, meaning 
that Sandia Corporation, which controlled R-271 for the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion (AEC), had to approve its use. A “Memorandum of Understanding between 
the Air Force Flight Test Center and Sandia Corporation” allowed AFFTC support 
aircraft to operate in the immediate vicinity of Mud Lake during X-15 flights. 
 
 
76 Disposition Form (DD96) from Lieutenant Colonel Donald J. Iddins, Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, ATTFC, to Mrs. 
Phyllis R. Actis, also at AFFTC, 30 January 958; letter from Colonel Carl A. Ousley, Chief of Project Controls at 
AFFTC to distribution (internal AFFTC codes), 7 February 958; memorandum for the record, Phyllis R. Actis, Plan-
ning Specialist, 7 February 958; memorandum for the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, not signed or 
dated (but received in the files on 9 February 958). All in the AFFTC Access to Space Office Project Files.
77 Ibid. The Corps of Engineers was responsible for acquiring the land from the landowners, but the Air Force was 
still expected to pay for it since it was required for AFFTC use.
78 Disposition Form (DD96) from Lieutenant Colonel Donald J. Iddins, Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, ATTFC, to Mrs. 
Phyllis R. Actis, also at AFFTC, 30 January 958; letter from Colonel Carl A. Ousley, Chief of Project Controls at 
AFFTC to distribution (internal AFFTC codes), 7 February 958; memorandum for the record, Phyllis R. Actis, Plan-
ning Specialist, 7 February 958; memorandum for the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, not signed or 
dated (but received in the files on 9 February 958). All in the AFFTC Access to Space Office Project Files.
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The AFFTC had to furnish flight schedules to Sandia one week before each an-
ticipated mission, and Sandia made the point that it had no radar search capabil-
ity and could not guarantee that the area was clear of traffic. Sandia also agreed 
not to schedule any tests within the restricted area that might conflict with X-15 
flights. Once approved by Sandia, the AFFTC sought additional approval from 
Nellis AFB since Mud Lake was also within the Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery 
Range. This approval was somewhat easier to negotiate because it was obtained 
from another Air Force organization.79 
 On 3 November 1958, a team from the AFFTC visited Mud Lake to conduct 
a preliminary study of lakebed conditions and to determine what action would be 
required to clear areas of the lakebed for use as a landing strip. When the group 
from the Flight Test Operations Division and Installations Engineer Division ar-
rived over the lake, the pilot made several low passes to orient the group and 
obtain a general knowledge of the various obstructions that might conflict with 
landing on the lakebed. What the group saw was a general pattern of obstructions 
running east to west in a straight line across the center of the lakebed. The team 
landed at the Tonopah airport and proceeded by car to the lake, 16 miles away, for 
a closer inspection .80 
 They found that the obstructions observed down the center of the lake were 
a series of old gunnery-bombing targets dating from World War II. Practice bod-
ies, wooden stakes, and good-sized rocks used to form bull’s-eyes for bombing 
practice littered the lakebed. The targets were in a narrow straight band down the 
center of the lake from west to east, but the debris covered a considerably wider 
area. As would become standard practice on all the lakes, the group dropped an 
18-pound steel ball from a height of 6 feet and measured the diameter of the 
resulting impression. This gave a good indication of the relative hardness of the 
surface and its ability to support the weight of the X-15 and other aircraft and 
vehicles. At the edges of the lake, the ball left impressions of 3.25 inches or so, 
while toward the center of the lake the impressions were only 2.25–3.0 inches in 
diameter. At the time, the Air Force believed that impressions of 3.125 inches or 
less were acceptable. The general surface condition of the lakebed varied from 
relatively smooth and hard to cracked and soft. Although it was not ideal, the 
group thought the lakebed could be made useable with minor effort.81 
 More lakebed evaluations followed on 13-14 July 1959. X-15 pilot Bob 
White and the AFFTC chief of flight test operations, Colonel Clarence E. “Bud” 
Anderson, used a Helio L-28 Super Courier aircraft to visit 12 dry lakes along the 
High Range route. At each lake, Anderson and White dropped the “imperial ball” 
from six feet and measured the diameter of the resulting impression. By this time, 
the Air Force had changed the criteria slightly: a diameter of 3.25 inches was ac-
ceptable, and anything above 3.5 inches was unacceptable. The survey included 
an evaluation of the surface hardness, surface smoothness, approximate elevation, 
79 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Air Force Flight Test Center and Sandia Corporation, undated. In 
the AFFTC Access to Space Office Project Files.
80 Memorandum for the record, Captain Byron E. Hanes, First Lieutenant John T. Craddock, and Glendon Johnson, 
AFFTC, 0 November 958. In the AFFTC Access to Space Office Project Files.
8 Ibid. Other documentation says that the ball weighed 7 pounds 9 ounces and was 5 inches in diameter. Many 
of those involved referred to this as the “imperial ball.”
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length and direction of possible runways, and obstacles. Anderson remembers 
that there was “only one lake where we had to make a full power go-around as we 
watched the tires sink as we landed.” Many future surveys would take personnel 
from AFFTC, NASA, and North American to most of the larger dry lakes along 
the High Range route.82  
 In addition, on 13 July 1959, four FAA representatives and two members 
of the AFFTC staff held a meeting at the FAA 4th Region Headquarters in Los 
Angeles to discuss using Silver Lake as a launch site for the X-15. Since some of 
the X-15 flight corridor would be outside existing restructured airspace, FAA ap-
proval was necessary. The FAA claimed jurisdiction under Civil Aeronautics Reg-
ulation 60.24, but was anxious to assist the Air Force within the limits of the law. 
The Air Force intended to use Silver Lake launches for early X-15 flights with the 
XLR11 engines. The proposed 100-mile flight path consisted of Silver Lake, Bi-
cycle Lake, Cuddeback and/or Harpers Lake, and then on to landing at Edwards. 
The FAA had no particular problem with the concept, but since its charter was to 
protect the safety of all users of public airspace, it believed that certain restrictions 
needed to be in place before the flights could be approved. The participants spent 
most of the meeting discussing possible operational problems and concerns, and 
then developing limitations or restrictions that mitigated the concerns.83  
 For Silver Lake launches, both the launch and the landing were performed in 
a restricted airspace called a “test area.” Silver Lake was inside Flight Test Area 
Four, while Edwards was at the center of Flight Test Area One. However, none 
of the test areas surrounding Edwards were restricted 24 hours per day, or seven 
days per week. In fact, they were open to civilian traffic most of the time, and their 
closure had to be coordinated with the FAA (the airspace immediately around 
Edwards was always closed to civilian traffic). In addition, the flight path from 
Silver Lake to Edwards would take the X-15 out of restricted airspace and into 
civilian airspace for brief periods. Future flights using the northern portion of the 
High Range would also be outside normal test areas. The FAA, therefore, needed 
to approve the plans and procedures for using that airspace.84  
 On 1 September 1959, L. N. Lightbody, the acting chief of the General Op-
erations Branch of the Los Angeles office (4th Region) of the FAA wrote to Col-
onel Roger B. Phelan, deputy chief of staff for operations at the AFFTC. The 
letter contained a “certificate of waiver covering the release of the X-15 research 
vehicle over Silver Lake” subject to some special limitations. The FAA imposed 
the limitations to ensure “maximum safety not only to your AFFTC personnel 
and equipment, but also to other users of the immediate airspace. Further, the 
communications requirements will insure the blocked airspace may be returned to 
its normal use with minimum delay.” The FAA approved the certificate of waiv-
er (form ACA-400) on 1 September 1959 and listed the period of waiver as 1 
82 E-mail, Clarence E. “Bud” Anderson to Dennis R. Jenkins, 28 January 2002; Trip Report, Colonel Clarence E. 
Anderson, Chief of the Flight Test Operations Division, AFFTC, 7 July 959. In the AFFTC Access to Space Office 
Project Files. The Helio L-28 Super Courier was redesignated U-0A in 962.
83 Letter, Colonel Roger B. Phelan/AFFTC to Administrator, th Region, FAA, 2 July 959, subject: Proposed X-
5 Operation Involving Controlled Airspace in the Vicinity of Silver Lake, California; letter, R. D. Freeland, Chief 
General Operations Brach, th Region, FAA, to Colonel Roger B. Phelan, AFFTC, 29 July 959.
8 Ibid.
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October 1959 to 31 March 1961, although it was subsequently extended to 1 July 
1963, and later still through the end of 1969.85 
 Given the effort that accompanied the acquisition of Cuddeback Lake in late 
1957 and early 1958, it is surprising that the first serious survey of the lake does 
not appear to have taken place until 7 October 1959. Of course, conducting de-
tailed surveys significantly ahead of the anticipated use was not a particularly use-
ful exercise since the periodic rains that kept the lakebeds useable also changed 
their character each time, as did the effects of other vehicles (such as cars). By 
this time, the X-15 had already made its first two flights from over Rosamond 
Dry Lake, landing each time at Rogers. Since the Air Force expected the X-15 to 
begin rapidly to expand its flight envelope, North American sent George P. Lodge 
to Cuddeback in an Air Force Piasecki H-21 Shawnee helicopter .86 
 Lodge conducted the standard hardness tests by dropping the same “impe-
rial ball” used in the other surveys. He found that the ball left an impression of 
about 3 inches (which was considered acceptable) at the southern end of the pro-
posed runway, but quickly degraded to 4–4.5 inches by the northern end. He noted 
that these measurements compared unfavorably to tests on Rogers (2 inches) and 
Rosamond (2 inches) conducted after the last rains. A note emphasized that there 
were a set of deep ruts running the length of the runway made by a vehicle when 
the lake was wet, and that although it was only a single set of ruts, they “wander 
around to some extent.” The nature of the lakebeds was such that grading or other 
mechanical methods could not repair major damage–only nature could do that. 
Lodge recommended that “Cuddeback lake, in its present condition, not be con-
sidered as an alternate landing site for the X-15 airplane and should be used only 
as a last resort in an extreme emergency.” He warned that “should a landing be at-
tempted with the X-15 airplane on Cuddeback lake in its present condition, there 
would be more than a 50-50 chance of wiping out the nose gear.” It was clear that 
the lakes had both good and bad qualities: they were largely self-repairing each 
time it rained, but they could also be self-destroying by the same process.87 
 Two weeks later, Lodge, who was a flight safety specialist for North Ameri-
can, performed a survey of Silver Lake and nine other lakes to determine their 
suitability as emergency landing sites. At Silver, Lodge found that the prevailing 
wind was out of the north, with the best landing heading estimated at 200–310 
degrees magnetic. The southern portion of the lake was soft with numerous sink-
holes, and not satisfactory for touchdown. Lodge also found an abandoned railroad 
bed, approximately 2 feet high and 10 feet wide, running north to south across the 
east side of the lakebed. There was also a dirt road with deep ruts running east to 
west across the northern part of the lake, a paved road going from Baker to Death 
Valley along the eastern perimeter, and another dirt road (this time with no ruts) 
running diagonally northwest to southeast.88 
85 Letter, L. N. Lightbody/FAA to Colonel Roger B. Phelan/AFFTC,  September 959. In the files at the AFFTC 
History Office.
86 Memorandum, George P. Lodge, North American Aviation, to Roy Ferren, North American Aviation, 8 October 
959, subject: Survey of Cuddeback Lake. Piasecki was later absorbed into Boeing Vertol.
87 Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
88 Memorandum, George P. Lodge, North American Aviation, to Roy Ferren, North American Aviation, 23 October 
959, subject: Survey of Silver and Miscellaneous Dry Lakes.
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 Despite these obstacles, there was approximately 16,000 feet of satisfactory 
lakebed between the soft southern portion and the northern road . There were a few 
sinkholes, most measuring about 7 inches across and 3–4 inches deep, but the Air 
Force would fill these before use. The usual imperial-ball tests resulted in impres-
sions between 2.9 and 3.7 inches in diameter, although the main area was on the 
lower end of that range. In addition, Lodge pounded both 3/8-inch and 1/2-inch 
steel rods into the ground with 200 pounds of force to determine what the condi-
tion of the soil was under the upper crust. The 3/8-inch rod generally penetrated 
between 1 and 3 inches, while the 1/2-inch rod penetrated between 0.25 and 1.5 
inches . The results of the tests led Lodge to recommend a location for a marked 
runway. Of the other nine lakebeds visited, Lodge landed only on the east and 
west lakes in the Three Sisters group, and determined that both were satisfactory 
for emergency use despite having “a few rocks and ammo links strewn about.”89 
 As 1959 ended, George Lodge was a busy man, and at the end of Novem-
ber he conducted yet another lake survey, this time of approximately 50 lakes in 
California, Nevada, and Utah. Again, the intent was to find suitable emergency 
landing sites for the X-15 as it expanded its flight-test program. The test methods 
Lodge used on the lakes were the same as he had used the previous month at 
Silver Lake .90 
 The Air Force and NASA continued to survey the established and previous-
ly used lakebeds periodically, particularly after it rained to determine that the 
lakebed was dry enough to support operations and that no sinkholes or gullies ex-
isted. Changing the direction of the available runways on a lakebed also required 
a revised survey. For instance, in early December 1959 Lodge conducted a new 
survey of Rosamond Dry Lake to determine whether the lake would support a 
marked runway running northeast to southwest. Marked runways already existed 
on headings of 10–190 degrees and 70–250 degrees. Starting from a location in 
the southwest corner of the lakebed, Lodge inspected a heading of approximately 
30 degrees, roughly toward the telemetry station located on the edge of the lake. 
He found that the lakebed was hard and smooth for 2 miles, moderately smooth at 
2.5 miles, smooth again at 3 miles, moderately rough at 3.5 miles, and rough from 
4 miles to the edge of the lakebed. Imperial-ball drop tests yielded diameters of 
about 2.5 inches across the route. The conclusion was that the runway was practi-
cal, and, as viewed from above, would result in a runway approximately halfway 
between the two existing runways, with all three converging at the southwest edge 
of the lakebed .91  
 The second round of lake acquisitions began when the XLR99 engine came 
on line. First up was securing rights to use Hidden Hills dry lake, slightly west 
of the Hidden Hills Ranch airstrip. Simulator studies had confirmed that Hidden 
Hills would be ideal as an emergency landing site during the launches for the ini-
tial XLR99 flights that needed to be conducted further uprange than the XLR11 
flights. The lakebed would continue to be used as a contingency site as the program 
89 Ibid.
90 Memorandum, George P. Lodge, North American Aviation, to Roy Ferren, North American Aviation,  December 
959, subject: Survey of Dry Lakes in California, Nevada, and Utah.
9 Memorandum, George P. Lodge, North American Aviation, to E. R. Cokeley, North American Aviation, 7 Decem-
ber 959, subject: Survey of Rosamond Dry Lake.
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continued to launch further uprange into Utah. At the beginning of 1960, it was 
expected that the program would need access to the lake by 1 October 1960.92 
 However, schedules change, and the XLR99 flight dates kept slipping. A re-
vised plan showed that the XLR99 research buildup flights would use Silver Lake 
and Hidden Hills Lake in California, Mud Lake in Nevada, and Wah Wah Lake 
in Utah as launch sites. The program needed various intermediate lakes along 
the upper portion of the High Range to provide complete coverage for emergen-
cy landings along the route. The Air Force would staff the intermediate lakes 
with crash and emergency personnel during flights. Additional contingency lakes 
would have runways marked on them, but would not be staffed with support per-
sonnel. At first the AFFTC and NASA had wanted to mark “all lakes with a sat-
isfactory 10,000 feet landing surface” to provide an additional factor of safety 
for the X-15 program. Although no plans existed to use these lakes, the planners 
believed that marking them would also allow continued X-15 operation when a 
primary intermediate lake was wet. However, legal personnel indicated that there 
was “NO possibility” (emphasis in original) of marking any lake unless a right-to-
use permit was obtained. Since personnel and funds did not exist to negotiate all 
the required permits, this plan was abandoned and a list of essential contingency 
sites was drawn up .93 
 The 30 September 1960 plan included launching immediate flights from Sil-
ver Lake, with the west lake at Three Sisters and Cuddeback acting as intermedi-
ate emergency sites. By 1 February 1961, operations would move to Hidden Hills, 
with Cuddeback as the intermediate site. On 1 April, Mud Lake would become the 
primary launch lake, with Grapevine and Ballarat as the intermediate sites, and 
contingency sites located at Panamint Springs and Racetrack. Two months later 
the launches would move to Wah Wah Lake, with Groom Lake, Delamar, and 
Hidden Hills becoming the intermediate sites, and Dogbone and Indian Springs 
the contingency sites. The AFFTC sought permission from Nellis to use the last 
two sites because they were located on the Las Vegas range, as was Mud Lake .94 
 Planners had always considered Smith Ranch Lake as a backup site to Wah 
Wah Lake, using Mud Lake as the intermediate site and the same contingency 
sites used during Mud Lake launches. This was still true at the end of February 
1961. The program expected to begin launches from Hidden Hills in March 1961, 
and the launch lake still needed to be surveyed and marked. NASA expected to 
begin using Mud Lake in April 1961 and two of the support lakes (Grapevine and 
Panamint) still required use permits, while Ballarat had replaced Racetrack as the 
second contingency site. The program still needed to survey and mark all three 
of the support lakes. Launches from Wah Wah would begin in June 1961, and all 
of the sites along that route (except for Hidden Hills) still had to be “acquired,” 
surveyed, and marked. As the program continued, however, it abandoned plans 
to use Wah Wah Lake, in part because of difficulties in obtaining permission to 
use the Nellis contingency sites (particularly Groom Lake) and airspace rights 
92 Letter, Richard J. Harer AFFTC to Phyllis R. Actis, AFFTC, 3 May 960, subject: Hidden Hills Dry Lake Right-To-
Use Permit. 
93 Memorandum for Record, Richard J. Harer, Chairman X-5 Operations Committee,  October 960.
9 Ibid.
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over Nevada’s restricted areas. Instead, the government eventually acquired the 
alternate launch site at Smith Ranch Lake, although flights from this point did not 
begin until June 1963.95
 Supporting the High Range
 As the X-15 program moved on to higher and faster flights, support became 
more difficult because it required more time to travel to the sites and more lakes 
for each flight. The minutes of the X-15 Operations Subcommittee on 9 March 
1961 give some insight into the coordination required. The subcommittee mem-
bership included Richard J . Harer, Colonel Bud Anderson, Major Robert M . 
White, Major K . Lewis, Captain J . E . Varnadoe, Lieutenant R. L. Smith, Captain 
F . R . O’Clair, Joseph R . Vensel, Stanley P. Butchart, C . E . Sorensen, and Lieuten-
ant Commander Forrest S. Petersen. White and Petersen were X-15 pilots, and 
several of the other members had long and distinguished flying careers (especially 
 
 
95 Ibid; letter, Colonel Clay Tice to distribution, subject: Acquiring, Surveying, and Marking Lakebeds in Support of 
X-5 Flight Test Program, 27 February 96. Flights from Hidden Hills actually did begin in March 96. 
Determining if  a lakebed could support the weight of  an X-15 and its support airplanes was a rela-
tively non-technical endeavor. A large steel ball, nicknamed the “imperial ball” was dropped from a 
height of  six feet and the resulting impression was measured. For most of  the program, a diameter of  
3.25 inches or less was considered acceptable to support operations. Neil Armstrong is kneeling beside 
the ball in this June 1958 photo at Hidden Hills. (NASA)
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Anderson and Butchart), so the group was not without a certain amount of ap-
plicable expertise .96 
 The previous October Paul Bikle had written a letter to the X-15 Operations 
Subcommittee and the AFFTC outlining an increase in support that would be re-
quired as the X-15 program moved uprange to the more remote lakes. The letter 
provides insight into how complicated it really was to conduct X-15 flights. For 
instance, each of the uprange stations (Beatty and Ely) had an operating crew of 
eight people, and the Air Force had to arrange transportation for the crew “a few 
days prior to each X-15 flight and for their return to Edwards after the flight.” Giv-
en that NASA frequently scheduled flights once per week, this required a constant 
movement of personnel. Beatty supported all launches, while the program only 
used Ely for the high-speed flights scheduled out of Wah Wah Lake beginning in 
June 1961 .97  
 The subcommittee did not think that supporting Hidden Hills launches would 
place any additional burden on the AFFTC since the effort required was gener-
ally similar to that needed for Silver Lake. However, flights from Mud Lake and 
farther uprange would require a much greater level of support. In its letter, NASA 
increased the amount of support requested, largely based on the unknown factors 
of never having launched from uprange. The AFFTC agreed that the equipment 
and personnel requirements for the uprange lake sites (as listed in the NASA let-
ter) were valid and, at least initially, appropriate. The Air Force hoped, however, 
that subsequent experience could reduce some of the requirements.98 
 One of the attachments to Bikle’s letter provided the details of the support 
he was requesting. This example uses a launch from Wah Wah Lake because it 
was the most comprehensive. The X-15 launch would take place 20 miles north 
of Wah Wah Lake and would require the X-15, NB-52, and two chase aircraft. 
An emergency team would be located at Wah Wah Lake in case the X-15 engine 
did not start or some other emergency required an immediate landing. This team 
would consist of two Air Force 500-gallon fire trucks, an H-21 helicopter, eight 
firemen, an Air Force pilot as lake controller, an Air Force crew chief, an Air 
Force doctor, an Air Force pressure-suit technician, and a NASA X-15 special-
ist. Delamar Lake, the next contingency landing site, was 120 miles away. One 
Air Force 500-gallon fire truck, four firemen, four Air Force flight crew, two 
Air Force paramedics, and a NASA X-15 specialist would staff it. A Jeep would 
carry a nitrogen purge system to safe the X-15 after landing. One hundred and 
fifteen miles closer to Edwards was Hidden Hills, the primary emergency site 
in case the pilot had to shut down the engine early. Orbiting this lake were two 
F-104 chase aircraft that were intended to pick up the X-15 as it slowed down 
at the nominal end-of-mission, but could also provide assistance in the event of 
emergency. An Air Force C-130 waited on the lake to evacuate the X-15 pilot in 
case of an emergency landing, along with an Air Force 500-gallon fire truck, four 
96 Minutes of Meeting, X-5 Operations Subcommittee, 20 March 96. In the AFFTC Access to Space Office 
Project Files.
97 Letter, Paul F. Bikle to AFFTC, 2 October 960, subject: AFFTC Operation Support of Remote Launches for the 
X-5 Program.
98 Minutes of Meeting, X-5 Operations Subcommittee, 20 March 96. In the AFFTC Access to Space Office 
Project Files.
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firemen, two pilots, four Air Force flight crew, two Air Force paramedics, and a 
NASA X-15 specialist .99 
 Back at Edwards, the NASA radio van, an H-21 helicopter, the NASA lake 
controller, two Air Force fire trucks, eight firemen, two Air Force flight crew, the 
Air Force flight surgeon, a pressure-suit technician, and a NASA X-15 specialist 
awaited. In addition, staged between Wah Wah Lake and Delamar were a NASA-
provided Jeep and three NASA X-15 specialists in case the X-15 had to set down 
unexpectedly at a lake other than those manned for the flight. An F-104 also or-
bited between Delamar and Hidden Hills to provide chase if the X-15 had to slow 
down during mid-flight. It was a complex ballet.
 As it turned out, however, the increase in support that NASA was requesting 
was not possible . For instance, NASA wanted three C-130 aircraft and four para-
medics dedicated to each launch, but the AFFTC did not have these resources. 
The AFFTC only had four C-130s assigned, and two were normally at El Centro 
supporting activities at the National Parachute Range. The base flight surgeon in-
dicated that he believed it would be acceptable to provide a capability for a flight 
surgeon to be on the scene of an accident “within one hour,” and the AFFTC 
adopted this suggestion. In general, however, the level of support provided by 
the AFFTC was consistent with that requested by Bikle; it differed primarily in 
some convenience items, not in essential services. On the other hand, NASA had 
proposed sending crews to the uprange sites the morning of each flight (meaning 
in the dark, since the X-15 often flew near first light). The AFFTC believed it was 
easier to send the uprange crews up the day prior to each flight. In most cases 
the personnel stayed in hotels in the towns near the support sites and reported to 
the site by 0800 hours in order to be ready by 0830 to support a 0900 takeoff of 
the NB-52 .100 
 By early 1961 the X-15 Operations Subcommittee reported that security re-
strictions concerning Groom Lake seemed to be easing, and everybody agreed 
that Groom Lake was a preferable landing site compared to Delamar Lake. The 
program hoped to gain permission to use Groom Lake in the future, and Captain 
Varnadoe agreed to contact the appropriate offices to determine the likelihood of 
that happening. As it ended up, although one black project (the U-2) was ending 
at Groom, another (the Blackbird) was getting set to begin, and the X-15 program 
never would obtain permission to use the lakebed.101  
 By this time the Edwards and Beatty sites of the High Range were operational 
and had supported 34 X-15 flights. The Ely station became operational in April 
1961 . One of the concerns of the X-15 Operations Subcommittee involved direct-
ing rescue forces to a downed X-15 pilot. The H-21 rescue helicopters did not 
have onboard navigation equipment, and required direction to within five miles of 
the crash site. From that point they could use radio homing equipment to find the 
rescue beacon on the pilot. The beacon itself was relatively new and at that time 
NASA had only installed it on X-15-2; however, it would later install the beacon 
99 Letter, Paul F. Bikle to AFFTC, 2 October 960, subject: AFFTC Operation Support of Remote Launches for the 
X-5 Program.
00 Minutes of Meeting, X-5 Operations Subcommittee, 20 March 96. In the AFFTC Access to Space Office 
Project Files.
0 The CIA-Lockheed A-2 Blackbird would arrive at Groom Lake in early 962. 
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Each X-15 pilot was issued a typed summary of  lakebed information, along with hand-drawn sketches of  
the lakes and the marked runways. These were the lakes available in January 1966. (North American Aviation)
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on the other two airplanes. North American had promised a 30-mile range for the 
beacon, but testing at Edwards revealed much less capability. The beacon was 
returned to North American and discovered to have only half-power in its battery 
(range is a square function, so this resulted in only one-quarter of the projected 
distance) . The H-21 used an AN/ARA-25 direction (homing) finder to locate the 
beacon. The subcommittee believed it would be desirable to install an ARA-25 
receiver on the NB-52s also to allow the carrier aircraft to locate the pilot and di-
rect the H-21s to the site. In addition, the NASA budget included funds to install 
auto-trackers on the High Range telemetry antennas. Once installed, the antennas 
could be set to 2.443 MHz and automatically track the pilot rescue beacon.102 
 Expeditious recovery of the X-15 pilot by an H-21 or C-130 required a de-
tailed knowledge of each lakebed, and this implied that all the rescue pilots would 
need to fly practice approaches at each possible recovery site. The recovery of 
the X-15 itself from uprange locations would be handled by NASA, although an 
AFFTC crane would be provided to lift the airplane onto a flatbed trailer.103
 More Lakes
 Jack McKay conducted a short lake survey in late March 1961 to investigate 
possible launch lakes for the maximum speed flights. During this trip he visited 
Tonopah, Nevada, on 22 March to discuss communication requirements, refuel-
ing capabilities, and storage requirements. The officer in charge of the Tonopah 
site stated that F-104 proficiency flights would not be a problem. A 500-gallon 
fuel truck was available with 91-octane gasoline to refuel H-21 helicopters. The 
pilot would sign a Form 15, committing the AFFTC to reimburse Tonopah for the 
fuel . Storage facilities at the airport were limited to a small U.S. Navy installa-
tion that consisted of one small, corrugated-metal building leased to the Atomic 
Energy Commission for the storage of classified materials. However, a fenced 
area around the building appeared suitable for securing X-15 support equipment 
if necessary. The manager of the civilian airport informed McKay that 91-octane 
fuel was available for purchase from a 2,000-gallon fuel truck.104 
 McKay also visited Smith Ranch Lake, located 100 miles north-northwest 
of Mud Lake. The Air force initially acquired this site as a backup to Wah Wah 
Lake and removed a total of 25,000 acres from the public domain, although some 
privately owned land also existed on the southwest portion of the lakebed. A five-
mile-long runway was marked on a heading of 025-205 degrees. McKay also 
investigated the use of Edwards Creek Valley Dry Lake, 26 miles northwest of 
Smith Ranch during the March 1961 trip, but took no further action.105 
 The increased performance of the “advanced X-15” (the X-15A-2) and its use 
of recoverable drop tanks necessitated that NASA and the AFFTC acquire rights 
 
02 Minutes of Meeting, X-5 Operations Subcommittee, 20 March 96. In the AFFTC Access to Space Office 
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0 Memorandum, Jack B. McKay to Chief of the Operations Division, 27 March 96, subject: Periodic Inspection 
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to additional property. All of this land was in Nevada. Most of it was owned by the 
federal government, and a great deal of it was already out of the public domain.106 
 The X-15A-2 would use drop tanks on the high-speed flights, something 
that researchers had not anticipated for the original X-15 flight program. The 
X-15 jettisoned the tanks at approximately Mach 2.1 and 65,000 feet. After some 
free-fall, the parachutes opened at 15,000 feet and lowered the empty tanks to 
the ground. With the chutes deployed, the heavier tank had a descent rate of 25 
feet per second (17 mph), while the lighter tank fell at 20 fps (14 mph). A heli-
copter recovered the tanks and placed them on flatbed trucks for the trips back to 
Edwards. Obviously, the program could not allow the tanks to fall onto civilians 
or their property. The possible impact areas for the tanks were quite large due to 
possible dispersions in the X-15 flight conditions at the time of tank jettison, as 
well as unknown wind effects .107  
 Despite its increased performance potential, the initial of the acceleration of 
X-15A-2 with full external tanks was considerably less than that of the standard 
X-15. This caused a reevaluation of the emergency lake coverage for flights with 
external tanks. Flight planners Robert G. Hoey and Johnny G. Armstrong used 
the AFFTC X-15A-2 hybrid simulator to conduct a parametric study of the glide 
capability of the aircraft for different engine burn times along the design pro-
file to 100,000 feet. This study concluded that, of the originally selected launch 
points, only Mud Lake was suitable for flights using the external tanks. How-
ever, since Mud Lake was only 215 miles from Edwards, it was not suitable for 
the high-speed flights that required more distance. The use of Smith Ranch as a 
launch point was desirable, but unfortunately the distance between Smith Ranch 
and Mud Lake was too great for the glide capability of the airplane, and thus for 
a period of time X-15A-2 would have been without a suitable landing site. NASA 
wanted to find a usable lake between Smith Ranch and Mud Lake to fill the gap.
 NASA conducted a new survey in May 1965 and again focused on Edwards 
Creek Valley Dry Lake, something that Jack McKay had mentioned as early as 
March 1961. This lake was 23 miles northwest of Smith Ranch; in a change of 
rules, there would be no plan to land at Edwards Creek, even in the event the 
engine failed to ignite immediately after launch. The lake did not provide the 
desired emergency coverage, but allowed a straight-in approach to Smith Ranch 
if an engine shutdown occurred at the worse possible time. In addition, if an 
emergency occurred at the time of tank ejection, the pilot could always land at 
Smith Ranch.108 
 Johnny Armstrong carried out a further analysis of X-15A-2 flight profiles in 
early 1965 using the hybrid simulator. For instance, Armstrong studied the glide 
capability of the X-15A-2 by terminating engine thrust at different times along the 
Mach 8 profile. For X-15A-2 flights with external tanks, there were two critical 
06 Memorandum, Colonel Guy M. Townsend, AFFTC Deputy for Systems Test to Phyllis R. Actis, Planning Specialist, 
0 May 965, subject: Land Requirements for Flight Test of the Advanced X-5. In the AFFTC Access to Space 
Office Project Files.
07 Ibid.
08 Johnny G. Armstrong, AFFTC technology document FTC-TD-69-, “Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 
Envelope Expansion Program, July 969, pp. 3-5; Johnny G. Armstrong, AFFTC Flight Research Division office 
memorandum AV-6-, “Geographical Impact Areas for the X-5A-2 Drop Tanks,” 22 July 96. In the AFFTC 
Access to Space Office Project Files
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points along the flight profile with regard to emergency landing sites. The first 
point was the decision to either to continue straight ahead to a forward landing site 
or initiate a turn to a landing site behind the airplane. The geographical location 
of potential emergency landing sites determined the length of this period. Second, 
the flight planners had to consider emergency lake coverage from the tank drop 
point. In all cases, it was desirable to arrive at the emergency landing lake at an 
altitude of 20,000 feet or greater.109 
 In his preliminary study the previous summer, Armstrong had concluded that 
launches from Mud Lake needed to be conducted from the east side of the lake be-
cause of external tank impact considerations, and this condition still held true. If a 
pilot was considering contingency landing sites, the critical time for a launch from 
Mud Lake was after 53 seconds of engine thrust; at that point it was possible to 
either continue forward to Grapevine Lake or turn around and land at Mud Lake . 
If the pilot elected to continue forward, he would arrive at Grapevine at an altitude 
of 43,000 feet. Returning to Mud Lake would result in an altitude of 11,000 feet 
(or 6,000 feet above Mud Lake) .110 
 The simulations also showed that adequate emergency lake coverage was not 
available for a Smith Ranch launch. There was a period of 29–31 seconds (depend-
ing upon the exact launch point) during which the X-15 could not go forward or 
turn around and arrive at the emergency landing site at 20,000 feet altitude. Worse, 
there was a period of 4–7 seconds in which it was not even possible to arrive at the 
emergency lakes at 5,000 feet altitude. In other words, given that Mud Lake was at 
5,000 feet altitude, the pilot could not even make a straight-in approach if the en-
gine shut down during the critical time. Additionally, if the engine shut down dur-
ing external tank separation, the X-15A-2 could not go forward to Mud Lake and 
would have to return to Smith Ranch, arriving with only 5,000 feet altitude.111 
 The use of Edwards Creek Valley as a launch lake allowed the pilot to at-
tempt a straight-in approach at either Smith Ranch or Mud Lake if the engine shut 
down at a critical time. There was even a small period in which the pilot could 
elect to abort to either lake . Once the pilot jettisoned the tanks, he could turn the 
airplane back to Smith Ranch, arriving at 5,000 feet. Given this analysis, the pro-
gram decided that X-15A-2 high-speed flights would proceed from either Mud 
Lake or Edwards Creek Valley. The tank recovery area for Mud Lake launches 
was entirely within Restricted Area R-4907 and posed only minor problems for 
securing use rights; however, the Air Force needed to acquire use rights for civil-
ian property in the anticipated drop areas for Edwards Creek Valley (and Smith 
Ranch) launches .112  
 The Air Force would launch the initial X-15A-2 flights from Mud Lake, but 
would not exploit the full potential of the advanced aircraft because of the limited 
distance between Mud Lake and Edwards. The program now expected to launch 
subsequent flights from Edwards Creek Valley based on two considerations: first, 
the airplane had slightly better gliding performance than anticipated, eliminating 
09 AFFTC Flight Research Division memorandum AV-65-6, pp. 3-. 
0 Ibid, p. . 
 Ibid. 
2 Ibid, p. 5. 
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most of the gaps in emergency lake coverage from Smith Ranch; second, there had 
been some difficulties obtaining adequate external tank drop areas from Edwards 
Creek Valley. As it turned out, there never were any launches from Edwards Creek 
Valley since the X-15A-2 program stopped at Mach 6.7 instead of proceeding to 
Mach 8. Of the four flights with external tanks, the program launched the first (with 
empty tanks) from Cuddeback, and the three flights with full tanks from Mud.113 
 Rogers Dry Lake was the designated landing site for all flights. Initially, the 
runways on Rogers were marked in typical fashion, showing left and right ex-
tremes, and thresholds on each end. A meeting of the original X-15 pilots on 19 
October 1960 established a standard operational procedure for releasing the ven-
tral stabilizer before landing. North American decided the pilots should jettison 
the ventral below 800 feet altitude and less than 300 knots to ensure recovery in a 
reusable condition. The pilots established that if the touchdown point on runway 
18 (the most frequently used) was two miles from the north end, then the ideal 
jettison queue would be when the pilot passed over the railroad tracks located 
one mile from the end of the runway. The pilots asked Paul Bikle to request the 
AFFTC to mark all Rogers runways with chevron patterns one mile from each end 
(to indicate the ventral jettison point), and also two miles down each runway (to 
indicate the touchdown point). The program subsequently adopted these markings 
for most of the lakebed runways.114 
 The markings on the lakebed were not paint, but a tar-like compound on top 
of the soil. The Air Force standardized the runways at 300 feet wide and at least 2 
miles (often 3 miles) long. The tar strips outlining the edges of the runways were 8 
feet wide. The width of the strips was critical because they provided a major visual 
reference for the pilot to judge his height (many of the lakebeds were completely 
smooth and provided no other reference). The chevron patterns were marked at 
the appropriate places on each lakebed with the same compound. The Air Force 
was responsible for keeping each of the active lakebeds marked, and laid new tar 
at least once per year after the rainy season. If the pilots complained the mark-
ings were not visible enough during the approaches practiced in the F-104s, the 
Air Force would re-mark the runway. As Milt Thompson remembered, “over the 
years, the thickness of the tar strips increased with each new marking until they 
exceeded 3 or 4 inches in height….”115 
 The FRC was primarily responsible for checking the lakebeds during the 
course of the flight program. As often as not, this involved landing the NASA DC-3 
on the lakebed for a visual inspection (usually performed by Walter Whiteside 
riding a motorcycle). If the lakebed appeared damp, the pilot of the DC-3 would 
make a low pass and roll its wheels on the surface, making sure not to slow down 
enough to become stuck. He would then fly a slow pass and observe how far 
the wheels had sunk in the mud. If the DC-3 was not available, the pilots used a 
T-33 or whatever other airplane they could get, although obviously they could not 
3 Memorandum, Colonel Guy M. Townsend, AFFTC Deputy for Systems Test to Phyllis R. Actis, Planning Specialist, 
0 May 965, Land Requirements for Flight Test of the Advanced X-5. In the AFFTC Access to Space Office 
Project Files.
 Letter, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to Commander/AFFTC, subject: Rogers Lake Runway Markings for X-5 Flights, 2 
October 960.
5 Thompson, At the Edge of Space, pp. 5-52.
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carry the motorcycle in those instances. On at least one occasion, the pilots (Neil 
Armstrong and Chuck Yeager) became stuck in the mud when the lakebed turned 
out to be softer than they had anticipated.116 
 The National Park Service declared Rogers Dry Lake a national historic land-
mark because of its role in the development of the nation’s space program. Since 
1977, NASA has used the lakebed as a landing site for many Space Shuttle test 
and operational flights.117 
 Despite the time and effort spent on locating, acquiring, and marking many 
launch and intermediate lakes, none of the X-15 pilots had any real desire to land 
on any of them, although several did. The pilots considered a landing at the launch 
lake or an intermediate lake an emergency, while landing on Rogers Dry Lake was 
normal. Both were deadstick landings, so what was the difference? Milt Thompson 
summed it up well in his book: “[Rogers] was where God intended man to land 
rocket airplanes. It was big. It had many different runways. It was hard. It had no 
obstructions on any of the many approach paths. It had all of the essential emer-
gency equipment. It was territory that we were intimately familiar with and it had 
a lot of friendly people waiting there.” In other words, it was home.118 
6 Ibid, p. 52. The NASA DC-3 was really a former Navy RD, which was the Navy equivalent of the Army/Air 
Force C-7.
7 http://www.edwards.af.mil/history/docs_html/center/lakebeds.html, accessed 25 January 2002.
8 Thompson, At the Edge of Space, p. 52.

Preparations
Although most histories consider the development of the three flight 
vehicles the high mark of the X-15 program, in reality several ancillary areas were 
perhaps as important as the actual airplanes and left a more lasting legacy. Early in 
the program, engineers recognized the need for a carrier aircraft, although this was 
largely an extension of previous X-plane practice. Nevertheless, the two Boeing 
B-52s used by the X-15 program would go on to long careers carrying a variety 
of vehicles that researchers had not even dreamed of during the X-15 develop-
ment. Most important, however, was the development of extensive engineering 
and mission simulation systems. Although it was crude by today’s standards, the 
X-15 pioneered the use of simulators not just to train pilots, but also to engineer 
the aircraft, plan the missions, and understand the results. Not surprisingly, given 
the involvement of Charlie Feltz, Harrison Storms, and Walt Williams in both 
the X-15 and Apollo programs, the X-15 pointed the way to how America would 
conduct its space missions. Simulation is one of the enduring legacies of the small 
black airplanes .

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SIMULATIONS
 Immediately after World War II, the Air Force developed rudimentary simu-
lators at Edwards AFB for the later phases of the X-1 and X-2 programs. In fact, 
an X-1 simulation powered by an analog computer led to an understanding of the 
roll-coupling phenomena, while another simulation accurately predicted the X-2 
control problems at Mach 3. The importance of these discoveries led the NACA 
HSFS to acquire an analog computer capability in 1957, mostly because the en-
gineering staff anticipated that simulation would play an important role in the 
upcoming X-15 program.1
Fixed-Base Simulators
 Simulation in the X-15 program meant much more than pilot training. It was 
perhaps the first program in which simulators played a major role in the develop-
ment of an aircraft and its flight profiles. The flight planners used the simulators 
to determine heating loads, assess the effects of proposed technical changes, abort 
scenarios, and perform a host of related tasks. In this regard, the term “flight 
planner” at the AFFTC and FRC encompassed a great deal more than someone 
who sat down and wrote out a plan for a launch lake and a landing site. It is very 
possible that the flight planners (such as Elmore J. Adkins, Paul L . Chenoweth, 
Richard E. Day, Jack L . Kolf, John A . Manke, and Warren S . Wilson at the FRC, 
and Robert G. Hoey and Johnny G. Armstrong at the AFFTC) knew as much as 
(or more than) the pilots and flight-test engineers about the airplanes.2 
 The initial group of X-15 pilots worked jointly with research engineers and 
flight planners to develop simulations to study the aspects of flight believed to pres-
ent the largest number of potential difficulties. During late 1956, North American 
developed a fixed-base X-15 simulator at their Inglewood facility that consisted 
of an X-15 cockpit and an “iron bird” that included production components such 
as cables, push rods, bellcranks, and hydraulics. The iron bird looked more or less 
like an X-15 and used flight-representative electrical wiring and hydraulic tubing, 
but otherwise did not much resemble an aircraft. The simulator included a com-
plete stability augmentation system (dampers), and ultimately added an MH-96 
adaptive flight control system. Controlling the simulator were three Electronics 
Associates, Inc . (EAI) PACE 231R analog computers that contained 380 opera-
tional amplifiers, 101 function generators, 32 servo amplifiers, and 5 electronic 
multipliers. None of the existing digital systems were capable of performing the 
computations in real time, hence the selection of analog computers. The simulator 
could also compute a real-time solution for temperature at any one of numerous 
 John P. Smith, Lawrence J. Schilling, and Charles A. Wagner, NASA technical memorandum 0695, “Simulation 
at Dryden Flight Research Facility from 957 to 982,” February 989, p. .
2 NASA has published several looks into simulation during the X-5 period. See, for example, Gene L. Waltman, 
Black Magic and Gremlins: Analog Flight Simulations at NASA’s Flight Research Center, NASA Monographs in 
Aerospace History No. 20, SP-2000-520 (Washington, DC: NASA, 2000) and John P. Smith, Lawrence J. Schil-
ling and Charles A. Wagner, NASA technical memorandum 0695, “Simulation at Dryden Flight Research Facility 
from 957 to 982,” February 989; flight planner names remembered by Johnny G. Armstrong and William H. 
Dana, told to the author via e-mail, April 2002.
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points on the fuselage and wing. Simulations were initiated in October 1956 using 
five degrees of freedom, and the simulator was expanded to six degrees of free-
dom (yaw, pitch, roll, and accelerations vertically, longitudinally, and radially) in 
May 1957.3  
 The simulator covered Mach numbers from 0.2 to 7.0 at altitudes from sea 
level to 1,056,000 feet (200 miles), although it was not capable of providing 
meaningful landing simulations. The initial round of simulations at Inglewood 
showed that the X-15 could reenter from altitudes as high as 550,000 feet as long 
3 Edward N. Videan, Richard D. Banner, and John P. Smith, “The Application of Analog and Digital Computer Tech-
niques in the X-5 Flight Research Program,” a paper presented at the International Symposium on Analog and 
Digital Techniques Applied to Aeronautics, 9-2 September 963, pp. 2-3; Lieutenant Colonel Burt Rowen, “Hu-
man-Factors Support of the X-5 Program,” Air University Quarterly Review, Air War College, vol. X, no. , Winter 
958-59, pp. 36-37; George B. Merrick and C. H. Woodling, “X-5 Flight Simulation Studies,” a paper in the 1958 
Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 9-96. There is considerable disagreement among written papers on 
the number of components (e.g., function generators) in the simulator. It is likely that the simulator was constantly 
being modified and the numbers changed frequently. For instance, the numbers quoted in the text come from the 
paper by Videan, Banner, and Smith; Merrick and Woodling say there were 70 arbitrary 90-diode function genera-
tors, 35 computing servos, 330 computing amplifiers, and other associated pieces of computing equipment.
Simulation in the X-15 program meant much more than pilot training and was the first program where 
simulators played a major role in the development of  the aircraft and its flight profiles. Engineers used 
the simulators to determine heating loads, the effects of  proposed technical changes, and to develop abort 
scenarios. Controlling the simulator were three Electronics Associates, Inc. (EAI) PACE 231R 
analog computers that contained 380 operational amplifiers, 101 function generators, 32 servo ampli-
fiers, and 5 electronic multipliers. None of  the existing digital systems was capable of  performing the 
computations in real time, hence the selection of  analog computers. (NASA)
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as everything went well. If done exactly right, a reentry from this altitude would 
almost simultaneously touch the maximum acceleration limit, the maximum dy-
namic pressure limit, and the maximum temperature limit. The slightest error in 
piloting technique would exceed one of these, probably resulting in the loss of 
the airplane and pilot. An angle of attack of 30 degrees would be required with 
the speed brakes closed, or only 18 degrees with the speed brakes open. The 
normal load factor reentering from 550,000 feet would reach 7 g, and a lon-
gitudinal deceleration of 4 g would last up to 25 seconds. Simulations in the 
centrifuge confirmed that pilots could maintain adequate control during these 
maneuvers, and considerations for the physical well-being of the pilot did not 
limit the flight envelope.4 
 These first simulations indicated the need for a more symmetrical tail to re-
duce aerodynamic coupling tendencies at low angles of attack, and potential thrust 
misalignment at high velocities and altitudes. This resulted in the change from the 
vertical-stabilizer configuration proposed by North American to the one that was 
actually built. Reentry studies indicated that the original rate-feedback-damper 
configuration was not adequate for the new symmetrical tail, and an additional 
feedback of yaw-rate-to-roll-control (called “yar”) was required for stability at 
high angles of attack.5 
 Initially, the North American fixed-base simulator was computation-limited, 
and researchers could only study one flight condition at a time. The first three ar-
eas investigated were the exit phase, ballistic control, and reentry. Later, upgrades 
allowed complete freedom over a limited portion of a mission, and by mid-1957 
unlimited freedom over the complete flight regime. By July 1958, the fixed-base 
simulator at North American already had over 2,000 simulated flights and more 
than 3,500 hours of experience under various flight conditions, and the airplane 
would not fly for another year.
 As crude as it may seem today, the simulator nevertheless provided the flight 
planners with an excellent tool. The flight planner first established a detailed set 
of maneuvers that resulted in the desired test conditions. He then programmed a 
series of test maneuvers commensurate with the flight time available to ensure 
that the maximum amount of research data was obtained. Since the simulator 
provided a continuous real-time simulation of the X-15, it enabled the pilot to fly 
the planned mission as he would the actual flight, allowing him to evaluate the 
planned mission from a piloting perspective and to recommend changes as appro-
priate. Certain data, such as heating rates and dynamic pressures, required real-
time computations to verify that the desired maneuvers were within the capability 
of the airplane .6 
  
 Rowen, “Human-Factors Support of the X-5 Program,” pp. 36-37; Merrick and Woodling, “X-5 Flight Simula-
tion Studies,” pp. 9-98. The simulator was overly optimistic. In theory, the X-5 could reach a maximum altitude 
of 700,000 feet; however, 550,000 feet represented the peak altitude without exceeding the 7.33-g load factor 
or the 2,500-psf dynamic pressure limit during reentry. Thermal studies indicated that something around 550,000 
feet would also be the limit from a thermodynamic perspective. See Gerald H. Johnson, “X-5 Structural Loads,” 
a paper in the 1958 Research Airplane Committee Report, p. 202; letter, Robert G. Hoey/AFFTC Flight Planner to 
Dennis R. Jenkins, 20 May 2002.
5 Merrick and Woodling, “X-5 Flight Simulation Studies,” p. 9.
6 Videan et al., “The Application of Analog and Digital Computer Techniques in the X-5 Flight Research Program,” 
pp. 3-.
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 Engineers also used the simulator to develop vehicle systems before commit-
ting them in flight. One of the most notable was the MH-96 adaptive flight control 
system. Exhaustive tests in the simulator, conducted largely by Neil Armstrong, 
allowed researchers to optimize system parameters and develop operational tech-
niques. Similarly, engineers used the simulators to investigate problems associated 
with the use of the dampers, and devised modifications to install on the airplane. 
Researchers then incorporated the results of flight tests into the simulator.7 
 At first, the FRC did not have an iron bird and had to make do with the crude 
cockpit used in the centrifuge at the Naval Air Development Center (NADC) 
7 Ibid.
The fixed-base simulator at North American was hardly a fancy affair, just a mocked-up cockpit 
with a full set of  instruments and a television screen. The original cadre of  pilots, including Joseph A. 
Walker, spent a considerable amount of  time in the North American simulator before the one at the 
Flight Research Center was ready. Although crude by today’s standards, the X-15 pioneered the use of  
simulators not just to train pilots, but also to engineer the aircraft, plan the missions, and understand 
the results. Not surprisingly, given the involvement of  Charlie Feltz, Harrison Storms, and Walt 
Williams in both the X-15 and Apollo programs, the X-15 pointed the way to how America would 
conduct its space missions. (NASA)
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Johnsville, Pennsylvania. This was a cost-saving measure since the X-15 con-
tract required North American to deliver its simulator (excepting the computers) 
to the FRC before turning the first airplane over to the government. Unlike the 
Inglewood installation, at the FRC the cockpit and analog computers were in the 
same room: not much to look at, but functional. The Air Vehicle Flight Simula-
tion Facility was located in building 4800 at the FRC in an area that later became 
the center director’s office. Like many early computer rooms, it used a linoleum- 
covered plywood false floor to cover the myriad of cables running beneath it. 
Large air conditioners installed on the building roof kept the computers cool. The 
X-15 simulator used a set of EAI analog computers procured for earlier simula-
tions at the FRC, including one model 31R, one 131R, and one 231R that were 
generally similar to the computers used by North American. John P. Smith had 
begun mechanizing the original equations in the simulator, but Gene L. Waltman 
completed the task during the last three months of 1960 after Smith was promoted 
to a new job. The X-15 simulator became operational at the FRC on 3 January 
1961. The X-15 simulator was the largest analog simulation ever mechanized 
at the FRC . The initial Air Vehicle Flight Simulation Facility at the FRC cost 
$63,000 and upgrades accounted for a further $1,700,000 by the end of 1968.8 
 Because the FRC simulator was not yet operational, the flight planning for 
the first 20 flights used the North American simulator. Dick Day and Bob Hoey 
spent a considerable amount of time during 1959 and 1960 in Inglewood on flight 
planning and training the first cadre of pilots.9  Initially, North American was to 
transfer the simulator from Inglewood to the FRC in January 1961, but the move 
was delayed for various reasons, including the need to integrate the MH-96 adap-
tive flight control system into X-15-3. By March 1961, however, Paul Bikle was 
becoming concerned: “With the performance envelope expansion program now 
underway, the requirement of traveling to NAA [North American Aviation] to use 
the X-15 simulator is becoming unduly restrictive in time and in obtaining the 
close working relationships essential to a sound flight panning effort.” Something 
needed to change.10 
 Bikle knew that North American did not want to transfer the simulator until 
the MH-96 integration was complete. In an effort to determine the consequences 
of moving earlier, Bikle called Dave Mellon at Minneapolis-Honeywell, who said 
he did not think the move would have an adverse affect on his schedule. Bikle 
also commented that “if a program delay is inevitable, it is preferable to delay the 
X-15-3 rather than the present program with the X-15-2.” Bikle pushed to have 
the simulator moved to the FRC during April 1961. “We again want to emphasize 
that once the transfer has been accomplished, the NASA will make the simulator 
 
8 Waltman, Black Magic and Gremlins, pp. 6-9; X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Head-
quarters, 3 January 96, p. 2; Jane Van Nimmen and Leonard C. Bruno, with Robert L. Rosholt, NASA Histori-
cal Data Book, 1958-1968, Volume I: NASA Resources 1958-1968, NASA publication SP-02 (Washington, DC: 
NASA, 988), p. 300. Support for the X-5 did not account for the entire cost of the simulation facility; however, 
an exact cost breakdown could not be ascertained.
9 The Air Vehicle Flight Simulation Facility was renamed the Flight Simulation Laboratory at some point in the 
mid-960s. Bob Hoey remembers that Day and Hoey generally traveled to Inglewood two or so days per week, 
accompanied by one of the initial pilots, when the detailed flight planning was being finalized. The team often flew 
from the FRC to Inglewood in the NASA DC-3 (RD).
0 Letter, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to Major Arthur Murray/X-5 Project Office, subject: X-5 Simulator Transfer, 7 March 96.
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available for whatever additional simulator effort is required by NAA, M-H [Min-
neapolis-Honeywell], and other contractors….”11 
 When the iron bird finally arrived in April 1961, engineers installed it along 
the east wall of the calibration hangar next door to the computer facility. A wall 
around the simulator provided some separation from the operations in the hangar. 
The cockpit faced away from the hangar door, and pilots discovered that sunlight 
coming through the windows caused visibility issues, so paint soon covered the 
windows . One of the unfortunate aspects of this installation was that the iron bird 
was located a little over 200 feet from the computers. This caused a number of 
signal-conditioning problems that a better grounding system eventually corrected. 
The hydraulic stand for the iron bird was originally located next to the mockup 
inside the hangar, but technicians subsequently relocated the unit to a small shed 
just outside, eliminating most of the noise from the simulator laboratory.12 
 To provide simulations that were more realistic, engineers at the FRC added 
a “malfunction generator” that could simulate the failure of 11 different cockpit 
 Ibid; X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters,  May 96, p. . 
2 Ibid, pp. 8-9. 
At first, the Flight Research Center made do with the crude cockpit that had been used in the centrifuge 
at NADC Johnsville. This was a cost-saving measure since the X-15 contract required North Ameri-
can to deliver their simulator (excepting the computers) to the FRC before turning the first airplane 
over to the government. Unlike the Inglewood installation, the cockpit and analog computers were in the 
same room at the FRC. The Air Vehicle Flight Simulation Facility was located in Building 4800 at 
the FRC in an area that later became the center director’s office. (NASA)
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instruments and 23 different aircraft systems. The instruments included a pressure 
altimeter, all three attitude indicators, and pressure airspeed, dynamic pressure, 
angle-of-attack, angle-of-sideslip, inertial altitude, inertial velocity, and inertial 
rate-of-climb indicators. The vehicle systems that could be failed included the 
engine, ballistic control system, both electrical generators, and any axis in the 
damper system. Later, the simulator could duplicate the failure of almost any 
function of the MH-96 adaptive control system. Almost all X-15 flights were pre-
ceded by practicing various emergency procedures in the simulator using these 
malfunction generators.13 
 Contrary to many depictions of flight simulators in movies, the fixed-base 
simulator for the X-15 was not glamorous. The iron bird stretched behind the 
cockpit, but other than in size, it did not resemble an X-15 at all. The cockpit 
was open, and the sides of the “fuselage” extended only high enough to cover the 
side consoles and other controls inside of it. A canopy over the cockpit became 
 
3 Videan et al., “The Application of Analog and Digital Computer Techniques in the X-5 Flight Research Program,” 
pp. 2-3 and ; Waltman, Black Magic and Gremlins, p. 52.
The final simulator at the Flight Research Center was functionally identical to the one at North American, 
and used the same analog computers. The structure behind the cockpit is the “iron bird” that included 
production components such as cables, push rods, bellcranks, and hydraulics. The iron bird looked more or 
less like an X-15 and used flight-representative electrical wiring and hydraulic tubing, but otherwise did 
not much resemble an aircraft. The simulator included a complete stability augmentation system (dampers), 
and ultimately added an MH-96 adaptive flight control system. (NASA)
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necessary when researchers installed some instruments and controls (par-
ticularly for the experiments) there for later flights, but even then, it was made 
of plywood.14  
 However, unlike most of the previous simulators at the FRC, the X-15 
cockpit did have an accurate instrument panel. On one occasion, technicians in-
advertently switched the location of the on/off switches for the ballistic control 
system and the APUs between the simulator and the airplane. It was normal pro-
cedure for the pilot to turn off the ballistic controls after reentry, and he practiced 
this in the simulator before each flight. During the actual flight, the pilot reached 
for the APU switch instead of the switch he thought was there. Fortunately, he 
caught himself and avoided an emergency. Everybody redoubled their efforts to 
ensure that the simulator accurately reflected the configuration of the airplane.15 
 When X-15-3 came on line with a completely different instrument panel ar-
rangement, it presented some challenges for the simulator. Since the pilots needed 
to train on the correct instrument panel layout, the simulator support personnel 
had to swap out instrument panels to accommodate each different airplane. The 
technicians eventually installed a crank and pulley lift in the ceiling, along with 
cannon plugs for the electrical connections, to assist in making the change. On 
at least three occasions the program decided to make the instrument panels in 
the three airplanes as similar as possible, but they quickly diverged again as new 
experiments were added.16 
 In addition to its simulation tasks, the iron bird found another use as the flight 
program began. Engineers and technicians at the FRC soon discovered that it 
was a relatively simple task to remove troublesome components from the flight 
vehicles and install them on the iron bird in an attempt to duplicate reported prob-
lems. Given the initial lack of test equipment available for the stability augmenta-
tion system and some MH-96 components, this proved a useful troubleshooting 
method. The simulator also played an important role in demonstrating the need 
for advanced display and guidance devices, and found extensive use in the design 
and development of new systems.17 
 The simulator had a variety of output devices in addition to the cockpit dis-
plays, including several eight-channel stripchart recorders and a large X/Y flatbed 
plotter . The plotter had two independent pens: one showed the X-15 position on 
a 3-foot-square map of the area, and the other indicated altitude. This plotter was 
identical to ones used in the control room and at the uprange stations. There were 
different maps for each launch lake showing the various contingency landing sites 
and prominent landmarks.18  
 Eventually the FRC simulator grew to encompass six analog computers, and 
the patch panels needed to operate them contained 500 patch cords. The addi-
tion of a Scientific Data Systems SDS-930 digital computer in 1964 allowed the 
generation of nonlinear coefficients for the X-15A-2. This required an additional 
 John P. Smith, Lawrence J. Schilling and Charles A. Wagner, NASA technical memorandum 0695, “Simulation 
at Dryden Flight Research Facility from 957 to 982,” February 989, p. 3. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Letter, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 August 2002.
7 NASA technical memorandum 0695, p. 3.
8 Ibid. 
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analog computer as an interface between the new digital computer and the rest of 
the simulator. The SDS-930 was somewhat unusual in that it was a true real-time 
computer, complete with a real-time operating system and a real-time implemen-
tation of Fortran .19 
 Despite its advanced specifications the SDS-930 was not initially satisfactory, 
which forced the flight planners to use the modified Dyna-Soar hybrid simulator 
at the AFFTC for the early X-15A-2 flights. The SDS-930 was generally unreli-
able, normally because of memory-parity errors that the computer manufacturer 
attempted to fix on numerous occasions during 1965, with little success. The 
problem was not only affecting flight planning for the X-15A-2, it was also delay-
ing simulations needed for the energy-management system scheduled to fly on 
X-15-3. During early 1966, the SDS-930 was extensively modified to bring it up 
to the latest configuration, including the addition of two magnetic-tape units and 
a line printer to assist in the energy-management simulations. While this was go-
ing on, the FRC took advantage of the downtime to upgrade the SAS and ASAS 
implementation on the iron bird, including replacing all of the computer interface 
equipment for both systems. Technicians also brought all of the mechanical rig-
ging up to the same standard as the three airplanes. However, Johnny Armstrong 
and Bill Dana both recall that no actual flight planning or flight simulation was 
“totally digital.”20 
 The hybrid (analog-digital) simulator at the AFFTC initially provided a tool 
that enabled studies of the performance and handling of the X-20 glider, com-
plete mission planning, and pilot familiarization. It was a logical outgrowth of 
the analog fixed-base simulators for the X-15. Although they had been ordered 
long before, the digital computers did not arrive at Edwards until July 1964, 
six months after the cancellation of the Dyna-Soar program. The equipment 
sat mostly unused until the flight planners decided to adapt it to the X-15A-2 
Mach 8 flight expansion program. This was done as much to provide Air Force 
personnel with some hands-on experience as for any demonstrated need for an-
other X-15 simulator.21 
 The analog section of the hybrid simulator used PACE 231R-V and 231R 
computers similar to those used at the FRC and North American installations. 
Each computer had approximately 75 operational amplifiers, 170 potentiometers, 
36 digitally controlled analog switches, and 26 comparators, and the 231R-V had 
a mode-logic group that supported an interface to a digital computer. The digital 
subsystem used a Control Data Corporation DDP-24 that had 8,192 words of fer-
rite core memory, a 5-microsecond access time, and a 1-MHz clock. Although a 
Fortran II compiler was available on the machine, engineers coded the real-time 
programs in assembly language to maximize the performance of the relatively 
9 Waltman, Black Magic and Gremlins, pp. 5-53. The Scientific Data Systems 900-9000 series consisted of the 
SDS 90, 920, 925, 930, 90, 95, and 9300 computers. The 2-bit machine at the FRC had 8K words of fer-
rite core memory, one eight-track magnetic-tape reader, a punched-card reader, a paper-tape reader, and one 
operator-console teletype. It did not include any printer or card punch. The unit delivered to the FRC was among 
the first 930s to be delivered.
20 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  March 966, p. 2; various e-mails 
between Johnny G. Armstrong and Dennis R. Jenkins, March 2002.
2 Captain Austin J. Lyons, Air Force report FTC-TR-66-, “AFFTC Experiences with Hybrid Computation in a Real-
Time Simulation of the X-5A-2,” March 967, pp. iii, and 3-; conversations among Robert G. Hoey, Johnny G. 
Armstrong, and Dennis R. Jenkins, various dates in 200 and 2002.
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slow machines. Two large patch panels connected the analog subsystem and 
digital subsystem.22 
 Like the other fixed-base simulators, the AFFTC device had a functional 
X-15 instrument panel, although it was not as exact as the ones used at the FRC. 
This was because its intended use was to investigate heating and control problems 
related to the X-15A-2, not to conduct pilot training. Ultimately, the program did 
use the AFFTC simulator for some X-15A-2 pilot training, but the final “proce-
dures” training was conducted at the FRC.
 Since the X-15 program technically did not need the simulator, the AFFTC 
engineers were able to develop a “generic” simulation that was usable for other 
aircraft, not just the X-15. This was an extremely astute idea, and the engineers 
subsequently used the simulator for the M2-F2, SR-71, X-24A, X-24B, and 
22 Ibid, pp. 5-6. The “DDP” stood for digital data processor, and the 2 indicated the number of bits per word.
The fixed-base simulators at Inglewood and the FRC consisted of  four major parts. The simulator 
included both controls and displays that were nearly identical to what the pilot found in the X-15 
cockpit. The analog computer and malfunction generator were the heart of  the system that provided 
the sequencing and control of  the other components. The hydraulic control system was the “iron bird” 
and actually contained other flight components in addition to the hydraulic system including a complete 
stability augmentation system (or, later, a complete MH-96 adaptive flight control system). (NASA)
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EF-111. The hybrid simulator was also the only one available to perform heating 
predictions during reentry simulations of the Space Shuttle Orbiter during the 
early 1970s, providing valuable input to that program.23 
 At the FRC, the simulation team kept busy maintaining the computers and 
updating the programming to reflect actual flight results. During most of the flight 
program the simulation lab was busy for at least two shifts, and often three shifts, 
per day. The first shift performed pilot training and flight planning, the second 
shift conducted control-system and other studies, and maintenance and repro-
gramming occupied the third shift as needed. However, the team generally took 
weekends off. This was not necessarily a good thing for the simulator since it took 
the analog computers quite a while on Monday morning to warm up.24 
 Despite the apparent success of the fixed-base simulators, everybody recog-
nized their limitations. The primary concern was that they were fixed-base and not 
motion-base, and therefore were inappropriate for landing training. For instance, 
the lack of a high-quality visual presentation meant that critical visual cues were 
not available to the pilots. The analog computer also had limitations. For example, 
the precision needed to calculate altitude and rate of climb for the landing phase 
was not readily achievable with the parameter scaling used for the rest of the 
flight. The parameter scaling was critical, and analog computers were accurate to 
about one part in 10,000 . For the X-15 simulation, with the altitude scaled such 
that 400,000 feet equaled 100 volts, one-tenth of a volt was equal to 40 feet. Any 
altitude less than this was down in the noise of the analog components and barely 
detectable. It was simply not possible to calculate accurate altitudes for the land-
ing phase and the rest of the flight profile at the same time. All of this necessitated 
maintaining a fleet of Lockheed F-104 Starfighters as landing trainers, something 
the X-15 pilots did not seem to mind at all.25  
 Nevertheless, Larry Caw and Eldon Kordes did mechanize a simple four-
degrees-of-freedom simulation to study landing loads early in the program. The 
simulation only covered the last few seconds of a flight, and was not particularly 
useful as a pilot training tool. However, it allowed Jack McKay and other en-
gineers to look at the variety of forces generated during an X-15 landing, and 
prompted the first round of landing-gear changes on the airplane.26 
 The lack of a motion-base simulator presented several interesting problems. 
For instance, some phenomena experienced in the JF-100C variable-stability air-
plane during the summer of 1961 indicated that using the beta-dot technique in 
the X-15 might be more difficult than anticipated. Consequently, a cooperative 
program was initiated with NASA Ames to use its three-axis motion-base simula-
tor. The objective was to investigate further the effect of g-loading on the pilot 
while he performed beta-dot recovery maneuvers. Four pilots–Forest Petersen, 
Bob Rushworth, Joe Walker, and Bob White–participated in the tests during Sep-
tember 1961. Paul Bikle reported that, “With fixed-base simulation, the ventral-on 
condition was uncontrollable, using normal techniques; however, it could be con-
23 Ibid, p. iii; letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 20 May 2002.
2 Waltman, Black Magic and Gremlins, pp. 5-53. 
25 Ibid; Videan et al., “The Application of Analog and Digital Computer Techniques in the X-5 Flight Research Pro-
gram,” p. 5.
26 Waltman, Black Magic and Gremlin, pp. 56-57. 
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trolled by using the special beta-dot control technique. With the moving cockpit 
simulation, control using either normal or beta-dot techniques was more difficult 
for the pilot than with the fixed-base cockpit simulation. These results were in 
general agreement with the ground and flight tests conducted with the variable-
stability F-100 airplane.”27 
 By the end of the X-15 program, the FRC had established simulation as an 
integral part of the flight program. Today, the Walter C. Williams Research Air-
craft Integration Facility (RAIF) provides a state-of-the-art complex of comput-
ers, simulators, and iron-bird mockups. As an example of the extent to which 
simulations were used, during the X-33 program, pilot Stephen D. Ishmael flew 
countless missions while engineers evaluated vehicle systems, flight profiles, and 
abort scenarios. What is ironic is that the X-33 was to be an unmanned vehicle— 
Ishmael was just another computing device, one with a quick sense of reason and 
excellent reflexes.
The Wheel
 The Navy, an otherwise silent partner, made a notable contribution to flight 
simulation for the X-15 program. Primarily, the Aviation Medical Acceleration 
Laboratory (AMAL) at NADC Johnsville provided a unique ground simulation of 
the dynamic environment.28  
 Even prior to the beginning of World War II, researchers recognized that accel-
eration effects experienced during high-speed flight would require evaluation, and 
by 1944 the BuAer became convinced that it would require a long-term commit-
ment to understand such effects completely. The centerpiece of what became the 
AMAL was a new $2,381,000 human centrifuge. Work on the facility at Johnsville 
began in June 1947, with the McKiernan-Terry Corporation of Harrison, New Jer-
sey, constructing the centrifuge building under the direction of the Office of Naval 
Research. The chief of naval operations established the AMAL on 24 May 1949, 
and during validation of the facility on 2 November 1951, Captain J . R . Poppin, the 
director of AMAL, became the first human to be tested in the centrifuge.29  
  
27 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters,  September 96, p. 3 and 5 Sep-
tember 96, p..
28 The Naval Air Development Center (known as NADEVCEN at the time), Johnsville, PA, was established after 
World War II to meet a growing need for research and development in naval aviation. In 9 the Navy acquired 
the Brewster Aircraft plant located on approximately 370 acres in Bucks County, PA, about midway between 
Philadelphia and Trenton, NJ. The Navy designated the plant the Naval Air Modification Unit (NAMU), a branch of 
the Naval Air Materiel Center (NAMC) in Philadelphia. The NAMU converted and modified newly produced aircraft 
prior to delivery to the fleet for combat use. With the capitulation of the Axis powers, the need for NAMU vanished. 
However, the growing need for a centralized research and development activity resulted in the redesignation of 
NAMU, effective  August 97, as the Naval Air Development Station (NADS), an independent activity under the 
Bureau of Aeronautics. On  August 99 the station was reorganized into the NADEVCEN. The mission of the 
NADEVCEN was expanded to include three laboratories: the Pilotless Aircraft Development Laboratory (PADL), 
the Aeronautical Electronic and Electrical Laboratory (AEEL), and the Aircraft Armament Laboratory (AAL). In July 
950, the Aeronautical Computer Laboratory (ACL) was added, first as a small engineering team and later as a 
laboratory using the Typhoon computer. At the time the Typhoon was the world’s largest analog computer and 
was used for theoretical studies and analyses of missile flight and performance. The addition of an IBM magnetic 
drum electronic data processing machine (IBM 650) provided digital problem-solving techniques. Eventually the 
Typhoon was modernized by adding GALE A and B analog computers to provide a large, versatile hybrid facility. 
The Aviation Medical Acceleration Laboratory (AMAL) became a part of the center on 7 June 952, when the 
world’s largest human centrifuge was dedicated. This laboratory was created to conduct research into aviation 
medicine. It soon began supporting space medicine and dynamic flight simulation studies involving the X-5.
29 http://www.vnh.org/FSManual/AppendixA.html, accessed 8 February 2002.
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 When the facility officially opened on 17 June 1952, it was the most sophis-
ticated of its kind in the world, and was capable of producing accelerations up 
to 40 g to investigate the reaction of pilots to accelerations. A 4,000-horsepower 
vertical electric motor in the center of the room drove the centrifuge arm. Depend-
ing on the exact requirements of the test, researchers could position a gondola 
suspended by a double gimbal system at one of several locations along the arm. 
The outer gimbal permitted rotation of the gondola about an axis tangential to the 
motion of the centrifuge, while the inner gimbal allowed rotation about the axis at 
right angles to the tangential motion. Separate 75-horsepower motors connected 
through hydraulic actuators controlled the angular motions of the gondola, and 
continuous control of the two axes in combination with rotation of the arm pro-
duced somewhat realistic high-g accelerations for the pilot.30 
 Initially, electromechanical systems controlled the centrifuge since gener-
al-purpose computers did not, for all intents, yet exist. In the centrifuge, large 
Masonite discs called “cams” controlled the acceleration along the three axes. A 
series of cam followers drove potentiometers that generated voltages to control 
the various hydraulic actuators and electric motors. The cams had some distinct 
advantages over manual control: they automated complex motions and allowed 
precise duplication of the motions. However, the process of cutting the Masonite 
discs amounted to little more than trial and error, and technicians had to produce 
many discs for each test.31 
 Researchers demonstrated the capabilities of the centrifuge in a series of 
experiments, including a joint Navy-Air Force study during 1956 that revealed 
that chimpanzees were able to sustain 40 g for 60 seconds. Two years later R. 
Flanagan Gray of the NADC set a human record of 31.25 g, which he sustained 
for 5 seconds in the “iron maiden,” a water-filled protective apparatus attached 40 
feet out on the arm. In 1957 the X-15 program became the first user of the com-
bined human centrifuge and NADC computer facility, marking the initial step in 
the development of dynamic flight simulation.32  
 The X-15 represented the most extensive, and by far the most elaborate, use 
of the cams for centrifuge control. Technicians at Johnsville cut the cams based 
on acceleration parameters defined by researchers at North American. Initially, 
the tests concentrated on routine flights, measuring the pilot’s reactions to the ac-
celerations. Before long, the tests were expanded to emergency conditions, such 
as an X-15 returning from a high-altitude mission with a failed pitch damper. The 
concern was whether the pilot could tolerate the accelerations expected under 
these conditions, which included oscillations between 0 g and 8 g on a cycle of 
0.7 seconds. Other conditions included oscillations between 4 g and 8 g with pe-
riods as long as 12 seconds. Researchers found that these conditions represented 
something near the physiological tolerance of the pilots. Even with the best sup-
port apparatus the engineers could provide, the pilots found it difficult to operate 
30 Carl C. Clark, “Centrifugal Simulation of the X-5,” a paper in the 1958 Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 
07-08.
3 James D. Hardy and Carl C. Clark, “The Development of Dynamic Flight Simulation,” Aero/Space Engineering, 
vol. 8, no. 6, June 959, pp. 8-52.
32 James E. Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” not dated, p. 0. In the files at the 
DFRC History Office.
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the controls, and small, purplish hemorrhages known as petechiae would form on 
their hands, feet, and back. In one experiment, Scott Crossfield actually blacked 
out due to a malfunction in his g-suit.33 
 With the use of the Masonite disc cam followers, the gondola was able to 
maintain a programmed and precisely reproducible acceleration pattern . This was 
a flaw in some people’s minds since the pilot did not influence the motion of the 
33 Hardy and Clark, “The Development of Dynamic Flight Simulation,” pp. 8-52.
When NADC Johnsville officially opened on 17 June 1952 it was the most sophisticated human cen-
trifuge in the world, capable of  producing accelerations up to 40 g to investigate the reaction of  pilots 
to accelerations. The initial runs at Johnsville used a generic cockpit that did not resemble an X-15 at 
all. During an early series of  tests, researchers mounted an oscilloscope in front of  the pilot, and asked 
him to move the gondola to match a trace on the scope. For the first runs, the pilot used a conventional 
center stick; later tests used a side-stick controller. (U.S. Navy)
0 Chapter 6: Prepar ations
gondola–he was, in effect, a passenger. However, the X-15 pilot had to maintain 
precise control while being forced backward or forward under the high accelera-
tions, and it was important to find out how well he could perform. This was es-
pecially true during marginal conditions, such as a damper failure during reentry. 
There were no guidelines for defining the degree of control expected from a pilot 
under those conditions .34 
 To address this issue, researchers subsequently modified the centrifuge to 
incorporate responses to pilot input into the preprogrammed acceleration curves . 
During an early series of tests, researchers mounted an oscilloscope in front of the 
pilot and asked him to move the gondola to match a trace on the scope. For the 
first runs the pilot used a conventional center stick; later tests used a side-stick 
controller. Eventually the complexity of the acceleration patterns moved beyond 
the capabilities of the Masonite discs and researchers began using punched paper 
tape, something that found widespread use on early computers. The results of 
these experiments indicated that under extreme conditions the side-stick control-
ler allowed the pilot to brace his arm against the cockpit side console to maintain 
better control of the aircraft .35 
 Researchers at Johnsville soon installed a complete X-15 instrument panel in 
the gondola, with the instruments receiving data from analog computers to emulate 
the flight profile being “flown” by the centrifuge. These simulations led to a rec-
ommendation to rearrange some of the X-15 instruments to reduce eye movement. 
As acceleration increased, the pilot’s field of view became narrower, and under 
grayout conditions the pilots could not adequately scan instruments that were nor-
mally in their field of view. Moving a few instruments closer together allowed the 
pilot to concentrate on one area of the instrument panel without having to move his 
head, an often difficult and occasionally impossible task under heavy g-loading.36 
 Another important conclusion drawn from this set of experiments was that 
the centrifuge was sufficiently flexible to use as a dynamic flight simulator. To 
enable this, in June 1957 researchers linked the centrifuge to the Typhoon analog 
computer, which was generally similar to the units used in the X-15 fixed-base 
simulators. This made dynamic control possible, and pilots in the centrifuge gon-
dola could actually “fly” the device, simulating the flight characteristics of any se-
lected type of aircraft. The computer output drove the centrifuge in such a manner 
that the pilot experienced an approximation of the linear acceleration he would 
feel while flying the X-15 if he made the same control motions. Unfortunately, the 
centrifuge only had three degrees of freedom (one in the main arm and two in the 
gondola gimbal system), whereas the X-15 had six degrees of freedom (three of 
rotation and three of translation). This meant that the angular accelerations were 
unlike those experienced in flight; however, researchers believed this limitation 
was of secondary importance. The perceived benefit of simulating even some-
what unrealistic movements was that they could introduce the pilot to the large 
accelerations he would experience during flight. The computer also drove the 
cockpit instruments to reflect the “reality” of flight. Engineers had not previously 
3 Stillwell, X-15 Research Results; Hardy and C Clark, “The Development of Dynamic Flight Simulation,” pp. 8-52.
35 Hardy and Clark, “The Development of Dynamic Flight Simulation,” pp. 8-52.
36 Clark, “Centrifugal Simulation of the X-5,” p. 08.
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attempted this type of closed-loop simulation (pilot to computer to centrifuge), 
and it was a far more complex problem than developing the fixed-base simula-
tors. Interestingly, in an experiment that was years ahead of its time, researchers 
using the X-15 simulation computer at NASA Langley controlled the Johnsville 
centrifuge over a telephone line on several occasions. The response time from this 
arrangement was less than ideal because of the low data rates possible at the time, 
but the overall concept worked surprisingly well.37 
 Certain inadequacies in the X-15 simulation were noted during these ini-
tial tests, particularly concerning the computation of aircraft responses at high 
frequencies, the pilot restraints, and the lack of simulated speed brakes. In May 
1958 the Navy modified the centrifuge in an attempt to cure these problems, and 
researchers completed three additional weeks of X-15 tests on 12 July 1958. Dur-
ing this time the pilots (Neil Armstrong, Scott Crossfield, Iven Kincheloe, Jack 
McKay, Joe Walker, Al White, and Bob White) and various other personnel, such 
as Dick Day and Bob Hoey, flew 755 static simulations using the cockpit installed 
in the gondola but with the centrifuge turned off. The pilots also completed 287 
dynamic simulations with the centrifuge in motion. The primary objective of the 
program was to assess the pilot’s ability to make emergency reentries under high 
dynamic conditions following a damper failure. The results were generally en-
couraging, although the accelerations were more severe than those experienced 
later during actual flight.38  
 A typical centrifuge run for a high-altitude mission commenced after the pilot 
attained the exit flight path and a speed of Mach 2, and terminated after the pilot 
brought the aircraft back to level flight after reentry. During powered flight, the 
thrust acceleration gradually built up to 4.5 g, forcing the pilot against the seat 
back. However, the pilot could keep his feet on the rudder pedals with some effort, 
and still reach the instrument panel to operate switches if required. Researchers 
also simulated the consequences of thrust misalignment so that during powered 
flight the pilot would know to apply aerodynamic control corrections with the 
right-hand side stick and the rudder pedals.39  
 At burnout, the acceleration component dropped to zero and the pilot’s head 
came off the backrest. The pilot attempted to hold the aircraft heading using the 
ballistic control system. In the design mission, the aircraft would experience less 
than 0.1 g for about 150 seconds, but the best the centrifuge could do was to re-
main at rest (and 1 g) during this period since there was no way to simulate less 
than normal gravity.40 
  
37 Hardy and Clark, “The Development of Dynamic Flight Simulation,” pp. 8-52; Clark, “Centrifugal Simulation of 
the X-5,” p. 2; http://www.vnh.org/FSManual/AppendixA.html, accessed 8 February 2002.
38 Clark, “Centrifugal Simulation of the X-5,” p. 08; Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Air-
craft,” p. 0; Robert G. Hoey, “Riding ‘The Wheel’,” in Fred Stoliker, Bob Hoey, and Johnny Armstrong, Flight 
Testing at Edwards: Flight Test Stories–1946-1975, (Edwards, CA: Flight Test Historical Foundation, 200), pp. 
66-67; letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 20 May 2002. There is some disagreement in the numbers. 
Stillwell in X-5 Research Results indicates that over 00 dynamic flights were conducted during this initial series 
of tests. Harrison Storms (“The X-5 Rollout Symposium,” 5 October 958) supplied the numbers used here, 
and these are also contained in the Clark paper. Bob Hoey would later talk his way into a ride on “The Wheel” 
during centrifuge simulations for the X-20 Dyna-Soar program.
39 Clark, “Centrifugal Simulation of the X-5,” pp. 09-0.
0 Ibid, pp. 09-0.
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 As the aircraft descended, the pilot actuated the pitch trim knob and the aero-
dynamic control stick at about 200,000 feet to establish the desired angle of attack, 
but continued to use the ballistic control system until the aerodynamic controls 
became effective. As the dynamic pressure built, the pullout acceleration com-
menced and the centrifuge began to turn. If the speed brakes were closed, the drag 
deceleration reached about 1 g. With the speed brakes open, this would increase 
to 2.8 g for the design mission and about 4 g for a reentry from 550,000 feet. The 
pilot gradually reduced the angle of attack to maintain the designed g-value until 
the aircraft was level, at which time the simulation stopped. During reentry, in 
addition to the drag acceleration, the pilot also experienced 5–7 g of normal ac-
celeration, so the total g-vector was 6–8 g “eyeballs down and forward”–a very 
undesirable physiological condition.41 
 Tests on the centrifuge established that, with proper restraints and anti-g 
equipment, the pilot of the X-15 could tolerate the expected accelerations. These 
included such oscillating accelerations as 5 g ± 2 g at one cycle per second for 10 
 Letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 20 May 2002; Clark, “Centrifugal Simulation of the X-5,” pp. 09-0.
A 4,000-horsepower vertical electric motor in the center of  the room drove the centrifuge arm that had a 
gondola suspended by a double gimbal system at one of  several locations along the arm. The outer gimbal 
permitted rotation of  the gondola about an axis tangential to the motion of  the centrifuge; the inner 
gimbal allowed rotation about the axis at right angles to the tangential motion. Continuous control of  
the two axes in combination with rotation of  the arm produced somewhat realistic high-g accelerations 
for the pilot in the gondola. Johnsville would gain fame when the Mercury program used the centrifuge 
for much the same purposes the X-15 had pioneered several years earlier. (U.S. Navy)
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seconds, which might occur during reentry from 250,000 feet with failed dampers, 
and 7 g normal and 4 g “into the straps” for 25 seconds, which might occur during 
reentry from 550,000 feet. The pilots’ ability to tolerate oscillating accelerations 
was unknown prior to the centrifuge tests, and this information contributed not 
only to the X-15 but also to Mercury and later space programs.42 
 The tests at Johnsville confirmed that a trained pilot could not only tolerate 
the acceleration levels, he could also perform all tasks reasonably expected of him 
under those conditions. This was largely due to the North American design of pilot 
supports and restraints, and the use of side-stick controllers. The accommodations 
included a bucket seat without padding adjusted in height for each pilot, and arm 
and elbow rests also fitted for each pilot. Restraints included an integrated harness 
with the lower ties lateral to the hips to minimize “submarining” and rolling in the 
seat, a helmet “socket” to limit motion posteriorly, laterally, and at the top, and a 
retractable front “head bumper” that could be swung down to limit forward mo-
tion of the head. When using the speed brakes or when the dampers were off, the 
pilots generally found it desirable to use the front head bumper. The pilots used 
the centrifuge program to evaluate two kinematic designs and three grip designs 
for the side-stick controller before an acceptable one was found. Despite an early 
reluctance, the pilots generally preferred the side stick to the center stick under 
dynamic conditions. Researchers quickly established the importance of careful 
dynamic balancing and suitable breakout and friction forces for the side stick.43 
 The centrifuge program also pointed out the need for pilot experience under 
high-acceleration conditions. For example, pilots who had at least 15 hours of 
practice on the static simulator at Inglewood and previous high-acceleration ex-
perience made five successful dynamic reentries out of five attempts, while pilots 
with 4–10 hours of simulator time had only seven successes in 15 attempts. An-
other group of pilots who had less than 4 hours of simulator time or no previous 
high-acceleration experience made only two successful dynamic reentries out of 
14 attempts. Most of the failures were due to unintentional pilot control inputs, 
including using the rudder pedals during drag deceleration, roll inputs while mak-
ing pitch corrections using the center stick because of the lack of arm support, 
and inadvertent ballistic control system firings due to leaving the left hand on the 
side-stick during acceleration. The more experienced pilots would detect these 
unintended control inputs more rapidly than the other pilots, and could correct the 
mistakes in time to avoid serious consequences.44 
 Researchers also evaluated physiological responses in the centrifuge. The 
drag decelerations of the speed brakes, when combined with the normal pullout 
loads, increased the blood pressure in the limbs. When the resultant acceleration 
was below 5 g, there was no particular discomfort; however, when the accelera-
tion was above 7 g (including a drag component of more than 3 g), petechiae were 
noted in the forearms and ankles, and a tingling, numbness, and in some cases 
definite pain were noted in the limbs. The symptoms became more severe when 
a pilot made several centrifuge runs in quick succession, something that would 
2 Clark, “Centrifugal Simulation of the X-5,” pp. 09-0.
3 Ibid, pp. 0-.
 Ibid.
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obviously never happen during the X-15 program. One pilot stopped the centri-
fuge when he experienced severe groin pains because of a poorly fitted harness. 
In two cases of reentry using open speed brakes, the pilots reported pronounced 
oculogravic illusions, with the visual field seeming to oscillate vertically and to be 
doubled vertically for a few seconds toward the end of the reentry. Despite this, 
Scott Crossfield made nine dynamic runs in one day on the centrifuge, but gener-
ally the pilots were limited to two runs on the centrifuge per day.45 
 Despite the demonstrated benefits of a pilot being able to experience the un-
usually high accelerations produced by the X-15 prior to his first flight, only the 
initial group of pilots actually benefited from the centrifuge simulations. Later 
pilots received the surprise of their life the first time they started the XLR99 in the 
X-15 . Granted, the Johnsville accelerations were not a realistic replica of the ones 
experienced in flight, due to the limitations of the centrifuge concept, but they still 
provided some high-acceleration experience. As Milt Thompson noted in a paper 
in 1964:46 
Prior to my first flight, my practice had been done in a relaxed, 
head forward position. The longitudinal acceleration at engine 
light forced my head back into the headrest and prevented even 
helmet rotation. The instrument-scan procedure, due to this 
head position and a slight tunnel vision effect, was quite dif-
ferent than anticipated and practiced . The acceleration buildup 
during engine burn (4-g max) is uncomfortable enough to con-
vince you to shut down the engine as planned. This is the first 
airplane I’ve flown that I was happy to shut down. Engine shut-
down does not relieve the situation, though, since in most cases 
the deceleration immediately after shutdown has you hanging 
from the restraint harness, and in a strange position for control-
ling [the airplane].
 The X-15 closed-loop program was the forerunner of centrifuges that NASA 
built at the Ames Research Center and the Manned Spacecraft Center (later re-
named the Johnson Space Center) to support the manned space programs. Perhaps 
the most celebrated program of AMAL was the flight simulation training for Proj-
ect Mercury astronauts, based largely on the experience gained during the X-15 
simulations. Beginning in June 1959 the seven Mercury astronauts participated in 
centrifuge simulations of Atlas booster launches, reentries, and abort conditions 
ranging up to 18 g (transverse) at NADC Johnsville.47
5 Ibid, pp. -2. The paper actually states that one pilot made nine runs in a single 2-hour period. Conversa-
tions with Scott Crossfield and Bob Hoey, as well as simple mathematics, make this hard to believe. If each run 
took 0 minutes to set up and 5 minutes to run, then nine runs would have taken over 2 hours. Crossfield vaguely 
recalls that he made nine runs in a single day, which seems much more likely.
6 Waltman, Black Magic and Gremlins, p. 57; the quote is from Milton O. Thompson, “General Review of Piloting 
Problems Encountered During Simulations and Flights of the X-5,” a paper presented at the Society of Experi-
mental Test Pilots Symposium, Beverly Hills, CA, 96. Thompson’s paper was also published as NASA technical 
memorandum X-5688, and the story is related on page 57 of Waltman’s monograph.
7 Hardy and Clark, “The Development of Dynamic Flight Simulation,” pp. 8-52; http://www.vnh.org/FSManual/Ap-
pendixA.html, accessed 8 February 2002.
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Heating Simulations
 At the beginning of the X-15 program, researchers used the methods de-
veloped by Edward Van Driest and Ernst Eckert to determine the heat-transfer 
coefficients for temperature calculations. However, the measured heat-transfer 
coefficients during the early flight program were considerably lower than the 
predicted values. Based on these preliminary results, derived primarily from the 
initial low-angle-of-attack flights, engineers modified Eckert’s turbulent-flow 
method to produce the adiabatic-wall reference-temperature method.48  
The first, and possibly the most difficult, step in computing surface tempera-
tures was to calculate the local flow conditions. Initially, researchers used the 
conventional attached-shock Prandtl-Meyer expansion method for the wing and 
empennage, and a tangent-cone approximation for the fuselage. The boundary-
layer transition was completely unpredictable, but since researchers expected 
turbulent flow during the major portion of most flights, they normally used turbu-
lent-flow calculations for the entire flight. Next came determining the heat-transfer 
coefficients, and finally calculating the skin temperature. Due to the tedious work 
involved in this process, which was done mostly by hand since general-purpose 
computers were not yet in widespread use, the researchers made many assump-
tions that simplified the procedure. For instance, it was assumed that temperature 
did not vary through the thickness of the skin, no heat was transferred along the 
skin, the specific heat of the skin was constant, solar radiation to the skin was neg-
ligible, the emissivity of the skin was constant, and no net heat transfer occurred 
between surfaces by radiation.49 
Temperatures calculated using the adiabatic-wall reference-temperature 
method tended to agree closely with measured data from the flight program. 
In several instances the calculated temperature was somewhat higher because 
the analytical method assumed turbulent flow all of the time. This was consid-
ered reasonable and sufficient for flight-safety purposes since it erred on the side 
of caution .50  
In 1957, Lockheed Aircraft Company developed a thermal analyzer program 
that ran on an IBM 704 digital computer, the largest of its type then available. This 
program was capable of running the heating prediction equations, including the 
effects of transient conduction, convection, radiation, and heat storage, that re-
searchers had previously omitted for the sake of expediency. With Lockheed’s as-
sistance, researchers modified the program to reflect the X-15 configuration. The 
program estimated the heat input to the skin elements using the attached-shock 
Prandtl-Meyer expansion method for flow conditions, and the adiabatic-wall ref-
erence-temperature method for heat transfer. Researchers used the laminar-flow 
 
8 Joe D. Watts and Ronald P. Banas, NASA confidential technical memorandum X-883, “X-5 Structural Tem-
perature Measurements and Calculations for Flights to Maximum Mach Numbers of Approximately , 5, and 6,” 
7 May 963, pp. 5-6. For information on the Van Driest methods, see “The Problem of Aerodynamic Heating,” 
Aerospace Engineering Review, vol. 5, no. 0, October 956, pp. 26-; for background on Eckert, see his 
“Survey on Heat Transfer at High Speeds,” WADC technical report 5-70, April 95.
9 NASA confidential technical memorandum X-883, pp. 6-7. For details on the Prandtl-Meyer method, see “Equa-
tions, Tables, and Charts for Compressible Flow, NACA Ames report 35, 953.
50 Ibid, pp. 7-8.
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theory of Fay and Riddell to compute the heat input to the stagnation points, with 
curves developed by Lester Lees used to weight the periphery.51 
To accompany the Lockheed-developed software, North American developed 
two other programs to predict structural heating values and their distribution along 
the airframe. The first program computed local-flow conditions on the aircraft, and 
the second program used the local-flow conditions to calculate the aerodynamic 
heat transfer to the skin. The program developed by Lockheed calculated the tran-
sient heating of internal structure based on the results of the other two programs.52 
To evaluate the acceptability of the thermal analyzer program, research-
ers compared calculated results with actual flight results on several occasions. 
The values always compared favorably, and were usually slightly better than 
5 J. R. Gardner, “Use of Thermal Analyzer Program,” Lockheed report 2870, 5 February 958. In the files at the 
Lockheed Martin Corporation; NASA confidential technical memorandum X-883, pp. 7-8. For details on Fay and 
Riddell, see “Theory of Stagnation Point Heat Transfer in Dissociated Air,” Journal of the Aeronautical Sciences, 
vol. 25, no. 2, February 958, pp. 73-85 and 2; For more on Lees, see “Laminar Heat Transfer Over Blunt-Nose 
Bodies at Hypersonic Flight Speeds, Jet Propulsion, vol. 26, no. , April 956, pp. 259-269.
52 Videan et al., “The Application of Analog and Digital Computer Techniques in the X-5 Flight Research Program,” 
pp. 6-7. In 956 the IBM 70 became the first mass-produced digital computer capable of performing floating-
point arithmetic. A typical 700-series (the 70 was a scientific machine; the closely-related 705 was a business 
machine) installation would be in a specially built room of perhaps 2,000 square feet with substantial air condition-
ing and cables running under a raised floor. The computer used core (wire-wound ferrite) memory instead of solid 
state, did not have disk drives (they did not exist yet), and recorded most of its data on seven-track magnetic 
tape, punched paper tape, or punched-card devices. Incidentally, the   first Fortran compiler was written for use 
on the 70.
One of  the primary goals of  the X-15 program was to validate the various heat-transfer methods with 
actual flight results. Many of  the early X-15 flights were dedicated to gathering data that the researchers 
would spend years comparing against wind tunnel and theoretical results. The results were vastly improved 
heat-transfer models that were used during the Apollo and space shuttle programs. (NASA)
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the hand-calculated values for the same conditions. North American and NASA 
quickly adopted the automated process based largely on the tremendous labor 
savings it offered.
 After the flight planners established a flight profile on the fixed-base simula-
tor, they digitized the results of a clean flight and input them into the IBM 704 to 
predict the skin and structural temperatures and thermal gradients for the flight. 
This was a time-consuming process. Researchers then compared the resulting 
data with the design conditions to ensure that the X-15 did not violate any struc-
tural margins. If any exceptions were uncovered during the comparison, research-
ers modified the flight profile and the entire process was repeated. Emergency 
and contingency flight profiles went through the same rigorous process. After the 
flight, researchers compared the heating predictions with actual flight data and 
then refined the simulations.53
Airborne Simulators
In addition to ground simulators and the centrifuge, pilots and researchers 
used aircraft to simulate various aspects of the X-15. For instance, the Lockheed 
F-104 Starfighter closely approximately the wing loading of an X-15 during land-
ing, and with the right combination of extended landing gear, flaps, and speed 
brakes, the F-104 at idle thrust did an excellent job of simulating the X-15. For 
the first 50 or so flights, the pilots dedicated an entire F-104 mission to practicing 
landing procedures. As new pilots entered the program, they conducted similar 
practices. Throughout the program, pilots used the F-104s to establish geographic 
checkpoints and important altitudes around the landing pattern at all the possible 
landing lakes.54 
Scott Crossfield and Al White conducted similar work very early in the pro-
gram using the North American YF-100A equipped with an eight-foot drag chute. 
Combined with extended gear and speed brakes, the F-100 at idle thrust did an 
adequate job of simulating the X-15 during landing, although not quite as well 
as the F-104. The entire process was a bit trickier since it required the in-flight 
deployment and release of the drag chute.55 
 As Al White later remembered, “With gear down, speed brake extended, at 
idle power, and that drag chute deployed, the airplane was comparable to the X-15 
on approach . I would start at about 25,000 feet, pick a spot on the lakebed, and see 
how close I could come to touching down on that spot. With all the room on the 
lakebed, it was not necessary to hit a spot, but it is always nice to have that much 
margin for error. I flew this trainer as much as I could, in preparation for that day 
 
 
53 Videan et al., “The Application of Analog and Digital Computer Techniques in the X-5 Flight Research Program,” 
pp. 7-8. 
5 White et al., “Résumé of X-5 Handling Qualities,” p. 20; Gene J. Matranga, NASA technical note D-057, 
“Analysis of X-5 Landing Approach and Flare Characteristics Determined from the First 30 Flights,” July 96, 
pp. 8-9.
55 Letter, Al White to Dennis R. Jenkins, 8 June 2002; Lieutenant Colonel Burt Rowen, “Human-Factors Support of 
the X-5 Program,” Air University Quarterly Review, Air War College, vol. X, no. , winter 958-59, p. 37; NASA 
technical note D-057, pp. 8-9.
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that never came.” Not flying the X-15 was one of the few disappointments during 
White’s significant career.56 
 Much of the X-15 flight planning took place prior to the first manned space 
flight. Since no one had ever left the atmosphere and returned in a winged ve-
hicle (or anything else), there had been concern that the rapidly changing stability 
and control characteristics in the X-15 as it reentered the atmosphere might pose 
an unusually demanding piloting task. To address this question, engineers in the 
Flight Research Department of the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory conceived 
the idea of simulating this brief (about 60 seconds duration) but unfamiliar X-15 
piloting task in a NT-33A that was owned by the Air Force but operated by Cor-
nell as a variable-stability trainer.57 
 The NT-33A already had been equipped with a larger internal volume F-94 
nose section that contained a three-axis (pitch, roll, and yaw) variable-stability 
and control system for in-flight simulation purposes. To support the X-15 pro-
gram, Cornell modified the front cockpit to superficially resemble the X-15, with 
a side-stick controller on the right-hand console for atmospheric flight control 
and another side-stick on the left-hand console simulating the ballistic controls. 
An “instructor” pilot sat in the back cockpit with a normal set of T-33 controls. 
Jack Beilman at Cornell designed a programmable, non-linear function generator 
that changed the gains of 32 sensed aerodynamic and rigid-body-motion feedback 
variables. It also changed the flight-control sensitivities continuously during the 
simulated reentry so that the NT-33A stability and control characteristics would 
match the predicted X-15 characteristics.58 
 The flight plan had the NT-33A entering a shallow dive at about 17,000 feet 
altitude and then pulling up to a ballistic trajectory that produced about 60 seconds 
of 0 g–about the same as the initial part of the X-15 reentry. At the same time, the 
variable-stability system on the NT-33A changed the flight-control sensitivities 
to simulate going from the vacuum of space to the rapidly increasing dynamic 
pressure of the atmosphere. Since the normal aerodynamic controls of the X-15 
would be ineffective outside the atmosphere, the pilot used the ballistic controller 
to establish the correct reentry pitch attitude.59 
 In the NT-33A simulation the “ballistic controller” produced no physical 
response whatsoever—it only changed the displayed pitch attitude on the instru-
ment panel. (At this point in the simulation, the NT-33A was at 0 g.) In order to 
maintain the fidelity of the simulation, the X-15 pilot in the front cockpit wore 
a hood and had no view of the outside world, since there would be little view of 
the real world in the X-15 at the simulated altitudes. This deception was neces-
sary for the high-angle-of-attack deceleration at the end of the simulated reentry 
because although the front cockpit instrumentation indicated the pilot was flying 
an unbanked steep descent (in the X-15), he was actually flying a steep 5-g turn 
56 Letter, Alvin S. White to Dennis R. Jenkins,  July 2002.
57 Jack Beilman, 5 September 999, a short unpublished paper supplied to the author via e-mail, 3 March 2002. 
Calspan was originally formed in 96 as the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Inc, part of Cornell University 
located in Ithaca, NY. In 972 the laboratory was reorganized as the publicly held Calspan Corporation. In 978 
Calspan was acquired by Arvin Industries, and in 995 it merged with the Texas-based Space Industries, Inc., to 
form Space Industries International. The company merged with Veda in 997 to become Veridian Corporation.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
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in the NT-33A. The simulator achieved this deception by gradually biasing the 
attitude indicator to a bank angle of 75 degrees while the X-15 pilot used the 
ballistic controller to maintain wings-level flight at the proper airspeed, angle 
of attack, and descent rate on his cockpit instruments. It was a carefully choreo-
graphed ballet between the “student” in the front seat and the safety pilot in the 
back who was trying to keep the NT-33 from becoming a smoking crater in the 
high desert.60 
 Accordingly, a Cornell team headed by engineering test pilots Bob Harper 
and Nello Infanti arrived at Edwards in May 1960 to begin a series of flights in the 
NT-33A in order to provide reentry training for six X-15 pilots (Neil Armstrong, 
Jack McKay, Forrest Petersen, Bob Rushworth, Joe Walker, and Bob White) . Each 
pilot was to receive six flights in the NT-33A that included a matrix of simulated 
Mach numbers, altitudes, and various control malfunctions (principally failed 
dampers) both separately and simultaneously.61  Infanti was the “instructor pilot” 
for each of the X-15 simulation flights in the NT-33A, and the rest of the Cornell 
team consisted of crew chief Howard Stevens, electronics technician Bud Stahl, 
and systems engineer Jack Beilman. As Beilman remembers:
 
During one of the flights, with Neil Armstrong in the front seat, 
we were simulating failed dampers at something like Mach 3.2 
and 100,000 feet altitude. Neil had great difficulty with this 
simulated undamped X-15 configuration and lost control of the 
airplane repeatedly. Nello had to recover from each one of these 
“lost-control” events using the controls in the back cockpit. [In-
fanti later recalled that some of these recoveries were “pretty 
sporty.”] The ground crew was monitoring the test radio fre-
quency as usual and followed these simulated flight control 
problems with great interest.
 
After landing, the NT-33A taxied to the ramp and Howard 
Stevens attached the ladder to the cockpits and climbed up to 
talk to Infanti about the airplane status. I climbed up the ladder 
front side to talk to Neil Armstrong. He handed me his helmet 
and knee-pad, got down from the cockpit and we talked about 
the flight and walked toward the operations building. As we ar-
rived at the door Armstrong extended his right hand to grasp 
the door handle–but his hand still held the side-stick that he had 
broken during his last battle with the X-15 dampers-off simula-
tion. I was unaware of any report of this incident during the 
flight and had not noticed the stick in Armstrong’s hand when he 
exited the cockpit. Addressing the matter for the first time, Arm-
strong said–without additional comment—“Here’s your stick!”
60 Ibid.
6 Jack Beilman, 5 September 999, a short unpublished paper supplied to the author via e-mail, 3 March 2002; 
X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 29 July 960, p. 2.
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[It developed that Infanti had been aware of the broken side-
stick after it happened because Armstrong had held it up over 
his head in the front cockpit for Nello to see.]
After the debriefing, we took the broken side-stick to the NASA 
workshop where Neil found the necessary metal tubing and re-
paired the stick while I mostly watched him work. The side-
stick was reinstalled and ready for the first flight the next morn-
ing. Really good test pilots fix what they break!
 In general, the pilots considered the NT-33 flights worthwhile, but there were 
some “obvious discrepancies or malfunctions” during the early flights. There 
were also a fair number of delays in the flights due to various system malfunctions 
caused by the high temperatures at Edwards. Eventually the Cornell crew cor-
rected the malfunctions, but the X-15 pilots considered the first 10 flights unsat-
isfactory since they did not adequately simulate the X-15 flight profile. This was 
largely because the programmed trajectories required the NT-33 to fly close to its 
maximum capabilities: something that was not as easy as it sounds, especially in 
the heat over the high desert.62 
 The X-15 pilots considered the final six flights, flown during the first half of 
September 1960, reasonably satisfactory. In fact, the pilots discovered a novel 
control technique for the divergent closed-loop lateral-directional oscillation en-
countered at Mach 3.5 and 10 degrees angle of attack with the SAS off during 
these flights. By using the rudder in conjunction with the turn and bank indicator 
(which was, in effect, a yaw-rate meter) the pilot was able to damp the oscil-
lations. With this technique, the ailerons were only a steady-state controller; in 
fact, any attempt to use the ailerons for control caused an immediate divergence. 
Researchers further investigated this technique on the North American fixed-base 
simulator with good results.63 
 A few hundred miles away, Bill Dana made a check flight in a specially modi-
fied JF-100C (53-1709) at Ames on 1 November 1960, and delivered the aircraft 
to the FRC the following day. Researchers at Ames had modified the aircraft into 
a variable-stability trainer that could simulate the X-15 flight profile somewhat 
more convincingly than the NT-33, making it possible to investigate new piloting 
techniques and control-law modifications without using an X-15. The most limit-
ing factor was that the JF-100C was a single-seat aircraft, meaning that no safety 
pilot was available to lend assistance if things went wrong. To establish the X-15 
flight characteristics on the JF-100C, technicians connected two portable analog 
computers to the airplane so that the combination became, essentially, a fixed-base 
simulator. One analog computer simulated the basic F-100C flight characteristics, 
and researchers manipulated the variable-stability gains until the motion traces 
matched those obtained from the North American X-15 simulator. Joe Walker and 
 
62 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 29 July 960, p. 3, 3 August 960, 
pp. 3-, and  September 960, p. 3. 
63 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 30 September 960, p. 3. Obviously, the 
NT-33 did not actually fly at Mach 3.5 but was simulating the control responses based on known aerodynamic data.
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Bob White flew these pseudo fixed-base simulations until they were satisfied that 
the JF-100C adequately represented the X-15.64  
 The first actual flight of the JF-100C with the new mechanization was made 
on 24 March and was considered generally satisfactory. The major discrepancies 
were that the Dutch-roll and roll-subsidence modes appeared to be less stable than 
those of the actual X-15. Nevertheless, the JF-100C was capable of performing 
some interesting simulations. For instance, six flights in late July 1961 simulated 
the X-15 at Mach 3.5, 84,000 feet, and 10 degrees angle of attack; later flights 
extended this to Mach 6 and angles of attack of 20 degrees. The aircraft returned 
to Ames on 11 March 1964 after making 104 flights for pilot checkout, variable-
stability research, and X-15 support.65  
 One of the tasks assigned to the JF-100C was investigating the effects of 
damper failure on the controllability of the X-15. Researchers had obtained the 
6 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 3 April 96, pp. -5 and  August 
96, pp. 2-3.
65 E-mail, Peter W. Merlin/DFRC History Office to Dennis R. Jenkins, 8 November 999; X-5 Status Reports, Paul 
F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 3 April 96, pp. -5 and  August 96, pp. 2-3. The JF-00 
was obviously not actually flying at these velocities. 
Much of  the X-15 flight planning took place prior to the first manned space flight. There was concern 
that the rapidly changing stability and control characteristics in the X-15 as it reentered the atmosphere 
might pose an unusually demanding piloting task. To address this, the Cornell Aeronautical Labora-
tory developed a method of  simulating this environment using an NT-33A operated by Cornell as a 
variable stability trainer. The simulations were hardly ideal, but provided much needed confidence to the 
original cadre of  X-15 pilots. (U.S. Air Force)
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early wind-tunnel data on sideslip effects with the horizontal stabilizer at zero 
deflection, and used this data in the 1958 centrifuge program at Johnsville. Based 
on these data, reentries using an angle of attack of less than 15 degrees were pos-
sible even with the roll damper off. On the other hand, reentries at angles greater 
than 15 degrees (which were required for altitudes above 250,000 feet) with the 
roll damper off showed a distinct tendency to become uncontrollable because of a 
pilot-induced oscillation (PIO) .66  
 As with a typical PIO, if the pilot released the control stick, the oscillations 
damped themselves. Nevertheless, researchers suspected that a large portion of 
the X-15 flight envelope was uncontrollable with the roll dampers off or failed. In-
vestigations were initiated to find a way to alleviate the problem. The first method 
tried (perhaps because it would have been the easiest to implement) was pilot-
display quickening. Sideslip and bank-angle presentations in the cockpit were 
quickened (i.e., presented with less delay) by including the yaw rate and roll rate, 
respectively. Researchers experimented with various quickening gains during in-
vestigation on the fixed-base simulator, but found no combination that signifi-
cantly improved the pilot’s ability to handle the instability.67 
 Shortly after the centrifuge program was completed, researchers conducted 
a wind-tunnel test to gather sideslip data with the horizontal stabilizer closer to 
the normal trim position (which was a large leading-edge-down deflection of –15 
to –20 degrees). When researchers programmed the results of these tests into the 
fixed-base simulator at North American, it showed that the PIO boundary for re-
entry with the roll damper off had dropped from 15 degrees to only 8 degrees, 
adding new urgency to finding a solution.68  
 To verify the magnitude of the problem in flight, several X-15 pilots explored 
the fringes of the expected uncontrollable region by setting the airplane up at the 
appropriate angle of attack and turning the roll and yaw dampers off. In each case, 
lateral motions began immediately. The pilots experimented with various combi-
nations of angle of attack and control inputs in both the X-15 and the JF-100C to 
better define the problem.69 
 Lawrence W. Taylor and Richard E. Day from the FRC, and Arthur F . Tweedie 
from North American independently investigated using the rolling tail to control 
sideslip angle during certain types of instability. An unconventional control tech-
nique, called “beta-dot,” evolved from these investigations and showed consider-
able promise on the fixed-base simulator. This technique consisted of sharp lateral 
control inputs to the left as the nose swung left through zero sideslip (or vice versa 
to the right). The pilot kept his hands off the stick except when making the sharp 
lateral inputs, which eliminated the instability induced by inadvertent inputs asso-
ciated with merely holding onto the center stick. However, when pilots used this 
technique in the JF-100C, it did not seem to work as well. Further investigations 
66 Letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 20 May 2002.
67 Lieutenant Commander Forrest S. Petersen, Herman A. Rediess, and Joseph Weil, “Lateral Directional Control 
Characteristics,” a paper in the 1961 Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 35-38. (This paper was later 
republished as NASA classified technical memorandum X-726, March 962.)
68 Letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 20 May 2002.
69 Petersen et al., “Lateral-Directional Control Characteristics of the X-5 Airplane,” pp. 3-35; telephone conver-
sation, Richard E. Day with Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 May 2002.
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showed that it worked somewhat better in the X-15 when the pilot used the side-
stick controller instead of the center stick .70 
 It appeared that the beta-dot technique might allow reentries from high al-
titudes with the dampers failed, if anybody could figure out how to perform the 
maneuver successfully. As Bob Hoey, the flight planner who later discovered the 
ventral-off stability fix for the same problem, recalled, “the beta-dot technique is 
one of those things that is really difficult to explain. You could watch someone 
make 20 simulated reentries and still not understand what they were doing. The 
method was based on making a very sharp aileron pulse, timed exactly right, and 
totally foreign to normal, intuitive piloting technique. Properly timed, this pulse 
would completely stop the rolling motion, although not necessarily at wings level. 
With a little finesse, you could herd the thing back to wings level flight, but, if at 
any time you reverted to a normal piloting technique, even for a second, you were 
in big trouble. Art Tweedie [who discovered this method] and Norm Cooper [a 
North American flight controls expert] could make successful simulator reentries 
with the dampers off while drinking a cup of coffee! This obviously became a big 
challenge for the rest of us.” Hoey became pretty good at the technique himself, 
at least in the simulator.71  
 Dick Day later wrote that “Robert Hoey, lead Air Force engineer on the X-15 
project, introduced the control technique to some of the X-15 pilots. Two pilots in 
particular, Major Robert White and Captain Joe Engle, became so adept at con-
trolling ground and flight simulators that they considered the method would serve 
as a backup in case of roll damper failure. Fortunately, the beta-dot technique was 
not required because removing the ventral solved the dampers-off controllability 
problem. It is worth noting, however, that the complete beta-dot equation was 
later used in the yaw channel of the Space Shuttle control system to overcome 
unstable control coupling.” It is another enduring legacy of the X-15 program.72 
 All of the X-15 pilots trained using this technique, but the actual usefulness 
of the beta-dot maneuver was questionable. Furthermore, a lateral input in the 
wrong direction, which was conceivable considering other potential problems 
clamoring for the attention of the pilot, could be disastrous. One of the reasons 
the technique was so foreign to the pilot was that the aileron pulse had to be in 
the same direction as the roll, which is hardly intuitive for most pilots. Then the 
pilot had to remove the pulse just as the needle on the sideslip indicator hit the 
null mark. As Hoey remembers, “about half the pilots were dead-set against [the 
beta-dot maneuver] and essentially refused to consider it as an option. Others 
conquered the technique and actually became fairly proficient in its use on the 
fixed-base and in-flight simulations.” Pilots flew the in-flight simulations using 
the NT-33 and JF-100C variable-stability airplanes, which somehow managed to 
survive the program.73 
  
70 Ibid, pp. 38-39. 
7 E-mail, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 6 June 2002.
72 Richard E. Day, Coupling Dynamics in Aircraft: A Historical Perspective, NASA publication SP-532, (Washington, 
DC: NASA, 997), p. 22; telephone conversation, Richard E. Day with Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 May 2002. 
73 Letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins,  June 2002; telephone conversation, Robert G. Hoey with Dennis 
R. Jenkins, 8 June 2002.
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 There were two other answers to the PIO problem at high angles of attack. 
The first was to make the stability augmentation system truly redundant, at least 
in the roll axis, by installing the alternate stability augmentation system (ASAS); 
however, this took almost a year to accomplish. Another answer–discovered by 
Dick Day and Bob Hoey using the simulator–proved to be remarkably easy, and 
unexpected: remove the ventral rudder. With the lower rudder on, a considerable 
portion of the reentry from an altitude mission would be within the uncontrollable 
region should a damper fail. However, a similar reentry with the lower rudder 
removed would not enter the predicted uncontrollable region at all. The downside 
was that the pilots faced significantly reduced flying qualities at low angles of 
attack without the rudder. Despite a few gripes from the pilots, everybody eventu-
ally agreed to remove the lower rudder for almost all of the high-altitude missions. 
Only a few missions of the X-15A-2 used the ventral rudder, which in this case 
provided an adequate stand-in for the eventual dummy ramjet. In all, the program 
would make 73 flights with the ventral rudder on and 126 with it off.74 
 By the time of the 1961 industry conference, researchers had determined that 
the fixed-base simulator and the F-104 in-flight landing pattern simulator were 
the two most valuable training tools available to the program. The centrifuge and 
variable-stability aircraft contributed to the overall pilot experience level, but 
were not necessary for use on a flight-by-flight basis. This mostly explains why 
only the first group of pilots got the thrills of “riding the wheel” at Johnsville and 
flying the NT-33 trainer.75
7 Petersen et al., “Lateral Directional Control Characteristics,” pp. 39-0. 
75 Robert G. Hoey and Richard E. Day, “X-5 Mission Planning and Operational Procedures,” a paper in the 1961 
Research Airplane Committee Report, p. 63.
Researchers at Ames modified a North American JF-100C (53-1709) Super Sabre into a vari-
able-stability trainer that could simulate the X-15 flight profile somewhat more convincingly than the 
NT-33, making it possible to investigate new piloting techniques and control-law modifications without 
using an X-15. The most limiting factor was that the JF-100C was a single-seat aircraft, meaning there 
was not a safety pilot to assist if  things went wrong. (NASA)
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CARRIER AIRCRAFT
 The concept of using a large aircraft to carry a smaller one aloft was not 
necessarily new, but the X-1 program was the first research effort that made ex-
tensive use of the idea. The original series of X-planes used two modified Boeing 
B-29s and three Boeing B-50s as carrier aircraft. However, despite the fact that 
thousands of B-29s and B-50s had been built, by the end of 1950 maintenance 
personnel at Edwards were finding that it was difficult to obtain replacement 
parts, especially for the B-29s. The performance of the aircraft had proven ad-
equate for the original X-1 aircraft, but as the research airplanes got heavier, the 
performance of even the more-powerful B-50s became marginal. In addition, the 
ability to take off at high gross weights was limited in the heat that was typical 
of the high desert during the summer months. Obviously, the research programs 
needed to find a better solution.76
B-36
 Three of the four competitors had sized their X-15 concepts around the prem-
ise of using a Convair B-36 as the carrier aircraft (Douglas had chosen a B-50). 
Easily the largest piston-powered bomber to enter operational service, the B-36 
could fly over 400 mph and some versions could climb well above 50,000 feet. 
Convair manufactured 385 of the giant bombers between June 1948 and August 
1954. The B-36 would have carried the X-15 partially enclosed in its bomb bays, 
much like the X-1 and X-2 had been in earlier projects. This arrangement had 
several advantages, particularly that the pilot could move freely between the X-15 
and B-36 during the cruise to the launch location. This was extremely advanta-
geous if problems developed that required jettisoning the X-15 prior to launch. 
The B-36 was also a large aircraft with more than adequate room for a propellant 
top-off system (liquid oxygen and ammonia), power sources, communications 
equipment, breathing oxygen, and monitoring instruments and controls. Launch 
would have occurred at approximately Mach 0.6 at altitudes between 30,000 and 
50,000 feet. At the first industry conference in 1956, engineers at North American 
anticipated that a B-36 would be modified beginning in the middle of 1957 and 
ready for flight tests in October 1958.77 
 During their proposal effort, North American evaluated four different 
schemes for loading the research airplane into the bomber, which were generally 
similar to those of the other bidders. Engineers quickly rejected the idea of using 
a pit (like the X-1 and operationally for the GRB-36D/RF-84K FICON project) 
because of the potential “fire hazard and accumulation of fumes.” Similarly, they 
76 Miller, The X-planes, pp. 398-399; http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/gallery/photo/D-558-2/HTML/E-2478.html, ac-
cessed 20 April 2002. A few other bombers were used a carrier aircraft for various missile and unmanned X-plane 
programs, but they are not listed here.
77 System Development Plan, X-5 Research Aircraft, Supporting Research System Number 7L, 22 March 956, 
p. 9. In the files at the AFFTC History Office; Lawrence P. Greene, “Summary of Pertinent Problems and Current 
Status of the X-5 Airplane” a paper presented at the NACA Conference on the Progress of the X-5 Project, 
Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 25-26 October 956, p. 250; Captain Charles C. Bock, Jr., “B-52/X-5 Flight 
Operations,” undated (but probably late 958), no page numbers. In the files at the AFFTC History Office.
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North American had originally selected a Convair B-36 very heavy bomber as the carrier aircraft for 
the X-15. However, just before modifications were to begin, NASA and the Air Force decided to 
replace the B-36 with a much newer Boeing B-52 Stratofortress. The B-52 was a good deal faster than 
the B-36, providing a better launch environment for the research airplane and reducing maintenance 
requirements for the ground crew. (North American Aviation)
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eliminated a plan to jack up the carrier aircraft nose gear, because of “the jockey-
ing necessary to position the research aircraft plus the precarious position of the 
B-36.” The most complicated scheme involved physically removing the verti-
cal stabilizer from the research airplane, sliding the X-15 under the bomber, and 
then reattaching the vertical once the airplane was in the bomb bay. The potential 
loss of structural integrity that would result from frequently removing the vertical 
eventually eliminated this option.78 
 Ramp loading, which was similar to another method used in the FICON proj-
ect, became the chosen solution.79  Loading the X-15 into the carrier aircraft began 
with “running the B-36 main landing gear bogies up on permanent concrete ramps 
by use of commercially available electric cable hoists attached to the gear struts.” 
The ground crew then towed the research airplane under the bomber and hoisted 
it into the bomb bays.80 
 The X-15 was suspended from three points: one on either side of the aft fuse-
lage attached to the rear wing spar, and a third on the centerline behind the canopy 
firmly supported by the structure of the forward liquid-oxygen tank bulkhead. The 
same types of cartridges used by tactical aircraft to jettison external fuel tanks 
were used to explosively separate the shackles.81 
 The only major structural modification made to the B-36 would be the re-
moval of bulkhead no. 7, which separated bomb bays 2 and 3, along with some 
compensating structural stiffening.82  The X-15 would occupy most of the three 
forward bomb bays. Since the B-36 used a single set of doors to cover the aft 
two bomb bays, shorter doors were necessary to cover only bay no. 4.83  Inter-
estingly, the remaining 16-foot doors covering the last bomb bay would still be 
functional. A small, fixed fairing replaced the doors that normally covered bomb 
bay nos. 1 and 2. North American proposed installing a 9-foot-diameter, 6.5-foot-
long heated compartment in the front of bomb bay no. 1, equipped with its own 
entrance hatch on the bottom of the fuselage. The compartment could seat three 
crewmembers, and included oxygen and intercom connections. A 36-inch hatch 
opened into the bomb bay, and a catwalk on both sides of the bomb bay allowed 
access to the X-15 in flight. An aerodynamic fairing with a rubber-sealing strip ran 
the full length of the bomb-bay opening.84 
78 North American report NA-55-22, “X-5 Advanced Research Airplane Design Summary,” 9 May 955, p. 35; 
North American report NA-55-227, “Carrier Modification Data for a X-5 Research Aircraft, Project 226 (NAA 
Designation ESO-787),” 9 May 955, pp. 3-9. 
79 At the operational FICON base at Fairchild AFB the RF-8K was parked in a large pit. The GRB-36D was then 
towed over the pit and the fighter was hoisted into position in the bomb bays. All other sites (mainly Edwards AFB 
and the Convair plant in Fort Worth) used a large set of ramps. The B-36 was towed up the ramps and the fighter 
was then towed under the B-36 and raised into position. Interestingly, the Air Force also investigated removing the 
vertical from the F-8, but this was more in case the mated pair landed at a site not equipped with either normal 
method and it was imperative to remove the F-8 for some reason. For more information on FICON, see Dennis 
R. Jenkins, Magnesium Overcast; The Story of the Convair B-36, (North Branch, MN: Specialty Press, 200).
80  “X-5 Advanced Research Airplane Design Summary, p. 35; “Carrier Modification Data for a X-5 Research 
Aircraft,” p. 3.
8  “Carrier Modification Data for a X-5 Research Aircraft,” pp. -9.
82 The B-36 had four bomb bays, but there was no permanent structure separating nos.  and 2, or nos. 3 and . In 
each case a removable bulkhead separated the bays, which allowed large bombs to be carried without structural 
changes. There was a bulkhead between nos. 2 and 3, but since the wing carry-through structure was immedi-
ately above this bulkhead, removing it did not seriously compromise the structural integrity of the airplane. 
83 This was not a major issue since various versions of the reconnaissance version of the B-36 used short bomb 
bay doors.
8 “Carrier Modification Data for a X-5 Research Aircraft,” pp. 0-2.
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 One of the more interesting suggestions concerning the carrier aircraft was 
that “a bank of powerful lights be turned on several minutes prior to launching so 
that the pilot [of the research airplane] will not be blinded by the sudden glare of 
daylight during launching.”85 
 The B-36 was equipped with a 1,000-gallon liquid-oxygen tank and a 100-
gallon ammonia tank to top off the research airplane’s propellants. This was sur-
prising because Bell and Douglas, as well as Reaction Motors, believed the rate of 
ammonia boil-off was so slow that no topping-off would be required. Suspended 
in the bomb bay above the X-15, the tanks allowed the propellants to be gravity-
fed into the airplane. A nitrogen bottle pressurized and purged the tanks, and lines 
running outside the fuselage to the former tail turret allowed the carrier aircraft to 
jettison and vent the rocket propellants .86
A Replacement
 In early 1957, just as North American was preparing to begin modifications 
on the B-36, the X-15 Joint Operations Committee began considering replace-
ments for the B-36 for various reasons. There were some concerns that the re-
search airplane would not be as stable as desired during launch because of the 
relatively slow speed of the B-36. Another reason was that as the weight of the 
X-15 and its subsystems grew, the Air Force and NACA began to look for ways 
to recover some of the lost performance; a faster carrier would compensate some-
what for the increased X-15 weight. Perhaps most vocally, personnel at Edwards 
believed that the 10-engine B-36 would quickly become a maintenance nightmare 
since the Air Force was already phasing it out of the inventory. A lack of spare 
parts and depot maintenance capabilities for the B-29 and B-50 carrier aircraft had 
already delayed the X-1 and X-2 programs on several occasions.87 
 A survey by North American identified the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress, Con-
vair B-58 Hustler, and Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker as possible B-36 replace-
ments. It is interesting to note that Douglas had apparently chosen the B-52 for 
their model 671 study four years earlier.88  
 The supersonic B-58 was attractive from a performance perspective, but 
looked less attractive from the maintenance and availability standpoint. Never-
theless, on 22 January 1957, future X-15 pilot Neil Armstrong traveled to the 
Convair plant in Fort Worth to discuss the possibility of using a B-58 to launch 
the research airplane. The first problem was that the 22-foot wingspan and 18-foot 
tail-span of the X-15 both intersected the plane of the rearward-retracting main 
gear on the B-58. This would have necessitated moving the entire X-15 forward 
of the desired location . Convair engineers believed that this might be possible, 
 
85 “X-5 Advanced Research Airplane Design Summary,” p. 38.
86  “Carrier Modification Data for a X-5 Research Aircraft,” pp. 5-9.
87 Harrison A. Storms, “X-5 Hardware Design Challenges” a paper in the Proceedings of the X-15 30th Anniversary 
Celebration, Dryden Flight Research Facility, Edwards, CA, 8 June 989, NASA CP-305, p. 27; Bock, “B-52/X-
5 Flight Operations.” 
88 Douglas report ES-7673, “Technical Report on High Altitude and High Speed Study,” 28 May 95, pp. 7 and 5-
6. Based on the performance parameters specified in the Douglas study, the B-52 was the most likely platform.
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but it would require designing a new nose gear for the B-58 since the X-15 would 
block the normal nose gear. Another possibility was to beef up the X-15 nose 
gear and use it while the pair was on the ground. The inboard engine nacelles on 
the B-58 would likely need to be “toed” outward or simply moved further out on 
the wing, and either would have necessitated major structural changes. Engineers 
would need to design a way to fold the X-15 vertical stabilizer because they could 
not make room for it within the B-58 fuselage without severing a main wing spar. 
The design of the B-58 included a weapons/fuel pod that weighed 30,000 pounds, 
only slightly less than the X-15. However, the baseline mission included using 
the fuel in the pod prior to dropping the pod, and the maximum drop weight was 
only 16,000 pounds. This would necessitate a new series of tests to validate that a 
heavier object would separate cleanly, especially at supersonic speeds. However 
unfortunately, the B-58 was obviously not going to work.89 
 The landing-gear configuration on the KC-135 and B-52 precluded carry-
ing the X-15 under the fuselage, as had been the practice in all earlier research 
programs. Although the performance and availability of the KC-135 made it at-
tractive, nobody could figure out where to carry the research airplane since the 
Stratotanker had a low-mounted wing and relatively short landing gear. Engineers 
quickly dropped the KC-135 from consideration.90  
 The B-52 also offered an excellent performance increment over the B-36, and 
since the Boeing bomber was still in production, the availability of spare parts and 
support should not become an issue. There was a large space on the wing between 
the fuselage and inboard engine nacelle that could be adapted to carry a pylon, 
and investigations were already under way to install similar pylons on later B-52s 
to carry air-to-surface missiles. In May 1957, NASA directed North American to 
perform an initial feasibility study on using the B-52 as an X-15 carrier. The study 
lasted several weeks and the results were favorable. At a meeting on 18-19 June 
1957, the program officially adopted the B-52 as a carrier aircraft. Representa-
tives from the FRC discussed concerns about maintenance and availability issues, 
and NASA recommended procuring two carrier aircraft to ensure that the flight 
program would proceed smoothly. The Air Force subsequently authorized North 
American to modify two B-52s in lieu of the single B-36.91  
 The North American investigations showed that the X-15, as designed, 
would fit under the wing between the fuselage and inboard engine pylon at an 
18% semi-span location. The wing structure in this location was capable of sup-
porting up to 50,000 pounds, so the 31,275-pound research airplane did not rep-
resent a problem. Nevertheless, this was not the ideal solution. The X-15 pilot 
would have to be in the research airplane prior to takeoff, and the large weight 
 
 
89 Memorandum, Neil A. Armstrong to Walter C. Williams, subject: Visit to Convair, Fort Worth, on 22 January 957, 
to discuss possible utilization of a B-58 aircraft as a research vehicle launcher, 3 January 957. In the files at the 
DFRC History Office.
90 Bock, “B-52/X-5 Flight Operations.” 
9 Contract change notice no. , “Replacement of a B-52 Airplane in lieu of a B-36 for use as X-5 Carrier Airplane, 
30 August 957; Bock, “B-52/X-5 Flight Operations;” letter, Harrison A. Storms/North American Aviation, to 
Commander/Air Materiel Command, subject: Contract AF-3693, Modification of B-52A For Use as X-5 Carrier 
Airplane, 28 June 957. In the files at the AFFTC History Office.
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transition when the B-52 released the X-15 would present some interesting con-
trol challenges.92 
 Lawrence P. Greene, the North American chief aerodynamicist wrote, “One 
item which caused considerable concern in the early evaluation was the fact that 
in this installation, the pilot could not enter the airplane in flight as had been pos-
sible in the B-36. This limitation was of concern from both the fatigue and safety 
aspects; however, the time from take-off of the B-52 to launching the X-15 is about 
1.5 hours, and considerable effort has been expended in plans for making the pilot 
comfortable during this time. In the event of an emergency, the configuration per-
mits the pilot to eject safely while the X-15 and B-52 are still connected.”93  
 Further analysis and wind-tunnel tests indicated that the potential problems 
were solvable, and that the increase in speed and altitude capabilities was desir-
able. Researchers conducted additional wind-tunnel tests of a 1/40-scale model 
in the Langley 7 by 10-foot tunnel and the University of Washington wind tun-
nel to explore possible flutter problems, but did not discover any critical issues. 
Researchers installed six-component strain-gage balances in both the B-52 and 
X-15 models, and the B-52 model had additional strain gages and a pressure gage 
located in the horizontal stabilizer to obtain measurements of possible tail buffet 
created by the X-15 installation.94 
 Initially the X-15 was to be carried under the left wing of the B-52. It was 
moved to the right wing to “permit easier servicing of the X-15 when installed 
on the B-52,” although exactly what was easier to service was not described. 
Researchers had conducted most of the wind-tunnel tests with models of the 
X-15 under the left wing. However, since both aircraft were largely symmetri-
cal, researchers decided that the test results were equally as valid for the right-
wing configuration. The initial design also had an anti-buffet fairing that partially 
shielded the pylon from the airflow, but wind-tunnel tests showed that the fairing 
did not significantly help anything, and the engineers subsequently deleted it.95  
 Originally, the Air Force indicated that it could make the two prototype B-52s 
(the XB-52 and YB-52) available to the X-15 program. Personnel at Edwards 
feared that the use of these two non-standard aircraft would result in the same 
maintenance and parts availability problems they were attempting to avoid. By 
92 Letter, Harrison A. Storms/North American, to Commander/Air Materiel Command, subject: Contract AF-3693, 
Modification of B-52A For Use as X-5 Carrier Airplane, 28 June 957. In the files at the AFFTC History Office; 
Gene J. Matranga, unpublished NASA technical report, “Launch Characteristics of the X-5 Research Airplane 
as Determined in Flight,” undated but sometime in May 960, no page numbers. Typescript the AFFTC Access 
to Space Office Project Files; Greene, “X-5 Research Airplane Development Status,” p. ; William J. Alford, Jr., 
and Robert T. Taylor, “Aerodynamic Characteristics of the X-5/B-52 Combination,” a paper in the 1958 Research 
Airplane Committee Report, p. 69.
93 Greene, “X-5 Research Airplane Development Status,” p. . No other reference could be found that indicated 
ejection was possible in the mated configuration. The flight manual states that the X-5 would be dropped and 
then the pilot would eject, although this obviously would not help during an emergency on the takeoff roll or 
shortly after rotation. The X-5 pilots and the flight planners, however, remember that ejection was possible while 
the plane was still attached to the NB-52.
9 Alford and Taylor, “Aerodynamic Characteristics of the X-5/B-52 Combination,” p. 70; Harry L. Runyan an Harold 
R. Sweet, “Flutter, Noise, and Buffet Problems Related to the X-5,” a paper in the 1958 Research Airplane Com-
mittee Report, p. 235.
95 Quote is from Letter, Harrison A. Storms, North American, to Commander, Air Materiel Command, subject: Con-
tract AF-3693, Modification of B-52A For Use as X-5 Carrier Airplane, 28 June 957. In the files at the AFFTC 
History Office; Matranga, “Launch Characteristics of the X-5 Research Airplane as Determined in Flight.” The 
change from the left wing to the right wing happened sometime between June 957 and June 958, but exactly 
when could not be determined. The wind-tunnel models were eventually updated for continued testing, but the 
initial tests were not repeated.
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August 1957 the Strategic Air Command agreed to make an early-production 
B-52A available, and the Air Force subsequently assigned serial number 52-003 
to the program in October 1957. In May 1958 the Air Force also assigned an early 
RB-52B (52-008) to the X-15 program. Both aircraft had been involved in isolat-
ing problems with the B-52 defensive fire control system, and Boeing delivered 
each aircraft to North American after the completion of their test programs.96 
 On 29 November 1957 the B-52A arrived at Air Force Plant 42 in Palmdale, 
California, after a flight from the Boeing plant in Seattle. North American placed 
the aircraft into storage pending modifications. On 4 February 1958, technicians 
moved the aircraft to the North American hangar and began modifying it to sup-
port the X-15 program. The aircraft, now designated NB-52A, flew to Edwards 
on 14 November 1958 and was subsequently named “The High and Mighty One.” 
The RB-52B arrived in Palmdale for similar modifications on 5 January 1959, 
and, as an NB-52B, flew to Edwards on 8 June 1959; the airplane briefly wore the 
name “The Challenger.”97  
 The major modifications to the two NB-52s included the following:98 
The no. 3 right main wing fuel cell was removed to allow 
the installation of pylon tie fittings and supports in the front 
and rear wing spars. 
The inboard flap mechanism on both wings was discon-
nected, and the flaps were bolted to the flap tracks. A cutout 
through the right inboard flap provided clearance for the 
X-15 vertical stabilizer. 
A pylon was installed between the right inboard engine 
nacelle and the fuselage. The pylon contained a primary 
hydraulic and a secondary, pneumatic-release mechanism 
for the research airplane .
Changes to the NB-52 avionics included the addition of 
an AN/APN-81 Doppler radar system to provide ground-
speed and drift-angle information to the stable platform 
in the X-15, an auxiliary UHF communications system to 
provide additional communications channels, and a change 
in the AN/AIC-10 interphone system to provide an AUX 
UHF position .
96 Bock, Jr., “B-52/X-5 Flight Operations;” various B-52 history cards and reports in the files at the Boeing Archives.
97 The “N” designation indicated that the aircraft had undergone permanent modifications to a non-standard con-
figuration. Some sources show this as an NRB-52B, which would have been correct. However, the RB-52 con-
figuration did not actually change anything substantial on the aircraft other than adding the capability to carry 
a self-contained reconnaissance capsule in the bomb bay. The Strategic Air Command quickly decided that it 
had little use for the RB-52s, and all were subsequently redesignated B-52s. The reconnaissance capability was 
deleted from future procurements.
98 Procurement specification amendment no.  to specification NA57-802, “Procurement Specification, Carrier Air-
plane Modification Program, X-5 Research Aircraft, 9 September 957; letter, Harrison A. Storms/North Ameri-
can, to Commander/ARDC, subject: Contract AF33(600)-3693, X-5 Research Airplane, Revision–Procurement 
and Model Specification, 7 November 957; North American report NA-58-82D, “Operating and Maintenance 
Instructions for B-52A Carrier Airplane AF52003 and B-52B Carrier Airplane AF52008,” 5 May 959 (changed 8 
August 96), pp. - through -2C. Copy courtesy of Mick Roth; Bock, “B-52/X-5 Flight Operations;” Captain 
John E. Allavie, Captain Charles C. Bock, Jr., and First Lieutenant Charles E. Adolph, AFFTC report TR-60-33, 
“Flight Evaluation of the B-52 Carrier Aircraft for the X-5,” September 960. In the AFFTC Access to Space Office 
Project Files.; internal letter (North American Rockwell), Charles C. Bock, Jr., to G. Boswell, subject: B-52 and X-5 
Launch Programs, 2 November 973; letter, Charles C. Bock, Jr., to Dennis R. Jenkins, 20 May 2002.
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The fuselage static ports were removed from the right side 
of the NB-52 to allow installation of the forward television 
camera. The airspeed system was recalibrated to use only 
the left static ports. This worked surprisingly well, even 
during sideslip maneuvers, with “no measurable differ-
ence” noted.
Two television cameras were installed in streamline fairings 
on the right side of the NB-52. The rear camera pointed 
generally forward and was equipped with the zoom lens 
to allow the launch operator to focus on areas of interest 
on the rear of the X-15. The forward camera used a fixed-
length lens pointed outward and slightly rearward to allow 
a view of the X-15 forward fuselage. Two monitors were 
located at the launch operator position, and either could 
show the view from either camera. Four floodlights and 
three 16-mm motion picture cameras were also installed. 
Two of these were Millikan DBM-5 high-speed units lo-
cated in a window on the right side of the fuselage at sta-
tion 374 and in an astrodome at station 1217. The third was 
an Urban GSAP gun camera mounted in the pylon pointed 
downward to show X-15 separation . 
The NB-52 forward-body fuel cell was removed to pro-
vide space for inspecting and maintaining various fluid and 
gas lines installed in the wing. The mid-body fuel cell was 
removed and the fuselage area above the bomb bay was 
reworked to provide space for 15 nitrogen and nine helium 
5 .
6 .
7 .
The Air Force initially contributed the third production B-52A (serial number 52-003) to the X-15 
program. This airplane had been used in initial B-52 testing at Boeing in Seattle, and came to Edwards 
when its testing duties were completed. The airplane was modified by North American to support carry-
ing and launching the X-15. The aircraft, now designated NB-52A, flew to Edwards on 14 November 
1958 and was subsequently named The High and Mighty One. (NASA)
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storage cylinders. Early during the flight program, a sepa-
rate liquid-nitrogen supply was added to the pylon to cool 
the stable platform on the X-15. 
Two stainless-steel liquid-oxygen tanks (a 1,000-gallon 
“climb” tank and a 500-gallon “cruise” tank) were installed 
in the bomb bay. The tanks were not jettisonable, although 
the contents could be vented through a streamlined jettison 
line protruding from the forward left side of the bomb bay. 
Liquid oxygen would be sucked into the right rear landing 
gear well if the doors were opened while liquids were be-
ing jettisoned; this was procedurally restricted. 
A launch operator station replaced the normal ECM com-
partment located on the upper rear flight deck. After the 
first flew flights with X-15-1, an astrodome-type viewing 
window was added to the NB-52 above the forward televi-
sion camera in case the video system failed, and a duplicate 
set of controls for the liquid-oxygen top-off system were 
located above the window to allow the launch operator to 
top off the X-15 while looking out the window. A defrost-
ing system was provided for the window, and two steel 
straps across the window provided safety for the launch 
operator in case the window blew out .
Changes to the NB-52 flight deck included the addition of 
a master launch panel on the lower left side of the main in-
strument panel, launch-indicating lights in the pilot’s direct 
field of vision, a normal launch switch on the left console, 
and an emergency launch handle below and to the left of the 
master launch panel. Changes were also made to the B-52 
fuel control panel in both aircraft to reflect the removal of 
the fuel cells and eliminate the external tank position.
Breathing oxygen was made available to the NB-52 crew-
members at all times. In addition, oxygen was tapped from 
the NB-52 oxygen system to supply the X-15 research pilot 
with breathing oxygen until flight release. 
A high-speed wheel, tire, and braking system was installed 
on the NB-52 because the original landing gear was only 
rated to 174 knots. The new system incorporated an ad-
equate margin for no-flap takeoffs and landings at heavy 
weights, and was rated to 218 knots.
All military systems, including the tail turret and defensive 
fire-control system, were removed. The modifications to 
the rear fuselage to delete the tail turret differed between 
the two aircraft. The ability to carry the reconnaissance pod 
on the RB-52B was also deleted .
Later in the flight program, additional instrumentation was 
added to the launch operator position to allow monitoring 
8 .
9 .
10 .
11 .
12 .
13 .
14 .
 Chapter 6: Prepar ations
of the MH-96 adaptive flight control system and X-20 iner-
tial flight data system. A “stable platform control and moni-
toring unit” was also added to the NB-52B to allow the 
launch operator to monitor and control the stable platform 
during captive-carries of the pod-mounted system used for 
post-maintenance validation.
 These changes differed somewhat from those initially proposed for the 
NB-52. For instance, the original design had a pressurized compartment in the 
bomb bay for an observer. When North American deleted this from the design, 
engineers moved the liquid-oxygen top-off tank there instead. The launch opera-
tor position was moved from the left side of the aircraft to the right side to permit 
“continuous observation of the research vehicle” after the X-15 itself was moved 
to the right side. This also allowed the launch operator to remain in his ejection 
seat for the entire launch process (previously he had to stand up occasionally to 
visually check the X-15).99 
 The change from a B-36 to a B-52 did not come cheaply. Although the basic 
aircraft was provided at no charge to the program, North American submitted a 
bill for an additional $2,130,929.06 for the modification of the first B-52. The 
second airplane cost somewhat less since it did not require wind-tunnel testing 
and the basic engineering was already complete.
 The Air Force named Captain Edward C . Gahl as the project pilot for the 
NB-52 carrier aircraft in 1957. Gahl was well up to the task. He was a graduate 
of the Experimental Test Pilot School and had been involved in flight-testing the 
B-52 and KC-135 prior to joining the carrier program. Unfortunately, Gahl per-
ished in a mid-air collision on 16 June 1958, long before the NB-52A had com-
pleted its modifications. Captain Charles C. Bock, Jr., replaced him as the chief 
carrier pilot .100 
 After the modifications to the NB-52A were completed, engineers from the 
Air Force, Boeing, NASA, and North American conducted a ground vibration test 
on the pylon using the X-15-1. The tests built on data already accumulated by 
Boeing-Wichita while the B-52F was being integrated with the North American 
GAM-77 Hound Dog missile.101  Technicians constructed a structural steel frame 
to make the NB-52 wing as rigid as possible, effectively preventing any movement 
by the NB-52 wing, pylon, horizontal stabilizer, or fuselage. The X-15 was ex-
cited by electromagnetic shakers and sensors mounted on the X-15 fuselage, wing, 
horizontal stabilizer, and vertical stabilizers measured the amplitude of motion for 
99 Procurement specification amendment no.  to specification NA57-802, “Procurement Specification, Carrier 
Airplane Modification Program, X-5 Research Aircraft, 9 September 957; letter, Harrison A. Storms/North 
American, to Commander/ARDC, subject: Contract AF33(600)-3693, X-5 Research Airplane, Revision–Pro-
curement and Model Specification, 7 November 957; letter, Walter C. Williams, to Commander/ARDC, subject: 
Modification of B-52A airplane for use as X-5 carrier airplane, 6 August 957. 
00 Biography, “Captain Edwards C. Gahl.” In the files at the AFFTC History Office; “Two Center Pilots Lost in Mid-Air 
Crash Here,” an article in the Desert Wings paper published at Edwards AFB. Gahl was the copilot on a Martin 
B-57 piloted by Lieutenant Colonel Boyd L. Grubaugh when the aircraft collided with an North American F-00 
piloted by Captain Cecil D. Crabb about 30 miles northwest of Edwards. Crabb managed to limp his damaged 
Super Sabre home to George AFB, but the B-57 crashed, killing both Edwards pilots.
0 The GAM-77 was a large jet-powered cruise missile that was originally designated B-77 and later redesignated 
AGM-28. Specially modified B-52s could carry a single Hound Dog on a pylon under each wing in a location very 
similar to where the X-5 pylon was mounted.
X-15: EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
various frequencies. Researchers used these data to determine the natural vibration 
frequencies of the pylon to verify data obtained from a series of flutter model tests 
of the NB-52/X-15 combination conducted by Boeing in a low-speed wind tunnel. 
The results from these two tests demonstrated that the flutter speed of the NB-52 
when carrying the X-15 was well above the required launch conditions.102 
 However, there was some concern about the jet exhaust from engine nos. 5 
and 6 of the NB-52 impinging on the X-15 empennage. Specifically, the engineers 
worried that the engine acoustics would detrimentally affect the X-15’s structural 
fatigue life. To mitigate this concern, at least initially, the engineers decided the 
NB-52 pilots would restrict engine nos. 5 and 6 to 50% thrust while carrying 
the X-15. The engineers and pilots believed this was an acceptable compromise 
between protecting the X-15 and the need to provide adequate power and control 
of the NB-52 during takeoff. At 50% power on these two engines, the tip of the 
X-15 horizontal stabilizer was exposed to 158 decibels and the sides of the verti-
cal stabilizers were exposed to 144 decibels; at 100% power each value was about 
10 decibels greater.103 
 Although it appeared feasible to operate the carrier aircraft engines at reduced 
power, it was not desirable, so North American began redesigning some parts of 
the X-15 to increase their fatigue life. The modifications to the vertical stabiliz-
ers consisted of increasing the rivet diameter, using dimpled-skin construction 
instead of countersunk rivets, and increasing the gage of the corrugated ribs along 
the edge where they flanged over to attach to the cap strip. The horizontal stabi-
lizer used larger rivets and dimpled construction.104 
 To verify the effectiveness of the modifications, researchers conducted 
several acoustic tests to establish the structural fatigue life of both the original 
and modified aft X-15 structures. A static ground test was run on a simulated 
X-15 empennage to determine the sound levels beneath the pylon (the hastily- 
constructed structure could not be attached to the pylon) with the B-52 engines 
operating at 85% rpm (equivalent to 50% thrust). Both the original and modified 
test panels withstood 20 hours of operation with no failure. Subsequent analysis 
indicated that the original panels would be adequate for operation at 50% pow-
er, and the new panels would allow operation at 100% power. North American 
decided to retrofit all three X-15s with the new structure, which would take sev-
eral months.105 
 Following completion of these tests, Captain Bock and Captain John E. 
“Jack” Allavie tested the NB-52A along with launch panel operator, William 
“Bill” Berkowitz from North American. To eliminate possible interference with 
the X-15, the engineers decided to bolt the inboard flaps in the closed position, 
meaning that the NB-52 pilots would have to fly the airplane without flaps. There-
fore, the pilots dedicated the initial flights to developing techniques for no-flap 
02 Bock, “B-52/X-5 Flight Operations;” “B-52/X-5 Ground Vibration Test,” Boeing Report D3-22, 29 January 959. 
03 Gareth H. Jordan, Normal J. McLeod, and Lawrence D. Guy, “Structural Dynamic Experiences of the X-5,” a 
paper in the 1961 Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 8-9 (this was later republished as NASA technical 
note D-58, March 962); Bock, “B-52/X-5 Flight Operations.” 
0 Harry L. Runyan an Harold R. Sweet, “Flutter, Noise, and Buffet Problems Related to the X-5,” a paper in the 
1958 Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 235-236; Jordan et al., “Structural Dynamic Experiences of the 
X-5,” pp. 8-9.
05 Bock, “B-52/X-5 Flight Operations;” Jordan et al., “Structural Dynamic Experiences of the X-5,” pp. 8-9.
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operations and measuring various performance parameters of the modified NB-52. 
The takeoffs were conducted using 50% power on engine nos. 5 and 6 since it ap-
peared that initial flights would be restricted to this power setting until all three 
X-15s were modified. The NB-52 also accomplished qualitative stability tests over 
the speed and altitude ranges anticipated for the X-15 program.106 
 There was very little no-flap, takeoff-and-landing experience with the B-52 
available to draw on, so Bock and Allavie conducted the initial tests using predict-
ed information and recommendations from Boeing personnel. Engineers based 
the anticipated takeoff speeds and distances on a lift coefficient of 0.75, meaning 
that the NB-52 had to be rotated about the aft main gear to an attitude that would 
produce the correct amount of lift. This was contrary to normal B-52 takeoffs 
where all four main gear lift at the same time. The pilots also realized that the 10% 
chord elevator used on the B-52 would have limited authority and that the hori-
zontal-stabilizer trim setting would be important if reasonable takeoff distances 
were to be attained .107  
 The flight tests involved a fair amount of trial and error. For instance, on the 
first test at a gross weight of 315,000 pounds (the maximum predicted weight for 
an actual X-15 flight), Bock set the stabilizer trim 0.5 degrees more than the normal 
recommended trim of 0 degrees. The pilots ran engine nos. 5 and 6 at 50% power, 
and fuel loading simulated the weight (but not the drag) of the X-15 on the right 
wing. The predicted takeoff distance was 10,500 feet at a speed of 176 knots. How-
ever, the NB-52 would not rotate, even with the control columns pulled all the way 
back. After the airplane passed the 10,000-foot marker on the runway, the pilots 
went to full power on engine nos. 5 and 6, and the aircraft broke ground at 12,650 
feet at 195 knots. Engineers later calculated the actual lift coefficient for this take-
off at 0.639. During a normal B-52 takeoff with the flaps down, all four main gear 
leave the ground simultaneously and the lift coefficient is approximately 0.55.108  
 Subsequent takeoff tests established that a trim setting of 2 degrees nose up 
was the optimum setting (this represented one-half of the available trim). This 
setting produced reasonable takeoff distances and a rapid but controllable rota-
tion just prior to liftoff, with the pilot holding the column all the way back. The 
maximum lift coefficients were later determined to be approximately 0.71.109  
 Landings also proved challenging. Again, the airplane needed higher than 
normal lift coefficients during landing in order to produce reasonable touchdown 
speeds and landing distances. Unlike the traditional B-52 landing on all four main 
gear at once, the NB-52s landed on their two aft main gear. The problem was that 
the designers had not intended the B-52 to do this. Very little control could be 
achieved as the aircraft rotated to a level attitude, and the forward main gear usu-
ally hit with a noticeable impact. Accelerometers installed in the pylon after the 
initial landing tests measured impact loads of 1.5–1.8 g. The engineers considered 
these annoying but acceptable.110  
  
06 Bock, Jr. “B-52/X-5 Flight Operations.” 
07 Ibid.
08 Ibid; telephone conversation, Charles Bock with Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 June 2002.
09 Ibid.
0 Ibid.
X-15: EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
 After the front main gear touched down, the pilots fully extended the NB-52 
air brakes and the drag chute deployed at 140 knots. When landing at heavier 
weights, such as when returning with the X-15 still attached, the pilots used mod-
erate braking. When these techniques were used with a 300,000-pound airplane, 
the touchdown speed was 172 knots and the landing roll took 10,800 feet. At 
250,000 pounds, touchdown occurred at 154 knots and light braking used only 
9,300 feet of runway. The importance of the drag chute was telling: one landing 
at 267,000 pounds with a failed drag chute required over 12,000 feet to stop even 
with heavy braking, and resulted in one brake being severely warped, necessitat-
ing its replacement.111  
 The NB-52 pilots now felt confident that they could control their airplane 
with the X-15 attached, so the first captive flight was attempted. The right wing 
sat on its outrigger wheel during the initial takeoff roll in order to keep spoiler 
extension and the associated drag at a minimum. The engineers did not expect the 
additional drag of the X-15 to result in any serious degradation of low-speed per-
formance; however, there existed some concerns about the possible impingement 
of the X-15 wake on the right horizontal stabilizer of the NB-52.112  
 Despite the concerns about exhaust impingement from engine nos. 5 and 6, 
the X-15 program had not taken a firm stand on what power levels to use. Bock 
and Allavie therefore decided to use full power on all eight engines for the flight 
on 10 March 1959. The takeoff gross weight was 258,000 pounds and the center 
of gravity was located at 26.5% mean aerodynamic chord (MAC). The actual 
takeoff distance was 6,085 feet and liftoff occurred at 172 knots . The lift co-
efficient developed on this takeoff was 0.66 since the pilots did not attempt to 
achieve maximum performance. Bock just wanted to demonstrate that the mated 
pair would actually fly as predicted, which it did for 1 hour and 8 minutes. The 
second flight (which was supposed to result in an X-15 glide flight, but did not 
due to a radio failure) produced largely similar results. On the third flight (another 
unsuccessful attempt at a glide flight) engine nos. 5 and 6 were set to 50% thrust 
until an indicated airspeed of 130 knots was reached, and then they were advanced 
to full power . This procedure extended the takeoff distance to 7,100 feet at the 
same gross weight and similar atmospheric conditions.113  
 Following takeoff, engine nos. 5 and 6 were set to 50% thrust at 5,000 feet 
altitude and the mated pair continued to climb using a circular pattern around 
Rogers Dry Lake. This kept Scott Crossfield in the X-15 within gliding distance 
of a suitable lake in the event of a possible emergency jettison. The NB-52 pilots 
flew all of these early tests to an altitude of 45,000 feet and Mach 0.85, which 
was pretty much the maximum performance of the mated pair. Bock and Allavie 
flew simulated launch patterns and practiced emergency and aborted launch pro-
cedures, and Crossfield accomplished X-15 propellant jettison tests using a water-
alcohol mixture that included red dye. Before each flight, technicians covered the 
 
 
 Ibid.
2 Ibid; telephone conversation, Charles Bock with Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 June 2002.
3 Ibid; telephone conversation, Charles Bock with Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 June 2002.
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underside of the right horizontal stabilizer of the NB-52 with a powdery substance 
so that the impingement would be easy to identify.114  
 Since the X-15 horizontal and vertical stabilizers used for these initial carry 
flights were the original design, the engineers decided to inspect them after the 
third flight. The inspection revealed several structural failures in the upper vertical 
stabilizer. For the most part, the corrugated ribs had failed where they flanged over 
to attach to the cap strip, but the most extensive failure was an 18-inch separation 
of the rib from the flange on the side away from the NB-52 engines. Subsequent 
investigation showed that the failures were largely a result of a previously unsus-
pected source: the turbulent airflow created by the X-15 pylon and the B-52 wing 
cutout. Researchers made pressure measurements to determine the exact environ-
ment around the wing cutout. Fortunately, the subsequent analysis indicated an 
acceptable fatigue life for the modified X-15 structures, even though the engineers 
had not factored this particular environment into the design. After this round of 
tests and analysis was completed, the pilots made most subsequent takeoffs with 
all eight B-52 engines operating at 100% power.115  
 Nevertheless, it was recognized that heavyweight takeoffs (≈315,000 pounds) 
with no flaps were going to require a considerable amount of runway during the 
summer heat. Most flight operations at Edwards during the summer were conduct-
ed in the early morning in any case, and if the takeoff roll was computed to be too 
long, one of the lakebeds could always be used (although this only happened once 
during actual flight operations). The NB-52B eliminated this particular deficiency. 
Unlike the A-model, the NB-52B was quipped with water injection for its engines. 
Bock and Allavie tested the NB-52B using water injection on just the outer four 
engines, and on all engines except nos. 5 and 6, with promising results. Bock noted 
that the use of water injection “appreciably increases take-off performance and is 
considered mandatory for take-off from the paved runway at a weight of 300,000 
pounds when the ambient temperature exceeds 90 degrees Fahrenheit.”116 
 Takeoffs were initially made using runway 04 at Edwards because that run-
way had several miles of lakebed overrun available. This allowed the pilots to 
fly a better pattern during climb-out, but more importantly, it avoided the use 
of heavy braking in case of an aborted takeoff. Engineers considered the use of 
maximum braking “undesirable” because of potential damage to the X-15 if one 
of the NB-52 tires failed. The other direction, runway 22, has a road at the end of 
it instead of lakebed .117 
 Pilots found the lateral and directional control systems of the carrier aircraft 
capable of trimming out the unbalance of the NB-52/X-15 combination. Most of 
the pilots noted that lateral control became sensitive above Mach 0.8, but believed 
that launches were possible up to Mach 0.85 with no particular problems. The 
evaluations did not reveal any buffeting in level flight. It was possible to induce a 
minor airframe buffet in maneuvering flight at 1.6 g (80% of the pylon load limit), 
but only at speeds well below the normal operating range. It was discovered that 
 Ibid.
5 Jordan et al., “Structural Dynamic Experiences of the X-5,” pp. 8-9.
6 Bock, “B-52/X-5 Flight Operations;” AFFTC report TR-60-33, p. 6. 
7 AFFTC report TR-60-33, p. 6. Runway 22, the other direction of the same piece of concrete, ends in one of the 
main base access roads.
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the specific range deterioration of the NB-52 was about 7% with an empty pylon; 
with the X-15 attached, the specific range decreased by approximately 16%. Giv-
en that researchers never planned to launch the X-15 from a distance of more than 
500 miles, and the B-52 was an intercontinental bomber, nobody considered this 
decrease in range significant. Nevertheless, a nonstop flight in May 1962 demon-
strated that the pair could fly 1,625 miles from Edwards to Eglin AFB, Florida.118 
 The engineers and pilots predicted that launching the X-15 would result in an 
instantaneous rearward shift of the NB-52 center of gravity, coupled with a tenden-
cy for the carrier aircraft to roll to the left. The X-15 glide flight (i.e., with no fuel) 
was expected to result in a 4.5% shift in the center of gravity, while full-fuel flights 
would result in a 9% shift (which rose to about 12% on the later X-15A-2 flights). 
Engineers calculated that the rolling tendency and pitch-up were well within the 
capabilities of the NB-52 to counter, and in fact actual operations revealed no par-
ticular problems. Under “normal” conditions, the center of gravity actually shifted 
approximately 7% and required a 40-pound push force on the control column to 
compensate, but the resulting pulse usually dampened in one cycle.119  
 Some other minor problems were discovered during the NB-52 flight tests. 
For instance, the aft alternator cooling air duct on the right-wing leading edge and 
the air ducts on the right side of the NB-52 fuselage ingested hydrogen peroxide 
residue during pre-launch operation of the X-15 nose ballistic control system. 
Engineers did not consider the residue hazardous since it was composed primarily 
of water. Interestingly, while the X-15 was attached to the NB-52, operation of the 
X-15 ballistic control system had no noticeable effect on the bomber. Operation of 
the X-15 aerodynamic flight control also had no appreciable effect on the NB-52; 
however, a slight airframe buffet was noted when the X-15 speed brakes were ex-
tended. A flap extension on the X-15 caused a small nose-down trim change, and 
extension of the X-15 main landing skids was not even apparent in the bomber. 
Initially, extension of the X-15 nose gear resulted in a “thump” that was felt and 
8 Bock, “B-52/X-5 Flight Operations;” AFFTC report TR-60-33, p. 7; telephone conversations, John E. Allavie and 
Robert M. White with Dennis R. Jenkins, various dates in May and June 2002.
9 Bock, “B-52/X-5 Flight Operations;” AFFTC report TR-60-33, p. 9. 
The Air Force also provided the second production RB-52B (the fifth B-model) to the X-15 program. The 
RB-52B (52-008) arrived in Palmdale for similar modifications on 5 January 1959, and as an NB-52B, 
flew to Edwards on 8 June 1959; the airplane briefly wore the name The Challenger. The NB-52B went 
on to a long career at the Flight Research Center before being retired in 2005. (U.S. Air Force)
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heard in the NB-52, but later changes to the X-15 extension mechanism elimi-
nated the event .120 
 On the other side of the equation, the NB-52 had some effects on the X-15. 
For instance, the NB-52 fuselage and wing created noticeable upwash and side-
wash on the X-15. Because of the NB-52 wing sweep, the right wing of the X-15 
was nearer to the B-52 wing leading edge and, consequently, flow over the X-15 
right wing was deflected downward more than over its left wing. This difference in 
effective angle of attack of the right and left wings resulted in a right rolling mo-
ment. There were also some concerns that the X-15 might strike the carrier aircraft 
during separation. Because there was only two feet of clearance between the X-15 
dorsal stabilizer and the cutout in the NB-52 wing, the X-15 could potentially 
strike the cutout if the X-15 bank angle exceeded 20 degrees before the airplane 
dropped below the NB-52 fuselage level (about 2.5 feet vertically). It was decided 
that all X-15 controls should be in the neutral position when the airplane was 
dropped, allowing the automatic dampers to take care of correcting the attitude. 
The first few X-15 launches experimented with the settings needed for the damp-
ers to do this, but Scott Crossfield soon developed a consistent set of settings.121 
 Scott Crossfield unexpectedly demonstrated the effects of not using the damp-
ers on the third flight (2-3-6) when the roll damper failed at launch. The X-15 
rolling velocity increased rapidly 
to a peak value of 47 degrees per 
second and a peak bank angle of 
40 degrees. The X-15 dorsal sta-
bilizer dropped below the NB-52 
wing cutout within 0.5 second, with 
the tail barely clearing the cutout. 
Crossfield finally managed to get 
the X-15’s wings level about 7 sec-
onds after launch .122 
           The damper generally ap-
plied a left-aileron input of 6–8 
degrees, reducing the peak right-
roll velocity to about 25 degrees 
per second . The pilot could do the 
same if the damper failed. Aileron 
inputs of only 2 degrees, however, 
resulted in peak roll velocities in 
excess of 50 degrees per second, 
with corresponding bank angles 
of over 40 degrees. This risked a 
tail strike during launch. As the 
20 AFFTC report TR-60-33, p. 8. 
2 Gene J. Matranga, unpublished NASA technical report, “Launch Characteristics of the X-5 Research Airplane 
as Determined in Flight,” undated but sometime in May 960. In the AFFTC Access to Space Office Project Files; 
North American report NA-67-3, “Technical Proposal for a Conceptual Design Study for the Modification of an 
X-5 Air Vehicle to a Hypersonic Delta-Wing Configuration,” 7 May 967, vol. I, pp. 39-0. In the files at the JSC 
History Office.
22 Matranga, “Launch Characteristics of the X-5 Research Airplane as Determined in Flight.” 
The most obvious modification was a large pylon under 
the right wing to carry the X-15. This was in contrast 
to all earlier X-planes, which had been carried partial-
ly submerged in the bomb bay of  the carrier aircraft, 
something that was not possible given the B-52 configu-
ration. The pylon worked satisfactorily and allowed the 
NB-52s to carry other research airplanes, such as the 
lifting bodies, later in their careers. (NASA)
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X-15 cleared the NB-52 flow field, it tended to roll left, so the damper and/or 
pilot had to be prepared to correct this sudden opposite movement. It took ap-
proximately 0.8 second for the X-15 to drop 10 feet below the NB-52.123 
     The first few seconds were quite a ride, at least during the first time for each 
pilot.  However, it quickly became routine. Bob White described it as “what might 
be expected and, after the very first experience, is of no concern to the pilot as 
normal 1.0-g flight is regained within 2 seconds. The rolloff at launch stops as the 
X-15 emerges from the B-52 flow field. Since the bank-angle change is small, it is 
easily and quickly corrected. Launch has been made by using either the center or 
side aerodynamic control stick with equal satisfaction in both cases.”124 
      During initial planning, the engineers set the X-15 launch parameters at 
Mach 0.78 and 38,000 feet. However, before the first flight, North American decid-
ed to raise the launch altitude to 40,000 feet to provide additional performance and 
increased safety margins. During early launches from 40,000 feet, the X-15 gener-
ally needed about 3,000 feet to recover before beginning its climb. After the first 
23 Matranga, “Launch Characteristics of the X-5 Research Airplane as Determined in Flight.” The engineers talked 
in terms of aileron input even though the X-5 used a rolling tail instead of conventional ailerons; it was largely 
indistinguishable to the airplane.
2 White et al., “Résumé of X-5 Handling Qualities,” pp. 3-6.
Another modification to the two NB-52s was a notch in the right wing to accommodate the X-15 
vertical stabilizer. Because there was only 2 feet of  clearance between the X-15 dorsal stabilizer and 
the cutout in the NB-52 wing , the X-15 could potentially strike the cutout if  the X-15 bank angle 
exceeded 20 degrees before the airplane dropped below the NB-52 fuselage level (about 2.5 feet verti-
cally). Fortunately, this was never an issue during the flight program. (U.S. Air Force)
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Although simplistic by modern standards, preparation of  the X-15 for flight was still a complicated 
procedure involving many people and pieces of  ground- support equipment. These drawings show the 
relative placement of  tank trucks and other equipment during the loading of  liquid oxygen and anhy-
drous ammonia prior to flight. (NASA)
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few flights, researchers decided to increase the launch parameters yet again, this 
time to Mach 0.80 and 45,000 feet, just below the previously determined buffet 
boundary for the NB-52/X-15 combination. Interestingly, when researchers raised 
the launch altitude to 45,000 feet, the research airplane needed between 4,000 and 
9,000 feet to recover, negating much of the value of the higher launch altitude.125 
 In June 1960 the Air Force installed an AN/APN-41 radar transponder in the 
NB-52A that allowed the High Range to track the carrier aircraft more accurately. 
This beacon was similar to the one installed in the X-15. The problem had been 
that the B-52 fuselage was often located between the X-15 beacon and the radar 
site before launch and acted as an effective shield. Installing a beacon on the B-52 
avoided the problem. A series of test flights that made simulated launches from 
Silver Lake (the NB-52 did not carry the X-15 for the tests) showed that using 
the beacon to position the B-52 resulted in a more accurate launch location than 
had previously been attained. This provided an extra margin of safety should the 
X-15 pilot have to make an emergency landing, and also allowed flight profiles to 
be repeated more accurately, helping post-flight analysis. The NB-52B received 
a similar beacon during July 1960. Flight 1-9-17 on 4 August 1960 was the first 
flight to use the new beacon.126 
 In June 1965 the FRC estimated that the full-up weight of the X-15A-2 with 
a real ramjet and fuel had grown to 56,000 pounds. This was more than 1,000 
pounds greater than the most recent analysis showed the NB-52 wing/pylon could 
safely tolerate. In January and February 1966 the Air Force modified the NB-52A 
to increase the allowable pylon weight to 65,000 pounds, allowing for the heavi-
est expected X-15A-2 flight with some reserve for gusts or other contingencies. 
The modifications consisted primarily of installing doublers and additional fas-
teners on various parts of the wing and pylon structure. Although the modifica-
tions allowed the NB-52 to carry the X-15A-2 safely, performance suffered. For 
instance, the maximum launch altitude was 1,500 feet lower and the maximum 
launch speed was restricted to about Mach 0 .8 when the research airplane carried 
the external tanks and ramjet. The Air force installed the same modifications on 
the NB-52B during its next major maintenance period.127
XB-70
 During the course of the X-15 program, various drawings and artist con-
cepts were released that showed the research airplane–particularly the proposed 
delta-wing version–carried by a North American XB-70 bomber. The use of this 
Mach 3+ capable aircraft would have greatly extended the performance envelope 
of the X-15. However, given the theoretical uncertainties of launching an object 
from the back of a larger aircraft traveling at Mach 3, it is unlikely that the Air 
Force or NASA ever seriously considered this concept. After the fatal crash on 
30 July 1966 of a Lockheed M-21 Blackbird while launching a D-21 drone from 
25 Matranga, “Launch Characteristics of the X-5 Research Airplane as Determined in Flight;” Jordan et al., “Struc-
tural Dynamic Experiences of the X-5,” p. 9.
26 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 29 July 960, pp.  and 5. 
27 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 2 June 965, p. 2; Knight, “Increased 
Piloting Tasks and Performance of X-5A-2 in Hypersonic Flight,” pp. 793-802.
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a similar configuration, it became even more unlikely. Nevertheless, sometime 
during 1966 North American conducted a study (logically called “XB-70/X-15”); 
unfortunately, however, no copy could be found in any archive, so its contents and 
conclusions are unknown .128
CHASE AND SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
 In addition to the NB-52s there were numerous chase and support aircraft, 
mostly provided by the Air Force. The number of chase aircraft differed depending 
on what the flight profile looked like. The program generally used three chase air-
craft on the early low-speed X-15 flights, four on most research flights, and five for 
the very long-range flights. Of course, all things were variable and additional chase 
aircraft were not uncommon, particularly during the middle years of the program.
 Chase-1 was the prelaunch chase, and was usually a North American F-100F 
Super Sabre during the early years and a Northrop T-38A Talon later, although 
NASA used a Douglas F5D Skyray on a couple of occasions. Al White frequently 
flew this chase during the North American flights, but an Air Force pilot gener-
ally flew the airplane once the government took over. Chase-1 took off with the 
NB-52 and flew formation during the climb-out and cruise to the launch lake. The 
chase pilot visually verified various parts of the X-15 checklist, such as control 
28 For more information on the crash of the M-2, see Tony R. Landis and Dennis R. Jenkins, Lockheed Blackbirds, 
WarbirdTech Series Vol. 0, (North Branch, MN: Specialty Press, 200), p. 50-52; various e-mails, Michael J. 
Lombardi, Boeing historian, to Dennis R. Jenkins, May and June 2002 confirming that the report could not be 
located in the Boeing archives. It also could not be located in the DFRC archives, National Archives II, the Air 
Force Historical Research Agency, or any of the major aerospace museums.
The use of  the Mach 3+ capable XB-70A as a carrier aircraft would have greatly extended the performance 
envelope of  the X-15. However, given the theoretical uncertainties of  launching an object from the back of  
a larger aircraft traveling at Mach 3, coupled with the fact that only two Valkyries were manufactured, it is 
unlikely that the Air Force or NASA ever seriously considered this concept. (North American Aviation)
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surface movements, propellant jettison, ballistic system checks, APU start, and 
engine priming. The use of the F-100 presented some problems at the beginning 
of the program because the aircraft could not maintain a low enough speed to fly 
formation with the NB-52 during a right-hand turn; however, the T-38 proved to 
be more satisfactory.
 Chase-2 was the launch chase and provided assistance for the X-15 pilot 
in the event of an emergency landing at the launch lake. Chase-2 was usually a 
Lockheed F-104 Starfighter flown by either another X-15 pilot or a NASA test 
pilot. The F-100 and T-38 could not produce enough drag to fly the steep final ap-
proach used by the X-15, which largely dictated the use of the Starfighter for this 
role. Conversely, the F-104 could not cruise at 45,000 feet due to its high wing 
loading, which made it unsuitable as Chase-1 . Chase-2 normally stayed below 
35,000 feet until 3 minutes before launch, and then went into afterburner and 
climbed to 45,000 feet just before the X-15 dropped. The pilot trailed the NB-52 
during launch and then tried to keep up with the X-15 as it left the launch lake 
area. It was a futile gesture, but it proved useful on the few occasions in which the 
X-15 engine failed soon after ignition. 
 Chase-3 covered landings at the intermediate lakebeds and was usually an 
F-104 flown by either another X-15 pilot or an Air Force test pilot. Unlike Chases 
1 and 2, which took off with the NB-52, Chase-3 waited until 30 minutes before 
X-15 launch to take off so that it would have enough fuel to loiter for a while. On 
flight profiles that had multiple intermediate lakes, Chase-3 would orbit between 
them. In the event the X-15 had to make an emergency landing, the F-104 would 
attempt to join up to provide support for the X-15 pilot during final approach and 
touchdown. For flights out of Smith Ranch there were two intermediate chases, 
usually called 3 and 4 (the Edwards chase became Chase-5 in these cases).
 Chase-4 covered the Edwards landing area, usually with an Air Force pilot. 
Again, only an F-104 could keep up with the X-15 in the landing pattern. This 
chase took off at the same time as Chase-3 and orbited 30-40 miles uprange along 
The Lockheed F-104 Starfighter was used as a chase airplane and to practice landing maneuvers. In 
addition to the F-104Ns owned by NASA, various F-104s from the Air Force Flight Test Center 
were used as needed. (NASA)
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the flight path. The pilot began accelerating on cue from NASA-1 in an attempt 
to intercept the X-15 at the maximum possible speed and altitude as the X-15 
descended into the Edwards area. Usually the chase pilot took his cues from the 
vapor trail left as the X-15 pilot jettisoned his residual propellants, since the re-
search airplane was too small and too dark to acquire visually until the chase pilot 
was right on top of it. Chase-4 would make a visual inspection of the X-15 as it 
descended and provide airspeed and altitude callouts to the X-15 pilot during the 
final approach, in addition to verifying that the ventral had successfully jettisoned 
and the landing gear extended.129 
 At times there were other chase aircraft, with a photo-chase or a “rover” be-
ing the most frequent. The photo-chase filmed the X-15, although Chase-1 was 
frequently a two-seater and carried a photographer in the back seat as well. Rover 
was usually another X-15 pilot who just felt like tagging along. All of the X-15 
pilots flew chase aircraft, as did many AFFTC test pilots, and students and instruc-
tors from the test-pilot schools at Edwards. The chase pilots (particularly other 
X-15 pilots) tended to use first names for themselves and the X-15 pilot during 
radio chatter; alternately, they simply used “chase” (without a number) since there 
was seldom more than one chase aircraft in the vicinity.
 A number of other aircraft provided various support functions. In particular, 
the program used the NASA Gooney Bird (R4D/DC-3) to ferry men and supplies 
to the uprange stations and to inspect the lakebeds as necessary. The Air Force 
used several Lockheed C-130 Hercules turboprops to transport fire engines and 
other material to the lakebeds and High Range stations for each flight. These 
aircraft often made several trips per day carrying men and equipment. During the 
actual flight one of them orbited midway down the flight corridor, usually with 
a flight surgeon and response team in case the X-15 had to make an emergency 
landing. The program took safety very seriously.
 Piasecki H-21 Shawnee helicopters were also shuttled to the primary emer-
gency landing lake in case of an emergency, and additional H-21s were located 
at Edwards. These provided a quick means of moving emergency personnel to an 
29 Letter, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 5 July 2002.
Ferrying men and supplies to the contingency landing sites and High Range stations kept the NASA 
Douglas R4D (C-47/DC-3) Skytrain busy. In addition, the Air Force used Lockheed C-130 Hercu-
les to move fire trucks and other heavy equipment. The C-130s also carried rescue teams during flight 
operations to ensure help would arrive swiftly in the event of  a major accident. (NASA)
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accident scene, surveying the runways, and evacuating the X-15 pilot if neces-
sary. The H-21 pilots also knew how to disperse fumes from a damaged X-15 by 
hovering near the crashed airplane, and they used this technique on at least one 
occasion, probably saving the life of the X-15 pilot.
IMPLICATIONS OF SPUTNIK
 In mid-1955 the Soviet Union and the United States separately announced 
intentions to orbit satellites as part of the 1957 International Geophysical Year. 
Nevertheless, when the Soviet Union launched the first Earth artificial satellite–
Sputnik (later called Sputnik 1)–on 4 October 1957, the event created a stir among 
the popular press. The seeming lack of response by President Dwight D. Eisen-
hower further antagonized the fourth estate and soon the American people as well. 
However, it was the 1,100-pound Sputnik 2 that ultimately caused the administra-
tion to take action, since it graphically portrayed the capability of Soviet launch 
vehicles and, directly, their ICBM program. 
 The Soviet achievements damaged American scientific and technological 
prestige, and the satellite was widely regarded as a threat to national security. 
Robert Gilruth later wrote, “I can recall watching the sunlight reflecting off the 
Sputnik 1 carrier rocket as it passed over my home on the Chesapeake Bay, Virgin-
ia. It put a new sense of value and urgency on the things we had been doing.”130 
 Over a year before, the Air Force had begun Project HYWARDS (Hypersonic 
Weapon and Research & Development Supporting System) to design a successor 
to the X-15 . Researchers considered this round III of the research airplane pro-
gram. Round I had been the X-1 and D-558 series, while round II consisted of the 
X-15. The goal of round III was to design a vehicle capable of achieving at least 
Mach 12 and perhaps as much as Mach 18. HYWARDS is outside the scope of 
this history, but it created an enormous debate between researchers at Ames and 
Langley, and between the NACA and the Air Force. The Air Force soon com-
bined HYWARDS with the remaining work on BoMi/RoBo and other projects 
into the Boeing X-20 Dyna-Soar program. Ultimately, the experimental research 
conducted for HYWARDS and Dyna-Soar, combined with the flight results from 
X-15, formed the technical foundation for the development of a space shuttle.
 Although HYWARDS was the next logical step in the progressive effort to fly 
a man into space, other programs, such as Project 7969, were under way concur-
rently. The organizations that proposed these programs intended then to put a man 
into space as soon as possible, mainly as a publicity ploy, and offered little in the 
way of a long-term solution to space flight. The X-15 figured into some of these 
programs, and at least two proposals for orbital X-15s were made during 1957 and 
1958 (see the “X-15B” section for more details).
30 Robert R. Gilruth, “From Wallops Island to Project Mercury, 95-958: A Memoir,” in History of Rocketry and 
Astronautics, American Astronautical Society History Series, vol. 7, part 2, R. Cargill Hall, editor (San Diego, CA: 
American Astronautical Society, 986), p. 62.
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 In the meantime, the NACA Executive Committee met in its regular annual 
session on 10 October 1957, less than a week after the launch of Sputnik . In-
terestingly, the committee did not discuss the Soviet satellite at any length. But 
the NACA Committee on Aerodynamics met on 18-20 November 1957 aboard 
the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal (CVA-59) and paid a great deal of attention to 
crafting a response to Sputnik. The committee noted that “[t]he big question to 
be answered now is how can these views [on accelerating space research] be put 
across to the NACA and to the Government in order that the NACA be recognized 
as the national research agency in this field, and be provided with the necessary 
funds … the NACA should act now to avoid being ruled out of the field of space 
flight research.” The committee suggested highlighting the hypersonics program 
in general and the X-15 program specifically in order to make that case.131 
 This threw a great deal more attention onto the X-15 program than it was 
ready for. North American was making good progress with its development ef-
fort, but the first airframe was still almost a year away from being completed. 
The XLR99 engine was much further away. Nevertheless, the media–and indeed, 
some within the NACA and military–saw the X-15 as the most promising Amer-
ican response to Sputnik. The North American plant in Inglewood, which was 
clearly visible from the Los Angeles International Airport, soon sported a huge 
“Home of X-15” neon sign and articles began to appear in periodicals ranging 
from popular newsstand magazines to serious industry journals. It was a spotlight 
the X-15 program was ill prepared to handle.132 
 Nevertheless, the publicity probably made some aspects of the X-15 program 
somewhat easier, particularly securing funding at a time when the program was se-
riously over budget. In his essay on the 1961 Collier trophy, W. D. Kay wrote:133 
 
After the launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957, interest in the [X-15] proj-
ect on the part of the military, political leaders, and the public 
at large grew rapidly… media coverage of the first flights was  
the most intense ever seen at Edwards, and even led to some 
public relations mix-ups between NASA and the Air Force. 
Once the first Mercury flights were underway, public attention 
shifted to the events at Cape Canaveral. This might, however, 
have ultimately worked to the [X-15] program’s benefit. A ma-
jor contributor to the X-15’s success over the long run was its 
emphasis on incremental development and its use in highly spe-
cialized scientific and technical research. As experience with 
many later space projects … has shown, the general public tends 
to lose interest in such “routine” undertakings rather quickly. In 
short, it appears the X-15 got a needed boost of public fanfare at 
precisely the right point in its history–the later development and 
early flight test stage–and then became regarded as a low-key 
3 Minutes of the meeting, NACA Committee on Aerodynamics, 8-20 November 957. Quote is on p. 7.
32 Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, p. 287.
33 W. D. Kay, “The X-5 Hypersonic Flight Research Program: Politics and Permutations at NASA,” in From Engi-
neering Science to Big Science: The NACA and NASA Collier Trophy Research Project Winners, edited by Pamela 
E. Mack, NASA publication SP-29 (Washington, DC: NASA, 998), p. 63. 
X-15: EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
effort worthy of only occasional interest just as it was entering 
its less “flashy” research phase. These shifts in external percep-
tion probably could not have been planned any better.
 Scott Crossfield might not completely agree that the program wanted the 
publicity, especially as he spent too many hours in an uncomfortable MC-2 full-
pressure suit in the hot desert sun providing encouragement for the technicians 
working to get the X-15 ready for its first glide flight. Overall, however, events 
probably turned out as well as anybody could have expected.
 There were a variety of proposals (some legitimate, most not) to use the X-15 
to put a man into orbit before the Soviets. However, there was a flaw with all of 
these ideas: the lack of a suitable booster. The ICBMs then under development 
had two significant problems. First, none had the “throw weight” to launch a 
complicated lifting reentry vehicle, be it an X-15 derivative or one of the round III 
concepts under study at Ames, Langley, or Wright Field. Second, the early ICBMs 
did not work very well; they tended to blow up.
Project 7969
 The Air Force initiated Project 7969, the manned ballistic rocket research 
system, in February 1956 with a stated goal of orbiting and recovering a manned 
space capsule. By the end of 1957, a joint Air Force-NACA team had evaluated 
at least 10 serious proposals during a conference held at Wright Field on 29–
31 January 1958. Avco, Convair, Goodyear, Lockheed, Martin, and McDonnell 
proposed spherical reentry vehicles or blunt capsules, while Bell, North Ameri-
can, Republic, and Northrop all proposed winged vehicles.134 
 The North American proposal included a “stripped” X-15 with an empty 
weight of 9,900 pounds. Cape Canaveral would launch the vehicle on a two-stage 
booster that allowed a single orbit with an apogee of 400,000 feet and a perigee of 
250,000 feet . The launch vehicle consisted of four Navaho boosters . Three were 
clustered together in the first stage and one acted as the second stage. The XLR99 
in the X-15 was the third stage. The X-15 would be equipped with beryllium ox-
ide leading edges and a René 41 alloy shingle heat shield, plus a thicker Inconel 
X hot structure. Due to the low perigee and aerodynamics of the X-15, no retro-
rocket was required for reentry. The pilot would eject and descend by parachute 
just before ditching the X-15 in the Gulf of Mexico, with the aircraft being lost. 
North American expected that it could conduct the first manned orbital flight 30 
months after a go-ahead, at a cost of $120 million.135  
3 House Report 228, Project Mercury, First Interim Report, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 2; comments by 
Clotaire Wood, NACA, 26 January 960, on Draft, NIS Meeting at ARDC Headquarters, 9 June 958; memoran-
dum, Maxime A. Faget, NACA Langley, to Hugh L. Dryden, Director, NACA, no subject, 5 June 958; comments 
by Maxime A. Faget on “Outline of History of USAF Man-in-Space R&D Program,” Missiles and Rockets, vol. 0, 
no. 3, 26 March 962, pp. 8-9; Mark Wade, http://www.astronautix.com/craftfam/mercury.htm, accessed 
7 April 2002; Lloyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Greenwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: A History 
of Project Mercury, (Washington, DC: NASA, 966), pp. 77-78.
35 E-mail, Scott Crossfield to Dennis R. Jenkins, 28 June 2002; Mark Wade, http://www.astronautix.com/craft/
x15b.htm, accessed 7 April 2002; “Outline of History of USAF Man-in-Space R&D Program,” pp. 8-9; mem-
orandum, Clarence A. Syvertson to Director, Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, subject: Visit to WADC, Wright-
Patterson AFB, Ohio, to Attend Conference on January 29-3, 958, concerning research problems associated 
with placing a man in a satellite vehicle, Moffett Field, 8 February 958. 
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 Given the early state of development of the X-15, there was almost no real 
engineering associated with this proposal. Nevertheless, it was further along than 
many of the others since researchers already knew that the basic X-15 shape was 
stable in most flight regimes, and both the airframe and XLR99 were at least un-
der active development.
 After the launch of Sputnik 1, Project 7969 was reoriented into the Man In 
Space Soonest (MISS) project to ensure that a U .S . Air Force pilot would be 
the first human in outer space. On 27 February 1958, General Curtiss E. LeMay, 
the Air Force vice chief of staff, was briefed on three alternatives that included 
the X-15 derivative, speeding up the Dyna-Soar program, and building a simple 
non-lifting ballistic capsule that could be boosted into low orbit by an existing 
ICBM-derived booster. LeMay apparently expressed no preference, and although 
it was a long and complicated process, the result was that a ballistic capsule ap-
peared to offer the best hope of immediate success. This idea formed the basis for 
Project Mercury after NASA was formed on 1 October 1958 and the first Ameri-
can manned space effort was transferred to the civilian agency.136
X-15B
 Nevertheless, engineers at North American continued to refine their Project 
7969 concept. A few days after the Soviet Union orbited Sputnik 1 on 4 October 
1957, North American packaged everything into a neat report and Harrison Storms 
took the idea to Washington. This version used two Navaho boosters clustered to-
gether as the 830,000-lbf first stage, a single Navaho booster as the 415,000-lbf 
second stage, and an X-15B powered by a 75,000-lbf Rocketdyne XLR105 Atlas 
sustainer engine as the third stage. Unlike the 7969 proposal, this one had a great 
deal more engineering in it, although it was still very preliminary since North 
American had not conducted wind-tunnel tests or detailed calculations on heating 
or aero loads .137  
 The X-15B was larger than the basic X-15 and was capable of carrying two 
pilots . The Inconel X skin was made thicker to withstand the increased reentry 
heating, and the vehicle had larger propellant tanks to feed the Atlas sustainer 
engine that replaced the XLR99. However, the shape and many of the internal sys-
tems were identical to those of the basic X-15 then under construction. Engineers 
had already demonstrated the supersonic and subsonic stability of the X-15 during 
numerous wind-tunnel tests, and keeping the same shape eliminated the need to 
repeat many of them.
 The flight plan was simple. Eighty seconds after launch from Cape Canaver-
al, the first stage would drop away and the second stage would fire. At an altitude 
of about 400,000 feet, the second stage would burn out and the X-15B would con-
tinue using its own power. The vehicle would eventually get up to 18,000 mph, 
enough for three orbits. The pilot would fire the XLR105 at a point that would 
allow the X-15B to land at Edwards using the reentry profiles already developed 
36 Swenson et al., This New Ocean, pp. 78-8.
37 Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, pp. 280-28. Unfortunately, a copy of the report could not be located, and 
neither Scott Crossfield nor Charlie Feltz had any particular memories of the concept. The X-5B designation was 
rather arbitrarily used by Storms and was not an official Air Force designation.
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for the basic X-15. It was a grand plan, and years ahead of its time. Unfortunately, 
when Storms got back from Washington he reported that “there were exactly 421” 
other people who had competing proposals. Eventually the X-15B just quietly 
faded from sight.138
Becker’s Lament
 Despite the variety of artists’ concepts and popular press articles on an orbital 
X-15, in the end the new National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
would decide to endorse a concept that had been initiated by the Air Force and 
use a small ballistic capsule for the first U.S. manned space program, renamed 
Mercury. Nevertheless, a small minority within NASA, mainly at Langley, 
continued to argue that lifting-reentry vehicles would be far superior to the non- 
lifting capsules. In fact, at the last NACA Conference on High-Speed Aerodynam-
ics in March 1958, John Becker presented a concept for a manned 3,060-pound 
38 Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, pp. 28-282, and 287. The “2” was undoubtedly an exaggeration by Storms 
or Crossfield, but the general sentiment was correct.
In the excitement caused by the Soviet launch of  Sputnik, North American proposed a heavily modi-
fied X-15B as an early orbital vehicle. Although the aerodynamics of  the X-15 were well-understood 
by this time, the X-15B did not have nearly the maneuverability of  the Air Force Dyna-Soar while 
returning from orbit, and in fact, many X-15B proposals had the pilot ejecting over water instead of  
attempting to land. (North American Aviation)
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winged orbital satellite. According to Becker, this paper, which dissented from the 
consensus within the NACA favoring a ballistic capsule, created more industry 
reaction–“almost all of it favorable”–than any other he had ever written, including 
the initial X-15 study.139 
 What ruled out acceptance of his proposal, even more than the sheer momen-
tum behind the capsules, was the fact that the 1,000 pounds of extra weight (com-
pared to the capsule design presented by Max Faget) was beyond the capability of 
the Atlas ICBM. If the Titan had been further along, Becker’s concept would have 
worked, but the simple fact was that Atlas was the only game in town. If it had all 
happened a year or two later, when the Titan became available, Becker believes 
that “the first U.S. manned satellite might well have been a [one-man] landable 
winged vehicle.” The decision to adopt the capsule concept made the X-15 a dead 
end, at least temporarily. It would be a decade later when the aerospace commu-
nity again decided that a winged lifting-reentry vehicle was feasible; the result 
would be the space shuttle .
 There was one other orbital X-15 proposal . At the end of 1959, Harrison 
Storms presented a version of the X-15B launched using a Saturn I first stage 
and an “ICBM-type” second stage. According to Storms, “We figure the X-15, 
carrying two pilots…could be put into orbit hundreds of miles above the earth. 
Or with a scientific or military payload of thousands of pounds…into a lower 
orbit.” Storms estimated that it would take three to four years of development and 
presented the idea to both the Air Force and NASA, but neither organization was 
interested. NASA was too busy with Mercury, and the Air Force was occupied 
with Dyna-Soar and fighting off Robert McNamara.140
MORE X-15S?
 During the development of the X-15, many wanted to expand the program be-
yond the three airplanes covered under the original agreements. This opinion obvi-
ously did not prevail, but the proposals are nonetheless of passing interest. Early 
on, North American suggested using X-15 as part of an extensive training program 
for astronauts and test pilots, believing that such a program could familiarize pilots 
with rocket-powered aircraft, the use of reaction controls, and the physiological 
sensations of space flight. The Air Force did not express any particular interest.141 
 Early in 1958, researchers at the HSFS wanted to procure one additional X-15 
for flight-control research, but NACA Headquarters did not concur. It was the first 
of several such proposals .142  
39 James R. Hansen, Engineer in Charge: A History of the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory–1917-1958, NASA 
publication SP-305 (Washington, DC: NASA, 987), pp. 377-38. Becker quote from p. 38. The subject was 
confirmed in a telephone conversation, John V. Becker with Dennis R. Jenkins, 7 June 200.
0 Ibid, pp. 37-375.
 Letter, John W. Crowley, Associate Director for Research, NACA/Washington, to HSFS, 28 February 958, sub-
ject: Flight control research for hypersonic airplanes. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
2 Ibid.
X-15: EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
 In mid-1958 the first serious proposal to expand the X-15 program came when 
Air Force Headquarters asked the ARDC if there was any merit to expanding the 
X-15 program. On 8 April 1958, headquarters requested recommendations for “con-
figuration changes, estimated costs, aircraft availability, the increased performance 
expected, the test results to be obtained, and a brief substantiation of their value.” 
Headquarters wanted the results of the study at an early date because it needed to 
make a decision before North American disbanded the engineering team.143  
 The X-15 Project Office asked the AFFTC, North American, and WADC for 
recommendations. By 29 April, these organizations concluded that the best ap-
proach would be to improve performance using new structural materials and an im-
proved rocket engine instead of the XLR99. The development difficulties with the 
XLR99 apparently influenced the call for a new engine, although the WADC sug-
gested that any new engine should “be obtained as a result of across the board BMD 
[Ballistic Missile Division] and other efforts, and not as a sole X-15 effort.”144  
 The Navy verbally concurred with expanding the program on 19 May, and the 
NACA agreed a day later. On 13 June the X-15 Project Office recommended to 
the ARDC that three additional airplanes be constructed using higher-temperature 
structural materials than those used in the original design. The ARDC forwarded 
this recommendation to Air Force Headquarters on 16 June.145  
 Apparently, the seeming urgency in the 8 April letter from headquarters had 
evaporated. On 18 November 1958, Major General Marvin C. Demler, director of 
research and development at Air Force Headquarters, finally informed the ARDC 
that the X-15 program would not be expanded. In the interim, the Research Air-
plane Committee had met on 31 October and Hugh Dryden concluded the three 
original airplanes were adequate for NASA’s purposes. Ultimately, the Research 
Airplane Committee recommended against procuring additional airplanes.146  
 There was, however, another fleeting prospect. After an explosion seriously 
damaged the X-15-3 during an XLR99 ground test, the X-15 Project Office had to 
solicit additional funds from the Pentagon to rebuild the aircraft. This prompted a 
renewed interest in the X-15 and the data it might deliver for future use in the Air 
Force space program. On 12 August 1960, Air Force Headquarters ordered a com-
plete review of the X-15 program. The X-15 Project Office presented its results 
at the 17-18 October 1960 X-15 program review. The briefing identified original 
program objectives that were no longer valid, new objectives to consider, continu-
ing objectives, and funding requirements. Surprisingly, the general officers who 
were briefed agreed that the X-15 promised to be considerably more important to 
the Air Force space effort than had been foreseen when the program was initially 
conceived in 1954, or when the program expansion was rejected in late 1958. The 
Pentagon advised the ARDC that it would “entertain” proposals for additional 
X-15s to be operated exclusively by the Air Force. 
 As part of the ongoing discussion, the AFFTC put together its own recom-
mendation for the program. On 26 October 1960 the AFFTC released a report 
3 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 23 April 958. 
 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 2 May 958. 
5 X-5 WSPO Weekly Activity Report, 8 June 958. 
6 Letter, Major General Marvin C. Demler, Director of Research and Development, USAF, to Commander, ARDC, 8 No-
vember 958, subject: Further Development of X-5 Aircraft. In the files at the Air Force Historical Research Agency.
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that called for three additional X-15s and one more NB-52 “to carry out R&D 
objectives not presently covered by the present NASA-AF-Navy X-15 program.” 
The AFFTC expected to “own and operate” these aircraft. Based on a 1 January 
1961 start, the AFFTC expected the first aircraft to be delivered (along with a 
third NB-52) in September 1961, with the others following in March and June 
1962. The flight program was to average 60 flights per year through December 
1965. Some of the research objectives for the new aircraft included flight con-
trol and guidance, aero-thermo-elasticity, supersonic boundary-layer turbulence, 
sonic fatigue, landing-impact data, and electromagnetic propagation. The AFFTC 
expected that it would need an additional 330 people to support the X-15, plus 37 
more to operate the High Range during AFFTC flights.147  
 Another proposal, originating from Brigadier General Donald R. Flickinger 
at ARDC Headquarters, was for a two-place biomedical research version of 
the airplane .148  
 The Air Force called a meeting at Wright Field on 14 November that brought 
together representatives from the ARDC, the WADC,149  the command and con-
trol division of the Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories, and the Army 
Corps of Engineers.150  It was immediately apparent to the X-15 Project Office 
that if all of the stated requirements for X-15-type aircraft were to be satisfied, 
“several additional X-15s will be required.” Two weeks earlier the government 
had notified North American of the meeting, and Charlie Feltz prepared a briefing 
outlining several advanced X-15 configurations. Feltz presented his briefing on 
the afternoon of 14 November and provoked further interest in a comprehensive 
extension program.151 
 Although a two-seat X-15 engineering study had been required in the original 
proposals, the government had not taken any action on the idea. Nevertheless, it 
loomed in the background during much of the early X-15 program. The variant 
shown during the November 1960 meeting differed somewhat from the one origi-
nally proposed. North American optimized this version for “space training and 
biomedical research.” Instead of simply deleting the research instrumentation and 
extending the canopy over the second cockpit, the new configuration extended the 
fuselage by approximately 14 inches and added a second cockpit with a separate 
canopy. The company deleted the aero-thermo research equipment, but the exten-
sion provided space for a variety biomedical equipment.152 
 North American environmentally separated the second cockpit from the 
primary cockpit so that it could study alternate atmospheres (i.e., not nitrogen-
7 Memorandum, Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. Russell (interestingly, Russell was the director of the AFFTC Dyna-
Soar Test Force), subject: Additional X-5 Aircraft Assigned to AFFTC, 26 October 960. In the files at the AFFTC 
History Office.
8 Letter, USAF Headquarters to ARDC Headquarters, subject: X-5 Development Plan, 3 November 960; “Ad-
vanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” 7 November 96, 
p. 2. In the files at the AFFTC History Office; Geiger et al., “History of the Wright Air Development Division: July 
960-March 96,” pp. I-0 to I-2. 
9 By this time, this was technically the Wright Air Development Division (WADD), not the WADC.
50 Exactly what the Army Corps of Engineers was doing there could not be ascertained. The Cambridge Research 
Laboratories are now the Electronic Systems Center at Hanscom AFB, MA.
5 Geiger et al., “History of the Wright Air Development Division: July 960-March 96,” pp. I-0 to I-2; Charles 
H. Feltz, North American report NA-60-, “X-5 Research Capability,”  November 960, no page numbers. In 
the files at the USAF Test Pilot School, Edwards AFB.
52 North American report NA-60-. 
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purged). A separate set of dummy controls could be installed that would allow the 
second pilot to react independently from the pilot flying the aircraft. His responses 
would be recorded and reconstructed on the ground to evaluate performance un-
der acceleration and weightless conditions. It was expected that flight profiles 
could be developed that would allow five minutes under essentially weightless 
conditions during flights to altitudes in excess of 500,000 feet. The change added 
354 pounds to the aircraft, but the use of an uprated XLR99 would have increased 
performance by 120 fps.153 
 The meetings resulted in NASA rearranging the existing X-15 program slight-
ly to accommodate the Air Force research priorities, and relegating excess work 
to the new research extension program. The product was a revised System 605A 
plan released on 1 February 1961. Essentially, the X-15 Project Office request-
ed approval for the construction of two additional aircraft, both of them slightly 
stretched two-seat versions similar to one proposed by Charlie Feltz in November. 
For the moment, the question of additional single-seat aircraft or advanced mod-
els was not considered pressing and was deferred. The two-seat aircraft would 
satisfy the need for biomedical research and training of future aerospace research 
pilots and Dyna-Soar astronauts.154 
 The idea was short-lived . On 20 March 1961, Major General Marcus F . 
Cooper, chief of research and engineering at ARDC Headquarters, disapproved 
the development plan. Cooper instructed the X-15 Project Office to revise the 
existing (October 1960) development plan to reflect funding changes proposed 
by the Pentagon. Nevertheless, in one paragraph Cooper instructed Wright Field 
to “give consideration to the election of the best type of vehicle to use in training 
future Aerospace Research Pilots.… The possibility of using the existing X-15s 
for this purpose after completion of the test program should be explored. In ad-
dition the need for additional X-15 aircraft or other vehicles, such as Dyna-Soar, 
for this purpose should be considered.” The concept could potentially require 
additional X-15s .155 
 Although this kept hopes alive for an expanded X-15 program, it essentially 
buried the two-seat X-15. As Cooper explained, funding shortages for FY61 and 
FY62 would prevent “the additional heavy funding required in those years to sup-
port the proposed additional X-15 aircraft.” It had also become apparent that the 
existing X-15s, with some additional equipment and telemetry installations, could 
acquire the majority of the desired biomedical data at far less cost. The X-15 Proj-
ect Office had also begun to worry that stretching the X-15 fuselage might involve 
more engineering and development work than anticipated, although the subsequent 
development of X-15A-2 proved this concern to be unfounded.156 
 The ARDC Commanders Program Management Review in March 1961 
tasked the X-15 Project Office to review “identified problem areas which might 
53 North American report NA-60-.
5 Geiger et al., “History of the Wright Air Development Division: July 960-March 96,” pp. I-2 to I-3. 
55 Letter, Major General Marcus F. Cooper, DCS/R&E, ARDC, to Director, Systems Management, WADD, subject: 
Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, System 605A, 20 February, 96. The letter was dated 
20 February, but the RDRA Endorsement was dated 20 March, marking the actual disapproval.
56 Letter, Major General Marcus F. Cooper, DCS/R&E, ARDC, to Director, Systems Management, WADD, subject: 
Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, System 605A, 20 February, 96; Geiger, “History of the 
Wright Air Development Division: July 960-March 96,” pp. I-2 to I-3. 
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require investigation by X-15 type aircraft with particular attention given to the 
relationship between the problem areas and presently authorized advanced aero-
space programs and studies.” The response indicated that two additional single-
place X-15s would be useful for investigating a variety of Air Force-specific areas 
of interest. The ARDC rejected this recommendation on 2 August 1961, and all 
thoughts of additional X-15s seemed to fade.157
COST OVERRUNS
 Not surprisingly by today’s standards, the original cost estimates for the X-15 
and the XLR99 had been hopelessly optimistic. The first Air Force estimate for 
development and two airplanes totaled only $12,200,000. By the time the Air 
Force issued the letter contracts, the estimates stood at $38,742,500 for the air-
frame, $9,961,000 for the engine, and $1,360,000 for the High Range. 
 By the time the government and North American signed the final contract, 
the total cost had already risen to $40,263,709 plus $2,617,075 in fee. This 
had increased to $64,021,146 by the beginning of 1959. During the next six 
months, the estimates increased first to $67,540,178, then to $68,657,644, and 
by 1 June to $74,500,000–almost double the letter contract amount. The three 
airframes ended up costing $23.5 million; the rest represented research and devel-
opment expenses.158  
 The engine was worse. In 1955 the Air Force estimated the engine costs would 
ultimately be about $6,000,000. The letter contract was for $9,961,000, and by the 
time the Air Force and Reaction Motors signed the final engine contract this had 
risen to $10,160,030, plus an additional $614,000 fee. At the end of FY58, the 
amount was over $38,000,000, and FY59 brought the total to $59,323,000. The 
cost for FY60 alone was $9,050,000. As of June 1959, the engine costs were 
$68,373,000–over five times the 1955 estimate for the entire program and almost 
a sevenfold increase over the initial Reaction Motors contract value . Each of the 
10 “production” engines cost just over $1 million.159  
 While it was not nearly as bad as the engine, the stable platform ran sig-
nificantly over budget as well. The original contract price was $1,213,518 plus 
an $85,000 fee. By May 1958, the cost had increased to $2,498,518 and a year 
later was at $3,234,188 plus $119,888 in fee. The auxiliary power units cost $2.7 
 
57 Letter, X-5 Project office to ARDC Headquarters, subject: Procurement of two additional X-5 aircraft, 26 May 
96; letter, AFSC Headquarters to X-5 Project Office, subject: Procurement of two additional X-5 aircraft, 2 
August 96.
58 Cost projections, Contract AF33(600)-3693, prepared quarterly by North American Aviation Department of Pric-
ing, 955-59. In the files at the Boeing Archives; interview, Captain Chester E. McCollough, Jr., Assistant Chief, 
X-5 WSPO, Director of Systems Management, ARDC, 2 June 959, by Robert S. Houston, History Branch, 
WADC. Written transcript in the files at the AFMC History Office; James E. Love and William R. Young, NASA 
technical note D-3732, 0 August 966, p. 6.
59 Interview, Captain Chester E. McCollough, Jr., Assistant Chief, X-5 WSPO, Director of Systems Management, 
ARDC, 2 June 959, by Robert S. Houston, History Branch, WADC. Written transcript in the files at the AFMC 
History Office; NASA technical note D-3732, p. 6.
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million, the ball nose another $600,000, the MH-96 adaptive control system $2.3 
million, and the David Clark full-pressure suits more than $150,000.160 
 During the first five years of development, the government spent $121.5 
million on the X-15 program, not including laboratory and wind-tunnel testing 
at Wright Field, the Arnold Engineering Development Center, NADC Johns-
ville, and the various NACA/NASA laboratories. The funding was broken down 
as follows: 161
FY56 FY57 FY58 FY59 FY60 Total
Air Force 8 .8 18 .3 39 .1 36 .3 13 .6 116 .1
Navy 0 .5 1 .8 2 .1 1 .0 0 .0 5 .4
Total 9.3 20.1 41.2 37.3 13.6 121.5
 Together with approximately $11,500,000 for the High Range, it was obvi-
ous that the cost of the X-15 project was going to exceed $150,000,000 before 
the flight program got underway. When the original development and manufac-
turing contracts were closed out in FY63 (replaced by sustaining engineering and 
support contracts), the total came to $162.8 million. By the time it was all over in 
1968, the total would almost double when all operational costs and modifications 
were included. Most published comparisons use the final program cost of 
approximately $300 million, but this is an unfair comparison to the original 
$12.2 million because the scope was extremely different.162 
 
60 James E. Love and William R. Young, “Operational Experience of the X-5 Airplane as a Reusable Vehicle Sys-
tem,” a paper presented at the SAE Second Annual Space Technology Conference, Palo Alto, CA, 9- May 
967, p. 3; NASA technical note D-3732, p. 6. The cost of the MH-96 was just that portion charged to the X-5 
program; other parts were paid for by the Dyna-Soar program.
6 [signed W.T.G.] “X-5: The World’s Fastest and Highest-Flying Aeroplane,” Flight, 8 May 959.
62 Love and Young, “Operational Experience of the X-5 Airplane as a Reusable Vehicle System,” p. 3; NASA techni-
cal note D-3732, p. 6. The cost of the MH-96 was just that portion charged to the X-5 program; other parts were 
paid for by the Dyna-Soar program. The original $2.2 million included a flight program to achieve “a few” flights 
at the design speed and altitude, not the extensive experimental research program that was actually flown. To 
compare apples to apples, it would probably be fair to compare this with the $62.8 million expended up through 
FY63–still a huge overrun by any standard.

The Flight Program
By January 1958, everything had moved into high gear and North Ameri-
can was assembling the three model NA-240 airplanes at its facility in Inglewood, 
adjacent to the Los Angeles International Airport. The company had released over 
6,000 engineering drawings–including one that was 50 feet long–by the end of 
1957, although it continued to make minor changes to the configuration. North 
American subcontracted about 200 items to various vendors, but manufactured 
the majority of the airplane on the premises.1 
ROLLOUT
 On 15 October 1958, North American rolled out the first X-15 (56-6670) in 
Inglewood to great pomp and circumstance. It was ironic, in a way. The NACA 
had given birth to a concept and had nurtured the X-15 for over four years, but two 
weeks earlier the committee itself had ceased to exist. In its place, the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created effective 1 October 
 Scott Crossfield, Always Another Dawn: The Story of a Rocket Test Pilot (New York: The World Publishing Com-
pany, 960), p. 289.
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1958. The X-15 had been the largest development program at the NACA; it would 
soon be one of the smallest at a moon-destined NASA.
 The master of ceremonies at the rollout was Raymond H. Rice, vice president 
and general manager of the Los Angeles division of North American Aviation. 
The keynote speakers included Major General Victor R. Haugen, deputy com-
mander of the ARDC; Brigadier General Marcus F. Cooper, commander of the 
AFFTC; Walt Williams, chief of the HSFS; and Harrison Storms, chief engineer 
for the Los Angeles division. Also in attendance were six future X-15 pilots: Neil 
A. Armstrong, A . Scott Crossfield, John B. McKay, Captain Robert A . Rushworth, 
Joseph A . Walker, and Captain Robert M . White .2 
 Congressmen and senators sat in the grandstands and Vice President Richard 
M. Nixon was on hand to proclaim that the X-15 had “recaptured the U.S. lead in 
space.” There were special exhibits featuring a David Clark full-pressure suit and 
a mockup of the Reaction Motors XLR99 engine. Guests could sit in the X-15 
fixed-base simulator, and attend a gala luncheon where everybody praised the 
efforts of all involved. For the X-15 team it was a moving occasion and a much-
needed respite from the years of hard work.3 
 Bob White, the man who felled every Mach number and altitude milestone in 
the X-15, later remembered eloquently, “The X-15 … was in the public eye from 
its inception and grew almost asymptotically from the day of its manufacture. 
Witness the presence of the vice president of the United States at the X-15 rollout 
ceremony. The X-15 was not controversial; it was audacious. It literally vibrated 
the imagination that this aircraft would double the fastest speed by more than 
three whole Mach numbers and … fly out of the atmosphere, into space, and back 
again to an on-Earth landing. The X-15 did these things and many more ….”4  
2 Raymond H. Rice, “The X-5 Rollout Symposium,” 5 October 958. Released statements in the files of the 
AFFTC History Office.
3 Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, pp. 303-30. The Nixon quote is as Crossfield remembered it on page 303.
 “The Pilot’s Panel,” a paper in the Proceedings of the X-15 30th Anniversary Celebration, Dryden Flight Research 
Facility, Edwards, CA, 8 June 989, NASA CP-305, p. 5.
X-15-1 was presented during the roll-out ceremony. The air-data boom on the nose would be used until 
the ball nose was ready. The bug-eye camera ports located behind the canopy and under the fuselage in 
the center-of-gravity compartment would provide some breathtaking views of  the early flights courtesy of  
National Geographic. (North American Aviation).
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 The space race had already begun, and the United States was eager to show 
any progress toward besting the Soviet accomplishments. Newspapers, maga-
zines, and newsreels all heralded the X-15 as the American entry in the space race . 
Considering that only four years earlier researchers had wanted to remove the 
“space leap” from the X-15 concept, it was ironic that many now portrayed this 
small black airplane as America’s response to the Soviet threat. It may have been 
small, but it had not come cheaply. Despite the original $12,200,000 estimate 
prepared by the WADC in 1954, at the time of the rollout Major General Haugen 
estimated that the government had spent nearly $120 million–and the airplane had 
not yet flown.5 
 Haugen also pointed out that the X-15 rollout was taking place two weeks 
ahead of the schedule established in June 1956, calling this “a tribute to all of the 
government and industry team.” The general then summed up the spirit of the pro-
gram: “It has been said that there are two extremes to research or exploratory fly-
ing–the approach that, for example, would strap a man on an ICBM and see what 
happens, and the super safe approach that would have us take tiny steps into the 
unknown and be absolutely sure of each step. We believe the solution is neither of 
these but rather a bold step into the future within the known technical capabilities 
of our engineers. We believe that the X-15 represents such a bold step … that will 
help us build better air and space vehicles in the future.”6 
 Perhaps because his base would host the flight testing, Brigadier General 
Cooper was a little more cautious in his remarks: “I wish to point out here that 
this research program will be one of long duration, and the type of flights which 
5 Cost estimate from Victor R. Haugen, “The X-5 Rollout Symposium,” 5 October 958. Released statements in 
the files of the AFFTC History Office. Ironically, as a colonel, Haugen was the director of the WADC laboratories 
when the NACA proposal that eventually became the X-5 was evaluated, and he concurred with the original 
$2,200,000 estimate for the project.
6 Major General Victor R. Haugen, “The X-5 Rollout Symposium,” 5 October 958. Released statements in the 
files of the AFFTC History Office.
Given the recent successes of  the Soviets with Sputnik, the rollout of  the X-15 was considered suf-
ficiently important for the vice president of  the United States to show up. Richard M. Nixon presided 
over the ceremonies along with distinguished speakers from the Air Force and the state of  California. 
(North American Aviation)
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excite the imagination and make newspaper headlines are many, many months 
away.” However, the general could not resist riding the space bandwagon, at least 
a little, by calling the program “the first major breakthrough in sustained piloted 
space flight.”7 
 Not to be outdone, Stormy Storms was even more direct: “The rollout of the 
X-15 marks the beginning of man’s most advanced assault on space. This will be 
one of the most dramatic, as in the X-15 we have all the elements and most of the 
problems of a true space vehicle.” Describing the potential performance of the 
airplane, Storms said, “The performance of the X-15 is hard to comprehend. It can 
out fly the fastest fighters by a factor of three, a high-speed rifle bullet by a factor 
of two, and easily exceed the world altitude record by many times.”8  
 Following the conclusion of the official ceremonies, North American moved 
the first X-15 back inside and prepared it for delivery. On the night of 16 October, 
covered completely in heavy-duty wrapping paper, X-15-1 traveled overland by 
truck through the Los Angeles foothills to Edwards for initial ground-test work.
FLIGHT PROGRAM OVERVIEW
 The primary objective of the flight program was to explore the hypersonic 
flight regime and compare the results against various analytical models and wind-
tunnel results. The physical X-15 configuration was of only passing interest and 
was not an attempt to define what any future operational aircraft might look like; 
it was simply a means to obtain the necessary thermal environment and dynamic 
pressures. The researchers wanted to understand heating rates, stagnation points, 
laminar and turbulent flow characteristics, and stability and control issues. Later, 
the X-15 would become a carrier for various experiments, and the airplane con-
figuration would be of even less interest.
 During the 10 years of operations, five major aircraft were involved in the 
X-15 flight program. The three X-15s were designated X-15-1 (Air Force se-
rial number 56-6670), X-15-2 (56-6671), and X-15-3 (56-6672) . The second air-
plane became X-15A-2 after North American extensively modified it following 
an accident midway through the flight program. The two carrier aircraft were an 
NB-52A (52-003) and an NB-52B (52-008); although not identical, they were 
essentially interchangeable.9  
 The program used a three-part designation for each flight. The first number 
represented the specific X-15 (“1” was for X-15-1, etc .) . There was no differentia-
7 Brigadier General Marcus F. Cooper, “The X-5 Rollout Symposium,” 5 October 958. Released statements in 
the files of the AFFTC History Office.
8 Harrison Storms, “The X-5 Rollout Symposium,” 5 October 958. Released statements in the files of the AFFTC 
History Office.
9 Contrary to many sources, the basic X-5s never carried an “A” suffix (i.e, they were “X-5” not “X-5A”). During 
the 950s it was not unusual for the first development model of an aircraft to not carry a suffix (e.g., YF-02, 
YF-05, etc.). The “A” was applied to the first major modification of the design (in this case the rebuilt X-5A-2). 
It should also be noted that according to the DoD designation system, the number after the designation was 
normally reserved for a “production block” number that was used to track minor changes on the production line. 
In the case of the X-5, that was not strictly true, and each airplane was simply numbered sequentially.
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tion between the original X-15-2 and the modified X-15A-2. The second position 
was the flight number for that specific X-15 (this included free flights only, not 
captive carries or aborts); the first flight was 1, the second was 2, etc. If the flight 
was a scheduled captive carry, the second position in the designation was a C; if 
it was an aborted free-flight attempt, it was an A. The third position was the total 
number of times that either NB-52 had carried aloft that particular X-15, includ-
ing captive carries, aborts, and actual releases. A letter from Paul Bikle estab-
lished this system on 24 May 1960 and retroactively redesignated the 30 flights 
that had already been accomplished.10 
FLIGHT DESCRIPTION
 X-15 flights did not begin with a pilot waking up and deciding he wanted to 
fly that day. Weeks or months before, a researcher would develop requirements for 
data gathered under specific conditions. One of the flight planners (Johnny Arm-
strong, Dick Day, Bob Hoey, Jack Kolf, or John Manke, among others) would 
take these requirements and lay out a flight plan that defined the entire mission. 
The term “flight planner” does not begin to describe the expertise of the engineers 
who performed this function. These engineers lived in the simulator and were ex-
perts on the airplane. They determined the thrust settings, climb angles, pushover 
times, and data-gathering maneuvers; they also evaluated stability and control 
issues and heating concerns. In addition to laying out specific flights, the flight 
planners performed parametric studies that were not related to a particular flight 
or pilot training. Some of these included glide performance, peak altitude versus 
pitch angle, speed-optimization techniques, and reentry trades involving dynamic 
pressure, load factors, angle of attack, and temperatures.11 
 The flight planners would then present their plan to the pilot selected for 
the flight. The flight planners and the pilot would spend the next week or month, 
depending on the complexity of the mission, in the simulator choreographing 
every second of the flight. After extensive practice with the nominal mission, 
the pilot flew off-design missions to acquaint himself with the overall effect of 
changes in critical parameters, including variations in engine thrust or engine shut- 
down times.12  
 At this point, the primary ground controller (called “NASA-1”) joined the 
flight planners and pilot for additional simulations so that they could all become 
familiar with the general timing of the flight. After practicing the off-design mis-
sions, the team evaluated various anomalous situations, including failures of the 
0 Memorandum, Paul F. Bikle to NASA Headquarters (RSS/Mr. H. Brown), subject: X-5 flight designation, 2 May 
960. In the files at the DFRC History Office. The 30 flights included 3 carries of X-5- that had resulted in eight 
free flights, and 7 carries of X-5-2 that also had resulted in eight free flights.
 Letter, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 5 July 2002; letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 
August 2002.
2 Letter, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 5 July 2002; Robert G. Hoey and Richard E. Day, “X-5 Mis-
sion Planning and Operational Procedures,” a paper in the 1961 Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 58-
59. (This paper was later published as NASA technical note D-59, March 962.)
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engine, stable platform, ball nose, radio and dampers, and variations in the stabil-
ity derivatives. For instance, the flight planners would insert simulated premature 
engine shutdowns at critical points to acquaint the pilot with the optimum tech-
niques for returning to the lake behind him or flying to an alternate lake ahead of 
him. Normally the failure of the velocity or altitude instrument would not affect 
a flight; however, in the event of an attitude presentation failure during the exit 
phase of an altitude mission, the pilot had to initiate an immediate pushover from 
about 30 degrees pitch attitude to 18 degrees so that he could visually acquire the 
horizon. Failures of the ball nose were usually not terminal since the pilot could 
still fly the mission using normal acceleration, attitudes, and stabilizer-position 
indications, but the results were not as precise. Radio failure meant the pilot had 
to be self-sufficient–an undesirable situation, but not a tremendous problem for 
most test pilots.13 
 A simple flight would encompass 15–20 hours of simulator time, and a com-
plex mission could easily double that. Given that each flight was only 8–10 min-
utes long, this represented a lot of training. By far, these were the most extensive 
mission simulations attempted during the X-plane program, and would point the 
way to how the manned space program would proceed. Although the drill at times 
seemed tedious and time-consuming to all involved, it undoubtedly played a ma-
jor role in the overall safety and success of what was unquestionably a potentially 
dangerous undertaking. All of the pilots praised the flight planners and the simu-
lators, and nobody believes the program would have succeeded nearly as well 
without it. Milt Thompson later observed, “[W]e were able to avoid many pitfalls 
because of the simulation. It really paid off. I personally do not believe that we 
could have successfully flown the aircraft without a simulation, particularly in 
regard to energy management.” Simulation and mission planning are some of the 
enduring legacies of the X-15 program.14 
FLIGHT DAY
 X-15 flights generally began early in the morning; indeed, most flight-testing 
at Edwards began early in the morning when the temperatures and winds in the 
high desert were lower. The ground crew had mated the X-15 to the NB-52 the 
day before and stayed all night or arrived early to prepare the airplane for the 
flight. Floodlights lit the scene as propellants and gases were loaded onto both 
the carrier aircraft and research airplane, and liquid-oxygen vapor drifted around 
the area, lending a surreal fog. When the X-15 pilot arrived, he generally went 
straight to the physiological support van to get into the David Clark full-pres-
sure suit. Getting the suit on and hooking up the biomedical instrumentation took 
 
3 Hoey and Day, “X-5 Mission Planning and Operational Procedures,” pp. 59-60; letter, Robert G. Hoey to 
Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 August 2002.
 Thompson, At the Edge of Space, p. 70.
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about 15 minutes once the program switched to the A/P22S-2 suits; the MC-2 
suits had taken considerably longer.15 
 When the ground crew was ready for the pilot to enter the cockpit, two tech-
nicians carried a portable cooling system and other equipment while they escorted 
the pilot from the van to the airplane–a scene vaguely similar to Cape Canaveral 
before a space flight. Oddly, the driver of the physiological support van in which 
the pilot donned the pressure suit made no particular effort to park near the X-15, 
forcing the pilot to walk across the ramp. A large ladder and platform were located 
alongside the X-15 to allow the pilot and his handlers easy access to the cockpit. 
The cockpit itself was large for a single-seat airplane, but the bulk of the pressure 
suit made it seem somewhat smaller. Nevertheless, most pilots found it had more 
than adequate room and some of the smaller pilots even had difficulty reaching 
all of the controls mounted far forward, since the seat was not adjustable. Once 
the pilot was in the cockpit, the ground crew hooked up a myriad of lines, hoses, 
and straps that provided life support and monitored the pilot’s biomedical data. 
While this was happening, the pilot began going through the preflight checklist to 
verify the status of all the aircraft systems. Once this was completed (usually a 30-
minute process), the ground crew closed the X-15 canopy. The cockpit suddenly 
seemed smaller since the canopy fit snugly around the pressure-suit helmet. 
 While this was happening, the ground crew was disconnecting the servicing 
carts used to prepare the NB-52 and X-15 for flight. At this point, the NB-52 start-
ed its engines and the carrier aircraft pilots went through their preflight checklist, 
taking about 10 minutes to complete the activity. The ground crew then closed up 
the NB-52 hatches and the mated pair taxied toward the runway accompanied by 
a convoy of a dozen or so vehicles. Edwards is a large base, and the aircraft had 
to taxi for 2 or 5 miles depending on which runway was active. One of the H-21 
helicopters took off and performed a visual check of the runway to make sure no 
debris was present, then took up a position beside and slightly behind the bomber, 
preparing to follow it down the runway for as long as possible.
 At the end of the runway, the ground crew removed the safety pins from the 
X-15 release hooks. When everybody signaled they were ready, the NB-52 took 
off and climbed to 25,000 feet while circling over Edwards to make sure the 
X-15 could make an emergency landing on Rogers Dry Lake. Once above 25,000 
feet, the NB-52 turned toward the launch lake and began climbing to 45,000 feet, 
since at this altitude the X-15 could glide to an alternate lakebed if necessary. The 
NB-52 supply topped off the X-15 liquid-oxygen tank, and the inertial platform 
was receiving alignment data, but otherwise things were quiet. Chase-1 flew in 
formation with the B-52, observing the X-15 for leaks or other anomalies that 
might signal a potential problem. 
 The mission rules dictated that if a serious problem occurred on the NB-52 
while the mated pair was on the way to the launch lake, the carrier aircraft would 
jettison the research airplane since the extra 30,000 pounds of dead weight under 
the right wing would undoubtedly be detrimental to saving the NB-52. Similarly, 
if something happened on the X-15 that looked like it would endanger the NB-52, 
the research airplane would be jettisoned . As Scott Crossfield later observed, “It 
5 Letter, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 5 July 2002.
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was not heroics; it was simple mathematics. Better to lose one man than four.” 
In reality, the X-15 stood a chance of surviving if it was jettisoned, especially if 
the X-15 pilot had some advanced notice. The major problem was that neither of 
the APUs aboard the X-15 was running during captive carry since there was not 
enough propellant to last more than about 30 minutes. During the climb-out, the 
NB-52 supplied all of the X-15’s electrical needs, as well as breathing oxygen and 
pressurization gas. If the carrier aircraft jettisoned the X-15, the pilot would have 
his hands full trying to get the APUs started using a small emergency battery since 
without the APUs the pilot had no flight controls, no radio, no anything. If the 
APUs started, the pilot could try to fly (with or without the engine) to a lakebed. 
Of course, the ejection seat was always an option. Fortunately, the program never 
had to find out what would happen in that scenario.16 
 At 12 minutes before the scheduled launch time, things began to happen. The 
X-15 pilot started both APUs and began to run through the prelaunch checklists. 
The pilot checked all of the X-15 systems, exercised the flight controls, tested the 
ballistic control system, and set all switch positions. Chase-1 observed the results 
of these tests and reported them back to the X-15 pilot. During this time, radar and 
radio communication with NASA-1 guided the carrier aircraft into position near 
6 Thompson, At the Edge of Space, pp. 86-87; Scott Crossfield, during an interview in the NBC documentary 
film The Rocket Pilots, 989.
The need for the various lakebeds was largely driven by a program requirement to always have a land-
ing site available to the X-15 pilot if  he needed it for any reason. Therefore, each flight was planned 
such that the X-15 could glide to an emergency landing site from any point on the flight path, although 
frequently the nearest site was behind the airplane and required the pilot to turn around, as illustrated 
in this drawing. The program used the emergency landing sites 10 times. (NASA)
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the launch lake. Eight minutes before launch the NB-52 began a long sweeping 
turn back toward Edwards, coming onto the final heading about 4 minutes later. At 
the same time, the X-15 pilot began activating the propulsion system. At 2 min-
utes prior to launch the X-15 pilot started the data recorders, checked the ball nose 
one last time, and turned on the cameras. One minute prior to launch the XLR99 
was set to precool and the igniter was set to idle. More checks were performed to 
make sure the engine looked ready to fire. The X-15 pilot took a deep breath.17 
 Three, two, one: launch. The X-15 separated from the NB-52 and began to 
fall. The launch was harder than most pilots initially expected because the X-15 
went from normal 1-g flight while attached to the carrier aircraft to 0-g flight 
instantaneously. The X-15 also wanted to roll to the right because of downwash 
from the NB-52 wing and interference from the fuselage. The X-15 pilots usually 
had left roll input applied at the moment of launch, but the airplane still rolled—
more so on some occasions than others.
 The XLR99 start sequence was remarkably simple, a necessary attribute in 
the days before computerized control systems. The first step was to pressurize the 
propellant tanks with gaseous helium to ensure a smooth flow of propellants to 
the turbopump. Then the oxidizer system was precooled to ensure that the liquid 
oxygen did not vaporize between the propellant tank and the turbopump (vapor-
ized liquid oxygen caused the turbopump to cavitate and go into an overspeed 
condition that resulted in an automatic shutdown). It required about 10 minutes 
to chill the oxidizer system. Next was the engine prime sequence that fed a small 
amount of liquid oxygen and ammonia to the turbopump. The igniter-ready light 
came on when the prime cycle began and the pilot turned on the igniter switch. 
This all happened before the X-15 dropped away from the NB-52. As the X-15 
was falling, the pilot continued the engine start procedure. There were about 10 
seconds available to light the engine before the pilot had to abort to the launch 
lake; that was time for two ignition attempts.18  
 Pressing the pump-idle button to start the turbopump initiated the ignition 
cycle. The turbopump spooled up quickly and forced propellants into the first-
stage igniter, where a spark plug ignited them. The propellants were then fed into 
the second-stage igniter chamber, where the flame generated by the first-stage 
igniter caused them to combust. The second-stage igniter produced 1,500 lbf–as 
much as one chamber on the XLR11.
 The throttle quadrant was a “backwards L” slot located on the left console. 
The outer corner was the “idle” position, the bottom inside corner of the L cor-
responded to minimum throttle, and the most forward position was 100% power. 
Moving the throttle inboard opened the main propellant valves and forced 30 gal-
lons per second of propellants into the main chamber, where they were ignited by 
the flame from the second-stage igniter. The pilots found early in the flight program 
that the engine did not ignite reliably at low-power settings, so they usually imme-
diately advanced the throttle to the 100% position. Although the XLR99 proved to 
be a remarkably reliable engine, it really did not like to throttle. Still, the capability 
provided a certain amount of research utility that would not otherwise have been 
7 Letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 August 2002.
8 Ibid.
 Chapter 7: The Flight Progr am
available, although it also contributed to several in-flight emergencies when the 
engine decided it no longer wanted to work as its designers had intended.19 
 In an attempt to ensure that the entire propulsion system was in working order, 
NASA conducted a ground run before almost every flight. Although it was com-
forting to the X-15 pilot to know the engine indeed seemed to work, these tests 
also added a great deal of wear and tear to the engines and other systems. During 
ground runs, the pilot would allow the engine to stabilize at 100% thrust for 8 
seconds, and then retard it to idle for 5 seconds before shutting the engine down. 
The pilot would then perform an emergency restart sequence that relit the main 
chamber at 75% thrust. The pilot would stabilize the engine for 5 seconds, reduce 
it to idle for a couple of seconds, and then shut it down. It all became routine.
 Energy management started the instant the NB-52 released the X-15. If the 
XLR99 did not light in two attempts, the pilot would make an emergency landing 
at the launch lake. If the engine died within the first 30–40 seconds of flight, the 
pilot would turn around and make an emergency landing at the launch lake. After 
about 40 seconds of burn, the airplane would be too far away to make it back to 
the launch lake, but if the engine burned less than 70 seconds, it was unlikely the 
pilot could make it to Rogers Dry Lake. The 30-second period in between was 
why the program had a large assortment of intermediate lakebeds available. 
 Unfortunately, the technology did not exist to provide the pilot with an en-
ergy-management display, although NASA installed a rudimentary unit in X-15-3 
toward the end of the flight program. It was up to the ground controller (NASA-1) 
to advise the pilot where to land if a problem developed during the flight. As flight 
attendants are fond of saying on every commercial airline flight, the nearest exit 
may be behind you. In many cases, the best landing site was an intermediate lake 
that the airplane had already passed at hypersonic velocities.
 The intermediate lakes were more important for the high-speed flights than 
for the altitude flights. Given enough altitude, the X-15 could glide for over 400 
miles–more than enough distance to make it back to Edwards from almost any 
point on the High Range. Every flight was supposed to have excess energy as 
the airplane arrived over Edwards, allowing some flexibility during the final ap-
proach. Nevertheless, part of why the program had an excellent safety record was 
that the pilots and flight planners always had contingency plans—even for the 
contingency plans.
 Most X-15 flights were essentially in the vertical plane, and it was important 
to establish the proper heading back toward Edwards during the first 20 seconds 
after launch. Once the engine shut down, the ballistics was pretty well established 
for the next few minutes of flight. If there was a wind at the launch altitude (and 
usually there was), the NB-52 would crab as necessary to maintain the proper 
ground track during the final 10-minute turn. At 1 minute to launch, the NB-52 pi-
lot would turn to the desired launch heading and allow the carrier aircraft to drift. 
Since winds at launch did not seriously affect the X-15 trajectory, this minimized 
the workload on the X-15 pilot to obtain, and hold, the desired heading. After 
launch, any necessary heading corrections were made by the X-15 pilot using 
small bank angles while performing a 2-g rotation and accelerating from Mach 
9 Ibid.
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1 to 2 in about 20 seconds. Once the X-15 reached the desired pitch angle, the 
g-level was less than one, and no further turning corrections could be made until 
after completion of the reentry.20  
 The thrust from the XLR99 could be terminated by one of two routine ways 
at the nominal end of burn. The most frequently used method was called “shut-
down.” When a specific set of flight conditions had been reached, the pilot would 
manually shut down the engine. Normally the pilot did this after a precalculated 
amount of time based on a stopwatch in the cockpit that started when the main 
propellant valves opened . After NASA installed the X-20 inertial systems later in 
the program, the pilot could also use inertial velocity to shut down the engine, and 
several of the high-altitude flights used the altitude predictor installed in X-15-3 . 
The other type of thrust termination was called “burnout.” In this method the pilot 
just let the engine burn until the propellants were exhausted and the engine quit.21 
  
20 E-mail, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 9 August 2002; telephone conversation, William J. “Pete” Knight 
with Dennis R. Jenkins,  September 2002.
2 Letter, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 5 July 2002; letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 
August 2002.
The design speed mission was flown at relatively low altitudes – from 100,000 to 110,000 feet. These 
were the essential heating flights that were used to validate the various theoretical and experimental 
(wind tunnel) results. The time at maximum speed was not spent flying straight and level since the pilot 
was conducting a series of  rudder pulses and other maneuvers to optimize the heating on the side of  
the aircraft that was instrumented. The ability to exactly repeat these maneuvers from one flight to the 
next  was critical for the ultimate success of  the flight program and a tribute to the flying skills of  the 
pilots. (NASA)
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 The high-speed flights were conducted at fairly low altitudes (a relative term 
since the altitudes would have been considered extraordinary before the X-15 
program began). For these flights, the X-15 was essentially an airplane; its wings 
generated lift, maneuvering was accomplished via a set of aerodynamic control 
surfaces, and the atmosphere created a great deal of drag and friction on the air-
frame. The pilot would begin a 2-g rotation to the desired pitch angle immediately 
after the engine lit. During this rotation the primary piloting task was to adjust 
the bank angle to attain and hold the desired heading back to Edwards. As he 
approached 70,000 feet, the pilot initiated a gentle pushover to come level at 
something between 100,000 and 110,000 feet. As the airplane came level, the 
pilot either stabilized his speed at some preset value to conduct various research 
maneuvers, or continued to accelerate to attain more speed. The X-15 liked to ac-
celerate; even at the top end, it took only 6 seconds to accelerate from Mach 5 to 
Mach 6. The research maneuvers continued after engine burnout until the airplane 
decelerated to the point that no more useful data were forthcoming. These were 
the essential heating flights.22 
 Altitude flights began much the same way, except that the pilot continued a 
steep climb out of the atmosphere. The engine shut down on the way up and the 
airplane coasted over the top on a ballistic trajectory. The pitch angle, in conjunc-
tion with the shutdown velocity, established both the range and maximum altitude 
of the arc that would follow. As the airplane continued on the ballistic trajectory, 
it was committed to a steep descent back into the atmosphere. The pilot set up the 
angle of attack for reentry, performed a pullout to level flight after reentry, and then 
began a shallow descent during the glide back to Rogers Dry Lake. A combination 
of dynamic pressure (q), load factor (g), and structural temperature limited the re-
entry since the relaxation of one parameter resulted in an excess of one of the oth-
ers. These flights spent between 2 and 5 minutes outside the atmosphere, much of 
that time in a weightless (i.e., no accelerations) environment. The ballistic control 
system allowed the pilot to maintain attitude control, but he could not change the 
flight path of the airplane. Contrary to popular lore, as fast as it was, the X-15 never 
flew anywhere near fast enough to attain orbital velocities or altitudes.23 
 For the next few minutes, the calls from NASA-1 were primarily compari-
sons between the planned profile (on the plot boards) and the actual radar track 
of the airplane. These let the X-15 pilot know how well he had flown the exit 
phase and, more importantly, what maneuvers might be required during reentry. 
If he was “high and long,” he would expect to make an immediate turn and apply 
the speed brakes during the latter part of the reentry. If he was “low and short,” 
he would expect a straight-ahead glide with brakes closed. A “left of course” call 
would alert him to expect a right turn to a new heading after reentry. The ability to 
comprehend some of these energy-management subtleties while simultaneously 
controlling the aircraft’s attitude and subsystems, and accomplishing test maneu-
vers was one of the goals of the X-15 simulator training.24 
22 E-mail, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 25 August 2002.
23 Letter, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 5 July 2002; letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 
August 2002. Escape (orbital) velocity is generally considered to be 7,500 mph at altitudes over 93 miles to 
maintain even a marginally stable orbit.
2 E-mail, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 25 August 2002.
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 Perhaps surprisingly, the altitude flights required a longer ground track than 
the high-speed flights. This was primarily because the airplane covered many 
miles while it was outside the atmosphere. Let us use the two maximum perfor-
mance flights as comparative examples. Joe Walker’s 354,200-foot altitude flight 
required a ground track of 305 miles to climb out of the atmosphere, coast to peak 
altitude, reenter, make the pullout, and then slow to land. On the other hand, Pete 
Knight’s 4,520-mph speed flight only took 225 miles, mainly because the airplane 
slowed quickly after engine burnout since the speed flights occurred in a relatively 
dense atmosphere.25 
 During the envelope expansion and heating flights, the pilots performed a 
specific set of maneuvers (rudder pulses, angle-of-attack changes, and rolls) to 
evaluate the stability and control of the airplane in various flight regimes. Many 
times these maneuvers were near the limits of controllability for the airplane, and 
well-practiced contingency plans were always at the ready. Other tests provided 
information on control effectiveness, aerodynamic performance, lift-to-drag ra-
tio, and aero-thermo loads. All of these maneuvers required that the pilot fly at a 
25 Joseph A. Walker, “Pilot Report for Flight 3-22-6,” 22 August 963; Major William J. Knight, “Pilot Report for 
Flight 2-53-97,” 3 October 967; Thompson, At the Edge of Space, p. 53; letter, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis 
R. Jenkins, 5 July 2002. Despite the thicker atmosphere, the speed brakes were frequently used to decelerate 
into the Edwards area on speed flights.
Surprisingly, the X-15 spent more time at higher Mach numbers during the altitude missions than it 
did during the speed missions. This is because there is less aerodynamic drag at high altitudes and the 
airplane coasted at high velocities for longer while it was outside the atmosphere. The altitude missions 
were particularly demanding on the pilot since even small deviations from the planned profile could result 
in overshooting the target altitude. The ballistic control system was required to control the attitude of  
the airplane during these missions, most of  which were flown by X-15-3 since the MH-96 adaptive 
control system provided more redundancy. (NASA)
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specific speed, attitude, and altitude while gathering the data. Often, the program 
needed to exactly duplicate the profile on subsequent flights to eliminate variables 
from the data, a decided challenge before the advent of computerized flight- 
control systems.26  
 As Milt Thompson later observed, “This is the kind of thing a research pi-
lot is required to do to earn his money–accomplishing good maneuvers for data 
purposes. Flying the airplane is just something the pilot does to get the desired 
test maneuver. He can be the greatest stick and rudder pilot in the world, but if he 
cannot do the required data maneuvers, he is worthless as a research pilot.” Most 
of the X-15 pilots were very good research pilots.27 
 Assuming all went as planned, the X-15 arrived back at Edwards and set up 
a high key (the highest point of the final approach to a runway) at approximately 
35,000 feet and 290 to 350 mph. As he approached Edwards, the X-15 pilot began 
dumping any residual propellants to lower the landing weight and to get rid of po-
tentially explosive substances. It also made a convenient way for the chase planes 
to find the small X-15 in the vast skies over the high desert. The X-15 then entered 
a 35-degree banking turn while maintaining 250 to 300 knots. The pilots normally 
turned to the left, although each pilot seemed to develop a preference, and it really 
did not matter much. At the completion of the turn, the X-15 was approximately 
4 miles abeam of the intended touchdown point at 18,000 feet altitude headed in 
the opposite direction of the landing runway (this was low key). The pilot then 
continued around 180 degrees, turned onto final at about 8,000 feet and 300 knots, 
and flared at around 1,000 feet. The pilot jettisoned the ventral rudder, lowered the 
landing flaps as the airplane came level at about 100 feet, and deployed the landing 
gear at 215–225 knots. Touchdown was generally made at around 190–200 knots. 
The pilot judged the possible crosswinds by the simple expedient of looking at the 
smoke from flares beside the runway.28 
 Unsurprisingly, not all flights arrived at high key exactly as planned. At least 
one flight arrived at high key at 80,000 feet and over Mach 3.5, another made high 
key at only 25,000 feet, and one made a straight-in approach because it was too 
low on energy when it arrived at Edwards. Despite these variances, the majority 
of X-15 touchdowns were made within 2,000 feet of the intended spot, although 
a couple of flights missed by over 4,000 feet. Neil Armstrong managed to miss 
by 12 miles–fortunately, Rogers is a large dry lake. The X-15 generally slid for 
8,000–10,000 feet before coming to a stop, chased by a convoy of rescue and sup-
port vehicles .29 
 The general concept was similar to that ultimately adopted as the terminal 
area energy-management maneuver used by the Space Shuttle. The proven ability 
of the X-15 (and later the heavyweight lifting bodies) to make unpowered ap-
proaches was one reason the Space Shuttle program decided it could eliminate the 
26 Letter, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 5 July 2002. A notable exception to this was flight 3-7-, 
which was always intended as a record flight (that still stands today) although research data were also collected 
during the flight.
27 Thompson, At the Edge of Space, p. 53.
28 Letter, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 5 July 2002. Even if the engine had been run to burnout, there were 
usually propellants left in the tanks since the sump system was not 00% effective, especially at some flight attitudes.
29 Letter, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 5 July 2002; Radio transcript for flight 3-7-, 7 July 962. 
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complexity of landing engines and make the Orbiter a glider. It is another endur-
ing legacy of the X-15 program.30 
THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTOR PLAN
 To make sure everything went as smoothly as possible, North American se-
lected Q. C. Harvey to run its X-15 operations at Edwards. Harvey had come to 
the high desert a decade earlier to work on the odd McDonnell XF-85 Goblin, and 
then migrated to Bell to work on the X-1 program. He had joined North American 
in 1953 to work on the F-86 and later the F-100 and YF-107 programs. Consid-
ered a good manager with excellent technical skills, he also worked well with 
Scott Crossfield. In everybody’s opinion, he was a good choice.31 
 According to the production contract, North American had to demonstrate 
each airplane’s general airworthiness above Mach 2 before delivering it to the 
Air Force, which would then turn it over to NASA. Mach 3 and beyond were part 
of the government flight program. Initially, North American planned to demon-
strate the basic capabilities of the first two airplanes using the XLR11 engines 
while the third airplane waited in Inglewood for the arrival of the XLR99 . At this 
point, all three airplanes were essentially identical in configuration except for the 
engines–the MH-96 adaptive flight control system was not part of the plan yet. 
After the company checked out the first two airplanes, the government would use 
them for the envelope expansion tests and the research program. North American 
would then demonstrate X-15-3 with the XLR99 engine for a couple of flights 
before turning it over to the government. Once the government accepted the third 
airplane with the XLR99, North American would install the ultimate engine in the 
first two airplanes. North American would then fly one or two flights in each air-
plane with the XLR99 and turn them back over to the government.32  It all seemed 
so simple.
 This carefully orchestrated plan suffered a fatal blow in June 1960 when 
X-15-3 blew up on the Propulsion System Test Stand (PSTS) during a ground 
test of the XLR99 . In the end, Scott Crossfield would fly one glide flight and one 
XLR11-powered flight in X-15-1 before turning the airplane over to the govern-
ment. Crossfield made nine contractor flights in X-15-2 with the XLR11s, and 
three more with the XLR99 before North American turned that airplane over to 
the government. The company never flew X-15-3, and Neil Armstrong took the 
airplane for its first flight after North American finished rebuilding it after the 
XLR99 ground explosion.
30 Letter, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 5 July 2002. Similar unpowered approaches were later demon-
strated in the lifting-body program, usually landing on the concrete runway instead of a lakebed. The lifting-body 
contributions have received a great deal more attention in the popular press than the X-5 landings, which were 
arguably closer in profile.
3 Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, pp. 298-299.
32 At this point the XLR99 was often referred to as the “ultimate” engine or the “X-5 engine” to differentiate it from 
the “interim” XLRs.
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THE ORIGINAL GOVERNMENT PLAN
 As North American continued to manufacture the three X-15s, personnel at 
the High Speed Flight Station (HSFS) began to plan how they would test the new 
airplane. During the admittedly brief history of the research airplane program, 
flight research had been conducted as a cooperative venture of varying degrees 
with the Air Force and/or Navy. Usually the contractor would first demonstrate 
the basic flight worthiness of the aircraft and then turn it over to the military 
service that had funded its development (the Air Force for the X-planes, or the 
Navy for the Douglas D-558 series). The military would then conduct a flight- 
envelope-expansion program with some NACA participation. For instance, the 
civilian agency normally supplied the instrumentation and research expertise. At 
some point after the military had obtained the data it desired, it would turn the 
airplanes over to the NACA, which then conducted a series of purely research-
oriented flights to validate wind-tunnel and other predictive techniques. The flight 
tests at the HSFS had followed a predictable pattern. All flight operations, main-
tenance, instrumentation, data reduction, research engineering, reporting, and 
project control were accomplished by NACA personnel. The Air Force supplied 
support services such as engine overhaul, chase aircraft, carrier aircraft operations, 
and the usual air base functions (crash trucks, medical services, etc.).33  
 In the case of the X-15, the original memorandum of understanding signed 
by the members of the Research Airplane Committee stated simply that “upon 
acceptance of the airplane and its related equipment from the contractor, it will be 
turned over to the NACA, who shall conduct the flight tests and report the results 
of same.” There was no provision in the MoU for Air Force flights. From experi-
ence, however, Walt Williams believed that the Air Force would want to conduct 
a program of its own. The Air Force substantiated this when it briefly proposed 
building a fourth airplane for the exclusive use of the AFFTC . The Research Air-
plane Committee, and others, did not agree and instead believed that the best ar-
rangement would be to operate the three X-15s on a cooperative basis.34  
 The NACA was not sure it really wanted the Air Force to be involved in the 
flight program. The NACA in general, and Walt Williams in particular, had a 
severe lack of confidence in the Air Force based largely on the poor management 
of the X-2 envelope-expansion program, which had resulted in the loss of both 
airplanes and the death of Mel Apt. It was a long and uphill battle for the AFFTC 
to establish a relationship wherein the HSFS management would appreciate the 
necessity for AFFTC support, and thus the need to allow some level of AFFTC 
participation .35  It eventually succeeded.
 As the flight program neared, the Air Force wanted to formalize the respon-
sibilities delegated to each organization. The AFFTC, in particular, wanted to ex-
pand its role, and expressed on several occasions a desire to change the original 
33 Memorandum, Walter C. Williams to Hugh L. Dryden, subject: NACA-Air Force cooperation program, X-5 air-
planes, 5 June 957. In the files at the NASA History Office.
3 Ibid.
35 Letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 August 2002.
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MoU. Failing to do that, the AFFTC rather arbitrarily assigned itself the duties of 
operating the Rocket Engine Test Facility and the carrier aircraft. Williams did 
not consider this “of any serious consequence” since similar arrangements had 
worked satisfactorily in the past.36 
 On 24 May 1957, Walt Williams met with Captain Iven C . Kincheloe, Jr ., 
who was designated to be the first Air Force X-15 pilot, and Richard J . Harer, the 
AFFTC X-15 project engineer, to discuss the division of responsibilities for the 
X-15 program. Paul F . Bikle, the AFFTC technical director, was unable to attend . 
Williams, true to form, bluntly asked the Air Force representatives exactly what 
the Air Force’s desires were . Kincheloe stated that the AFFTC would like to take 
over the entire job—it wanted everything it could get. On the other hand, Kinche-
loe stated that he did not believe the AFFTC personnel were technically qualified 
to conduct such a program, and as a result they wanted to work with the NACA. 
The underlying tone was that the AFFTC personnel felt uninformed on the prog-
ress of the program, something Williams indicated that he would try to correct. All 
in attendance agreed, however, that Edwards should present a unified view to the 
outside world, and that the AFFTC and HSFS should internally coordinate their 
answers before publicly announcing them.37 
 Actually, the two groups had already taken this tack during the mockup in-
spection. Engineers from the AFFTC and HSFS had met prior to and again during 
the inspection to discuss what items needed to be changed. Several other items, 
particularly the switch from a B-36 to a B-52 carrier aircraft, had also resulted 
from pre-coordinated joint action. In spite of this, the AFFTC representatives 
still felt that they were not receiving sufficient consideration on the program and 
wanted a more formal agreement finalized.38 
 This led to a discussion of missions and objectives. The AFTTC pointed out 
that it wanted its engineering staff to benefit from active participation in the en-
tire program. This would allow the Air Force engineers to become familiar with 
advanced technology for evaluating future weapons systems, which was, after all, 
their primary job. Of particular concern was that the NACA was specifying the re-
search instrumentation without AFFTC input. Williams pointed out that the main 
reason NASA had not consulted AFFTC personnel concerning instrumentation 
was that they lacked the experience to make any significant contributions. Indeed, 
the researchers at the HSFS were largely dependent on the scientists at Langley 
and Lewis for advice since nobody had ever designed instrumentation to measure 
the aero-thermo environment expected for the X-15.39  
 At the end of the meeting, Williams pointed out that the NACA was primarily 
responsible for research into structures, handling qualities, and flight techniques, 
and therefore needed to have the primary responsibility for the X-15 program. 
This had been the rationale behind the original MoU. Nevertheless, Williams was 
 
36 Memorandum, Walter C. Williams to Hugh L. Dryden, subject: NACA-Air Force cooperation program, X-5 air-
planes, 5 June 957. In the files at the NASA History Office.
37 Ibid. Paul Bikle would eventually replace Walt Williams as the director of the newly renamed NASA Flight Research 
Center.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
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smart enough to know that he needed the support of the AFFTC personnel, and 
besides, many of their observations were valid–they needed to be involved in the 
program in order to sharpen their skills for evaluating future weapons systems. 
Much more so than NASA, the NACA existed primarily to provide data that were 
useful to the industry and the military services that paid most of the bills.40 
 In an attempt to satisfy everybody concerned, Williams agreed to set up the 
X-15 Flight Test Steering Committee as a logical successor to similar committees 
used on previous programs. However, Williams emphasized that the NACA “had 
no intention whatsoever” of relinquishing the technical direction of the program 
per the original MoU. To ensure that this was the case, Williams appointed him-
self chairman of the committee and reserved the controlling vote. Other members 
of the committee were the AFFTC X-15 project engineer, the HSFS X-15 project 
engineer, and a test pilot from each organization. Initially the NACA personnel 
were Kenneth S . Kleinknecht, Joseph A . Walker, and Hubert M . Drake, respec-
tively; Richard Harer, Iven Kincheloe, and an undetermined engineer represented 
the Air Force . The Air Force’s Paul Bikle would act as an advisor to the commit-
tee, somewhat countering Williams and his unilateral veto authority. It was the 
beginning of a long association between Bikle and the X-15 .41 
 Walt Williams wrote a letter to Hugh Dryden on 5 June 1957 explaining his 
reasons for setting up the committee. It took four months for Dryden to respond 
formally, but when he did, Dryden cautioned Williams not to exceed the scope of 
his authority: “Any major changes in the scope or intent of the [X-15] program 
have to be cleared with NACA Headquarters. It is presumed there are similar 
restrictions on the [Air Force] Flight Test Center. It should be understood at the 
outset, therefore, that the steering committee would have jurisdiction only in re-
gard to matters that would normally come under the jurisdiction of the Flight 
Test Center or the High-Speed Flight Station.” At the same time, Dryden wrote 
to Lieutenant General Donald L. Putt on 2 October 1957 indicating he had autho-
rized Williams to participate in such a committee, and urged Putt to authorize the 
AFFTC to participate. Eventually this group morphed into the X-15 Joint Opera-
tions Committee and was responsible for coordinating most of the X-15 flight 
program. Some references indicate that the Navy had membership on the X-15 
Joint Operations Committee.42  
 Soon after Dryden wrote this, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, diverting 
the attention of Headquarters elsewhere. At the end of 1957, NASA disbanded 
the Interlaboratory Research Airplane Projects Panel; for the next decade, over-
0 Ibid.
 Ibid; “Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” 7 Novem-
ber 96, pp. 9-20. In the files at the AFFTC History Office. See the letter from Dryden to Putt, 2 October 957 
in the files at the DFRC History Office. A copy of the letter was sent to Brigadier General Marcus F. Cooper at the 
AFFTC over the signature of Colonel W. Gordon Duncan some time later. A copy is in the files at the AFFTC His-
tory Office. Kenneth S. Kleinknecht started his career in 92 at the Lewis Research Center after graduating from 
Purdue University with a B.S. in mechanical engineering. In 95, Kleinknecht transferred to the Flight Research 
Center. After NASA was formed, he transferred to the Manned Spacecraft Center in 959. Before being named 
the manager of Project Mercury, Kleinknecht was active in the National Air Races, served as supervisor for a 
number of avionics tests at Lewis, and was the Head of the Project Engineering Station for the X-E. Additionally, 
Kleinknecht served on the X-5 project and as the technical assistant to the director of the Manned Spacecraft 
Center. Some documentation calls the original committee the HSFS-FTC Steering Committee. In addition, some 
sources also call this the X-5 Joint Operating Committee (instead of “operations”).
2 Letter, Hugh L. Dryden to Walter C. Williams, no subject, 2 October 957; letter Hugh L. Dryden to Lieutenant 
General Donald L. Putt, subject: new flight test steering committee, 2 October 957.
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sight for the X-15 would come from the Research Airplane Committee run by 
Hugh Dryden.
 Although the development of the X-15 had carried the System 644L designa-
tion, the initial flight program was designated System 605A. An R&D project card 
was prepared that outlined the extent of the test series, as well as the anticipated 
funding requirements. At the time, the AFFTC optimistically expected that 300 
flights would be made over a five-year period beginning in July 1959 from air-
launch sites located above Cuddeback Lake, Silver Lake, Mud Lake, Jakes Lake, 
and the Bonneville Salt Flats. The anticipated funding was $2,400,000 in FY60, 
$2,386,000 in FY61, and $2,325,000 for each of the next three years.43 
 The X-15 Joint Operations Committee coordinated the flight program and 
could call on support from other organizations as needed. The FRC was respon-
sible for the maintenance and logistics of the three X-15s, while the AFFTC 
maintained the two NB-52s. An exception to this was that the FRC maintained 
the unique launch equipment on the NB-52s. Technically, flying the NB-52s was 
a joint project, but in reality a NASA pilot never flew the airplanes; the FRC did, 
however, supply the launch panel operators. NASA was responsible for data col-
lection and analysis, with support from the Air Force as needed (or desired by 
the Air Force). All aircraft instrumentation, as well as High Range operation and 
maintenance, was the responsibility of NASA. The AFFTC was responsible for 
the biomedical instrumentation package, and maintained the David Clark full-
pressure suits and rescue apparatus (parachutes, etc .) . The Air Force provided 
most support aircraft (C-130s, H-21s, and chase aircraft), although NASA began 
to provide more chase aircraft as the program continued, and the Navy briefly 
contributed a Douglas F5D Skyray. It was not unusual for NASA pilots to fly 
AFFTC chase planes .44  
 The AFFTC supplied all of the propellants and gases necessary for X-15 and 
NB-52 operation, and was responsible for all maintenance of uninstalled engines 
(XLR11 and XLR99) and engine overhauls. The Air Force maintained and operated 
the Rocket Engine Test Facility used for ground-engine runs. NASA was responsi-
ble for installing engines in the X-15s, performing maintenance and inspections of 
installed engines, and conducting the ground runs using the AFFTC test stands . As 
the program continued, NASA began to perform more maintenance on the XLR99 
engines, including recoating the nozzles. The AFFTC maintained the X-15 APUs 
and was responsible for all engine, APU, and stable-platform logistics.45 
 The Air Force marked and maintained the lakebeds; provided inter-agency 
coordination (e.g., with the FAA); supplied medical, fire, and security personnel 
3 R&D Project Card, System 605A, 0 September 959. In the files at the AFFTC History Office. The project card 
was not finally approved until 7 December 959. Among the more interesting tidbits of information on the card 
were the detailed costs for each year. For instance, in FY60 a total of 8,000 gallons of anhydrous ammonia were 
to be purchased at $0.55 per gallon. Hydrogen peroxide (208,000 gallons needed) cost $0.67 per gallon. Liquid 
oxygen cost $3.25 for each of the 3,568 tons expected to be used. The grand total was $357,007 for propel-
lants and gases. Another $,362,87 would be spent on other supplies, and 82,32 hours of military time and 
56,83 hours of civilian time would be used during the year. The cost of the civilian time was $506,708, or an 
average of $3.23 per hour (no cost was given for the military time). $56,05 would be spent on travel, mainly to 
visit Wright Field and the various contractor facilities. The other years were similar.
 R&D Project Card, System 605A, 0 September 959. In the files at the AFFTC History Office. Interestingly, al-
though a NASA pilot never flew the NB-52s during the X-5 program, squadron leader David Cretney from Royal 
Air Force did. Also, North American supplied one launch panel operator for some of the contractor flights.
5 Ibid.
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as needed; and operated the long-range camera facilities. The Air Force also oper-
ated and maintained several radar facilities that were not part of the High Range 
but nonetheless generated data to support the flight program. NASA provided 
maintenance for the stable platform (and later the inertial systems) and the ball 
nose, since both of these were considered research instrumentation. It was a com-
plicated agreement but it worked remarkably well.46 
 The AFFTC expected the ARDC (and later the Systems Command) to “estab-
lish, fund, and monitor an open call type contract with North American Aviation, 
Inc. to furnish such articles and supplies and perform for the Government such 
services as may be required.” Similar contracts existed with Reaction Motors for 
the engines, and with Sperry for the stable platform.47 
REVISIONS
 As it turned out, the initial flight plan was modified somewhat as the program 
progressed. The envelope-expansion program was eventually broken into two 
parts: the basic research program and the basic program extension. The first cat-
egory consisted mostly of the original plan that covered the aerodynamic, stability 
and control, and structural aspects of the basic X-15. The government expected 
that it would take only 17 flights to reach the design conditions of Mach 6 and 
250,000 feet; the rest of the early flights would be for pilot familiarization. 
 Nevertheless, intermediate progress deviated considerably from the plan, 
since during the course of the program observations sometimes indicated the need 
for extreme caution and at other times permitted larger increments than planned. 
In the end, partially because of the delay resulting from X-15-3 blowing up at the 
Rocket Engine Test Facility, it took 45 flights to reach Mach 6, and 52 flights to 
reach 246,700 feet (close enough to 250,000).
 The basic program extension was essentially similar but was concerned with 
answering a few lingering questions and conducting the same evaluations of the 
“advanced” X-15A-2. In the meantime, a separate program began that used the 
X-15 as a flying test bed and as a carrier for a variety of follow-on experiments.48 
 It is interesting to note that the X-15 program lacked much of the drama of 
the earlier X-planes. Although it was pushing performance levels and the state of 
art further than any previous airplane, the X-15 did not experience the catastroph-
ic technical problems that had plagued earlier programs. The XLR99 worked, 
if not perfectly, well enough for its intended purpose, unlike the Curtiss-Wright 
XLR25 in the X-2 . The Inconel X hot structure seemed to suffer little ill effect 
from its prolonged exposure to high temperatures and dynamic pressures. The 
inertial coupling phenomena that had caused the loss of the X-2, and almost the 
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  December 96, p. . In the files at the DFRC History Office; Thomas 
A. Toll and Jack Fischel, “The X-5 Project: Results and New Research,” Astronautics & Aeronautics, March 
96, pp. 2-22.
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X-1A, had been addressed by a combination of aerodynamic design, an efficient 
damper system, and some restrictions on flight maneuvers. The explosive effects 
of Ulmer leather and liquid oxygen were well understood and avoided.49 
 However, these conclusions were not obvious as the envelope-expansion 
program began. The researchers–and pilots–worried about many things. Would 
the hot structure survive the tremendous heating rates? Would the wings remain 
attached to the fuselage during a 6-g pullout from high altitude after the structure 
was heated to 1,200°F? Would the ballistic control system provide sufficient con-
trol while outside the atmosphere? 
 The flight program expanded speed and altitude concurrently. Normally, the 
speed flights came first to ensure that the airplane was controllable at the veloc-
ity necessary for the next altitude flight. During the high-speed flights, the pilot 
pulled up to an angle of attack that simulated the expected pullout from the next 
high-altitude flight, allowing a relatively safe evaluation of the effects of the pull-
out. It took only 12 flights for the X-15 to expand its envelope from the Mach 3.5 
and 136,500 feet attained with the XLR11 (and basically representative of the 
best the earlier X-planes had managed) to Mach 6.06 and 246,700 feet. It was an 
amazing feat.
 Perhaps not so amazingly to the designers, John Becker and the researchers at 
Langley had done a lot of basic research, and Charlie Feltz and his team at North 
American had taken that, added to it, and developed a very robust airframe. North 
American took Hartley Soulé’s comments to Harrison Storms about making er-
rors on the strong side seriously. The airplane ended up a bit overweight, resulting 
in slightly diminished performance, but it could take a great deal of punishment 
and survive . The simulation program run by North American and later by the FRC 
and AFFTC flight planners correctly predicted almost every nuance of the flight 
program. As the pilots learned to trust the simulator, most of the initial worries 
disappeared. Still, it was incredible that the program accomplished the envelope 
expansion so apparently effortlessly.
 This is not to say the program did not experience problems. As Bob Hoey 
remembers, “[T]he X-15 had a significant inertial coupling problem for roll rates 
that were easily within the capability of the control system. The boundaries were 
reasonably well established on the simulator, and everyone recognized that there 
was no need to perform rapid rolls on an X-15 mission, so the pilots were advised 
‘don’t do that!’ and they didn’t.” The auxiliary power unit provided more than its 
share of challenges early on, and was never completely satisfactory. The stable 
platform got off to a marginal start, got better, and then got a lot worse. In the 
end, a more modern unit originally designed for the canceled X-20 Dyna-Soar 
replaced it . The ballistic control system was particularly troublesome during the 
initial flights, so much so that researchers purposely turned it off on some of the 
early altitude buildup flights. Fortunately, the bugs had been worked out and it 
performed satisfactorily by the time it was really needed.50  
 The XLR99 had its share of minor problems (mainly sensitivity to throt-
tling) and a worrisome habit of shedding some of the insulating coating inside its 
9 Letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 August 2002.
50 Ibid.
0 Chapter 7: The Flight Progr am
exhaust nozzle. Then there was the landing gear, which underwent a constant set 
of modifications right up until the final year of the flight program. In this case, 
it was not the components’ fault, at least not completely. The airplane was over-
weight when North American delivered it, and it continued to get heavier over the 
years. Upgraded struts, skids, nose wheels, tires, and stronger supporting struc-
tures never caught up with the weight increases. Still, few of the problems were 
show-stoppers, and the X-15 program continued at a blistering pace.
 Each of the initial X-15 pilots had spent many hours in the fixed-base simula-
tor at North American and had undergone centrifuge training at NADC Johnsville. 
Prior to his first flight in the X-15, each pilot went through a ground dry run with 
the X-15 mated to the NB-52 to familiarize himself with the complete prelaunch 
checklist and cockpit procedures. Each pilot also performed engine runs at the 
Rocket Engine Test Facility prior to his first X-15 flight. In addition, the pilots 
flew missions in the NT-33 and JF-100C variable-stability trainers to become fa-
miliar with the low-speed handling characteristics of the X-15. The pilots prac-
ticed landings in F-104s, including approaches to each of the uprange lakebeds in 
service at the time. There should be no surprises.51 
CAN IT FLY?
 As conceived at the time of the rollout in 1958, the contractor flight program 
consisted of four phases. The first was called “B-52 and X-15 Lightweight Captive 
Flight Evaluation” and was intended to verify the mated flight characteristics with 
an unfueled X-15, operational procedures, jettison characteristics (using dye), 
systems (APU, hydraulic, heat and vent, and electrical) operations, B-52 commu-
nications and observation, and carrier aircraft performance at launch speed and al-
titude. The second phase was the “X-15 Lightweight Glide Flight Evaluation” and 
involved launching an unfueled X-15 on an unpowered glide flight to verify the 
launch procedure, low-speed handling characteristics, and landing procedures.52 
 The third phase was the “B-52 and X-15 Heavyweight Captive Flight Evalu-
ation,” which was intended to replicate the first series of tests with a fully loaded 
X-15, demonstrate topping off the liquid-oxygen system, and verify that a full 
propellant load could be jettisoned using actual propellants. The last phase in-
volved the initial “X-15 Powered Flight Evaluation” using the interim XLR11 
engines. The schedule showed the first captive flight on 31 January 1959, with the 
first glide flight on 9 February 1959 and the first powered flight on 2 April 1959. 
Somehow, it would not work that way.53  
 X-15-1 arrived at Edwards on 17 October 1958, trucked over the foothills from 
the North American Inglewood plant. The second airplane joined it in April 1959, 
5 Hoey and Day, “X-5 Mission Planning and Operational Procedures,” pp. 60-6.
52 North American report NA58-90, “X-5 Research Airplane NAA Model NA-20 Flight Test Program,”  August 
958, p. I-3. In the AFFTC Access to Space Office Project Files.
53 North American report NA58-90, p. I-3.
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and the third would arrive later . As Air Force historian Dr . Richard P . Hallion later 
observed, “In contrast to the relative secrecy that had attended flight tests with the 
XS-1 a decade before, the X-15 program offered the spectacle of pure theater.” It 
was not that the X-15 program necessarily relished the limelight–it simply could 
not avoid it after Sputnik .54 
 Beginning in December 1958, North American conducted numerous ground 
runs with the APUs installed in X-15-1 at Edwards. The company intended this 
to build confidence in the units before the first flights, but it did not turn out 
that way. Bearings overheated, turbines seized, and valves and regulators failed, 
leaked, or did not regulate. The mechanics would remove the failed part, rebuild 
it, and try again. More failures followed. Scott Crossfield later described this pe-
riod as “sleepless weeks of sheer agony.” Harrison Storms eventually got together 
with the senior management at General Electric, who sent Russell E. “Robby” 
Robinson to Edwards to fix the problem. For instance, Robinson noted that invari-
ably after one APU failed, the other would follow within a few minutes. The engi-
neers finally deduced that a sympathetic vibration transferred through the shared 
mounting bulkhead caused the second one to fail. North American devised a new 
mounting system that separated the APUs onto two bulkheads.55  
 The North American pilot was Scott Crossfield, the person who arguably 
knew more about the airplane than any other individual did. After they performed 
various ground checks, technicians mated X-15-1 to the NB-52A and then con-
ducted additional ground tests. All of this delayed the original schedule by about 
60 days. When the day for the first flight arrived, Crossfield described it as a “car-
nival at dawn.” Things were different during the 1950s. Crossfield and Charlie 
Feltz shared a room in the bachelor officer quarters (BOQ) at Edwards; there 
was no fancy hotel in town. They each dressed in a shirt and tie before driving to 
the flight line–nothing casual, even though Crossfield soon changed into a David 
Clark MC-2 full-pressure suit. When they got to the parking lot next to the NB-52 
mating area, more than 50 cars were already waiting. The flight had been sched-
uled for 0700 hours . Based on his previous rocket-plane experience, Crossfield 
predicted they would take off no earlier than noon, and maybe as late as 1400.56 
 Crossfield was pleasantly surprised. At 1000 hours on 10 March 1959, the 
mated pair took off on its scheduled captive-carry flight (retroactively called pro-
gram flight number 1-C-1). It had a gross take-off weight of 258,000 pounds, and 
lifted off at 172 knots after a ground roll of 6,085 feet. During the 1 hour and 8 
minute flight, Captains Charlie Bock and Jack Allavie found that the NB-52 was 
an excellent carrier for the X-15, as was expected from numerous wind-tunnel and 
simulator tests.57  
 During the captive flight, Crossfield exercised the X-15 flight controls, and 
the recorders gathered airspeed data from the flight test boom to calibrate the 
5 Richard P. Hallion, editor, The Hypersonic Revolution: Case Studies in the History of Hypersonic Technology 
(Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Aeronautical Systems Division, 987), vol. I, “Transiting from Air to Space: The North 
American X-5,” p. 29.
55 Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, pp. 3-33.
56 James E. Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” not dated, p. 2. In the files at the 
DFRC History Office; Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, pp. 322-323.
57 Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” p. 2; Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, pp. 
322-323.
 Chapter 7: The Flight Progr am
instrumentation. Bock and Allavie found that the penalties imposed by the X-15 
on the NB-52 flight characteristics were minimal, and flew the mated pair up to 
Mach 0.85 at 45,000 feet. Part of the test sequence was to make sure the David 
Clark full-pressure suit worked as advertised, although Crossfield had no doubts. 
This was a decidedly straightforward test. The suit should inflate as soon as the 
altitude in the cockpit went above 35,000 feet. As the mated pair passed 30,000 
feet, Crossfield turned off the cabin pressurization system and opened the ram 
air door to equalize the internal pressure with the outside air. Once the airplanes 
climbed above 35,000 feet, Crossfield felt the suit begin to inflate, and “from 
that point on [his] movements were slightly constrained and slightly awkward.” 
Still, Crossfield could reach all of the controls, including the hardest control in 
the cockpit to reach: the ram air door lever. Crossfield closed the door, and as the 
cockpit repressurized, the suit relaxed its grip. Pilots repeated this test on every 
X-15 flight until the end of the program. Near the end of the flight, Crossfield 
Scott Crossfield spent many hours in his David Clark full-pressure suit while the X-15-1 was prepared 
for its initial flights. Despite the daytime temperatures in the desert, Crossfield believed that his pres-
ence, ready to go, kept ground crew morale high. (NASA)
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lowered the X-15 landing gear just to make sure it worked, even if it looked a little 
odd while still mated to the NB-52.58 
 The next step was to release the X-15 from the NB-52 to ascertain its glid-
ing and landing characteristics. North American rescheduled the first glide flight 
for 1 April 1959, but aborted it when the X-15 radio failed . The NB-52A and 
X-15 spent 1 hour and 45 minutes airborne conducting further tests in the mated 
configuration. A combination of radio failure and APU problems caused a second 
abort on 10 April. Yet a third attempt aborted on 21 May 1959 when the X-15 
stability augmentation system failed and a bearing in the no. 1 APU overheated 
after approximately 29 minutes of operation.59 
 The problems with the APU were the most disturbing. All of these flights 
encountered various valve malfunctions, leaks, and speed-control problems with 
the APUs, all of which would have been unacceptable during research flights. 
Tests conducted on the APU revealed that extremely high surge pressures were 
occurring at the pressure relief valve (actually a blowout plug) during the initial 
peroxide tank pressurization. The installation of an orifice in the helium pres-
surization line immediately downstream of the shut-off valve reduced the surges 
to acceptable levels. Engineers decided that other problems were unique to the 
captive-carry flights and deemed them of little consequence to the flight program 
since the operating scenario would be different. Still, reliability was marginal at 
best. The APUs underwent a constant set of minor improvements during the flight 
program, but continued to be a source of irritation until the end.60 
 On 22 May, North American conducted the first ground run of the interim 
XLR11 engine using X-15-2 at the Rocket Engine Test Facility. Scott Crossfield 
was in the cockpit for the successful test, clearing the way for the eventual first 
powered flight–if X-15-1 could ever make its unpowered flight. Another attempt 
at the glide flight on 5 June 1959 aborted even before the NB-52 left the ground, 
when Crossfield reported smoke in the cockpit. Investigation showed that a 
cockpit ventilation fan motor had overheated. The continuing problems with the 
first glide flight were beginning to take their toll, both physically and mentally, 
on all involved .61 
 Because of the lessons learned on the aborted glide flights and during the 
XLR11 ground runs, engineers modified numerous pieces of equipment on the X-
15. These included the APUs, their support brackets, the mounting bulkheads, and 
the bearings inside them. North American also improved the flight control sys-
tem’s mechanical responsiveness. In addition, technicians accomplished a great 
deal of work on the various regulators and valves, particularly in the hydrogen-
peroxide systems. Storms remembered, “[I]n the final analysis, the regulators and 
valves were the most troublesome hardware in the program insofar as reliability 
was concerned.”62 
58 Ibid.
59 Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” p. 3; Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, pp. 
323-32.
60 Ibid.
6 Because the NB-52 never left the ground, this attempt was not assigned a program flight number.
62 Harrison A. Storms, “X-5 Hardware Design Challenges” a paper in the Proceedings of the X-15 30th Anniversary 
Celebration, Dryden Flight Research Facility, Edwards, CA, 8 June 989, NASA CP-305, p. 3.
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1959 FLIGHT PERIOD
 Finally, at 0838 hours on 8 June 1959, Scott Crossfield and X-15-1 dropped 
from the NB-52A at Mach 0.79 and 37,550 feet. Just prior to launch, the SAS 
pitch damper failed, but Crossfield elected to proceed with the flight and switched 
the pitch channel to standby. At launch, the X-15 separated cleanly and Crossfield 
rolled to the right with a bank angle of about 30 degrees. Usually the obedient test 
pilot, on this flight Crossfield allowed himself to deviate slightly from the flight 
plan and perform one unauthorized aileron roll. However, not all was well. On the 
final approach to landing, the X-15 began a series of increasingly wild pitching 
motions. Crossfield: “[T]he nose of the X-15 pitched up sharply. It was a maneu-
ver that had not been predicted by the simulator … I was frankly caught off guard. 
Quickly I applied corrective elevator control. The nose came down sharply. But 
instead of leveling out, it tucked down. I applied reverse control. The nose came 
up but much too far. Now the nose was rising and falling like the bow of a skiff in 
a heavy sea … I could not subdue the motions.” The X-15 was porpoising wildly, 
sinking toward the desert at 175 knots.63 
 The airplane touched down safely at 150 knots and slid 3,900 feet while turn-
ing slightly to the right. After he landed, Crossfield said he believed that the air-
plane exhibited a classic case of static instability. Harrison Storms, on the other 
hand, was sure that the cure was a simple adjustment. In the end, Storms was 
right. As he would on all of his flights, Crossfield had used the side-stick control-
ler during the flare instead of the center stick, and this subsequently proved to 
be the contributing cause of the oscillations. The side-stick controller used small 
hydraulic boost actuators to assist the pilot since it would have been impossible 
(or at least impractical) to move the side stick through the same range of motion 
required for the center stick. However, the engineers had decided to restrict the au-
thority of these hydraulic cylinders somewhat, based on a best guess of the range 
of movement required. The guess had been wrong, and because of this a cable in 
the control system was stretching and retracting unexpectedly. What appeared to 
be pilot-induced oscillations during landing actually reflected the mechanics of 
the control system. The fix was to provide more authority to the hydraulic cylinder 
by changing an orifice—a simple adjustment.64  
 Although the impact at landing was not particularly hard, later inspection re-
vealed that bell cranks in both main landing skids had bent. Unfortunately, North 
American had not instrumented the main skids on this flight, so no specific im-
pact data were gathered. However, the engineers generally believed that the shock 
struts had bottomed and remained bottomed because of higher-than-predicted 
landing loads. Excessive rebound loads caused by a foaming of the oil in the nose 
gear strut compounded the issue, although it took several more landings to realize 
63 The aileron roll was confirmed in an e-mail, Scott Crossfield to Dennis R. Jenkins,  May 2002; Scott Crossfield 
and Harrison Storms, during an interview in the NBC documentary film The Rocket Pilots, 989; Crossfield, 
Always Another Dawn, pp. 32-33.
6 Crossfield and Storms, The Rocket Pilots; Crossfield Always Another Dawn, pp. 33-36; telephone conversa-
tion, Scott Crossfield to Dennis R. Jenkins, 8 August 2002. The side and center sticks were mechanically inter-
connected to the control system cables through bell cranks; this was years before an electric side stick would be 
flown. Crossfield had long believed the center stick should be “cut off and thrown away.”
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this. As a precaution against the main skid problem occurring again, the metering 
characteristics of the shock struts were changed, and engineers conducted ad-
ditional lakebed drop tests at even higher loads with the landing-gear test trailer 
used to qualify the landing-gear design. The landing gear would continue to be a 
concern throughout the flight program. All other airplane systems operated satis-
factorily on this flight, clearing the way for the first powered flight using X-15-2 . 
The following day North American moved X-15-1 into the hangar to hook up its 
 
 
 
 
Scott Crossfield climbs out of  X-15-1 after the first captive-carry flight. The X-15 landing gear had been 
deployed during the flight to demonstrate it would work after being cold-soaked at altitude. A member of  the 
ground crew installs protective covers on the nose-mounted air data boom. (AFFTC History Office)
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XLR11s and propellant system and make other changes in preparation for its first 
powered flight.65  
 While the NB-52 was carrying X-15-1 as expensive wing cargo, engineers 
were testing the XLR11s at the Rocket Engine Test Facility using X-15-2 . De-
spite the successful 22 May test, things were not going particularly well. Perhaps 
the engines had been out of service for too long between programs, or maybe 
too much knowledge had been lost during the coming and goings of the various 
engineers and technicians over the years, but the initial runs were hardly trouble-
free. Various valves and regulators in the propellant system also proved to be 
surprisingly troublesome. Moreover, sometimes things just went to hell. After one 
engine run, the ground crew began purging the hydrogen-peroxide lines of all 
residual liquid by connecting a hose from a ground nitrogen supply to a fitting on 
X-15-2. On this day, it was a new hose. Despite the careful procedures and great 
caution used, the hose had a slight residue of oil. When the technician applied gas 
pressure to the hose, the film of oil ran into the hydrogen-peroxide lines. The only 
thing truly compatible with peroxide is more peroxide, not oil. The result was an 
immediate explosion and fire that raced through the X-15 engine compartment. As 
always, the Edwards fire crew was standing by and quickly extinguished the fire, 
but not before gutting the engine bay. One X-15 crewman was badly burned; if he 
had been standing two feet closer, he likely would have been killed. It took weeks 
to repair the airplane .66 
 Forty-six days after the first glide flight, and after the damage from the explo-
sion was repaired, the NB-52A took X-15-2 for a captive-carry flight with full 
propellant tanks on 24 July 1959. One of the purposes of this flight was to evalu-
ate the liquid-oxygen top-off system between the NB-52 and X-15. It proved to 
be erratic. Another test was to measure the time it took to jettison the propellants 
at altitude. While still safely attached to the wing of the NB-52, Crossfield jet-
tisoned the hydrogen peroxide, which took 140 seconds. He then jettisoned the 
liquid oxygen and alcohol simultaneously, which took 110 seconds. The times 
matched predictions. The APUs and pressure suit performed flawlessly. Despite 
the failure of the top-off system, researchers considered the flight a success. The 
original contract had specified that North American would turn the first airplane 
over to the government in August 1959. For a while it looked like the company 
might deliver the first X-15 on schedule, but it was not to be.67  
 During August and early September, engineers canceled several attempts to 
make the first powered flight before the aircraft left the ground, due to leaks in the 
APU propellant system and hydraulic problems. There were also several failures 
of propellant tank pressure regulators, and on at least one occasion, liquid oxygen 
streamed out of the safety vent while the NB-52 carried the X-15. No flight oc-
curred on that day. Charlie Feltz, Bud Benner, and John Gibb, along with a variety 
 
 
65 Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” pp. 2-3; letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. 
Jenkins, 2 August 2002. Although the XLRs had been “installed” for the glide flight, in reality they were little 
more than ballast. They were not hooked up to the propellant system or capable of being ignited.
66 Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, pp. 38-350.
67 Ibid, pp. 352-353.
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of other North American engineers and technicians, worked to eliminate these 
problems, all of which were irritating but not critical—other than to the morale.68 
 At the 30th anniversary celebration, Storms described the mood at the time:69
 
A typical launch attempt would start the night before, and the 
crews would work all night preparing the X-15 and fueling it. 
About 8 a.m., Scott Crossfield would be in his flight gear and, 
after walking around the operation, get into the cockpit and 
start his checkout. Scott would stay in the ready condition as 
the countdown continued. This, unfortunately, might be as late 
as 3 or 4 in the afternoon before the B-52 would be allowed 
to take off. By the time it had reached launch altitude and at-
tempted to hold for the required length of time with all systems 
in operation, sometime during this period a regulator would fail, 
a valve would fail, or the bearings on one or both APUs would 
go out. Then back to Edwards. When Scott returned, we would 
be scheduled to go to a press conference and meet many tired, 
and by that time somewhat edgy, reporters that always wanted 
answers that were just not available. These were not happy meet-
ings for any of the participants. 
Shortly after about the fourth such encounter, I was gathered up 
by General John McCoy of Wright Field and taken over to Mr. 
[James Howard ‘Dutch’] Kindelberger’s office, the then chair-
man of the board. The general explained that the country was 
in a bad spot with the Sputnik success and that our false starts 
were not very much of a positive boost to the national position. 
In short, “when were we going to launch that X-15?” This one 
time in my life all eyes were on me. Not the most desirable po-
sition. The answer I gave was to go over the conditions that we 
and the NASA had set up for a launch. Also, I gave my support 
to this approach and pointed out that we were attempting to put 
a new type of flying machine in the air without the loss of either 
millions of dollars worth of equipment or the pilot. However, if 
they wanted to, I would take them to the task force that set up 
the launch ground rules and they could either convince them of 
a different approach or overrule them, if possible. The whole 
meeting ended up with the Air Force’s plea for increased effort 
on out part and hope for early success. Fortunately for all con-
cerned, the next attempt turned out to be a winner.
68 Ibid, pp. 350-357.
69 Storms, “X-5 Hardware Design Challenges” pp. 30-3. In June 955, General John Louis McCoy became the 
commander of the ARDC Directorate of Systems Management at Wright-Patterson AFB, serving until January 
960. James Howard “Dutch” Kindelberger retired as chief executive officer of North American in 960. Although 
he remained as chairman of the board until his death in 962, he never got to see the ultimate success of the 
X-5 program. He was succeeded by John Leland “Lee” Atwood in both jobs.
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 At last, Scott Crossfield made the first powered flight using X-15-2 on 17 
September 1959. The NB-52A released the research airplane at 0808 in the morn-
ing while flying at Mach 0.80 and 37,600 feet. X-15-2 reached Mach 2 .11 and 
52,341 feet during 224.3 seconds of powered flight using the two XLR11 engines. 
Crossfield surprised everybody, including most probably himself, by perform-
ing another aileron roll, this time all the way around. As Crossfield remembers, 
“Storms was tickled.” On a more serious note, he observed, “With the rolling 
tail one would expect very clean ‘aileron’ rolls without the classical adverse yaw 
from ailerons, and that is the way it rolled. No big deal at all.” The government’s 
concerns about the rolling tail were for naught.70 
 Crossfield landed on Rogers Dry Lake 9 minutes and 11 seconds after launch, 
despite some concerns about a crosswind on the lake. Following the landing, 
ground crews noticed a fire in the area around the ventral stabilizer, but quickly 
extinguished it. A subsequent investigation revealed that the upper XLR11 fuel 
pump diffuser case had cracked after engine shutdown and sprayed fuel through-
out the engine compartment. Alcohol collected in the ventral stabilizer and some 
unknown cause ignited it during landing. Crossfield noted that “the fire had 
burned through a large area, melting aluminum tubing, fuel lines, valves, and 
other machinery.” For the second time in less than six months, X-15-2 went back 
to Inglewood. It took about three weeks to repair the damage.71 
 Edwards was not the only place where the X-15 created interest, although 
it was certainly the most visible. Back at Langley Research Center, just a month 
after the first powered flight, approximately 20,000 visitors attended the first an-
niversary inspection, held on Saturday, 24 October 1959. The crowds had come 
at NASA’s invitation, and local newspapers had spread the word that for the first 
time in its 42-year history Langley would be open to the public. NASA scientists, 
engineers, and technicians showed the public just what the new agency was doing 
to launch their country into space. The attractions included full-scale mockups of 
the X-15, XLR99, and a dummy in an MC-2 full-pressure suit. A small group of 
Langley secretaries acted as the hostesses for the exhibit, while both John Becker 
and Paul Bikle were nearby to answer questions. The event was a success with 
both the public and the media.72 
 Back in the high desert, the third flight (2-3-9) of X-15-2 took place on 5 
November 1959 when the NB-52A dropped the X-15 at Mach 0.82 and 44,000 
feet. The flight got off to a bad start; during the engine start sequence, one cham-
ber in the lower engine exploded. Chase planes reported external damage around 
the engine and base plate, and the resulting fire convinced Crossfield to land on 
Rosamond Dry Lake. Crossfield shut down both engines, but the 13.9 seconds 
70 E-mails, Scott Crossfield to Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 and  May 2002; The roll was captured by the camera chase, 
and video can be seen in the NBC documentary film The Rocket Pilots, 989. “Aileron” is in quotes because the 
X-5 did not have ailerons and used the rolling tail for control instead. Still, aerodynamicists continue to use the 
term “aileron” to describe motion.
7 Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” p. 3; Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, pp. 
365-366.
72 James R. Hansen, Spaceflight Revolution: NASA Langley Research Center from Sputnik to Apollo, NASA pub-
lication SP-308 (Washington, DC: NASA, 995), pp. 28-30. Langley had held “inspections” since 926, but 
previously they had been closed conferences for invited members of the aeronautic community. In most cases, 
the laboratories were open on the day after the conference to family and friends of employees, plus a few invited 
guests. Normally these inspections attracted about 00 people.
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of powered flight had been sufficient to accelerate the X-15 to Mach 1. Unfortu-
nately, the flight attitude necessary to descend to the lakebed made it impossible 
to dump most of the remaining propellants. Crossfield initiated the landing flare at 
about 950 feet altitude and 253 knots . The aircraft touched down near the center 
of the lake at approximately 161 knots and a 10.8-degree angle of attack with a 
descent rate of 9.5 feet per second. Crossfield noted: “The skids dug in gently. The 
nose slammed down hard and the airplane plowed across the desert floor, slowing 
much faster than usual. Then she came to a complete stop within 1,500 feet in-
stead of the usual 5,000 feet.” When the nose gear had bottomed out, the fuselage 
literally broke in half at station 226.8, shearing out about 70% of the bolts at the 
manufacturing splice. The broken fuselage dug into the lakebed, creating a very 
effective brake .73  
 A contributing factor to the hard landing was the 15,138-pound touchdown 
weight. During development, engineers had established a limiting rate of sink of 
9 fps based on design weight of 11,500 pounds. However, the as-built airplane 
had increased to 13,230 pounds. In addition, Crossfield had been unable to jetti-
son some of the propellants because of the steep descending attitude necessary to 
reach the landing site, which further increased the landing weight. Crossfield later 
 
73 Crossfield, The Rocket Pilot; Gene J. Matranga, NASA technical note D-057, “Analysis of X-5 Landing Ap-
proach and Flare Characteristics Determined from the First 30 Flights,” July 96, pp. 3-; Crossfield, Always 
Another Dawn, pp. 38-382. Fuselage stations are measured in inches from a fixed point somewhat ahead of the 
nose of the aircraft.
A minor explosion during Flight 2-3-9 on 5 November 1959 resulted in an emergency landing on 
Rosamond Dry Lake that broke the back of  X-15-2. As built, the X-15 was heavier than originally 
intended, and it did not help that Scott Crossfield was unable to jettison all of  the unused propellants 
before the emergency landing. The airplane was repaired in time for its fourth flight on 11 February 
1960. (AFFTC History Office)
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stated that the damage was the result of a structural defect that probably should 
have broken on the first flight.74  
 Yet again, X-15-2 went to the Inglewood plant for repairs, and returned to 
Edwards in time for its fourth flight on 11 February 1960. North American re-
paired the damaged fuselage and strengthened the manufacturing splice by dou-
bling the number of fasteners and adding a doubler plate, top and bottom, at the 
fuselage joint. The company also modified the other two airplanes to prevent 
similar problems.75 
1960 FLIGHT PERIOD
 While X-15-2 was undergoing repairs, X-15-1 became the primary flight ve-
hicle and made its first powered flight on 23 January 1960. The performance of 
the airplane was beginning to show: Crossfield reached 1,669 mph (Mach 2.53) 
and 66,844 feet during 267.2 seconds of powered flight. Engineers installed the 
stable platform for the first time, and its performance was encouraging. This was 
also the first X-15 flight that used the NB-52B as a carrier aircraft. Tensions were 
beginning to ease, and Crossfield could not resist kidding around a bit with Q.C. 
Harvey, who was the ground controller for the flight. After the airplane landed, 
and before the convoy arrived on the scene, this was the radio chatter: Crossfield: 
“Does steer real good. Look at that. You can steer it all over. Want me to park it 
at NASA?” QC: “Yes, Scott.” Crossfield: “Oh, I’m in the mud. Bogged down.” 
QC: “Bogged down?” Crossfield: “Full in the mud.” QC: “Don’t do that to our 
lake Scott. Scott, you still with me? This is QC.” Crossfield: “Bet your life.” QC: 
“How badly dug in are you?” Crossfield: “I was just kidding you, buddy.”76  
 Under the terms of the contract, the X-15 “belonged” to North American 
until it demonstrated its basic airworthiness and operation. Everybody agreed this 
flight adequately satisfied the criteria, and although X-15-1 had made only two 
flights the government was anxious to get started. Engineers performed a pre-de-
livery inspection a few days after the flight, and on 3 February 1960 the Air Force 
formally accepted X-15-1 and subsequently turned the airplane over to NASA on 
long-term loan.77 
 With the earlier X-planes, the Air Force had conducted an envelope-expansion 
program before turning the research airplanes over to the NACA. For the X-15 
program, however, nobody could figure out how to expeditiously conduct the en-
velope-expansion and research programs in a serial manner, so the government 
decided to conduct them in parallel. After some initial organizational squabbles, 
7 Crossfield, The Rocket Pilots, 989; NASA technical note D-057, pp. 3-; letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. 
Jenkins, 2 August 2002.
75 Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” p. .
76 Radio transcript for X-5 no. , first powered flight (later redesignated flight -2-7). In the files at the DFRC His-
tory Office; “Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” 7 
November 96, p. . In the files at the AFFTC History Office.
77 “Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” 7 November 
96, p. .
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the Air Force and the NACA agreed to cooperate. The organizations selected two 
pilots to conduct the envelope expansion: Joseph A. Walker from NASA would 
concentrate on altitude expansion, and Major Robert M . White would conduct the 
high-speed flights. Four other pilots would be “checked out and utilized in a rou-
tine manner on research flights not directly involved with the expeditious expan-
sion of the X-15 flight envelope.” Paul Bikle believed that “the use of more than 
two pilots in the part of the program devoted to expanding the envelope cannot be 
justified from a technical standpoint and would seriously interfere with the timely 
completion of the research objectives associated with this part of the program.”78 
 Despite the generally good cooperation between NASA and the Air Force, 
occasionally minor disputes did pop up. One of these centered around which or-
ganization would make the first government flight in the X-15. Paul Bikle tells it 
best in the minutes of a 1 October 1959 meeting between himself and Brigadier 
General John W . Carpenter III, the commander of the AFFTC:79  
The point of which pilot would make the first flight in the first 
X-15 to be turned over to NASA was then raised . On the pro-
posed schedule, Walker was listed as the pilot . General Carpen-
ter felt that there was no technical reason why Walker should 
be selected instead of White and I agreed that this was the case. 
He felt that the Air Force had spent about one hundred mil-
lion dollars for the X-15 airplanes and that the Air Force was 
spending roughly four million dollars per year in support of 
the X-15 program and that, for this reason, the Air Force pilot 
should make the first flight so that the Air Force could extract 
the maximum benefits from the publicity which will be associ-
ated with the flight. I could appreciate his point of view but 
told him that NASA had conceived the program back in 1952, 
had devoted a large percentage of their efforts to the program 
over the past seven years, had the responsibility for conducting 
the research program, and I felt for these reasons it would be 
more appropriate for an NASA pilot to make the first flight. 
General Carpenter could appreciate my point of view on this 
and said that he would feel the same way if he was in my po-
sition . However, he could not accept this decision for the Air 
Force and he felt that we would have to agree to disagree on this 
point. He plans to contact Headquarters, ARDC and have them 
contact Headquarters, USAF to determine if the Air Force posi-
tion is such that they will bring the matter before the Research 
Airplane Committee. I would anticipate that the Air Force will 
78 Letter, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to NASA Headquarters (copy to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Committee). sub-
ject: Participation of USAF pilots in X-5 flights, 2 October 959; Letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 
August 2002. The other four pilots were Neil Armstrong, Jack McKay, Forrest Petersen, and Bob Rushworth.
79 Letter, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to NASA Headquarters (copy to Hartley A. Soulé/Research Airplane Committee), sub-
ject: Participation of USAF pilots in X-5 flights, 2 October 959. In the files at the DFRC History Office. Carpenter 
had replaced General Cooper as commander of the AFFTC in March 959. Cooper had come to the desert on  
July 957, and left to become assistant administrator of the FAA on 20 February 959. Carpenter arrived in March 
959 and left in June 96 for a tour at Air Force Headquarters.
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approach NASA Headquarters on this matter, probably at the 
Administrator’s level.80 
 There is no record that Carpenter officially brought the matter to the atten-
tion of Hartley Soulé and the Research Airplane Committee, or to T. Keith Glen-
nan, the NASA administrator at the time. Interestingly, Carpenter also did not 
agree with assigning specific flight profiles to each of the two pilots during the 
envelope-expansion program, believing that the pilots should each fly a portion 
of both types of flights. NASA had discussed this idea at some length on previ-
ous occasions, and always concluded it was better to assign a single pilot to each 
flight profile in order to gain experience more quickly. As it turned out, Walker 
and White would each fly both profiles. The X-15s, however, would be somewhat 
specialized: X-15-1 would be used to expand the flight envelope to the design 
objectives, while X-15-2 would be used for pilot familiarization and the early 
research flights.
 At the FRC itself, the X-15 program was having major impacts on the cul-
ture and staffing. To stay abreast of the workload, an increasing number of people 
at the FRC found themselves working on the X-15 program; within a year or two, 
it would seem that everybody at the FRC was working on the X-15. However, the 
increasing number of personnel and the visibility created by the program were 
driving away the informality that had traditionally characterized the desert facil-
ity. Walt Williams had thought nothing of issuing verbal instructions to a team 
of engineers, who in turn would ask technicians, flight crews, and mechanics for 
help as needed. This no longer worked. Paul Bikle needed to be able to trace the 
money. This meant paperwork such as had never been imagined at the FRC–pa-
per to monitor the intense contractor involvement, paper to monitor agreements 
with the Air Force, and paper to account for the progress of the flight program 
itself. In addition, more paper meant the need for more people to manage it, 
which itself meant more paper. It was a vicious circle, and the FRC would never 
be quite the same.81 
 When X-15-2 returned to Edwards, North American and the government 
struggled to get the ballistic control system operational. So far, neither airplane 
had required the system since the altitudes were low enough for the aerodynamic 
flight controls to remain effective. For a variety of reasons, the system proved 
unreliable, primarily because of leaks and poor centering characteristics in the 
metering valves. In fact, based on the difficulties in activating the system in the 
second airplane, NASA decided the initial XLR99 flights in X-15-3 would take 
place without the ballistic controls. To make matters worse, on 26 April 1960 the 
bladder inside the peroxide tank of X-15-2 failed, further delaying efforts.82 
80 The quote has some errors of fact in it. Brigadier General Marcus E. Cooper had stated at the rollout ceremony 
that the Air Force had spent $20 million on the program, not the $00 million used here. Records show that 
AFFTC was spending about $2.5 million per year at this point, not $ million. In addition, the NACA had conceived 
what became the X-5 program during 95, not 952, although the basic idea had been floated two years 
earlier. Still, the general sentiment of the meeting is insightful.
8 Michael H. Gorn, Expanding the Envelope: Flight Research at NACA and NASA (Lexington, KY: University Press 
of Kentucky, 200), p. 23.
82 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters,  May 960. In the files at the DFRC 
History Office.
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 In any event, Joe Walker made the first government X-15 flight (1-3-8) on 25 
March 1960 . The NB-52 dropped X-15-1 at Mach 0.82 and 45,500 feet, although 
the stable platform had malfunctioned just prior to release. Two restarts were re-
quired on the top XLR11 before all eight chambers were firing, and the flight 
lasted just over 9 minutes, reaching Mach 2.0 and 48,630 feet. Overall, Walker was 
impressed with the flight. The Air Force finally flew the airplane on 13 April 1960, 
when Bob White took X-15-1 to Mach 1.90 and 48,000 feet on flight 1-4-9.83 
 The next six months saw Walker and White taking turns flying X-15-1 . Most 
of the early flights flown with the XLR11 engines did not include an operable bal-
listic control system, mostly because there was no need for one and the program 
engineers had enough “new” things on their hands without worrying about sys-
tems they did not need. The ballistic control system used eight 113-lbf thrusters 
located in the nose (two pointed in each of the major directions) and two 40-lbf 
thrusters in each wing tip. Each of the nozzles used a 1.40-inch-diameter hole 
in the skin . The ballistic control system was always used whenever the dynamic 
pressure was below 25 psf (approximately 180,000 feet and above), although 
83 Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” p. ; Joseph A. Walker, “Pilot Report for Flight 
No. 3 (later redesignated -3-8),” 25 March 960; Robert M. White, “Pilot Report for Flight No. 2 (later redesig-
nated --9),” 3 April 960.
The predicted performance of  the XLR11 was, as could be expected, significantly lower than that of  
the XLR99. However, the XLR11 flight provided valuable experience in operating the airplane and 
uncovered many problems with various systems such as the stability augmentation system and auxiliary 
power units. The availability of  the interim engines allowed the program to be in a better position to 
exploit the performance of  the XLR99 once it arrived. (NASA)
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many pilots began using it as low as 100,000 feet (approximately 50 psf). At this 
pressure, the effectiveness of the ballistic controls approximated the effectiveness 
of the aerodynamic controls. The maximum propellant flow was 0.06 gallon per 
second for the pitch thrusters and 0.02 gallon per second for the roll thrusters. A 
typical high-altitude mission consumed about 2 gallons of hydrogen peroxide.84 
  On 5 May 1960, Scott Crossfield tested the ballistic control system for the first 
time, with X-15-2 securely mounted to the wing of the NB-52B. The flight suf-
fered an APU failure before launch and aborted back to Edwards (flight 2-A-17). 
Nevertheless, North American considered the ballistic control-system test suc-
cessful, but noted that the initial use of the upper nose thrusters coated the cockpit 
windscreen with peroxide, which promptly turned to opaque frost. Because the 
catalyst beds had not come up to temperature, the first use of the thrusters expelled 
a small amount of undecomposed hydrogen peroxide. The solution was simple: 
install heaters on the catalyst beds. This was accomplished on all three airplanes 
before the first free flight that used the ballistic controls.85  
 Surprisingly, there was still some debate over exactly how the ballistic con-
trol system should operate. North American conducted a series of studies in the 
fixed-base simulator to compare different techniques. These included having the 
thrusters operate proportionally to stick input, on-off at full thrust, or on-off at half 
thrust, and a proportional system with an on-off damping loop. The simulations 
used the baseline altitude mission to 250,000 feet with angles of attack varying 
between 5 and 25 degrees. Eventually North American and the government de-
cided the proportional system was best.86 
 Joe Walker made the first flight (1-7-12) from a remote location (instead of 
Rosamond) on 12 May 1960. The use of Silver Lake by this flight represented 
not only the first X-15 launch from a remote lake, but also the first launch of any 
rocket plane from a remote lake, since all previous X-plane flights took place over 
the Edwards reservation. The stable platform failed just before launch, and NASA 
had decided to omit the ballistic control system because of continuing problems, 
but all other systems performed satisfactorily. X-15-1 dropped away from the 
NB-52 at Mach 0.83 and 44,800 feet. Walker ignited all eight chambers on the two 
XLR11s, and set an 8-degree angle of attack to a maximum altitude of 77,882 feet. 
After a pushover at peak altitude and entry into a slight dive, the aircraft acceler-
ated more than expected. Walker turned off three chambers of the XLR11, but this 
resulted in an abrupt deceleration that caused the propellant pumps to cavitate and 
the other five chambers to shut down seconds later. Walker reached a maximum 
speed of Mach 3.19, marking the first Mach 3+ flight for the X-15 program. Dur-
ing this flight, Walker recalled, his “intention to utilize the side stick for some 
evaluation during the glide back to base was abandoned after being initiated as 
8 George B. Merrick, North American, “X-5 Controlled in Space by Reaction-Control Rocket System,” SAE Journal, 
August 960, pp. 38-; Robert D. Reed and Joe D. Watts, “Skin and Structural Temperatures Measured on the 
X-5 Airplane During a Flight to Mach Number of 3.3,” NASA confidential technical memorandum X-68, Janu-
ary 96, pp. 2-3; Bruce O. Wagner, “X-5 Auxiliary Power Units and Reaction Controls,” a paper in the 1958 
Research Airplane Committee Report, p. 303. The Bell Aircraft-developed “ring-slot pintle” nozzles had a relatively 
high heat capacity and caused local heat-sink effects in the skin around them. But they were the only nozzles that 
were thin enough to fit in the wing without some sort of fairing and the attendant aero-thermal problems.
85 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 5 May 960, p. 7.
86 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters,  June 960, p. 5.
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a result of very strained arm position required in order to grasp the hand grip of 
the control stick and it was thought that any evaluation of its capabilities would 
be clouded by this aspect.” Walker concluded with, “Having established that the 
powerplant can be started dependably and that the systems function adequately 
in the aircraft, it is felt that the remote lake launching yields the desired benefits 
of performance and resulting expansion of the envelope at rather small cost of 
operational complications.”87 
 The XLR11 flight profiles–both speed and altitude–differed from those 
achieved later with the XLR99 because of the lower available thrust and slower 
speed buildup. Eventually, 30 flights used the interim XLR11 engines. X-15-1 
would make 21 of these flights, while the other nine would be flown by X-15-2 . 
The third X-15 was equipped with the XLR99 engine from the start. In general 
the XLR11 flights stayed below 100,000 feet, although several were barely above 
that altitude and Bob White took X-15-1 to 136,500 feet on 12 August 1960 (flight 
1-10-19), establishing a new altitude record for piloted aircraft. The maximum 
speed recorded with the XLR11 engines was Mach 3.50 (2,275 mph) on flight 
1-21-36, again with Bob White at the controls.88 
 For the XLR11 altitude missions, the NB-52 generally launched the X-15 
approximately 100 miles from Edwards on a near straight-in heading at an alti-
tude of approximately 45,000 feet and a launch speed of Mach 0.85. This was the 
scenario for Bob White’s record flight: After separating from the NB-52, White 
started all eight chambers and initiated a climb at the maximum lift-drag ratio 
by flying at a nearly constant 8 degrees angle of attack. As the airplane neared 
60,000 feet, White brought it to level flight and increased to Mach 1.9. He then 
initiated a 1.5-g pull-up to an angle of attack of 15–19 degrees. This condition 
simplified the longitudinal piloting task, although the stick force was still high, 
but complicated the roll control task because of the limited available differential 
control. Propellant exhaustion occurred 256.2 seconds after engine ignition at an 
altitude of 116,500 feet and a Mach number of 1.93. The aircraft continued bal-
listic over the top, with White decreasing the angle of attack to about 10 degrees. 
The deflection of the stabilizer initiated a ±4 degree pitching oscillation with a 
period of about 8 seconds, but the combined efforts of White and the pitch damper 
managed to reduce this to ±1 degree after four cycles. The flight reached a maxi-
mum pressure altitude of 133,900 feet at a static pressure of 5.6 psf. Based on the 
U.S. extension to the ICAO atmosphere charts, this corresponded to 136,500 feet 
geometric altitude. The Mach number at the peak altitude was 1.63 at a dynamic 
pressure of 10.6 psf. The nominal acceleration remained below 0.1 g for 57 sec-
onds at an angle of attack of 11 degrees. During reentry the airplane experienced a 
maximum dynamic pressure of 785 psf until White came level at 46,000 feet and 
began preparing for his landing.89  
 
87 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters,  June 960, p. 2; Joseph A. Walker, 
“Pilot Report for Flight No. 5 (later redesignated -7-2),” 2 May 960.
88 One of the 2 X-5- flights was unpowered, although the XLRs were physically installed in the airplane.
89 Euclid C. Holleman and Donald Reisert, NASA confidential technical memorandum X-5, “Controllability of the 
X-5 Research Airplane with Interim Engines During High Altitude Flights,” March 96, pp. 6-7.
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The XLR99 Arrives
 The first ground-test XLR99 (s/n 101) arrived at Edwards on 7 June 1959, 
and the first hot test was accomplished without an actual X-15 at the Rocket En-
gine Test Facility on 26 August 1959. X-15-3 arrived at Edwards on 29 June 1959 . 
It was essentially identical to the other two airplanes in that it was equipped with 
a standard Westinghouse stability augmentation system, a stable platform, and a 
normal cockpit instrument panel. What made it different, at this point, was that it 
had the XLR99 engine. X-15-3 was never equipped with the XLR11 engines. At 
the same time, North American removed the second X-15 from flight status after 
its ninth flight (2-9-18) on 26 April 1960 in anticipation of replacing the XLR11 
engines with the XLR99. This left only X-15-1 on active flight status, although 
the XLR99-powered X-15-3 would soon be joining it.90 
 North American made the first ground run with the XLR99 in X-15-3 on 2 
June 1960 at the PSTS. Subsequent inspection revealed damage to the liquid-
oxygen inlet line brackets, the result of an unexpected, but easily corrected, wa-
ter-hammer effect. After repairs were completed, the company conducted another 
ground run with satisfactory results. For all of the ground runs during the program, 
a pilot had to be in the cockpit since the nearby blockhouse could not operate the 
engine by remote control. For the early tests, the pilot was Scott Crossfield, al-
though all of the pilots would participate in ground runs prior to their first flights. 
The MC-2 full-pressure suit was an order of magnitude more comfortable than 
earlier pressure suits, but Crossfield still had little desire to wear it more than 
necessary. Since there was no need for altitude protection during the engine runs 
on the ground, Crossfield generally wore street clothes in the cockpit . All other 
personnel required for the tests were in the blockhouse, with the exception of Air 
Force fire crews a relatively safe distance away.91 
 The third ground run began on 8 June at approximately 1930 hours. The 
objectives were to demonstrate the restart capability and throttling characteristics 
of the XLR99. All pre-test operations, servicing, and APU starts were successful 
and all systems were operating normally. The engine was primed, set to idle, and 
then ignited at 50% thrust. After the chamber pressure stabilized for 7 seconds, 
Crossfield advanced the throttle to 100% for 5 seconds and then moved the throt-
tle to idle for 5 seconds before shutting down the engine. Nobody noted anything 
abnormal during these events. After 15 seconds, Crossfield moved the throttle to 
the 50% position. The turbopump started normally, first-and second-stage ignition 
occurred, and the main chamber start appeared normal. After the main chamber 
pressure stabilized, it rapidly fell off and the engine shut down automatically. At 
this time, a valve malfunction light came on in the cockpit, so Crossfield moved 
the throttle to the off position and the light went out. In order to restart the XLR99 
90 E-mail, Bill Arnold (Reaction Motors) to Dennis R. Jenkins, various dates in September 2002. North American oper-
ated the PSTS until it turned over the last XLR99-equipped airplane to the government. At that time, the AFFTC 
Rocket Engine Group under the maintenance division took over the operation and maintenance of the PSTS and 
all engine maintenance and overhaul. NASA performed all engine operations, including minor engine maintenance, 
while the engine was installed in the airplanes. The lack of the MH-96 in X-5-3 at this point can be derived from 
various documents, but it was confirmed by Scott Crossfield in an e-mail to the author on 28 May 2002.
9 Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, p. 00; telephone conversation, Scott Crossfield with Dennis R. Jenkins, 8 
August 2002.
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after a malfunction shutdown, the pilot had to push a switch that reset the auto-
matic safety devices. As Crossfield wrote in his accident statement, “the reset 
button was depressed at which time the airplane blew up.” It was approximately 
1945 hours .92 
 Crossfield later observed, “During this entire sequence except for the mal-
function shut down, there was no evidence in the cockpit of difficulty.” The ex-
plosion appeared to be centered forward of the engine compartment, and caused 
the aircraft to separate around fuselage station 483.5, just forward of the liquid-
oxygen tank. Don Richter, who was in the main blockhouse, indicated that he 
observed the explosion originating 5 feet forward from the aft end of the airplane, 
with the fireball quickly expanding to about 30 feet in diameter.93 
 The explosion threw the entire forward fuselage about 30 feet forward. 
Crossfield said, “In the explosion, which is not describable, the cockpit translated 
abruptly forward and to the right with an acceleration beyond the experience of 
this pilot.” The basic X-15 airframe had been designed–largely at Crossfield’s 
urging–to protect the pilot in case of an emergency; it appeared to work well. 
Ever the competent test pilot, Crossfield turned on his Scott airpack, turned off 
the engine switches, and pulled all the circuit breakers. He attempted to contact 
personnel inside the blockhouse, but the explosion had severed communications 
with the ground.94 
 The fire truck that had been standing by was on the scene within 30 seconds, 
water pouring from its overhead nozzle, and a second fire truck arrived a minute 
or two later to help extinguish the fires. Art Simone and a suited fireman rushed to 
the cockpit and Crossfield was rescued uninjured. Simone had inhaled ammonia 
fumes and received minor burns to his hands, but suffered no lasting effects. The 
fires were largely out within a few minutes of the explosion, and Crossfield was 
safe . It was time to figure out what had happened.95 
 Representatives from the Edwards provost marshal’s office, the North Ameri-
can industrial security office, and the Edwards air police arrived on the scene and 
roped off the area pending an investigation. Around 2110 hours, North American 
photographer Stan Brusto arrived to photograph the wreckage; after this was com-
plete, the Air Force removed the data recorders from the aircraft for analysis. The 
air police withdrew after putting into place procedures to limit access to the area, 
leaving one fire truck on standby just in case. Personnel spent the next 24 hours 
finding all the bits and pieces blown from the aircraft, tagging them, and preparing 
to move the remains of the aircraft back to Inglewood. Major Arthur Murray from 
the X-15 project office authorized the move on 10 June.96 
 Engineers removed the XLR99 from the wreckage on 13 June and took it to 
hangar 1870 at Edwards for inspection. North American transported the remains 
of X-15-3 by truck from Edwards on 15 June, parking overnight at the intersection 
92 Accident investigation report 60-RWRL-568, not dated, no page numbers. In the files at the AFFTC Access to 
Space Office Project Files. The general scenario was confirmed during a telephone conversation, Scott Crossfield 
with Dennis R. Jenkins, 8 August 2002.
93 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
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of Sepulveda and San Bernardo Road before continuing on to Inglewood on 16 
June .97  By 4 August the company had assessed the damage and determined that 
the airframe would have to be replaced from fuselage station 331.9 aft. The dor-
sal and ventral stabilizers, all four speed brakes, both horizontal stabilizers, both 
main landing skids, and both propellant tanks would be replaced. The company 
considered the wings repairable, as were the APUs and stable platform. All of the 
miscellaneous equipment in the rear and center fuselage, along with most of the 
research instrumentation in the aft fuselage, also required replacement. Reaction 
Motors did not consider the XLR99 repairable, although the company salvaged 
some parts for future use. The Rocket Engine Test Facility required major repairs, 
but was back on line by the end of June.98 
 Subsequent investigation revealed that the initiating cause of the explosion 
was an overpressurization of the ammonia tank. Because of the toxic nature of 
ammonia fumes, the Air Force had incorporated a vapor-disposal system into the 
PSTS to allow the ammonia fumes to be vented from the airplane during engine 
testing without endangering people. Essentially the disposal system consisted of a 
90-foot pipe that connected the airplane ammonia vent to a water pond where the 
ammonia was diluted. At the time of the explosion, the ammonia tank pressurizing 
gas regulator froze or stuck in the open position while the vent valve was operating 
erratically or modulating only partially open. North American had considered this 
condition a potential failure on the airplane itself, and had addressed the problem 
during development. However, when combined with the back pressure created by 
the vapor-disposal system attached to the ammonia vent, the tank pressure surged 
high enough to rupture the tank. In the process, debris damaged the hydrogen-per-
oxide tank, and the mixing of the peroxide and ammonia caused an explosion.99 
 Post-accident analysis indicated that there were no serious design flaws in 
either the XLR99 or the X-15. The Air Force determined that the cause of the 
accident was a failure of the pressure regulator, exacerbated by the unique con-
figuration required for the ground test. Nevertheless, North American devised 
several modifications to preclude similar failures in the future. These included 
redesigning the pressurizing gas regulator to reduce maximum flow through an 
inoperable regulator, providing the regulator with additional closing forces in the 
event of freezing, relocating the regulator to minimize the chances of moisture 
accumulation and subsequent freezing, and redesigning the relief valve and its 
surrounding plumbing.100 
 Rebuilding the aircraft was not as straightforward as it sounded. Besides the 
estimated $4.75 million cost, there would be a considerable delay in obtaining 
suitable replacement parts. The X-15s were not mass-produced items, and struc-
tural spares were nonexistent. The time required to repair the airplane meant it 
would miss most of the envelope expansion program and was, therefore, some-
what redundant . 
97 This was to ease traffic problems in the area.
98 Accident investigation report 60-RWRL-568; X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Head-
quarters,  July 960, p. 5.
99 Lawrence P. Greene and Rolland L. Benner, “X-5 Experience from the Designer’s Viewpoint,” a paper in the 1961 
Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 35-36.
00 Ibid, pp. 35-36.
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 There had been considerable interest in testing a new Minneapolis-Honeywell 
MH-96 adaptive flight control system in a high-speed vehicle prior to its use on 
the X-20 Dyna-Soar. Given the unfortunate event, the Air Force took this oppor-
tunity to modify X-15-3 to include the system. Complicating this was the fact the 
X-15 program was operating under a “reduced budget”–$8.6 million for FY61 
instead of the $10.5 million that had been requested. However, the X-15 pro-
gram still enjoyed considerable support within the Pentagon, and in early August, 
Air Force Headquarters authorized the ARDC to release $1 million from existing 
funds (i.e., the $8.6 million) to cover the procurement of long lead items needed 
for the repairs. The remaining $3.75 million, along with the restoration of the 
$1.9 million removed from the program earlier, was to follow “at a later date.” In 
the interim, the Pentagon directed the X-15 program to “operate on a fiscal 1961 
schedule compatible with … funds of $10.5 million plus an additional $4.75 mil-
lion to cover the repair of the damaged aircraft.” Although money never came 
easily for the X-15 program, it always came.101 
  
0 Clarence J. Geiger, Albert E. Misenko, and William D. Putnam, “History of the Wright Air Development Division: 
July 960-March 96,” AFSC historical publication 6-50-2, August 96, pp. I-38 to I-0. In the files at the Air 
Force Historical Research Agency (K23.0).
Scott Crossfield was at the controls of  X-15-3 when it suffered a catastrophic explosion during a ground 
run of  the XLR99. Fortunately, Crossfield was not injured. Subsequent investigation showed there was 
nothing wrong with either the engine or airframe design and that the explosion had been caused by the failure 
of  a minor component and the unique configuration required for ground testing. The X-15-3 was subse-
quently rebuilt to include the advanced MH-96 adaptive flight control system. (AFFTC History Office)
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 On 10 August, the Air Materiel Command requested that North American 
submit an estimate for the repair of X-15-3. Twelve days later the Air Materiel 
Command ordered the repair using the $1 million authorized by the Pentagon, 
and North American proceeded with the work. The company estimated that the 
aircraft could be completed in August 1961 and available for flight in October. 
The Pentagon came through at the end of March 1961, funding the X-15 program 
at $15.25 million–the original $10.5 million request plus the cost of rebuilding the 
damaged airplane.102 
 The new money allowed the AFFTC to increase the propellants it had ordered 
because of 1) the high consumption of propellants required for component testing 
at the PSTS, 2) the high level of development testing of the APU and ballistic con-
trol system, and 3) the increased development testing of the XLR99 at the Rocket 
Engine Test Facility. A quick review shows the quantities and costs involved in 
this usually overlooked matter:103 
Item Original FY61 Revised FY61
Alcohol (gal) 48,000 @ $0.51 = $24,480 60,000 @ $0.51 = $30,600
Ammonia (gal) 140,000  @  $0.28  =  $39,200 256,000  @  $0.28  =  $71,680
Peroxide (lbs) 261,000  @  $0.60  =  $156,600 420,000 @  $0.60  =  $252,000
Helium (sfc) 2,400,000  @  $0.02  =  $48,000 5,400,000  @  $0.02  =  $108,000
Nitrogen (tons) 1,500  @  $15.00  =  $22,500 3,500  @  $15.00  =  $52,500
 At Inglewood, North American was installing the XLR99 in X-15-2 and in-
corporating several other changes at the same time. These included a revised vent 
system in the fuel tanks as an additional precaution against another explosion, 
revised ballistic control system components, and provisions to install the ball nose 
instead of the flight-test boom used so far in the program. The company had been 
looking to conduct the first flight in early September, but discovered corrosion in 
the engine hydrogen-peroxide tank. While North American was taking care of the 
corrosion, Reaction Motors tore down one of the ground-test engines to determine 
the condition of the individual components after 2 hours of engine operation. The 
inspection revealed no outstanding deficiencies or indications of excessive wear, 
clearing the way for the first X-15 flight with the million-horsepower engine.104 
 The installation of the ball nose presented its own challenges since it had 
no capability to determine airspeed. The possibility of a failure in the ball-nose 
steering mechanism also made it unsuitable as a total-pressure port to derive air-
speed. The X-15 was designed with an alternate airspeed probe just forward of 
the cockpit, although two other locations–one well forward on the bottom cen-
terline of the aircraft, and one somewhat aft near the centerline–had also been 
02 Ibid, pp. I-38 to I-0.
03 ARDC Form , Management Report, “X-5 Research Aircraft,” 5 August 960, signed by Colonel Carl A. 
Ousley, Deputy Chief of Staff/Operations, AFFTC. In the files at the AFFTC History office.
0 William Beller, “Turbopump Key to New X-5 Engine,” Missiles and Space, 5 August 960, p. 33; James E. 
Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” not dated, p. 7. In the files at the DFRC History 
Office.
X-15: EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
considered. Several early flights compared the data available from each location, 
while relying on the data provided by the airspeed sensors on the flight-test boom 
protruding from the extreme nose. The primary location exhibited some velocity-
indication sensitivity at speeds over 345 mph and angles of attack over 4 degrees. 
At 8 degrees alpha the indicated airspeeds were generally about 25 mph low. The 
tests indicated that the data from all three locations were about the same, so the 
engineers decided to retain the original location. An interesting discovery was 
that the error was substantially less after the ball nose was installed, which led to 
a theory that the extended nose boom was contributing to the errors. Fortunately, 
the airspeed indications were consistent at the speeds and angles of attack en-
countered in the landing pattern, so researchers simply adjusted the instruments 
to compensate. After NASA installed the ball nose, engineers compared angle-of-
attack data (based on the horizontal stabilizer position) with those from previous 
flights using the flight-test boom. The data were generally in good agreement, 
clearing the way for operational use of the ball nose .105 
Back to Flying
 In its own way, the X-15 program was “politically correct,” even if the term 
did not yet exist. Paul Bikle had decided that a NASA pilot should make the first 
government X-15 flight, but he would later give the honor of performing the first 
government XLR99 flight to an Air Force pilot. The initial piloting duties were 
split evenly between one NASA pilot and one Air Force pilot. It seemed only fit-
ting, therefore, that the third government pilot to qualify in the X-15 should be 
from the Navy.
 Forrest Petersen checked out in the airplane while Joe Walker and Bob White 
conducted the envelope-expansion phase with the XLR11 engine. Like all of the 
early pilot familiarization flights, Petersen’s first flight would be low and slow, if 
that describes Mach 2 and 50,000 feet. The flight plan showed Petersen launching 
over Palmdale, heading toward Boron, turning left to fly back toward Mojave, 
and making another left turn toward Edwards. The launch went well, but as the 
airplane approached Boron the upper engine began to fail; soon it stopped alto-
gether. Petersen reported that he “believed erroneously that the lower engine was 
still running, but the inability to hold altitude, and airspeed variations from values 
expected for single engine operation forced the pilot to the inevitable conclusion 
that both engines were shut down.” Milt Thompson, who was NASA-1 for the 
flight, advised Petersen to head directly for Rogers Dry Lake. Petersen arrived at 
high key with only 25,000 feet altitude, much lower than desired, and Joe Walker 
tucked a chase plane into formation and coached Petersen through a tight turn 
onto final. The landing was almost perfect, and Petersen handled the entire in-
cident with his usual aplomb. Petersen’s final report was understated: “Nothing 
during the flight surprised the pilot with the exception of early engine shutdown.” 
The only Navy pilot was an excellent addition to the team.106 
05 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 3 January 96, pp. 3- and 28 
February 96, p. 3.
06 Lieutenant Commander Forrest S. Petersen, “Pilot Report for Flight -3-25,” 23 September 960. In the files at 
the DFRC History Office; Thompson, At the Edge of Space, pp. 93-9.
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 It was time for Crossfield to go back to work with the ultimate engine. The 
first flight attempt of X-15-2 with the XLR99 was on 13 October 1960, but a 
peroxide leak in the no. 2 APU ended the day prior to launch. Just to show how 
many things can go wrong on a single flight, there was also liquid-oxygen im-
pingement on the aft fuselage during the prime cycle, manifold pressure fluc-
tuations during engine turbopump operation, and fuel-tank pressure fluctuations 
during the jettison cycle. Two weeks later, Crossfield again entered the cockpit 
with the goal of making the first XLR99 flight. More problems with the no. 2 
APU forced an abort .
 On 15 November 1960, everything went right and Crossfield made the first 
flight (2-10-21) of X-15-2 powered by the XLR99. The primary flight objective 
was to demonstrate engine operation at 50% thrust. The launch was at Mach 0.83 
and 46,000 feet, and the X-15 managed to climb to 81,200 feet and Mach 2.97 us-
ing somewhat less than half the available power. The second XLR99 flight (2-11-
22) tested the engine’s restart and throttling capability. Crossfield made the flight 
on 22 November, again using the second X-15. During the post-flight inspection 
of the aircraft and its engine, engineers found that, like most of the ground-test 
engines, the XLR99 was beginning to shed some of the Rokide coating on the 
exhaust nozzle.107  
 Despite being fast-paced, the X-15 program was never reckless. As North 
American prepared X-15-2 for its next flight during December 1960, AFFTC 
commander Brigadier General John Carpenter heard rumors about the Rokide 
coating and called a meeting to discuss the matter. Representatives from the Air 
Force, NASA, North American, and Reaction Motors were present. Each gave 
his opinion, which was that it appeared safe to continue . Carpenter dismissed 
the meeting but asked Scott Crossfield and Harrison Storms to stay. During this 
session he questioned Crossfield on his feelings about making the flight given 
the condition of the engine. Scott did not show any concern and indicated he 
was willing to go ahead with the flight. Carpenter excused Crossfield but asked 
Storms to stay.108 
 Storms recalled, “When we were alone, General Carpenter asked my opin-
ion. I told him that earlier this day on my arrival at Edwards that I had inspected 
the thrust chamber in question and did not have any great concerns. Yes, some 
of the insulation was gone, but not to any great extent and the individual areas 
were small. It had not all been lost in one area, but the loss was fairly evenly well 
distributed over the entire area. Further, it certainly had not caused any negative 
comments from the manufacturer or their test engineers. The General’s comment 
was, ‘Very well, we will make it a joint decision to proceed with the flight.’ … 
Seriously, there is a point to be made here. That is, there is a very fine line be-
tween stopping progress and being reckless. That the necessary ingredient in this 
situation of solving a sticky problem is attitude and approach. The answer, in my 
opinion, is what I refer to as ‘thoughtful courage.’ If you don’t have that, you will 
very easily fall into the habit of ‘fearful safety’ and end up with a very long and 
tedious-type solution at the hands of some committee. This can very well end up 
07 Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” pp. 5-6.
08 Storms, “X-5 Hardware Design Challenges,” pp. 32-33.
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giving a test program a disease commonly referred to as ‘cancelitis,’ which results 
in little or no progress.” It was an excellent observation, and is as applicable today 
as it was in 1960 .109 
 With the blessing of Carpenter and Storms, North American conducted the 
third and final XLR99 demonstration flight (2-12-23) using X-15-2 on 6 Decem-
ber 1960. Crossfield successfully accomplished the engine-throttling, shutdown, 
and restart objectives. This marked the last X-15 flight for North American Avia-
tion and Scott Crossfield. The job of flying the X-15 was now totally in the hands 
of the government test pilots. Crossfield, the engineer, transferred to testing the 
Hound Dog cruise missile and then to the Apollo program.110 
 After this flight, the program established a work schedule that would allow an 
early XLR99 flight with a government pilot using North American maintenance 
personnel. Bob White would make the flight as early as 21 December 1960, as-
suming North American could accomplish the necessary maintenance work in 
time. This included replacing the engine, which had suffered excessive chamber 
coating loss; installing redesigned canopy hooks and a reinforced vertical sta-
bilizer; rearranging the alternate airspeed system; and relocating the ammonia 
tank helium pressure regulator into the fixed portion of the upper vertical. The 
company made good progress until engineers found a pinhole leak in the chamber 
throat of the replacement engine during a ground run. Although Reaction Motors 
considered the leak acceptable, it became increasingly worse during a subsequent 
test . Since a spare XLR99 was not available, the program canceled the flight and 
established a schedule to deliver the aircraft to the government prior to another 
flight. As a result, North American formally delivered X-15-2 to the Air Force and 
turned the airplane over to NASA on 7 February 1961. On the same day, X-15-1 
was returned to the North American plant for conversion to the XLR99, having 
completed the last XLR11 flight (1-21-36) of the program the day before with Bob 
White at the controls .111 
 The first two years of the flight program showed five major reasons for flight 
cancellations: problems with the APUs and their fuel system, XLR11 problems, 
propellant system (less engine) difficulties, weather, and heating and ventilation 
troubles. When the ultimate engine came on line, the top five reasons changed 
slightly to XLR99 problems, propulsion system (less engine) difficulties, miscel-
laneous, problems with the APU and its fuel system, and stable platform failures. 
It was not surprising that the engine became a major source of delays, since the 
XLR99 was a major leap forward in rocket engine technology and growing pains 
were to be expected. Many of the propulsion-system problems were a direct result 
of the XLR99, such as some plastic seal materials being incompatible with anhy-
drous ammonia. Although the XLR99 was performing satisfactorily in flight, by 
09 Ibid.
0 Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” pp. 5-6.
 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 30 December 960, pp. ; North Ameri-
can report NA-65-, “X-5 Research Airplane Flight Record,” revised 5 May 968; “Advanced Development Plan 
for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” 7 November 96, p. . The North American 
report says that X-5-2 was delivered on 8 February 96; the Air Force report says 7 February. Engine 03 was 
removed and replaced with engine 0. These were the only two flight engines available at the time (05 had been 
destroyed in the X-5-3 ground accident, 06 and 08 were in acceptance testing, and 07, 09, and  were 
in assembly).
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the end of December 1960, maintenance personnel had discovered ammonia leaks 
in the thrust chambers of three engines. Reaction Motors dispatched technicians 
to Edwards to correct the problems while the Air Force, NASA, North American, 
and Reaction Motors all looked for a cause .112 
 From the beginning of the X-15 flight program in 1959 until the end of 1960, 
seven pilots had made 31 flights with the first two airplanes. The NB-52s had 
carried the two X-15s 55 times, including two scheduled captive flights and 22 
aborted launch attempts. However, X-15-1 was experiencing an odd problem. 
When the pilot started the APU, the hydraulic pressure was either slow in coming 
up or dropped off out of limits when he moved the control surfaces. The solution 
to the problem was found after researchers placed additional instrumentation on 
the hydraulic system. The bootstrap line that pressurized the hydraulic reservoir 
was freezing, causing a flow restriction or stoppage. Under these conditions the 
hydraulic pump would cavitate, resulting in little or no pressure rise. The apparent 
cause of this problem was the addition of a liquid-nitrogen line to cool the stable 
platform. Since North American had installed the nitrogen line adjacent to the hy-
draulic lines, it caused the Orinite hydraulic oil to freeze. The solution was to add 
2 Geiger et al., “History of the Wright Air Development Division: July 960-March 96,” pp. I-8 to I-5; James E. 
Love and John A. Palmer, “Operational Reliability Experience with the X-5 aircraft,” a paper in the 1961 Research 
Airplane Committee Report, pp. 279-280.
Major Robert M. White flew the last XLR11 flight of  the program (1-21-36) on 7 February 1961. 
This was the fastest XLR11 flight, reaching 2,275 mph and Mach 3.50. Six months earlier White 
had gone to 136,500 feet using the XLR11s. Bob White holds the distinction of  being the first man 
to fly Mach 3, Mach 4, Mach 5, and Mach 6, and the first pilot to fly to 200,000 feet and 300,000 
feet, all in the X-15. (NASA)
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electric heaters to the affected hydraulic lines, since there was not enough room in 
the side tunnel to separate the lines sufficiently to prevent the problem. 
 Some problems defied all efforts to fix them. For example, North American 
tested the APU and its fuel system for many hours on an exact replica of the 
airplane installation. Yet, over the course of the program, the APUs caused more 
schedule delays and cancellations than any other system. One of the major prob-
lems was a critical pressure switch. Although the switch had been thoroughly (and 
correctly) qualified by the vendor, the program had to replace it by the dozen. 
Even with improvements, the switch continued to be a problem.113 
 Paul Bikle closed the year by saying that he was generally pleased with the 
progress made: “The data coverage within this envelope has been fairly complete 
in the areas of performance, flight dynamics, control, and structural loads, but 
somewhat limited in structural heating due to the low heating rates encountered.” 
Bikle cautioned, however, that the short duration and transient nature of each 
flight had generally precluded the acquisition of extensive or systematic mea-
surements under selected flight conditions, as was possible with conventionally 
powered aircraft .114 
1961 FLIGHT PERIOD
 The first government flight (2-13-26) with the XLR99 finally took place on 
7 March 1961 with Bob White at the controls. This was the first time a manned 
aircraft had flown faster than Mach 4, reaching Mach 4.43 and 77,450 feet. The 
objectives of the flight were to obtain additional aerodynamic and structural 
heating data, as well as information on stability and control of the aircraft at high 
speeds. The flight was generally satisfactory. Post-flight examination showed a 
limited amount of buckling to the side-fuselage tunnels, attributed to thermal 
expansion (the temperature difference between the tunnel panels and the primary 
fuselage structure was close to 500°F). The damage was not significant because 
the panels only carried air loads and were not primary structure. However, the 
buckling continued to become more severe as Mach numbers increased in later 
flights, and eventually NASA elected to install additional expansion joints to 
minimize the buckling.115 
 It was a complicated ballet, and many things could go wrong. On 21 March, 
Joe Walker took off in X-15-2 mated to the NB-52B (2-A-27). The telemetry sys-
tem failed soon after takeoff, and the NB-52B landed with the hope of affecting 
a repair for another attempt later in the day. Unfortunately, during the landing the 
NB-52 drogue chute failed to operate properly, resulting in damage to the chute 
compartment. Heavy braking was required, causing the brakes on the forward 
3 Love and Palmer, “Operational Reliability Experience with the X-5 aircraft,” pp. 280-28.
 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 30 December 960, pp. 2.
5 James E. Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” not dated, p. 20. In the files at the 
DFRC History Office; letter, Major General Robert M. White (USAF, Retired) to Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 June 2002.
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truck to overheat and the safety fuses of the tires to blow to relieve the air pres-
sure. The repairs took a week. During the next attempt, on 29 March, a failure 
in the NB-52 landing-gear steering mechanism–possibly a residual effect of the 
earlier landing incident–delayed the flight for a day.116 
 Joe Walker’s flight (2-14-28) on 30 March 1961 marked the first Hidden Hills 
launch and the first use of the new David Clark A/P22S-2 full-pressure suit instead 
of the earlier MC-2. Walker reported that the suit was much more comfortable 
and afforded better vision. The flight began rather inauspiciously with an engine 
failure immediately after the NB-52 released the X-15, but Walker successfully 
restarted the XLR99. During the “coast” portion of the flight between 100,000 
feet and 169,000 feet, Walker experienced about 2 minutes of weightlessness, a 
new record for piloted aircraft. However, the flight revealed a potential problem 
with the stability augmentation system: as Walker descended through 100,000 
feet, a heavy vibration occurred and continued for about 45 seconds until Walker 
recovered at 55,000 feet. The vibration included incremental acceleration of ap-
proximately 1 g in the vertical and transverse axes at a frequency of 13 cps, cor-
responding to the first bending mode of the horizontal stabilizer. This was one of 
the first cases of “structural resonance” for the X-15.117  
 Structural resonance can occur when high-gain feedback control systems 
are linked to lightly damped (welded) structural components, and happens when 
a control system sensor (in this case a pitch-rate gyro) detects motion at some 
structural mode frequency and then commands a surface actuator to move at that 
frequency, thus sustaining the oscillation. The motion transmits directly through 
the vehicle structure and does not require any aerodynamic response. Program 
personnel had observed this particular oscillation following one landing and dur-
ing ground tests on the landing gear.118  
 Engineers originally thought it was associated with landing-gear modes and 
did not expect it to occur in flight. Subsequent analysis showed the SAS pitch 
gyro sustained the vibration at the natural frequency of the horizontal stabilizer. 
Essentially, the oscillations began because of the increased activity of the controls 
on reentry, which excited the oscillation and stopped after the pilot reduced the 
pitch-damper gain.119  
 The Air Force, NASA, North American, and Westinghouse (the manufacturer 
of the SAS) discussed two possible solutions for the vibration problem: a notch 
filter for the SAS, and a pressure-derivative feedback valve for the horizontal sta-
bilizer hydraulic actuator. The notch filter eliminated SAS control surface input at 
13 cps, and the feedback valve damped the stabilizer-bending mode. In essence, 
the valve corrected the source of the problem, while the notch filter avoided the 
problem. Although it was believed that either solution would likely affect a cure, 
the final decision was to use both. The Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory conducted 
6 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 3 April 96, pp. -2.
7 Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” p. 2; Geiger et al., “History of the Wright Air 
Development Division: July 960-March 96,” pp. I-5 to I-52.; letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 
August 2002.
8 Letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 August 2002.
9 Joseph A. Walker, “Pilot Report for Flight 2--28,” 3 April 96; letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 
August 2002.
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an independent assessment of the SAS, specifically looking at the two solutions to 
the vibration problem. The preliminary results from Cornell agreed with the as-
sessments of Westinghouse and the FRC; however, no final record of the Cornell 
results could be ascertained .120  
 Joe Walker’s flight took place five weeks before Alan Shepard’s subor-
bital Mercury flight in Freedom 7, and was of great interest to the media and 
the public . Congressman Roman Pucinski (D-IL) asked Walker to write a short 
report on his impressions of the flight. Paul Bikle forwarded the report to Dr . 
Charles H. Roadman, the acting director of the Office of Life Science Programs at 
NASA Headquarters:121
 
I had plenty of time at the peak of the trajectory to make outside 
observations. The most impressive observation initially was the 
aspect of the sky overhead. The color I would describe as being 
a very deep violet blue, not indicative of a black shading, but an 
extremely dark bluish cast….
The next thing is that you have no doubt from external visual 
cues that you’re really high up … No difficulty is experienced in 
observing and identifying geographical features on the surface 
of the Earth particularly in areas with which one is familiar. An 
outstanding aspect of this is the appreciation of relative heights 
or elevations; different levels of the surface . Mountains still 
stand out as mountains and looking down into the Los Angeles 
Basin, I could tell the smog as distinct from some low stra-
tocumulus clouds along the seacoast. Areas which are heavily 
forested or under agricultural development could be separated 
from those areas where nothing was growing, and once again, 
if one were familiar with the territory, this is even easier to pick 
out. The curvature of the Earth was very apparent.
 There was a quiet rivalry between some of the X-15 pilots and their counter-
parts on Project Mercury. Milt Thompson remembered when he and Joe Walker 
traveled to Cape Canaveral to watch Virgil I. “Gus” Grissom fly the second sub-
orbital Mercury flight in July 1961. Walker told Grissom that the X-15 had al-
most as much thrust as the Redstone booster that was going to lift Liberty Bell 7 
(57,000 lbf versus 76,000 lbf for the Redstone), and that the X-15 engine had a 
throttle. Walker also pointed out that the X-15 pilots were flying the exit profile, 
while the Mercury astronauts were just along for the ride. In terms of actual 
performance, the suborbital Mercury flights and the X-15 were roughly com-
parable . Al Shepard reached a maximum speed of 5,180 mph and an altitude of 
116 miles; the X-15 would eventually demonstrate 4,520 mph and 67 miles. Of 
20 Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” p. 2; Geiger et al., “History of the Wright Air 
Development Division: July 960-March 96,” pp. I-5 to I-52; X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. 
Brown/NASA Headquarters, 5 May 96, p.  and  June 96, p. .
2 Letter, Paul F. Bikle to Dr. Charles H. Roadman, 3 April 96, attaching a copy of a memorandum from Joseph A. 
Walker, subject, visual observations during flight 2--28, 30 March 96.
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course, Walker was not really arguing; it was obvious that the astronauts would 
ultimately go much faster and higher than the X-15. Somehow, Tom Wolfe picked 
up this story and portrayed it in The Right Stuff as more of a real argument than 
it ever was .122 
 By June 1961, government test pilots had been flying the X-15 for just over 
a year. There were four primary objectives during this period: comparing the 
predicted hypersonic aerodynamic heating rates against actual flight results, 
determining the structural characteristics of the X-15 during high heating, in-
vestigating hypersonic stability during boost and reentry, and evaluating pilot 
performance during hypersonic flight and zero g. These objectives were largely 
satisfied by late 1961, although some specific research continued until 1967 using 
the X-15A-2 .123 
 Physiologists discovered that the heart rates of the X-15 pilots varied between 
145 and 185 beats per minute compared to only 70–80 beats per minute on test 
missions in other aircraft. The researchers ultimately determined that pre-launch 
anticipatory stress, not post-launch physical stress, was the primary cause of the 
high heart rate. The researchers determined that the high rates were probably rep-
resentative of the physiological condition of future astronauts, which was later 
confirmed on the Mercury flights. Interestingly, the pilots thought little about the 
weightlessness aspects of some of their mission profiles. Bob White commented 
that “zero-g, while apparently an interesting area to consider has had no notice-
able effect on the pilot control task for the approximate 2-minute period during 
which the weightless state was experienced.”124  
 Although the X-15 researchers at Langley and elsewhere performed years 
of theoretical analysis and wind-tunnel testing on the airplane configuration and 
missions, sometimes the best results came from the folks in the trenches. The 
flight planners and pilots learned early on that the best way to reenter from the 
high-altitude missions was to establish a constant angle of attack at the top and 
then allow the acceleration forces to build as the dynamic pressure increased. As 
the airplane approached the desired g-loading, the pilot gradually decreased the 
angle of attack and the airplane usually experienced the maximum dynamic pres-
sure just prior to level flight. As the maximum altitude increased, so did the initial 
angle of attack needed to avoid exceeding the airplane structural limits. The pilots 
and flight planners practiced this many times in the fixed-base simulators.125 
 The early simulations had showed that reentries with the SAS turned off were 
possible at initial angles of attack up to 15 degrees, which was adequate to achieve 
the altitude goals of the X-15 program. Above 15 degrees, a serious instability 
would develop and the airplane would be uncontrollable without the dampers, 
and even then would tend to oscillate in sideslip. Researchers programmed the 
22 Thompson, At the Edge of Space, p. 6; telephone conversation, Scott Crossfield with Dennis R. Jenkins,  
June 2000.
23 Crossfield, Always Another Dawn, pp. 307-366.
2 Stillwell, X-15 Research Results, pp. 65; quote from Robert M. White, Glenn H. Robinson, and Gene J. Matranga, 
NASA confidential technical memorandum X-75, “Résumé of X-5 Handling Qualities,” March 962, p. 5; tele-
phone conversation, Major General Robert M. White with Dennis R. Jenkins, 8 August 2002.
25 Robert G. Hoey, “X-5: Ventral-Off,” in Fred Stoliker, Bob Hoey, and Johnny Armstrong, Flight Testing at Edwards: 
Flight Test Stories–1946-1975 (Edwards, CA: Flight Test Historical Foundation, 200), pp. 55-58. Anyone who 
is interested in getting a better “feel” for how testing progressed at Edwards during this period should find a copy 
of this collection of short stories written by some of the flight test engineers and flight planners.
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simulator with the results of all of the wind-tunnel data accumulated so far in the 
program. The problem was that the early wind-tunnel tests had the horizontal sta-
bilizer at zero deflection, but the airplane usually flew with a substantial deflection, 
approximately 15–20 degrees leading-edge down. As the wind-tunnel research-
ers expanded their tests to include runs at non-zero deflections, serious concerns 
began to develop. When researchers mechanized the new data into the simulator, 
they discovered that the maximum angle of attack possible with the dampers failed 
(or turned off) was only about 8 degrees, not 15 degrees as had been thought. This 
limited the maximum altitude to about 200,000 feet since the non-redundant roll 
damper was required for control at higher angles of attack. This limitation was 
obviously unsatisfactory and the researchers needed to find a solution.126 
 Engineers considered the original SAS fail-safe because it consisted of dual 
channels; however, these were not redundant channels–each axis had a working 
channel and a monitor channel. When the system detected a difference between 
the working and monitor channels in any axis, it inhibited the dampers for that 
axis, eliminating any possibility it could do something untoward. The system, 
therefore, was fail-safe but not fail-operational. Discussions (usually initiated by 
the pilots) on whether the SAS should be truly redundant (fail-operational) had 
taken place since the beginning of development contract, with the conclusion be-
ing that the weight penalty was too severe. By 1961, however, the program had 
stopped worrying about saving a few pounds, and was concentrating instead on 
producing the most useful vehicle possible. If the simulations were right, a single 
failure in the roll channel would result in the loss of the airplane reentering from 
high altitude. Two flight planners, Richard E. Day from the FRC and Robert G. 
Hoey from the AFFTC, decided this required further investigation since it poten-
tially could keep the X-15 from achieving its design objectives.127 
 The first step was “to verify the problem was real and not some quirk in the 
simulation.” During flight 1-11-21 on 19 August 1960, Joe Walker intentionally 
turned off the roll dampers and began to increase the angle of attack. The diver-
gent lateral oscillations experienced by Walker were identical to what the simu-
lator had predicted–the problem was real. Ironically, the cause was an adverse 
rolling moment created by having too much vertical stabilizer. Although the air-
plane had adequate directional stability, the dihedral effect was strongly negative 
at high angles of attack (i.e., left sideslip produced left roll).128 
 Part of the problem lay in the technique used for the original analysis of the 
flight profiles, which assumed that the airplane spent most of the flight at zero, or 
very low, angles of attack. Only the reentry pull-up at high-q and high-g was at 
15 degrees angle of attack for a short time. North American engineers were well 
aware that this did not reflect how NASA would use the airplane, and it was obvi-
ous to everybody that the most practical method was to establish a constant, high 
26 Hoey, “X-5: Ventral-Off,” pp. 55-58; letter, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 August 2002.
27 Robert G. Hoey, AFFTC technology document FTC-TDR-62-7, “Envelope Expansion with Interim XLR Rocket 
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Program,” a paper in the 1961 Research Airplane Committee Report, p. 305; Robert A. Tremant, NASA technical 
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angle of attack before any buildup in dynamic pressure or acceleration occurred . 
The North American design missions represented a worst-case structural load, but 
the engineers were late in assessing the handling qualities and stability problems 
of setting up and flying through reentry at fairly high angle of attack.129 
 To provide operational redundancy, North American developed a backup roll 
damper. This alternate stability augmentation system (ASAS) operated at a fixed 
gain level that was set before each flight based on the pilot’s preferences. It con-
tained its own sensors, had minimal electronics, and fed directly to the existing 
servocylinders. This backup system was for emergency use only and the pilot 
could engage it at any time. NASA installed the ASAS in X-15-1 and X-15-2 
during April 1962. Subsequently, in early 1967 NASA modified the ASAS in 
X-15A-2 to include the yaw axis in anticipation of flights with the dummy ram-
jet. This provided an extra margin of safety for the X-15A-2 at Mach numbers 
above 6, but was subsequently installed in X-15-1 as a matter of commonality. 
The MH-96 provided its own redundancy, so X-15-3 did not include an ASAS .130 
 However, Hoey and Day were not convinced that the ASAS was the entire 
answer, although nobody questioned its potential usefulness. Hours in the simula-
tor had convinced the flight planners that the airplane did not fly the high angle-
of-attack reentry profile all that well even when all the dampers were functioning 
properly, and they began exploring possible aerodynamic fixes.131  
 The primary reason for the large, symmetrical vertical stabilizer was to com-
pensate for potential thrust misalignment at the end of the exit phase when dy-
namic pressure was low. This had been a major concern early on, and the program 
had even evaluated using the ballistic control system to handle thrust misalign-
ments. As it turned out, Hoey remembers, “the engine guys figured out a clever 
way of aligning the engines in the airplanes, which essentially eliminated thrust 
misalignment as a problem. We never experienced any significant thrust misalign-
ment during the flight program.” The trouble became that the wedge-shaped dor-
sal and ventral stabilizers actually prevented the airplane from flying safely at 
high angles of attack because of a negative dihedral effect .132  
 Since it appeared that the problem was that the ventral stabilizer was too 
large, Hoey and Day decided to see what would happen if they made it smaller. 
This was easy to do because the pilot jettisoned the lower rudder at the end of each 
flight anyway. There was a substantial base of wind-tunnel and flight-test data at 
low speeds with the ventral off, since this was the standard landing configuration. 
However, the high-speed investigation of this configuration consisted of a single 
set of wind-tunnel runs at Mach 3–hardly conclusive data. Nevertheless, Hoey 
and Day created a temporary modification to the simulator using these data and 
“some freehand guesses” to fill in the holes at other Mach numbers.133 
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 As could easily be imagined, the directional stability was somewhat less 
throughout the envelope, but the dihedral effect was normal at all angles of attack 
and the Dutch roll stability was satisfactory. More importantly, the simulator was 
easily controllable with the dampers off from altitudes as high as 250,000 feet. 
Hoey and Day were sufficiently confident in the ventral-off scheme that they pro-
posed to test it on an upcoming Mach 4 flight at 80,000 feet. When the two flight 
planners first presented their idea to the rest of the technical community, they met 
with some skepticism. The aerodynamicists wanted to run a complete set of wind-
tunnel tests to verify the concept, something that would take a considerable amount 
of time. However, Paul Bikle and Bob Rushworth believed the risks involved in 
testing the idea were minimal and worthwhile, and approved the concept.134 
 The technicians at the FRC began building a heat shield to bolt onto the bot-
tom of the fixed portion of the ventral to protect the area from aerodynamic heat-
ing, and to clean up the drag in the area to ensure there were no local hot spots. 
As the proposed flight got closer, however, Hoey and Day became increasingly 
nervous since they had based their idea on “pretty thin evidence.” What bothered 
the flight planners the most was that the trend in high-speed flight had been to 
increase the vertical surface area, which explains why the X-15 had such large 
surfaces to begin with. In fact, the vertical surfaces on most of the early supersonic 
combat aircraft had been increased 15–20% based on initial supersonic flight tests. 
Hoey and Day were proposing to decrease the surface area of the X-15 by 27%. 
However, the planners had no idea what stability degradation might occur due to 
rocket plume effects, and no data on the effects of operating the speed brakes. Bob 
Hoey observed, “On the morning of the flight, I suspect that Bikle and Rushworth 
had more confidence in Hoey and Day than did Hoey and Day.”135 
 There was another concern, one that researchers could not adequately inves-
tigate except in the wind tunnel or in flight. With the ventral rudder removed, the 
X-15 would have no directional control for the first second or two immediately 
after launch from the carrier aircraft, since the NB-52 wing would blank the dorsal 
vertical stabilizer and rudder until the airplane had dropped a few feet. It did not 
seem like a real problem, but it was an unknown.136  
 With complete faith in the flight planners, Bob Rushworth flew the first 
ventral-off flight (1-23-39) on 4 October 1961, reaching Mach 4.3 and 78,000 
feet. The flight went without a hitch. The X-15 had sufficient directional stability 
during launch, and the handling qualities were similar to those of the ventral-on 
configuration at low angles of attack, but better at 8 degrees. Rushworth per-
formed several stability pulses that matched the trends seen in the simulator. This 
apparent success prompted the researchers at Langley to begin wind-tunnel tests 
of the entire speed and altitude range, but it would be another year before the 
program began to fly routinely without the ventral.137 
 On 30 April 1962, Joe Walker flew the first flight (1-27-48) to nearly the 
design altitude, reaching 246,700 feet with the ventral on and the ASAS installed. 
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Five months later the researchers had completed the ventral-off wind-tunnel tests 
and mechanized the results on the simulator. These tests showed that the configu-
ration allowed reentries with the dampers off at angles of attack as high as 26 
degrees, equal to 400,000 feet. Wind-tunnel data showed that there were some 
directional stability problems in the transonic region with the speed brakes de-
ployed, but the flight planners briefed the pilots on how to avoid this area. Jack 
McKay flew the second ventral-off flight (2-29-50) on 28 September 1962, and 
the flight was completely nominal.138 
 Eliminating the lower portion of the ventral had another benefit that research-
ers had recognized as early as 1961: the lift-drag ratio increased from 4.25 to 4.5, 
offering slightly improved range. Eventually the airplanes flew Mach 6 reentries 
with trajectories of up to 26 degrees and flight path angles approaching –38 de-
grees. It would be over three years before the program would use the ventral rud-
38 Joseph A. Walker, “Pilot Report for Flight -27-8,” 30 April 962; Jack B. McKay, “Pilot Report for Flight 2-29-
50,” 28 September 962; Hoey, “X-5: Ventral-Off,” pp. 55-58.
The X-15 pilots and the astronauts at Cape Canaveral were always joking with each other about who 
had the best ride. The X-15 was incapable of  reaching orbital velocities, but within its domain, it gave 
even the Saturn I used on the early Apollo missions a run for its money. (NASA)
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der again in flight, and then only five times–all of them with X-15A-2. In all, the 
program would make 73 flights with the ventral on and 126 with it off.139 
 Heading back to the flight program, it is interesting to note that things that 
sound potentially catastrophic, or at least important, in retrospect were not neces-
sarily so at the time. For instance, on 11 October 1961, the left outer windscreen 
glass on flight 2-20-36 developed a series of longitudinal cracks. In an unusual 
lapse of procedure, technicians had inadvertently installed one of the original 
soda-lime windshields in the left panel of X-15-2 and it fractured during reentry 
from 217,000 feet. The item did not figure at all in the post-flight pilot report, 
and rated exactly three lines of radio chatter at the time. Bob White to Forrest 
Petersen, who was NASA-1 that day: “OK, my … outside windshield went ….” 
Petersen responded, “Understand, outside pane?” White confirmed, “That’s cor-
rect,” and both men returned to their duties.140 
 White was not quite as calm on the next flight (2-21-37) when a similar thing 
happened. The right side of the windshield shattered as he decelerated through 
Mach 2.7 after White became the first person to pilot an aircraft above Mach 6. 
In this case, the windshield was the correct alumino-silicate glass. The event even 
made it into the report this time:141 
I would guess at about 2.7 Mach number at 70,000 feet, some-
where in that neighborhood, when I said, “Good Lord, not again,” 
that’s where the right windshield panel went. … I could see out 
the left windshield panel fairly well, and the lake was just off to 
the left so it looked like it would be real handy for a left-hand cir-
cle landing pattern. As I got down lower, I realized I couldn’t see 
out the right side. For all intents and purposes, the visibility out 
of the right windshield was nonexistent. I asked the chase plane 
to stay in close, thinking right after it happened that it might also 
happen on the left side. In that event, I considered going to high 
face plate heat when I got subsonic, jettison the canopy and see 
what happened from there. The pattern was as per usual, but on 
the final approach I was quite surprised at what a compromise it 
offered being able to see out of only one windshield.
 Investigations revealed that the retainer frame buckled near the center of the 
upper edge of the glass and created a local hot spot, causing the glass to fail. Engi-
neers subsequently changed the retainer from its original 0.050-inch-thick Inconel 
X design to one that used a 0.100-inch-thick 6A1-4V titanium alloy. The reduced 
coefficient of expansion of titanium better compensated for the differential expan-
sion associated with the cooler Inconel X substructure. Nevertheless, as the flight 
envelope expanded and the environment became more severe, the glass deterio-
rated along the rear edge just forward of the aft windshield frame. Engineers cured 
39 Stillwell, X-15 Research Results, pp. 5-52; NASA technical note D-057, pp. 8-9; letter, Robert G. Hoey to 
Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 August 2002.
0 Radio transcript, Flight 2-20-36. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
 Robert M. White, “Pilot Report from Flight 2-2-37,” 9 November 96. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
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this by cutting away the aft retainer, eliminating the lip that was causing the hot 
spot on the glass.142 
 In 1968, John Becker wrote, “The really important lesson here is that what 
are minor and unimportant features of a subsonic or supersonic aircraft must be 
dealt with as prime design problems in a hypersonic airplane. This lesson was ap-
plied effectively in the precise design of a host of important details on the manned 
space vehicles.”143 
 During the first year of XLR99 flight operations, nearly all of the flights 
experienced malfunction shutdowns of the engine immediately after launch, and 
sometimes after normal engine burnout. The engine always relit on the second 
attempt, making the former cases more of an annoyance than anything else. The 
post-burnout malfunction was more perplexing since the only engine system that 
was active after shutdown was the lube-oil system. Analyses of this condition re-
vealed wide acceleration excursions during the engine-start phase. Engineers cre-
ated a reasonable simulation of this acceleration by placing an engine on a work 
stand with the ability to rotate about the Y-axis. Under certain conditions, the 
lube-oil pump cavitated for about 2 seconds, tripping an automatic malfunction 
shutdown. To eliminate this problem, Reaction Motors installed a delay timer in 
the lube-oil malfunction circuit that allowed the pump to cavitate up to 6 seconds 
without actuating the malfunction shutdown system. After this delay timer was 
installed in early 1962, the program did not experience any further malfunction 
shutdowns of this type, although the engine still required two ignition attempts 
on occasion .144 
 On 11 October 1961, flight 2-20-36 became the first to use the ballistic con-
trol system to maintain the attitude of the airplane. Bob White flew the mission 
to Mach 5.21 and 217,000 feet and reported that the system worked as expected. 
Post-flight inspections, however, revealed an unexplained high propellant con-
sumption by the no. 2 system. Actually, both systems used more propellant than 
expected, and this provided an impetus to install a transfer system that trans-
ferred residual propellants from the XLR99 turbopump supply to the ballistic 
control system. North American subsequently installed the transfer system in all 
three airplanes .145 
 
2 Eldon E. Kordes, Robert D. Reed, and Alpha L. Dawdy, “Structural Heating Experiences of the X-5,” a paper in 
the 1961 Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 33-3; Greene and Benner, “X-5 Experience from the De-
signer’s Viewpoint,” pp. 38-39; Love and Fischel, “Status of X-5 Program,” p. 6. North American conducted a 
series of laboratory tests on the new configuration in late 96. During the last test of the series the glass failed at 
.50 times the temperature and .50 times the deflections that had been experienced on flight 2-2-37. However, 
it was not believed that this represented an accurate test since the longeron on the test sample was made of alu-
minum (instead of Inconel X) and was very close to its melting point of ,200°F. It was thought that this produced 
an excessive concentration of force on the glass. Except for the last test, however, there was no indication that 
the titanium glass retainer was buckling or lifting away from the glass to create any potential hot spots, so the new 
configuration was cleared for flight. See X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 
2 January 962, p. 6. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
3 John V. Becker, “The X-5 Program in Retrospect,” 3rd Eugen Sänger Memorial Lecture at the Deutsch Ge-
aellschaft Fur Luftfahrforschung, Bonn, Germany, 5 December 968; and James E. Love, “X-5: Past and Fu-
ture,” paper presented to the Fort Wayne Section, Society of Automotive Engineers, 9 December 96.
 Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” p. 7.
5 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 6 October 96, p. 9. Since the bal-
listic control system shared propellant tanks with the APUs, this change also provided more propellants for the 
APUs if needed.
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Pilot in the Loop
 During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the value of a human pilot and redun-
dant systems in space vehicles was a matter of some controversy. There was, and 
continues to be, a great debate on the relative merits of piloted vehicles versus auto-
mated ones. Because it had many similarities to early spacecraft, the X-15 became 
the subject of several evaluations and studies to determine whether the general 
design approach taken concerning redundancy and control were appropriate.146 
 The AFFTC conducted one of these evaluations during late 1961. The ba-
sic approach of the study was to perform a detailed flight-by-flight engineering 
analysis of each problem or failure that occurred for the 44 free flights, plus an ad-
ditional 2 captive flights and 30 aborts, made through 1 November 1961. For each 
problem, researchers assessed the action taken by the pilot or redundant system 
with regard to its impact on mission success and vehicle recovery. The research-
ers then compared the results with those that would be obtained on a hypothetical 
unmanned and/or non-redundant X-15.147  
 The researchers strictly adhered to several important ground rules during 
the evaluation and documented every problem, whether it seemed significant 
or not. The researchers conservatively assessed the benefits of the pilot-in-the-
loop and redundancy to avoid any glorification of either of these elements.148 The 
researchers also attempted to minimize conjecture, especially in the case of the 
hypothetical unmanned X-15. For instance, the researchers did not credit a pilot 
with detection or corrective action that some other element would definitely have 
provided in his absence. Likewise, he was not marked down for detrimental ef-
fects that would have been the same without a pilot. The study used a similar 
assessment scheme for redundancy. Finally, for the hypothetical unmanned X-15, 
the study assumed no changes to systems or components other than removing all 
redundant systems and substituting relatively simple and reliable present-day sys-
tems in their place.149  
 The results were not surprising. Of the 44 free flights conducted up to that 
time, researchers considered 43 successful as flown.150 Computed as an airplane 
that carried a pilot but no redundant systems, only 27 would have been success-
ful. The number fell to 24 with redundancy but without a pilot, and to only 23 
with no redundancy or pilot. The study noted that 19 flights were completely 
trouble- free, so they would have been successful in any of the three configura-
tions. Significantly, the evaluation showed that the majority of times the mission 
was not successful, the aircraft would have been lost . In fact, in the case of a pi-
6 Robert G. Nagel, “X-5 Pilot-in-the-Loop and Redundancy Evaluation,” a paper in the 1961 Research Airplane 
Committee Report, p. 289. An expanded version of this paper (covering the first 7 flights) was published as 
AFFTC technical documentary report 62-20, “X-5 Pilot-in-the-Loop and Redundant/Emergency Systems Evalu-
ation,” October 962.
7 Ibid, pp. 289-290.
8 This also required some manipulation of the data. For instance, problems concerning the life support system, and 
the benefits of its redundancy were only factored into the piloted X-5. It was believed that if it were not for the pres-
ence of the pilot, there would have been no need for such systems or redundancy. This approach was taken to keep 
the results conservative with regard to prohibiting any distortion of the virtues of redundant systems in general.
9 Nagel, “X-5 Pilot-in-the-Loop and Redundancy Evaluation,” pp. 289-290.
50 Flight 2-3-9 was not, since it terminated after only 3.9 seconds of powered flight and Crossfield made an emer-
gency landing on Rosamond Dry Lake.
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loted but non-redundant X-15, the study showed that 14 aircraft would have been 
lost in 44 missions.151  
 Around the same time, The Boeing Company conducted a similar study that 
analyzed the first 60 flights of the Bomarc surface-to-air missile. This large un-
manned missile was designed to be relatively non-redundant in order to keep its 
manufacturing costs low.152 The Boeing study compared the actual flight results 
with a theoretical piloted Bomarc that incorporated a level of redundancy mostly 
equivalent to the X-15. Thus, the Boeing study was roughly the inverse extrapola-
tion of the AFFTC X-15 evaluation, and the results bore an amazing similarity. 
For the X-15, the total mission success rate had been approximately 98%, which 
compared well to the computed 97% rate for a piloted and redundant Bomarc. 
Conversely, for both the actual Bomarc and the theoretical unmanned, non-redun-
dant X-15, the total mission success rate was an identical 43%. This lent credibil-
ity to the idea that, with the current state of the art, it was still important to include 
a pilot in the loop .153  
The Third Industry Conference
 November 1961 saw the first industry conference held in three years (NASA 
had held previous conferences in 1956 and 1958). The classified conference at 
the FRC featured 24 papers from 56 authors, including 4 X-15 pilots, and was 
attended by 442 people. Of the authors, 5 came from North American, 37 from 
various NASA centers, 13 from the Air Force, and 1 from the Navy. The at-
tendees represented virtually every major aerospace contractor in the country, all 
of the NASA centers, several universities, the various military services, and the 
British Embassy.154 
 At the time the papers for the conference were prepared, the program had 
made 45 flights during the 29 months since the initial X-15 flight. The first of these 
was a glide flight, and of the subsequent powered flights, 29 had used the XLR11 
engines and 15 used the XLR99 . A maximum altitude of 217,000 feet (flight 2-20-
36) and a velocity of 6,005 feet per second (flight 2-21-37) had been achieved.155 
 Researchers had already accomplished quite a bit of analysis on aerodynamic 
heating, one of the primary research objectives of the X-15. Several theoretical 
models had been developed to predict heating rates, but little experimental data 
were available to validate them since it was uncertain whether wind tunnels were 
capable of realistically simulating the conditions. The X-15 provided the first 
real-world experience at high Mach numbers in a well-instrumented, recoverable 
vehicle. Data from the X-15 showed that none of the models were completely ac-
5 Nagel, “X-5 Pilot-in-the-Loop and Redundancy Evaluation,” pp. 29-292.
52 The supersonic Bomarc missiles (IM-99A and IM-99B) were the world’s first long-range anti-aircraft missiles. The 
Bomarc used analog computers, some of which were built by Boeing and had been developed for GAPA experi-
ments during World War II. Authorized by the Air Force in 99, Bomarc was the result of coordinated research 
between Boeing (Bo) and the University of Michigan Aeronautical Research Center (marc). Boeing built 700 
Bomarc missiles between 957 and 96, as well as 20 launch systems. Bomarc was retired from active service 
during the early 970s.
53 Nagel, “X-5 Pilot-in-the-Loop and Redundancy Evaluation,” pp. 293 and 30.
5 Table of contents and registered guest list in the front of the 1961 Research Airplane Committee Report.
55 De E. Beeler and Thomas A Toll, “Status of X-5 Research Program,” a paper in the 1961 Research Airplane 
Committee Report.
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curate, although all showed some correlation at different Mach numbers. The data 
showed that the wind tunnels were reasonably accurate.156 
 A particular area of interest to researchers was how the boundary layer tran-
sitioned at different Mach numbers and angles of attack. Researchers used two 
methods to detect laminar and turbulent areas on the airplane in flight. The first 
was to use thermocouple data reduced to heat-transfer coefficients, which showed 
a much higher level of heat transfer in a turbulent boundary layer than in a laminar 
one. The second method was to use temperature-sensitive “DetectoTemp” paint 
applied over large areas of the airplane. In general, NASA applied the paint to the 
left side of the airplane, and the thermocouples were on the right side.157 
 The first use of the paint was on 4 August 1960 for flight 1-9-17, which was 
the XLR11 maximum speed attempt. The results were promising inasmuch as 
the paint established a semipermanent pattern of contrasting colors at different 
temperature levels. The pattern retained on the wing and vertical stabilizer after 
the flight clearly indicated all of the heat-sink locations and areas of high heating. 
For instance, the internal spars and ribs stood out as heat sinks, while areas such 
as the expansion joints on the wing leading edge stood out in the color pattern 
as concentrated heating areas. Researchers decided that they could use the paint 
to collect qualitative temperature data, particularly in small areas that were not 
equipped with thermocouples.158 
 One of the notable discoveries made using the paint was that patterns indi-
cated high-temperature, wedge-shaped areas originating at the wing leading-edge 
expansion joints and extending for a considerable distance rearward. The 0.080-
inch-wide expansion joints appeared to result in a turbulent flow during the entire 
flight, producing 1,000°F temperatures in an 8-inch wedged-shaped area behind 
them. The measured heat-transfer data on the other wing supported this view, 
offering “a classic example of the interaction among aerodynamic flow, thermo-
dynamic properties of air, and elastic characteristics of structure.” Although the 
rates were well within the limits of the airframe, engineers installed small 0.008-
inch-thick Inconel X shields over the expansion joints in an attempt to minimize 
the interference. Flights with these covers showed that the turbulent wedges still 
existed, although they were smaller, and researchers theorized that they would be 
present for shorter periods on each flight.159 
 The conclusion drawn from this was that the “boundary layer transition, 
which may be produced by such discontinuities in the surface of a high-speed 
vehicle, would be extremely difficult to predict. As yet, for the X-15, there has not 
been established parametric correlation which would allow the prediction of the 
56 Richard D. Banner, Albert E. Kuhl, and Robert D. Quinn, “Preliminary Results of Aerodynamic Heating Studies on 
the X-5,” a paper in the 1961 Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. -5. The theoretical models included 
ones from Ernst Eckert at Wright Field, Eva Winkler at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory, and E. R. Van Driest.
57 Banner et al., “Preliminary Results of Aerodynamic Heating Studies on the X-5,” pp. 6-7. This paint was 
procured from Curtiss-Wright and turned various colors depending upon the temperatures encountered. The 
paint was a light green when it was applied. It changed to a light blue at approximately 9°F, light blue to yellow 
at 293°F, yellow to black at 28°F, and then black to brown at 6°F. Several similar paints, such as Tempilaq 
(Tempil, Inc.), were also used. For a good description of Tempilaq see http://www.tempil.com/TempilaqG.htm, 
accessed 30 July 2002.
58 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 5 August 960, p. 3.
59 Stillwell, X-15 Research Results, pp. 65; Banner et al., “Preliminary Results of Aerodynamic Heating Studies on 
the X-5,” pp. 7-8.
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transition location on the wing a	priori. Under these circumstances, it would seem 
that conservative estimates of transition should still be required.”160 
 To show how the preflight estimates and flight data correlated, the authors 
presented data for one thermocouple on the lower surface of the right wing about 
1.4 feet from the leading edge at mid-semispan. For the high-speed flight profile, 
the measured data indicated an all-turbulent flow with a high skin-heating rate 
and high maximum temperature. The calculated skin temperature agreed quite 
well during the high heating period, but slightly overestimated the measured value 
near its peak and during a period of cooling just afterwards. A close look at the 
trajectory during this period of disagreement showed a high angle of attack, and 
researchers believed the differences were due to their inability to properly predict 
the local flow conditions. For a high-altitude mission, however, this point of the 
wing appeared to experience laminar flow, at least at times. An all-turbulent flow 
prediction resulted in a higher temperature than was actually measured during 
the exit phase of the trajectory, greater cooling during the ballistic portion, and 
an overestimate of the maximum temperature during reentry. The assumption of 
laminar flow during the latter part of the exit phase resulted in better agreement 
between the measured and calculated data. Researchers noted, however, that one 
of the turbulent wedges originating on a wing leading-edge expansion joint might 
affect the thermocouple in question. Researchers did not understand exactly what 
might cause the location to go laminar, but theorized that either the turbulent 
wedge vanished or its lateral spread was delayed.161 
 The wing leading-edge expansion slots produced problems in addition to the 
wedge-shaped boundary layer issue. On one flight the area directly behind the 
expansion slots buckled. One reason for this was that the fastener spacing directly 
behind the slot was wider than on other sections of the leading edge, providing 
less support for the area. It was also determined that the original segmentation 
of the leading-edge heat sink did not adequately relieve the thermal compression 
loads . The skins at the expansion slots acted as a splice plate for the solid heat-
sink bar, and as a result buckled in compression. Engineers made several changes 
to solve this problem. The shield installed over each expansion slot to help the 
boundary layer problem minimized the local hot spot, but engineers also added 
a fastener near each slot and three additional expansion slots (with shields) in 
the outboard segments of the leading edge. This presented some concern since 
North American had designed the original expansion slots with shear ties to pre-
vent relative displacement of the leading edge, and it was not cost-effective to 
provide shear ties for the new slots because the entire wing structure would have 
required modification. A structural analysis showed that sufficient shear stiffness 
was present in the leading edge to meet the design requirements without shear 
ties, but engineers expected some relative displacement at the three new slots. Ac-
tual flight tests showed that this displacement averaged about 0.125 inch. Overall, 
 
 
 
60 Banner et al., “Preliminary Results of Aerodynamic Heating Studies on the X-5,” p. 8.
6 Ibid, pp. 8-9.
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the modifications prevented any serious leading-edge buckling, although minor 
distortions continued throughout the flight program.162 
 The conclusion drawn from the available data was that “when the bound-
ary layer is known to be either laminar or turbulent, the skin temperatures can 
be predicted with reasonable accuracy.” The problem was to figure out what the 
boundary layer would do under different flight conditions.163 
 The effect of temperature is not linear, and at Mach 6 the heating load on the 
X-15 was eight times that experienced at Mach 3. Unsurprisingly, the front and 
lower surfaces of the aircraft experienced the highest heating rates. During the 
conference, researchers discussed several intriguing aspects of the temperature 
problems. One was surprising, given that the program had always worried about 
high temperatures: “The first temperature problem occurred on the side-fairing 
panels along the LOX tank before the X-15 was first flown. Pronounced elastic 
buckles appeared in the panels as a result of contraction when the tank was filled 
for the first time.” Adding a 0.125-inch expansion joint to the tunnel fairing near 
the wing leading edge relieved the buckling.164 
  
62 Eldon E. Kordes, Robert D. Reed, and Alpha L. Dawdy, “Structural Heating Experiences of the X-5,” a paper in 
the 1961 Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 3-35.
63 Banner et al., “Preliminary Results of Aerodynamic Heating Studies on the X-5,” pp. 8-9.
6 Kordes et al., “Structural Heating Experiences of the X-5,” pp. 3-32; Stillwell, X-15 Research Results, pp. 65.
The X-15 program was one of  the first to employ temperature-sensitive paint that established a semi-
permanent pattern of  contrasting colors at different temperature levels. The paint clearly showed the 
different heating loads absorbed by the hot-structure airframe. In general, NASA applied the paint to 
the left side of  the airplane; the thermocouples were on the right side. (NASA)
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 However, after a Mach 4.43 flight (2-13-26) on 7 March 1961, several per-
manent 0.25-inch buckles formed in the outer sheet of the fairing between the 
corrugations near the edge of a panel. Since the panel only carried air loads (not 
structural loads), the buckles did not seriously affect structural integrity. During 
the flight, the panels that buckled had experienced temperatures between 490°F 
(near the wing leading edge) to 590°F (near the front of the fairing). On this par-
ticular flight, the pilot shut down the engine prior to propellant depletion, leaving 
about 20% of the liquid oxygen in its tank. The maximum temperatures occurred 
after shutdown, and it was theorized that the cold tank (–260°F), together with 
the high outer-skin temperatures, resulted in large thermal gradients that caused 
the buckles. These gradients were higher than had been calculated for the original 
design, since the estimates had assumed propellant depletion on all flights. Based 
on this experience, engineers added four expansion joints in the fairing ahead of 
the wing that allowed a total expansion of slightly over 1 inch. This modification 
appeared to prevent any further buckling.165 
 Researchers expected the surface irregularities produced by the buckles to 
cause local hot spots during high-speed flights. To investigate this, NASA cov-
ered the buckled areas with temperature-sensitive paint for flight 2-15-29. The 
results from the Mach 4.62 flight showed that the maximum temperature in the 
buckle area was essentially the same as in the surrounding areas with no evidence 
of local hot spots. The researchers went back to their slide rules to come up with 
revised theories .166 
 Other heating problems experienced during the early flight program included 
hot airflow into the interior of the airplane, which caused unexpected high tem-
peratures around the speed brake actuators, and loss of instrumentation wires in 
the wing roots and tail surfaces. In a separate incident, cabin pressure forced the 
front edge of the canopy upward, allowing hot air to flow against and damage 
the seal. NASA resolved the canopy problem by attaching a shingle-type strip to 
the fuselage just ahead of the canopy joint to prevent airflow under the edge of 
the canopy. A similar problem developed in the nose landing-gear compartment: 
a small gap at the aft end of the nose-gear door was large enough to allow the 
airstream to enter the compartment and strike the bulkhead between the nose-gear 
compartment and the cockpit. This stream caused a local hot spot that melted 
some aluminum tubing used by the pressure-measuring system on flight 2-17-
33. During the Mach 5.27 flight, the bulkhead heated to 550°F, high enough to 
scorch the paint and generate some smoke inside the cabin. It was a potentially 
catastrophic problem, but fortunately no significant damage resulted. In response, 
engineers added an Inconel compression seal to the aft end of the nose-gear door 
and installed a baffle plate across the bulkhead.167 
 
 
 
65 Kordes et al., “Structural Heating Experiences of the X-5,” p. 32.
66 Ibid, pp. 32-33.
67 Ibid, p. 33.
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Manpower
 By late 1961, most of the people involved in the flight program expected it 
to end in December 1964. This would allow an orderly investigation of the re-
maining aero-thermo environment, an evaluation of the MH-96 adaptive control 
system, and a few follow-on experiments. This was in general agreement with the 
original 1959 Air Force plan, although it consisted of only 100 flights instead of 
the anticipated 300 flights.168 
 A quick look at the labor required to support the X-15 shows that it was not 
a small program. The following table counts only government employees, not 
contractors, in “equivalent” man years, meaning that there may have been more 
people actually supporting the program than shown, but they were doing so on a 
less than full-time basis. In general, the Air Force figures consisted of about 55% 
civil servants and 45% military personnel. The Air Force paid the civilians an 
average of $8,370 per annum at the ASD and $7,850 at the AFFTC. The FY65 
numbers reflect the period between June 1964 and December 1964 (the govern-
ment fiscal years at the time ran from 1 July to 30 June).169 
Organization FY62 FY63 FY64 FY65 Total
ASD 22 16 11 6 55
AFFTC 170 170 170 85 595
NASA-FRC 420 420 420 300 1,560 
Total 612 606 601 391
 The next table shows the projected propellant and gas requirements at the 
same point in the program:170 
Propellant FY62 FY63 FY64 FY65 Total
Ammonia (gal) 240,000 240,000 240,000 120,000 840,000
Peroxide (lbs) 420,000 420,000 420,000 210,000 1,470,000
Helium (scf) 5,400,000 5,400,000 5,400,000 2,700,000 18,900,000
Liquid nitrogen (tons) 3,500 3,500 3,500 1,750 12,250
Liquid oxygen (tons) 3,560 3,560 3,560 1,780 12,460
 The AFFTC also had a separate budget for support of the X-15 program, 
including supplies required for the operation of the NB-52s, other support and 
chase aircraft, propellant analysis and servicing, instrumentation, data processing 
and acquisition, photo lab, biomedical support, engineering, and test operations. 
68 “Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” 7 November 96, 
pp. 2 and 60; R&D Project Card, System 605A, 0 September 959. Both in the files at the AFFTC History Office.
69 “Ibid. Naturally, the NASA personnel were civil servants; no equivalent pay scales could be found.
70 “Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” p. 60.
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Additional funds were budgeted for travel. Again, these are only Air Force funds; 
the equivalent NASA funding could not be ascertained.
FY62 FY63 FY64 FY65 Total
O&M funds $1,277,403 $1,277,403 $1,277,403 $638,702 $4,470,911
Travel $65,000 $59,000 $55,000 $27,000 $206,000
 
The Adaptive Control System Arrives
 By the time North American was manufacturing the X-15 airframes, the Air 
Force had already selected the Minneapolis-Honeywell MH-96 adaptive control 
system for use on the upcoming X-20 Dyna-Soar. At the time, Honeywell had 
tested the system on a McDonnell F-101 Voodoo, but many researchers wanted to 
get some high-performance experience with the system prior to committing it to 
space flight on the X-20 . When an XLR99 ground test almost destroyed X-15-3, 
the Air Force seized the opportunity to include a prototype MH-96 when North 
American rebuilt the airplane.171 
7 E-mail, Scott Crossfield to Dennis R. Jenkins, 28 May 2002.
The X-15 program was a joint venture between the Air Force, Navy, and NASA, although the Navy 
generally played the role of  a silent partner. The Air Force developed and paid for the airplanes and 
operated much of  the support infrastructure at Edwards AFB, while NASA flew the airplanes (often 
with military pilots) and performed the maintenance. This 1961 organizational chart delineates the 
various interrelationships. In all, it worked well. (NASA)
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 The MH-96 was the first command augmentation system with an adaptive 
gain feature that provided invariant aircraft response throughout the flight en-
velope. The MH-96 used a rate command control mode whereby a given con-
trol-stick deflection would produce a specific rate response for the airplane. For 
example, a 1-inch pitch stick deflection would result in a 5-degrees-per-second 
pitch rate, regardless of how far the control surfaces had to deflect to produce that 
rate. This meant that the response would be the same regardless of airplane speed 
or flight condition.172 
 In a conventional aircraft of the period, the pitch rate response would vary 
with airspeed. In an airplane with a large speed envelope, such as the X-15, a 
1-inch stick deflection with a conventional system could result in such disparate 
responses as almost none at low speed to an extremely violent one at high speed. 
The MH-96 was an attempt to cure this. However, nothing comes free. With an 
invariant response, the pilot lost the “feel” for the airplane; for example, the con-
trols did not become sloppy as it approached a stall. The system automatically 
compensated for everything right up to the point that the airplane stopped flying. 
The same problem would confront the first fly-by-wire systems.173 
 The rate-command system eliminated the need to modify the trim settings 
because of configuration changes, such as deploying the landing gear or flaps. 
The system also masked any shifts in the center of gravity. In many respects, these 
were good things because they eliminated mundane tasks that otherwise needed 
to be accomplished by a pilot who already had his hands full of rocket plane. On 
the other hand, they eliminated many of the normal cues the pilots used to confirm 
that certain things had happened, such as the trim change after the landing gear 
deployed. It took an open mind–and some experience–to get comfortable flying 
the MH-96 .174 
 The MH-96 was potentially superior to the basic flight-control system in-
stalled in the other two airplanes, for a couple of reasons. The first was that it 
was more redundant than the SAS (even after the ASAS was installed), which 
eliminated many of the concerns of flying to high altitudes. Also, the MH-96 
blended the ballistic controls and the aerodynamic controls together beginning at 
90,000 feet. The pilot moved the same stick regardless of altitude and the MH-96 
decided which controls were appropriate to command the airplane. The MH-96 
also offered a few autopilot modes (such as roll hold, pitch-attitude hold, and 
angle-of-attack hold) that significantly reduced the pilot’s workload during the 
exit phase .175 
 The system minimized any extraneous aircraft motions by providing much 
higher damper gains. The pilots appreciated this feature particularly during alti-
tude flights, and X-15-3 was designated the primary airplane for altitude flights. 
72 Minneapolis-Honeywell report MH-2373-TM, “Operation and Maintenance Manual, MH-96 Flight Control Sys-
tem for the X-5 Aircraft,” various volumes, 3 May 96, provided under Air Force contract number AF33(66)-
660, passim; Robert P. Johannes, Neil A. Armstrong, and Thomas C. Hays, “Development of X-5 Self-Adaptive 
Flight Control System,” a paper in the 1961 Research Airplane Committee Report.
73 Minneapolis-Honeywell report MH-2373-TM; Johannes et al., “Development of X-5 Self-Adaptive Flight Control 
System;” letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 June 2003.
7 Ibid.
75 Minneapolis-Honeywell report MH-2373-TM; Johannes et al., “Development of X-5 Self-Adaptive Flight 
Control System.”
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Neil Armstrong had been heavily involved in the development and evaluation of 
the MH-96 and made the first four evaluation flights with the system.
 North American moved the rebuilt X-15-3 from Inglewood to Edwards on 15 
June 1961, and finally delivered the airplane, along with the XLR99 and MH-96, 
to the government on 30 September. After various ground tests were completed, 
Neil Armstrong attempted to take the airplane for its first flight on 19 Decem-
ber 1961, but a problem with the XLR99 resulted in an abort. The flight (3-1-2) 
successfully launched the next day, with additional flights on 17 January and 5 
April 1962. As it turned out, the MH-96 worked remarkably well, but Armstrong 
and others realized the system would require a considerable period of evaluation 
before researchers could thoroughly understand it. The MH-96 provided good 
service to the X-15 program until a fateful day in 1967.176 
1962 FLIGHT PERIOD
 The year did not get off to a great start. Forrest Petersen’s X-15 experience 
had begun with an engine failure on his first flight in 1960, and ended the same 
way on 10 January 1962 during flight 1-25-44 when the XLR99 refused to start–
twice . Petersen had no choice but to land at Mud Lake, marking the program’s 
first uprange landing. This was exactly why NASA launched each flight within 
gliding distance of a suitable emergency landing lake. Other than Crossfield’s 
initial glide flight, this would be the only X-15 flight below Mach 1.177 
 One of Petersen’s post-flight comments was that Mud Lake had been marked 
the same as Rogers, and he stressed the importance of having these markings 
for depth perception and as a familiar guide. This was the primary reason that the 
AFFTC attempted to keep all of the lakebed markings as similar as possible. When 
the X-15 landed at a remote lake, the only way home was to load the craft on a 
flatbed truck and haul it over the public roads. Fortunately, the 22-foot wingspan 
made this job considerably easier than it sounds. Milt Thompson, however, related 
a story about one incident in which the truck driver noted a large camper coming 
toward him at high speed. Although the trucker pulled as far to the right as pos-
sible, the camper managed to hit the wing of the X-15, resulting in a huge gash in 
the camper but very little damage to the steel wing. Thompson did not record the 
consequences of this incident, but most likely NASA bought a new camper.178 
 Petersen’s departure from the program had nothing to do with his flight expe-
rience; the record is complimentary about his contributions to the program. Nev-
ertheless, Petersen was an up-and-coming naval officer, and he needed to return 
76 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 5 June 96, p. ; Neil A. Armstrong, 
“Pilot Report for Flight 3--2,” 20 December 96. Both in the files at the DFRC History Office
77 Informal interview (no interviewer noted) with Lieutenant Commander Forrest S. Petersen,  January 962. Writ-
ten transcript in the files at the DFRC History Office.
78 Informal interview (no interviewer noted) with Lieutenant Commander Forrest S. Petersen,  January 962. Writ-
ten transcript in the files at the DFRC History Office; camper story in Thompson, At the Edge of Space, p. 99. It 
could not be ascertained on which flight the camper incident happened, but Johnny Armstrong remembers it was 
later in the program than Petersen’s landing.
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to active service in order to continue advancing his career. His destination after 
leaving the program was to command VF-154 at NAS Miramar; subsequently 
he returned to the “black shoe” Navy, served as executive officer on the USS 
Enterprise, and ultimately retired as a vice admiral.
 The program personnel reacted to emergency landings very professionally, 
and such events seldom slowed things down much. NASA trucked X-15-1 back 
to Edwards on 13 January 1962 and removed the engine so that engineers could 
inspect the engine mounts and main landing skids. The inspection revealed no 
significant damage, so the airplane was prepared for a 23 January flight and per-
formed a satisfactory ground run on 19 January. However, rain on 20 January 
closed Rogers (not-so) Dry Lake, and all flight activities ceased. The airplane 
headed to the maintenance shops for minor modifications.179 
 The weather continued to get worse. It rained the following day and snowed 
the day after that, resulting in over half an inch of water on Rogers and over 12 
inches of snow on Mud Lake. By this time only Silver, Hidden Hills, and Three 
Sisters were still dry and useable. A week of relative sunshine brightened the out-
look, but things took a turn for the worse when heavy rains pelted the area from 
7 through 12 February. This essentially precluded any flights before 15 April at 
the earliest. NASA decided to take the opportunity to perform maintenance and 
modifications to all three airplanes.180 
 When flights resumed on 20 April 1962, Neil Armstrong’s fourth MH-96 
evaluation flight (3-4-8) in X-15-3 would become the program’s longest-duration 
flight at 12 minutes and 28.7 seconds. The flight plan called for a peak altitude of 
205,000 feet, with Armstrong performing various maneuvers during exit and re-
entry to evaluate the MH-96. At the conclusion of the flight, Armstrong reported, 
“In general, aircraft control and damping during ballistic flight and entry were 
outstanding, and considerably more smooth than had been expected. Unfortunate-
ly, this may be at the expense of excessive reaction control fuel consumption.” 
This was confirmed when the APU/BCS low-peroxide warning light came on as 
the airplane descended through 160,000 feet. Armstrong initiated the transfer of 
unused turbopump propellant to the APU tank, and the light went out as he de-
scended through 115,000 feet.181 
 Things began to get a bit strange at this point. As Armstrong began his 
pullout, the airplane began a slight climb, unnoticed by Armstrong. As soon as 
Joe Walker (NASA-1) saw a slight positive rate of climb on the radar data, he 
knew Armstrong was in trouble. When Walker told him to make a hard left turn, 
Armstrong rolled into a 60-degree left bank and pulled up to start the turn. When 
Walker called for the next hard left turn, Armstrong realized that he was above 
the atmosphere and was not turning. He sailed right by Edwards at Mach 3 and 
100,000 feet headed for Palmdale in a 90-degree bank with full nose-up stabilizer, 
but the airplane did not want to turn .182 
79 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters,  February 962, p. .
80 Ibid; X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 5 February 962, p. .
8 Neil A. Armstrong, “Pilot Report for Flight 3--8,” 20 April 962; e-mail, Neil A. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 
3 August 2002.
82 Ibid; letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 August 2002; e-mail, Neil A. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 
3 August 2002.
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 Once a “skip” out of the atmosphere starts, there is no choice but to wait until 
the vehicle peaks in altitude and settles back into the atmosphere. By that time, 
Armstrong was 45 miles south of Edwards. Ironically, although he had excessive 
energy when he was over Edwards, he now did not have enough to make it back 
to Edwards .183 
 Armstrong was not getting much help at this point from Joe Walker in the 
NASA-1 control room since the planners had never envisioned a landing from 
the south and there were no checkpoints marked on the maps. Nobody could offer 
much assistance except for the reassuring voices of the chase pilots. Palmdale was 
not really a viable option because the Air Force installation there had a concrete 
runway, which was not an ideal surface for the X-15 skids. Eventually, Armstrong 
began setting up for a landing on runway 35 at the extreme south end of Rogers 
Dry Lake. This was about as far away as you could get from the normal runway 
18 at the north end of the lake, and the recovery and emergency vehicles were 
racing at full speed to cover the 12 miles before Armstrong touched down. The 
landing itself was not dramatic as Armstrong set the record for the longest miss 
distance during a non-emergency landing (12 miles). Milt Thompson later called 
this “Neil’s cross-country flight.”184 
83 Neil A. Armstrong, “Pilot Report for Flight 3--8,” 20 April 962; letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 
August 2002.
8 Thompson, At the Edge of Space, p. 06; letter, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 August 2002.
The initial cadre of  X-15 pilots pose in front of  Building 4800 at the Flight Research Center. From 
left, Forrest S. Peterson (USN), A. Scott Crossfield (NAA), Robert M. White (USAF), and Joseph 
A. Walker (NASA). (NASA)
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Astronaut Wings
 As near as can be determined, the three X-15s spent their entire career in and 
around Edwards, except for the occasional trip back to Inglewood to be repaired 
or modified. There was one exception, part of Project Eglin 1-62. On 2 May 1962, 
Jack Allavie and Bob White, along with a pressure-suit technician and a B-52 
crew chief, took the NB-52A and X-15-3 to Eglin AFB in Florida for the 4-hour-
long “Air Proving Ground Center Manned Weapons Fire Power Demonstration” 
attended by President John F. Kennedy. According to Allavie, “[W]e took off with 
an inert X-15 and flew all the way to Eglin AFB in Florida … that’s 1,625 miles 
and it was a simple flight. We landed there, put the X-15 on exhibit, and then flew 
it back to Edwards” on 5 May with a stop at Altus AFB, Oklahoma, for fuel. Pho-
tographic evidence shows a mission marking on the NB-52A depicting an X-15 
oriented in the opposite direction of the regular launches (indicating, one guesses, 
a flight eastward) and the inscription “PRES. VISIT EGLIN FLA.” Although it 
was by far the longest captive carry of the program, NASA did not assign the 
flight a program flight number.185 
 Back at Edwards, during the summer of 1962 Bob White made three flights in 
X-15-3 that demonstrated the potential problems of matching the preflight profile. 
On the first flight (3-5-9), White became disoriented during the exit and decided 
that he needed to push the nose down slightly so that he could visually acquire 
the horizon: “When we got up to 32 degrees, and at about 60 seconds in time, I 
guess it was just a small case of disorientation. I say a small case because I didn’t 
lose complete orientation but when I was up at this climb angle, and this is the 
first time that I’ve had this feeling, I looked at the ball, I had 32 degrees in pitch, 
but I had the darndest feeling that I was continuing to rotate. I couldn’t resist the 
urge just to push on back down until the light blue of the sky showed up. I never 
did get to the horizon, but I was satisfied that it wasn’t happening.” By the time he 
was satisfied and began his climb again, his energy was such that he undershot his 
planned 206,000-foot peak altitude by 21,400 feet.186  
 White’s next flight (3-6-10) was only nine days later. This one was much 
better. White undershot by only 3,300 feet, about average for the program. White 
reported that the weather obscured most of his view of the ground: “I did look 
around quite a bit, and I was a little disappointed because of all the low clouds 
that obscured the coast line. I took a couple of definite looks because I wanted to 
try and scan up further north, and down along the Mexican coast, and pick out 
some places, but the cloud cover was so extensive that I couldn’t really do that. 
Then too, when you’re up there it feels like everything’s right under the nose. It 
was reassuring again to hear ground saying you’re right on profile and track. That 
eliminates any concern on the pilot’s part.”187 
85 Telephone conversation, John E. Allavie with Dennis R. Jenkins, 22 May 2002; telephone conversation, Major 
General Robert M. White with Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 May 2002; e-mail, Tony Landis/DFRC to Dennis R. Jenkins, 
5 June 2002; e-mail, Peter W. Merlin/DFRC Archivist to Dennis R. Jenkins, 0 June 2002. The Kennedy Library 
checked the appointment books and determined that the president had been at Eglin on  May 962. James B. 
Hill, the audiovisual archivist at the library, reports that the library does not have any photographs showing Ken-
nedy inspecting the X-5, although there are 6 photos of him at the Eglin event.
86 Major Robert M. White, “Pilot Report for Flight 3-7-,” 7 July 962.
87 Ibid.
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 If it seemed that White was getting better at hitting his planned altitude, the 
next flight would dispel any such thoughts. On 17 July 1962, White took X-15-3 
on a flight that was supposed to go to 282,000 feet, which was sufficient to qual-
ify him for an Air Force astronaut rating. The MH-96 failed just before launch, 
which probably should have meant scrubbing for the day. Instead, White reached 
over and reset the circuit breakers. The MH-96 appeared to function correctly, so 
White called for a launch. White seemed to be trying to make up for the altitude 
he had not achieved on his last two flights. The climb angle was a bit steeper than 
called for, and the engine produced a bit more thrust than usual and burned a bit 
longer than expected. The result was a flight that was 32,750 feet higher than 
planned, setting a new Fédération Aéronautique Internationale (FAI) record for 
piloted aircraft of 314,750 feet and becoming the first winged vehicle to exceed 
300,000 feet, the first flight above 50 miles, and the first X-15 flight that qualified 
its pilot for an astronaut rating. This time, as the first astronaut from Edwards, 
White was suitably impressed with the view:188
 
You could just see as far as you looked. I turned my head in 
both directions and you see nothing but the Earth. It’s just tre-
mendous. You look off and the sky is real dark. I didn’t think 
the impression would be much different than it was up around 
250,000 feet, but I was impressed remarkably more than I was 
at 250,000 feet. It amazed me. I looked up and was able to pick 
out San Francisco bay and it looked like it was down over there 
off the right wing and I could look out, way out. It was just tre-
mendous, absolutely tremendous. You have seen pictures from 
high up in rockets, or these orbital pictures of what the guy sees 
out there. That’s exactly what it looked like. The same thing.
 White reentered and arrived over the high key at Mach 3.5 and 80,000 feet. 
The potential for a repeat of Armstrong’s excursion to Pasadena was present, but 
White had learned from Armstrong’s mistake: “I was mainly concerned at this 
time with the possibility of overshooting the landing point. I think that was my 
overriding consideration at this point. I went by the lake and turned it around, and 
when I went around in the turn I just pushed in on the bottom rudder so I could 
get the nose down and stay in where I had some q. I didn’t want any bounce in 
altitude. If I had gotten bounce, I would never have gotten back.”189 
 A wide sweeping turn over Rosamond brought White back to a more normal 
high key at 28,000 feet and subsonic speeds. He continued around for a near- 
perfect landing at 191 knots. Milt Thompson in the chase plane commented, “Nice, 
you really hit that … Bob,” and Joe Walker in the NASA-1 control room finished 
by saying, “This is your happy controller going off the air.” Despite having over-
88 Ibid. During the course of the X-5 program, the Department of Defense recognized 50 miles (26,000 feet) as 
the beginning of space, and Air Force pilots flying above this altitude qualified for an astronaut rating. Despite 
reports that NASA recognizes the international standard of 00 kilometers (62. miles, 328,099 feet), this is not 
the case–NASA does not specifically recognize any standard (telephone conversation, William F. Readdy, associ-
ate administrator for manned space flight, with Dennis R. Jenkins, 27 October 200). Because of this, the civilian 
X-5 pilots were not awarded “astronaut wings” until late 2005.
89 Major Robert M. White, “Pilot Report for Flight 3-7-,” 7 July 962.
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shot the altitude by more than 10%, White flew the flight nearly perfectly, and 
data from this flight would be used for several years to check out and calibrate the 
fixed-base simulator.190 
 Interestingly, this flight will probably remain an altitude record for airplanes 
as long as the FAI has a category for rocket-powered aircraft. In theory, it is pos-
sible to break the record one time. According to the rules, new records must ex-
90 Radio transcript for flight 3-7-, 7 July 962. In the files at the DFRC History Office. Use of the data in the 
fixed-base simulator comes from a telephone conversation, Johnny Armstrong with Dennis R. Jenkins, 30 May 
2002; e-mail, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 June 2002.
The altitude missions demanded precise piloting , and even then, several variables beyond the control of  
the pilot could result in significant altitude errors. On 17 July 1962, Bob White took X-15-3 on a 
flight that was supposed to go to 282,000 feet. The climb angle was a bit steeper than called for, the 
XLR99 produced a bit more thrust than usual, and it burned a bit longer than expected. The result 
was a flight that was 32,750 feet higher than planned, setting a new FAI record for piloted aircraft of  
314,750 and becoming the first winged vehicle to exceed 300,000 feet, the first flight above 50 miles, 
and the first X-15 flight that qualified its pilot for an astronaut rating. (NASA)
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ceed the old mark by 3%, meaning that somebody will have to fly at least 324,193 
feet altitude to beat White’s record. However, according the FAI, the atmosphere 
ends at 328,099 feet (100 kilometers). Therefore, it will be impossible to better the 
subsequent record without going into space, which would disqualify the attempt 
(as happened with Joe Walker’s 354,200-foot flight). The chances of somebody 
managing to get above 324,194 feet without exceeding 328,098 feet are extremely 
remote. It has been 40 years and nobody has tried yet.191 
 The next day, on 18 July 1962, President John F. Kennedy presented the 
Robert J. Collier Trophy to four X-15 pilots–Scott Crossfield, Forrest Peterson, 
Joe Walker, and Bob White—“for invaluable technological contributions to the 
advancement of flight and for great skill and courage as test pilots of the X-15.” 
By this point Crossfield had been gone for two years, and Petersen had already left 
to become the commanding officer at VF-154. Nevertheless, all four pilots jour-
neyed to Washington to accept the trophy on the South Lawn of the White House. 
The National Aeronautic Association annually awards the Collier Trophy, which 
is generally considered the most prestigious recognition for aerospace achieve-
ment in the United States. In the case of the X-15, the selection of the recipi-
ents was not arbitrary; it represented the first pilot from each organization (North 
American, Navy, NASA, and Air Force) to fly the airplane. The trophy itself was 
7 feet tall and weighed 500 pounds, and when Kennedy presented it to Bob White 
(the spokesman for the group), he commented, “I don’t know what you are going 
to do with it.”192  
 Later the same day the Air Force presented White with his astronaut wings 
during a small ceremony at the Pentagon, and that evening NASA feted all four 
pilots at a dinner where they received the NASA Distinguished Service Medal 
from Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson. NASA administrator James E. Webb 
commented at the dinner that the X-15 program was “a classic example of a most 
effective way to conduct research.”
 Since the beginning, the X-15 program had used four North American F-100 
Super Sabres as Chase-1. However, the F-100 was getting old, and the AFFTC 
was happy to begin receiving new Northrop T-38 Talons during October 1961. 
Pilots reported that the T-38 “appears as good or better than the F-100F for X-15 
support.” The Air Force conducted several test flights, sans the X-15, to evaluate 
whether the T-38 could fly close chase at 45,000 feet when the NB-52 was in a 
right-hand turn–something the F-100 could not do. Such a capability would allow a 
9 Thompson, At the Edge of Space, p. 2. As of 2 September 2006 the Fédération Aéronautique Internationale 
still regards this flight as a record for the class “Class C- (landplanes), group IV (rocket engine), launched from 
an aircraft.” The current status was obtained from an e-mail, Anne-Laure Perret/FAI Executive Officer to Dennis 
R. Jenkins, 2 July 2002 and 2 September 2006.
92 William MacDougall, “White, 3 Other X-5 Pilots Get Collier Trophy,” Los Angeles Times, 9 July 962; Pamela E. 
Mack, “Introduction,” From Engineering Science to Big Science: The NACA and NASA Collier Trophy Research 
Project Winners, edited by Pamela E. Mack, NASA publication SP-29, 998, p. xi. The caption for the photo on 
page 50 of the book incorrectly identifies the event as happening on 8 July 96 (it was 962). Mack had some 
interesting observations concerning the trophy, although none were particularly applicable to the X-5 award. 
One paragraph is particularly telling: “The United States has had and still has a number of aviation and aerospace 
organizations, ranging from booster groups to professional societies. The National Aeronautic Association fits 
somewhere in the middle of that range. In turn, its prize is shaped by the composition of the committee that 
awards it and by a series of rules, in particular that the prize be given for an achievement in the preceding year. 
While the Nobel Prize is usually given for an accomplishment whose significance has been proven by years of 
experience, the Collier Trophy represents an almost concurrent evaluation of an achievement (and like the Pulitzer 
Prize, it sometimes lacks the wisdom of hindsight).”
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right-hand NB-52 pattern prior 
to a launch, and would greatly 
improve ground telemetry re-
ception during that period since 
the NB-52 fuselage would not 
block the X-15-to-ground line 
of sight. The previously used 
left-hand pattern resulted in 
a loss of telemetry during the 
turn until approximately 2 
minutes prior to launch, but 
allowed the F-100F to re-
main in a suitable chase posi-
tion during activation of the 
X-15 systems. The problem 
was that during a right turn the 
F-100 was on the inside of the 
turn and had to fly at a slow in-
dicated airspeed . In a left turn 
on the X-15 side, the F-100 
was on the outside of the turn, 
flying at a higher and more ac-
ceptable indicated airspeed . 
The first flight (1-32-53) to use 
a T-38 was in July 1962 and 
the T-38 would be Chase-1 for 
almost every flight until the 
end of the program.193 
A Bad Day
     On 9 November 1962, Jack McKay launched X-15-2 from the NB-52B on 
his way to what was supposed to be a routine heating flight (2-31-52) to Mach 
5 .55 and 125,000 feet . Just after the X-15 separated, Bob Rushworth (NASA-1) 
asked McKay to check his throttle position, and McKay verified it was full open. 
Unfortunately, the engine was only putting out about 35% power. In theory, the 
X-15 could have made a slow trip back to Rogers Dry Lake, but there was no way 
of knowing why the engine had decided to act up, or whether it would continue 
to function for the entire trip. The low power setting seriously compounded the 
problems associated with energy management since the flight planners had calcu-
lated the normal decision times for an emergency landing at each of the intermedi-
ate lakebeds based on 100% thrust. The computer power at the time was such that 
there was no way to recompute those decision points in real time, so the mission 
93 E-mail, Clarence E. Anderson to Dennis R. Jenkins, 28 January 2002; e-mail, Scott Crossfield to Dennis R. 
Jenkins, 28 January 2002; Minutes of Meeting, X-5 Operations Subcommittee, 20 March 96. One flight (2--
28) on 30 March 96 had used a T-38 from the Test Pilot School flown by Pete Knight as Chase-2, but -32-53 
was the first use as Chase-. A few flights used a Douglas F5D Skyray as Chase-.
On 18 July 1962, president John F. Kennedy presented 
the Robert J. Collier Trophy to the X-15 program. The 
award was accepted by Scott Crossfield, Forrest Peterson, 
Joe Walker, and Bob White in a ceremony on the South 
Lawn of  the White House.. The trophy is seven feet tall 
and weighs 500 pounds. (NASA)
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rules dictated that the pilot shut down the engine and make an emergency landing. 
McKay would have to land at Mud Lake .194 
 As emergency landing sites went, Mud Lake was not a bad one, being about 
5 miles in diameter and very smooth and hard. When Rushworth and McKay de-
cided to land at Mud, the pilot immediately began preparing for the landing. The 
engine was shut down after 70.5 seconds, the airplane turned around, and as much 
propellant as possible was jettisoned. It was looking like a “routine” emergency 
until the X-15 wing flaps failed to operate. The resulting “hot” landing (257 knots) 
caused the left main landing skid to fail, and the left horizontal stabilizer and wing 
dug into the lakebed, resulting in the aircraft turning sideways and flipping upside 
down. Luckily, McKay realized he was going over and jettisoned the canopy just 
prior to rolling inverted. The unfortunate result was that the first thing to hit the 
lakebed was McKay’s helmet.195  
 As was the case for all X-15 flights, the Air Force had deployed a rescue 
crew and fire truck to the launch lake. Normally it was a dull and boring assign-
ment, but on this day they earned their pay. The ground crew sped toward the 
X-15, but when they arrived less than a minute later, they found that their breath-
ing masks were not protecting them from the fumes escaping from the broken 
airplane. Fortunately, the pilot of the H-21 recovery helicopter noted the vapors 
from unjettisoned anhydrous ammonia escaping from the wreck and maneuvered 
his helicopter so that his rotor downwash could disperse the fumes. The ground 
crew was able to dig a hole in the lakebed and extract McKay. By this time, the 
C-130 had arrived with the paramedics and additional rescue personnel. McKay 
was loaded on the C-130 and rushed to Edwards, and the ground crew tended to 
the damaged X-15. At this point the airplane had accumulated a total free flight 
time of 40 minutes and 32.2 seconds.196  
 It had taken three years and 74 flights, but all of the emergency preparations 
had finally paid off. In this case, as for all flights, the Air Force had flown the 
rescue crew and fire truck to the launch lake before dawn in preparation for the 
flight. The helicopter had flown up at daybreak. The C-130 had returned to Ed-
wards and carried another fire truck to an intermediate lake (they were possibly 
the most traveled fire trucks in the Air Force inventory). The C-130, loaded with 
a paramedic and sometimes a flight surgeon, then began a slow orbit midway 
between Mud Lake and Edwards, waiting. Outside the program, some had ques-
tioned the time and expense involved in keeping the lakebeds active and deploy-
ing the emergency crews for each mission. The flight program was beginning to 
seem so routine. Inside the program, nobody doubted the potential usefulness of 
the precautions. Because of the time and expense, Jack McKay was resting in the 
 
9 Armstrong, “Expanding the X-5 Envelope to Mach 6.7,” pp. 200-20. In his book, Johnny Armstrong says that 
Pete Knight was NASA- for this flight; however, all other documents, including the radio transcripts, indicate that 
Bob Rushworth was the communicator. Additionally, although most contemporary documentation (including the 
flight report) indicates that the engine was at 30% power; subsequent analysis showed it was really at 35%.
95 William P. Albrecht/X-5 Project Engineer, “X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight 2-3-52,” 6 November 962; 
William P. Albrecht/X-5 Project Engineer, “X-5 Operations Flight Report Supplement for Flight 2-3-52,” 22 May 
96; Armstrong, “Expanding the X-5 Envelope to Mach 6.7,” pp. 200-20; Thompson, At the Edge of Space, 
p. 229. The 257-knot landing speed was almost 60 knots higher than normal.
96 Ibid.
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base hospital, seemingly alive and well. Had the ground crew not been there, the 
result might have been much different.197  
 Although the post-flight report stated that the “pilot injuries were not seri-
ous,” in reality Jack McKay had suffered several crushed vertebra that made him 
an inch shorter than when the flight had begun.  Nevertheless, five weeks after his 
accident, McKay was in the control room as the NASA-1 for Bob White’s last 
X-15 flight (3-12-22). McKay would go on to fly 22 more X-15 flights, but would 
ultimately retire from NASA because of lasting effects from this accident.198  
 X-15-2 had not fared any better–the damage was major, but not total. On 15 
November 1962, the Air Force and NASA appointed an accident board with Donald 
R . Bellman as chair. The board released its findings, which contained no surprises, 
in a detailed report distributed during December 1962. Six months after the Mud 
Lake accident, the Air Force awarded North American a contract to modify X-15-2 
into an advanced configuration that eventually allowed the program to meet its 
original speed goal of 6,600 fps (Mach 6.5). Because of the basic airplane’s ever-
increasing weight, it had been unable to do this, by a small margin.199  
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 William P. Albrecht/X-5 Project Engineer, “X-5 Operations Flight Report Supplement for Flight 2-3-52,” 22 May 
96; Armstrong, “Expanding the X-5 Envelope to Mach 6.7,” p. 20.
Jack McKay made an emergency landing at Mud Lake on 9 November 1962 after the XLR99 stuck 
at 35-percent power on Flight 2-31-52. Unfortunately, the wing flaps failed and the airplane was heavy 
with unjettisoned propellant, resulting in a very high 257-knot landing speed. As McKay touched down, 
the left rear skid failed and the airplane flipped over. Since Mud was a designated emergency landing 
site for this flight, fire trucks were standing by and paramedics were orbiting in a C-130 transport. 
McKay was airlifted to the hospital at Edwards with serious injuries. McKay recovered and flew 22 
more X-15 flights and the X-15-2 was rebuilt into the advanced X-15A-2. (NASA)
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1963 FLIGHT PERIOD
 On 4 October 1962, the first in-flight failure of an APU had occurred when 
the no. 1 APU failed 5 minutes after launch on flight 3-10-19. On 17 January 
1963, a second failure took place, this time 4 minutes after launch on flight 
3-14-24. Almost 3 months passed while a team of specialists from the Air Force, 
NASA, and General Electric investigated the problem, representing the only 
significant cessation of flight activities caused by mechanical failure during the 
X-15 program.200 
 What the engineers found was excessive wear on the high-speed (51,200-
rpm) turbine shaft pinion. The solution became obvious when simulated altitude 
tests revealed that when engineers eliminated seal leakage from the drive-turbine 
case into the gear-reduction box, the gearbox was no longer pressurized. The lower 
ambient temperature at altitude reduced the efficiency of the lubricant as a coolant 
and as a film between the gear teeth. This deficiency caused pinion failure at alti-
tudes in as little as 90 seconds. Engineers devised a way to pressurize the gearbox 
and effectively solved the problem.201 
 As it became obvious that the program was going to continue past its initial 
mandate to gather aero-thermo data, the FRC began correcting some of the short-
comings of the original design. For instance, pilots had long complained that the 
configuration of the instrument panel was less than ideal. During the summer 
of 1963, NASA made modifications to relieve the panel’s visual clutter and im-
prove its scan pattern. At the same time, the agency added a dynamic pressure 
indicator, heading vernier, altitude predictor, and cross-track position indicator 
to provide more trajectory-control data. The resulting instrument panel bore little 
resemblance to the original; in fact, even the original black color had given way 
to a medium gray that the pilots found contrasted better with the instruments. By 
the fall of 1963, the dynamic pressure and heading indicators had been used on 
several flights and found to be “effective piloting aids.” Engineers planned more 
changes for X-15-3 in the form of an energy-guidance display to allow the pilot 
more precise control of the boost trajectory.202 
 Although the use of dampers was increasing on the aerodynamic controls, 
there continued to be debate about including some sort of stability augmenta-
tion system for the ballistic controls. As early as June 1960, North American had 
conducted tests on the fixed-base simulator to investigate a proposed reaction 
augmentation system (RAS). Three pilots–Neil Armstrong, Joe Walker, and Bob 
White–were involved in the tests. All agreed that the RAS made the airplane a 
great deal easier to fly, and that the “combination of RAS and SAS affords a 
considerable improvement in reentry-control characteristics.” This seemed to be 
in direct contradiction to the 1956 findings that dampers were not required for 
 
 
200 Love and Fischel, “Status of X-5 Program,” p. 7.
20 Ibid.
202 “Semi-Annual Summary Status Report of X-5 Program,” October 963, p. 9.
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the ballistic control system, but in intervening years the program engineers had 
learned a great deal more about the actual vehicle flight characteristics.203 
 By 1963 the FRC had decided it was time to modify X-15-1 and X-15-2 to 
incorporate the RAS . X-15-3 was not so equipped since the MH-96 essentially 
took care of this function. The RAS was the proportional system with an on-off 
damping loop. The system apparently worked fairly well, although most of late 
1963 and early 1964 were spent developing filter modifications so that the system 
would not excite any of the natural frequencies on the X-15. The first modified 
unit was available in the summer of 1964.204  
Maximum Altitude
 Joe Walker would fly the maximum altitude flight (3-22-36) of the program 
on 22 August 1963, his second excursion above 300,000 feet in just over a month. 
The simulator predicted that the X-15 could achieve altitudes well in excess of 
400,000 feet, but there was considerable doubt as to whether the airplane could 
successfully reenter from such heights. A good pilot on a good day could do it, but 
if anything went wrong, the results were usually less than desirable. In order to 
provide a margin of safety, NASA decided to limit the maximum altitude attempt 
to 360,000 feet, providing a 40,000-foot pad for cumulative errors. This might 
sound like a lot, but the flight planners and pilots remembered that Bob White had 
overshot his altitude by 32,750 feet. The X-15 was climbing at over 4,000 fps, so 
every second the pilot delayed shutting down the engine would result in a 4,000-
foot increment in altitude. The XLR99 also was not terribly precise–sometimes 
the engine developed 57,000 lbf, while other times it developed 60,000 lbf. An ex-
tra 1,500 lbf for the entire burn translated into an additional 7,500 feet of altitude . 
A 1-degree error in climb angle could also result in 7,500 feet more altitude. Add 
these all up and it is easy to understand why the program decided a 40,000-foot 
cushion was appropriate .205 
 Walker had made one build-up flight (3-21-32) prior to the maximum altitude 
attempt in which he overshot his 315,000-foot target by 31,200 feet through a 
combination of all three variables (higher-than-expected engine thrust, longer-
than-expected engine burn, and a 0.5-degree error in climb angle). Walker com-
mented after the flight, “First thing I’m going to say is I was disappointed on two 
items on this flight, one was that I was honestly trying for 315,000, the other one 
was I thought I had it made on the smoke bomb on the lakebed. I missed both of 
them.” Although he missed the smoke bomb on landing, it was well within toler-
ance. As for missing the altitude, the 40,000-foot cushion suddenly did not seem 
very large.206 
 The flight was surprisingly hard to launch, racking up three aborts over a two-
week period mainly because of weather and APU problems. On the actual flight 
day, things began badly when both the Edwards and Beatty radars lost track on the 
203 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters,  July 960, p. 3.
20 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 2,” April 96, p. 6.
205 Thompson, At the Edge of Space, p. 23; letter, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 August 2002; letter, 
Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 August 2002.
206 Joseph A. Walker, “Pilot Report for Flight 3-2-32,” 9 July 963. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
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NB-52 during the flight to the launch lake, but both reacquired it 4 minutes prior to 
the scheduled launch time. The launch itself was good and Walker began the long 
climb to altitude. Although this was the first flight for the altitude predictor, Walker 
flew the mission based on its results, changing his climb angle several times to stay 
within a predicted 360,000 feet . When the XLR99 depleted its propellants, X-15-3 
was traveling through 176,000 feet at 5,600 fps. It would take almost 2 minutes to 
get to the top of the climb, ultimately reaching 354,200 feet.207 
 To give the reader a sense of what reentry was like on this flight: The airplane 
was heading down at a 45-degree angle, and as it descended through 170,000 feet 
it was traveling 5,500 fps–over a mile per second. The acceleration buildup was 
non-linear and happened rather abruptly, taking less than 15 seconds to go from 
essentially no dynamic pressure to 1,500 psf, then tapering off for the remainder 
of reentry, and reaching a peak acceleration of 5 g at 95,000 feet. Walker main-
tained 5 g during the pullout until he came level at 70,000 feet. All the time the 
anti-g part of the David Clark full-pressure suit was squeezing his legs and stom-
ach, forcing blood back to his heart and brain. Walker said that “the comment of 
207 Ibid.
It was not uncommon for X-15 altitude flights to miss their expected altitude. The X-15 climbed at over 
4,000 fps, so every second that the pilot delayed shutting down the engine resulted in a 4,000-foot incre-
ment in altitude. The XLR99 also was not terribly precise – sometimes the engine developed 57,000-lbf; 
other times it developed 60,000-lbf. An extra 1,500-lbf  for the entire burn translated into an additional 
7,500 feet of  altitude. A 1-degree error in climb angle could also result in 7,500 feet more altitude.
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previous flights that this is one big squeeze in the pullout is still good.” The glide 
back to Edwards was uneventful and Walker made a perfect landing. The flight 
had lasted 11 minutes and 8 seconds, and had covered 305 ground miles from 
Smith Ranch to Rogers Dry Lake. Although Walker had traveled more than 67 
miles high, well in excess of the 62-mile (100-kilometer) international standard 
supposedly recognized by NASA, no astronaut rating awaited him. This was ap-
parently reserved for people who rode ballistic missiles at Cape Canaveral, and it 
would take 42 years to correct the oversight.208 
 By the end of 1963, the program had gathered almost all of the data research-
ers had originally desired and the basic research program was effectively complet-
ed. The program would now push into the basic program extensions phase using 
X-15A-2 to gather similar data at increasingly high speeds while the other two air-
planes continued the follow-on experiments. The basic program extensions were 
a set of experiments that had not been anticipated when the Air Force and NASA 
conceived the basic program. Some were truly follow-ons to issues that were un-
covered during the basic program; others were the result of new factors, such as the 
increased capabilities of the modified X-15A-2. In general, researchers continued 
all of the original research into aerodynamics, structures, and flight controls for the 
rebuilt airplane. The FRC paid for many of the experiments from general research 
funds, not from a separate appropriation from Headquarters or Congress.209 
 Despite the progress and future plans, there was no uniform agreement that 
the X-15 program should continue. At least privately, several officials (including 
Paul Bikle) argued that the value of the projected research returns was not worth 
the risk and expense, and that the program should be terminated at the conclusion 
of the basic research program, or as soon as the X-15A-2 had completed its basic 
program. This body of opinion was the same that had initially led NASA to argue 
against modifying X-15-2 into the advanced configuration. However, by this time 
the X-15A-2 was well under construction and researchers had proposed an entire 
series of follow-on experiments, making it unlikely that the program would be 
terminated any time soon.210 
 Although the point would be moot after the Department of Defense canceled 
the Dyna-Soar on 10 December 1963, at the end of 1963 the X-15 program was 
making plans for four unnamed future X-20 pilots to make high-altitude familiar-
ization flights in X-15-3 during the first half of 1964. Several of the Dyna-Soar 
pilots had already flown the X-15 simulator in preparation.211 
 
208 Ibid; Thompson, At the Edge of Space, p. 53; letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 August 2002.
209 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 22.
20 Letter, Paul F. Bikle to USAF/ASD, no subject, 2 November 96. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
2 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 3. Surprisingly, nobody seems to remember which 
X-20 pilots were selected to make the four flights. The six X-20 pilots were Major James W. Wood, Major Henry 
C. Gordon, Major William J. Knight, Major Albert H. Crews, Major Russell L. Rogers, and Milton O. Thompson. 
Wood was the lead pilot. Bob Hoey remembers that “I was all in favor of that since there were a lot of similarities 
between the X-5 and the X-20. The side arm controller was quite similar, although the X-20 stick was all fly-by-
wire so the movement was a lot smoother. Landings would have been very similar–same L/D and about the same 
wing loading.” After the Dyna-Soar was canceled, Pete Knight and Milt Thompson joined the X-5 program.
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1964 FLIGHT PERIOD
 After the 100th X-15 flight (1-44-70), the NASA administrator, James E. 
Webb, presented a Group Achievement Award to “The X-15 Research Airplane 
Flight Test Organization” even if such an entity, in reality, did not exist. The award 
was “for outstanding accomplishments during the X-15 flight research program, 
from the first flight on June 8, 1959 to the one-hundredth flight on January 28, 
1964.” Given that these events included flights by Scott Crossfield and the Air 
Force pilots, Webb meant the award for the entire X-15 team, hence the fictional 
organizational reference.212 
 The first part of 1964 brought good news and bad news. Captain Joe H. Engle 
and NASA test pilot Milton O. Thompson joined the program as pilots, which was 
good, but trouble with the stable platform caused the program to restrict flights to 
below 200,000 feet. To solve the problem with the stable platform, the Air Force 
and NASA were modifying a batch of inertial guidance systems originally procured 
for the Dyna-Soar program. The first unit became available in September 1964, but 
it was a “low” year, literally. In addition to the Dyna-Soar inertial systems, engi-
22 Copy of the award, in the author’s collection.
NASA Administrator James E. Webb presented a Group Achievement Award to the “The X-15 Re-
search Airplane Flight Test organization” on 28 January 1964. Oddly, such an organization did not 
actually exist, but it was a way to honor the entire X-15 community, including the Air Force, Navy, and 
North American Aviation. (NASA)
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neers and technicians at the FRC extensively modified the original Sperry stable 
platform and installed it in X-15A-2 and X-15-3 as an interim measure.213 
 By mid-1964, the FRC was getting serious about obtaining boundary-layer 
noise data, and finally found microphones that could tolerate the temperatures in-
volved. The precision flying required for these measurements was more demand-
ing than it sounded: the pilot had to maintain a steady-state altitude and speed for 
about 10 seconds to obtain useful data, something that was not necessarily easy 
to accomplish with the X-15. These particular data also had to be collected on 
flights below 100,000 feet since the aerodynamic pressure was a key component 
of the noise .214 
 One of the nagging problems experienced by the X-15 program was that the 
research instrumentation–particularly the data recorders–was not keeping up with 
the performance potential of the aircraft. In addition, the increased complexity of 
the experiments required a greater quantity of more precise data. The standard 
data-recording devices, such as oscillographs and manometers, performed well 
during the flight program, with a reliability of around 94%. However, the limited 
space within the X-15 often forced researchers to use smaller Parsons tape record-
ers. Some parameters, such as very low-pressure data, were not suited for the tape 
recorders, which introduced too much noise and made the data hard to extract. 
All of the recorders, and the sensors themselves, were analog devices (frequently 
optical), not modern digital units. Eventually, the FRC decided to reinstall the 
larger oscillograph recorders that provided better accuracy but resulted in fewer 
parameters being recorded per flight.215  
 The XLR99 did not particularly like to throttle, and Joe Vensel, the director 
of FRC flight operations, mandated that the pilots should not throttle the engine 
until the X-15 had sufficient energy to make it back to Edwards. Thompson talked 
him into changing his mind for a flight (3-29-48) on 21 May 1964. As Thompson 
throttled back from 100% to 45%, the XLR99 shut down–only 41 seconds into a 
planned 120-second burn. The problem was a pressure spike in the second-stage 
chamber pressure-sensing line, something that had been present for several years. 
This particular engine had not shown a tendency to generate spikes during the 
three flights and four ground runs that had been accomplished since the engine was 
installed in X-15-3. The intensity of the spike was sufficient in this case to deform 
the switch mechanically, holding the contacts closed and thus preventing an engine 
restart. Although X-15-3 accelerated to Mach 2.90 at 64,200 feet, Thompson could 
not make Rogers Dry Lake and opted for an emergency landing on Cuddeback .216 
 If it was not bad enough that Thompson had to make an emergency landing, 
he touched down with so much speed he nearly ran out of lakebed. Thompson: 
“I finally get it on the ground and I’m landing way long and there’s a road that 
goes across the lakebed about three miles up the lakebed. I hit that road doing 
100 miles per hour, just plowed through the banks that they had up on either side, 
23 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 2,” April 96, p. ; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  December 
96, p. .
2 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  December 96, p. 8.
25 Ibid, pp. 9-0
26 Vincent N. Capasso/X-5 Project Engineer, “X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight 3-29-8,” 28 May 96; 
“X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  December 96, p. . Both in the files at the DFRC History Office.
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and bounced over the road and finally came to a stop about 500 feet beyond the 
road. There was a fire truck that had pulled up behind me when I landed, and they 
came roaring across there and hit that road about the same speed. Somebody told 
me later that fire truck was 10 feet in the air.” Milt continued, “Anyway, after 
that landing I borrowed a line from Jack McKay who had made a similar landing 
up at Delamar; he landed a bit long and it turned out he ran off the edge of the 
lakebed and up in the boondocks. Somebody asked Jack after that landing ‘How 
long was the runway on Delamar?’ and he said ‘Oh, it’s about 3 miles long with a 
500-foot overrun .’ Well, it turns out that Cuddeback is the same thing–three miles 
long to the road and a 500-foot overrun.” This marked the program’s first emer-
gency landing at Cuddeback. The landing did not seriously damage the X-15, and 
Thompson was uninjured.217  
 By the end of 1964, after 120 flights and accumulated flying time of 2 hours 
at speeds above 3,000 mph, the X-15 airplanes were beginning to show their age. 
Wrinkles and buckles marred the once-sleek fuselages and engineers had cut gaps 
elsewhere. Scars were visible where technicians had hammered the skin of the 
wings back in place. The X-15s appeared old and tired. One of the airplanes had a 
vertical stabilizer with a sharp leading edge (a radical departure from the others), 
and none of them had the vertical stabilizer with which it first flew. Other changes 
were less obvious, such as the added structure that stiffened the fuselage and verti-
cal stabilizer, and the electronics that helped operate the flight controls.218 
27 “The Pilot’s Panel,” a paper in the Proceedings of the X-15 30th Anniversary Celebration, Dryden Flight Research 
Facility, Edwards, CA, 8 June 989, NASA CP-305, p. 52.
28 Stillwell, X-15 Research Results.
The X-15-3 carried a dorsal rudder with a “sharp leading edge” for many of  its later flights. The leading 
edge of  this rudder protruded forward a bit further than the normal rudder and had a small radius. In this 
photo, the temperature-sensitive paint and two leading-edge expansion slots show up well. (NASA)
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 At this point, the three X-15s were more different than similar. Originally, 
the first two aircraft were substantially alike, while the MH-96 in X-15-3 sig-
nificantly altered its character. However, the modification of the second airplane 
into the advanced X-15A-2 meant that all three aircraft shared little more than 
the general configuration. In addition to the originally installed SAS, X-15-1 and 
X-15-2 also had the independent ASAS, while X-15-3 used the MH-96 adaptive 
control system and a different damper scheme. A reaction-augmentation system 
added to the ballistic control system on X-15-1 and X-15-2 provided better ve-
hicle damping at high altitudes, while the MH-96 on X-15-3 performed much the 
same function.219 
 By now, NASA expected the flight program to continue through the end of 
calendar year 1968. The FRC would take X-15-1 and X-15-3 out of service at the 
end of CY67 and mid-CY67, respectively, while the Mach 8-capable X-15A-2 
would continue through the end of 1968. Data reduction and analysis would con-
tinue for several months after the end of the flight program. However, the X-15 
program still had high-level supporters. Senator Clinton P. Anderson (D-NM) 
said, “During the past four-and-one-half years the program has achieved a very 
commendable record, providing a wealth of research data for the aeronautical 
and space programs of the United States. The past accomplishments of the X-15 
program reflect a superb job of managing flight-test operations, and cooperation 
between the NASA, the Air Force, and the Navy.” Given that no significant por-
tion of the X-15 program was conducted in New Mexico, this was high praise.220 
 James E. Love, the NASA X-15 program manager, revealed that it cost an 
average of $270,000 to refurbish the airplane after each flight, approximately 3% 
of the cost of a new X-15. He based this figure on the annual operating budget of 
$16.3 million for the program, excluding military salaries. NASA also provided 
some “cost per pound” information, although its exact relevance is difficult to de-
termine. For example, the X-20 inertial flight data system cost $6,670 per pound, 
and the X-15 stable platform cost $4,700 per pound. Other X-15 system costs per 
pound were as follows: airframe, $1,930; engine, $5,900; stability augmentation 
system, $5,400; auxiliary power unit, $3,750; ball nose, $1,300; and NB-52 car-
rier aircraft, $170.221  
High-Temperature Loads Calibration Laboratory
 The requirement to measure flight loads on aircraft flying at supersonic and 
hypersonic speeds led the FRC to construct the High-Temperature Loads Calibra-
tion Laboratory in building 4820 during 1964. The facility allowed researchers to 
calibrate strain-gage installations and test structural components and complete ve-
hicles under the combined effects of loads and temperatures. The laboratory was 
a hangar-type structure with a small shop and office area attached to one end. A 
29 James E. Love and Jack Fischel, “Status of X-5 Program,” a paper in the Progress of the X-15 Research Airplane 
Program, A Compilation of the Papers presented at the Flight Research Center, 7 October 965, NASA publica-
tion SP-90 (Washington, DC: NASA, 965), pp. 3-.
220 Letter, Albert J. Evans to Hugh L. Dryden, subject: Notification of approval of additions to the X-5 test-bed 
program, 30 March 96. In the files at the NASA History Office. Anderson quote in the Evans letter.
22 B. K. Thomas, Jr. “X-5 Flights Providing Baseline Data on Reusable Space Vehicles,” Aviation Week & Space 
Technology, 9 January 967, pp. 67-69.
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door measuring 40 feet high and 136 feet wide allowed access to an unobstructed 
test area that was 150 feet long by 120 feet wide and 40 feet high.222 
 A state-of-the-art control room was provided to operate the heating and loads 
equipment remotely, and a data acquisition system occupied the second floor over 
the office spaces. Large windows overlooked the hangar floor, and the room in-
cluded a closed-circuit television system. A high-capacity hydraulic system could 
operate up to 34 actuators to apply loads to test specimen or entire aircraft. Per-
haps more importantly for the X-15 program, the facility had a programmable 
heating system that used infrared quartz lamps available in various lengths from 5 
inches to 32 inches. Reflector arrangements were available for heating rates from 
0 to 100 Btu per second per second and temperatures up to 3,000°F.223 
 NASA used this facility for a variety of purposes during the remainder of the 
flight program. This included testing a set of X-15 horizontal stabilizers as part of 
the loads program undertaken late in the flight program, and the laboratory proved 
222 Walter J. Sefic and Karl F. Anderson, NASA technical memorandum X-868, “NASA High Temperature Loads 
Calibration Laboratory,” September 969.
223 Ibid.
The High Temperature Loads Calibration Laboratory was established at the Flight Research Center 
to allow researchers to calibrate strain-gage installations and test structural components and complete 
vehicles under the combined effects of  loads and temperatures. The facility was equipped with a program-
mable heating system that used infrared quartz lamps available in various lengths from 5 inches to 32 
inches. Reflector arrangements were available for heating rates from 0 to 100 Btu per second per second 
and temperatures up to 3,000 degrees Fahrenheit. This photo shows an X-15 horizontal stabilizer 
being tested under the lamps. (NASA)
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to be critical for solving the inadvertent landing-gear extension problem suffered 
by X-15A-2 when it began its envelope expansion program. NASA later used the 
laboratory to test portions of the XB-70A and Lockheed Blackbirds.
1965 FLIGHT PERIOD
 From 1 December 1964 to 31 March 1965, 12 flight attempts resulted in only 
eight flights. There were also two scheduled captive flights of the X-15A-2 to 
verify aerodynamic loads on the landing gear. The Honeywell inertial system in 
X-15-1 and the landing-gear problems on X-15A-2 were the primary causes of the 
delays and aborts. Weather also caused 10 delays, ranging from 1 to 10 days each, 
but this was normal for the winter in the high desert. All launches used the NB-
52B since the other carrier aircraft was in Wichita undergoing major maintenance 
and did not return until 28 April .224 
 Also during this period, the FRC evaluated how to equip each X-15 with the 
experiments for the follow-on program, and concluded that “[a]ll three X-15s will 
increase in weight because of the number and variety of experiments and research 
tests being planned.” Engineers at the FRC began investigating modifications to 
the NB-52 wing/pylon structure and X-15 landing gear to support the heavier 
22 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,”  April 965, pp. -2; X-5 Status Report No. 65-5, Paul F. Bikle/FRC 
to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 3 May 965, p. 2.
Most X-15 flights looked pretty much the same, varying mainly in what experiments were being carried, 
and what surfaces had temperature-sensitive paint or experimental ablators on them. The large white 
rectangle on the bottom of  the fuselage is condensation from the liquid oxygen tank. (NASA)
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aircraft. These increases in weight pretty much guaranteed that the program had 
already reached its maximum altitude; the maximum speed, on the other hand, 
still lay ahead with the modified X-15A-2.225 
 On 26 February 1965, Jack McKay took X-15-1 on a Mach 5.40 heating 
flight (1-52-85). Afterwards, McKay commented that there was “quite a bit of 
pounding over the airplane during the acceleration part of it and this is just that 
regular banging during the heating run you know. Every time you get used to that 
and you don’t fly that bird for some time that first one will wake you up. It is hard 
to tell just where it is coming from. It is just like somebody is hitting the airplane 
with a sledge hammer.”226 
The Fourth Industry Conference 
 NASA held the fourth and last conference on the progress of the X-15 pro-
gram at the FRC on 7 October 1965. This conference was considerably smaller 
than the previous ones, with only 13 papers written by 25 authors. The FRC em-
ployed 18 of the authors, while four came from other NASA centers, one from 
the AFFTC, and the remaining two from other Air Force organizations. Approxi-
mately 500 persons attended the event. At this point, the program had conducted 
approximately 150 flights over 6 years.227 
 By the time of the conference, the X-15 had essentially met or exceeded all 
of its revised performance specifications. The future would bring no additional al-
titude marks, and additional speed of less than a Mach number. For the most part, 
the government was using the X-15 as an experiment carrier, although X-15A-2 
continued some additional aero-thermo-dynamic research. Jim Love noted that 
10 pilots had used the three X-15s to accumulate almost 1 hour of flight above 
200,000 feet and almost 4 hours at speeds in excess of Mach 4.228 
 The follow-on experiments were taking on unanticipated importance. Love 
observed, “The use of the airplane as an experimental test bed is one of the most 
significant extensions in the research capability of the X-15 airplanes. They have 
been utilized to carry various experimental packages to required environments, 
obtaining measurements with these packages, and then returning the experiment 
and results to the experimenters … several experiments were installed on each air-
craft for better flight utilization. For this reason, on the X-15-1 airplane, specially 
constructed [wing] tip pods and tail-cone box have been installed … to accom-
modate the experiments …. Three experiments have been completed, five are in 
progress, and three more are planned for next year.”229 
  
 
225 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,”  April 965, p. .
226 Pilot questionnaire, John B. McKay, flight -52-85 (undated, but probably 26 February 965).
227 Progress of the X-15 Research Airplane Program, a compilation of the papers presented at the flight research 
center, 7 October 965, NASA publication SP-90 (Washington, DC: NASA, 965), p. iii; X-5 Status report no. 
65-0, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  October 965, p. 2. The conference had been 
planned for two days (7-8 October), but was reduced to a single day a few months previously. Unfortunately, this 
proceedings report did not include a list of attendees. The other industry conferences were held in 956, 958, 
and 96.
228 Love and Fischel, “Status of X-5 Program,” p. 2.
229 Ibid, p. 5. The omitted text is primarily references to figures that do not appear in this history.
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 Love noted that “the X-15 program has never settled down to a routine op-
eration because of the continued increase in complexity and the nature of ex-
periments and research performed by each aircraft. This attribute is probably 
characteristic of research programs.” The lack of routine, however, undoubtedly 
increased the cost of the program and placed a heavy burden on personnel to 
maintain safety.230 
The X-15A-2
 After Jack McKay’s emergency landing in X-15-2 on 9 November 1962, 
North American proposed modifying X-15-2 to an advanced configuration ca-
pable of reaching Mach 8 velocities. NASA in general and Paul Bikle in particular 
were not particularly enthusiastic and felt the Air Force should simply repair the 
aircraft to its original configuration or retire it altogether. Many researchers be-
lieved that the Mach 8-capable X-15A would be of limited value for aero-thermo 
research. However, NASA did not press its views, and on 13 May 1963 the Air 
Force directed North American to repair and modify the aircraft at a cost of $4.75 
million. The advanced aircraft was intended to evaluate an air-breathing hyper-
sonic research engine (HRE) being developed at Langley. It was designed to reach 
8,000 fps at an altitude of 100,000 feet, and a dynamic pressure of 1,000 psf. 
Heating rates up to 210 Btu per square foot per second were expected, with peak 
structural temperatures approaching 2,400°F.231  
 The modifications did not significantly alter the physical appearance of 
X-15A-2. The wingspan was still 22.36 feet, but the airplane was 29 inches longer 
due to a plug in the center of gravity compartment between the propellant tanks. 
Perhaps the most obvious change was the addition of external propellant tanks on 
each side of the fuselage below the wings. These allowed the airplane to carry ap-
proximately 70% more propellant, a necessary ingredient in raising performance 
to 8,000 fps. The tanks provided an additional 60 seconds of engine burn time, for 
a total of 150 seconds at 100% power. Other modifications included adding hy-
drogen-peroxide tanks within extended aft-side fairings to supply the turbopump 
for the longer engine burn times, and additional pressurization gas in a spherical 
helium tank just behind the vertical stabilizer.232  
 The fuselage extension provided additional internal volume for experiments, 
and the center-of-gravity compartment access doors could accommodate optical 
windows looking up or down. The compartment could also accommodate a liq-
uid-hydrogen tank, with a total capacity of 48 pounds, to fuel the ramjet mounted 
under the fixed portion of the ventral stabilizer, but it appears NASA never actually 
installed the tank. Perhaps the most difficult part of incorporating this extension 
230 Ibid, p. 5.
23 Elmor J. Adkins and Johnny G. Armstrong, “Development and Status of the X-5A-2 Airplane,” a paper in the 
Progress of the X-15 Research Airplane Program, a compilation of the papers presented at the FRC, 7 October 
965, NASA publication SP-90 (Washington, DC: NASA, 965), pp. 03-0; Edwin W. Johnston, “Current and 
Advanced X-5,” a paper presented at the Military Aircraft Systems and Technology meeting, Washington, DC, 
2-23 September 96; Johnny G. Armstrong, AFFTC technology document FTC-TD-69-, “Flight Planning and 
Conduct of the X-5A-2 Envelope Expansion Program,” July 969, p. 2. The repair and modifications were ac-
complished under Air Force contract AF33(657)-6.
232 Adkins and Armstrong, “Development and Status of the X-5A-2 Airplane,” pp. 0-05.
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was moving the B-52 pylon attach points to maintain the vertical stabilizer in the 
appropriate position under (through) the NB-52 wing.233  
 North American strengthened the landing gear using a strut that was 6.75 
inches longer than the original. This provided 33 inches of ground clearance to the 
bottom of the fixed ventral stabilizer; the expected ramjet was 30 inches in diam-
eter. The new strut provided a 1,000-pound increase in allowable landing weights, 
but there was some concern over the effects of the longer strut on nose-wheel and 
forward fuselage loads. In an attempt to provide an additional margin of safety, 
the nose-gear trunnion was mounted 9 inches lower (effectively lowering the nose 
gear by the same amount), allowing an attitude at nose-gear touchdown that was 
similar to that of the basic airplanes.234  
 Instead of the trapezoidal windows on the original airplanes, North Ameri-
can installed elliptical windows that used three panes of glass to withstand the 
increased temperatures at Mach 8. The outer pane was 0.65-inch-thick fused 
silica, the middle pane was 0.375-inch alumino-silicate, and the inner pane was 
0.29-inch laminated soda lime glass. This time the company mounted the outside 
windshield-retaining frame flush with the glass to prevent the reoccurrence of the 
flow heating experienced early in the program.235 
 The X-15A-2 modification also included a “skylight” hatch. Two upward-
opening doors, 20 inches long by 8.5 inches wide, were installed above the instru-
ment compartment behind the cockpit to expose cameras and other experiments. 
North American revised the normal research instrumentation elevator so that the 
upper shelf could extend upward through the open hatch if needed. The modifica-
tions also included additional data recorders: five 36-channel oscillographs, eight 
three-channel oscillographs, two 14-track tape recorders, one 24-cell manometer, 
and one cockpit camera. In addition, a new 86-channel PDM telemetry system 
was used to transmit data to the ground in real time.236 
 The accident had seriously damaged the outer portion of the right wing. North 
American found that it could adequately repair the main wing box, but the outer 
41 inches were a total loss. With the government’s concurrence, the company 
modified the wing box to support a replaceable outer panel that allowed the test-
ing of various materials and structures during hypersonic flight. The panel pro-
vided with the airplane (and the only one that apparently ever flew) was similar in 
construction and materials to the standard X-15 wing except that it was equipped 
with a 26.7 by 23-inch access panel that allowed access to an extensive amount of 
research instrumentation.237 
  
233 Ibid, p. 05; Johnston, “Current and Advanced X-5;” letter, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 
August 2002.
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Advanced X-5;” Major William J. Knight, “Increased Piloting Tasks and Performance of X-5A-2 in Hypersonic 
Flight,” The Aeronautical Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society, vol. 72, September 968, pp. 793-802 (de-
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 NASA conducted wind-tunnel tests of the X-15A-2 during the summer and 
fall of 1963. The tests indicated that there was little aerodynamic difference be-
tween the modified X-15A-2 without external tanks and the basic X-15. Despite 
the anticipated similarities, engineers decided it was prudent to conduct an abbre-
viated flight series to verify that the airplane still handled satisfactorily. Stability 
and control maneuvers conducted during the initial flights of the X-15A-2 largely 
verified the wind-tunnel predictions. However, the verification took significantly 
longer than expected when the program encountered trouble with the modified 
landing-gear system.238 
 North American completed final assembly of X-15A-2 in Inglewood on 15 
February 1964, and the Air Force accepted the airplane on 17 February, three 
weeks ahead of schedule and slightly below budget. The airplane was, however, 
773 pounds overweight, a condition that was expected to reduce the maximum 
velocity somewhat. The design launch weight was 49,640 pounds, and propel-
lants accounted for 32,250 of these pounds (18,750 pounds internally and 13,500 
238 Knight, “Increased Piloting Tasks and Performance of X-5A-2 in Hypersonic Flight,” pp. 793-802; “Flight Plan-
ning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 Envelope Expansion Program,” p. 7.
After Jack McKay’s emergency landing at Mud Lake, the Air Force had North American rebuild the 
X-15-2 with several modifications intended to allow flights to Mach 8 to support ramjet propulsion 
research. The X-15A-2 was designed to reach 8,000 fps at an altitude of  100,000 feet, and a dynamic 
pressure of  1,000 psf. Heating rates up to 210 Btu per square foot per second were expected, with peak 
structural temperatures approaching 2,400 degrees Fahrenheit. A 29-inch fuselage extension provided 
a larger center-of-gravity compartment to hold a liquid hydrogen fuel tank for the proposed ramjet, and 
external tanks carried additional propellants for the XLR99. (NASA)
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pounds in the external tanks). Subsequent modifications would add another few 
hundred pounds in empty weight. North American delivered the airplane to the 
FRC on 18 February and an “official” government acceptance ceremony took 
place on 24 February.239 
 After NASA conducted the final systems checks, the modified aircraft made 
its first captive flight (2-C-53) on 15 June 1964 and its first free flight (2-32-55) 
on 25 June. The main purpose of the flight was to check out the various systems, 
evaluate the handling qualities of the modified airplane, and gain preliminary ex-
perience with the ultraviolet stellar photography experiment (#1).240 
 It was not bad for a “checkout” flight. Using 77% thrust, Bob Rushworth 
reached Mach 4 .59 and 83,300 feet . In an ironic twist, Jack McKay, who had 
been injured on the flight that damaged the airplane, was the NASA-1 controller . 
As expected, Bob Rushworth reported that the modified X-15A-2 handled much 
like a basic X-15. Static longitudinal stability remained about the same, despite a 
10% forward shift in the center of gravity. The already low directional stability of 
the unmodified airplane was somewhat lower in X-15A-2, but Rushworth did not 
think it posed a significant threat to safety. The longitudinal trim characteristics of 
the modified airplane were essentially unchanged up through Mach 3 at angles of 
attack up to 15 degrees. The modified airplane had a trim capability reduced by 
approximately 3–5 degrees at higher angles of attack and Mach numbers.241 
 Things got more exciting on the second flight (2-33-56). Shortly after a maxi-
mum Mach number of 5.23 was obtained, the nose gear unexpectedly extended 
as the airplane decelerated through Mach 4.2. After the flight Rushworth wrote, 
“Everything was going along fine and just about the time I was ready to drop it 
over [lower the nose] I got a loud bang and … the resulting conditions that I had 
gave me quite a little bit of concern because the airplane began to oscillate wildly 
and I couldn’t seem to catch up with it. I put the dampers back on and stuffed the 
nose down to about 5 degrees angle of attack and it seemed to be normal then 
except I had a sideslip and I was then required to use left roll to hold the airplane 
level. A couple of seconds later I realized that this sound that I had heard was very 
much similar to the nose gear coming out in the landing pattern so that was the 
only thing I could think of. I announced that and then a few seconds later I began 
to get smoke in the cockpit, quite a little bit more than I had ever seen before. This 
partially confirmed that the nose gear, at least the door was open. I wasn’t sure 
that the gear was out but it was; there was enough of an explosion there to make 
me think that the gear was out.”242 
 For the time being, the chase planes were of no help in confirming the problem 
since they were some 10 miles below the X-15. Jack McKay as NASA-1 could 
not help much either, since no emergency procedures existed for this particular 
failure . McKay did advise Rushworth that it would probably be best if the X-15 
239 Johnston, “Current and Advanced X-5;” Knight, “Increased Piloting Tasks and Performance of X-5A-2 in Hy-
personic Flight,” pp. 793-802.
20 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  December 96, p. ; Major Robert A. Rushworth, “Pilot Report for 
Flight 2-32-55,” 25 June 96.
2 Major Robert A. Rushworth, “Pilot Report for Flight 2-32-55,” 25 June 96; Armstrong, “Expanding the X-5 
Envelope to Mach 6.7,” pp. 5-6.
22 Armstrong, “Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 Envelope Expansion Program,” p. 0; Radio transcript, 
flight 2-33-56,  August 96. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
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remained at high altitude until it had slowed considerably, thereby easing the aero-
thermo loads on the extended nose gear. At one point NASA-1 advised Rushworth 
to use the brakes to slow down a bit, but Rushworth had other ideas: “No, I don’t 
want to get brakes out, I want to get the damn thing home.” Fifty miles away from 
Edwards, the X-15 was still traveling at Mach 2.5 and McKay advised Rushworth, 
“Let’s go max L/D, Bob. You’re looking OK now. Your heading is good. You’re 
on profile. Looks like you’ve got plenty of energy.”243  
 The chase planes finally spotted the X-15 as it was descending 20 miles north-
east of Edwards. Despite the degraded control and increased drag resulting from 
the extended nose gear, Bob Rushworth was doing fine. Joe Engle in Chase-3 
verified that the nose gear appeared to be structurally sound and in the locked-
down position. As for the tires, Engle reported, “OK, Bob, your tires look pretty 
scorched; I imagine they will probably go on landing.” There was a worry, howev-
er, that the oleo strut had also been damaged by the heat and dynamic pressure; if it 
failed on landing, the X-15 could break in half or worse. There seemed to be little 
choice. Engle was right–the tires disintegrated shortly after the nose gear came 
down, but Rushworth managed to stop the airplane without serious difficulty.244 
 An investigation revealed that aerodynamic heating was the cause of the fail-
ure. The expansion of the fuselage was greater than the amount of slack built into 
the landing gear release cable. This caused an effective pull on the release cable 
that released the uplock hook. An outward bowing of the nose gear door imposed 
an additional load on the uplock hook. The load from both of these sources caused 
the uplock hook to bend, allowing the gear to extend. Engineers duplicated this 
failure in the High-Temperature Loads Calibration Laboratory by simulating the 
fuselage expansion and applying heat to the nose-gear door.245 
 The same stability and control data flight plan was duplicated for the next 
X-15A-2 light (2-34-57) on 29 September 1964. Again, shortly after reaching a 
maximum Mach number of 5.20, Bob Rushworth experienced a similar but less 
intense noise and aircraft trim change at Mach 4.5–the small nose-gear scoop door 
had opened. In his post-flight report Rushworth noted, “Yes, I sensed it was the 
little door, because the magnitude of the bang when it came open wasn’t as large 
as the other experience.” During the normal gear-extension sequence, air loads 
on the small door pulled the nose gear door open to assist in the extension of the 
nose gear. Although not as serious a failure as that on the previous flight, it again 
precluded obtaining dampers-off stability data. NASA redesigned the nose-gear 
door to provide positive retention of the scoop door regardless of the thermal 
stresses. Engineers also modified the other two airplanes since the basic failure 
mode was common.246 
 To check out the modifications to the nose gear, the program decided on a 
low-speed flight (2-35-60) to a maximum Mach number of 4.66. The flight plan-
ners decided to give Bob Rushworth a break after the two previous adventures, so 
23 Radio transcript, flight 2-33-56,  August 96. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
2 Major Robert A. Rushworth, “Pilot Report for Flight 2-33-56,”  August 96; Radio transcript, flight 2-33-56, 
 August 96. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
25 Armstrong, “Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 Envelope Expansion Program,” p. 0.
26 Major Robert A. Rushworth, “Pilot Report for Flight 2-3-57,” 29 September 96. In the files at the DFRC History 
Office.
0 Chapter 7: The Flight Progr am
Jack McKay made this flight, which went off without a problem. The nose gear 
performed normally.247 
 Rushworth was in the cockpit again for the next fight (2-36-63) of X-15A-2 
on 17 February 1965. In a run of bad luck that is hard to fathom, this time the 
right main skid extended at Mach 4.3 and 85,000 feet. In his post-flight report 
Rushworth wrote, “Jack [McKay, NASA-1] was talking away and things were 
going along real nice and I couldn’t seem to get a word in there to tell him that I 
had a little problem. It took several seconds to get the airplane righted and damp-
ers back on, very much similar to the nose gear coming out. Once I got it righted, 
I realized that I had a tremendous sideslip, I guess 4 degrees, and it took a lot of 
rudder deflection to get sideslip to zero. This persisted all the way down until I got 
subsonic. Once I had gone subsonic the airplane handled reasonably well.” Again, 
the chase pilot was able to verify that the gear appeared structurally sound, and 
Rushworth managed to make a normal landing. When Rushworth finally got out 
of the airplane, he turned around and kicked it–enough was enough. Post-flight 
inspection revealed that the uplock hook had bent, allowing the gear to deploy. 
Again, aerodynamic heating was determined to be the source of the high load on 
the uplock hook .248 
 NASA flew five more X-15A-2 flights (2-38-66 through 2-42-74) before the 
envelope expansion program was begun. These flights were primarily conducted 
to study stability and control, but they also included landing-gear performance 
tests. Each flight carried the ultraviolet stellar photography experiment but ob-
tained little useable data because of problems in maintaining the precise attitudes 
required for the experiment. Fortunately, the landing gear seemed to behave 
throughout these flights, but it had caused this portion of the flight program to 
take longer than expected.249 
 The engineers had always had some concerns about operating the X-15A-2 
with the 23.5-foot-long, 37.75-inch-diameter external tanks. These attached to the 
airplane structure within the side fairings at fuselage stations 200 and 411. Pro-
pellant and gas interconnects ran through a tank pylon that was located between 
stations 317 and 397 and was covered by a set of retractable doors after the tanks 
were jettisoned. The left tank contained about 793 gallons of liquid oxygen in 
one compartment and three helium bottles with a total capacity of 8.4 cubic feet. 
The right tank contained about 1,080 gallons of anhydrous ammonia in a single 
compartment. The empty left tank weighed 1,150 pounds and the empty right tank 
weighed only 648 pounds; when they were full of propellants, they weighed 8,920 
pounds and 6,850 pounds, respectively. Note that the left tank was over 2,000 
pounds heavier than the right tank when they were full. To minimize weight and 
cost, the government had opted not to insulate the liquid-oxygen tank. As a result, 
the evaporation rate was high enough that the engineers considered the NB-52 
top-off supply to be marginal. If a flight encountered a long hold time prior to 
27 Armstrong, “Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 Envelope Expansion Program,” p. 0.
28 Major Robert A. Rushworth, “Pilot Report for Flight 2-36-63,” 7 February 965. In the files at the DFRC History 
Office; AFFTC technology document FTC-TD-69-, p. 0; Thompson, At the Edge of Space, p. 237; Adkins and 
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ceedings of the X-15 30th Anniversary Celebration, Dryden Flight Research Facility, Edwards, CA, 8 June 989, 
NASA CP-305, p. 9.
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launch, it might prove necessary to abort the mission and return to Edwards due 
to excessive liquid-oxygen boil-off.250 
 The use of external tanks on the X-15A-2 was unique in that the pilot had 
to jettison the tanks from the aircraft. The structural limitations of the aluminum 
tanks and the degraded handling qualities dictated that the maximum allowable 
Mach number with the external tanks was 2.6, so the pilot had to jettison the tanks 
before reaching that speed. In addition, a landing was not possible with the tanks 
installed because of the increased drag and a lack of ground clearance. Hence, 
the program expended considerable effort to ensure the tanks would jettison 
when commanded.251 
 Each tank was forcibly ejected from the airplane during flight through the 
use of fore and aft gas-cartridge ejectors and a forward solid-propellant sustainer 
rocket that imparted pitching and rolling moments to the tank after it had been 
ejected. For a normal empty tank jettison, both sets of gas cartridges fired and the 
nose rocket ignited. In the case of an emergency jettison when the tanks were full, 
only the nose gas cartridge fired. 
 The tanks were relatively expensive, so they were equipped with a recovery 
system that included a drogue and a main parachute. The drogue chute deployed 
from its nose compartment immediately after separation, and the main descent 
parachute deployed when a barometric sensor detected the tanks passing through 
8,000 feet. Although the engineers expected some impact damage, they believed 
it was possible to refurbish the tanks at a reasonable cost .252 
 Wind-tunnel tests indicated that satisfactory separation characteristics existed 
when the dynamic pressure was less than 400 psf and the angle of attack was less 
than 10 degrees; acceptable separation probably existed for dynamic pressures up 
to 600 psf. At higher angles of attack and dynamic pressures, researchers expected 
the tanks to roll excessively and to pitch up within close proximity to the airplane. 
Tank separation characteristics with partly expended propellants were unknown 
and were a potential problem since there were no slosh baffles or compartments 
for center-of-gravity control. The researchers expected the full-tank ejection char-
acteristics to be satisfactory for any reasonable flight conditions that might occur 
within 15 seconds of launch .253 
 Prior to the first flight using external tanks, the Air Force conducted two dum-
my tank jettison tests with X-15A-2 located over a 10-foot-deep pit in the ground 
beside the ramp. Technicians constructed a pair of beams with similar mass and 
inertia properties to simulate empty tanks. Preloaded cables attached to the beams 
applied simulated aerodynamic drag and side loads. The first test used a single set 
of ejector cartridges at simulated air loads of 400 psf, 5 degrees angle of attack, 
and 3 degrees of sideslip. The second test used two sets of ejector cartridges at 
a simulated dynamic pressure of 600 psf. Both tests were successful, and high-
speed motion pictures showed good separation characteristics. During the tests, 
250 Ibid, p. 5; Adkins and Armstrong, “Development and Status of the X-5A-2 Airplane,” p. 07; North American 
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to a Hypersonic Delta-Wing Configuration,” 7 May 967, vol. I, pp. 82-8.
25 Armstrong, “Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 Envelope Expansion Program,” p. 6.
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 Chapter 7: The Flight Progr am
the X-15 APU supplied hydraulic and electrical power, and engineers engaged the 
SAS to observe its reaction to the separation, which was satisfactory.254 
 Despite this, during a review leading up to the first flight, engineers expressed 
concern over the possible separation of partially filled tanks during an emergency. 
The wind-tunnel tests and the tank separation system only covered full and empty 
scenarios. What would happen if the pilot had to abort the flight during the first 
60 seconds of powered flight while the engine was siphoning propellants from 
the external tanks? The initial response was that the tanks, as designed, would not 
withstand the loads imposed during a separation with a partial load. Engineers 
at the FRC and AFFTC considered installing a rapid propellant-dump system, 
installing a set of baffles in the tanks, or even providing a system that would allow 
the pilot to refill the tanks using internal propellants. All seemed too complicated 
given the time and money available to the program.255 
 After a great deal of consultation among the engineers, flight planners, and 
pilots, management decided to continue, at least for the time being. The risk was 
considered reasonable because the XLR99 had never encountered a premature 
25 Ibid.
255 Armstrong, “Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 Envelope Expansion Program,” p. 8.
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shutdown from 100% thrust–all failures had occurred either during ignition or 
while throttling. If a failure happened during ignition, the tanks would be full 
and would not present a problem, and the plan called for no throttling during the 
high-speed runs. Nevertheless, engineers decided to add a third jettison button in 
the cockpit. This one, intended for use with partial tanks, would fire the forward 
gas cartridge and ignite the separation rocket–sort of a middle ground between the 
other scenarios .256 
 Although there were physical differences between the basic X-15 and the 
X-15A-2 without external tanks, their aerodynamic qualities were similar. With 
external tanks on the airplane, however, some rather dramatic differences existed, 
with the general trend toward unfavorable characteristics. The offset center of 
gravity caused by the external tanks further complicated the overall control task. 
At launch with full tanks, the vertical center of gravity was approximately 9 inches 
below the aircraft waterline, moving upward as the engine consumed propellants. 
The pilot had to use additional nose-up stabilizer trim to counteract the nose-down 
pitch at engine ignition caused by this offset below the thrust vector. The heavier 
liquid-oxygen tank on the left side displaced the center of gravity 2 inches to that 
side, causing a left rolling moment that the pilot also had to counteract.257 
 The nominal flight profile for the speed missions was to maintain the airplane 
at a 12-degree angle of attack until it reached a pitch attitude of 34 degrees. The 
pilot held this climb attitude until the external propellant was depleted. Tank ejec-
tion occurred at approximately Mach 2.1 and 67,000 feet, and the pilot maintained 
an angle of attack of 2 degrees until the airplane reached 100,000 feet. The air-
plane then accelerated to maximum velocity.258 
 As was the case with the basic airplane, the simulator predicted poor handling 
qualities at high angles of attack, due primarily to the large negative dihedral ef-
fect caused by the presence of the ventral rudder. For a yaw damper failure with 
the speed brakes out, a divergent sideslip oscillation persisted above 6 degrees 
angle of attack. Although the pilot could damp this divergence, it required almost 
continuous attention and left little time for other tasks. The simulator showed that 
turning off the roll damper would eliminate the divergent yaw oscillation, but then 
the pilot would have to fly the airplane with less lateral directional stability. From 
the simulator studies it was determined that, because of the relatively low-altitude 
profiles required, the airplane could be safely flown after a roll and/or yaw damper 
failure if an angle of attack of less than 8 degrees was maintained. The program 
accepted this restriction for the initial envelope expansion flights. However, for 
the projected ramjet tests, which required flights at high dynamic pressures, a di-
vergence of this type could occur too rapidly for the pilot to take corrective action. 
Hence, NASA decided to provide a redundant yaw damper, similar to the ASAS 
used for the roll axis. The FRC began initial design work, but the flight program 
ended before the system was completed.259 
256 Ibid.
257 Adkins and Armstrong, “Development and Status of the X-5A-2 Airplane,” p. 08; Knight, “Increased Piloting 
Tasks and Performance of X-5A-2 in Hypersonic Flight,” pp. 793-802; “Flight Planning and Conduct of the 
X-5A-2 Envelope Expansion Program,” pp. 9-20.
258 Adkins and Armstrong, “Development and Status of the X-5A-2 Airplane,” p. 08.
259 Armstrong, “Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 Envelope Expansion Program,” p. 2.
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 The final ground-based external tank test took place on the Rocket Engine 
Test Facility where X-15A-2 had completed a full-duration engine run with the 
external tanks installed on the aircraft. Engineers had already corrected deficien-
cies uncovered during several earlier tests.260 
 The expected performance of X-15A-2 represented a significant improve-
ment over the demonstrated 6,019 fps of the basic aircraft. With external tanks 
and the ventral rudder, the estimated velocity was between 7,600 and 7,700 fps at 
120,000 feet. Replacing the ventral with an assumed ramjet configuration would 
decrease that to about 7,200 fps at 118,000 feet, a result of increased weight and 
drag for the ramjet configuration. This performance was, however, appreciably 
less than the design goal of 8,000 fps at 100,000 feet. As a result, Reaction Motors 
was investigating the development of a new injector and nozzle to provide addi-
tional thrust in an attempt to bring the performance back up to 8,000 fps. Again, 
the end would come before the company completed the work.261 
 The length of time the airplane could remain at high velocity and dynamic 
pressure determined the amount of useful data about the ramjet that could be 
obtained. Researchers expected that X-15A-2 could stay above 7,000 fps for 
50 seconds and above 6,000 fps for 110 seconds per flight. For ramjet tests that 
required steady conditions (that is, at a relatively constant velocity and dynamic 
pressure), the pilot would throttle the XLR99 to minimum and extend the speed 
brakes so that low acceleration existed. The expected stabilized test time for 
this configuration was approximately 14 seconds at 7,000 fps and 40 seconds at 
6,000 fps .262 
 The first flight (2-43-75) with empty external tanks was on 3 November 
1965, the only flight launched from Cuddeback, about 60 miles north of Edwards. 
Bob Rushworth jettisoned the tanks at Mach 2.25 as the airplane passed through 
70,300 feet, and took the airplane to Mach 2.31 and 70,600 feet before landing at 
Rogers Dry Lake after a flight of only 5 minutes and 1 second (the shortest non-
emergency powered flight of the program). Post-flight analysis indicated that the 
handling qualities were essentially as predicted by the simulator. Rushworth, who 
for a change was flying without deploying part of the landing gear, commented 
that he thought the “roll stability was significantly less than I had expected,” but 
the “longitudinal control wasn’t quite as bad” as he had anticipated.263  
 Two ground-based mobile trackers, each with 150-inch lenses on 35-mm 
Mitchell cameras running at 72 and 48 frames per second, provided photographic 
coverage of the tank separation. In addition, six Askania tracking cameras record-
ed the tank recovery system. Because the events took place at quite a distance, 
the resulting image size was small and researchers could only make a qualita-
tive analysis of the event. The tanks separated cleanly from the aircraft; however, 
it appeared that the tanks did not rotate nose down as much as expected. They 
260 Ibid.
26 Adkins and Armstrong, “Development and Status of the X-5A-2 Airplane,” p. 0.
262 Ibid.
263 Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Rushworth, “Pilot Report for Flight 2-3-75,” 3 November 965; AFFTC technology 
document FTC-TD-69-, p. 29; Armstrong, “Expanding the X-5 Envelope to Mach 6.7,” p. 202; letter, Johnny G. 
Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 August 2002. Local folklore has it that after Rushworth’s February 965 flight 
the ground crew installed a cockpit placard that read “Do Not Deploy Landing Gear Above Mach ,” and that this 
was the solution to the landing-gear problems.
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exhibited a tumbling action during flight with the drogue chutes attached, and 
tended to trim at an angle of attack of about –110 degrees. The drogue chutes oc-
casionally collapsed during flight, so the engineers lengthened the drogue chute 
riser for future flights. Impact with the desert destroyed the liquid-oxygen tank af-
ter the nose cone containing the main descent chute did not separate properly. The 
Air Force recovered the ammonia tank in repairable condition. The tumbling ac-
tion of the tanks increased the total drag and the tanks fell short of their predicted 
impact points–the ammonia tank landed 2.3 miles short and 0.6 mile to the left, 
while the liquid-oxygen tank landed 2.7 miles short and 1.6 miles to the left. This 
was still well inside the bounds of the Edwards impact range and did not represent 
a problem.264 
 Joe Engle ended up being the only X-15 pilot who would get to fly the next 
lifting-reentry vehicle, the Space Shuttle. He also has the distinction of being the 
only person to fly back from orbit, on the second Space Shuttle flight (STS-2). 
Milt Thompson said that “Joe Engle seemed to have a charmed relationship with 
the X-15” because for the most part all of Engle’s flights went according to plan. 
However, not everybody would agree with that assessment of his 15th flight. On 
10 August 1965, Engle took X-15-3 to 271,000 feet–his second flight above 50 
miles. Mission rules stated that the X-15 pilot should fly an alternate low-altitude 
mission if the yaw damper channel on the MH-96 failed during the first 32 seconds 
of flight. This was because it was unlikely the airplane could make a successful 
reentry with a failed yaw damper. On this flight (3-46-70), the yaw channel failed 
0.6 seconds after the X-15 dropped off the pylon. Engle reset the damper and did 
not feel obligated to fly the alternate profile since the damper successfully reset. It 
was a temporary reprieve, however. The damper failed again 19 seconds later; the 
reset was successful for at least 10 seconds until it failed again. The damper failed 
three times in the first 32 seconds of flight. Remarkably, Engle successfully flew 
the mission, although he missed some of the profile for various reasons, including 
a preoccupation with resetting the failing yaw damper.265 
 At the end of 1965, NASA could see that the end of the X-15 program was 
in sight. Researchers had long since completed the originally envisioned basic 
flight research, and the aircraft were now primarily experiment carriers, although 
X-15A-2 was still extending the flight envelope somewhat. However, plans to 
use X-15A-2 as a hypersonic ramjet test bed began to unravel when, on 6 August 
1965, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara disapproved the funding neces-
sary for the effort.266 
 Under the best-case scenario, the FRC anticipated that the flight program us-
ing the basic X-15s would begin winding down at the end of 1967 when X-15-3 
began receiving its delta-wing modifications. By the end of 1969, X-15-1 would 
be retired, leaving only X-15A-2 and the newly redelivered delta-wing X-15-3 in 
 
26 Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Rushworth, “Pilot Report for Flight 2-3-75,” 3 November 965; Armstrong, “Flight 
Planning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 Envelope Expansion Program,” p. 29; X-5 Status Report 65-2, Paul F. 
Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  December 965, p. 3.
265 Joe H. Engle, “Pilot Report for Flight 3-6-70,” 23 August 965; Memorandum, Joseph A. LaPierre/FRC to Chief, 
Research Division, X-5 Project Office, subject: Flight Research Report on Flight 3-6-70, 23 August 965.
266 John V. Becker, “A Hindsight Study of the NASA Hypersonic Research Engine Project,”  July 976, p. 22. Pre-
pared under contract NAS-250 but never published. Copy in the author’s collection.
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service. X-15A-2 would finish its ramjet tests in mid-1970, transferring all flight 
activity to the delta wing.267 
 Paul Bikle had long believed that any extended operation of the X-15 pro-
gram beyond its original objectives was unwise and hard to justify in view of the 
high cost and risk involved. As early as 1961, he had suggested the end of 1964 as 
a desirable termination date. As time went on, Bikle felt that continued extensions 
of the program were becoming increasingly hard to justify, and he personally had 
strong doubts that either the delta wing or the HRE would ever reach flight status 
on an X-15. In spite of these personal misgivings, Bikle continued to support the 
program in his public statements.268 
1966 FLIGHT PERIOD
 January 1966 was much like December 1965 in the high desert–wet. Between 
12 November and 1 December 1965 more than 3 inches of rain had fallen, and 2 
more inches fell during December. NASA described Rogers, Three Sisters, Silver, 
and Hidden Hills as “wet,” while Mud Lake was only “damp.” Over 95% of Cud-
deback was under water and there was visible snow at Delamar. A lack of landing 
sites effectively grounded the X-15 program.269 
 This gave the program time to do maintenance on the airplanes and incor-
porate various modifications. For instance, engineers installed the Honeywell 
IFDS, finally, on X-15-3 along with a new Lear Siegler-developed vertical-scale 
instrument panel. All of the instrumentation wiring on this airplane was removed 
and replaced with new four-conductor shielded Teflon wire. It received the modi-
fications necessary to carry the wing-tip experiment pods, and the third skid and 
stick-kicker needed for higher landing weights were installed.270  
 The pilots were not greeting the new X-15-3 instrument panel with over-
whelming enthusiasm. Paul Bikle opined that “there has been some evidence 
of reluctance to accept the vertical-scale, fixed-index [tape] instruments.” Bikle 
noted that previously “no objective evaluation of the suitability of the panel for 
the X-15 mission had been made.” To correct this, engineers installed a duplicate 
of the panel in the fixed-base simulator and conducted runs using “measurable 
flight control and pilot performance parameters in a comparison of the Lear panel 
with the traditional panel.”271 
 Of all the performance measures taken, only two showed consistent and sig-
nificant differences. These were the absolute error in velocity at power reduction 
and the burnout altitude; in both cases, the statistical results favored the Lear panel . 
267 Project Development Plan, “Delta Wing X-5,” second draft, December 965, pp. 36-37. In the files at the DFRC 
History Office.
268 Letter, Paul F. Bikle to USAF/ASD, no subject, 2 November 96; John V. Becker, “A Hindsight Study of the 
NASA Hypersonic Research Engine Project,”  July 976, p. 26. Prepared under contract NAS-250 but never 
published. Copy in the author’s collection.
269 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  December 965, and 3 January 966.
270 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 3 January, 2 February, and  March 966.
27 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  March 966, p. 3.
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An examination of the altitude and velocity indicators on both panels showed that 
the differences were the result of high-scale resolution on the Lear instruments, 
which was almost twice that of the traditional panel instruments. The pilots were 
still not altogether happy with the new panel, but they no longer mistrusted it.272 
 During this down period, X-15A-2 received a new Maurer camera to replace 
the Hycon unit in the center-of-gravity compartment. This was not as simple as 
it sounded and took almost eight weeks of work. X-15-1 received a modification 
that allowed ground personnel to easily remove or replace the wing-tip pods as 
needed to support various experiments. NASA could now swap the pods between 
X-15-1 and X-15-3, and was manufacturing a second set of pods.273 
 As January passed with no relief from the wet lakebeds (another half inch 
of rain fell at Edwards, with more snow on the upper areas of the High Range), 
NASA performed more modifications on the airplanes. Because the increase in 
stiffness of the main skids and the addition of the third skid transmitted higher 
272 Ibid. The introduction of tape-style instruments into operational aircraft was initially viewed with similar mistrust. 
The scientific (“human factors”) community was sure that the new displays were easier to read and provided bet-
ter information; the pilots pointed to 50 years of using the older, round instruments without a problem. In the end, 
the tape-style instruments had a relatively short life in most combat aircraft and were eventually replaced by the 
old-style round dials–at least until the advent of the “glass cockpit” in the 980s.
273 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 3 January 966. In the end, one set of 
pods was lost with X-5-3 on flight 3-65-97; the other set is installed on X-5- as it is displayed in the NASM.
For most of  the flight program, the X-15 used an instrument panel that contained conventional instru-
mentation. In 1965, Lear Siegler developed a new panel for X-15-3 that used vertical-scale instruments 
that were supposed to provide enhanced situational awareness for the pilot. Similar instruments were 
being incorporated into the latest generation of  Air Force fighters about the same time. At first, the 
new instrument panel was not met with overwhelming enthusiasm from the X-15 pilots, but eventu-
ally they came to accept the new instruments, although having two very different cockpit configurations 
complicated the simulators and training regiments. (NASA)
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loads through the structure to the nose gear, engineers decided to reinforce the 
skin on X-15-1 between fuselage stations 91 and 106. The Air Force sent the 
NB-52B to Tinker AFB for major maintenance, leaving her older sister to support 
the flight program, assuming the lakebeds ever dried out. The carrier aircraft re-
turned on 8 April and the AFFTC spent the next five weeks modifying it to carry 
the heavier X-15A-2 .274 
 NASA also used the time to complete various analyses, including a complete 
simulation of reentry profiles at the increased weights currently flown by the air-
planes. The ground rules were that reentries would be limited to 1,600 psf using 
an angle of attack of 20 degrees. To avoid exceeding the structural limitations of 
the airplanes, NASA decided to restrict X-15-1 to altitudes under 265,000 feet 
and X-15A-2 to less than 250,000 feet. Mostly because it was equipped with the 
MH-96, NASA allowed X-15-3 to operate up to 360,000 feet . These restrictions 
were not really a problem since the program had already reached the maximum 
altitude it was planning on, although the first two airplanes would bump into these 
limits on several future flights.275 
 The simulations showed that, as currently configured, X-15A-2 should be 
able to reach a maximum velocity of 7,500 fps without the ramjet and 7,100 fps 
with the ramjet, both at 120,000 feet. These velocities assumed a launch weight 
27 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 2 February 966, p. ; X-5 Status 
Report 66-5, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  May 966, p. .
275 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  March 966, p. 2. The X-5- was 
restricted to lower altitudes than X-5-3 since it was not equipped with the MH-96 adaptive flight control system; 
the X-5A-2 was not intended to fly much above 00,000 feet during its maximum speed program. Bob Hoey 
remembers that the ballistic control system was eventually removed from the X-5A-2 to save weight.
The X-15A-2 configuration was tested in a variety of  wind tunnels, including one at the NASA Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California. The JPL tests centered around determining the effects of  
shock-wave impingement on the proposed ramjet and finding an alternate vertical-stabilizer configuration to 
provide enhanced stability at Mach 8 while carrying a ramjet under the ventral stabilizer. (NASA)
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of 51,650 pounds with the use of external tanks and an XLR99 burn time of 
152 seconds. Based on these simulations, flight planners decided to conduct the 
X-15A-2 envelope-expansion program with the ventral on, primarily because it 
most closely resembled the planned ramjet configuration. However, the program 
was short of ventral rudders, and it was uncertain whether economic constraints 
would allow each flight to use one.276 
 More importantly, Langley and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory conducted 
wind-tunnel tests to investigate shock-wave systems affecting the proposed ram-
jet installation on X-15A-2. Researchers worried that shock waves impinging on 
the ramjet could affect inlet and engine performance, structures, and structural 
heating. The tests provided data for angles of attack between –5 and +20 degrees 
at Mach numbers between 2.3 and 4.63. A review of the data showed that a shock 
wave emanating from the forward tip of the landing-gear skid would impinge on 
the ramjet inlet at all Mach numbers, and did not significantly vary with the angle 
of attack. These tests also showed that there was a complex shock impingement 
around the ventral stabilizer in general. Apparently, these data went unnoticed.277 
 By the beginning of April, the weather had improved considerably. The Air 
Force was in the process of repairing and re-marking Rogers, Grapevine, and Mud 
Lake . Cuddeback was dry but still too soft to re-mark. All of the other lakes were 
drying rapidly and were ready to use by the end of the month.278 
Flying Again
 Bob Rushworth’s last flight (2-45-81), on 1 July 1966, was also the first 
flight with full external tanks. As Johnny Armstrong later observed, “with 20-20 
hindsight, flight 45 was destined for failure.” On X-15A-2, the propellants in the 
external tanks were pressure-fed to the internal tanks, and the engine received 
propellants from the internal tanks in the normal fashion. The fixed-base simula-
tor had shown that the X-15 would quickly become uncontrollable if the propel-
lant from one external tank transferred while that from the other tank did not, 
because the moment about the roll axis would be too large for the rolling tail to 
counter . If this situation developed, the pilot would jettison the tanks, shut down 
the engine, and make an emergency landing.279  
 The problem was that, for this first flight with full tanks, there was no direct 
method to determine whether the tanks were feeding correctly. Instrumentation 
was being developed to provide propellant transfer sensors (paddle switches), but 
it was not available for this flight. Instead, a pressure transducer across an orifice 
in the helium pressurization line provided the only information. Researchers had 
verified that the pressure transducer worked as expected during a planned captive-
carry flight (2-C-80) with propellants in the external tanks.280 
276 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  March 966, p. 2 and attachments; 
X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  March 966, p. 2.
277 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  April 966, p. 2.
278 Ibid, pp. 7-8.
279 Armstrong, “Expanding the X-5 Envelope to Mach 6.7,” pp. 202-203; various e-mails and telephone conversa-
tions, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, June/July 2002.
280 Ibid.
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 During the flight to the launch lake, while still safely connected to the 
NB-52, Rushworth verified that the pressure transducer was working. Rushworth 
jettisoned a small amount of propellant from the internal tanks, and NASA-1 
watched the helium pressure come up as the external propellants flowed into the 
airplane (NASA-1 had to do it since nobody had thought to provide the pilot 
with any indicators). However, 18 seconds after the X-15 dropped away from 
the NB-52, Jack McKay (NASA-1) called to Rushworth: “We see no flow on 
ammonia, Bob.” Rushworth responded, “Roger, understand. What else to do?” 
McKay: “Shutdown. Tanks off, Bob.” Rushworth got busy: “OK, tanks are away 
… I’m going into Mud.” Any emergency landing is stressful, but this one ended 
well . Bruce Peterson in Chase-2 reported, “Airplane has landed, everything OK, 
real good shape.”281 
 Jettisoning the tanks with the “full” button was supposed to initiate only the 
nose cartridges and not fire the separation rockets. However, in this case, ap-
parently because of faulty circuitry, the separation rockets did fire. Fortunately, 
the separation occurred without the tanks recontacting the airplane. Engineers 
obtained a great deal of data on the tank separation because an FM telemetry 
system in the liquid-oxygen tank transmitted data on accelerations and rotational 
rates during separation. Post-flight inspection of the ejector bearing points on the 
aircraft indicated that the ammonia tank briefly hung on the aircraft, marring the 
ejector rack slightly. The drogue chutes deployed immediately after separation 
and the dump valve in the tank allowed the propellants to flow out. The main 
chute deployment was satisfactory; however, the mechanism designed to cut the 
main chute risers failed and high surface winds dragged the tanks across the des-
ert . Nevertheless, the Air Force recovered both tanks in repairable condition .282 
 Bob Rushworth left the program after this flight, going on to a distinguished 
career that included a tour as the AFFTC commander some years later . Rushworth 
had flown 34 flights, more than any other pilot and more than double the statisti-
cal average. He had flown the X-15 for almost 6 years and had made most of the 
heating flights. These flights were perhaps the hardest to get right, and Rushworth 
did so most of the time.283 
 Major Michael J. Adams, making his first flight (1-69-116) on 6 October 
1966, replaced Rushworth in the flight lineup. He started his career with a bang, 
literally. X-15-1 launched over Hidden Hills on a scheduled low-altitude (70,000 
feet) and low-speed (Mach 4) pilot-familiarization flight. The bang came when 
the XLR99 shut itself down 90 seconds into the planned 129-second burn after 
the forward bulkhead of the ammonia tank failed. Fortunately, the airplane did 
not explode and Adams successfully landed at Cuddeback without major inci-
dent. Perhaps Adams was just having a bad day. After he returned to Edwards, he 
jumped in a T-38 for a scheduled proficiency flight. Shortly after takeoff, one of 
the J85 engines in the T-38 quit; fortunately, the Talon has two engines. Adams 
 
28 Radio transcript for flight 2-5-8; Armstrong, “Expanding the X-5 Envelope to Mach 6.7,” pp. 202-203.
282 William P. Albrecht/X-5 Project Engineer, “X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight 2-5-8,” 5 July 966; memo-
randum, Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Rushworth to Chief, Research Projects Office, subject: Preliminary report 
of X-5 flight 2-5-8, 2 July 966.
283 Thompson, At the Edge of Space, p. 239; letter, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 August 2002.
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made his second emergency landing of the day, this time on the concrete runway 
at Edwards .284 
 Jack McKay seemed to have more than his share of problems, and holds the 
record for the most landings at uprange lakes (three). His last emergency landing 
was made during his last flight (1-68-113), on 8 September 1966. The flight plan 
showed this Smith Ranch launch going to 243,000 feet and Mach 5.42 before 
landing on Rogers Dry Lake. However, as McKay began his climb he noticed 
the fuel-line pressure was low. Mike Adams as NASA-1 recommended throttling 
back to 50% to see if the fuel pressure would catch up; it did not . McKay shut 
down the engine and began jettisoning propellants to land at Smith Lake. The 
landing was uneventful and NASA trucked the airplane back to Edwards.285 
 The program had experienced a few flights where the pilot overshot the 
planned altitude for various reasons, but Bill Dana added one for the record 
books on 1 November 1966. On flight 3-56-83, Dana got the XLR99 lit on the 
first try and pulled into a 39-degree climb, or so he thought, heading for 267,000 
28 Major Michael J. Adams, “Pilot report for flight -69-6,” 6 October 966. In the files at the DFRC History Office; 
Thompson, At the Edge of Space, pp. 28-29. Note that the “low and slow” familiarization flights performed by 
the original group of X-5 pilots had gone from Mach 2 and 50,000 feet to Adams’ Mach  and 70,000 feet.
285 Jack B. McKay, “Pilot Report for Flight -68-3,” 8 September 966; Radio transcript for flight -68-3. Both 
in the files at the DFRC History Office.
The external tanks on X-15A-2 were more than half  the size of  the airplane itself. The fixed-base 
simulator had shown that the X-15 would quickly become uncontrollable if  propellant from one ex-
ternal tank transferred but the other one did not – the moment about the roll axis was too large for 
the rolling tail to counter. If  this situation developed, the pilot would jettison the tanks, shut down the 
engine, and make an emergency landing. Unfortunately, this exact scenario played out on 1 July 1966 
on the first flight with full tanks. Thankfully, Bob Rushworth managed to jettison the tanks and make 
an uneventful emergency landing at Mud Lake. (NASA)
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feet. In reality, the climb angle was 42 degrees. Interestingly, Pete Knight in the 
NASA-1 control room did not notice the error either, and as the engine burned 
out he reported, “We got a burnout, Bill, 82 seconds, it looks good. Track and 
profile are looking very good.” As Dana climbed through 230,000 feet, NASA-1 
finally noticed and said, “[W]e got you going a little high on profile. Outside 
of that, it looks good.” The flight eventually reached 306,900 feet–39,900 feet 
higher than planned.286 
 As Dana went ballistic over the top, he asked Knight if “Jack McKay [was] 
sending in congratulations.” The reference was to flight 3-49-73 on 28 Septem-
ber 1965, when McKay had overshot his altitude by 35,600 feet. Dana had been 
NASA-1 on that flight and had needled McKay ever since. Dana’s fun, however, 
did not stop with the overshoot. As he reached to shut down the engine, Dana ap-
parently bumped the checklists clipped to his kneepad with his arm. Dana later 
recalled, “At shutdown my checklist exploded. I don’t know how it came out of 
that alligator clamp, but anyway I had 27 pages of checklist floating around the 
cockpit with me, and it was a great deal like trying to read Shakespeare sitting 
under a maple tree in October during a high wind. I only saw one instrument at a 
time for the remainder of the ballistic portion … these will be in the camera film 
which I think we can probably sell to Walt Disney for a great deal.” After an oth-
erwise uneventful landing, Dana could not find the post-landing checklist, “Thank 
you, Pete,” he joked. “Since my page 16 is somewhere down on the bottom of the 
floor, maybe you could go over the checklist with me?”287 
1967 FLIGHT PERIOD
 As was usual for the high desert during the winter, the rains had begun in late 
November 1966, and during early 1967 most of the lakebeds were wet, preclud-
ing flight operations. This gave North American and the FRC time to perform 
maintenance and modifications on the airplanes. For instance, X-15-1 was having 
its ammonia tank repaired and the third skid added, X-15A-2 was having instru-
mentation modified, and X-15-3 was having an advanced PCM telemetry system 
installed. By February the lakebeds at Three Sisters, Silver, Hidden Hills, and 
Grapevine were dry, and Rogers and Cuddeback were expected to be within two 
weeks. Unfortunately, snow and ice still covered Mud, Delamar, Smith Ranch, 
and Edwards Creek Valley. It would be late March before all the necessary lakes 
were dry enough to support flight operations.288 
 The program was also making plans to add new pilots, allowing some of 
the existing pilots to rotate to other assignments. For instance, John A . Manke, a 
286 Conversation, William H. Dana by Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 August 999; conversation, William H. Dana with Dennis 
R. Jenkins, 2 September 2002; William H. Dana, “Pilot Report for Flight 3-56-83,”  November 966; Radio 
transcript for flight 3-56-83. Both in the files at the DFRC History Office.
287 Conversation, William H. Dana and Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 August 999; William H. Dana, “Pilot Report for Flight 
3-56-83,”  November 966; Radio transcript for flight 3-56-83. Both in the files at the DFRC History Office.
288 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 0 January 967, p.  and 3 February 
967, p. 9. Both in the files at the DFRC History Office.
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NASA test pilot, went through ground training and conducted a single engine run. 
Unfortunately, Mike Adams’s accident would eliminate any chance that Manke 
would ever fly the X-15.289 
 Pete Knight would eventually set the fastest flight of the program, but before 
that event he had at least one narrow escape while flying X-15-1 . As he related in 
the pilot’s report after flight 1-73-126:290
 
The launch and the flight was beautiful, up to a certain point. 
We had gotten on theta and I heard the 80,000-foot call. I 
checked that at about 3,100 fps. Things were looking real good 
and I was really enjoying the flight. All of a sudden, the engine 
went “blurp” and quit. There could not have been two seconds 
between the engine quit and everything else happening because 
it all went in order. The engine shut down. All three SAS lights 
came on. Both generator lights came on and then there was an-
other light came on, and I think it was the fuel low line light. I 
am not sure. Then after all the lights got on, they all went out. 
Everything quit. By this time, I was still heading up and the 
airplane was getting pretty sloppy. As far as I am concerned 
both APUs quit.
 
 Once the X-15 began its reentry after an essentially uncontrolled exit, Knight 
managed to get one of the APUs started. Unfortunately, the generator would not 
engage, which meant Knight had hydraulics but no electrical power. He elected to 
land at Mud Lake .
Once I thought I was level enough I started a left turn back to 
Mud. Made a 6-g turn all the way around … Once I was sure I 
could make the east shore of Mud Lake with sufficient altitude 
I used some speed brakes to get it down to about 25,000 [feet 
altitude] and then varied the pattern to make the left turn into 
the runway landing to the west. On the final, all this time the 
trim was still at 5 degrees for the theta that we had. I was getting 
pretty tired of that side stick so I began to use both hands. One 
on the center stick and one on the side stick taking the pres-
sure off the stick with the left hand and flying it with the right. 
Made the pattern and the airplane is a little squirrelly without 
the dampers but really not that bad. … I settled in and got it 
right down to the runway and it was a nice landing as far as 
the main skids were concerned, but the nose gear came down 
really hard. 
289 Letter, John Manke to Tony Landis, 27 October 200. Manke would go on to make the first supersonic flight of a 
heavy-weight lifting body and the first runway landing of a lifting body. He served as chief of flight operations at 
the FRC, and became “site manager” of the short-lived Ames-Dryden Flight Research Facility (when the FRC was 
administratively attached to the Ames Research Center).
290 Major William J. Knight, “Pilot Report for Flight -73-26,” 29 June 967. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
 Chapter 7: The Flight Progr am
After I got it on the ground I slid out to a stop. I started to open 
the canopy. I could not open the canopy. I tried twice and could 
not move that handle, so I sat there and rested for a while, I 
reached up and grabbed it again. Finally, it eased off and the 
canopy came open. Then I started to get out of the airplane and 
I could not get this connection off over here. I got the hat [hel-
met] off, to cool off a little bit, and tried it again. Then I was 
beginning to take the glove off to get a hand down in there also. 
I never did get that done. I tried it again and it would not come 
so I said the hell with it, and I’ll pull the emergency release. I 
pulled the emergency release and that headrest blew off and it 
went into the canopy and slammed back down and hit me in the 
head. I got out of the airplane and by that time, the C-130 was 
there. Got into the 130 and came home.
 It was one of the few times an X-15 pilot extracted himself from the airplane 
without the assistance of ground crews. Normally a crew was present at each 
of the primary emergency lakes, but Mud was not primary for this flight and 
no equipment or personnel were stationed there. Based on energy management, 
Knight probably should have landed at Grapevine. At the time, there was no en-
ergy-management display in the X-15, so NASA-1 made those decisions based on 
information in the control room. However, since the airplane had no power, and 
hence no radio, decisions made by NASA-1 were not much help.291  
 It is likely that the personnel on the ground were more worried than Knight 
was, because when the APUs failed they took all electrical power, including that 
to the radar transponder and radio. At the time, the radars were not skin tracking 
the X-15, so the ground lost track of the airplane. It was almost 8 minutes later 
when Bill Dana, flying Chase-2, caught sight of the X-15 just as it crossed the east 
edge of Mud Lake .292 
 The problem was most likely the result of electrical arcing in the Western Test 
Range launch monitoring experiment. Unlike most experiments, this one con-
nected directly to the primary electrical bus. The arcing overloaded the associated 
APU, which subsequently stalled and performed an automatic safety shutdown. 
This transferred the entire load to the other APU, which also stalled because the 
load was still present. The APUs had been problematic since the beginning of 
the program, but toward the end they were generally reliable enough for the 30 
minutes or so that they had to function. Each one was usually completely torn 
down and tested after each flight. In this case, something went wrong. After this 
flight, NASA moved the WTR and MIT experiments to the secondary electrical 
bus, which dropped out if a single generator shut down; this would preclude a 
complete power loss to the airplane.293 
  
29 Ibid.
292 Ibid.
293 Memorandum, Perry V. Row to Paul F. Bikle, subject: Flight suitability of the number one X-5, 30 January 968; 
letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 August 2002.
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 Paul Bikle commented that Knight’s recovery of the airplane was one of the 
most impressive events of the program. The flight planners had spent many hours 
devising recovery methods after various malfunctions; all were highly depen-
dent upon the accuracy of the simulator for reproducing the worst-case, bare-
airframe aerodynamics. NASA constantly updated the simulator with the results 
from flights and wind-tunnel tests to keep it as accurate as possible. The flight by 
Knight was the only complete reentry flown without any dampers. As AFFTC 
flight planner Bob Hoey remembers, “[W]e would have given a month’s pay to be 
able to compare Pete’s entry with those predicted on the sim, but all instrumen-
tation ceased when he lost both APUs, and so there was no data! Jack Kolf told 
Pete that we were planning to install a hand crank in the cockpit hooked to the 
oscillograph so he could get us some data next time this happened.” Fortunately, 
it never happened again.294 
Ablative Coatings
 During the early 1960s, major aerospace contractors during the early precon-
cept phases of space shuttle development were becoming increasingly interested 
in silicone-based elastomeric ablative coatings as possible heat shields. Engineers 
believed this type of ablator offered several advantages over the resin ablators 
used on previous capsules, including ease of application to complex shapes; flex-
ibility over a wide range of temperatures; potential for refurbishment with spray, 
bonded sheets, or prefabricated panels; and superior shielding effectiveness at 
low-to-moderate heating rates. This coating would have to be a good insulator, 
lightweight, and easy to apply, remove, and reapply before another flight. The first 
real-world opportunity to test the materials on a full-scale reusable vehicle would 
come on X-15A-2 during its envelope expansion to Mach 8.295 
 It was obvious that the Mach 6.5 structural design of the X-15 was not ad-
equate to handle the aerodynamic heating loads expected at Mach 8. For example, 
the total heat load for a location on the underside of the nose was approximately 
2,300 Btu per square foot at Mach 6, but over 13,000 Btu at Mach 8. Similarly, 
the wing leading edge absorbed 9,500 Btu per square foot at Mach 6, but 27,500 
Btu at Mach 8. It might have been possible to beef up the hot structure to accom-
modate these heat loads, but this would have amounted to an extensive redesign 
the program could not afford.296 
 Researchers believed the ability of the ablator to protect the airplane might 
well be the governing factor during the envelope expansion. To provide an en-
gineering tool to evaluate this problem during the planning of these flights, the 
AFFTC developed a real-time temperature simulation using the former Dyna-
29 Letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 August 2002.
295 Joe D. Watts, John P. Cary, and Marvin B. Dow, “Advanced X-5A-2 Thermal-Protection System,” a paper in the 
Progress of the X-15 Research Airplane Program, a compilation of the papers presented at the FRC, 7 October 
965, NASA publication SP-90 (Washington, DC: NASA, 965), p. 7. The early shuttle development programs 
included contracts from both the Air Force and various NASA centers as part of the Integral Launch and Reentry 
Vehicle (ILRV) programs. For a further discussion of the early studies into the Space Shuttle and its thermal 
protection system, see Dennis R. Jenkins, Space Shuttle: The History of the National Space Transportation Sys-
tem–The First 100 Flights (North Branch, MN: Specialty Press, 200) and T. A. Heppenheimer, The Space Shuttle 
Decision: 1965-1972 (Washington, DC/London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002).
296 Watts et al., “Advanced X-5A-2 Thermal-Protection System,” pp. 7 and 23.
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Soar hybrid simulator. In conjunction with a complete fixed-base simulation of 
X-15A-2, the hybrid had ability to predict the temperature at selected points for 
both protected and unprotected surfaces. Researchers obtained a temperature-time 
history from these simulations for a point aft of the nose-gear door for a flight to 
Mach 7.6 at 100,000 feet. They then compared this with the temperature at the 
same location for an actual Mach 6 flight. Both the effective heating rate and the 
maximum temperature were significantly more severe at the higher speed.297  
 There had been some minor interest in the use of ablators for the X-15 as 
early as 1961. For instance, on flight 1-23-39 researchers tested a sample of 
Avcoat no. 2 on the leading edge of the right wing, directly over the semispan 
thermocouple. The leading-edge temperature at 144 seconds after launch was 
only 25°F underneath the test sample, and the thermocouple on either side of it 
showed 350°F and 315°F. Nevertheless, since the entire point of the X-15 was 
to gather accurate aero-thermo data, it made no sense to protect the structure, 
until now .298 
 It appears that the ablator initially chosen by North American for X-15A-2 
was Emerson Electric Thermolag 500, and this is the product shown in most refer-
ence documentation as late as the end of 1964. North American extensively tested 
this material in its 2.5-inch, 1-megawatt plasma tunnel for up to 317 seconds at a 
time, even though only 180 seconds were required for the actual X-15A-2 flight 
conditions. The material thickness on the leading edge was 0.70 inch, the forward 
fuselage ranged between 0.20 inch and 0.04 inch, and the wing mid-span quarter-
chord thickness was 0.10 inch. A commercial paint spray gun applied the material, 
which weighed only 303 pounds.299  
 After further evaluation, however, researchers decided the material was unac-
ceptable, primarily because of its cure cycle. The coating had to be subjected to 
300°F for a prolonged period to cure properly, and although this had not been a 
serious problem for small test areas, accomplishing it on the entire airplane would 
have been a challenge. In addition, researchers found that T-500 was somewhat 
water-soluble after it cured–not an ideal trait for something that was to be used 
outdoors, even in the high desert.300 
 In late 1963 the Air Force and NASA formed a joint committee to select a 
more suitable ablative material, although T-500 continued as the baseline for an-
other year. To determine which ablative materials qualified as candidates for use 
on the X-15, the committee set up an evaluation program and requested all major 
ablator manufacturers to provide test samples. The primary factors used in evalu-
ating the materials were the shielding effectiveness, room-temperature cure cycle, 
bond integrity, operational compatibility with the X-15, and refurbishment. The 
researchers used three facilities for this evaluation, including the 2-inch arc jet 
tunnel at the University of Dayton Research Institute, the 2.5-megawatt arc tunnel 
at Langley, and the X-15 airplanes. They ranked the materials in order of their 
297 Adkins and Armstrong, “Development and Status of the X-5A-2 Airplane,” p. 06.
298 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 6 October 96, p. 7 plus attached photos.
299 Edwin W. Johnston, “Current and Advanced X-5,” a paper presented at the Military Aircraft Systems and Tech-
nology Meeting, Washington, DC, 2-23 September 96. The ablator was actually made by the Electronics and 
Space Division of Emerson Electric, St. Louis, MO.
300 Armstrong, “Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 Envelope Expansion Program,” pp. 2-25.
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shielding effectiveness as measured under a low heat-flux environment, and sent 
the results to the Air Force Materials Laboratory at Wright-Patterson AFB.301 
 While North American was rebuilding the second airplane, NASA began 
initial flight tests of various ablative coatings on X-15-1 and X-15-3. Engineers 
applied the coatings to removable panels behind the ball nose, and directly to 
locations under the liquid-oxygen tank, on the lower surface of the horizontal 
stabilizers, and on the canopy, ventral stabilizer, speed brakes, and rudder. The 
ventral stabilizer and speed brakes provided moderate heating rates in easily ac-
cessible locations that could tolerate material failures if they occurred. The liquid-
oxygen tank provided a test area for checking the bond integrity at temperatures 
approaching –300°F during actual flight. The removable nose panels provided 
measured back-surface temperatures and allowed direct comparison of two mate-
rials under the same heating conditions. Researchers expected the canopy applica-
tion to show whether a windshield-contamination problem existed, but the tests 
proved inconclusive .302  
 Flight-testing began in late 1963 and concluded in October 1964. NASA 
wanted to find a material that could provide protection at heating rates of 5–150 
Btu per square foot per second and shearing stresses as high as 15 psf at a total 
weight of less than 400 pounds. The bonding had to be reliable at skin tempera-
tures from –300 to +500°F, and ideally the material should not require special 
curing or handling.303  
 Eventually, 15 different materials were flight-tested and the more promising 
included General Electric ESM 1004B, Martin MA-32H and MA-45R, McDon-
nell B-44, and NASA E-2A-1 Purple Blend. Researchers at Langley were devel-
oping the NASA material primarily as a backup in case the commercial products 
did not prove acceptable. The evaluation group also performed limited tests of 
alternate forms of the Martin and McDonnell materials, and ultimately selected 
one of these, MA-25S, for full-scale use .304 
 Flight-testing proved to be an extremely valuable part of the overall evalua-
tion. Researchers discovered numerous deficiencies in materials, bond systems, 
and spray techniques during the flights that they probably would not have found 
any other way–another example of the fact that there is no substitute for real-
world experience. The flight conditions experienced at Mach 5 showed material 
problems that had not appeared in ground-facility tests, mainly poor bonding and 
excessive erosion and blistering on some segments.305  
 Most of these problems, if they had occurred during a Mach 8 flight, would 
have likely resulted in the loss of the airplane. One of the most serious problems 
was bond failures of sheet materials, usually because the material was too stiff to 
conform to skin irregularities, resulting in voids in the bond (glue). This proved to 
30 Watts et al., “Advanced X-5A-2 Thermal-Protection System,” p. 8. Air Force contract number AF33(65)-
32. For further information on this evaluation, see Dennis Gerdeman and Michael Jolly, “Preliminary Evaluation 
of Ablative Coatings for X-5 Application,” University of Dayton report UDRI-TM-6-08, 5 June 96.
302 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 2,” April 96, pp. 6-7; Watts, Cary, and Dow, “Advanced X-5A-2 Ther-
mal-Protection System,” p. 9.
303 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 2,” April 96, pp. 6-7; Watts et al., “Advanced X-5A-2 Thermal-Protec-
tion System,” p. 9.
30 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  December 96, p. 2; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,”  
April 965, p. 3. 
305 Watts et al., “Advanced X-5A-2 Thermal-Protection System,” pp. 8-9.
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be a major blow to the concept of using ablators, since researchers had expected to 
be able to easily service the sheet materials before and after flight. The alternative 
was to apply the ablator with a spray gun, but many of the materials responded 
by delaminating and peeling off during flight. In every case examined in detail, 
this was the result of improper application, not a material failure. Nevertheless, 
it pointed out the difficulties of actually using these materials, and the test areas 
were generally only a couple of square feet–imagine the problems involved with 
coating an entire airplane.306  
 A few materials eroded very badly on the ventral stabilizer leading edge. This 
was a sign of inadequate thermal protection since Mach 5 provided a low heating 
306 Ibid, p. 9.
The Mach 6.5 structural design of  the original X-15 was not adequate to handle the aerodynamic 
heating loads expected at Mach 8 for the advanced X-15A-2. For example, the total heat load for a 
location on the underside of  the nose was approximately 2,300 Btu per square foot at Mach 6, but over 
13,000 Btu at Mach 8. Similarly, the wing leading edge absorbed 9,500 Btu per square foot at Mach 
6, but 27,500 Btu at Mach 8. To protect the airframe, researchers turned to ablative coatings similar 
to ones being proposed for the space shuttle. (NASA)
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environment compared to the expected Mach 8 design requirements. For instance, 
the test panel under the nose reached a peak surface temperature of 1,000°F on a 
Mach 5 mission; at Mach 8, this panel would soar to 1,750°F.307 
 Something all the materials had in common was that they were difficult to re-
move after flight. Char and remaining virgin material required soaking in solvents 
and manual scraping. One alternative that was tested was applying pressure- 
sensitive tape to the airframe, and then applying the ablative over the tape. Techni-
cians would simply strip the tape off after a flight and all residual material would 
come off with it, leaving a clean surface. However, if the tape got too hot–even 
in small areas–it could start to peel, taking the ablator with it, and leaving the 
airframe exposed to catastrophic heating levels.308 
 As the flight-testing was nearing completion, researchers began thermal-
performance testing using the 2.5-megawatt arc tunnel at Langley to determine 
the relative shielding effectiveness of the candidate materials. These tests closely 
simulated the peak heating rates and enthalpy levels expected on the design Mach 
8 mission. The material manufacturers provided test samples of their materials 
installed on identical leading-edge and afterbody models.309 
 The leading-edge tests showed that most of the silicone-based ablators were 
unable to withstand the severe heating conditions. The three silicone-based mate-
rials had densities between 32 and 60 pounds per cubic foot, resulting in a surface 
between 0.545 inch and 0.294 inch thick. The back surface temperature of all 
three products was relatively similar, but the materials experienced a variety of 
erosion, blistering, and cracking problems during the tests. The fourth material 
tested in the Langley facility was a phenolic-silica ablator with a density of 110 
pounds per cubic foot, resulting in a surface thickness of only 0.165 inch. The 
shape retention of this material was excellent, but its shielding effectiveness was 
low. All four of the materials passed the afterbody tests, with no significant differ-
ences in performance noted.310  
 During the arc-tunnel tests, researchers observed that loosened material from 
the ablator tended to reattach to surfaces downstream. Flight tests on X-15-1 with 
a panel of windshield glass mounted on the vertical stabilizer aft of a sample patch 
of the ablator showed that the glass panel quickly became opaque, which would 
seriously restrict the pilot’s vision. Since the pilot obviously needed to see during 
landing, researchers considered three different approaches to restore the necessary 
vision. These included explosive fragmentation of the outer windshield glass after 
the high-speed run was completed, boundary-layer blowing over the windshield 
during the entire flight, and a hinged metal “eyelid” that could be opened after the 
high-speed portion of the flight.311  
 The explosive concept worried everybody and was not pursued very far be-
cause there seemed to be too many possible failure modes. The boundary-layer 
idea was the only one that potentially provided a continuously clear windshield; 
however, the pilot actually had little reason to need completely clear vision at 
307 Ibid, pp. 9 and 25.
308 Ibid, p. 9.
309 Ibid, p. 20.
30 Ibid, pp. 20-2.
3 Armstrong, “Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 Envelope Expansion Program,” pp. 25-26.
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100,000 feet since there was really nothing to run into at that altitude, and the 
implementation was complex and expensive. Therefore, the program selected the 
eyelid because it was the easiest to implement. The right windshield was unpro-
tected and provided normal pilot vision during launch and initial climb-out. Dur-
ing the high-speed run, the right windshield would become opaque, allowing the 
pilot to see little more than light and dark patches of sky. The eyelid was installed 
over the left windshield; it would remain closed during the climb-out and high-
speed flight, and open once the airplane slowed below Mach 3. The pilot would 
look out of the left side of the windshield for landing. This carried some risks, 
though. After one of his windshields shattered during a 1961 flight, Bob White 
reported that his vision had been “compromised” during landing. When flight 
tests began, the pilots discovered another phenomenon: the open eyelid created a 
small canard effect, causing the airplane to pitch up, roll right, and yaw right. The 
effects were small but noticeable.312  
 In the end, the Air Force and NASA determined that the General Electric, Mar-
tin, McDonnell, and NASA Purple Blend products were all potentially acceptable 
and sent requests for proposals to the manufacturers. The source evaluation board 
received the proposals during late 1965, and in January 1966, NASA awarded a 
contract to Martin Marietta to design and apply a sprayable ablator to X-15A-2.313 
 The basic MA-25S ablative material had a virgin material density of 28 
pounds per cubic foot . Martin had developed MA-25S “specifically for applica-
tion over complex vehicle configurations,” although it had existed well before 
the X-15 application was proposed. Most significantly, application and curing 
took place at room temperature (70°F to 100°F). A special premolded fiber-re-
inforced elastomeric silicone material (ESA-3560-IIA) similar to that used on 
the Air Force X-23A PRIME reentry vehicles would cover all the leading edges. 
Martin developed a premolded flexible material (MA-25S-1) to cover the seams 
around access panels, and used smaller pieces of this material to cover fasteners 
and other items that required last-minute access.314 
 Interestingly, although Martin considered MA-25S a “mature” product, “all 
previous applications had been accomplished with laboratory equipment,” and in 
March 1966 the company had to start from scratch to come up with methods to 
coat an entire airplane. Once the engineers finished writing the procedure, Martin 
procured several large sheets of Inconel and used them as test subjects. The com-
pany also ran compatibility tests with the various liquids and gases found on the 
X-15. Hydraulic fluid, helium, nitrogen, and ammonia did not seem to present any 
problems. An outside laboratory had to test the hydrogen peroxide, delaying the 
results, but no problems were expected. However, the MA-25S material, like all of 
32 Knight, “Increased Piloting Tasks and Performance of X-5A-2 in Hypersonic Flight,” pp. 793-802; Armstrong, 
“Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 Envelope Expansion Program,” p. 26; Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. 
White, “Pilot Report for Flight 2-2-37,” 9 November 96. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
33 Armstrong, “Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 Envelope Expansion Program,” p. 25; X-5 Status 
Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 2 February 966, p. 6. 
3 Martin Marietta design report ER-535, “Thermal Protection System: X-5A-2,” undated (but probably April 
967), pp. 59-60; Armstrong, “Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 Envelope Expansion Program,” p. 25. 
Originally, Martin Marietta apparently used a small “s” in the trade name of the ablator (MA-25s). However, it is 
generally known as MA-25S and seems more readable that way, so that is what will be used here. MA-25S and 
ESA-3560 have both had long lives and are currently being used to insulate some portions of the Space Shuttle 
external tank.
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the ablators originally tested for the X-15, was impact-sensitive after exposure to 
liquid oxygen. Tests showed that a local detonation would occur on the material if 
it was submerged in liquid oxygen and struck with a force as low as 8 foot-pounds. 
Martin concluded that “the significance of the material being impact sensitive 
with liquid oxygen is not well understood at this time and this particular material 
characteristic should be reviewed with X-15A-2 operations personnel.”315 
 The sensitivity to liquid oxygen brought several unexpected problems since 
the casual spilling of liquid oxygen (not an uncommon occurrence) suddenly 
became a major problem. In response, Martin proposed spraying a white protec-
tive wear layer over the ablator to isolate it from any minor liquid-oxygen spill-
age. Nevertheless, the potential for contaminating the inside of the liquid-oxygen 
lines, pumps, vents, etc. during the application (spraying and sanding) of the abla-
tor was the most worrisome.316 
 On 18 May 1966, X-15A-2 flight 2-44-79 provided the first relatively large-
scale tests of MA-25S and the ESA-3560-IIA leading-edge material. The materi-
als had been applied (as appropriate) to three nose panels (F-3, F-4, and E-4), 
the UHF antenna, both main landing skids and struts, both sides of the ventral 
stabilizer, both lower speed brakes, and the left horizontal stabilizer. Researchers 
instrumented all of these panels to determine the effects of the ablator. Ground 
handling resulted in ablator damage that technicians repaired using a documented 
repair procedure; the test would inadvertently provide validation of its reparabil-
ity. As part of the evaluation, technicians used various application techniques in 
different locations, providing some validation of the proposed concepts. In gen-
eral, these tests were successful, although instrumentation failures precluded the 
gathering of any precise data from the nose panels.317 
 The ablator also forced the program to develop a new pitot-static system. 
NASA relocated the static pickups since ablative material now covered the normal 
locations on the sides of the forward fuselage. Engineers moved the static source 
into a vented compartment behind the canopy that tests on X-15-1 had shown to 
be acceptable. An extendable pitot tube replaced the standard dogleg pitot ahead 
of the canopy because the temperatures expected at Mach 8 would exceed the 
standard tube’s limits. The retractable tube would remain within the fuselage until 
the aircraft decelerated below Mach 2, at which point the pilot would actuate a 
release mechanism and the tube would extend into the airstream. This was similar 
in concept to the system eventually installed on the space shuttle orbiters. The 
ill-fated flight 2-45-81 marked the first use of the retractable pitot tube, in paral-
lel with the normal system. Despite other problems on the flight, Bob Rushworth 
considered the new system acceptable for flight, and subsequent data analysis 
confirmed this.318  
35 Martin Marietta monthly letter report no. 3, subject: X-5 thermal protection system, 7 April 966. In the files at the 
DFRC History Office; Armstrong, “Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 Envelope Expansion Program,” p. 25.
36 Letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 August 2002.
37 Martin Marietta monthly letter report no. 5, subject: X-5 thermal protection system, 0 June 966. In the files at 
the DFRC History Office.
38 Armstrong, “Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 Envelope Expansion Program,” p. 26; X-5 Status 
Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 2 July 966, p. 9. 
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Getting Ready for Maximum Speed
 The general cautiousness that was beginning to permeate NASA was also 
affecting the X-15 program, and the buildup to the maximum speed flight was 
unusually conservative. Although the program had never been “wild and crazy,” 
it had previously taken reasonable risks when it understood the problems and their 
consequences. This was not the case during preparations for the maximum speed 
flight, which really did not represent that large an increment over the Mach 6+ 
speeds already attained. Nevertheless, in preparation, the program dealt with each 
individual piece separately.
 Pete Knight flew the next X-15A-2 flight (2-49-86) with the ventral on, pri-
marily to familiarize himself with the handling qualities, since all of his previous 
flights had been with the ventral off. All future X-15A-2 flights would use either 
the ventral or the ramjet. Flight 2-50-89 was the first flight where the external tanks 
operated (knowingly) successfully, including the improved instrumentation that let 
the ground crew and pilot know the propellants were transferring correctly.319 
 After this flight, X-15A-2 went down for the final modifications needed to get 
ready for the maximum speed flight. Perhaps the most noticeable was the installa-
tion of the “eyelid” over the left-hand canopy window. NASA sent the canopy to 
Inglewood in January 1967 and it returned to Edwards in early April, in time for 
flight 2-51-92. In addition, NASA relocated the thermocouple recording system 
from the center-of-gravity compartment to the main instrument bay since it had 
failed to operate on the previous two flights because of the cold environment. By 
May 1967, three dummy ramjet shapes had arrived at Edwards, and wind-tunnel 
39 Major William J. Knight, “Pilot Report for Flight 2-9-86,” 30 August 966.
The NB-52s required a modification to strengthen the wing in order to carry the X-15A-2 and its external 
tanks. On 27 June 1066, Bob Rushworth was in the cockpit of  a scheduled captive-carry flight (2-C-80) 
to test the X-15A-2 with full external tanks. (NASA)
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tests in the JPL 21-inch hypersonic tunnel had verified the mated ramjet configu-
ration. One of the three dummy ramjets was sent to Inglewood to have a thermal 
protection system installed, and engineers at the FRC instrumented the other two 
in preparation for flight. Researchers had already calibrated the flow-field cone 
probes at Mach numbers of 3.5 and 4.4 in the Ames 1 by 3-foot wind tunnel, with 
additional tests scheduled at Mach numbers of 5.0 and 7.4.320 
 Pete Knight evaluated the handling qualities of the X-15A-2 with the dummy 
ramjet installed under the fixed portion of the ventral stabilizer on flight 2-51-92. 
This flight did not include the external tanks and reached Mach 4.8. Knight jet-
tisoned the ramjet just before landing, much like the ventral rudder, to provide the 
necessary clearance for the landing gear. Next up for X-15A-2 was a flight with 
the ablative coating and dummy ramjet, but without the external tanks.321 
Ablator Application
 There had always been questions about exactly how to apply an ablative coat-
ing over the surface of an entire airplane, even one as small as the X-15. Even 
more questions existed on how to maintain the airplane after applying the coating, 
and how difficult it would be to refurbish the coating between flights. There ap-
pears to have been little actual concern about the effectiveness of the ablator; if it 
was applied correctly, everyone was relatively sure the concept would work.
 As part of its initial contract, Martin Marietta developed a comprehensive 
procedure for applying the coating, maintaining it, and removing it if necessary. 
Martin accomplished the first complete application of the ablator in general agree-
ment with the schedule and procedures published earlier. Simply because it repre-
sents one of the few attempts to use an ablative coating on an entire airplane, it is 
appropriate to review the application in detail .322 
 The process began with cleaning the airplane, and Martin admitted the pre-
paratory cleaning was “somewhat overdone” for the first application. Technicians 
masked all joints, gaps, and openings before the cleaning began to prevent solvent 
from getting into the airplane. The surface condition of the airplane, with its ac-
cumulation of contamination and overabundance of lacquer, necessitated the use 
of a great deal of solvent during the initial cleaning. Technicians accomplished 
the final cleaning with powdered cleanser and water using a “water-break-free” 
test to ascertain when the surface was properly clean. Some areas of the aircraft, 
especially around fastener heads and skin joints, never did achieve a completely 
water-break-free condition, and Martin noted that “these areas continually bleed 
hydraulic fluid or other contamination.”323 
320 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 0 January 967, p.  and  April 967, 
pp. 2 and 5. 
32 Major William J. Knight, “Pilot report for flight 2-5-92,” 8 May 967. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
322 For the detailed instructions of how to apply, maintain, and remove the ablative coating, see Martin Marietta report 
ER-535, “Thermal Protection System: X-5A-2,” undated (but probably April 967). In the files at the AFFTC 
and DFRC History Offices.
323 Martin Marietta monthly progress report no. 3, subject: X-5 full scale ablator application,  July 967. In the 
files at the DFRC History Office; A. B. Price, Martin Marietta report MCR-68-5, “Full Scale Flight Test Report: 
X-5A-2 Ablative Thermal Protection System,” December 967, pp. 5-6. A clean surface is a “water-break-free” 
area on which the water sheets out over the surface, while the presence of oil or contaminants will cause water 
to bead up. This is a standard test used in many industries (particularly the paint industry).
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 Next, technicians used polyethylene tape to mask all of the seams between 
panels to keep the ablative material out of the aircraft compartments. The only 
problem encountered in the initial ablator application was that nobody had an-
ticipated masking the gap between the fixed portion of each vertical stabilizer 
and the rudders. The installation crew then improvised a solution that was mostly 
successful. As a means of checking the adequacy of the masking during all phases 
of ablator operation, technicians placed airborne contamination collectors in nine 
aircraft compartments before beginning the application process. At the end of the 
process, quality inspectors from Martin Marietta and NASA checked these col-
lectors and found very little contamination, indicating that the masking worked 
as expected .324 
 Before turning the airplane over to Martin Marietta, NASA had made a few 
minor changes to accommodate the ablator installation. The retractable pitot 
tube (or “alternate pitot” as it was called) was installed, as was a new retaining 
ring around the ball nose that had a step at its aft end . When the ablator was built 
up during the application, it would fill up to the top of the step, resulting in a 
smooth surface.325 
 Next up was installing the molded ablator “details” on the aircraft. This in-
cluded premolded leading-edge covers made from ESA-3560-IIA for the wing 
and horizontal stabilizers, and covers for various antennas, the canopy leading 
edge, and the vertical stabilizer leading edge. Although it was not provided as 
part of the kit, the installation team fabricated a detail for the leading edge of the 
dummy ramjet instrumentation rake from a spare piece of the vertical stabilizer 
leading-edge detail.326 
 After technicians glued the details onto the surface of the leading edges, they 
covered the majority of the airplane with polyethylene sheeting to protect cleaned 
areas from overspray during the sequential ablator applications. The airplane was 
broken down into nine distinct areas that technicians would spray in sequence. 
Technicians installed marker strips (a vinyl foam tape) over the contamination 
masking and applied a layer of DC93-027 RTV over fastener heads and periph-
eral gaps of the seldom-removed panels. The installation team then sprayed the 
MA-25S ablator using a commercial paint spray gun. Controlling the thickness of 
the ablator was the most significant difficulty encountered during the application 
process, but the team got much better toward the end as they became more famil-
iar with the deposition characteristics of the material. Some areas, particularly the 
middle of the wing root and the crown centerline of the fuselage, proved to be 
too much of a stretch for the technicians standing on the ground. This condition 
resulted in a “somewhat cheezy” ablator application in those areas, but the layer 
was deemed adequate to protect the airframe.327 
  
32 A. B. Price, Martin Marietta report MCR-68-5, “Full Scale Flight Test Report: X-5A-2 Ablative Thermal Protec-
tion System,” December 967, pp. 6-7. The collectors were essentially petri dishes with millipore filters in them 
that collected any dust that settled in the bottom of the compartments.
325 Martin Marietta design report ER-535, “Thermal Protection System: X-5A-2,” undated (but probably April 
967), passim.
326 Martin Marietta report MCR-68-5, pp. 8-9.
327 Ibid, pp. 9-0.
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 Once the entire surface was covered, the next task was to go back and remove 
the trim marker strips. This proved more difficult than had been expected because 
the tape was “too thick and possessed too high an adhesive tack.” Nevertheless, 
the team eventually accomplished the task, but decided to use a different tape next 
time. It was important to avoid disturbing the sealing tape under the marker strips, 
since it would have to protect the compartments from the effects of the sanding 
operation still to come.328 
 The ablator was left to cure at room temperature for a few hours, and then 
technicians sanded the entire surface to remove overspray and irregularities, and 
to bring the ablator layer down to within ±0.020 inch of its design thickness. This 
proved to be a very tedious operation. First, the team had to draw grid lines on 
the airplane to establish precise monitor locations, and a penetrating needle dial 
gage determined the thickness at each point on the grid. Technicians then sanded 
the surface. Since this removed the grid lines, they would have to be redrawn and 
the thickness rechecked . The process continued until the desired thickness was 
reached. It was evident that there was a need for a better way to establish the grid 
on the airplane .329 
328 Ibid, p. 0.
329 Ibid, p. .
Applying the MA-25S ablator was more involved than most expected. The airplane had to be scrubbed 
clean, and then each individual panel had to be taped to ensure ablator did not get into the airplane. The 
ablator was then sprayed, sanded to a consistent finish, and its depth measured. The amount of  time 
required to coat the relatively small X-15 did not bode well for a large Space Shuttle. (NASA)
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 When the sanding was finished, the team glued 10 test plugs to the ablator 
surface and cut through the ablator layer around their periphery. A pull test was 
performed on the plugs to determine whether the ablator had properly bonded 
to the skin. The first application successfully passed all of its pull tests. Various 
“hard point inserts” were then installed around the external tank inboard sway 
brace attach points and the aircraft jacking points. Inserts of MA-25S-1 material 
also covered the ram air door in the fuselage nose and the engine compartment fire 
doors on the aft fuselage.330 
 MA-25S had a natural pinkish color and somehow this seemed inappropriate 
for the world’s fastest airplane. Fortunately, the specification called for a layer of 
Dow Corning DC90-090 RTV over the entire airplane to provide a wear coating 
and to seal the ablator. The DC90-090 was translucent white and did not com-
pletely hide the pink, so NASA asked Martin Marietta to apply an extra coat 
(or two, in some areas) so that the airplane would have a uniform white finish. 
This exhausted the available supply of the coating; however, Dow Corning had 
replaced DC90-090 with a similar product called DC92-007. Martin requested 
samples of the new product to determine its suitability as a substitute.331 
 At this point, the team applied a limited number of hazard and warning mark-
ings to the exterior using standard high-temperature aircraft lacquer paint. The 
last step was to remove the polyethylene tape that sealed the service panels and 
install strips of MA-25S-1 around their periphery to provide extra durability dur-
ing panel removal and replacement. Martin then returned the airplane to the X-15 
maintenance crews, who installed instrumentation and prepared it for flight.332 
Ablator Flights
 Because so many unknowns still existed, the Air Force and NASA decided 
to conduct a thorough post-flight inspection of the entire airplane surface for each 
mission, and to monitor the ablator char depth and back-surface temperatures 
throughout the performance buildup. The ablator weighed 125 pounds more than 
planned and, taken with the expected increase in drag, the maximum speed of 
airplane was expected to barely exceed Mach 7.333  
 Pete Knight made the first flight (2-52-96) in the ablator-coated, ramjet-
equipped X-15A-2 without the external tanks on 21 August 1967. The flight 
reached Mach 4.94 and the post-flight inspection showed that, in general, the 
ablator had held up well. The leading-edge details on the wings and horizontal 
stabilizers had uniform and minor charring along their lengths. A careful exami-
nation revealed only minor surface fissuring with all char intact, and good shape 
retention. The char layers were approximately 0.050 inch deep on the wing lead-
ing edge and 0.055 inch deep on the horizontal stabilizer–well within limits.334 
330 Ibid, pp. 2-3.
33 Martin Marietta monthly progress report no. 3, subject: X-5 full scale ablator application,  July 967. In the 
files at the DFRC History Office; Martin Marietta report MCR-68-5, p. 3.
332 Martin Marietta report MCR-68-5, pp. 3-5.
333 Watts et al., “Advanced X-5A-2 Thermal-Protection System,” p. 2; Knight, “Increased Piloting Tasks and 
Performance of X-5A-2 in Hypersonic Flight.”
33 Martin Marietta report MCR-68-5, pp. 6-65.
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 The ablator details for the canopy and dorsal vertical stabilizer showed al-
most no thermal degradation, and local erosion and blistering of the wear layer 
were the only evidence of thermal exposure. The leading edge of the forward vane 
antenna suffered local erosion to a depth of 0 .100 inch because of shock-wave 
impingement set up by an excessively thick ablator insert over the ram air door 
just forward of the antenna. The remainder of the leading-edge detail on the aft 
vane antenna showed “minor, if not insignificant degradation.”335 
 The most severe damage during the flight was to the molded ablator detail 
on the leading edge of the modified ventral, which showed heavy charring along 
its entire length. “The increased amount of thermal degradation was directly at-
tributable to the shock wave interactions from the pressure probes and the dummy 
ramjet assembly.” Additional shock waves originated from the leading edges of 
the skids. The shock impingement had apparently completely eroded the lower 
portion of the detail, and very little char remained intact. However, it was dif-
ficult to ascertain how much of the erosion had taken place during the flight since 
sand impact at landing had caused similar, although much less significant, erosion 
during an earlier ablator test flight. Still, this should have been a warning to the 
program that something was wrong, but somehow everybody missed it.336 
 The primary ablative layer over the airplane experienced very little thermal 
degradation as the result of this Mach 5 flight. On the wings and horizontal sta-
bilizers, only the areas immediately adjacent to the molded leading edges were 
degraded. These areas exhibited the normal random reticulation of the surface, 
there was no evidence of delaminating, and all material was intact. Some super-
ficial blistering of the ablative layer was evident on the outboard lower left wing 
surface . Martin Marietta believed the blistering was most probably the result of 
an excessively thick wear-layer application. Not surprisingly, the speed brakes 
exhibited some wear, but there was no significant erosion or sign of delamina-
tion. The only questionable area of ablator performance was the left side of the 
dorsal rudder. A number of circular pieces of ablator were lost during the flight. 
A close examination of the area revealed that all separation had occurred at the 
spray layer interface, and significant additional delamination had occurred. The 
heavy wear layer, however, had held most of the material in place. The program 
had seen similar delamination during some of the earlier test flights and traced it 
to improper application of the material. It then changed the installation procedures 
to prevent reoccurrence .337 
 After the inspection, Martin Marietta set about repairing the ablator for the 
next flight. With the exception of the leading-edge details for the ventral stabi-
lizer and the forward vane antenna, refurbishment was minimal. Only the wings 
and horizontal stabilizers had experienced any degree of charring, and techni-
cians refurbished them by sanding away the friable layer. They did not attempt 
to remove all of the thermally affected material, and sanding continued only un-
til they exposed resilient material. The canopy leading-edge detail required no 
 
335 Ibid, p. 65.
336 Ibid. 
337 Ibid, pp. 65-67.
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refurbishment, but Martin lightly sanded its surface to remove the wear layer to 
minimize deposition on the windshield during the next flight.338 
 Martin repaired local gouges in the main MA-25S ablator using a troweled 
repair mix and kitchen spatulas, eliminating most of the sanding usually required 
for the patches. Technicians sanded the speed brakes to apparent virgin material 
and resprayed the areas to the original thickness. They also completely stripped 
the left side of the dorsal rudder and reapplied the ablator from scratch using the 
revised procedure .339 
 Although the ablator around the nose of the airplane had experienced no sig-
nificant thermal degradation, a malfunction of the ball nose necessitated its re-
338 Martin Marietta report MCR-68-5, p. 5.
339 Ibid.
As it finally rolled out of  the paint shop at the Flight Research Center, the MA-25S-covered X-15A-2 
was the polar opposite of  what an X-15 normally looked like. Instead of  the black Inconel X finish, 
the airplane had a protective layer of  white Dow DC90-090. Actually, this was a relief  to the pilots 
since the MA-35S has a natural pink color. (NASA)
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placement, and the ablator was damaged in the process. Unfortunately, Martin had 
depleted the supply of ablator during the refurbishment process, forcing the use 
of a batch of MA-25S left over from a previous evaluation. For the final prepara-
tion the entire surface of the airplane was lightly sanded and a new coating of the 
replacement DC92-007 wear layer was applied.340 
Maximum Speed
 All was ready on the morning of 3 October 1967 as Colonel Joseph P . 
Cotton and Lieutenant Colonel William G. Reschke, Jr., started the engines on 
the NB-52B. Pete Knight had already been in the cockpit of X-15A-2 for over an 
hour performing the preflight checklist with the ground crew led by Charlie Baker 
and Larry Barnett and a host of support personnel in the NASA control room. At 
1331 hours the mated pair took off from Edwards and headed to Mud Lake . An 
hour later, Knight “reached up and hit the launch switch and immediately took 
my hand off to [go] back to the throttle and found that I had not gone anywhere. 
It did not launch.” This was not a good start, but a second attempt 2 minutes later 
resulted in the smooth launch of flight 2-53-97.341 
 The flight plan showed that X-15A-2 would weigh 52,117 pounds at sepa-
ration, more than 50% heavier than originally conceived in 1954. As the X-15 
fell away, Knight lit the engine and set up a 12-degree angle of attack resulting 
in about 1.5 g in longitudinal acceleration. As normal acceleration built to 2 g, 
Knight had to hold considerable right deflection on the side stick to keep X-15A-2 
from rolling left due to the heavier liquid-oxygen tank. When the aircraft reached 
the 35-degree planned pitch angle, Knight began to fly a precise climb angle. The 
simulator had predicted a maximum dynamic pressure of 540 psf, remarkably 
close to the 560 psf measured during the rotation. Knight maintained the planned 
pitch angle within ±1 degree.342 
 Knight jettisoned the external tanks 67.4 seconds after launch at Mach 2.4 and 
72,300 feet. Tank separation was satisfactory, but Knight described it as “harder” 
than it had been on flight 2-50-89. The parachute system performed satisfactorily 
and the Air Force recovered the tanks in repairable condition . Free of the extra 
weight and drag of the external tanks, the airplane began to accelerate quickly, 
and Knight came level at 102,100 feet. As Knight later recalled, “We shut down 
at 6,500 [fps] and I took careful note to see what the final got to. It went to 6,600 
maximum on the indicator.”343 
 Seventy-one seconds after engine shutdown, Knight performed the first of 
a series of planned rudder pulses with the yaw damper off. The sideslip indica-
30 Martin Marietta monthly progress report no. 6, subject: X-5 full scale ablator application, 6 October 967. In the 
files at the DFRC History Office; Martin Marietta report MCR-68-5, p. 9.
3 Major William J. Knight, “Pilot Report for Flight 2-53-97,” 3 October 967; memorandum, Major William J. Knight 
to Chief, Research Projects Office, subject: Preliminary Report of X-5 Flight 2-53-97, 26 October 967. 
32 Flight plan for flight 2-53-97, 9 September 967; Major William J. Knight, “Pilot Report for Flight 2-53-97,” 3 
October 967; memorandum, Major William J. Knight to Chief, Research Projects Office, subject: Preliminary 
Report of X-5 Flight 2-53-97, 26 October 967; Armstrong, “Expanding the X-5 Envelope to Mach 6.7,” pp. 
20-205; X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 8 November 967, p. . 
33 Memorandum, Major William J. Knight to Chief, Research Projects Office, subject: Preliminary report of X-5 flight 
2-53-97, 26 October 967; Armstrong, “Expanding the X-5 Envelope to Mach 6.7,” pp. 20-205; X-5 Status 
Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 8 November 967, p. . 
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tor did not rotate as expected, but post-flight analysis revealed that the aircraft 
achieved a satisfactory yaw rate and lateral acceleration. Since the maneuver oc-
curred at approximately the same time the unprotected ball nose reached its maxi-
mum temperature, researchers theorized that differential expansion in the nose 
may have resulted in a false instrument reading. Almost amusingly, despite the 
significant heating experienced by the rest of the airplane, the aft viewing Mil-
likan 16-mm camera installed in the center-of-gravity compartment froze because 
of a malfunction of the thermal switch that activated the camera heater.344 
 As Knight decelerated through Mach 5.5, the HOT PEROXIDE light came 
on; unknown to anybody, the intense heat from shock waves impinging on the 
dummy ramjet were severely damaging the airplane. Unfortunately, the peroxide 
light distracted Knight from his planned maneuvers and his energy management. 
As worries mounted, NASA-1 directed Knight to jettison his peroxide and be-
gan vectoring him toward high key. The X-15A-2 came across the north edge of 
Rogers at 55,000 feet and Mach 2.2. When Knight went to jettison the remain-
3 Major William J. Knight, “Pilot Report for Flight 2-53-97,” 3 October 967; memorandum, James R. Welsh (for 
Elmor J. Adkins/X-5 Research Planning Office) to Assistant Chief, Research Projects, subject: Preliminary report 
on X-5 flight 2-53-97, 26 October 967. 
This is how the ventral stabilizer and ramjet installation looked on the morning of  3 October 1967 prior 
to Flight 2-53-97. The skid landing gear is extended in this photograph. (NASA)
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ing propellants so that the chase plane could find him, nothing came out. There 
would be no help from the chase. Knight was high on energy, unable to jettison 
his propellants, and unsure about the condition of his airplane. He turned through 
high key at 40,000 feet but was still supersonic. While on final approach, Knight 
tried to jettison the ramjet, but later indicated that “I did not feel it go at all.” The 
ground crew reported that they did not see anything drop. Something was obvi-
ously wrong, but things were happening too quickly to worry about it.345  
 Fortunately, things mellowed out after that and Knight made an uneventful 
landing. Once on the ground, Knight realized that something was not right when 
a majority of the ground crew rushed to the back of the airplane. After he finally 
egressed and walked toward the rear of the X-15, he understood: there were large 
holes in the side of the ventral with evidence of melting and skin rollback.346 
 Post-flight analysis showed that the airplane had managed to attain Mach 
6.70, equivalent to 4,520 mph (6,629 fps), at 102,700 feet, an unofficial speed 
mark for winged-vehicles that would stand until the return of the Space Shuttle 
Columbia from its first orbital mission in April 1981. This was the only X-15 
flight to exceed the original 6,600-fps design goal.347 
 Later analysis showed that the shock wave from the spike nose on the ram-
jet had intersected the ventral and caused severe heating. Flight planner Johnny 
Armstrong observed, “So now maybe we knew why the ramjet was not there.” 
The telemetry indicated that the ramjet instrumentation ceased to function 25 sec-
onds after the XLR99 shut down. Later that afternoon several people, including 
Armstrong, were reviewing the telemetry when they noted an abnormal decrease 
in the longitudinal acceleration trace that indicated a sudden decrease in drag. The 
conclusion was that this was when the ramjet had separated. When the flight pro-
file was computed, it was determined that this happened at about the 180-degree 
point during the turn over the south area of Rogers Dry Lake at about Mach 1 and 
32,000 feet. Armstrong began correlating the telemetry with recorded radar data: 
“I could say that I did a detailed calculation of the drag coefficient for a tumbling 
ramjet, then a 5th order curve fit of the potential trajectory, corrected for winds–
but actually, I just made an engineering estimate.” In other words, he guessed.348 
 Not everybody believed Armstrong, but Bill Albrecht, the NASA operations 
engineer for X-15A-2, and Joe Rief, the AFFTC airfield manager, thought the 
theory had merit. Albrecht and Armstrong checked out a radio-equipped carryall 
van, cleared it with the tower, and headed out onto the Edwards impact range. 
Armstrong had previously marked up a map with some landmarks near where the 
telemetry and radar indicated the ramjet had separated. As they drove, Armstrong 
35 Major William J. Knight, “Pilot Report for Flight 2-53-97,” 3 October 967; Radio transcript for flight 2-53-97. 
Both in the files at the DFRC History Office; Thompson, At the Edge of Space, pp. 23-25.
36 Armstrong, “Expanding the X-5 Envelope to Mach 6.7,” pp. 20-205; memorandum, William J. Knight to Chief, 
Research Projects Office, subject: Preliminary report of X-5 flight 2-53-97, 26 October 967.
37 Memorandum, James R. Welsh (for Elmor J. Adkins/X-5 Research Planning Office) to Assistant Chief, Research 
Projects, subject: Preliminary report on X-5 flight 2-53-97, 26 October 967; Major William J. Knight, “Pilot report 
for flight 2-53-97,” 3 October 967. Both in the files at the DFRC History Office. This is sometimes shown as ,53 
mph and Mach .72. The difference is what atmospheric corrections were applied to convert Mach and dynamic 
pressure to miles per hour. The official NASA records show ,520 mph and Mach 6.70; the Air Force tends to use 
the higher figures. This was the only X-5 flight that actually exceeded the original design goal of 6,600 fps; the 
next closest was flight 2-50-89 at 6,233 fps. The fastest “basic” X-5 flight was -30-5 at 6,09 fps.
38 Armstrong, “Expanding the X-5 Envelope to Mach 6.7,” pp. 205-206; telephone conversation, Johnny Arm-
strong with Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 May 200.
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indicated a place to stop. They got out and walked about 200 yards directly to the 
ramjet, which was lying in two major pieces. The pair gathered up the nose cone 
and pressure probes and then headed back to the van (the main body of the ramjet 
was too heavy for only two men to lift). The next day Albrecht and Armstrong di-
rected a helicopter to retrieve the ramjet. Subsequent inspection showed that three 
of the four explosive bolts that held the ramjet on had fired, probably due to the 
excessive temperatures that had melted large portions of the ramjet and ventral.349 
Did it Work?
 From the Martin Marietta post-flight report: “The actual flight environment 
in the area of the modified ventral fin proved to be much more severe than antici-
pated. The condition was directly attributable to interaction effects of the shock 
waves generated by the dummy ramjet, the ventral, and the pressure probes. The 
ablator applications in this area were inadequate to protect the structure under 
these flow conditions, and the vehicle suffered localized damage in the area.”350 
 The flight had completely eroded the ablator application, including both the 
molded leading-edge detail and the sprayed MA-25S layer, from the forward 
portion of the ventral. The vehicle skin sustained major damage due to the ex-
cessively high heating in the shock impingement, which burned through at the 
leading edge and on the sides of the ventral at the torque box assembly. This 
also damaged the torque box and destroyed the wiring and pressure lines in the 
forward compartment.351 
 A study of the thermocouple responses in the area of the ventral indicated that 
the  ablator had provided at least some protection for the first 140 seconds of flight. 
Continual erosion of the ablator surfaces was occurring during this period, and 
by approximately 160 seconds the degradation was such that all protection broke 
down. The ablator materials should have had zero surface recession, but instead 
eroded away. The particles from the forward sections of ablator, in turn, caused se-
vere impact erosion of the downstream ablator layer. The lower speed brakes were 
bare of ablator, and the material on the inboard edges of the main landing skids and 
the undersides of the side fairings experienced considerable abrasion.352 
 Otherwise, the ablator had performed well enough. The flight had uniformly 
charred the details over the leading edges of the wings, horizontal stabilizers, 
canopy, and dorsal stabilizer along their lengths. All of the parts had retained their 
shape, and the char layer attachment was firm. There were some signs of localized 
surface melt in areas of shock impingement during peak heating, but because of 
a continually varying velocity during the flight, shock presence in any one area 
was limited and the degradation was “insignificant.” The nose-up trim attitude de-
graded the lower surface of the wing details more heavily than the upper surfaces; 
the reverse was true for the horizontal stabilizers.353 
39 Ibid, pp. 205-206. Armstrong kept the probes in his desk drawer for years, but presented them to Pete Knight in 
a ceremony at the AFFTC Museum just before Knight passed away in 200.
350 Martin Marietta report MCR-68-5, pp. 70-7.
35 Ibid, pp. 78-79.
352 Ibid, pp. 78-79.
353 Ibid, p. 7.
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 The lower, fixed portion of the dorsal stabilizer leading edge charred more 
heavily than the upper, movable rudder, and some evidence of unsymmetrical 
heating of the rudder was present, with the left side sustaining a higher heat load. 
The ablator details for both vane antennas were heavily charred and experienced 
local erosion or spallation of the char from their surface. They looked worse than 
they were; measurements showed that more than half an inch of ablator remained 
on the antennas, which were undamaged in any case.354 
 The sprayed MA-25S layer over the fuselage and side fairings showed vary-
ing degrees of effects. Thermal degradation, with the resultant reticulation of the 
ablator surface, occurred only on the forward areas of the nose. Ablator fissuring 
extended along the fuselage belly to approximately the forward vane antenna. The 
ablator on the crown of the fuselage and the belly aft of the vane antenna showed 
no evidence of thermal exposure.355 
 Engineers could easily correlate the varying amounts of charring experienced 
over the fuselage with their location or proximity to the various design features of 
the airplane. For instance, heavily charred areas were directly behind the pressure 
orifices in the ball nose. These openings were apparently sufficient to “trip” the 
flow, causing a rapid transition to turbulent boundary-layer conditions. The holes 
for the ballistic control-system thrusters greatly increased heating effects in their 
vicinity. Localized stagnation within the recesses apparently permitted burning 
of the ablator, evidenced by a surface discoloration. The thickness of the material 
behind the nose-gear door was seriously degraded.356 
 The various stacks and vents protruding from the airplane caused localized 
heating problems. Stagnation shock and trailing-wake damage were evident 
downstream from an external tank disconnect door that failed to close after the 
tanks were jettisoned. The ablator surface on the lower wing experienced varying 
degrees of charring over the whole area. This was heaviest adjacent to the molded 
leading edges, and some blistering was evident near the wing tips. However, the 
upper wing surfaces thermally degraded only near the leading edge details; the 
remainder of the surface was unaffected. Again, the ablator on the upper surface 
of the horizontal stabilizers degraded more heavily than the lower surfaces. Along 
the inboard edge of the stabilizers, next to the side fairings, sections of ablator 
were missing from both the top and bottom surfaces, forward of the torque tube. 
The open cavity of the stabilizer’s inboard closing rib and the adjacent fairing 
formed a channel to trap the airflow during flight. This resulted in severe heating 
within the cavity and caused degradation of the ablator from the back face.357 
 In addition to the thermal degradation, the stabilizer upper surfaces sustained 
a significant amount of impact damage. Some of the abrasions obviously occurred 
during landing since the exposed ablator was virgin material, while others had 
occurred early in flight and the exposed ablator had become charred. Engineers 
thought the likely cause was spallation of small pieces of upstream ablator of fluid 
 
35 Ibid, p. 72.
355 Ibid, pp. 72-73.
356 Ibid, pp. 72-73.
357 Ibid, pp. 7-75.
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droplets from the various vents and drains. As expected, ablation residue partially 
covered the unprotected right-hand windshield.358 
 Pull tests were conducted at random locations on the surface of the ablator to 
determine whether it was still well bonded to the airplane. The results were gener-
ally acceptable. In the end, Martin Marietta believed that the ablator “performed 
satisfactorily except in the area of the modified ventral fin.” Nevertheless, Martin 
went on to suggest a series of minor modifications that would solve some of the 
problems experienced on these two flights.359 
 The ablator obviously was not completely successful. Unexpectedly, the ab-
lator actually prevented cooling of the airframe by preventing heat from absorb-
ing into the underlying hot structure. The post-flight condition of the airplane was 
a surprise to Jack Kolf, an X0-15 project engineer at the FRC, who noted, “If there 
had been any question that the airplane was going to come back in that shape, we 
never would have flown it.”360  
 Engineers had not fully considered possible shock interaction with the ramjet 
shape at hypersonic speeds. As it turned out, the flow patterns were such that a 
tremendous shock wave impinged on the ramjet and its supporting structure. Re-
searchers later estimated that the heat in the ventral stabilizer was 10 times higher 
than normal. The warning signs had been there in various wind-tunnel tests and 
previous flights, but researchers had not recognized them.361 
 It is interesting to note that post-flight photographs of the X-15A-2 damage 
normally highlight two areas. The first is the ventral stabilizer and ramjet. Heat-
ing effects unquestionably damaged this area, although there had been indications 
on the previous flight that something was not right. The second area shown is the 
large fissures around the nose. When NASA replaced the ball nose before this 
flight, it used an outdated batch of MA-25S because it was all that was available. 
Although its application characteristics, cure rate, and appearance were the same 
as those of the “fresh” ablator used elsewhere, thermal exposure resulted in a 
greater shrink rate than the newer material. This produced much more pronounced 
fissuring, but it appeared that the ablator provided sufficient protection.362 
 The original contract with Martin Marietta indicated the company was re-
sponsible for “touching up” the ablator twice to allow three flights with the initial 
application. The damage sustained by the ventral stabilizer precluded the aircraft 
from flying again in the near future. Consequently, the Air Force directed Martin 
to remove the ablator so that it could return the aircraft to North American for 
inspection and repair. NASA technicians under the direction of a Martin engineer, 
however, performed the actual removal. The technicians removed the MA-25S-1 
strips from the service panel peripheries, cleaned the panel edges, and then ap-
plied polyethylene tape to protect the aircraft interior from contamination. They 
stripped the ablator layer using plexiglass scrapers and scrubbed the surface to 
358 Ibid, pp. 7-75.
359 Ibid, p. 77.
360 John V. Becker, “The X-5 Program in Retrospect,” 3rd Eugen Sänger Memorial Lecture at the Deutsch Ge-
aellschaft Fur Luftfahrforschung, Bonn, Germany, 5 December 968); interview with Jack Koll, 28 February 977 
(interviewer not noted). Transcript in the files at the DFRC History Office.
36 Martin Marietta report MCR-68-5, pp. 77.
362 Ibid, pp. 7-75.
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remove all residual ablator material. The final cleaning was performed with alu-
minum wool and nylon pads with powdered cleanser, and wooden toothpicks 
proved useful for dislodging the ablator material from skin gaps and the heads of 
permanent fasteners.363 
 NASA sent X-15A-2 to North American for repair and general maintenance. 
The airplane returned to Edwards on 27 June 1968, and a series of nondestructive 
load and thermal tests on the instrumented right wing began on 15 July in the FRC 
High Temperature Loads Calibration Laboratory. As it turned out, the airplane 
would never fly again.364 
 Some of the problems encountered with the ablator were non-representative 
of possible future uses. North American had designed the X-15 with an uninsulat-
ed hot structure, but researchers expected to design any future vehicle with a more 
conventional airframe that would eliminate some of the problems encountered on 
this flight. However, other problems were very real. The amount of time it took to 
apply the ablator was unacceptable. Even considering that after they gained some 
experience the technicians could cut the application time in half or even more, the 
six weeks it took to coat the relatively small X-15 bode ill for larger vehicles.365 
  
363 Ibid, pp. 20-2.
36 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 7 July 968, p. . In the files at the 
DFRC History Office.
365 Dennis R. Jenkins, Space Shuttle: The History of the National Space Transportation System–The First 100 Flights 
(North Branch, MN: Specialty Press, 200), pp. 60-62.
This is the ventral stabilizer after Flight 2-53-97; the ramjet had fallen off  during landing. The X-15A-2 
skin sustained major damage due to the excessively high heating in the shock impingement, which burned 
through at the leading edge and on the sides of  the ventral at the torque box assembly. This also damaged 
the torque box and destroyed the wiring and pressure lines in the forward compartment. (NASA)
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 The use of an ablative coating on X-15A-2 came at an interesting time. The 
development of what became the space shuttle was just beginning, with various 
study efforts being initiated under the auspices of NASA and the Air Force. It 
was obvious that some sort of reusable thermal protection system was going to be 
required on a space shuttle, and a great deal of attention initially turned to abla-
tives because they were the most mature technology available at the time. The 
experience with the X-15 provided very meaningful insights into the problems 
that the space shuttle undoubtedly would have encountered using this technology. 
Nevertheless, various contractors continued to propose the use of ablators on their 
space shuttle concepts, in decreasing quantity, until 1970 when several forms of 
ceramic tiles and metal “shingles” became the preferred concepts. Based at least 
partially on the results of the X-15 tests, the space shuttle program decided to go 
down a different road; whether that road was truly superior is open to debate. At 
least it represented a different set of problems.
Tragedy
 At 10:30:07.4 on 15 November 1967, X-15-3 dropped away from the NB-52B 
45,000 feet over Delamar Dry Lake. Major Michael J. Adams was at the con-
trols, making his seventh X-15 flight. Adams had spent slightly over 23 hours in 
the fixed-base simulator practicing this particular mission (3-67-95), which was 
This is the nose of  X-15A-2 after Flight 2-53-97. NASA had replaced the ball nose before this 
flight because of  a maintenance issue, and had used an outdated batch of  MA-25S to patch the area 
because it was all that was available. Although its application characteristics, cure rate, and appearance 
were the same as the “fresh” ablator used elsewhere, thermal exposure resulted in a greater shrink rate 
than the newer material. This produced much more pronounced fissuring , but analysis indicated that 
the ablator provided sufficient protection, despite appearances. (NASA) 
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intended to evaluate the Ames boost guidance display and conduct several ex-
periments, including measuring the ultraviolet plume of rocket exhausts at high 
altitude. About 1 minute after launch, as X-15-3 passed through 85,000 feet, an 
electrical disturbance caused the MH-96 dampers to trip out. It was later deter-
mined the disturbance most probably had emanated from electrical arcing in the 
experiment in the nose of the right wing-tip pod that was being flown for the first 
time. Adams reset the dampers and continued.366 
 As planned, Adams switched the cockpit sideslip attitude indicator to an alter-
nate display mode. One of the more controversial aspects of the attitude indicator 
was a second use for the cross-pointers, which were developed late in the program 
to allow precise pointing of several experiments. In this mode the cross-pointers 
displayed vernier attitude errors (pitch error on the alpha needle, and bank error 
on the beta needle). A switch allowed the pilot to control the display mode. During 
the climb, the pilot switched the display to the vernier-attitude-error mode, and 
would normally have switched back to the sideslip mode prior to reentry.367 
 Unlike the other two airplanes, X-15-3 automatically blended the ballistic 
control-system thrusters with the aerodynamic controls as needed using the right 
side stick, allowing the pilot to largely ignore the dedicated ballistic controller on 
the left. The electrical disturbances fooled the flight-control system into believing 
that the dynamic pressure was higher than it actually was, resulting in the system 
failing to engage the ballistic control system as would normally occur at high 
altitude. Adams felt the lack of response as the airplane approached maximum 
altitude and began using the left side stick to operate the thrusters. Unfortunately, 
Adams reverted to flying the vertical needle on the attitude indicator as if it were 
still showing sideslip instead of its actual vernier-attitude-error display.368 
 Pete Knight was NASA-1 on the ground. As the X-15 climbed after engine 
shutdown, Adams initiated a wing-rocking maneuver to sweep the ultraviolet 
plume experiment up and down across the horizon. Because Adams was appar-
ently interpreting the attitude indicator incorrectly, he began rocking the wings 
excessively. After Adams stopped the wing rocking, the X-15 began to drift to-
ward its peak altitude, flying with a 15-degree sideslip to the right. As Adams 
descended, the drift began again and X-15-3 yawed at a right angle to the flight 
path. The airplane entered a hypersonic spin as it encountered rapidly increasing 
dynamic pressure at 130,000 feet.369  
 The designers of the NASA control room had not thought to provide a head-
ing indication, so the controllers were unaware of the attitude of the airplane. 
Everybody knew the ball nose did not accurately align with the relative wind at 
altitudes above 250,000 feet, so there was little concern when the angle of attack 
and angle of sideslip began drifting off nominal values near peak altitude. In real-
ity, the airplane was yawing wildly, eventually turning completely around. Fifteen 
366 Donald R. Bellman et al., NASA report (no number), “Investigation of the Crash of the X-5-3 Aircraft on Novem-
ber 5, 967,” January 968, pp. 8-5, and 25; e-mail, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 26 July 2002; 
radio transcript for flight 3-65-97; 
367 E-mails, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 August and 20 November 2002.
368 Bellman, “Investigation of the Crash,” p. ; e-mails, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 26 July and 23 
November 2002; e-mail, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 20 November 2002.
369 Bellman, “Investigation of the Crash,” pp. 8-5; letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 August 2002. To 
date, this is the only hypersonic spin that has been encountered during manned flight research. 
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seconds later Adams reported that the airplane “seems squirrelly” and at 1034 
hours he advised, “I’m in a spin, Pete.” Adams radioed again, “I’m in a spin,” 
followed by groans as the pilot was subjected to heavy accelerations. Engineers 
knew very little about the hypersonic spin characteristics of the X-15, and there 
was no recommended spin recovery technique.370  
 Realizing that X-15-3 would never make it back to Rogers Dry Lake, the 
chase pilots–Hugh M. Jackson and Bill Dana–shoved their F-104s into after-
burner and raced for Ballarat and Cuddeback, the most likely emergency landing 
lakes. In the X-15, Adams used the combined power of the aerodynamic and bal-
listic controls against the spin. Eventually, largely through a weathervane effect, 
the airplane recovered at 120,000 feet and 140 psf . It then entered an inverted 
Mach 4.7 dive at an angle of nearly 45 degrees. At this point, it looked like Adams 
might pull out of the dive. However, a technical problem emerged as the MH-96 
entered a limit-cycle oscillation when the airplane emerged from the spin. This 
prevented the system from reducing the pitch gain in response to the increasing 
dynamic pressure. While descending at over 2,700 fps, the X-15 began to exhibit 
an increasingly severe rapid pitching motion. The severe oscillations in the flight-
control system effectively blocked pilot inputs. As it passed through 65,000 feet, 
X-15-3 was descending in an inverted dive at Mach 3.93 and approaching both the 
side-load and normal-load limits. At 1034:57.5, the airplane broke up at approxi-
370 Radio transcript for flight 3-65-97; Bellman, “Investigation of the Crash,” pp.  and 8-5.
At 10:30:07.4 on 15 November 1967, X-15-3 dropped away from the NB-52B 45,000 feet over 
Delamar Dry Lake with Major Michael J. Adams at the controls. Technical problems combined with 
possible piloting issues caused the X-15-3 to break-up at approximately 62,000 feet with a veloc-
ity of  about 3,800 fps and a dynamic pressure of  1,300 psf. The wreckage fell near Johannesburg , 
California. (NASA)
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mately 62,000 feet with a velocity of about 3,800 fps and a dynamic pressure of 
1,300 psf. An Air Force pilot spotted the wreckage near the town of Johannesburg. 
Mike Adams was dead, and X-15-3 was destroyed.371  
 The Air Force and NASA convened an accident board. It took two months 
for the board, chaired by Donald R . Bellman, to prepare its report. During the 
investigation, personnel searched for additional pieces of wreckage, especially the 
film from the cockpit camera. The weekend after the accident, an unofficial search 
party from the FRC found the cockpit camera but not the film cartridge. Since the 
film cassette was lighter than the camera, engineers theorized that the cassette must 
have been blown north by winds at altitude. A search party organized by Victor 
Horton converged on the area on 29 November, and Willard E . Dives found the 
cassette. The film was flown to the EG&G laboratory in Boston for processing. 
37 Bellman, “Investigation of the Crash,” pp. 3-32.
Mike Adams flew the X-15 for 13 months from 6 October 1966 until 15 November 1967, making 
seven flights. All of  these were with the XLR99 engine and he reached Mach 5.59, a maximum speed 
of  3,822 mph, and an altitude of  266,000 feet. Adams died on Flight 3-65-97. The Air Force 
posthumously awarded Mike Adams an astronaut rating for his last flight in X-15-3, which had at-
tained an altitude of  266,000 feet (50.38 miles). This was the only fatality during the program’s 199 
flights. (NASA)
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 Johnny Armstrong and Jack Kolf began analyzing the cockpit film when it 
returned. Armstrong later recalled, “We had the time history from the flight re-
corded in the control room. We could see the vertical needle on the attitude indi-
cator in the film and correlated the time of the film and the recorded time history. 
It became clear to us that the pilot was making manual ballistic inputs as if the 
vertical needle was sideslip rather than roll angle. His inputs were in the correct 
direction to make sideslip zero if it had been sideslip. However since it was roll 
angle his inputs drove the nose further from away from the flight path and eventu-
ally into … a spin.”372 
 The accident board concluded that Adams misinterpreted his instruments, and 
combined with distraction and possible vertigo, this led him to allow the heading 
of the X-15-3 to deviate unexpectedly. The overall effectiveness of the MH-96 
had been degraded by the electrical disturbance early in the flight, further adding 
to the pilot’s workload . The MH-96 then caused the airplane to break up . The 
board made two major recommendations: install a telemetered heading indicator 
in the control room, visible to the flight controller, and medically screen X-15 
pilot candidates for labyrinth (vertigo) sensitivity. Because of the crash, NASA 
added an attitude indicator in the control room to display real-time heading, pitch, 
roll, sideslip, and angle-of-attack information. Although it was not specifically 
called out in the accident report, many engineers came away with a more impor-
tant lesson: do not use the same instrument to display multiple different indica-
tions in a high-workload or high-stress environment.373  
 The Air Force posthumously awarded Mike Adams an astronaut rating for his 
last flight in X-15-3, which had attained an altitude of 266,000 feet (50.38 miles). 
This was the only fatality that occurred during the program’s 199 flights.374 
 
Almost the End
 On 13 October 1960, the government established the Aeronautics and Astro-
nautics Coordinating Board (AACB) to coordinate various activities between the 
Department of Defense and NASA. The deputy administrator of NASA and the 
assistant secretary of the DDR&E served as cochairmen of the AACB; initially 
this meant Hugh Dryden and Herbert F. York, respectively. In an indirect way, the 
Research Airplane Committee that was created in 1954 to manage the X-15 pro-
gram fell under the auspices of the AACB. However, given that the X-15 program 
existed prior to the creation of the AACB, the board had little direct impact on 
the program. The Research Airplane Committee continued to function much as it 
always had until sometime in 1965.375 
  
372 E-mail, Johnny G. Armstrong to Dennis R. Jenkins, 26 July 2002.
373 Bellman, Investigation of the Crash, pp. 8-5.
37 Aeronautical order 30, awarding the rating of command pilot astronaut to Major Michael J. Adams, 5 November 
967. In the author’s collection. 
375 Interview, Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., by Martin Collins, 5 December 988, electronic transcript available at 
http://www.nasm.si.edu/nasm/dsh/trasncpt/seaman10.htm, accessed 25 April 2002. The AACB also oversaw 
the Manned Spacecraft Panel, Unmanned Spaceflight Panel, Launch Vehicle Panel, Spaceflight Ground Environ-
ment Panel, and Supporting Space Research and Technology Panel. 
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 The AACB Aeronautics Panel began discussing the issue of continued fund-
ing for the X-15 in early 1966. Charles W. Harper from NASA made a good case 
for continuing Air Force funding for the X-15 since both the HRE and delta-wing 
projects were of potential value to the Air Force as well as to NASA . Both proj-
ects were part of a joint national hypersonics program organized in May 1965 by 
John Becker from NASA Langley and R. E. Supp from the Air Force Systems 
Command. Becker and Supp made a presentation to the Aeronautics Panel on 13 
June 1966 showing that the HRE and delta-wing projects would be the principal 
users of the X-15 after the end of 1967, although a number of other experiments 
also continued . After a brief discussion, the Aeronautics Panel endorsed these 
projects and recommended that the AACB develop a cost-sharing plan that would 
allow the X-15 program to continue.376 
 The next meeting of the AACB on 5 July 1966, in fact, would influence the 
X-15 program greatly, but not the way the Aeronautics Panel had expected. In-
stead, the meeting essentially defined the date the X-15 program would end. In 
rejecting the recommendation of the Aeronautics Panel, the AACB indicated that 
the two most important approved Air Force experiments (20 and 24) would con-
clude at the end of 1967, and the AACB saw little need for continued Air Force 
support of the program past that date. Beginning on 1 January 1968, the program 
would become the responsibility of NASA exclusively.377  
 Rather quickly, however, it became apparent that the planned completion of 
the two Air Force experiments would run well into 1968. Consequently, at the 
24 August 1967 meeting of the AACB, the participants attempted to work out 
some compromise that would allow the X-15 program to continue. The agree-
ment changed little on the surface. From a monetary perspective, NASA agreed 
to begin funding the sustaining engineering contracts the Air Force maintained 
with North American, Reaction Motors, and the other original contractors. Both 
agencies concluded it was easier to allow the Air Force contracts to continue than 
to terminate them and restart them as NASA contracts. Instead, NASA would 
reimburse the Air Force for the cost of the contracts. The FRC agreed to continue 
its maintenance responsibilities for the airplanes and most of their systems, while 
the AFFTC agreed to continue maintenance of the carrier aircraft, rocket engines, 
and other systems it had been responsible for.378  
 The largest change was the dissolution of the Research Airplane Committee 
that had guided the X-15 program since the signing of the original 1954 memo-
randum of understanding. The X-15 Joint Operations Committee and the X-15 
Joint Program Coordinating Committee that had reported to the Research Air-
plane Committee would now report to the Aeronautics Panel of the AACB.379 
 All in attendance agreed the X-15 program would continue at least through 
the middle of 1968. How long the program would continue after that depended 
upon the status of the Air Force experiments and the NASA funding situation. On 
26 October 1967, the Air Force and NASA signed a new memorandum of under-
376 Minutes of the Meeting, AACB Aeronautics Panel, 3 June 966.
377 Memorandum for Dr. John S. Foster and Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., prepared by Thomas C. Muse (Assistant 
Director OSD, DDR&E) and Charles W. Harper (Deputy Administrator, OART), 26 October 967.
378 Ibid.
379 Ibid.
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standing, replacing the original 1954 MoU that had governed the X-15 program 
for 13 years. Charles W. Harper (NASA deputy associate administrator for the 
Office of Advanced Research and Technology) worked with Thomas C. Muse 
(assistant director OSD, DDR&E) to get the new agreement signed by Dr. John 
S . Foster (director, DDR&E) and Dr . Robert C . Seamans, Jr. (NASA deputy ad-
ministrator). The new MoU reestablished Air Force responsibility for X-15 costs, 
and spelled out the specific responsibilities of the two organizations. However, 
instead of ending with a statement of national priority, the new MoU contained 
the ominous proviso, “funds permitting.” To most NASA managers, this meant 
that NASA would still have to face up to the total funding of the X-15 program as 
soon as the last two Air Force experiments ended.380  
 Charles Harper and his boss at the Office of Advanced Research and Technol-
ogy, Mac Adams, made one last effort to find funds for the program during the 
fall of 1967. They solicited help from the NASA Office of Manned Spaceflight 
(OMSF) because both the HRE and the delta-wing projects would produce new 
technology for the Space Shuttle. The attempt failed, however, because the OMSF 
was already having trouble promoting the space shuttle concept and did not want to 
add to its problems by supporting a potentially attractive-sounding alternative.381 
 The accident involving Mike Adams underscored the concerns long ex-
pressed privately by Paul Bikle and others regarding the high costs and risks as-
sociated with extending the X-15 program. In the discussions that followed the 
accident, Bikle convincingly speculated on the enormous costs of the HRE flight 
program involving years of delay in getting started, malfunctions, and repairs. In 
December 1967, the Air Force and NASA both agreed to abandon the HRE flight 
program and to terminate the X-15 program at the end of 1968. On 13 March 1968 
the Air Force announced that it would allow its X-15 funding to expire at the end 
of the year, but that it would continue to support flight tests to the “completion of 
Air Force IR [24] and WTR [20] experiments.”382 
 NASA allocated $1,500,000 for X-15 operations in FY68, with the Air Force 
contributing another $777,000. It appeared the program could save $150,000 
by not returning X-15A-2 to flight status, and by flying a minimum number of 
other flights using X-15-1. The first six months of 1969 would require approxi-
mately $400,000 to catalog and dispose of spare parts, ground equipment, and 
prepare the two remaining vehicles for shipment to museums. The X-15 program 
would transfer some parts and ground equipment to other programs, and scrap 
the remainder.383 
 
380 Ibid.
38 John V. Becker, “A Hindsight Study of the NASA Hypersonic Research Engine Project,”  July 976, p. 27. Pre-
pared under contract NAS-250, but never published. Copy in the author’s collection.
382 Ibid; “X-5 Program,” a briefing prepared by the AFFTC in late October 968. In the files at the AFFTC History Of-
fice. Although this statement indicated that the WTR experiment was #28, in reality it appears to have been #20.
383 “X-5 Program.”
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1968 FLIGHT PERIOD
 The X-15 program would only fly another eight missions. During 1968, Bill 
Dana and Pete Knight took turns flying X-15-1 . However, even within NASA, not 
everyone was certain the flights were worth the risk and $600,000 cost.384  
 X-15A-2 returned to Edwards on 27 June 1968. On 15 July, a series of non-
destructive load and thermal tests began on the instrumented right wing in the 
FRC High Temperature Loads Calibration Laboratory. The airplane would remain 
grounded forever.385 
 Nevertheless, during the first part of 1968 the AFFTC and FRC worked to-
gether to see if there was sufficient interest to extend the program. By October 
1968, they had surveyed the current users of the airplane and potential future 
researchers, and found some programs that could likely benefit from the X-15 
being available. Two of the Air Force experiments (20 and 24) might need more 
time, especially the WTR launch monitoring, which would require extraordinary 
luck to get the X-15-1 and an ICBM in the air at the same moment. The groups 
investigating the impingement heating on the last flight of X-15A-2 also would 
have been happy to keep that airplane flying, since they had little other means of 
conducting experiments to understand the problem.386 
 Technically, NASA had already canceled the HRE flight program, but most 
everybody acknowledged that the ramjet experiments could also benefit from 
flight testing. However, NASA was a bit gun-shy after the bad experience on 
X-15A-2, and the flight ramjet development was running well behind schedule. 
Several other programs within the defense community were studying advanced 
propulsion concepts (ramjets, turbo-ramjets, or similar engines), and most of them 
potentially could have used the X-15 as a platform if it was still flying. There was 
even some talk about reviving the delta-wing concept that had been canceled after 
the loss of X-15-3 .387 
 Despite this minor interest, in the end the AFFTC report concluded that “no 
known overpowering technological benefits will be lost if [the X-15] program 
ends on 31 December 1968.” It noted that there was a firm requirement for the 
completion of the two Air Force experiments, and that “many USAF/USN tech-
nological activities [were] underway or planned for the Mach 4-6 regime,” but the 
report failed to identify any specific requirements for the use of the small black 
airplanes. It noted that “the future value of the X-15 as a hypersonic test capabil-
ity should be more evident by mid-late 1969” and that the “option to use X-15 
resources after 1969 should be protected.”388 
  
38 USAF headquarters development directive no. 32, 5 March 96, reprinted in System Package Program, Sys-
tem 653A, 8 May 96, p. 3-7; memorandum, John V. Becker and R. E. Supp, subject: Report of meeting 
of USAF/NASA working groups on hypersonic aircraft technology, 2-22 September 966; James E. Love and 
William R. Young, NASA technical note D-3732, “Survey of Operation and Cost Experience of the X-5 Airplane 
as a Reusable Space Vehicle,” November 966, pp. 7.
385 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 7 July 968, p. . 
386 “X-5 Program.”
387 Ibid.
388 Ibid.
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 Bill Dana completed the 199th—and as it turned out the last–X-15 flight, 
reaching Mach 5.38 and 255,000 feet on 24 October 1968. The program made 
10 attempts to launch the 200th flight, but maintenance and weather problems 
forced cancellation every time. The attempt on 12 December actually got air-
borne (1-A-142), but the X-15 inertial system failed before launch. On 20 De-
cember 1968, things looked dismal, but everybody geared up for an attempt. Bill 
Dana began taxiing an F-104 for a weather flight, but John Manke noted that 
snow was falling–at Edwards! Manke recalled Dana before he took off and can-
celed the mission. Later that afternoon, technicians at the FRC demated X-15-1 
from the NB-52A for the last time. After nearly 10 years of flight operations, the 
X-15 program ended.389 
 By the end of the program, the two remaining airplanes were tired. In ab-
solute terms, they were still young airframes–just 10 years old and with only 
about 10 flight hours each. The total free-flight time for all three airplanes was 
only 30 hours, 14 minutes, and 57 seconds. Even counting all the time spent 
under the wing of the two NB-52s, the total barely reached 400 hours. Despite 
early Air Force estimates of 300–500 flights, that had not been the original idea. 
Bob Hoey remembers asking North American project aerodynamicist Edwin W. 
“Bill” Johnston how long North American expected the airplanes to last. Johnston 
responded that the company had “expected that each airplane would only see 5 
or 6 exposures to the design missions [i.e., Mach 6 or 250,000 feet].” They did 
much better.390 
 The X-15s accumulated much more flight time than most of the high-perfor-
mance X-planes, and the environment they flew in was certainly extreme. They 
frequently experienced dynamic pressures as high as 2,000 psf, and as low as 
(essentially) 0 psf. The airframes endured accelerations ranging from –2.5 g to 
over +8.0 g. Temperatures varied from –245°F to over 1,200°F. It had been a 
rough life.
 In addition, NASA tested the airplanes–a lot. After each flight, NASA re-
moved, disassembled, and thoroughly checked almost every system. Then each 
was reinstalled and tested some more. If the technicians noted any anomalies they 
made the appropriate repairs and retested. Milt Thompson wrote, “[M]y personal 
opinion is that we wore the airplanes out testing them in preparation for flight.” 
The space shuttle would suffer much the same fate.391 
 It is interesting to note that although the X-15 is generally considered a Mach 
6 aircraft, only two of the three airplanes ever exceeded Mach 6, and then only 
four times. On the other hand, 108 flights exceeded Mach 5 (not including the four 
Mach 6 flights), accumulating 1 hour and 25 minutes of hypersonic flight. At the 
other end of the spectrum, only two flights were not supersonic (one of these was 
the first glide flight), and 14 others did not exceed Mach 2. It was a fast airplane. 
 
389 USAF Headquarters development directive no. 32, 5 March 96, reprinted in System Package Program, Sys-
tem 653A, 8 May 96, p. 3-7; memorandum, John V. Becker and R. E. Supp, subject: Report of meeting 
of USAF/NASA working groups on hypersonic aircraft technology, 2-22 September 966; James E. Love and 
William R. Young, NASA technical note D-3732, “Survey of Operation and Cost Experience of the X-5 Airplane 
as a Reusable Space Vehicle,” November 966, pp. 7.
390 Letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 August 2002.
39 Thompson, At the Edge of Space, p. 223.
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Similarly, there were only four flights above 300,000 feet (all by X-15-3), but only 
the initial glide flight was below 40,000 feet.392 
Final Dispositions
 In November 1968, William P. Albrecht and Vincent N . Capasso inspected 
X-15A-2, which had been in storage at the FRC since the completion of the ther-
mal tests. The engineers determined what work would be needed to prepare the 
aircraft for display in a museum, or to return it to flight status if necessary. As the 
airplane stood, it was missing control surfaces, most of its cockpit displays, and 
the removable right outer wing panel. All of the pieces were stored nearby.393 
 A cursory inspection of the airplane showed signs of minor corrosion in un-
protected areas, and the engineers believed the aircraft needed “a thorough inspec-
tion for corrosion with cleaning and repainting as required. A lubrication would 
be accomplished at the same time to protect moving surfaces …. This would take 
two men approximately 2 to 4 weeks to accomplish.”394 
 To restore the vehicle to flight status, the engineers believed three to four 
months of work would be required, including installing the engine plumbing, 
control surfaces, actuators, and SAS pump. All of the wiring would have to be 
checked and the hydraulic system would need servicing. In addition, the instru-
ment panel would have to be installed and the landing gear made flight-ready. If 
the airplane went to a museum, the engineers thought that some items (mainly 
bars to replace the control surface actuators) would have to be fabricated. A rough 
estimate included three people for a month to prepare the airplane for display, plus 
time to paint and stencil the exterior.395 
 Officially, the X-15 program simply “expired” at the end of its authorized 
funding on 31 December 1968. After the New Year holiday, things began to hap-
pen quickly. Between the Apollo program and the increasing tempo of the air war 
in Southeast Asia, neither NASA nor the Air Force seemed particularly interested 
in the small black airplanes that were stored in the High-Temperature Loads Cali-
bration Laboratory at the FRC. 
 On 4 January 1969, officials at Edwards formally requested reassignment in-
structions for the two remaining X-15 airplanes. A response came on 20 February 
directing that the “number one X-15 be made available for display in the Smith-
sonian Museum. The Smithsonian is prepared to receive the X-15 and it may be 
transported to Andrews as soon as it is ready for shipment. In order to protect 
the option of any future flight test program, extreme care should be taken in han-
dling the X-15 so that it will not be altered or damaged. The Air Force Museum 
should retain accountability for the aircraft and reassign it to the Smithsonian for 
 
392 At the 3rd Eugen Sänger Memorial Lecture in 968, John Becker stated that 09 flights exceeded Mach 5. A 
reevaluation of the flight data shows that only 08 actually did. See John V. Becker, “The X-5 Program in Retro-
spect,” 3rd Eugen Sänger Memorial Lecture at the Deutsch Geaellschaft Fur Luftfahrforschung, Bonn, Germany, 
5 December 968, p. 3 for Becker’s original numbers.
393 Memorandum, William P. Albrecht and Vincent N. Spasso to James E. Love/X-5 Program Manager, subject: 
Status of X-5A-2,  November 968. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
39 Ibid.
395 Ibid.
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display.” A later message directed NASA to transfer X-15A-2 to the Air Force 
Museum at Wright-Patterson AFB.396 
 A meeting on 7 January 1969 at North American discussed how best to dis-
pose of the remaining program assets for which North American still had respon-
sibility. Unlike many programs that require the contractor to account for every 
pencil purchased with government funds, the X-15 ended much more casually. 
For instance, the “contractor was advised … that no physical inventory of X-15 
assets will be required,” and that the North American working inventory would be 
“accepted by the Air Force as the formal X-15 inventory record.” The Air Force 
justified this casual attitude by noting that “(a) it is a research type program, (b) 
the last physical inventory was taken less than a year ago, (c) [it is] in the interest 
of program economy.” Nevertheless, North American had to assign class codes 
(indicating how to dispose of the item) to some 9,000 line items having a mon-
etary value in excess of $6,000,000.397 
 On 18 March 1969, the public affairs officer at the FRC wrote to his coun-
terpart at NASA Headquarters. The opening paragraph was telling: “Sometime 
this spring, probably May, the number one X-15 will go into the Smithsonian. 
Because of the haste of the announcements and Apollo 8, the world didn’t seem to 
care much when the program was concluded last December. I’d like to see if we 
can’t remind the world about the X-15 and use the Smithsonian as an excuse.”398 
 The Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum (NASM) had 
begun its efforts to acquire an X-15 as early as 1962, but nothing was likely to 
happen as long as the flight program continued. After the funding expired, the 
Air Force agreed to lend X-15-1 to NASM for two years. NASA partially disas-
sembled X-15-1, loaded it onto a flatbed trailer, and flew it to Andrews AFB inside 
an Air Force transport. On 13 May 1969, a truck moved X-15-1 from Andrews 
to the Silver Hill Facility (later the Paul E. Garber Facility) in Maryland. After 
some minor refurbishment, the Smithsonian installed the X-15 near the original 
1903 Wright Flyer on the floor in the north hall of the Arts and Industries build-
ing, which housed the NASM at the time. On 7 July 1971, the Air Force officially 
transferred ownership of X-15-1 to the NASM, which subsequently loaned the 
airplane to the FAA for display at Transpo 72 in the spring of 1972. The airplane 
then traveled to the FRC to help commemorate its 25th anniversary. The NASA 
loan was effective for one year beginning in August 1972, but ultimately was 
extended until the summer of 1975. The X-15 returned to the Smithsonian for 
installation in the new NASM building on the mall before it opened to the public 
 
 
 
 
396 TWX 63236Z Jan 69, subject: Termination XB-70, X-5 program,  January 969. This TWX also requested 
instruction for the reassignment of the remaining XB-70A (62-000); TWX 2020Z Feb 69, subject: Transfer of 
X-5 SN56-6670 to the Smithsonian Museum. Both in the files at the DFRC History Office.
397 Meeting minutes, “Disposition of Those X-5 Program Assets for which NR has Accountability,” 7 January 969. 
At this point North American Aviation had become North American Rockwell (usually abbreviated NAR, but only 
NR here).
398 Letter, Ralph B. Jackson/FRC to Joseph A. Stein/NASA Headquarters, 8 March 969. In the files at the NASA 
History Office.
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on 1 July 1976. X-15-1 currently hangs in the Milestones of Flight Gallery at the 
NASM in Washington, D.C.399  
 X-15A-2, completely refurbished after its unhappy experience with the abla-
tive coatings, became the property of the National Museum of the United States 
Air Force at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. However, prior to the airplane arriving 
in Ohio, the museum loaned it to the Alabama Space and Rocket Center in Hunts-
ville (now the U.S. Space & Rocket Center). The airplane arrived on a one-year 
loan on 27 March 1970, although for some reason the Air Force did not installed 
the right wing while the airplane was in Huntsville. The airplane now sits—in 
black Inconel finish—in the Presidential and Research & Development Galleries 
of the National Museum of the United States Air Force. A set of external tanks and 
a dummy ramjet are part of the display. 
 The Air Force buried the remains of X-15-3 at an undisclosed location on 
the Edwards reservation. In 1991 the Astronaut Memorial at the Kennedy Space 
Center, Florida, added Mike Adam’s name, a tacit reminder of an oft-forgotten 
manned space program.400 
 The two NB-52s remained at Edwards to support the heavyweight-lifting-
body program. Not long after the end of the lifting-body program, NASA retired 
the NB-52A to the Pima Air & Space Museum outside Tucson, Arizona. The 
NB-52B continued to serve as a carrier aircraft, launching the X-38 and X-43 
vehicles, through the beginning of 2005. NASA finally received a B-52H in mid-
2005 to serve as a carrier aircraft, but a lack of requirements resulted in the air-
plane returning to the Air Force in 2006. At the time of its retirement, the NB-52B 
was the oldest operational (and lowest flight time) B-52 in the Air Force.401 
CORRECTING AN OVERSIGHT
 On 23 August 2005, 40 years of aerospace controversy ended. For years, 
many aviation historians and enthusiasts had questioned why the Air Force pilots 
who flew the X-15 to altitudes above 50 miles received astronaut ratings, while 
the NASA pilots who accomplished the same feat in the same airplanes did not. 
The answer came on a small stage at the DFRC when Navy Captain Kent V . 
Romminger, chief of the NASA Astronaut Office at the Johnson Space Center, 
presented certificates proclaiming three NASA test pilots as astronauts. NASA ad-
ministrator Shawn O’Keefe authorized the recognition, and Romminger, associate 
administrator for the Space Operations Mission Directorate William F. Readdy, 
and DFRC director Kevin L. Peterson signed the certificates. The purposefully 
 
399 E-mail, F. Robert van der Linden/X-5 curator for the NASM to Dennis R. Jenkins, 6 May 2002. It is not unusual 
for the NASM to begin the process of obtaining a significant vehicle much earlier than would seem appropriate. 
For instance, they began attempts to acquire the Space Shuttle Columbia as early as 982, barely a year after it 
had made its first flight.
00 The author played a key role in getting Mike Adams placed on the memorial.
0 NASA DFRC press release 02-2, “ NASA’s Historic B-52B and ‘New’ B-52H Participating in 50th Anniversary 
Activities,  April 2002.
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small ceremony was a private moment for a very special group of men and 
their families.402 
 In the late 1960s, these three men–William H. Dana, John B. McKay, and Jo-
seph A . Walker–had piloted the X-15 to altitudes in excess of 50 miles. Although 
five of their colleagues had received Air Force astronaut ratings for similar ac-
complishments, NASA had never recognized the three civilian pilots. Now, 40 
years after the fact, the agency did. Only Bill Dana was still alive to receive his 
certificate, and to have his wife, Judy, place the blue and gold name tag with the 
astronaut wings emblem on his flight jacket. However, almost the entire McKay 
and Walker families were on hand to receive the tribute. Joe Walker, who always 
had a smile on his face, was the first human being to fly into space twice; now his 
son has a set of astronaut wings to proudly display. On hand to honor their col-
leagues were three former X-15 pilots: Joe H. Engle, who after his X-15 flights 
became the only person to fly the space shuttle back from orbit under manual 
control; Robert M . White, perhaps the least known of the test pilots (odd con-
sidering he was the first person to fly to Mach 4, Mach 5, and Mach 6, as well 
 
02 Personal experience of the author, who had the privilege of being present at the ceremony.
In August 2005, NASA finally recognized three NASA pilots who had flown over 50 miles altitude 
but had not received astronaut wings like their military counterparts. Three former X-15 pilots joined in 
the ceremony. From left, Robert M White, William H. Dana (proudly wearing the new wings on his flight 
jacket),  Neil A. Armstrong, and Joe H. Engle. The families of  Jack McKay and Joe Walker were pres-
ent to accept their astronaut wings from Kent Romminger, the Chief  of  the Astronaut Office. (NASA)
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as the first person to fly to 200,000 feet and then to 300,000 feet; Bob still holds 
the world absolute-altitude record at 314,750 feet); and Neil A. Armstrong, who 
needed little introduction. Unfortunately, Scott Crossfield could not attend due to 
previous commitments. There was not a dry eye in the house.403  
03 Oddly, although the recognition of the three X-5 pilots was authorized by one NASA administrator (Sean O’Keefe) 
and recognized publicly by his successor (Mike Griffin), and the certificates were signed by the head of the Astro-
naut Office, the associate administrator for Space Flight, and the Dryden Center director, the JSC Public Affairs 
Department refused to concede that astronauts can come from anywhere but Houston (an example of the small 
minds of bureaucrats in action).

The Research Program
Because the research program was the rationale for the X-15’s existence, 
flights to obtain basic aero-thermo data began as soon as North American and the 
government were sure the airplane was relatively safe for its intended purpose. 
Nevertheless, almost from the beginning, the airplanes carried a few minor ex-
periments that had little to do with its basic aero-thermo research objectives; the 
B-70 emission coating and a radiation detector were early examples. Still, the first 
couple of years of the flight program were primarily dedicated to expanding the 
flight envelope and obtaining the basic data needed by aerodynamicists to validate 
the wind-tunnel predictions and theoretical models used to build the X-15. 
 As this goal was increasingly satisfied, more X-15 flights carried unrelated 
experiments, such as tests of ablative materials and star trackers for the Apollo 
program. Usually these experiments required little support from the X-15 itself, 
other than some power and recording capacity. Later in the program, flights be-
gan to be conducted for the sole purpose of supporting the “follow-on” experi-
ments, although even these usually gathered aero-thermo or stability and control 
data to support continued evaluation. In reality, the X-15 as an experiment ended 
sometime in 1963 (except for the advanced X-15A-2); after that, the airplane was 
mostly a carrier for other experiments.

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RESEARCH INSTRUMENTATION
 Previous X-planes had recorded all of the research data onboard, mainly be-
cause telemetry systems were in a very early state of development and bandwidth 
was very limited. Nevertheless, several earlier programs did telemeter a small 
amount of data to the ground in real time. It was decided early on that all X-15 
data would continue to be recorded onboard the aircraft, although much more ex-
tensive use of telemetry would also be made. The reason for recording everything 
onboard was “to eliminate the risk of data loss and degradation inherent in radio-
frequency telemetry links.” This took on more significance for the X-15 program 
since the airplane would frequently be out of range of the antennas at Edwards, 
and would have to rely on the new and untried High Range installations at Beatty 
and Ely.1 
 Initially, the instrumentation centered on the aero-thermo environment that 
the researchers intended the X-15 to investigate. When the follow-on experiments 
began to arrive, more of the instrumentation and recording capacity shifted to 
support non-aero-thermo investigations. A group of researchers from the HSFS, 
Langley, and Lewis–with limited input from the WADC and AFFTC–came up 
with the initial requirement for between 1,000 and 1,100 data points. Per the origi-
nal specification, instrumentation was limited to 800 pounds and 40 cubic feet, 
and could use up to 2.25 kilowatts of power. The approved design included 1,050 
instrumented points (588 thermocouples, 64 strain gages, 28 control surface po-
sition indicators, 136 aerodynamic surface pressures, 22 basic flight parameters 
(angle of attack, etc.) and 212 airplane condition monitors). By contrast, the X-2 
had used only 15 thermocouples and a few electrical pressure transducers, and 
carried only 550 pounds of research instrumentation.2 
 In mid-1957, the NACA asked the Air Force to modify the X-15 specifica-
tion to double the amount of research instrumentation carried by the airplanes. 
Given that North American had already frozen the design by that time, this came 
as something of a shock. In order to keep the airplane’s weight (and hence per-
formance) from being too seriously degraded, numerous structural and subsystem 
details were redesigned to save weight.3 
 When the X-15 emerged from North American, it could carry 1,300 pounds 
of research instrumentation, the majority of which were installed in a removable 
elevator in the instrumentation compartment just aft of the cockpit. Engineers de-
signed the cabling so that they could remove the entire elevator from the airplane, 
which allowed them to perform all pre- and postflight calibrations more easily. 
Originally, the engineers intended this feature to remove the instrumentation from 
 Kenneth C. Sanderson, NASA technical memorandum X-56000, “The X-5 Flight Test Instrumentation,” 2 April 
96, pp. 2-3. A similar paper was presented by Sanderson at the Third International Flight Test Instrumentation 
Symposium in Buckinghamshire, England, 3-6 April 96; letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 
August 2002.
2 Letter, Gerald M. Truszynski to Dennis R. Jenkins, 9 May 2002; NASA technical memorandum X-56000, pp. 2-3. 
A similar paper was presented by Sanderson at the Third International Flight Test Instrumentation Symposium in 
Buckinghamshire, England, 3-6 April 96; Lieutenant Colonel Burt Rowen, “Human-Factors Support of the 
X-5 Program,” Air University Quarterly Review, Air War College, vol. X, no. , winter 958-59, pp. 3-39.
3 Scott Crossfield, Always Another Dawn: The Story of a Rocket Test Pilot (New York: The World Publishing Com-
pany, 960), pp. 263-26; telephone conversation, Charles H. Feltz to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 May 2002.
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possible ammonia contamination, but NASA seldom used it for that purpose. 
Within the airframe itself, all of the wiring and tubing were routed through the 
fuselage side tunnels.4 
 In addition to the instrumentation compartment, North American installed 
small amounts of equipment in the nose of the airplane, in a center-of-gravity 
compartment located between the oxidizer and fuel tanks, and in the rear fuselage. 
The main instrumentation compartment and the nose compartment were pres-
surized and temperature-controlled. The center-of-gravity compartment was tem-
perature-controlled but unpressurized, and the rear fuselage area was insulated 
against high temperatures but was otherwise uncontrolled. Individual instruments 
and equipment were shock-mounted or hard-mounted as necessary; hard mount-
ing was preferred because it saved weight and space.5  
 In many respects, X-15 development occurred at an awkward time. Modern 
data-processing systems were in their infancy, but they promised to offer a sub-
stantial improvement over the largely mechanical systems that had preceded them. 
However, the simple fact was that they were not ready. This forced the instrumen-
tation engineers to rely on oscillographs and precision photographic recorders for 
the aircraft instead of modern magnetic tape recorders. Most of the rationale was 
simple: these devices were available from commercial sources or from NACA 
stock, lessening the cost of an already over-budget program. The program could 
also procure and test them within the time available before the first flight. 
 However, they came with some handicaps. The time associated with process-
ing data from an oscillograph system, especially when large quantities of data 
were involved, was long and tedious compared to that required for data from 
magnetic tape systems. The instrumentation community debated this problem at 
length, but finally decided that the 15,000 data points expected to be collected 
on each flight would not result in processing times that would be detrimental to 
the planned flight schedule. It was also a fact that during 1956–1957, a costly, 
time-consuming development program would have been required to obtain a fully 
automatic magnetic tape system that could withstand the X-15 environment.6 
 Despite the “design” instrumentation list, as manufactured the first two air-
planes each had 656 thermocouples, 112 strain gages, 140 pressure sensors, and 
90 telemeter pickups. The thermocouples were 30-gage chromel-alumel leads 
that were spot-welded to the inside surface of the skin . The leads connected to 
20-gage extensions that were routed to the signal-conditioning equipment and 
recorders. The use of 20-gage extensions was necessary to reduce circuit resis-
tance in the thermocouple loops and to minimize measurement errors due to re-
sistance changes caused by the large temperature variations along the wire. Since 
the thermocouples were inaccessible after the airplanes were constructed, North 
American designed the installation to function for the life of the airplane and re-
quire no maintenance. A silicone-impregnated fiberglass braid covered the leads 
and extensions, and those in close proximity to the skin used an outer sleeve of 
 Rowen, “Human-Factors Support of the X-5 Program,” pp. 3-39; North American report NA58-90, “X-5 
Research Airplane NAA Model NA-20 Flight Test Program,”  August 958, pp. II-2 through II-3. 
5 NASA technical memorandum X-56000, “ p. . 
6 Ibid, pp. 5-6. 
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unimpregnated fiberglass. The silicone impregnation slowly sublimated during 
repeated exposure to elevated temperatures, but retained its electrical insulat-
ing properties. Its use, however, created a potential problem since tests showed 
that out-gassing could result in an explosion if the temperature quickly rose to 
1,200°F for the first time. NASA eliminated this hazard on the X-15 by gradually 
building up to the maximum Mach number during the course of the envelope-
expansion program.7  
 The first two airplanes used Bakelite strain gages, but these lost their ef-
fectiveness as structural temperatures increased. Consequently, North American 
completed X-15-3 with Micro-Dot weldable-type strain gages designed for use 
at higher temperatures. The static pressure taps consisted of 0.3125-inch-outside-
diameter tubing installed flush with the outside surface of the skin. A study was 
made of the lag effects of a tube-connected system, and it was determined that 
0.25-inch tubing with lengths as great as 40 feet was acceptable for gradual ma-
neuvers and steady-state data at altitudes up to 100,000 feet.8 
 Most of the instrumentation was located on the right side of the airplane; 
however, there were minimal corresponding sensors on the left side of the for-
ward fuselage and vertical stabilizer. Since the aircraft was largely symmetrical, 
researchers assumed the data was equally applicable to either side. Because of in-
stallation difficulties, no instrumentation was located near the integral propellant 
tanks. Similarly, North American did not initially install any pressure instrumen-
tation in the horizontal stabilizers due to the difficulty of running tubing to this 
location. However, the company did install some strain gages in the horizontal, 
with the wiring running through the pivot point. As part of a loads study late in the 
program, North American manufactured a new set of horizontal stabilizers with 
electrical pressure transducers, loads sensors, and thermocouples. Toward the end 
of the flight program, researchers also installed instrumentation in the wing-tip 
pods and ventral stabilizer on some flights.9  
 Precision NACA recorders that employed servo-repeater systems to position 
a light source on moving film recorded angle-of-attack and angle-of-sideslip data 
provided by the ball nose. Similar devices recorded the attitude-angle outputs 
from the stable platform. Electrical transducers sensed all other data. A central 
patch panel in the main instrumentation compartment collected the data, routed 
7 James E. Love (manager), “X-5 Program,” NASA FRC, October 96. pp. -5; Richard D. Banner, Albert 
E. Kuhl, and Robert D. Quinn, “Preliminary Results of Aerodynamic Heating Studies on the X-5,” a paper in 
the 1961 Research Airplane Committee Report, p. 3; Kenneth C. Sanderson, NASA technical memorandum 
X-56000, “The X-5 Flight Test Instrumentation,” 2 April 96, pp. -2. The instrumentation number varied 
widely over the course of the program and among the three airplanes. For instance, in early 96, 750 thermo-
couples were installed in X-5- (293 surface units, 9 located in the substructure, and 266 located in various 
compartments). The telemetered data included such things as control surface positions (right stabilizer, left sta-
bilizer, vertical stabilizer, upper dive brake, lower dive brake, and right wing flap [since the flaps were mechani-
cally interconnected there was no sensor on the left one]), stability augmentation system servo shaft positions 
(left/right pitch and roll, and yaw), airplane attitude (pitch, roll, and yaw–all from the stable platform), altitude (three 
precisions: 0-30 in. Hg, 0-3 in. Hg, and 0- in. Hg), airspeed (again, in three precisions: 0-2500 psf, 0-000 psf, 
and 0-00 psf), horizontal velocity (0-7000 fps), vertical velocity (0-6000 psf), pilot control positions (longitudinal 
trim, all three control sticks plus the rudder pedals), accelerations (+8/- g normal, ± g transverse, and ±5 g 
longitudinal), and various cameras.
8 Love, “X-5 Program,” pp. -5; Banner et al., “Preliminary Results of Aerodynamic Heating Studies on the X-
5,” p. 3; letter, Gerald M. Truszynski to Dennis R. Jenkins, 9 May 2002.
9 Banner et al., “Preliminary Results of Aerodynamic Heating Studies on the X-5,” p. 3; North American report 
NA58-90, “X-5 Research Airplane NAA Model NA-20 Flight Test Program,”  August 958, pp. II-2 through II-
3; “Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” 7 November 
96, pp. 0-; Love, “X-5 Program,” pp. -5, and 22. 
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it to appropriate signal conditioners, and then sent it to recording oscillographs 
and the telemetry set. The NACA-developed photo-oscillographs were capable of 
recording 36 channels each. Recording speeds could be varied from 0.25 inch per 
second to 4.0 inches per second, resulting in recording times ranging from 56 min-
utes to only 3.5 minutes using 70-foot film magazines. The photo-oscillographs 
used a blue-sensitive polyester-based thin film with the trade name Cronar®. A 
variety of 16-mm motion picture cameras photographed portions of the pilot’s 
instrument panel, and the wings and empennage during flight.10 
 Recorder limitations restricted the number of installed sensors that could be 
recorded simultaneously. A 12-channel oscillograph recorded 40 thermocouples 
per channel at 1-second intervals, and four manometer-oscillographs recorded 
up to 96 pressure transducers. A NACA-designed aneroid-type 24-cell film- 
recording manometer similar to those used in previous flight programs recorded 
the surface pressures. Again, recorder limitations restricted the number of pressure 
measurements that could be recorded simultaneously. The exact data recorded 
often differed on each flight as researchers and engineers connected different sen-
sors to the recorders and telemetry system. A single switch in the cockpit turned 
 
0 Kenneth C. Sanderson, NASA technical memorandum X-56000, “The X-5 Flight Test Instrumentation,” 2 April 
96, pp. 6-7. Cronar® film was first released in 955 and is still used in various imaging and medical applica-
tions. The film is produced (and trademarked) by duPont Teijin Films.
This block diagram shows the basic interrelationship of  the various pieces of  research instrumentation 
carried on the X-15. The exact instrumentation varied considerably between airplanes, and flight to 
flight. Late in the program the X-15-3 received a much more modern PCM telemetry system. (NASA)
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on all of the recorders, and an event switch allowed the pilot to mark the recording 
when something significant occurred.11 
 Two separate cockpit instrument panels were supplied with each of the first 
two airplanes: one for the initial low-speed flights using the XLR11 engines and 
the nose-mounted flight-test boom, the other for hypersonic flights using the 
XLR99 engine and the ball nose. NASA significantly revised the instrument pan-
el in the first two airplanes early in the flight program based on pilots’ comments 
that the original panel was difficult to scan under all flight conditions, especially 
when they were wearing the MC-2 full-pressure suit. As initially completed, 
X-15-3 had an instrument panel identical to the XLR99 panels manufactured 
for the first two airplanes. However, when North American rebuilt the airplane 
following its XLR99 ground explosion, the Air Force decided to incorporate the 
Minneapolis-Honeywell MH-96 adaptive flight-control system, and this neces-
sitated a unique instrument panel. NASA subsequently replaced this panel late in 
the flight program with a set of vertical-tape displays developed by Lear-Siegler. 
All of the instrument panels were in a constant state of flux as various switches 
and indicators were added to almost any available location in the cockpit to sup-
port the various experiments and data requirements for any given flight. Every 
attempt was made to keep the critical displays and switches in constant locations 
between the three airplanes (at least as much as possible given the radical dif-
ference in X-15-3), and twice the program created a “standard X-15” cockpit 
arrangement and brought the airplanes into compliance. This greatly eased the 
problems associated with keeping the simulator accurate, and made life much 
easier for the pilots and flight planners.12  
 Initially, the X-15s used a pulse-duration modulation (PDM) telemetry sys-
tem that researchers considered state of the art when they selected it. However, 
the system was insufficient for many types of data that researchers wanted to view 
on the ground (particularly the biomedical parameters), and the AFFTC Human 
Factors Subcommittee requested the installation of a more sophisticated FM-FM 
telemetry system. Initially, the FRC objected to the proposed change because of 
the size and volume requirements of such a system. However, on 2 December 
1960 Paul Bikle stated that he favored the installation of a FM-FM system if it 
fit into the space then used by the existing North American telemetry system. By 
then, the state of the art allowed the Air Force to purchase a 12-channel FM-FM 
system for use in the biomedical package. NASA subsequently installed this sys-
tem in the X-15s as needed to support biomedical work, and the first flights took 
place in late 1961 .13 
 In May 1967, NASA installed a modern pulse-code modulation (PCM) sys-
tem in X-15-3. The first flight (3-58-87) for the new system was on 26 April 1967 
with Bill Dana at the controls. By all accounts, the new system worked well and 
 North American report NA58-90, pp. II-2 through II-3. See also many of the weekly status reports from Paul Bikle 
that described the flight-by-flight changes in instrumentation.
2 Air Force flight handbook FHB-23-, “Interim Flight Manual, USAF Series X-5 Aircraft,” 8 March 960; Air Force 
technical order X-5-, “Utility Flight Manual, USAF Series X-5 Aircraft,” 3 March 965; North American report 
NA58-90, pp. II-2 through II-3; e-mail, Scott Crossfield to Dennis R. Jenkins, 28 May 2002. 
3 Minutes of Meeting, X-5 Human Factors Subcommittee, 30 December 960. In the files at the DFRC History 
Office. At the end of 960 this subcommittee changed its name to the Bioastronautics Subcommittee because of 
“the obsolescence of the term human factors.”
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provided a great deal more bandwidth than the old PDM and FM-FM telemetry 
systems. It appears that NASA never updated the other two aircraft to PCM.14 
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
 One of the few areas of research that were handled almost exclusively by the 
Air Force was studying the physiological responses of the pilots to the demanding 
flight profiles required for high-performance aircraft. Although NASA monitored 
the results of the biomedical program, the Air Force was entirely responsible for 
the conduct of the research . 
 Before the beginning of the X-15 flight program, a Convair TF-102A (54-1354, 
subsequently redesignated JTF-102A) was modified to evaluate the new David 
Clark MC-2 full-pressure suit (and later the A/P22S-2). The David Clark Com-
pany had designed the MC-2 pressure suits with 24 electrical contact points to 
facilitate connections between the sensors and the telemetry system. The system 
monitored helmet pressure versus suit-pressure differential, cockpit pressure ver-
sus suit pressure differential, body surface temperatures, and electrocardiogram 
data. Beginning in December 1958, the Air Force used the JTF-102A to familiar-
ize the X-15 pilots with the MC-2 pressure suit and to develop baseline physi-
ological data for each of the pilots. Researchers also used the aircraft to evaluate 
additional physiological instrumentation and test the operational suitability of the 
MC-2 for future weapons systems (unrelated to the X-15). This initial JTF-102 
test program lasted several months and eventually accumulated approximately 15 
hours of flight time by pilots wearing the MC-2 ensemble, although the Air Force 
continued to use the JTF-102 through the end of the flight program.15  
Instrumentation
 When the Air Force approved the X-15 program in December 1954, the avia-
tion medical community in the United States had already embarked on research 
into the physiological effects of weightlessness in anticipation of technological 
developments that would permit manned space flight. This research consisted 
largely of obtaining physiological measurements from human subjects while they 
flew Keplerian trajectories in a modified Lockheed F-94C Starfire and attempted 
to perform certain psychomotor tasks. The maximum duration of weightlessness 
in these early experiments was 30–40 seconds, and it was difficult to separate 
the subject’s responses to the weightless state from his responses to the pre- and 
post-trajectory accelerations. Nausea and vomiting, for example, occurred in the 
majority of test subjects in these experiments, probably due to the relatively rapid 
 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 5 May 967, pp. 5-6; Vincent N. Ca-
passo/X-5 project engineer, “X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight 3-58-87,” 3 May 967; “X-5 Semi-Annual 
Status Report No. 7,” 0 May 967, p. 29. 
5 Lieutenant Colonel Burt Rowen, “Human-Factors Support of the X-5 Program,” Air University Quarterly Review, 
Air War College, vol. X, no. , winter 958-59, pp. 3-39.
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transitions between hypergravic and hypogravic states. Despite the amount of 
uncertainty surrounding the experiments, some medical researchers nevertheless 
concluded that weightlessness would induce nausea and vomiting in most people. 
The Air Force widely reported this conclusion, which greatly influenced several 
early manned space studies.16 
 Because the X-15 flight profiles would provide longer periods of weightless-
ness than were possible with lower-performance aircraft, acquiring physiological 
data became an early objective of the program. As North American finalized the 
X-15 configuration, there were additional reasons for monitoring biomedical data 
from a safety standpoint. Since the cockpit of the X-15 was engineered for a 
3.5-psi differential between the inside of the cockpit and the outside atmosphere 
(or lack thereof), it was not considered feasible to use a breathable atmosphere. 
At sea level, oxygen accounts for approximately 20% of the normal atmospheric 
pressure of 14.7 psi. A breathable atmosphere therefore requires 20% of the nor-
mal 14.7 psi–about 3 psi of oxygen in the 3.5-psi cockpit.17  Engineers considered 
the problems of combustion and fire associated with this 86% oxygen atmosphere 
to be insurmountable. As a result, North American pressurized the X-15 cockpit 
and ventilated the full-pressure suit with nitrogen, supplying breathing oxygen 
to the helmet area only. A neck seal (MC-2 suit) or a face seal (A/P22S-2 suit) 
separated the breathing space from the remainder of the suit. In order to prevent 
the leakage of nitrogen into the breathing space, technicians adjusted the breath-
ing-oxygen regulator to deliver oxygen at a pressure 1 inch of water higher than 
the suit pressure .18 
 The maintenance of this helmet-suit pressure differential was vital, since 
otherwise the pilot could develop an insidious hypoxia that would lead to seri-
ous impairment or unconsciousness. The suit pressure regulator maintained 3.5 
psi in the suit, the same pressure maintained in the cockpit. In the event of loss 
of cockpit pressure, the suit would automatically inflate, thus preventing a cata-
strophic decompression of the pilot. It was not particularly unusual for the suit to 
inflate partially as the X-15 cabin differential changed during exit or reentry. The 
suit/cabin-pressure differential provided an indication of the proper functioning of 
the suit and suit-pressure regulator, and the cabin-pressure regulator. In the event 
of failure of the suit regulator or breathing-oxygen regulator, the pilot could select 
the emergency oxygen system that pressurized both the suit and helmet with oxy-
gen; this was the same emergency system used during ejection.19  
 North American designed and fabricated the original biomedical instrumen-
tation system as part of the basic X-15 contract. The system monitored eight 
parameters, including the ECG, oxygen flow rate, helmet/suit-pressure differential, 
cabin/suit-pressure differential, and pilot skin temperature, from four locations. 
The helmet/suit-pressure differential also served as an excellent respirometer; 
6 Lieutenant Colonel Harry R. Bratt, AFFTC technical report FTC-TR-65-2, “Biomedical Aspects of the X-5 Pro-
gram, 959-96,” August 965, p. . 
7 This is essentially the environment that later contributed to the deaths of three astronauts in the Apollo  fire–a 
pure oxygen atmosphere. Interestingly, the North American engineering team for the Apollo spacecraft included 
Harrison Storms and Charlie Feltz, the men who had been in charge of the X-5 program.
8 Rowen, “Human-Factors Support of the X-5 Program,” pp. 3-39; Bratt, “Biomedical Aspects of the X-5 Pro-
gram, 959-96,” p. 2. 
9 Ibid.
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since the breathing space in the helmet was relatively small, the pilot’s respiration 
produced pressure fluctuations that the 0–0.5-psi transducer could follow, provid-
ing a real-time indication of respiratory rate. The ECG, oxygen flow rate, and 
skin temperatures were recorded using an onboard oscillograph recorder. The two 
pressure differentials were sent to the ground via PDM telemetry and displayed in 
the control room, along with cabin pressure (obtained via vehicle, not biomedical, 
instrumentation) on a heated stylus stripchart recorder. The first physiological and 
environmental data recorded on the X-15 program were obtained during flight 
1-6-11 on 6 May 1960 with Bob White at the controls.20 
 One of the first things that researchers assessed on the X-15 was whether the 
cockpit environment adequately protected the pilot. The requirement was to keep 
the pilot’s skin temperature below 100°F even though the aircraft’s outer skin 
could heat to nearly 1,000°F. In fact, researchers found that the cockpit outer wall 
was reaching 750°F, but the cockpit itself remained in a temperature range be-
tween 36°F and 81°F. The Air Force removed the skin-temperature sensors after 
the first round of flights when it became obvious that the mission was not expos-
ing the pilot to any significant thermal stress.21 
 The original biomedical signal-conditioning package, mounted in the instru-
mentation compartment behind the cockpit, was 5 by 6.5 by 11.5 inches in exterior 
dimensions and weighed 11 pounds. In general, this instrumentation functioned 
well, but as researchers gained experience they corrected minor deficiencies and 
simplified the system. For example, the original ECG used five electrodes that 
simulated the clinical I, II, III, and V4 leads. However, since the ST segment and 
T(minus) wave changes are essentially uninterpretable under dynamic conditions, 
a one-channel ECG gave just as much information as a multi-channel system. 
Therefore, the ECG was simplified to a three-electrode configuration (two 0.75-
inch-diameter stainless-steel screen mid-axillary leads and a reference electrode 
on the lower abdomen). A silicone potting compound ring surrounded the metal 
mesh electrode, a conductive paste assured good contact with the skin, and pres-
sure-sensitive adhesive secured a plastic cap over each electrode to keep it in 
place. Beginning with flight 2-18-34 on 12 September 1961, the Air Force in-
stalled a Tabor Instruments amplifier on the ejection seat. Amplifying the signals 
closer to the pilot resulted in much better data.22  
 Researchers found the pilot’s heart rate during flight usually increased from 
the normal 70–80 beats per minute to 140–150 per minute, but with no apparent 
physiological effect. One interesting finding, later confirmed on Mercury flights, 
was that the pilot’s heart rate decreased during the period of zero g. The reduc-
tion, however, was not great (to about 130 beats per minute). The respiration 
rate followed similar trends, increasing to three or four times the resting rate, but 
20 Harry R. Bratt and M. J. Kuramoto, “Biomedical Flight Data Collection,” ISA Journal, October 963, pp. 57-58; 
Bratt, “Biomedical Aspects of the X-5 Program, 959-96,” p. 3. 
2 Burt Rowen, Ralph N. Richardson, and Garrison P. Layton, Jr., “Bioastronautics Support of the X-5 Program,” a 
paper in the 1961 Research Airplane Committee Report, pp. 256-257. According to Harry R. Bratt at the AFFTC, this 
represented “the first in-flight physiological data [acquired] under operational flight conditions in the United States.”
22 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 2 October 96, p. ; Rowen et al., 
“Bioastronautics Support of the X-5 Program,” p. 257; Bratt, “Biomedical Aspects of the X-5 Program, 959-
96,” p. 3. Axilla: of or relating to the armpit. The skin temperature sensors would make a return on later versions 
of the biomedical instrumentation. 
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researchers considered this less meaningful because talking influences the respi-
ratory system and has a poor dynamic response rate in any case. On almost all 
flights, there was a large peak in respiration rate during the powered portion of the 
flight when the pilots tended to breathe rapidly and shallowly.23 
 During the initial phases of the flight program, researchers only installed the 
biomedical package in the X-15 on a non-interference basis. As a result, it fre-
quently did not work correctly since technicians had not allocated sufficient time 
to its installation and checkout. Most of the difficulties were traced to shorts and 
broken wires. Although the biomedical team coordinated with the Air Force and 
NASA, the next flight frequently suffered the same problems. As a result, in early 
1961 the Air Force and NASA assembled a dedicated team to work on biomedical 
issues, and the system became much more reliable.24 
 The researchers requested that the biomedical instrumentation package fly 
on all XLR99 flights that expanded the envelope. In a meeting held at the FRC 
on 2 December 1960, the Air Force and NASA agreed that the acquisition of 
physiological data was important from both a flight-safety and research perspec-
tive. However, NASA did not make the acquisition of biomedical data mandatory, 
mainly because it did not want to have to cancel a flight because the biomedical 
package failed.25 
 After Paul Bikle approved the concept of installing an FM-FM telemetry 
system dedicated to the biomedical package, the Air Force awarded a $79,000 
contract to the Hughes Aircraft Company to develop and manufacture the sys-
tem.26  The system included an FM radio transmitter rather than a hardwire link to 
the aircraft telemetry transmitter. This was done to demonstrate the feasibility of 
the radio link in order to permit the mobility expected on future spacecraft. The 
final Bendix TATP-350 unit measured 9.30 by 3.95 by 0.70 inches and weighed 
0.84 pound. The first unit was delivered in March 1962, and the third and final unit 
was delivered in July 1962. Researchers demonstrated the system during flights 
of the JTF-102A using MC-2 suits, and in an unusual test the system received a 
telemetered ECG from a free-falling parachutist.27 
 NASA installed the new FM-FM system in all three X-15s during the summer 
of 1962. This installation permitted the ECG to be telemetered and displayed in 
the control room along with the helmet/suit- and cabin/suit-pressure differentials, 
cabin pressure, and two axes of aircraft acceleration (vertical and longitudinal). 
The system multiplexed these signals onto a single FM channel and then dis-
played them on a six-channel Sanborn stripchart recorder in the control room.28 
 In 1962, the AFFTC began providing biomedical system expertise to the 
Dyna-Soar program. Because of severe space and weight limitations on the X-20, 
 
 
23 Rowen et al., “Bioastronautics Support of the X-5 Program,” pp. 258 and 26.
2 Minutes of Meeting, X-5 Human Factors Subcommittee, 30 December 960. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
25 Ibid.
26 Air Force contract number AF0(6)63.
27 Bratt and Kuramoto, “Biomedical Flight Data Collection,” pp. 58-59; Bratt, “Biomedical Aspects of the X-5 
Program, 959-96,” p. . 
28 Bratt, “Biomedical Aspects of the X-5 Program, 959-96,” p. 3. 
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miniaturization was an absolute necessity. Based on its success in providing the 
X-15 FM-FM system, the Air Force awarded Hughes Aircraft a contract to fabri-
cate two prototype signal-conditioning units designed around X-20 requirements. 
Researchers first used the system to monitor environmental and physiological 
data during dynamic simulations on the centrifuge at NADC Johnsville. When 
North American rebuilt X-15-2 into its advanced configuration, the company in-
stalled a Hughes signal-conditioning system to test the new system prior to its use 
on the X-20 . After the cancellation of the Dyna-Soar program in December 1963, 
Hughes modified the design to incorporate interchangeable modules that could 
meet a variety of requirements. Hughes repackaged the system so that all of the 
modules were a common size and used identical connectors.29 
 The final package measured 4.0 by 3.5 by 0.7 inches and weighed only 0.6 
pound. Like the earlier Hughes system, this package used an FM transmitter link 
to the aircraft telemetry system, although a hardwire link could also be used if 
needed. For X-15 use, the package provided the ECG, helmet/suit- and cabin/
suit-pressure differentials, Korotkoff sounds, and partial pressure of oxygen in 
the breathing space. When required, researchers could substitute modules that 
provided the partial pressure of CO2 and an impedance pneumogram.30 
 During the summer of 1963, the Air Force again modified the biomedical 
instrumentation, this time by adding a blood-pressure monitoring system devel-
oped by the Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine at Brooks AFB, Texas. The 
system used an occlusive cuff crystal microphone to determine arterial pressure in 
the upper arm. An electro-pneumatic programmer that cycled once per minute au-
tomatically inflated the cuff. During deflation of the cuff, a microphone detected 
the Korotkoff sounds, and a display showed these sounds simultaneously with the 
cuff pressure trace and the ECG. The system could be turned on or off by the pilot 
and had a fail-safe feature that could dump the pressure in the cuff in the event 
of a power failure, preventing a tourniquet effect from the cuff. Surprisingly, the 
first few flights of the package did not yield meaningful blood-pressure informa-
tion, since the pilot’s pressures exceeded the maximum reading available on the 
instrumentation. The school modified the cuff inflation pressure to allow up to 240 
millimeters of mercury to obtain useful systolic pressure end-points.31 
 The school had used the blood-pressure monitoring system for in-flight studies 
using conventional jet aircraft for some time, and it had been very reliable in ser-
vice. However, the initial use in the X-15 was not completely satisfactory because 
of a generally inadequate signal-to-noise ratio. The X-15 environment proved to 
be particularly severe; the combination of frictional noise from the suit, vibration, 
acoustic noise, and pilot movement artifacts produced a high background noise 
 
29 Bratt and Kuramoto, “Biomedical Flight Data Collection,” pp. 60-6; Bratt, “Biomedical Aspects of the X-5 
Program, 959-96,” p. 3. 
30 Bratt, “Biomedical Aspects of the X-5 Program, 959-96,” p. 3.
3 Ibid, pp. -5, and 2. The Korotkoff sounds are audible vibrations generated by the turbulent flow of blood 
beyond an abrupt constriction in an artery, such as produced by an occlusive cuff on the upper arm. As the oc-
clusive cuff pressure is lowered, the pressure at the first audible sound is taken as the systolic pressure (peak 
pressure at the passage of the pulse wave). The pressure at the last audible sound, or the point at which the 
amplitude and frequency of the sounds changes abruptly, is taken as the diastolic pressure (relaxation pressure 
between pulse waves).
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and a low signal-to-noise ratio. Researchers experimented with several filters and 
amplifiers, and eventually found a satisfactory combination.32 
 In addition to the ECG and various cockpit and suit pressures and tempera-
tures, the researchers added blood pressure, skin temperature (on the calf, abdomen, 
forearm, and axilla), respiratory rate, radiation, and partial pressures of oxygen and 
carbon dioxide in the helmet. A $47,000 Bendix Aviation mass spectrometer deter-
mined the partial pressure of oxygen, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen, 
and water vapor .33  A linear pneumotachometer provided by Spacelabs, Inc., under 
a $23,000 Air Force contract34 furnished a rapid method for determining the total 
oxygen consumed by measuring changes in the pilot’s breathing rate.35 
 As researchers evaluated the biomedical data during the flight program, it 
became apparent that the initial objective of obtaining data on the physiologi-
cal response to weightlessness was not feasible using the X-15. The duration of 
weightlessness (3–4 minutes) was too short and the pilot’s responses were condi-
tioned by too many uncontrollable variables that occurred simultaneously for any 
conclusions to be made concerning the physiological response to weightlessness. 
In addition, the manned space programs initiated shortly after the X-15 began 
its flight program provided a much longer weightlessness duration without the 
attendant stresses of having to fly the airplane; this portion of the X-15 data was 
instantly obsolete. Nevertheless, the X-15 data provided researchers a unique op-
portunity to observe the basic physiological responses of pilots in manned ve-
hicles flying exit and reentry profiles–something that Mercury did not, since the 
astronaut was simply along for the ride during those periods.36 
Some Results
 In mid-1965 the X-15 program was roughly three-quarters of the way through 
its eventual flight program, and flight surgeons at the AFFTC published a report on 
their findings to date. At the time, nine different pilots had flown the X-15 (Adams, 
Dana, and Knight had not yet flown); however, researchers only collected data 
from the six who had flown a sufficient number of flights to be statistically relevant 
to the analysis (omitting Armstrong, Petersen, and Thompson). The researchers 
noted that a “potentially very useful comparison of pilot performance and concur-
rent physiologic response is not possible because the X-15 flight test program is 
not structured as a psycho-physiological experiment. The aforementioned vari-
ability in flight profiles and unpredictable aircraft malfunctions makes possible 
only a general, qualitative comparison, rather than a specific, quantitative one.”37  
32 Ibid, p. . The Air Force and NASA both wanted a means to perform constant blood-pressure monitoring, but no-
body could figure out an easy way to do it. The AFFTC did issue a contract to Spacelabs, Inc., in Van Nuys, CA, to 
study “a system for monitoring cardiovascular dynamics either through blood pressure or by use of physiological 
parameters having high predictive value.” The results of the study indicated that pulse-wave velocity (PWV) had 
potential to provide the data, but researchers were not sure the results were interpretable in the clinical sense. 
Although studies continued, the technique was never used on the X-5.
33 Air Force contract number AF0(6)637.
3 Air Force contract number AF0(6)63.
35 Robert E. Hedblom and Burt Rowen, “Medical Monitoring of X-5 Pilots in Flight,” a paper presented to the X-5 
Human Factors Subcommittee on 30 December 960. In the files at the DFRC History Office; Rowen, “Biomedical 
Monitoring of the X-5 Program,” pp. 3-.
36 Bratt, “Biomedical Aspects of the X-5 Program, 959-96,” p. 2. 
37 Ibid, p. 9. 
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 It is important when considering the physiological data obtained during the 
X-15 program to keep in mind the conditions under which researchers collected the 
data. In addition to the normal variability of physiologic responses, no two X-15 
flights were the same. Different flight profiles and random aircraft malfunctions 
varied the physiological and psychic stresses to which the pilots were exposed.38  
 During an altitude mission, immediately after launch, the X-15 rotated to a 
preplanned climb angle and accelerated at 3–3.5 g. The pilot experienced a front-
to-back (“eyes-in”) inertial force that increased the apparent weight of the body, 
particularly the chest area, and resulted in a prompt increase in respiratory rate 
that continued until the acceleration subsided. After approximately 40 seconds 
of acceleration, the pilot pushed over to a “zero-normal” acceleration . The pulse 
rate, which had been increasing up to and throughout the launch operation, tended 
to decline during this period. At engine burnout, approximately 80 seconds after 
launch, the longitudinal acceleration dropped abruptly to zero, followed by a vari-
able period in which all accelerations were essentially zero. The pilot was in an 
essentially weightless state during this period and the respiration rate showed a 
prompt decline.39  
 Immediately after engine burnout, the pilot invariably immediately experi-
enced an increased heart rate that tended to decrease during the zero-g period. The 
increased heart rate at this point was probably a psychic response to the abrupt 
transition from a hypergravic state (in the normal plane) to a hypogravic (“weight-
less”) state. From this point to the landing phase, the pilot was busily engaged in 
usually complex flight maneuvers, including “accomplishing deliberate aircraft 
perturbations in roll, pitch, and yaw for the purpose of collecting stability and 
control information.” Heart rates and respiratory rates tended to reflect the dif-
ficulties the pilot encountered in managing the flight.40  
 After the aircraft passed over the top of its trajectory and was descending at a 
steep angle, the pilot had to pull out of the dive into level flight. This pull-up gen-
erated a positive normal acceleration that the pilot experienced as increased body 
weight. At this point, the anti-g portion of the David Clark full-pressure suit ac-
tivated to counteract these forces. Nevertheless, during this maneuver, the blood 
tended to pool in the lower parts of the body, the carotid arteries experienced 
decreased pressure, and the cardio-accelerator reflex produced a prompt increase 
in heart rate. The heart rate lowered as the accelerations decreased. The landing 
maneuver produced only mild accelerations, and the small increase in both heart 
rate and respiratory rate during this phase was entirely a psychic response to the 
task of accomplishing the landing. Since steady-state conditions existed for only 
a few seconds at a time during the brief 8–10-minute flights, physical and psy-
chic stimuli were usually occurring concurrently and independently. This meant 
that “only the grossest correlation with heart rate and respiratory rate responses 
[could] be made.”41  
  
38 Ibid, p. 9. 
39 Ibid, pp. 9-0. 
0 Ibid, p. 0. 
 Ibid, pp. 0-. 
 Chapter 8: The Research Progr am
 In most professions, including piloting, there is a general trend for heart rates 
and respiratory rates to decrease as an individual gains experience in performing 
a task. However, an analysis showed “no statistically significant difference” be-
tween early flights and later flights for each of the six pilots analyzed. Researchers 
believed a number of factors could explain this failure to adhere to the expected 
trend. The first, and probably most important, was that there were no “easy” X-15 
flights. Trying to obtain the maximum amount of data on each flight kept the pilot 
very busy performing the required maneuvers at the proper time while maintain-
ing the desired flight profile. This required intense concentration, and the pilot 
also had to monitor aircraft systems during this period.42  
 In psychological terms, the pilot had a fast-moving, intensive task to per-
form continuously during his 8–10-minute flight, plus a few minutes on each end. 
Added to this was the psychic stress of actual or potential system failures, which 
were not uncommon during the flight program. Another factor was the variation in 
flight profiles, which meant that the pilots had little or no opportunity to develop 
a routine for a familiar flight. Furthermore, there was often a considerable interval 
between flights flown by individual pilots. In the end, the researchers found that it 
was “not surprising that a rapid reduction in responsiveness” was not seen. The re-
searchers found that, overall, “the spectrum of physiological response of the pilots 
to X-15 flights, in terms of heart rate, respiratory rate, blood pressure, and pulse 
pressure, has remained quite stable throughout the X-15 Program regardless of 
pilot experience level. This pattern of physiological response may be tentatively 
considered the norm for this type of operation.”43  
 In the end, the X-15 program was both a contributor to and a recipient of bio-
medical instrumentation. It was the first program to generate meaningful require-
ments in airborne biotelemetry and was the impetus for the development of several 
pieces of instrumentation that later found their way into standard clinical practice. 
Although Mercury and Gemini gathered better data, the X-15 nevertheless con-
tributed to the physiological database that helped establish baselines for future 
programs. However, perhaps the most significant contribution of the X-15 pro-
gram from a biomedical perspective was “the unequivocal, and at times dramatic, 
demonstration of the capabilities of the human pilot in managing a vehicle and a 
flight profile from launch to landing, which is a true space flight in miniature.”44  
MH-96 ADAPTIVE CONTROL SYSTEM
 Although it was an integral part of X-15-3, the Minneapolis-Honeywell 
MH-96 adaptive flight-control system was also an experiment and hence part of the 
research program. In 1956, researchers performing in-house studies at the Flight 
Control Laboratory of the Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) at Wright-Pat-
2 Ibid, p. . 
3 Ibid, p.  and 7. 
 Ibid, p. 6. 
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terson AFB determined that it was feasible to design a self-adaptive flight-control 
system. As the name implies, such a system automatically adapts itself to provide 
essentially constant damping in flight conditions of varying control-system effec-
tiveness. In other words, a given movement of the control stick would always 
result in the same airplane response, regardless of how far the control surfaces had 
to move to accomplish the maneuver. At the time, most aircraft still had simple me-
chanical linkages to the flight controls, with manually set trim tabs. The new super-
sonic fighters had more sophisticated system that adjusted their gains as a function 
of measured and computed air data. However, these functions required extensive 
flight-testing to perfect, and generally resulted in complex and unreliable systems. 
Researchers expected that future vehicles would be operating in flight regimes 
where air data might not be available, and decided to develop a new approach. The 
Air Force awarded a number of study contracts in 1957 that led to flight-testing of 
a variety of adaptive concepts on several Lockheed F-94 Starfires by the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator 
Company. When government funding ended, Minneapolis-Honeywell continued 
its effort with a company-funded flight program using a McDonnell F-101A Voo-
doo. The Air Force subsequently provided limited funding for the F-101 trials, and 
future astronaut Virgil Grissom flew some of the evaluation flights.45 
 By 1958 the Flight Control Laboratory was convinced of the potential of 
self-adaptive techniques; however, the performance of the available aircraft was 
insufficient to test the concepts, particularly the first expected application in the 
Boeing X-20 Dyna-Soar orbital glider. The logical choice of test platforms was 
the X-15 because its flight profile was the closest approximation to the Dyna-Soar 
that was available. Unfortunately, the X-15 program was already in high gear and 
the Air Force was reluctant to delay the critical hypersonic testing planned for the 
three airplanes .46 
 Despite the lack of an available test platform, the Flight Control Laboratory 
continued with its development effort. The Air Force released invitations to bid in 
late 1958, evaluated proposals during early 1959, and awarded to contract to Min-
neapolis-Honeywell in June 1959. Although the primary purpose of the program 
was to test the self-adapting technique in a true aerospace environment, research-
ers also decided to evaluate several features that were recognized as desirable 
for any production system. These included dual redundancies for reliability, the 
integration of aerodynamic and ballistic control systems, rate-command control, 
and simple outer-loop hold modes for attitude and angle of attack. Within a few 
months, Honeywell flew the prototype MH-96 in the F-101A at Minneapolis and 
in the X-15 fixed-base simulator in Inglewood.47  
 The basic system consisted of an adaptive controller that contained the vari-
ous electronic modules and redundant rate gyro packages (each containing three 
5 Robert P. Johannes, Neil A. Armstrong, and Thomas C. Hays, “Development of X-5 Self-Adaptive Flight Control 
System,” a paper in the 1961 Research Airplane Committee Report, p. 83; David S. Ball, “In Search of X-5 No. 
3,” Quest, vol. 3, no. , spring 99, p. 27.
6 Johannes et al., “Development of X-5 Self-Adaptive Flight Control System,” p. 83. As originally delivered, 
X-5-3 had the same control system as the other two X-5s; the MH-96 was installed while it was being rebuilt 
following the ground explosion that destroyed the aft part of the airplane. It should be noted that all X-5-3 flights 
used the MH-96.
7 Ibid, pp. 83-8.
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rate gyros–one for each axis). The system also required an attitude reference (i.e., 
an inertial platform) and angle-of-attack and angle-of-sideslip information. The 
electronics modules were programmed with an ideal response rate (the “model”) 
for the aircraft, and the MH-96 adjusted the damper gains automatically until 
the aircraft responded at the ideal rate. Essentially, the gain changer operated by 
monitoring the limit-cycle amplitude and adjusting the gain to maintain a constant 
amplitude. A tendency for the amplitude limit cycle to increase resulted in a gain 
reduction, whereas loss of the limit cycle initiated a gain increase. Lead compen-
sation largely determined the limit-cycle frequency, which had to be higher than 
the aircraft’s natural frequency but lower than its structural frequency. On the 
X-15, that worked out to about four cycles per second.48 
 Early on, this model presented a problem that was first seen in the X-15 simu-
lator: a quick decrease in gain was necessitated by the rapid buildup of control 
surface effectiveness during reentry. Delays in the gain reduction, partly caused 
8 Ibid, p. 8. On the X-5 the attitude reference was provided by the stable platform (and later the Honeywell IFDS); 
the alpha and beta information was provided by the ball nose. Bob Hoey provided this observation: “Limit cycle 
is a natural phenomena associated with high feedback gains. The frequency is primarily a function of the amount 
of friction and slop in the control linkage. Frequency CAN be tailored to some degree by lead compensation, as 
mentioned. The key point is that limit cycle occurs VERY, VERY close to the stability boundary of the system. 
Controlling the gain to a specified limit cycle amplitude is like walking on the edge of a cliff. The slightest miscue 
that might cause the gain to get a little too high can result in loss of stability and loss of control. We saw that on the 
simulator often when we were a little ham-fisted with the controls. Milt [Thompson] had a wild few seconds on one 
of his heating flights, and of course, Mike [Adams] really saw the dark side of the MH-96 system.” Letter, Robert 
G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 August 2002, with comments on a draft version of this manuscript.
The MH-96 adaptive flight control system installed in X-15-3 was an early attempt at a fly-by-wire 
concept, although the linkages were still largely mechanical. Pilot inputs were compared to an ideal model 
running on a small computer, and the MH-96 commanded the control surfaces to move an appropriate 
amount based on speed, dynamic pressure, and other variables. The system generally worked well, and the 
MH-96 was used for all of  the program’s high-altitude flights since it provided better redundancy than 
the standard stability-augmentation system installed in the other two airplanes. (NASA)
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by the lag in the mechanical control linkages, resulted in temporary oscillations as 
high as 3 degrees, peak to peak, at the servo. Modifications to the gain computer 
improved the situation but never eliminated it. However, since the X-20 was going 
to be a fly-by-wire vehicle, it would not have suffered from this problem. A dif-
ferent issue proved easier to resolve. A control problem existed whenever motions 
about one axis were coupled to another . To address this, the MH-96 contained 
cross-control circuitry that commanded a roll input proportional to the yaw rate 
in order to combat the unfavorably high negative dihedral effect demonstrated by 
the X-15 during wind-tunnel testing. This was, essentially, the MH-96 flying the 
beta-dot technique.49 
 When a ground test of the XLR99 severely damaged X-15-3, the Air Force 
agreed to modify the airplane to accommodate the prototype MH-96. The instal-
lation of the system into the airplane began in December 1960 and presented 
something of a challenge. Although it allowed the removal of the original Westing-
house stability augmentation system, the MH-96 required an even greater volume. 
NASA installed most of the system electronics on the lower instrument-elevator 
shelf, but this required a “rather extensive revision of the original instrument- 
recording configuration” since the data recorders normally occupied this area.50 
 One of the significant features of the MH-96 was its redundant design, which 
would become  a feature of many future flight-control systems. This system was 
one of the first to experience the conflicting objectives of reliability and the ability 
to “fail safe”. Extremely high reliability was a requirement due to the low prob-
ability of a successful reentry from high altitude without damping. The ability 
to fail safe was equally important since a large transient introduced in a high- 
dynamic-pressure region would result in the destruction of the vehicle. The MH-96 
provided completely redundant damper channels, such that either channel could 
control the vehicle. The adaptive feature of the circuitry permitted one channel 
to be lost with little or no loss in system performance, since the remaining gain 
changer would attempt to provide the additional gain required to match the limit 
cycle. The gain computers were interlocked, when operative, to prevent overcriti-
cal gain following a limit-cycle circuit failure, and to provide the desired limiting 
effect for hard-over failures .51 
 In the case of a model or variable-gain amplifier failure, conventional moni-
tor circuits would disengage either or both channels when required. Combined 
with the desire of NASA for increased system flexibility, this led to the addition 
of parallel fixed-gain channels with fail-safe passive circuitry. Since these chan-
nels operated simultaneously with the adaptive channels to avoid the time-lag 
penalties of switching, they effectively limited the minimum gain for adaptive 
operation. The fixed-gain circuits had to be sufficiently powerful for satisfactory 
emergency performance throughout the flight envelope, but below the critical level 
in the high-dynamic-pressure regions. A successful compromise was elusive, and 
X-15-3 spent most of its career with some restrictions on its flight envelope.52 
9 Ibid, pp. 86-87; letter, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 August 2002.
50 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 5 December 960, p. 5. 
5 Johannes et al., “Development of X-5 Self-Adaptive Flight Control System,” p. 88.
52 Ibid, p. 88.
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 As installed in X-15-3, the MH-96 provided stability augmentation in the 
pitch, roll, and yaw axes. The MH-96 controlled both the aero surfaces and the 
ballistic control system, blending the two as needed to achieve the desired control 
responses. In addition, autopilot modes provided control-stick steering, pitch and 
roll attitude hold, heading hold, and angle-of-attack hold. Pilot commands to the 
system were electrical signals proportional to the displacement of the right side 
controller or the center stick, and the rudder pedals . Nevertheless, the left-hand 
controller remained in the cockpit and the pilot could use it if desired to manually 
control the ballistic control thrusters . Provisions were also incorporated to electri-
cally trim the pitch and roll axes. Trimming presented some problems of its own, 
mainly because the MH-96 was adapted to use existing X-15 hardware instead of 
its own newly developed hardware. In order to keep the pitch servos centered, the 
“trim follow-up” system used a low-rate trim motor to adjust the center point of 
the pilot’s stick. This not only centered the servos, it also physically moved the 
stick. If the pilot was performing a precise task while the trim motor was moving 
the stick, it was easy to get out of phase with the trim motor and it would become 
saturated, oscillating at low amplitude all by itself at about 0.5 Hz, with no pilot 
input for several seconds. The pilots found this disconcerting.53  
 The reliability of the adaptive system on the X-15 was excellent, despite the 
fact that it was not a production system. The mean time between failures of the 
dampers was 360 hours, and the entire system averaged 200 hours, mainly be-
cause some servos were not redundant. The adaptive electronics had a failure 
time of 100,000 hours. All of these figures compared favorably with the 100 hours 
demonstrated by the Westinghouse SAS in the other two airplanes.54 
 The MH-96 experienced only two persistent failures during its 65 flights, 
and each involved only a single axis. It also experienced several other momen-
tary failures on one or more axes; however, in each instance the adaptive mode 
reengaged following the transient disturbance. Milt Thompson observed that “it 
appears obvious that black-box technology is capable of providing a high degree 
of reliability through redundancy and improved electronic hardware.” Thompson 
admitted, however, that the quality of maintenance and the caliber of technical 
support might have had something to do with the reliability.55 
 Although it was not known at the time, 50 years later almost all high- 
performance aircraft would use some sort of adaptive flight controls. Many of 
the problems would be eliminated, or at least minimized, by the incorporation of 
digital fly-by-wire technology, quick-acting hydraulic and electric actuators, and 
fast digital computers. Nevertheless, given the technology available at the time, 
the MH-96 was an important first step.
53 Minneapolis-Honeywell report MH-2373-TM, “Operation and Maintenance Manual, MH-96 Flight Control System 
for the X-5 Aircraft, Volume V, System Description and Bench Test Procedure (Preliminary),” 3 May 96, pro-
vided under Air Force contract number AF33(66)-660, pp. 3-6; e-mail, Robert G. Hoey to Dennis R. Jenkins, 
25 August 2002.
5 Johannes et al., “Development of X-5 Self-Adaptive Flight Control System,” p. 88.
55 Milton O. Thompson and James R. Welsh, “Flight Test Experience with Adaptive Control Systems,” a paper pre-
sented at the AGARD Guidance and Control and Flight Mechanics Panels, 3-5 September 968, Oslo, Norway).
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THE FOLLOW-ON PROGRAM
 During the early 1960s, the X-15 was the only platform that could realisti-
cally carry a useful payload above the Earth’s atmosphere and return. Researchers 
had been making use of various sounding rockets that provided relatively inex-
pensive access to the upper atmosphere from a variety of locations around the 
world. However, in general these rockets had very small payload capabilities, 
could not provide much in the way of power or controlled flight, and were usually 
not recoverable. On the other hand, although the X-15 was very limited in where 
it could fly (over southern California and Nevada), it could provide a fair amount 
of power, it was at least somewhat controllable for aiming purposes, and, most 
importantly, it was recoverable.
EXPERIMENT ACCOMMODATIONS
 Although the X-15 provided some internal space for experiments, many re-
searchers wanted specific views of the world outside or to have their experiments 
located away from the “noise” of the airplane. This gave rise to several modifica-
tions that ultimately affected all three X-15s.
Wing-Tip Pods
 Several experiments (particularly a proposed micrometeorite collection sys-
tem) had to be located outside the flow field of the X-15 and, it was hoped, outside 
the zone of contamination from the ballistic control-system thrusters. The most 
obvious location was the wing tips.
 There were several preliminary designs for the wing-tip pods. Initially North 
American wanted to give the pods a rectangular cross-section, since it would be 
easier to package the various experiments in them. However, after considering 
both normal and potential emergency operations in terms of the effects of stability 
and control, heating, drag, and turbulence, the engineers decided to use circular-
cross-section pods constructed of Inconel X. The pods were 8 inches in diameter 
and 58 inches long, and could weigh a maximum of 96.2 pounds, although the 
program exceeded this limit on numerous occasions.56 
 There was some initial discussion about equipping the pods with an emer-
gency jettison system in case the micrometeorite collection system stuck open, 
but the final design had the collection equipment simply burning off during re-
entry if that occurred. Researchers tested the wing-tip pods in the supersonic and 
56 Statement of Work for the Micrometeorite Collection experiment (#3). In the AFFTC Access to Space Office Proj-
ect Files; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  December 96, p. 5; X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC 
to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 0 January 967, p. 6. Interestingly, the weight of the pods often differed from 
side to side. For instance, on flight 3-57-86 the right pod weighed 72. pounds with the longitudinal center of 
gravity at 3% of the wing-tip chord, while the left pod weighed 97.2 pounds at 33% chord.
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hypersonic wind tunnels at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) on 24–25 October 
1962 to verify that they had no adverse effect on the airplane. On 5 November 
1962, North American tested the configuration in its low-speed wind tunnel to 
verify that the landing characteristics were not affected. The test results proved to 
be satisfactory.57 
 Initially, North American manufactured a single set of the pods for X-15-1 . 
NASA installed the modifications necessary to use the wing-tip pods, including the 
attachment points and wiring routed through the wing, on X-15-1 during March 
1964. The first flight (1-50-79) with the pods was conducted on 15 October 1964 
with Jack McKay at the controls. The flight reached Mach 4.56 and 84,900 feet, 
and the pods did not seem to have any major adverse effect on the handling of the 
airplane. Subsequently, however, some pilots complained that the pods seemed to 
introduce a buffet at load factors significantly below the previous buffet bound-
ary. Researchers installed accelerometers in the pods to verify this, but failed to 
uncover any evidence of buffeting. However, the redistribution of mass due to the 
57 Edwin W. Johnston, “Current and Advanced X-5,” a paper presented at the Military Aircraft Systems and Tech-
nology Meeting, Washington, DC, 2-23 September 96. 
Wing tip pods were developed for X-15-1 to house experiments that needed to be located outside the flow 
field of  the X-15. The pods were 8 inches in diameter, 58 inches long , and could weigh a maximum 
of  96.2 pounds. The first flight (1-50-79) with the pods was on 15 October 1964 with Jack McKay 
at the controls. Similar pods were later manufactured for X-15-3. (NASA)
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pod installation appeared to result in a 17-cps vibration tied to the wing-bending 
mode that was excited by some maneuvers and gusts, which likely explained what 
the pilots felt .58  
 Researchers subsequently determined that having only one set of pods put an 
unreasonable constraint on scheduling experiments, and decided to manufacture a 
second, easily removable set of pods. NASA modified the third airplane to carry 
wing-tip pods, and could switch the pods between X-15-1 and X-15-3 as needed 
to support the experiments and flight schedule. Frequently the rear compartment 
on one or both pods contained cameras aimed at various parts of the airplane 
(usually the ablative panels on the stabilizers) or one of the experiments in the 
tail-cone box. At some point, the pods on X-15-1 also received a small set of drag 
braces for unspecified reasons (probably an attempt to cure the vibration prob-
lem). Despite the original intent, and the best efforts of all involved, the wing-tip 
pods did not put the experiments outside the contamination zone of the ballistic 
control thrusters. Residue from the hydrogen peroxide would render several ex-
periments useless. The pods were also inside the nose shock-wave interference 
zone at certain angles of attack, further hampering some experiments.59 
Tail-Cone Box
 Several experiments needed to view the sky behind the X-15, so NASA de-
cided to build a “tail-cone box” behind the upper vertical stabilizer. In September 
1961, NASA asked North American to investigate whether the installation would 
have an adverse effect on the aerodynamic stability of the airplane, and after a 
brief analysis the company concluded that none was expected. North American 
began detailed engineering for the box on 10 August 1962, with fabrication ex-
pected to take about two months. The program often referred to these as “boat-
tail” boxes.60 
 The box, which was located immediately behind the upper speed brakes, 
was the same width as the vertical stabilizer, as high as the speed brakes, and 
protruded aft to the extreme rear of the fuselage. It was closed on the sides and 
top, but open on the back to allow the instruments to view behind the airplane. 
The Inconel X structure provided no environmental control (temperature or pres-
surization) for the experiments it housed. NASA procured two different types of 
boxes and installed them on the airplanes as needed to support the specific experi-
ment manifested for a particular flight. The first style of box was equipped with a 
stabilized platform that allowed precise aiming of the experiment. This box could 
also be equipped with a removable panel that covered the rear opening during 
the exit phase to prevent exhaust efflux from contaminating the experiment. The 
58 Trip report, Captain Hugh D. Clark/X-5 Project Office, describing a trip on 20-2 August 962 to the FRC to dis-
cuss the Follow-On Experiments Program, report dated 7 September 962. In the files of the Air Force Historical 
Research Agency; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  December 96, p. 5; X-5 Status Report, Paul 
F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  December 965, p. ; Ronald S. Waite/X-5 Project Engineer, 
“X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight -5-72,” 5 April 96. 
59 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  December 96, p. 5; X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. 
Martin/NASA Headquarters,  December 965, p. . 
60 Trip report, Captain Hugh D. Clark/X-5 Project Office, describing a trip on 20-2 August 962 to the FRC to dis-
cuss the Follow-On Experiments Program, report dated 7 September 962. In the files of the Air Force Historical 
Research Agency.
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second style was a “lightweight” box used for experiments that did not require the 
stabilized platform. Both X-15-1 and X-15-3 ultimately included the capability to 
carry the tail-cone box. The rebuilt X-15A-2 sported a very similar protuberance, 
but in this case the box housed a spherical helium tank that provided additional 
pressurization gas for the propellant system.61 
Skylight Compartment
 Several of the proposed experiments needed to expose telescopes or other 
devices to the atmosphere at high altitudes. To accommodate this, North Ameri-
can devised the “skylight” modification, which consisted of a hatch that opened 
at high altitude to give a portion of the instrument compartment free access to the 
outside environment. This required the installation of pressure bulkheads around 
a portion of the instrument elevator to allow the lower portion of the instrument 
6 Ibid.
Several experiments needed to view the sky behind the X-15 so NASA decided to build a “tail-cone 
box” behind the upper vertical stabilizer. This is the Phase II MIT Apollo Horizon Experiment 
(#17) on X-15-1. NASA procured two different types of  boxes and installed them on the airplanes 
as needed to support the specific experiment manifested for a particular flight. The first style of  box was 
equipped with a stabilized platform that allowed precise aiming of  the experiment. The second style was 
a “lightweight” box used for experiments that did not require the stabilized platform. Both X-15-1 
and X-15-3 ultimately included the capability to carry the tail-cone box. The rebuilt X-15A-2 sported 
a very similar protuberance, but in this case, the box housed a spherical helium tank that provided 
additional pressurization gas for the propellant system. (NASA)
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compartment that held the data recorders to remain pressurized. The proposed 
hatch was 18 by 12 inches, with the 18-inch dimension lengthwise of the aircraft, 
and a pair of 6-inch-wide doors split along the centerline to open. Several of the 
experiments also required a stabilized platform inside the compartment. Since 
the University of Wisconsin had the first experiment that needed such a platform, 
NASA awarded the university a contract to develop a star-tracking, gyro-stabi-
lized platform that would replace the upper portion of the instrumentation el-
evator. The university estimated that this platform could be available about six 
months after it received the go-ahead.62 
 North American anticipated that it would take about two months to perform 
the modification to X-15-2, with most of that time required for rerouting wiring in 
the instrument compartment and building the pressure bulkheads. A change order 
was prepared for the modification and was awaiting approval when Jack McKay’s 
landing accident damaged X-15-2 and put the entire effort on hold . The Air Force 
decided to press ahead with the skylight modification as part of rebuilding X-15-2 
into the advanced configuration, but for some reason the actual implementation 
changed somewhat. The hatch became slightly larger, with two upward-opening 
62 Ibid.
Several of  the proposed experiments needed to expose telescopes or other devices to the atmosphere at high 
altitudes. To accommodate this, North American devised the “Skylight” modification that consisted of  a 
hatch that opened at high altitude to give a portion of  the instrument compartment free access to the outside 
environment. A skylight compartment was installed during the rebuilding of  X-15A-2 and, somewhat 
later, on X-15-1. This is the Ultraviolet Stellar Photography Experiment (#1) on X-15A-2. (NASA)
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doors that were 20 inches long by 8.5 inches wide. Otherwise, the changes were 
mostly the same as originally conceived.63 
 North American also installed a similar but slightly smaller compartment 
on X-15-1 in early 1966 to carry the “Western Test Range (WTR) launch-
monitoring” experiment (#20). Only the WTR and MIT experiments used this 
X-15-1 capability.64 
Bug-Eye Camera Bays
 As completed, each X-15 had four “bug-eye” structural camera bays, named 
for their odd shape .65  Two were located on top of the fuselage just behind the 
cockpit, and two were under the center-of-gravity compartment. Originally, 
each bay held a 16-mm motion picture camera that ground personnel could aim 
through a limited field of view to observe the fuselage, wings, or stabilizers. Over 
the course of the program, researchers used these bays to house a variety of other 
equipment. Sometimes the bug-eye fairings above the fuselage provided a view-
ing port for the experiments or simply provided extra volume, and at other times 
flush plates covered the area. The lower bays were usually faired over later in the 
flight program with the internal space used by experiments or data recorders.
 Although it was not truly an experiment, the National Geographic Society 
occasionally provided cameras for the upper bug-eye camera bays. Photos look-
ing back at the vertical stabilizer of the X-15 with the curve of the Earth in the 
background are more often than not ones taken by the Society’s cameras.66 
Early Experiments
 During the early portion of the flight program, various small experiments 
were piggybacked onto the airplanes as time and space permitted. These usually 
required little, if any, support from the airplane or pilot during the mission since 
the flight program was concentrating on acquiring aero-thermo and stability and 
control data .67  
B-70 Signature Reduction
 In what was perhaps the first true “follow-on” experiment, in 1961 researchers 
used X-15-2 to test a coating material designed to reduce the infrared emissions 
of the North American B-70 Valkyrie bomber. One of the complaints frequently 
voiced against the B-70 was that it was a large target. Although the concept of 
63 Ibid; Elmor J. Adkins and Johnny G. Armstrong, “Development and Status of the X-5A-2 Airplane,” a paper in the 
Progress of the X-15 Research Airplane Program, a compilation of the papers presented at the FRC, 7 October 965, 
NASA publication SP-90 (Washington, DC: NASA, 965), p. 05; Johnny G. Armstrong, AFFTC technology docu-
ment FTC-TD-69-, “Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 Envelope Expansion Program, July 969, p. 7.
6 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 5 May 967; Ronald S. Waite/X-5 
Project Engineer, “X-5 Flight Operations report for Flight -63-0,” 20 May 966.
65 For some reason, the publicity mockups used by North American and the mockups used in several movies did not get 
the bug-eye shape correct. They used a rectangular protrusion, whereas the actual aircraft used a rounded shape.
66 See a variety of status reports (e.g., X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 5 
January 962, p. 3. In the files at the DFRC History Office).
67 Captain Ronald G. Boston, “The X-5’s Role in Aerospace Progress,” a paper prepared at the Department of 
History of the Air Force Academy, August 978, p. 36.
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“stealth” (a term not yet applied to the idea) was not far advanced in 1960, engi-
neers at Lockheed and North American both understood that reducing the radar 
and infrared signatures of strategic aircraft would at least delay their detection by 
the enemy. For instance, Lockheed specifically intended the shape and materials 
of the A-12/SR-71 Blackbird to lower its radar signature. North American con-
ducted several detailed studies into the infrared and radar signatures of the B-70 
to provide a basis for reduction attempts.68 
 During the very short YB-70 development period, the Air Force directed 
North American to investigate ways to reduce the probability that the B-70 would 
be detected. The company made preliminary investigations into applying various 
radar absorbing materials to the airframe, particularly the insides of the air in-
takes. However, most of the North American effort appears to have concentrated 
on reducing the infrared signature of the aircraft. Exhausting cool air around the 
J93 engines was one means of reducing the infrared signature of the B-70. 
 As part of its research, North American developed a “finish system” (i.e., 
paint) that provided a low emittance at wavelengths used by Soviet infrared de-
tecting devices, and allowed most of the excess heat to be radiated from the sur-
face in wavelengths that were not normally under surveillance. The finish used 
a low-emittance basecoat with an organic topcoat that was transparent to energy 
in the 1–6-micron range. The topcoat was strangely opaque and highly emissive 
at wavelengths between 6 and 15 microns. This finish was relatively invisible 
to infrared detecting equipment and still allowed the skin to radiate excess heat 
overboard to maintain its structural integrity.69 
 North American developed two different coatings: one for areas that reached 
a maximum of 485°F, and the other for areas up to 630°F. The first (logically 
called Type I) consisted of Engelhard Industries’ Hanovia ceramic metallic coat-
ing no. 2, applied 0.004 mils thick. Over this was applied a 1-mil-thick mixture 
of 85% Ferro Enamaling no. AL-8 Frit and 15% Hommel no. 5933 Frit. The Type 
II basecoat was a mixture of 40% Hanovia silver resinate and 60% Hanovia L.B. 
coating no. 6593 applied 0.004 mil thick. The topcoat was a mixture of 74% 3M 
Kel-F no. 2140, 24% 3M Kel-F no. 601, and 2% Al2O3 applied 1 mil thick. Most 
probably, the topcoats would have been opaque silver instead of the white finish 
used on the two XB-70A prototypes.70 
 The finish system was somewhat difficult to apply to an aircraft as large as the 
B-70, but the engineers expected that further development would yield improve-
ments in the process. The most difficult problem was that the underlying surface 
had to be highly polished prior to applying the basecoat. In addition, the basecoat 
of both finishes had to cure at 750°F, while the topcoat of the Type II finish had 
to cure at 1,000°F (creating almost a ceramic finish). Accelerated environmental 
tests indicated that the surface would prove durable on the stainless-steel sections 
of the B-70, but its long-term adhesion to titanium appeared to be weak. Both fin-
68 See, for example, North American report NA-59-53-, “Thermal Radiation Characteristics of the B-70 Weapon 
System,” 3 July 959 and North American report NA-59-887, “B-70 Radar Cross Section, Infrared Radiation, 
and Infrared Countermeasures,” 3 December 959. Both originally classified Secret.
69 North American report NA6-295 “Development of Coating Materials for Reduction of the Infrared Emission of the 
YB-70 Air Vehicle,” 6 March 96.
70 Ibid.
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ishes were relatively immune to exposure to hydraulic fluid, fuels, oils, and other 
substances encountered during operational service.71  
 To obtain real-world flight experience, the Type I coating was applied to 
one panel on the vertical stabilizer of X-15-2 in March 1961 and flown on flight 
2-13-26 by Bob White. Since Inconel X is a type of stainless steel, the test was 
relatively representative of the proposed B-70 installation. No observable physi-
cal changes occurred during the Mach 4.43 flight, during which the aircraft’s ex-
terior reached 525°F, and the engineers made no attempt to measure the infrared 
qualities of the coating during this single flight. It was made simply to determine 
whether the coating would survive the aero-thermo environment, and appears to 
have been successful .72  
Radiation Detection
 The next experiment came from an unlikely source. On 3 August 1961, the 
Air Force Special Weapons Center at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, delivered 
an ionizing radiation-detection device for use on the X-15. NASA installed the 
10-pound package in the left side console of the cockpit outboard of the ejection 
seat. Actually, the first attempt to install the experiment failed because the space 
allocated in the cockpit was insufficient, but Kirtland soon repackaged it to fit.73 
 The experiment activated automatically when the pilot turned on the main 
instrumentation switch during flight. The package contained an ion chamber, two 
scintillators, a Geiger tube, and a self-contained multi-channel tape recorder. Dif-
ferent thicknesses of human-tissue-equivalent plastic encased the ion chamber 
and scintillators. With the Geiger tube acting as a count rate monitor, the detectors 
recorded radiation dose rates on the surface and at depths of 0 .25 inch and 1 .0 inch 
in the plastic between 1 millirad per hour and 100 millirads per hour.74   
 The first flight attempt was made on 29 September 1961, but this flight 
(1-A-38) aborted prior to launch due to a flight-control anomaly in the X-15. The 
package successfully flew on 4 October 1961 with Bob Rushworth at the controls 
of flight 1-23-39. The experiment subsequently flew several more times during 
late 1961. After each flight the taped data went to Kirtland for analysis, and the 
results ultimately showed that the pilots received essentially a normal background 
dosage of radiation (0.5 millirads per hour) during the flights. Since there seemed 
to be no cause for concern, the Air Force deleted the radiation detector from flights 
beginning in 1962.75 
 The program flew a different radiation experiment on X-15-2 from early 1961 
until September 1963. The “Earth cosmic-ray albedo” experiment investigated 
the cosmic-ray environment at altitudes from 50,000 feet upward to determine the 
cosmic-ray environment in which future manned space vehicles would operate. 
The experiment consisted of placing small photographic emulsion stacks in up-
7 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 5 February 96, p. 6.
7 Burt Rowen, Ralph N. Richardson, and Garrison P. Layton, Jr., “Bioastronautics Support of the X-5 Program,” a 
paper in the 1961 Research Airplane Committee Report, p. 259; Minutes of Meeting, X-5 Human Factors Sub-
committee, 30 December 960; “Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology 
Program 653A,” 7 November 96, p. 6. In the files at the AFFTC History Office.
75 Bratt, “Biomedical Aspects of the X-5 Program, 959-96,” p. 6. 
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per and lower structural (i.e., bug-eye) camera bays to obtain information on the 
cosmic-ray albedo flux and spectrum, as well as the flux and spectra of electrons 
and protons leaking out of the Van Allen belts. The X-15-2 carried the stacks to 
high altitudes on as many flights as practical and placed no restrictions on the 
flight path or trajectory. The NB-52 carried similar stacks during the same flights 
to provide lower-altitude references. Researchers at the University of Miami and 
the University of California at Los Angeles and Berkeley analyzed the film from 
the stacks .76 
 In a very similar experiment, X-15-1 and X-15-2 carried two nuclear- 
emulsion cosmic-radiation measurement packages from the Goddard Space Flight 
Center on the aft ends of their side fairings to investigate the cosmic-radiation 
environment at extreme altitudes. These emulsion stacks were considerably larger 
than the Earth cosmic-ray albedo stacks and were located external to the airplane. 
Several flights carried the packages to altitudes above 150,000 feet. The packages 
required no special maneuvers and no servicing other than installation just prior 
to flight, and removal after landing.77  
And a Couple More
 Researchers considered X-ray photographs important for understanding the 
problems of the solar atmosphere, which led to the “X-ray mapping of the sun” 
experiment. Instruments on sounding rockets had obtained similar photographs 
of the sun, but the excessive motion of the vehicle had greatly complicated mea-
surements. NASA installed a small pinhole camera in one of the upper bug-eye 
camera bays on the X-15 in January 1962. This experiment flew above 150,000 
feet several times between March 1962 and September 1963.78 
 The “electron-distribution determination” experiment measured electron dis-
tribution in the upper atmosphere using radiofrequency techniques. These mea-
surements of the ionosphere D-layer (often as low as 50 miles) were important for 
investigators seeking to gain a basic understanding of the ionosphere. Since the 
temporal variation of the electron distribution was important, a series of flights 
was desirable; however, there appears to be no record indicating that the experi-
ment actually flew or acquired any useful data.79 
 
 
 
76 “Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” pp. 5-6; X-5 Sta-
tus Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters,  August 96, p.  and  September 96, p. . 
77 “Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” p. 6; X-5 
Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters,  September 96, p. . In the files at the 
DFRC History Office.
78 “Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” p. 6. 
79 Ibid.
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EARLY PLANNING
 During the summer of 1961, the Air Force ASD and NASA Headquarters 
proposed a new initiative to use the X-15 to carry scientific experiments that 
were unforeseen when John Becker conceived the aircraft in 1954 . For instance, 
researchers at the  FRC wanted to use the X-15 to carry high-altitude experiments 
for the proposed Orbiting Astronomical Observatory, while others wanted to car-
ry a hypersonic ramjet for air-breathing propulsion studies. Of particular interest 
was the ability of the X-15 to carry experiments above the attenuating effects of 
the atmosphere.80 
 On 15 August 1961, the Research Airplane Committee signed a memorandum 
of understanding (MoU) to form the X-15 Joint Program Coordinating Committee 
with Air Force and NASA representatives as cochairmen. The MoU included the 
following statements:81 
The X-15 is a program of national importance undertaken 
in accordance with the terms of a Memorandum of Un-
derstanding dated 23 December 1954 among the Depart-
ment of the Air Force, Department of the Navy, and the 
NACA (now the NASA). It is recognized that the X-15 
flight research program will soon complete the initial phase 
of flight research.
It is necessary that an optimum follow-on research program 
be formulated to insure maximum benefit to the national 
objectives accrue from the research program.
An X-15 Joint Program Coordinating Committee with the 
NASA and USAF representatives in the role of co-chairman 
is hereby assigned the responsibility to formulate the opti-
mum follow-on research program for the X-15. The pro-
gram will be transmitted to the participating departments 
through normal channels and will be jointly reviewed by 
HQ [Headquarters] USAF and the NASA RAPL [Research 
Airplane Project Leader (Hartley Soulé)] prior to submittal 
to the Research Airplane Committee.
The X-15 Joint Program Coordinating Committee is rec-
ognized by the Research Airplane Committee as the focal 
point of the subject project for continuous evaluation and 
formulation of program objectives for approval of the Re-
search Airplane Committee. The establishment of a Joint 
Program Coordinating Committee is not intended to change 
80 James E. Love, “History and Development of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” not dated, p. 23. In the files at the 
DFRC History Office.
8 MoU, “X-5 Flight Research Program, signed on 5 August 96 by the Research Airplane Committee; letter, 
Hugh L. Dryden to Major General Marvin C. Demler, no subject (but referencing the MoU), 2 July 96; “Ad-
vanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” pp. 2-3. At this 
point the Research Airplane Committee included Hugh L. Dryden from NASA, Major General Marvin C. Demler 
from the Air Force, and Rear Admiral John T. Hayward from the Navy.
1 .
2 .
3 .
4 .
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the functions or responsibility of the NASA FRC-AFFTC 
Flight Test Steering Committee [later called the X-15 Joint 
Operations Committee].
 
 The initial cochairs of the X-15 Joint Program Coordinating Committee were 
Lieutenant Colonel E. F. Pezda, chief of the X-15 project office at the ASD, and 
Paul Bikle from the FRC. The committee held its first meeting on 23–25 August 
1961, during which the scientific community suggested over 40 experiments as 
suitable candidates. Hartley Soulé and John Stack proposed separating the experi-
ments into four groups.82  
 • Group I consisted of desirable experiments that did not require special 
aircraft modifications or special flight profiles. It was also initially lim-
ited to experiments that could be prepared within three to four months 
of approval .
 • Group II consisted of experiments that required “appreciable aircraft 
modifications” or a relatively long lead time for preparation.
 • Group III was a holding area for experiments that were not well defined.
 • Group IV included experiments that supported other programs (such as 
the Dyna-Soar or Apollo).
 By November 1961, a long list of possible experiments had been divided 
among the first three groups; the fourth group was not populated pending coor-
dination with other programs. The X-15 Joint Program Coordinating Committee 
met four more times (9 May 1962, 7-8 January 1963, 18 September 1963, and 16 
October 1963), and initially forwarded proposals for 28 experiments to the Re-
search Airplane Committee for approval. The committee subsequently approved 
at least three other proposals for implementation, and it appears that several others 
were assigned experiment numbers; however, the nature or purpose of some of 
them is unknown.83  
APPROVED TEST-BED EXPERIMENTS
 The final name used by the FRC for the follow-on research program was 
“test-bed experiments,” although the Research Airplane Committee and other 
sources continued to call it the “follow-on program.” The effort was formally 
announced in a news release on 13 April 1962: “The hypersonic X-15 will be-
come a ‘service’ airplane to carry out new experiments in aeronautical and space 
sciences, in a program planned to make use of its capabilities for extremely high 
82 Memorandum, Homer Newell to Hugh L. Dryden, 8 December 96, subject: X-5 follow-on program; memo-
randum, Paul F. Bikle to Hartley A. Soulé, undated (probably November 96); “Advanced Development Plan for 
X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” pp. 2-3 and 5; Love, “History and Development 
of the X-5 Research Aircraft,” p. 23; NASA news release 6-26; Linda Neuman Ezell, NASA Historical Data 
Book Volume II: Programs and Projects 1958-1968, NASA publication SP-02 (Washington, DC, NASA, 988), 
p. 507; System Package Program, System 653A, 8 May 96, p. -3. 
83 System Package Program, System 653A, pp. 6-37 through 6-8; NASA news release 62-98; X-5 news release 
62-9; letter, Hugh L. Dryden to Lieutenant General James Ferguson, 5 July 963; NASA news release 6-2.
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speeds and altitudes beyond Earth’s atmosphere. The new program adds at least 
35 flights … and may take two years to complete.” John Stack and Hubert M . 
Drake announced that an ultraviolet stellar photography experiment from the 
Washburn Observatory at the University of Wisconsin would be the first.84  
Experiment #1: Ultraviolet Stellar Photography
 The NASA Office of Space Sciences sponsored experiment #1 to investigate 
the ultraviolet emissions of large, hot stars, and the properties of interstellar me-
dia. Researchers had already obtained limited data using sounding rockets, but de-
sired additional data prior to the launch of the Orbiting Astronomical Observatory 
(OAO). The purpose of the experiment was to obtain measurements of the stellar 
brightness between 1,800 and 3,200 200 ångstroms (Å). The ozone layer blocks 
this spectrum from observation by ground-based instruments. Dr. Arthur D . Code 
and Dr . Theodore E . Houck from the Washburn Observatory at the University of 
Wisconsin designed the experiment.85  
 During December 1960, North American conducted a few runs in the 
fixed-base simulator to determine whether a pilot could fly the X-15 precisely 
enough to allow the experiment to collect useful data; the answer appeared to be 
yes. The simulations, however, pointed out the need for the reaction augmentation 
system, and were yet another driver to develop and install the system in the first 
two airplanes .86  
 Before the experiment began, researchers at the University of Wisconsin 
wanted to gather information on the ultraviolet intensity of the sky background. 
To accomplish this, they installed a photomultiplier in one of the upper bug-eye 
camera bays of X-15-1 in April 1962. The photomultiplier required power and the 
use of one recording channel, but little else in the way of support. The first flight 
of the instrument was made on 19 April 1962 (flight 1-26-46). Originally, the 
university planned to install the complete experiment in the skylight compartment 
of X-15-2 in August 1962, but scheduling priorities delayed this until December 
1962. Unfortunately, Jack McKay’s accident on flight 2-31-52 would postpone all 
future uses of X-15-2 .87  
 Ultimately, the experiment consisted of an ultraviolet “star tracker” and ho-
rizon scanner installed on a stabilized platform in the skylight compartment on 
X-15A-2 after it was modified. The star tracker first flew on flight 2-33-56 and 
functioned properly in the caged mode. The next X-15A-2 flight repeated the 
same tests. Flight 2-35-60 was intended to check out an uncaged (i.e., free to 
8 News release 62-9, “X-5 Assigned New Follow-On Research Role,” 3 April 962; System Package Program, 
System 653A, pp. 6-37 through 6-8; NASA news release 62-98; X-5 news release 62-9; letter, Hugh L. 
Dryden to Lieutenant General James Ferguson, 5 July 963; NASA news release 6-2. At this point, the 
Research Airplane Committee consisted of Hugh L. Dryden, Major General Marvin C. Demler, and Vice Admiral 
William F. Raborn.
85 System Package Program, System 653A, p. 6-37; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 
3; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  December 96, p. 6. The OAO was a series of four orbiting 
observatories launched between 966 and 972 by NASA to provide astronomical data in the ultraviolet and X-
ray wavelengths normally filtered out by the Earth’s atmosphere. Only two of the four launches were successful. 
86 System Package Program, System 653A, p. 6-37; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 
3; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  December 96, p. 6. 
87 “Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” 7 November 
96, p. 7; X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 6 April 962, p. 3. 
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move) stabilized platform without opening the skylight doors, but a blown fuse 
prevented this. The experiment was successfully checked out on the next two 
X-15A-2 flights.88 
 The experiment was carried on five additional flights (2-38-66 through 2-41-
73); however, little usable star-tracking data were obtained because of problems in 
maintaining the precise attitudes required for the experiment. Nevertheless, data 
from flight 2-39-70 confirmed speculation that the sky background was somewhat 
brighter than originally expected. The brightness gave less contrast between the 
star or constellation and the sky, making acquisition and observation more dif-
ficult. After the last flight in this series, researchers temporarily discontinued the 
experiment because of the position of the desired stars during the winter in south-
ern California. The position of the stars supported three additional flights (2-46-83 
through 2-48-85) the following summer. All of these flights were successful and 
obtained good data.89 
 Researchers determined that the atmosphere above 45 miles did not absorb 
the light from stars of moderate or larger magnitude. During flight 2-47-84, the 
experiment successfully photographed the stars Eta Aurigae, Alpha Aurigae, and 
Rho Aurigae from altitudes above 246,000 feet, which were some of the first stel-
lar ultraviolet images. In late 1966, NASA removed the experiment from X-15A-2 
in preparation for its Mach 8 envelope-expansion program.90  
Experiment #2: Ultraviolet Earth Background
 The Air Force Geophysics Research Directorate sponsored experiment #2 to 
measure the total Earth background radiation (albedo) and horizon in support of 
designing missile-warning surveillance satellites. Researchers expected that the 
Earth’s atmosphere would absorb most of the ultraviolet rays and thus appear 
very black to an ultraviolet sensor. Any missile rising from the surface of the 
Earth would show as a bright point of light in the ultraviolet, and thus could be 
easily detected. As originally envisioned, the experiment would use an array of 
spectrometers installed in the lower bug-eye camera bays. Researchers wanted to 
obtain data during each of the four seasons and at altitudes above 132,000 feet 
to be above the ozone ultraviolet absorption level, but otherwise did not require 
special flight considerations. The experiments would obtain spectral background 
data in the middle ultraviolet spectrum, high-angular-resolution data relative to 
the solar-blind ultraviolet horizon gradient, high-angular-resolution data in the 
solar-blind gradient near 3,100 Å, and vacuum ultraviolet background data. The 
 
 
88 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 3; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,” 
 December 96, p. 6. 
89 Johnny G. Armstrong, AFFTC technology document FTC-TD-69-, “Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-5A-2 
Envelope Expansion Program, July 969, pp. 2 and 3.
90 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 9 July 965,  April, and 8 August 
966; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 6,”  November 966, p. 5; Captain Ronald G. Boston, “The X-5’s 
Role in Aerospace Progress,” a paper prepared at the Department of History of the Air Force Academy, August 
978, pp. 36-37; e-mail, Marilyn Meade/University of Wisconsin to Dennis R. Jenkins, 5 June 2002. Ms Meade 
indicated that the original X-5 film was reflown onboard Spacelab  during STS-9 on 28 November 983 to 
commemorate the event.
 Chapter 8: The Research Progr am
experiment was scheduled to begin in late 1962, but was postponed almost a year 
because key Air Force personnel were busy with other projects.91  
 Researchers planned to fly the experiment on X-15-2, but a meeting on 17 
September 1962 between Captain Hugh D. Clark and Captain James H. Smith 
from the ASD, and James E. Love and Lannie D. Webb from the FRC resulted in a 
decision to use X-15-3 instead . This decision also affected the ultraviolet exhaust-
plume characteristics (#3) and infrared-exhaust-signature (#10) experiments.92 
 During the postponement, the Air Force briefly canceled the experiment 
due to a lack of funding, but ultimately reinstated it. The experiment required at 
least one flight in excess of 150,000 feet to calibrate the test package, and then 
six further flights to acquire data. The equipment consisted of a high-resolution 
Barnes ultraviolet scanning spectrometer and a solar-blind radiometer mounted 
on a stabilized platform in the tail-cone box on X-15-3. Mechanical problems 
with the experiment precluded any data collection through the end of 1963, and 
equipment and scheduling problems continued to conspire against the experiment 
until the Air Force finally canceled it in early 1965 without acquiring any useful 
data. Instead, researchers decided to concentrate their efforts on experiment #3, 
which used the same basic equipment aimed at a specific point behind the X-15 to 
measure its exhaust.93  
Experiment #3: Ultraviolet Exhaust-Plume Characteristics
 The ASD sponsored experiment #3 to measure the exhaust characteristics 
from a liquid-oxygen-ammonia rocket engine (the XLR99). It used the same ba-
sic equipment as experiment #2, without the stabilized platform. The first flight 
(3-41-64) was made on 23 April 1965 with Joe Engle at the controls. By the 
end of 1965, the high-resolution Barnes ultraviolet scanning spectrometer and 
solar-blind radiometer that had proved so troublesome on experiment #2 had 
successfully obtained good data. As a follow-up, researchers installed a Millikan 
dual-channel radiometer in X-15-3 during the weather down period at the begin-
ning of 1966, and installed a vacuum ultraviolet spectrometer later in the year. 
The Millikan radiometer flew on flight 3-55-82 but froze due to a failed heater, 
and there is no record of it flying again. Similarly, no record exists of the spec-
trometer ever being flown.94 
 
 
 
 
9 “Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” p. 8; State-
ment of work for the ultraviolet earth background experiment (#2). 
92 Trip report, Captain Hugh D. Clark/X-5 Project Office, describing a trip on 20-2 August 962 to the FRC to 
discuss the follow-on experiments program, report dated 7 September 962. In the files of the Air Force Histori-
cal Research Agency; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 35; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status 
Report No. 3,”  December 96, p. 6. 
93 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 35; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  De-
cember 96, p. 6; X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  April 966, p. 8. 
9 Ibid; X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  February 965 and  April 966; 
“X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 6,”  November 966, p. 5. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
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Experiment #4: Langley Horizon Definition
 NASA Langley sponsored experiment #4 to examine the visible and far-
infrared spectrum to determine whether certain horizon phenomena were suffi-
ciently stable to serve as Apollo space-navigation references. Researchers made the 
first observations in November 1962 from the top of a 12,000-foot mountain using 
a simple photometer and several interference filters. The data indicated that the 
“stable phenomena” hypothesis appeared to be correct, but emphasized the need 
for observations made from outside the Earth’s atmosphere using equipment that 
was more sophisticated. Researchers flew variations of the experiment on sound-
ing rockets and the X-15.95  
 Researchers installed a radiometer in the tail-cone box of X-15-3 along with 
a 16-mm motion-picture camera pointing out the rear. The camera provided wide-
angle coverage to check for clouds or haze during the data-gathering period. The 
radiometer included a motor-driven scan mirror that provided a 30-degree field of 
view, and reflected energy into a parabolic mirror that focused the energy on the 
detector. The radiation passed through an optical bandpass filter to select the ap-
propriate spectral band. The angle of the scan mirror and the output of the detector 
were recorded on an FM-FM magnetic tape recorder.96  
 The experiment first flew on 2 May 1963 (flight 3-16-26) and made five addi-
tional flights during 1963. Three of these six flights provided meaningful data for 
the MIT-Apollo horizon photometer experiment (#17). Another successful flight 
(3-30-50) on 8 July 1964 investigated the near infrared in the 0.8–2.8-micron 
region. After the flight, the experiment returned to Langley for modifications, and 
was intended to fly at least three more times. In the end, only two additional flights 
were flown during 1965 (3-42-65 and 3-44-67), since the more sophisticated MIT 
experiment had already begun flying aboard X-15-1 .
 Langley was generally happy with the X-15 as an experiment platform: “Not 
only is the design of the experiment simplified because there are few restrictions 
due to size and weight limitations, but also the availability of standard X-15 at-
titude and position data are an important advantage … the radiometer is reusable 
… and good weather data is available.” This was in contrast to sounding rockets 
that provided comparatively short flights, had minimal onboard instrumentation, 
and, of course, were not generally recoverable.97 
This experiment provided the first infrared data gathered on the Earth’s limb from 
above 30 miles. From these data, researchers modeled the horizon profile to an 
 
 
95 Anthony Jalink, Jr., “Radiation Measurements of the Earth’s Horizon,” a paper in the Progress of the X-15 Re-
search Airplane Program, a compilation of the papers presented at the FRC, 7 October 965, NASA publication 
SP-90 (Washington, DC: NASA, 965), p. 95; Carlton R. Gray, “An Horizon Definition Experiment,” AIAA paper 
no. 69-869, presented at the AIAA Guidance, Control, and Flight Mechanics Conference, Princeton, NJ, 8-20 
November 969, p. . It is often difficult to differentiate this experiment from experiment #7 (MIT-Apollo Horizon 
Photometer) in the literature since both were commonly called “horizon definition” and used similar equipment.
96 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 35; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,” 
 December 96, p. 6. In the files at the DFRC History Office; Jalink, “Radiation Measurements of the Earth’s 
Horizon,” pp. 96-98.
97 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 35; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,” 
 December 96, p. 6; X-5 Status Report No. 66-, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 
 April 966, pp. 8-9; Jalink, “Radiation Measurements of the Earth’s Horizon,” pp. 98-99.
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accuracy of 4 kilometers for use in attitude-referencing systems carried aboard 
early orbiting spacecraft.98  
Experiment #5: Photo Optical Degradation
 With the appearance of high-performance aircraft and missiles during the 
mid-1950s, designers began to be concerned with the effects of a turbulent 
boundary layer on the performance of optical equipment. As early as 1956, wind- 
tunnel researchers determined that the effects of a narrow beam of light through 
a turbulent boundary layer were a function of the free-stream Mach number and 
the density of the stream. The effects of this “light spreading” on the accuracy of 
star trackers were studied by Autonetics in 1957 and again by North American in 
connection with the B-70 program. Researchers observed the first actual effects 
of aerodynamics on aerial photography in 1957 when pictures taken from a Mc-
Donnell RF-101 Voodoo at Mach 1.4, viewed stereoscopically, provided a false 
evaluation of the terrain. This led the Army Corps of Engineers to award a contract 
to Vidya (a division of Itek Corporation) during 1959–1960 to develop a theory 
that explained the phenomena. The Navy sponsored similar work at MIT during 
1959 to determine the degrading effects of turbulent flow on the resolving power 
of cameras.99 
 The ASD sponsored this experiment to determine the degradation of optical 
imagery caused by supersonic and hypersonic shock waves, boundary layers, and 
rapid frictional heating of the photographic window. Several different experimen-
tal packages were employed using well-instrumented aerial cameras and multiple 
boundary-layer rakes.100 
 Officially called the “induced turbulence experiment,” this project sought “to 
determine the effects of aerodynamics associated with supersonic and hypersonic 
aircraft, typified by the X-15 research airplane, on the performance of (1) a high-
acuity modern camera set, exemplified by the Fairchild KS-25, and (2) a carto-
graphic camera, exemplified by the Fairchild KC-1.” The cartographic aspects 
of the experiment were of interest to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, while 
the Air Force was interested in the possible effects on tactical and strategic aerial 
reconnaissance. This experiment also used data collected by the small two-camera 
package installed in X-15-2 as part of experiment #27.101 
 This program was very involved, and significantly funded under an Air Force 
contract to North American as part of Project 6220, Photographic Reconnaissance 
Technology. The Reconnaissance Division of the Air Force Avionics Laboratory 
under the direction of Donald I. Groening coordinated the experiments. Two prin-
ciple subcontractors were also involved: Aeroflex Laboratories fabricated parts 
for the ART-15A stabilized mount, and Vidya provided theoretical and image 
98 Boston, “The X-5’s Role in Aerospace Progress,” p. 38. 
99 Air Force report AL-TR-6-328, “Influence of High-Speed Flight on Photography,” 8 January 965, pp. x-xiv. 
In the AFFTC Access to Space Office Project Files.
00 Donald I. Groening, “Investigation of High-Speed High-Altitude Photography,” a paper in the Progress of the X-15 
Research Airplane Program, a compilation of the papers presented at the FRC, 7 October 965, NASA publica-
tion SP-90 (Washington, DC: NASA, 965), p. 85.
0 “Influence of High-Speed Flight on Photography,” p. xiii; Boston, “The X-5’s Role in Aerospace Progress,” p. 2.
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analysis. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corporation provided the KS-25 cam-
era under a separate Air Force contract . The Hycon Manufacturing Company pro-
vided the camera lens and conducted resolution testing, and the Cornell Aeronau-
tical Laboratory assisted in determining the final target design.102 
Phase I
 The Army Corps of Engineers and the ASD jointly sponsored Phase I. The 
initial requirement was for three separate flight profiles: high-speed, high-alti-
tude, and one that mimicked the Mach 3 B-70 bomber. The exact profiles were 
important because the launch lakes had to be established well in advance of the 
flights so that the Air Force could erect 6 to 10 photo targets along the flight path. 
This involved removing yet more land from the public domain. The B-70 profile 
placed another constraint on the program because it required flying the XLR99 at 
40% thrust, and the early engines were incapable of doing this reliably. There was 
also a desire to photograph the same targets during Phase II.103 
 The launch lakes were Delamar and Smith Ranch. The targets would be lo-
cated along the flight path from Delamar to Edwards with single three-bar targets 
located near Pahrump and Indian Springs in Nevada, and two sets of three targets 
straddling the flight path at Pilot Knob and Cuddeback in California. The single 
target at Pahrump determined the performance of the camera primarily at the 
maximum altitude point on the high-altitude missions, while the single target at 
Indian Springs determined performance at the maximum speed point on the high-
speed profile. Triple targets at Pilot Knob and Cuddeback allowed for accumu-
lated navigation errors and measured performance at high-supersonic speeds. The 
Pilot Knob targets also measured the camera performance at the point of reentry 
from the high-altitude profile. Each target was a collection of white stripes of dif-
ferent widths on a black background (a standard Mil-Std-150A photo-calibration 
target pattern) with an additional large contract patch and two sharp edges normal 
to each other to determine the atmospheric attenuation and edge response. The Air 
Force called this the Delamar camera range.104  
 A photometric van from the Scripps Institute of Oceanography at the Uni-
versity of California was usually set up at the Pahrump site. This van had three 
photometers that measured the total sky radiance, solar radiance, and radiance 
of the surface of the target. Researchers located meteorological instrumentation 
near each target to provide compensation data for the analysis, and the Air Force 
launched standard radiosondes to support the experiment.105 
 The X-15 package for the cartographic program contained a KC-1 camera, 
an ART-15A stabilized mount, and photometric and environmental instrumenta-
tion to measure the conditions that prevailed during the time of the experiment. 
The KC-1 had been modified with a GEOCON I lens designed by Dr . J . Baker 
02 Air Force contract number AF33(600)-0765; “Influence of High-Speed Flight on Photography,” p. i; Ronald S. 
Waite/X-5 project engineer, “X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight -39-63,” 5 November 963.
03 Trip Report, Captain Hugh D. Clark/X-5 Project Office, describing a trip on 20-2 August 962 to the FRC to 
discuss the follow-on experiments program, report dated 7 September 962. In the files of the Air Force Histori-
cal Research Agency.
0 “Influence of High-Speed Flight on Photography,” pp. 7-9. 
05 Ibid, p. 23. 
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of Spica, Incorporated, to combine low distortion with relatively high acuity, and 
was adapted for operation at high altitude. The experiment package, minus the 
camera, weighed approximately 156 pounds. The KC-1 camera and lens added 
another 85–90 pounds depending on the film load, and occupied a space about 16 
inches long by 18 inches wide by 21 inches high at the bottom of the instrument 
The Photo Optical Degradation Experiment (#5) was used to determine the degradation of  opti-
cal imagery caused by supersonic and hypersonic shock waves, boundary layers, and rapid frictional 
heating of  the photographic window. Several different experimental packages were employed using 
well-instrumented aerial cameras and multiple boundary-layer rakes. Two different camera systems were 
installed in the X-15 for the experiment. (NASA)
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compartment. The GEOCON I low-distortion mapping lens had a focal length of 
6 inches and a relative aperture of f/5.6, and could provide a resolution of 37 lines 
per millimeter on Super-XX film. North American modified X-15-1 to accept a 
KC-1 camera, including modification of the ART-15 mount and the addition of an 
18-inch-diameter window that was 1.5 inches thick in the bottom of the instru-
ment compartment. The film was nominally 9 by 9 inches, and 390 feet of it were 
stored in the magazine.106 
 Bob Rushworth flew the first flight (1-33-54) with the KC-1 on 11 April 1963 
and NASA shipped the exposed film to Westover AFB in Massachusetts for pro-
cessing. The last of six flights (1-38-81) was made on 18 July 1963, again with 
Rushworth as the pilot. The majority of the detailed results are still classified, but 
a general overview is given in the Phase II discussion.107 
Phase II
 The Phase II experiment involved six data-gathering flights using X-15-1 
beginning with flight 1-42-67 on 5 December 1963, again with Rushworth as the 
pilot. As it happened, this proved to the fastest flight by a basic X-15, reaching 
Mach 6 .06 . Jack McKay flew the last flight (1-49-77) of the experiment on 30 
June 1964. Three checkout flights (1-39-62 through 1-41-65) had preceded the 
data-gathering flights.108 
 The purpose of the experiment was to obtain quantitative data to determine 
the effects of aero-thermo distortions associated with vehicles flying at hypersonic 
speeds and extreme altitudes. Researchers believed the results were directly ap-
plicable to the Lockheed A-12/SR-71 and North American B-70/RS-70 programs, 
and to “future hypersonic reconnaissance systems.” The Air Force conducted 
similar experiments (albeit at much lower speeds) using Martin RB-57D aircraft 
and high-altitude balloons.109 
 The high-acuity experiment package was somewhat more sophisticated than 
the one flown during Phase I, replacing the original KC-1 camera with a more 
sensitive KS-25. In addition to the new camera on the same ART-15A stabilized 
mount, researchers installed a small analog computer that collected signals from the 
X-15 stable platform to use for image-motion compensation and instrumentation to 
monitor the mechanical and optical performance of equipment. Seven downward-
looking photometers measured the spectral changes in light with respect to altitude 
and provided a signal to the automatic exposure control system on the KS-25. 
Two additional upward-looking photometers monitored the amount of visible light 
remaining in the upper atmosphere. Instrumentation provided a continuous record 
of the temperature on the inner and outer surfaces of the photographic window. A 
multiple-pickup boundary-layer rake determined whether the boundary layer was 
laminar or turbulent and monitored its thickness for subsequent comparison with 
06 Ibid, pp. 8, -7, and 27; Statement of work for the induced turbulence experiments (#5 and #6). In the AFFTC 
Access to Space Office Project Files. The X-5 modifications were performed under ECP X-5-55.
07 “Influence of High-Speed Flight on Photography,” pp. 8, -7, and 27. 
08 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 33; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,” 
 December 96, p. 6. 
09 “Influence of High-Speed Flight on Photography,” p. iii; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, 
p. ; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  December 96, p. 20. 
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photographic quality. A display of delta cross-range using inertial system outputs in 
the cockpit center pedestal assisted the pilot in maintaining the correct course.110 
 The KS-25 and its additional electronics weighed 325 pounds in addition 
to the 156-pound experiment support package from the earlier tests. The KC-25 
was much larger than the earlier KC-1, occupying a volume approximately 13 
inches long, 10 inches wide, and 43 inches high; this camera took up the entire 
height of the instrument compartment. Again, Dr . J . Baker of Spica built a special 
lens that had a focal length of 24 inches and a relative aperture of f/4, and could 
provide a resolution of 70–90 lines per millimeter on Super-XX film. The film 
was nominally 4.5 by 4.5 inches and 250 feet of it were stored in the magazine. 
The camera had to undergo several modifications to adapt it to the X-15 envi-
ronment. The automatic focus control was disabled since its time range was not 
compatible with the speed of the X-15, and the automatic exposure control was 
modified to fix the lens at f/4 (instead of varying it between f/4 and f/16). After 
it was modified, the Air Force tested the camera in a centrifuge at the Rocket 
Propulsion Laboratory at Edwards to determine the effects of large acceleration 
on its electromechanical properties.111 
 The X-15 flew both high-speed and high-altitude flights with the experiment, 
and the Air Force analyzed the photographs to determine the influence of the 
hypersonic flight environment on the degradation of image quality. Researchers 
deemed the image quality from four particular flights (1-42-67, 1-45-72, 1-46-73, 
and 1-47-74) to be the best, and used these data for the analysis. These flights 
varied in altitude from 101,000 feet (three flights) to 175,000 feet (1-46-73) and 
in speed from Mach 5.01 (1-46-73) to Mach 6.06 (1-42-67). NASA returned the 
experiment to the vendor for repair after it malfunctioned prior to launch on abort 
1-A-68, and reinstalled it in time for flight 1-45-72. In addition to the support 
used in Phase I of this experiment, Phase II also used a Boeing RB-47 Stratojet 
equipped to photograph the same targets just before and after the X-15 flights, 
providing researchers with a known reference.112  
 Researchers performed a laboratory analysis on the film to determine the 
extent of the deleterious effects of the flight conditions on the optical perfor-
mance of the camera system. They determined the resolution for those frames that 
contained images of the three-bar resolving power targets. They then used these 
readings to check the values of resolution obtained by making microdensitom-
eter traces of edges appearing in the photographs, converting these edge traces to 
transfer functions, and finding the intersection of these with the film threshold to 
estimate system resolution and determine the degradation in optical performance. 
The resolution ranged from less than 11 to greater than 60 lines per millimeter for 
a lens-emulsion combination whose low-contrast performance was between 80 
and 90 lines under laboratory conditions.113  
  
0 Groening, “Investigation of High-Speed High-Altitude Photography,” pp. 85-86.
 “Influence of High-Speed Flight on Photography,” pp. xiv and -2. 
2 Ronald S. Waite/X-5 project engineer, “X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight -3-69,” 22 January 96; 
Ronald S. Waite/X-5 project engineer, “X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight --70,”  April 96; “Influ-
ence of High-Speed Flight on Photography,” pp. xv and 27. 
3 “Influence of High-Speed Flight on Photography,” p. xv. 
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 Regardless of the technical considerations, the photography proved to be 
rather spectacular. On each flight the camera exposed a frame with the X-15 still 
attached to the NB-52 to use as a reference. This frame almost always had a reso-
lution of over 80 lines per millimeter. On one flight the X-15 photographed the 
Indian Springs target while at Mach 5.47 and 101,400 feet, when the temperatures 
on the camera window were –4 degrees on the inner surface and +287°F on the 
outer surface. The resolution of the photograph was 60 lines per millimeter.114 
 Other examples included a photograph of Indian Springs AFB taken at Mach 
5.43 and 120,000 feet, with inner and outer window temperatures of –1°F and 
+321°F, respectively. Three aircraft parked on the ramp of the base were readily 
identifiable. Another photo taken at Mach 4.37 and 169,600 feet also had a 60-line 
resolution. Researchers determined from these tests that the photographic quality 
obtained at high speeds and altitudes was acceptable. Researchers also performed 
a subjective analysis of the image quality for the bulk of the photographs in an 
effort to find some correlation between image quality and certain data from the 
flight environment. However, they could not establish any direct relationship.115  
 In the latter part of Phase II, researchers also tested several experimental 
near-infrared color films for the first time in flight. Various reports indicate that 
the X-15 flights led directly to the use of near-infrared color film during the con-
flict in Southeast Asia (the heat-sensitive colored emulsions showed enemy activ-
ity under the dense jungle canopy). Researchers soon adopted similar techniques 
for Earth-resource photography.116 
Conclusions
 The experiment had its share of problems. In addition to the accumulated 
navigation errors experienced on most flights that often precluded directly over-
flying the targets, numerous equipment malfunctions plagued the experiment. For 
instance, both the KC-l and KS-25 incorporated a vacuum system that used a 
sense line routed from the experiment to ambient pressure in the aircraft’s liquid-
nitrogen bay. Sporadic malfunctions occurred that resulted in loss of vacuum and, 
hence, loss of data. A survey of six flights showed that three of them experienced 
problems with the vacuum system.117  
 The researchers did not believe the experiment was particularly conclusive, 
since there were many unanswered questions. For instance, researchers found iso-
lated instances of high-quality images being obtained at speeds between Mach 2.5 
and 6 at altitudes of 55,000–100,000 feet. However, they also noted nonperiodic 
image smears that evidently arose from image motion that was not accounted for 
in the flight data by vibration, aircraft motion, or stabilizer-mount movements. 
This behavior limited the analysis of the experimental results. Still, researchers 
concluded that the distortion of the quartz window due to thermal effects had a 
negligible effect on resolution, and that scattering from the turbulent boundary 
layer was not severe and its optical effects were slight in any case.118  
 Groening, “Investigation of High-Speed High-Altitude Photography,” pp. 86-87.
5 Ibid, pp. 87-88.
6 Boston, “The X-5’s Role in Aerospace Progress,” pp. 2-3.
7 Ronald S. Waite/X-5 project engineer, “X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight -38-6,” 30 July 963.
8 “Influence of High-Speed Flight on Photography,” pp. xv-xvi. 
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 It was also determined that the mathematical model used to predict the opti-
cal performance gave good agreement with the measured performance, and that 
further improvements in the method could not be made using the results of these 
X-15 flights. Like Phase I, the detailed results of Phase II remain classified.119 
 However, it is likely that the results of this experiment are no longer ter-
ribly applicable. Although the 3-arc-second cameras tested on the X-15 appar-
ently showed a negligible impact from the hypersonic aero-thermo environment, 
the increased sensitivity of the more-modern 0.5-arc-second (or better) cameras 
may well be subject to significant degradation from shock waves and boundary-
layer flow. 
Experiment #6: Earth Atmospheric Degradation Effects 
 The Air Force combined experiment #6, originally known as the “environ-
mental effects on optical measurements” experiment, with experiment #5.120 
Experiment #7: Electric Side-Stick Controller
 The ASD and FRC jointly sponsored this experiment to address pilots’ 
complaints about the feel of the side-stick controllers in the X-15. Side-stick con-
trollers were of interest because of the relatively small cockpit space they re-
quired and the better support they provided for the pilot’s arm under accelerated 
flight conditions. Pilots criticized the side stick in the X-15 because of the adverse 
feel characteristics caused by connecting it mechanically to the center stick and 
the power actuators that moved the control surfaces. As in the much-later F-16, 
there was no mechanical linkage between the electric side stick and the flight-
control system, and the electric side-stick would have transmitted instructions 
to the MH-96 adaptive control system to fly the airplane. In addition to provid-
ing a better control system for the X-15, the electric side-stick program would 
have provided experience applicable to the Dyna-Soar. By the end of 1962, North 
American had begun flight-testing a modified F-100C equipped with an electric 
side stick, but these tests were not completely successful. The Air Force put plans 
to install the electric side stick in the X-15 fixed-base simulator on hold, and then 
canceled the experiment at the end of 1963 when the Dyna-Soar program abruptly 
ended . NASA never installed the electric side stick in X-15-3 .121 
Experiment #8: Detachable High-Temperature Leading Edge
 The ASD and FRC sponsored experiment #8 to look at various leading-edge 
concepts suitable for use on future high-speed vehicles. Researchers wanted to 
evaluate four concepts: 1) a segmented leading edge that allowed thermal ex-
9 “Influence of High-Speed Flight on Photography,” pp. xv-xvi; X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/
NASA Headquarters,  April 966, p. 9. 
20 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  December 96, p. 6. 
2 “Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” 7 November 
96, p. 5; Trip report, Captain Hugh D. Clark/X-5 project office, describing a trip on 20-2 August 962 to the 
FRC to discuss the follow-on experiments program, report dated 7 September 962. In the files of the Air Force 
Historical Research Agency; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  December 96, p. 6. 
X-15: EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
pansion in a number of segments to occur away from the primary restraint; 2) a 
thin-skin, refractory-metal concept that relied on a low coefficient of expansion to 
minimize thermal stresses; 3) a prestressed leading edge that used a mechanically 
or thermally applied prestress system; and 4) a nonmetallic leading edge that 
contained an ablative material (much like North American’s X-15 proposal).122  
 The original X-15 wing and empennage leading edges used a round profile 
to minimize the effects of heating. NASA (particularly Ames) had wanted re-
movable wing leading edges to allow different designs to be tested during the 
flight program, but these disappeared early in the development period. After the 
basic envelope expansion was completed, various researchers in the Air Force and 
NASA became interested in reviving the idea. Since replacing the wing leading 
edge would have required an extensive wing redesign, researchers decided to find 
an alternate way. The selected method was to modify a ventral rudder to accom-
modate leading edges manufactured from René 41 and tantalum, and the modified 
rudders were ready for flight in mid-1966. However, it is unlikely that they ever 
flew, given that X-15A-2 was the only aircraft to fly with the ventral rudder during 
the time the modified units were available.123 
 Sharp-leading-edge studies that were intended to evaluate various heating 
theories were also part of this experiment. The standard X-15 rudder had a lead-
ing-edge radius of 0.5 inch over the very forward 0.6 inch of chord. The sharp-
leading-edge modification extended the leading edge of the dorsal rudder 5.16 
inches forward, resulting in an overall chord of 9.00 feet. This sharp 347-stain-
less-steel leading edge had a radius of only 0.015 inch at the tip, and essentially 
had a knife-edge shape. To ensure turbulent flow along one side of the rudder, 
researchers placed boundary-layer trips consisting of spot welds 0.125 inch in 
diameter and 0.020 inch high on the right side approximately 5 inches from the 
leading edge.124 
 To gather data on flights with the sharp rudder, researchers mounted an Inco-
nel X shear-layer rake impact probe on the left side of the sharp-leading-edge rud-
der 27 inches aft of the leading edge and 12 inches from the top. Eleven 30-gage 
chromel-alumel thermocouples were spot-welded to the inside surface of the skin, 
equally spaced chord-wise on the right side of the rudder 22 inches from the top. 
NASA installed six 0.25-inch-diameter pressure orifices near the thermocouples 
and connected the surface orifices and impact probes to standard NACA manome-
ters in the side fairing of the fuselage. Similar instrumentation on a blunt-leading-
edge rudder on X-15-2 collected baseline data; however, in this case the impact 
probe was on the right side 95 inches from the front of leading edge and 22 inches 
from the top of the rudder. The location of the probes was changed because the 
researchers wanted to gather slightly different data.125  
22 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 36; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,” 
 December 96, p. 6. 
23 System Package Program, System 653A, 8 May 96, p. 6-39; X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. 
Martin/NASA Headquarters,  April 966, p. 9. 
2 Ronald P. Banas, NASA technical memorandum X-36, “Comparison of Measured and Calculated Turbulent 
Heat Transfer in a Uniform and Nonuniform Flow Field on the X-5 Upper Vertical Fin at Mach Numbers of .2 
and 5.3,” 28 May 965, pp. 25-26. Often the leading-edge profile is quoted as a diameter instead of a radius; the 
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25 Ibid, pp. , and 25-27. 
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 The sharp rudder first flew on X-15-3 on 7 November 1963 (3-23-39) with 
Bob Rushworth at the controls. Several flights using X-15-2 had already gath-
ered baseline data with the standard configuration. The X-15-3 would carry the 
sharp rudder through flight 3-33-54, when NASA removed it to install additional 
instrumentation. A normal rudder borrowed from X-15-1 replaced it for flight 
3-34-55 . NASA reinstalled the sharp rudder in time for flight 3-35-57, and X-15-3 
continued to fly with it until the airplane was lost. The tests allowed researchers 
to validate various heating theories for both the blunt- and sharp-leading-edge 
shapes. In general, the theories fell into two groups: those that closely predicted 
the flight results (Moeckel and Love), and those that overestimated the heat trans-
fer by 30–50% (Eckert).126 
Experiment #9: Landing Computer
 The ASD sponsored experiment #9 to test a landing computer developed by 
Sperry in conjunction with the MH-96 installation on X-15-3 . The Air Force can-
celed the experiment prior to completion, but combined elements of it with ex-
periment #14.127 
Experiment #10: Infrared Exhaust Signature
 The Air Force Geophysics Research Directorate sponsored experiment #10, 
with Leonard P. Marcotte as the principal investigator, to determine the infrared 
characteristics of a liquid-oxygen-ammonia rocket engine. This was conceptually 
similar to experiment #3 except that it involved the infrared spectrum instead of 
the ultraviolet. Measurements had been made of the signatures from Atlas and 
Titan ICBM engines; however, no measurements from oxygen-ammonia engines 
were available. Researchers wanted the data to use as part of a missile-detection 
system. The primary instrument was a Block Associates E-8 infrared radiometer 
that measured radiation in four spectral regions by focusing radiation through a 
calcium fluoride lens and four selective filters onto a lead sulfide detector. The 
range of the detectors was 2.5–7.0 microns. Personnel from the Cambridge Re-
search Laboratory accomplished pre- and postflight checkouts of the package.128  
 The experiment was carried in the tail-cone box of X-15-3 on seven flights 
during 1963 and early 1964, but because of mechanical problems, data were 
obtained on only a single mission. Researchers asked for four additional flights 
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during late 1964, but apparently no flights were made. The detailed results are 
still classified.129 
Experiment #11: High-Temperature Windows
 The ASD sponsored experiment #11 to investigate various transparent mate-
rials in the high-temperature environment. The rapid buildup of temperature and 
dynamic force as cold structures reentered the atmosphere at hypersonic veloci-
ties created severe problems for the window designers. The window design and 
installation technique were critically important since both affected the heat trans-
fer between the airframe and the transparency, as well as between the outer and 
inner window surfaces. NASA instrumented the X-15-2 canopy windows, as well 
as the center-of-gravity compartment windows, to provide precise temperature 
data. Among other things, the experiment tested the fused silica windows used on 
the photo optical degradation experiment (#5). The experiment acquired useful 
data on several flights during 1963.130  
 Proposals were later made to modify the experiment to test an X-20 window 
and retainer during high-speed flights on the X-15. Researchers wanted to install 
the window on one of the X-15-2 lower speed brakes and expose it to variable 
dynamic pressures on several Mach 6 flights during 1964. These plans never came 
to fruition after Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara canceled the Dyna-Soar 
program in December 1963. Nevertheless, X-15A-2 carried an instrumented win-
dow in the fixed portion of its ventral stabilizer for five flights during early 1966. 
Among other things, researchers used these flights to investigate whether ablator 
smoke and residue would adhere to the glass enough to hinder vision through the 
windshield; they concluded that it would.131  
Experiment #12: Atmospheric-Density Measurements
 Given the increased operations of both high-altitude manned vehicles and mil-
itary missiles, the Air Force considered it important to determine the atmospheric 
density at altitudes above 100,000 feet as well as the day-to-day variation. As origi-
nally envisioned, the experiment would have used an alphatron ionization gage in 
a modified wing tip (this experiment predated the wing-tip pod concept) on X-15-2 
that was outside the contamination caused by the APU and ballistic control ex-
hausts. The measurements placed no constraints on the flight path or trajectory.132 
 The engineers could not find a reasonable way to mount the ionization gage, 
so the researchers rescoped the experiment to perform analytical research using 
29 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 3; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,” 
 December 96, p. 6; Statement of work for the infrared exhaust signature experiment (#0). In the AFFTC 
Access to Space Office Project files. 
30 System Package Program, System 653A, 8 May 96, p. 6-39; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” Oc-
tober 963, pp. 36-37; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  December 96, p. 7. 
3 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, pp. 36-37; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,” 
 December 96, p. 7; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,”  April 965, p. 2; X-5 Status Report, Paul 
F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  April 966, pp. 9-0; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 7,” 
0 May 967, pp. 22-23. 
32 “Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” 7 November 
96, p. 9. 
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air data gathered by the normal X-15 ball nose and stable platform. Density-height 
profiles in the stratosphere and mesosphere were obtained from measurements of 
impact pressure, velocity, and altitude on two flights (2-14-28 and 2-20-36) in 
1961 and four more (3-16-26, 3-20-31, 3-21-32, and 3-22-36) in 1963. The re-
searchers noted that the modern recorders in X-15-3 provided more precise data, 
but the X-15 pressure-measuring system had a substantial lag in it, which made 
it difficult to perform an exact analysis. The density computations used a form of 
the Rayleigh pitot formula, and the data agreed well with measurements made by 
Arcas rocketsondes launched at Point Mugu around the time of the X-15 flights. 
The X-15 data generally indicated 5–7% greater densities than the standard pre-
dicted values at altitudes between 110,000 and 150,000 feet .133 
 The Air Force Geophysics Research Directorate sponsored a follow-on ex-
periment to determine the atmospheric density at high altitudes to provide data 
for the designers of future aerospace vehicles. The wing-tip pods finally allowed 
researchers to measure atmospheric impact pressure with a densatron ionization 
gage installed in the nose of the right wing-tip pod on X-15-1. The College of 
Engineering at the University of Michigan built the experiment under Air Force 
contract. Researchers used two flights (1-50-79 and 1-51-81) to check out the 
installation and measure temperatures in the instrument. NASA then installed a 
small amount of radioactive tritium in the gage to measure the atmospheric den-
sity above 90,000 feet.134 
 The intended goal of obtaining atmospheric density profiles on a regular basis 
was never realized; in fact, the experiment only flew on three more flights (five 
flights in four years). As the researchers later commented, “The research activity 
undertaken here was valuable if for no other reasons than to point out the numer-
ous restrictions associated with a manned rocket vehicle.”135 
 An analysis of the data showed that despite predictions that the wing-tip pods 
would be outside the interference area, the experiment was limited below 100,000 
feet by the bow shock-wave interference, and above 240,000 feet by the residue 
from the ballistic control-system thrusters. In between those altitudes, the thrust-
ers intermittently biased the gage output; however, researchers could still obtain 
sufficient data for useful analysis.136  
Experiment #13: Micrometeorite Collection
 The Air Force Geophysics Research Directorate sponsored experiment #13 
to collect samples of micrometeorites and extraterrestrial dust at altitudes above 
150,000 feet. This was the initial impetus to manufacture the wing-tip pods, and 
researchers installed a collector in the nose of the left wing-tip pod on X-15-1 . At 
33 Earl J. Montoya and Terry J. Larson, NASA technical memorandum X-56009, “Stratosphere and Mesosphere 
Density-Height Profiles Obtained with the X-5 Airplane.”
3 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 3; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  
December 96, p. 7; Statement of work for the atmospheric density measurements experiment (#2). In the 
AFFTC Access to Space Office Project files. Air Force contract number AF9(628)-333 (Project 6020, Task 
606002).
35 Jack J. Horvath and Gary F. Rupert, University of Michigan report 06093--F, “Pitot Measurements on an X-5 
Rocket Plane,” August 968, pp. 2 and 38.
36 Ibid, pp. 38-39.
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high altitude and low dynamic pressure, the lid opened from the rear to a vertical 
position on top of the wing. As it lifted, rotating upward toward the front, it also 
swiveled so that the underside of the lid faced the aircraft fuselage and exposed 
the collector to the air stream. The collector then “broke seal” to expose a rotat-
ing collection surface behind an orifice in the side of the collector unit. The unit 
rotated to six different positions during the collection, and the location served to 
indicate the time of the event.137 
 During flight 1-50-79 the collector door inadvertently opened during the exit 
phase and remained so for the remainder of the flight, but fortunately did not 
cause serious damage. The collector was flown on flight 1-51-81, without ex-
posing the collection device, to determine the amount of contamination resulting 
from ground handling. The plan was to operate the collector on as many high-al-
titude flights of the X-15 as possible.138 
 The experiment flew on flight 1-63-104, but the altitude attained on the flight 
was not sufficient to provide meaningful data, and an engine problem forced an 
emergency landing on Delamar Lake. After Jack McKay landed the X-15, the 
ground crew noticed that the collector box had extended, although they could not 
determine when this occurred. A postflight inspection revealed that the retraction 
mechanism was not functioning properly, and NASA returned the experiment to 
North American for repair.139 
 The experiment malfunctioned during preflight testing prior to flight 3-55-82 
and NASA removed it from the aircraft. After it was modified to increase its reli-
ability, the experiment flew on flight 1-65-108 to an altitude of 241,800 feet, but 
the collection rotor jammed in its second position. Subsequently, the experiment 
flew on both X-15-1 and X-15-3 and collected some particles during six flights. 
Unfortunately, residue from the ballistic control-system thrusters had contami-
nated the particles, and the Air Force canceled the experiment.140 
Experiment #14: Advanced Integrated Flight-Data and  
Energy-Management Systems 
 The ASD and FRC jointly sponsored experiment #14. “A [principal] objective 
of this program is to obtain information to be applied to problems of design and 
use of advanced flight control equipment for vehicles which reenter the atmosphere 
from Earth orbits. Accordingly, a primary goal in the EMS design work has been to 
include the features of advanced orbital re-entry energy management systems to the 
maximum extent compatible with the X-15 vehicle and the flight control hardware 
37 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 33; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  De-
cember 96, p. 7; Statement of work for the micrometeorite collection experiment (#3); X-5 Status Report 
66-8, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 8 August 966, p. 6. Initially, NASA and North American 
studied the installation of some sort of bulge on or near the wing tip; however, subsequent analysis indicated that 
this led to unexpected aero-thermo problems, and the idea was abandoned. Next came a study of an external 
store that could be suspended beneath the X-5 wing; this too had aero-thermo problems. The wing-tip solution 
had the fewest problems and was the easiest to implement, although the wings did have to be largely disas-
sembled so that wires could be run to connect to the pods.
38 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 33; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,” 
 December 96, p. 7. 
39 X-5 Status Report 66-5, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  May 966, p. 7. 
0 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 6,”  November 966, p. 2; Boston, “The X-5’s Role in Aerospace Prog-
ress,” p. 37.
 Chapter 8: The Research Progr am
to be tested.” To this end, the Air Force contracted with Bell Aerosystems to de-
velop a suitable unit targeted at the Dyna-Soar program. Robert W. Austin and John 
M. Ryken at Bell led the work on Advanced Technology Program (ATP) 667A.141 
 James E. Love and Melvin E. Burke from the FRC, and Lieutenant Colonel 
Elmer F. Smith, director of the X-15 Project Office at Wright-Patterson AFB, 
worked out an MoU for including the Advanced Integrated Flight Control System 
(AIFCS) in the X-15 flight program. Smith signed the MoU on 9 September 1963 
and Paul Bikle signed it on 12 September.142 
 Essentially the MoU indicated that the Air Force would be responsible for 
funding the development program, testing the system prior to its installation in an 
X-15, and maintaining the system after it was delivered. The FRC would handle 
the actual flight research program and provide a digital computer to upgrade the 
fixed-base simulator. The MoU stated that the X-15 Joint Program Coordinating 
Committee would determine the installation and flight schedule after “a reason-
able reliability shall be demonstrated … as evidence in laboratory tests, rocket 
sled tests and finally flight tests in a Douglas F5D Skyray prior to the initiation of 
installation modifications of the X-15 airplane.”143 
 The Bell system was extensively simulated using an analog system to experi-
ment with different control-loop arrangements, and an IBM 7090 digital computer 
to work out the problems associated with the digital programming. The results 
showed that the system performed well in a range of missions covering the X-15 
flight envelope. Although Bell would design the system, Litton Industries would 
program it into one of their digital flight computers. The energy-management 
system (EMS) used slightly more than 3,000 words of memory and “about 15- 
percent of real-time on the Litton Flight Data System computer.” The X-15-3 car-
ried the system because it required the MH-96 adaptive flight-control system.144 
 Probably the most significant change from the system designed for Dyna-Soar 
was the use of an artificial dynamic pressure limit to ensure that the X-15 stayed 
within dynamic (q) and thermal limits. The decision to use a q-limit instead of di-
rectly using temperature as a control variable (as in the case of the Dyna-Soar) was 
the result of discussions among Air Force, Bell, and NASA personnel. The use of 
q-limits eliminated the need to instrument the exterior of the X-15 to obtain addi-
tional temperature data. The only inputs the system needed were dynamic pressure 
and altitude-rate information. The EMS performed four basic functions:145
 Bell report 776-935002, “An Energy Management System Design for Flight Testing in the X-5,” 20 April 963. 
The Dyna-Soar system was being developed under Air Force contract AF33(66)-763 “Study and Preliminary 
Design of an Energy Management Computer for Winged Vehicles.” The X-5 system was developed under Air 
Force contract AF33(657)-8330 “Advanced Energy Management System for Re-entry Vehicles.”
2 Memorandum of Understanding between the NASA Flight Research Center and USAF X- Systems Project 
Office relating to the X-5 airplane and the advanced integrated flight control system, (USAF Advanced Technol-
ogy Program 667A), 9 September 963; memorandum, James E. Love/X-5 program manager to Paul F. Bikle, 
subject: Seventh bi-monthly meeting of participants in RTD advanced integrated flight data system program (ATP 
667A), 7 October 963. Both in the files at the DFRC History Office.
3 Ibid.
 Bell report 776-935002, “ pp. ii-iii. The IBM 7090 was a transistorized version of the IBM 700-series and was 
equipped with 32 Kbytes of 36-bit core memory and a hardware floating-point unit. Fortran was its most popular 
language. IBM 7090s controlled the Mercury and Gemini space flights, the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System 
(until well into the 980s), and the CTSS time-sharing system at MIT. 
5 Bell report 776-935002, pp. -5. In itself, this was not an issue with the X-5 since it was already well instru-
mented; however, the idea was to demonstrate a method that could be used on an operational vehicle that might 
not be equipped with temperature transducers. This concept would prove to be very useful in the development 
of the Space Shuttle.
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Computation of vehicle total maneuver potential, forma-
tion of a nondimensional ground area attainable, and gen-
eration of angle of attack and bank commands for vehicle 
destination maneuvering.
Computation of the minimum value of dynamic pressure 
attainable at the next pullout (perigee) point and genera-
tion of override commands required to insure that pullout 
conditions do not reach critical values .
Computations to nondimensionalize measured dynamic 
pressure and generation of override commands for α [an-
gle of attack] and ∅ [bank angle] to ensure that present 
dynamic pressure and aerodynamic heating do not reach 
critical values. (A similar loop for control of “g” loading 
was not contained within the EMS since this was already 
provided in the Honeywell [MH-96] adaptive flight control 
system for the X-15.)
Computations to nondimensionalize measured rate of 
change of altitude and generation of commands to damp 
phugoid motions (long-period oscillations along the lon-
gitudinal axis).
 The pilot could select either an automatic or manual energy-management 
mode. In the manual mode, the system displayed the results of the energy-man-
agement computations to the pilot but did not take any independent action. This 
allowed the pilot to fly the correct energy-management profile or to deviate from 
it as needed. In the automatic mode, the system displayed the same information to 
the pilot but also sent commands directly to the MH-96 to fly the desired reentry 
profile. The system was programmed to arrive at high key with “sufficient energy 
for the pilot to accomplish the final descent and landing with considerable energy 
reserve.” Interestingly, the system did not direct the X-15 toward any particular 
heading over high key, so the pilot had to use some of the excess energy to estab-
lish a heading that would allow him to land.146 
 As development progressed, there were concerns that the system was requir-
ing too much power and cooling. Jim Love and Lannie D. Webb from the FRC 
first voiced these concerns during a meeting on 17 September 1962 with Captain 
Hugh D. Clark and Captain James H. Smith from the ASD. Love indicated that the 
electrical demands were so high that the X-15-3 electrical system would have to 
be “beefed up” to accommodate the new system. Whereas the original Sperry sta-
ble platform required 1.4 pounds per minute of cooling, the new system required 
over 6.3 pounds per minute. The original Litton computer was finally tested in 
the NASA F5D (BuNo 142350/NASA 213) in late 1964, despite an initial intent 
to begin testing in January 1964. The F5D portion of the program ended on 31 
March 1965 after 17 flights.147 
6 Ibid, pp. 7-8. 
7 Trip report, Captain Hugh D. Clark/X-5 Project Office, describing a trip on 20-2 August 962 to the Flight 
Research Center to discuss the Follow-On Experiments Program, report dated 7 September 962. In the files 
of the Air Force Historical Research Agency; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,”  April 965, p. 3. 
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 This experiment was reoriented in October 1964 to use Honeywell equip-
ment instead of the originally procured Litton components. The centerpiece was 
an H-387 digital computer hooked to a new Lear Siegler instrument panel. In 
addition to conducting the experiments that were initiated under ATP 667A, re-
searchers later included studies of pilot displays, energy management, and pilot-
ing problems during the exit phase of high-performance vehicles. The program 
expected to make 16 flights in X-15-3 to cover most of the flight envelope.148 
 As finally defined for the X-15 program, this experiment was an evaluation 
of vertical-tape displays, energy-management concepts and techniques, and com-
mand guidance for boost and trajectory control. The equipment consisted of a 
Honeywell inertial system, coupler, and computer; a Honeywell AN/AYK-5 Alert 
digital computer; a Lear Siegler cockpit instrument panel with vertical-tape dis-
plays; the Honeywell MH-96 adaptive control system; and the ball nose . NASA 
installed the system in X-15-3 during the weather down period in early 1966.149 
 Another part of the experiment was to test a boost-guidance technique and 
display that had been developed by the Ames Research Center and was called, 
logically enough, the Ames boost-guidance evaluation. For the most part, the ex-
periment consisted of additional programming for the Alert computer. Data was 
displayed on the horizontal pointer of the three-axis attitude indicator, making it 
a “fly-to-null” display of altitude error plus altitude rate error. This change ulti-
mately confused Mike Adams, and on flight 3-65-97 contributed to the loss of 
X-15-3. Researchers flew it for the first time on flight 3-58-87 to evaluate needle 
movement on the display. A postflight review of the cockpit film showed that the 
cross-pointer was moving as expected since the guidance parameters stored in 
the computer were not representative of the planned flight. Subsequent flights 
programmed the boost-guidance software to match the desired flight profile. On 
future flights, the pilot was to fly the boost portion using the boost-guidance pro-
gram as long as the display of pitch attitude was within +2 degrees of the planned 
flight path. The experiment seemed to function as expected.150  
 Overall, the entire integrated flight-data system appeared to work well enough 
during the next 14 flights. Its performance on its last flight is more open to debate.
Experiment #15: Heat-Exchanger System or Vapor-Cycle Cooling
 The ASD sponsored experiment #15 to verify performance estimates for evap-
orators and condensers at zero gravity. Researchers wanted to mount the experi-
ment in the instrument compartment of X-15-1 during four high-altitude flights 
with a large zero-g parabola at the top. The first of the Garrett AiResearch heat 
exchangers (excess units from the canceled Dyna-Soar) arrived in early November 
1964. North American conducted the initial performance tests in Inglewood during 
8 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 35; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  De-
cember 96, p. 7; X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  April 965, p. 7; 
“X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,”  April 965, p. 3. 
9 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  April 966, p. 0. 
50 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 3 March 967, p.  and 0 May 967, 
p. ; memorandum, Elmor J. Adkins/X-5 Project Office to Assistant Division Chief, Research Projects, subject: 
Preliminary report on X-5 flight 3-58-87, 0 May 967; memorandum, Elmor J. Adkins/X-5 Project Office to As-
sistant Division Chief, Research Projects, subject: Preliminary report on X-5 flight 3-6-95, 3 November 967. 
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late November, and the unit underwent centrifuge tests at the Rocket Propulsion 
Laboratory at Edwards in mid-December 1964. Engineers tested the units aboard 
a KC-135 in early 1965 and scheduled the installation in X-15-1 for mid-1965.151 
 However, the experiment faced several challenges. The most pressing was 
that starting the large compressor needed to cool the equipment required more 
power than was available on either the X-15 or the NB-52. Engineers thought 
that installing larger alternators in the NB-52 might be possible, but the wiring on 
the carrier and the X-15 would have to be upgraded to a heavier gage to handle 
the load. Another possible method would be to start the compressor using ground 
power before takeoff since the X-15 APUs could supply the operating load, with-
out starting the compressor. The compressor was equipped with an automatic shut-
off feature that could detect a failure of one of the X-15 APUs; a single unit could 
not supply both the experiment and the airplane, and the airplane came first.152  
 Difficulties in bringing the experiment up to the safety standards demanded 
by the X-15 program delayed the experiment for over a year. As it ended up, 
NASA never installed the hardware on an X-15 and the experiment was moved to 
the Apollo Applications Program, which itself never got off the ground.153
 Experiment #16: Rarefied Wake-Flow Experiment
 The FRC sponsored a rather fanciful concept known as the “rarefied wake-
flow” experiment. Initially the plan was to tow an inflatable plastic sphere behind 
the X-15. By measuring the tension on the tow rope and analyzing photographs, 
the researchers hoped to determine the atmospheric density above 200,000 feet 
and the drag characteristics of a towed sphere in free-molecular-flow regions, 
assess the effect of vehicle flow fields, and study supersonic wakes. Additional 
investigations included the motion of a towed drag body and the viability of inflat-
able reentry vehicle deceleration devices.154 
 The experiment was modified so that a small Mylar balloon could be released 
(instead of towed) from the tail-cone box on X-15-3 at altitudes above 250,000 
feet to investigate the properties of supersonic wakes at low densities. The ex-
periment would require two flights above 300,000 feet using balloons original-
ly procured for Project Mercury, and researchers wanted four additional flights 
above 250,000 feet using somewhat sturdier balloons. Two unsuccessful attempts 
(flights 3-21-32 and 3-22-36) to release a Mercury balloon occurred in mid-1963, 
marking the end of this idea.155  
 The experiment ended up using a Pace flow transducer mounted in the for-
ward section of the X-15 left wing-tip pod. This installation negated many of the 
5 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 3; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,” 
 December 96, pp. 7-8. 
52 Trip report, Captain Hugh D. Clark/X-5 Project Office, describing a trip on 20-2 August 962 to the FRC to 
discuss the follow-on experiments program, report dated 7 September 962. 
53 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  April 966, pp. 0-. 
5 System Package Program, System 653A, 8 May 96, pp. 6-0 and 6-.
55 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 36. These balloons were 30 inches in diameter and 
could be folded, packaged, and housed with their own gas expansion bottle in a very small space. The balloons 
had been used on Mercury for various experiments in space. See Lloyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Greenwood, 
and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury (Washington, DC: NASA, 966), pp.  
and others.
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original secondary objectives of the experiment. The revised experiment called 
for flights above 300,000 feet, which resulted in very few flight opportunities, 
and by December 1964 it was determined that flights above 250,000 feet would 
be sufficient. (Only four program flights were above 300,000 feet, while 15 others 
got above 250,000 feet.) The experiment was an evaluation of a mechanical trans-
ducer for rarefied-flow measurement and measured upper-atmosphere ambient 
density. NASA carried the experiment on a “standby” status to replace experiment 
#13 if opportunity allowed, but by the end of 1965 the experiment apparently still 
had not flown. In April 1966 the ballast nose cone for the wing-tip pods was modi-
fied to accept the Pace transducer, allowing the experiment to be installed in either 
wing-tip pod on either X-15-1 or X-15-3. The experiment flew several times on 
each airplane during 1966 and 1967.156 
Experiment #17: MIT-Apollo Horizon Photometer 
 The Office of Manned Space Flight sponsored experiment #17 to measure the 
Earth’s horizon-intensity profile as a function of altitude to different wavelengths 
in the visible spectrum. This was officially called the “simultaneous photographic 
horizon scanner experiment,” and was in many respects a follow-on to the Lang-
ley horizon definition experiment (#4) using much more sophisticated equipment. 
The MIT project was large and wide-ranging, using various aircraft, sounding 
rockets, as well as Mercury and Gemini spacecraft, to carry radiometers to mea-
sure the Earth’s infrared horizon. Of these, the X-15 carried the largest and most 
sophisticated package to define the Earth’s limb for use as an artificial horizon 
for the space sextant carried aboard the Apollo spacecraft. Researchers designed 
the sextant as a backup device in the event of a radar or communications failure. 
NASA installed a single Phase I and two Phase II experiments on X-15-1 .157  
 The interim Phase I system was a fixed platform in the tail-cone box sup-
porting three MIT Instrument Laboratory-designed photosensitive instruments (a 
photomultiplier photometer, a solid-state photometer, and a camera) pointing aft 
and approximately aligned with the aircraft thrust axis. Researchers evaluated 
the fixed platform during flight 1-51-81, and flew four additional flights to obtain 
photometer output levels.158 
 The Phase II experiment contained a spectral photometer, a camera, and a star 
tracker mounted on a three-axis stabilized platform in the tail-cone box that isolated 
it from X-15 attitudes. Researchers designed the star tracker to acquire Polaris, and 
the gimbaled system could control horizon-scan rates to obtain the most useful data 
independent of aircraft maneuvering. A door that opened above 100,000 feet cov-
ered all of the instruments during the X-15 exit phase. NASA installed the Phase 
II experiment in X-15-1 during the weather down period in early 1966. The initial 
plan was to fly a single flight to 220,000 feet as a checkout of the system, and then 
56 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  April and  May 966; “X-5 Semi-
Annual Status Report No. 3,”  December 96, p. 8; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 6,”  November 
966, p. 2. 
57 Boston, “The X-5’s Role in Aerospace Progress,” pp. 38-39.
58 Carlton R. Gray, “An Horizon Definition Experiment,” AIAA paper no. 69-869, presented at the AIAA Guidance, 
Control, and Flight Mechanics Conference, Princeton, NJ, 8-20 November 969, p. ; “X-5 Semi-Annual Sta-
tus Report No. 3,”  December 96, p. 8. 
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fly four data-gathering flights to 250,000 feet under various seasonal sun-angle and 
atmospheric conditions with the system pointed approximately true north.159 
 Flight 1-63-104 was the checkout for part 1 of Phase II, and postflight in-
spection showed that the experiment was in good condition despite the emer-
gency landing. The experiment flew on flights 1-65-108, 1-66-111, 1-67-112, and 
1-68-113, but did not obtain data on flights 1-65-108 and 1-67-112 because of 
electrical power problems, or on flight 1-68-113 due to a loss of the scan signal. 
An evaluation of the data from flight 1-66-111 indicated that the photometer func-
tioned properly but the star tracker did not acquire Polaris as programmed. The 
experiment subsequently flew on four additional flights and gathered good data 
on all of them.160 
 Five flights (part 2 of Phase II) added a Barnes infrared edge tracker to mea-
sure the 14–40-micron infrared profile. The Manned Spacecraft Center sponsored 
this part of the experiment using an instrument designed for spacecraft attitude 
stabilization in the Apollo Applications Program. The Barnes instrument was es-
sentially a telescope employing a 2.4-inch-diameter silicon lens mounted on the el-
evator under the skylight hatch of X-15-1. North American installed this hardware, 
collocated with the WTR launch-monitoring experiment, in early 1967. Research-
ers checked out the experiment on flight 1-76-134, and made four data-gathering 
flights between June and September 1968. Flight 1-80-140 was the last flight of the 
experiment, and Paul Bikle reported that “star recognition was not achieved.”161 
 One of the more interesting aspects of the experiment was that the High 
Range could not provide sufficiently accurate radar data to meet the needs of MIT. 
Instead, NASA arranged for the Sandia Corporation to track the X-15 using the 
MPS-25 radar at Cactus Flats, Nevada . This radar could track the airplane with 
0.10-milliradian-attitude accuracy and a range accuracy of several yards.162 
 The experiment concluded that the concept was feasible for use as a 
space-navigation technique, but because the most stable portions of the radiance 
were in the near-ultraviolet range, it was usable only during daylight portions of 
an orbit. To verify that the idea worked from greater distances, NASA asked the 
astronauts on Apollo 8, 10, and 11 to make visual sightings of the Earth’s horizon 
using the onboard spacecraft sextant. This exercise was conducted several times 
en route to and returning from the Moon, and revealed that the sextant had rela-
tively good accuracy compared to radar positioning.163 
Experiment #18: Supersonic Deceleration Devices
 Initially, NASA Langley sponsored experiment #18 to test the concept of 
inflatable devices. During the late 1950s, engineers thought they could use in-
59 Gray, “An Horizon Definition Experiment,” pp. -3; X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA 
Headquarters,  April 966, p. . 
60 X-5 Status Report 66-5, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  May 966, pp. 7-8; “X-5 Semi-
Annual Status Report No. 6,”  November 966, p. 22. 
6 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  April 966, pp. 8-9, 3 March 967, 
p. , p. , 6 September 968, p. , and 7 October 968, p. 2; Gray, “An Horizon Definition Experiment,” p. 2; 
“X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 35. The Manned Spacecraft Center was subsequently 
renamed the Johnson Space Center.
62 Gray, “An Horizon Definition Experiment,” p. 2.
63 Ibid, pp. 8-2; Boston, “The X-5’s Role in Aerospace Progress,” pp. 38-39.
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ternal pressure to erect and stabilize structures in space because of the lack of 
atmosphere and gravity. The inflation of these structures, however, was difficult 
to investigate on the ground. A test would consist of carrying the structure either 
internally or externally on the X-15, ejecting it at high altitude under conditions 
of zero-g and zero dynamic pressure, and then photographing the inflation of the 
structure. It was expected that the experiment could be packaged in place of the 
ventral rudder if the equipment was not too large; otherwise, an external store 
might be required.164 
 After more thought, this concept seemed a bit far-fetched. The experiment 
was reoriented away from inflatable structures and toward inflatable decelerator 
devices. In this incarnation, the experiment was sponsored by the FRC to evaluate 
the drag, stability, and deployment characteristics of various decelerator configu-
rations at Mach numbers as high as 5 and altitudes as high as 200,000 feet. Dr. 
Heinrich at the University of Minnesota had developed a variety of such devices, 
and researchers at Langley studied a number of configurations in wind tunnels to 
determine which ones held the most promise for actual flight tests. The possibili-
ties included inflatable spheres and cones, and various self-inflating parachutes. 
In December 1964 the plan was to fly the first X-15 decelerator tests during the 
early summer of 1965 and deploy the decelerator at Mach 4 following burnout. 
The tests would require the installation of a decelerator tow kit in the tail-cone 
box. NASA fabricated the modification kits for two X-15 airplanes and gathered 
preliminary data in April 1965 using an F-104 to drop a decelerator at Mach 1.8 
from 57,000 feet. Engineers made some modifications to X-15-3 to support the 
experiment during the weather down period in early 1966, but apparently never 
installed the experiment.165  
Experiment #19: High-Altitude Sky Brightness
 The ASD sponsored experiment #19 to determine the intensity, polarization, 
and spectral distribution of the daytime sky at high altitudes. Researchers would 
use the information to develop electro-optical tracking systems that were capable 
of discriminating a star’s optical signal from the surrounding sky’s brightness. 
Northrop Nortronics was developing a spectrophotometer for use on a Lockheed 
U-2 reconnaissance aircraft as part of the High Altitude Daytime Sky Background 
Radiation Measurement Program to survey the sky at altitudes between 20,000 and 
70,000 feet in 10,000-foot increments. The Air Force, however, desired data ob-
tained at up to 200,000 feet, and in 1962 the service modified the Nortronics con-
tract to develop instrumentation for the X-15. The goal was to survey the sky in the 
range of 3,500–7,500 Å, with a spectral resolution of approximately 2 Å, to sup-
port the design of future star trackers. Researchers extrapolated the data gathered 
by the U-2 to higher altitudes and used it to predict and verify data acquired by 
 
6 “Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” p. 56. 
65 System Package Program, System 653A, 8 May 96, p. 6-; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” Oc-
tober 963, p. 36 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  December 96, p. 9; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status 
Report No. ,”  April 965, p. 3; X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  April 
966, p. . 
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the X-15 since the effects of high-speed aerodynamics were largely unknown. The 
researchers wanted the X-15 to acquire data from 40,000 feet to 200,000 feet.166  
 Researchers first flew the spectrophotometer in the rear portion of the left 
wing-tip pod of X-15-1 on flights 1-50-79 and 1-52-85 to check out its operation. 
The experiment flew on flight 1-63-104, but the emergency landing precluded the 
66 System Package Program, System 653A, p. 6-; letter, Ralph H. Becker/Navigation & Guidance Laboratory, to 
Ted Little/AMC, subject: High Altitude Daytime Sky Background Radiation Measurement Program, 29 October 
962; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 33; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  
December 96, p. 9; Boston, “The X-5’s Role in Aerospace Progress,” p. 39; letter, Ralph H. Becker/Navigation 
& Guidance Laboratory, to Ted Little/AMC, subject: High Altitude Daytime Sky Background Radiation Measurement 
Program, 29 October 962; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 33; “X-5 Semi-Annual 
Status Report No. 3,”  December 96, p. 9. In the files at the DFRC History Office. The Original Nortronics 
contract was AF33(69)-29 for the Sky Radiation Measurement Program (for use on the Lockheed U-2).
The High-Altitude Sky Brightness Experiment (#19) surveyed the sky in the range between 3,500 to 
7,500 angstroms, with a spectral resolution of  approximately 2 angstroms to support the designs of  
future star trackers. Researchers extrapolated the data gathered by the U-2 to higher altitudes and used 
it to predict and verify data acquired by the X-15. The spectrophotometer sensor was located in the rear 
portion of  the left wing-tip pod, and flew on both X-15-1 and X-15-3. (NASA)
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acquisition of any meaningful data. Researchers obtained data on flight 1-65-108, 
and the experiment flew on flight 1-66-111; however, no useful results were ob-
tained because a slow-blow fuse failed. Engineers conducted several tests in 
an environmental chamber to investigate the fuse, which consistently failed at 
140,000 feet and –158°F. They eventually traced the problem to a power con-
nector on the experiment. After repairs were made, the instrument flew several 
flights aboard X-15-3 beginning with 3-56-83, and acquired useful data on at 
least two flights.167
 Experiment #20: Western Test Range Launch Monitoring
 The ASD funded experiment #20 under the name “Pacific Missile Range 
(PMR) launch monitoring.” The goal was to measure from high altitude the sig-
nature of an ascending ballistic missile to determine the feasibility of using the 
ultraviolet spectrum for space-based detection and tracking systems. There was 
initial concern regarding this experiment because the timing requirements seemed 
very critical given the short duration of X-15 flights and the acceleration profile 
of an ICBM. Nevertheless, the Air Force deemed the experiment important for 
national security and requested six flights in excess of 250,000 feet. In mid-1964 
the Air Force awarded a contract to the Northrop Space Laboratories to design and 
fabricate equipment. A review of the preliminary design revealed that the experi-
ment package and its recording equipment were too large to fit on X-15-1, so the 
Air Force, NASA, and Northrop were reevaluating the problem as 1965 ended.168 
 Eventually Northrop worked through the problems and NASA installed the 
experiment during the weather down period in early 1966. The experiment con-
sisted of an optical system, a vidicon camera, a four-spectral-band radiometer, 
and a servo-driven scanning mirror installed on the extensible elevator under 
the skylight hatch of X-15-1. The experiment first flew on 15 June 1967 (flight 
1-72-125), but an electrical malfunction within the experiment precluded a com-
plete operational checkout . The X-15-1 subsequently carried the experiment on 
eight additional flights.169 
 The primary target for the experiment would be a Minuteman II ICBM 
launched from Vandenberg AFB, although some thought was given to trying the 
experiment against a Titan II target. The Air Force also wanted the X-15 to track 
multiple Minuteman ICBMs launched from Vandenberg in rapid sequence (simu-
lating an actual wartime response). In each case, the X-15 portion of the experi-
ment would be secondary to other reasons for launching the missiles. Whatever 
 
 
67 X-5 Status Report 66-5, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  May 966, p. 8; “X-5 Semi-An-
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experiment the Air Force was conducting involved the use of a B-52 in addition 
to the target ICBMs.170 
 On 22-23 May 1968, representatives from the Air Force, NASA, and 
Northrop met to discuss various aspects of the upcoming flights. The first order 
of business was to discuss the security classification surrounding the project, and 
the Air Force agreed that the only classified data the FRC would receive would 
be the actual launch time of the targets. The representative from the Strategic Air 
Command (SAC), Lieutenant Colonel John McElveen, indicated that SAC “will 
do everything possible to insure a successful coordination with the exception of 
compromising their primary objective.” This would include allowing Vandenberg 
to adjust its launch times to coincide with X-15 launches as long as the delays 
were a reasonable length of time.171 
 The attendees spent most of the meeting discussing how to make sure the 
ICBM and X-15 would be in position at the right time. They decided that, when-
ever possible, the experiment should be scheduled for between 1000 and 1400 
70 Memorandum, Jack L. Kolf/FRC to James E. Love/X-5 Program Manager, subject: WTR Experiment Coordi-
nation, 23 May 968. Most likely, the “other reasons” for launching the missiles were operational training; real 
missiles were routinely removed from operational silos, transported to Vandenberg, and launched by operational 
crews. On several occasions Vandenberg launched multiple Minuteman ICBMs during operational testing; how-
ever, no multiple Titan launches were ever conducted. It could not be ascertained exactly what the Air Force B-52 
was needed for.
7 Ibid.
The most ambitious of  the follow-on experiments was the Western Range Launch Monitoring Experi-
ment (#20) installed under the Skylight hatch on X-15-1. The X-15 was supposed to track a Minute-
man ICBM launched from Vandenberg AFB, but the timing of  getting the X-15 in position at the 
exact moment the ICBM was launched never worked. (NASA)
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hours Pacific daylight time. The X-15 flight planners would purposefully schedule 
the X-15 so that it would arrive at its launch point either on time or slightly late, 
since the Air Force could hold off on launching the target but could not recall it 
once it was launched. For the multiple-target missions, Vandenberg would launch 
the Minuteman ICBMs 30 seconds apart. Procedures allowed the Air Force B-52 
to hold while the NB-52/X-15 got into position for launch, and to time the launch 
of the target ICBMs. Nevertheless, this experiment would have required extraor-
dinary luck to have everything in place at exactly the right time.172 
 The Air Force apparently put a high priority on this experiment since it was one 
of the two reasons listed for extending Air Force funding of the X-15 program into 
1968. Unfortunately, the first nine attempts to coordinate this aerial ballet failed. 
On at least two occasions, equipment on the X-15 failed to operate as expected, and 
on another Vandenberg could not launch the target because of a technical problem. 
The experiment also required very precise flight-path control. For instance, during 
flight 1-79-139 the experiment extended 129 seconds after launch. It immediately 
began searching for the target, but quickly failed after the elevator and azimuth 
torquers drove against their stops. It was later determined that Bill Dana deployed 
the experiment slightly before the airplane achieved the 0±2-degree pitch and roll 
attitude requirement. Engineers warned Dana and Pete Knight not to extend the 
experiment until the airplane was stable as it approached apogee.173 
 As the flight went on, more difficulties arose. About 208 seconds after launch, 
NASA-1 requested Bill Dana to retract the experiment. Things appeared normal 
at first, and the experiment retracted without the delays noted on some previous 
flights. However, the timing was unfortunate since the call was made a bit later 
than planned, and the automatic timer interrupted the normal action and initi-
ated an emergency-retract sequence. Nevertheless, the experiment successfully 
retracted. Since a demonstration of the normal retraction sequence was required 
before the experiment could become “operational,” NASA scheduled a flight to 
check out the mechanism. On flight 1-80-142, Pete Knight extended the experi-
ment 162 seconds after launch and the sensor went into track mode 5 seconds lat-
er. At 240,000 feet, Knight commanded the experiment to retract, but indications 
at 220,000 feet showed that it had not. Knight activated the emergency mode, with 
satisfactory results.174 
 Finally, the Air Force and NASA managed the first coordinated launch of the 
X-15 and a WTR target. Flight 1-81-141 launched from Smith Ranch on a mag-
netic heading of 169 degrees, within 3 seconds of the optimum time. Bill Dana 
reached the planned 36-degree pitch angle 30 seconds after launch and held it 
until burnout at 5,400 fps. The flight experienced a nose-left thrust misalignment 
that caused 4.5-degree of sideslip, but Dana did not use any rudder input during 
the exit phase, resulting in a 3-degree error in ground track. The experiment was 
extended at approximately 235,000 feet as planned (roughly 137 seconds after 
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X-15 launch), but 2.8 seconds later all power was lost to the system and the ex-
periment retracted. The flight did not acquire any useful data.175 
 The last attempt was on the 200th X-15 flight. The launch attempt on 21 
November 1968 was coordinated with Vandenberg, and the Air Force launched a 
Minuteman II at 1028 hours; unfortunately, the X-15 never left the ground because 
of a problem with the NB-52A. By this time the Air Force had spent $700,000 on 
the experiment, not counting the normal flight costs of the X-15 (which carried 
other experiments as well) or the cost of the Minuteman ICBMs (which were be-
ing launched anyway).176 
Experiment #21: Structural Research
 The FRC sponsored experiment #21 to investigate lightweight structures in 
the high-temperature environment by using the detachable outer wing panel on 
X-15A-2. The experiment consisted of two configurations: one for sustained Mach 
3 cruise, and one for hypersonic cruise. The hypersonic outer wing panel was 
required to withstand temperatures beyond Mach 8 without the use of ablative 
coatings. Both panels needed extensive instrumentation for loads, stresses, and 
temperatures. The FRC received proposals in late 1964, but never built or tested the 
panels. By the end of 1965, NASA placed this experiment on “inactive” status.177 
Experiment #22: Air-Breathing Propulsion
 Very early on, a small group of researchers believed that the X-15 was a po-
tentially useful test bed for various air-breathing propulsion system components, 
including complete ramjet engines. The airplane was capable of speeds in the 
Mach 3–5 region, in which inlet and exit problems were greatest, and a ramjet 
engine was considered a desirable method of propulsion. The X-15 would provide 
testing under true atmospheric conditions (ground-test facilities were seldom able 
to achieve the proper stagnation temperatures and Reynolds number). The X-15 
would also permit closer control of test conditions than was possible with ground-
controlled rockets, such as those launched at the Pilotless Aircraft Research Divi-
sion (PARD) .178 
 The most desirable position for the propulsion test package appeared to be 
in place of the ventral rudder, although it had to be jettisoned before landing to 
provide adequate clearance for the landing gear. At this point Dick Day and Bob 
Hoey had not proposed to fly the X-15 with the ventral removed, so this was one 
of the larger unknowns of the initial engine proposal. Two wing-root tanks, each 
holding about 100 gallons of liquid hydrogen, carried fuel for the ramjet. Other 
75 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  November 968, pp. -2. In the files 
at the DFRC History Office.
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79-39, 5 September 968; memorandum, Jack L. Kolf to Assistant Chief, Research Projects, Subject: Preliminary 
report on X-5 flight -8-, 5 November 968; e-mail between Jeffery Geiger, 30th Space Wing Historian, and 
Dennis R. Jenkins, 8 April 2002; “X-5 Program,” a briefing prepared by the AFFTC in late October 968. 
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positions for the engine would be possible if permanently attached engines were 
required. For example, a small engine could replace one of the wing root tanks or 
a pair of engines mounted under the wing tips.179 
 The FRC proposed the first truly serious version of this experiment as “an 
extensive air-breathing engine development program … in which one or more 
sub-scale modular experimental engines would be flown in a true flight environ-
ment aboard the X-15.” Somehow, the experiment took on a life of its own and 
morphed into the hypersonic research engine (HRE) project (discussed sepa-
rately below).
Experiment #23: Infrared Scanning Radiometer
 The ASD and later the Air Force Research Technology Division sponsored 
experiment #23 as a follow-on to the infrared exhaust signature experiment (#10) 
to determine the feasibility of an infrared imaging instrument operating at Mach 
3–5 at altitudes between 90,000 and 120,000 feet. NASA installed a Singer scan-
ning radiometer in the lower portion of the instrument compartment of X-15-1 
during mid-March 1965. The 
experiment looked through 
an Iratran IV window in the 
lower fuselage and recorded 
the reflected solar radiation 
as well as radiation emitted 
by Earth.180 
 The first of six flights was 
made on 26 March 1965 
(1-53-86); the last was flight 
1-60-99 on 30 September 
1965. Actually, flight 1-59-
98 was supposed to be the 
last flight, but a broken wire 
had precluded the acquisition 
of any useful data. The Air 
Force decided to leave the 
experiment on the airplane 
for Pete Knight’s familiariza-
tion flight (1-60-99), although 
Knight did not attempt to fly 
the profile normally required 
for the experiment. Despite 
this, the experiment obtained 
good data. Although the ex-
periment only generated a 
79 Ibid.
80 Ronald S. Waite/X-5 Project Engineer, “X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight -53-86,” 3 April 965; “X-5 
Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. ; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  December 
96, p. 20. 
The Infrared Scanning Radiometer Experiment (#10) was 
used to determine the feasibility of  an infrared imaging in-
strument operating at Mach 3-5 at altitudes between 90,000 
and 120,000 feet. A Singer scanning radiometer was in-
stalled in the lower portion of  the instrument compartment 
of  X-15-1 during mid-March 1965. The experiment looked 
through an Iratran IV window in the lower fuselage and re-
corded the reflected solar radiation as well as radiation emit-
ted by Earth. (NASA)
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crude, two-dimensional image, it proved that it was possible to perform infrared 
reconnaissance at hypersonic speeds. The development of a Germanium metal 
window that was transparent to infrared photography offset the masking effect 
of an aerodynamically heated window. This work reportedly advanced the de-
velopment of infrared line scanners, such as the Texas Instruments AN/AAS-18, 
that went on to operational service on various Air Force reconnaissance aircraft . 
The Earth Resources Development Agency (ERDA) also capitalized on this tech-
nology by contracting with the Mead Corporation to develop several portable 
suitcase-size scanners for use on general aviation aircraft to detect various forms 
of pollution .181 
Experiment #24: High-Altitude Infrared Background Measurements
 Experiment #24 was sponsored by the Air Force Research Technology Di-
vision to obtain high-altitude infrared measurements of the Earth, horizon, and 
sky in the 3–5- and 8–14-micron regions for use in various surveillance appli-
cations (i.e., target tracking). The measuring device was a simple dual-channel, 
solid-state radiometer with a flat rotating mirror that provided a circular scan. A 
self-contained liquid-helium system cooled the experiment. The Autonetics Divi-
sion of North American built the experiment, and NASA installed it in the right 
wing-tip pod on X-15-1 during the weather down period in early 1966. Research-
ers requested three flights to altitudes above 150,000 feet, but the only verifiable 
attempt was on the aborted 200th flight.182
Experiment #25: Optical Background Measurements
 The Air Force Research Technology Division sponsored experiment #25 as 
an extension of the ultraviolet exhaust plume experiment (#3). The objective was 
to obtain narrow-band optical-background measurements covering the spectral 
region between 0.3 and 1.3 microns. Northrop modified the existing Barnes high-
resolution spectrometer and associated equipment from experiment #3 to operate 
at visible wavelengths.183 
 Researchers installed the experiment in the X-15-3 tail-cone box to determine 
the background characteristics of the atmosphere and Earth when viewed with a 
narrow-band receiver. The data was applicable to future laser systems for space 
vehicles. The experiment had flown twice by the end of 1965, but had gathered 
little usable data because of system noise. Researchers modified their equipment 
and the experiment flew on two additional checkout flights in mid-1966.184 
 Flights 3-53-79 and 3-54-80 carried the experiment. The first flight failed to 
acquire useful data due to improper instrumentation, and Bill Dana inadvertently 
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turned off the experiment after only 131 seconds on the second. The experimenter 
reported, however, that the limited data collected was satisfactory. The experi-
ment was last flown on flight 3-56-83, and good data were collected.185 
Experiment #26: Supersonic Transport (SST) Structural Demonstration 
Techniques
 The Air Force Research Technology Division sponsored experiment #26 to 
evaluate a new technique for determining the mechanical loads and thermal stress 
experienced by aerospace vehicles exposed to a thermal environment. Republic 
Aviation developed an experimental analytical procedure that enabled the deter-
mination of loads, deformation, and stresses from given strain and temperature 
measurements. Laboratory tests on a box beam and frame structure yielded data 
with a calculated accuracy of ±10%. This procedure could be proof-tested on the 
X-15 and then used to validate the analytical design methods and structural load 
criteria used for the SST and other advanced aerospace vehicles .186 
 Researchers proposed to install thermocouples and strain gages in the fu-
selage-wing attachment structures and fabricate one horizontal stabilizer with 
strain gages and thermocouples installed on the spars. Approximately 360 sensors 
would have been required to perform the tests.187 
 The researchers forwarded a suggested program for using this technology 
to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for possible funding. The FAA 
endorsed the requirement but thought it would be more appropriate for NASA 
to fund the experiment. NASA reviewed the experiment and agreed that a well- 
verified means of interpreting flight loads and thermal stress data was essential 
for the future SST, and that NASA should be responsible for developing the tech-
nique. However, NASA did not believe that a specific experiment of this magni-
tude was required to assess the Republic method.188 
 Eventually, however, the FRC approved and sponsored at least part of the 
experiment, which was broken into two parts called, logically enough, Phase I 
and Phase II. The Phase I program used a slightly instrumented set of horizontal 
stabilizers during several flights to gather baseline airplane data. The tests began 
on flight 3-52-78 on 18 July 1966 and concluded on flight 3-61-91 on 20 July 
1967. Not every flight collected data, due to a variety of malfunctions, but suffi-
cient data were gathered. On several Phase I flights the pilots noted a slight buffet 
and beta excursion under some flight conditions, a phenomenon the researchers 
could not explain .189  
 Phase II included a new set of horizontal stabilizers that were manufactured 
by North American during May 1966. NASA instrumented the left-hand unit with 
128 strain gages and 125 thermocouples, and tested it in the High Temperature 
85 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 6,”  November 966, p. 25. 
86 System Package Program, System 653A, p. 6-.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  April 966, p. 2. In the files at the 
DFRC History Office; memorandum, James R. Welsh (for Elmor J. Adkins, Chief/X-5 Project Office) to Assistant 
Chief, Research Projects, subject: Preliminary report on X-5 flight 3-6-9, 2 August 967.
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Loads Calibration Laboratory before installing it on X-15-3 in time for flight 
3-62-92. To investigate buffet and beta excursions experienced during the Phase I 
portion of the experiment, pilots performed maneuvers at Mach 2.5, 3.7, and 4.0 
with a pull-up to approximately 12 degrees angle of attack made at each Mach 
number. The pilots did not notice a buffet or beta excursion at the two higher 
Mach numbers, but at Mach 2.5 they experienced results similar to those encoun-
tered on the two previous flights. The beta excursion registered about 3 degrees, 
but the pilot was not positive that buffet occurred during this maneuver. Buffet 
had been experienced at 10.5 degrees on the previous flight. The only configura-
tion change that occurred between the flights was the replacement of the Phase I 
horizontal stabilizer with the Phase II units. To evaluate this, NASA reinstalled 
the original horizontal stabilizers for flight 3-63-94. The pilot did not notice any 
buffet, leading researchers to suspect some minor manufacturing flaw in the new 
horizontal stabilizers. Unfortunately, X-15-3 was lost before researchers could 
complete any further work. Since the experiment depended on the PCM telemetry 
system in X-15-3, researchers could not move it to X-15-1 .190 
 Another test in this series was to study of the effect of various discontinuities 
on local surface heating between Mach 4 and Mach 6. To avoid having to make 
detailed local measurements, the experiment was designed to determine the ratio 
of the heating rates on two symmetrically located panels under the center fuselage 
and on the wing tips. One panel in each location would have the discontinuity 
while the other would not. Discontinuities included forward and aft facing steps, 
wavy surfaces (sinusoidal distortions), streamwise corners, and antenna posts. At 
least two X-15-3 flights included the step panels, and the wavy panels made at 
least three flights.191
Experiment #27: Hycon Camera
 The Air Force Research Technology Division sponsored experiment #27. 
It was conceptually an extension of experiment #5, which had used KC-1 and 
KS-25 cameras to acquire optical data at speeds between Mach 6 and Mach 8. 
This experiment used X-15-2 and was approximately 80% complete at the time of 
Jack McKay’s accident in the second airplane. The experiment, however, contin-
ued after X-15A-2 returned to service .192 
 The first part of this experiment actually preceded experiment #5. NASA 
installed two instruments–a vertical camera with a 12-inch focal length, and an 
oblique camera with a 6-inch focal length–in the center-of-gravity compartment 
(between the propellant tanks) in X-15-2. The resulting data permitted the in-
vestigation of contrast attenuation at high altitudes and showed the feasibility of 
performing aerial photography from supersonic vehicles. These tests began as 
early as 9 October 1962 (flight 2-30-51) when the 6-inch oblique camera photo-
90 Memorandum, Elmor J. Adkins, Chief/X-5 Project Office to Assistant Chief, Research Projects, subject: Prelimi-
nary report on X-5 flight 3-62-92,  September 967; memorandum, Elmor J. Adkins, Chief/X-5 Project Office 
to Assistant Chief, Research Projects, subject: Preliminary report on X-5 flight 3-63-9, 2 November 967.
9 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 37; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,” 
 December 96, p. 9. 
92 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. ; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,”  
December 96, p. 20. 
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graphed the Las Vegas area from very high altitude using black and white film. 
During flight 2-39-70 on 22 June 1965, the 6-inch camera used color film to take 
a similar photo, and the 12-inch camera photographed Indian Springs AFB using 
color-infrared Ektachrome film. These tests included the evaluation of a special 
film, Kodak SO-190, which had a resolution of almost 200 lines per millimeter, a 
speed index of 6, and very low granularity.193 
 In late December 1965, a new Maurer model 500 camera replaced the Hycon 
in the center-of-gravity compartment on X-15A-2. NASA installed the camera 
during the weather down period during early 1966, with the intent to carry it 
throughout the envelope-expansion flights beginning with flight 2-49-86. Pre-
flight tests of the system indicated that the experiment was functioning satisfacto-
rily, but checks of the system before launch showed that the platform would not 
erect properly. Despite this, the camera data were satisfactory and the quality of 
the resulting photographs was excellent. The X-15A-2 carried the camera on two 
more flights, also with satisfactory results.194 
 A Hycon KA-51A “Chicago Aerial” camera then replaced the Maurer, which 
only flew one time on flight 2-52-96. For the next flight of X-15A-2, NASA re-
moved the Hycon experiment and installed an aft-viewing Millikan 16-mm cam-
era to photograph the dummy ramjet.195
Experiment #28: X-Ray Air Density
 There is no record of what organization sponsored experiment #28. The ex-
periment consisted of an X-ray tube and detector located in the forward portion of 
the right wing-tip pod. The wing-tip pod skin scattered the X-rays, and solid-state 
cells measured the backscatter to determine air density. The design and fabrica-
tion of this experiment began in late 1965 and several flights during 1967 and 
1968 apparently carried it, although no results could be ascertained.196
Experiment #29: JPL Solar-Spectrum Measurements
 The JPL sponsored experiment #29, which consisted of a spectrometer con-
taining 12 sensors and a servo-positioning system installed in the rear section of 
the left wing-tip pod of X-15-1. Researchers wanted to use the data to improve 
the methods of correcting for atmospheric absorption, determine the absolute en-
ergy of the sun, and calibrate solar cells to validate solar simulation. JPL built 
93 Groening, “Investigation of High-Speed High-Altitude Photography,” pp. 85, 88, and 93; “Influence of High-Speed 
Flight on Photography,” p. 8. IR Ektachrome differs from normal film in that the spectral sensitivity of each emul-
sion layer is shifted toward the infrared. The blue light is removed by filtering, and in the final reversed image that 
is printed, naturally green objects are blue, yellow objects are green, and red objects are yellow. Objects that 
radiate or reflect strongly in the near-infrared, such as healthy vegetation, are red.
9 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 3 January and  April 966; “X-5 Semi-
Annual Status Report No. 6,”  November 966, p. 25. 
95 William P. Albrecht/X-5 Project Engineer, “X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight 2-52-96,” 25 August 967; 
William P. Albrecht/X-5 Project Engineer, “X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight 2-53-97,” 9 October 967.
96 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  April 966, p. 3; “X-5 Semi-An-
nual Status Report No. 6,”  November 966, p. 25. There seems to be a great deal of confusion in the official 
documentation concerning the experiment number assigned to the WTR launch-monitoring experiment. Most 
documents call it experiment #20; however, many Air Force documents refer to it as experiment #28. Since most 
documents use #20, that is what will be used here. Very late in the program the X-ray air density experiment was 
called #28, as reflected here.
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the experiment in early 1966, but a pop-up hatch used to expose the spectrometer 
failed the qualification test in April 1966. Researchers subsequently redesigned 
the experiment to use a quartz window in the pod instead of a hatch to eliminate 
the problem. At the same time, researchers modified the experiment to use the 
new PCM telemetry system in X-15-3 .197 
 The experiment first flew on flight 3-58-87, and later on two additional flights. 
A preliminary review of the data showed excessive electrical noise on the data 
channel, but researchers considered the data acceptable .198
Experiment #30: Spectrophotometry
 In experiment #30, an objective spectrograph and two photometers were used 
to obtain spectra of the planets and observe day airflow at high altitude. As of 
April 1966, this experiment did not have a sponsor of formal approval, although it 
did apparently receive an experiment number. By the end of 1966, NASA had can-
celed the experiment before any actual hardware development was undertaken.199 
Experiment #31: Fixed Alpha Nose
 The FRC sponsored the fixed-ball-nose experiment to investigate the fea-
sibility of using a fixed-sphere-cone sensor to measure air data parameters in 
extreme flight environments. Rodney K. Bogue and John P. Cary built the experi-
ment hardware.200  
 The standard X-15 ball nose proved to be remarkably reliable given its op-
erating environment, performing less than satisfactorily on only one of its first 
70 flights. Nevertheless, in retrospect, the ball nose was an overly complicated 
solution to the problem. All that was really needed was a way to compute the dif-
ference in pressure between opposing ports, not to drive the entire sensor to seek 
the null pressure . 
 Late in the program, NASA flew an experiment that used a non-moving sen-
sor to detect the angle of attack. Researchers attached a fixed ball nose on the left 
wing-tip pod, permitting the use of the normal ball nose for comparison purposes. 
The sensor consisted of a ported sphere, 4.36 inches in diameter, mounted on the 
nose of the pod. The total length of the sensor was 18.75 inches, but it looked 
like a simple extension of the pod. Five pressure ports were located on the pod. 
One port was 5 degrees below the zero angle-of-attack stagnation point, and the 
remaining four ports were located symmetrically around this point in the vertical 
and horizontal planes. The vertical ports were used to measure the angle of attack. 
Researchers planned to use the horizontal ports for the angle of sideslip, but this 
97 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 7,” 0 May 967, p.27; James E. Love and Jack Fischel, “Summary of 
X-5 Program,” a paper in the Progress of the X-15 Research Airplane Program, a compilation of the papers 
presented at the FRC, 7 October 965, NASA publication SP-90 (Washington, DC: NASA, 965), p. ; X-5 
Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  April and  May 966. 
98 X-5 Status Report 66-0, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 6 October 966, p. 6. 
99 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  April 966, p. 3. 
200 Rodney K. Bogue, FRC working paper 30, “X-5 Fixed Ball Nose Flight Test Results,” July 972. Typescript in 
the files at the DFRC History Office. Several clarifications to the original narrative were provided in an e-mail from 
Rodney K. Bogue to Dennis R. Jenkins, 6 June 2002.
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was never implemented. The sensor flew on a single flight (1-53-86) to Mach 5.17 
with Bob Rushworth at the controls .201 
 The standard ball nose had a demonstrated measurement error of less than 
0.25 degree over its entire operating range. On its single flight, the fixed nose 
did not return the same absolute data as the ball nose. This was not surprising 
since the wing-mounted device and the nose-mounted unit operated in different 
flow fields. Several factors affected the performance of the wing-mounted device, 
including 1) flow disturbances and shock-wave impingement from the forebody 
of the X-15, 2) rotational flow about the lifting-wing surface (the latter effect was 
particularly noticeable during approach and landing), and 3) suspected small de-
flections (bending and twisting) of the wing that created a variable offset between 
the normal- and fixed-ball-nose devices. Nevertheless, the fixed-ball-nose data 
showed the same trends as the ball-nose data. Researchers concluded that the 
fixed ball nose was a feasible alternative to the ball nose .202  
 Confidence was high enough that NASA manufactured a “fixed alpha nose” 
and installed it on a wing-tip pod for six of the last seven X-15-1 flights. Again, 
the data did not precisely match those obtained with the ball nose, but were re-
peatable enough that researchers could make consistent correlations. A concep-
tually similar system was used on the Apollo launch escape system to provide 
limited air data to the astronauts in case of an abort forced them to separate the 
capsule from the Saturn booster. NASA designed and installed a similar system, 
using ports in the nose cone, on the Space Shuttle Columbia as the Shuttle Entry 
Air Data System (SEADS) experiment between 1986 and 1991.203  
OTHER FLOWN EXPERIMENTS
 In addition to the “numbered” experiments formally approved by the Re-
search Airplane Committee, the X-15s carried several other experiments that were 
often funded by the FRC as part of its own normal research activities.
Saturn Insulation
 The “Saturn insulation” experiment exposed various types of insulation ma-
terial from the Saturn launch vehicles to the hypersonic environment. Some docu-
mentation shows this as experiment #41. The X-15-3 made at least five flights 
with pieces of Saturn insulation material. By flying the material on the X-15, re-
searchers could examine it after a flight, which was not possible with the expend-
able Saturn boosters. Generally, researchers installed variable-thickness panels on 
 
20 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
203 For more on the SEADS experiment, see Dennis R. Jenkins, Space Shuttle: The History of the National Space 
Transportation System–The First 100 Flights (North Branch, MN: Specialty Press, 200), pp. 36-37.
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the upper speed brakes with two thermocouples on the left side, and seven ther-
mocouples, two static-pressure transducers, and one pitot probe on the right side. 
They also installed additional constant-thickness insulation panels on the lower 
speed brakes with two thermocouples on the right side and seven thermocouples 
on the left side. NASA installed a camera in the right wing-tip pod to look at the 
upper speed brakes, and a second camera in the left pod pointed at the lower speed 
brakes. Some of the tests were decidedly unsuccessful. For instance, NASA ap-
plied Saturn insulation to the upper left speed brake on the aborted flight attempt 
on 31 October 1967 (3-A-96); the bond failed and the insulation came off during 
the captive flight. Researchers replaced the insulation before Mike Adams’s fatal 
flight (3-65-97).204 
 After X-15-3 was lost, NASA transferred the experiment to X-15-1 . Research-
ers installed 16-mm movie cameras in each wing pod to photograph the insulation 
on the upper speed brakes, and installed 18 thermocouples in the speed brakes 
 
 
20 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 8 November 967, p. 2; Vincent N. 
Capasso, “X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight -75-33,” 9 April 968; memorandum, James R. Welsh/X-5 
Research Project Office to Assistant Chief, Research Projects, subject: Preliminary report on X-5 flight -75-33, 
7 April 968; Vincent N. Capasso, “X-5 Operations Flight Report for Flight -76-3,” 30 April 968. All in the 
files at the DFRC History Office. If this was experiment #, then nothing could be ascertained about experiments 
#32 through #0.
The test of  insulation for the Saturn launch vehicles is usually heralded as one of  the X-15’s contribu-
tions, but in reality the tests were minimal and concentrated more on the adhesives behind the insulation. 
Here the Saturn insulation is installed on the upper speed brakes of  X-15-3 on 31 October 1967, just 
before its last flight. Note the tail cone box behind the speed brakes. (NASA)
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themselves. Several flights carried the insulation until the end of the program, al-
though sometimes it was on the lower speed brakes (and other times on both).205 
 Since these tests were conducted fairly late in the Saturn development pro-
gram (1966–1967), it is unlikely that any unexpected information was gained. 
More probably, the researchers just achieved final confirmation of the material’s 
ability to withstand high dynamic pressures without losing its thermal properties.
Skid Materials
 The ASD sponsored an experiment that was essentially a product evalua-
tion program of materials selected for use on the Dyna-Soar. Researchers bonded 
cermet (ceramic-metallic composite) runners to the rear landing-gear skids on 
the X-15 for five flights using X-15-3 in early 1964. Two additional flights were 
conducted using X-15A-2 to evaluate Inconel X skids. Engineers compared these 
data with those obtained on five earlier flights that used standard 4130-steel skids 
but carried additional instrumentation to measure landing loads:206 
Test Flight Skid
Material
Lakebed
Surface
Landing
Weight
Distance
Main 
Nose
Nose 
Gear
Impact
Slideout
Dis-
tance
Touch-
down 
Speed
(pounds) (feet) (seconds) (feet) (knots)
1  1-9-17 4130 Steel Dry-hard 14,700 312 0 .70 7,920 207
2 1-10-19 4130 Steel Dry-hard 14,500 304 0 .80 — 196
3 1-11-21 4130 Steel Dry-hard 14,600 218 0 .54 — 196
4 1-12-23 4130 Steel Dry-hard 14,950 294 0 .74 8,170 204
5 1-13-25 4130 Steel Dry-hard 15,150 205 0 .60 4,488 164
6 3-25-42 Cermet Dry-hard 14,920 252 0 .72 5,702 175
7 3-26-43 Cermet Dry-hard 15,100 253 0 .61 4,807 208
8 3-27-44 Cermet Dry-hard 15,100 310 0 .83 5,204 193
9 3-28-47 Cermet Dry-hard 14,750 320 0 .89 5,808 187
10 3-29-48 Cermet Dry-soft 14,920 172 0 .76 3,520 181
11 2-33-56 Inconel X Dry-hard 17,798 288 0 .71 6,056 205
12 2-34-57 Inconel X Damp-hard 15,855 365 0 .72 8,968 221
  
 
205 X-5 Status Reports, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters, 5 April 968, p. 2 and 2 May 968, p. 
2. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
206 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 35; “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. 3,” 
 December 96, pp. 8-9; Ronald J. Wilson, NASA technical note D-333, “Drag and Wear Characteristics of 
Various Skid Materials on Dissimilar Lakebed Surfaces During the Slideout of the X-5 Airplane,” March 966. 
Data in the table comes mainly from Wilson. The cermet process is interesting. To coat a standard 30 steel 
skid, a 0.865-inch screen of tungsten-carbide chips is copper-brazed to the skid surface after the surface is 
precoated with a flux. A 0.020–0.00-inch-thick matrix of tungsten (35%), chrome, nickel, and boron (65%) is 
flame-sprayed on top of the copper-brazed carbide chips, fused and grit-blasted, and then flame-sprayed with a 
copper-nickel matrix. The surface is then ground to a nominal thickness of 0.20 inch.
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 One of the outcomes of the study was an evaluation of skid wear. The amount 
of skid wear depended on the speed of the sliding, the hardness of the skid material, 
the strength of the surface material, and the sliding distance. For this evaluation, 
engineers measured the thickness of the X-15 skids after each flight, generally 
near the point of attachment to the main strut. The difficulties involved in remov-
ing and reinstalling the skids in a timely manner precluded weighing them. The 
cermet skids experienced a considerable amount of wear during the first landing 
because of the soft outer layer of copper-nickel, but showed less wear on later 
landings because the tungsten-carbide chips were uncovered.207 
 The data for the 4130-steel skids showed an increasing amount of skid wear 
as the sliding distance increased beyond 6,400 feet. The wear characteristics 
of the Inconel X skids were not determined because of the difficulty of mea-
suring the chemically milled areas inside the skid. However, preliminary data 
indicated a wear resistance superior to that of the 4130 steel, with or without a 
cermet coating.208 
Cold Wall
 The X-15 offered investigators a unique opportunity to measure heat trans-
fer and skin friction under quasi-steady flight conditions at high Mach numbers 
and low wall-to-recovery temperature ratios. This allowed them to make a direct 
comparison between measured flight data and calculated values. A considerable 
amount of heat-transfer data and some skin-friction data were obtained during the 
flight program, and these data indicated that the level and rate of change of turbu-
lent skin friction and heat transfer were lower than predicted by the most widely 
used theories, such as those of Van Driest and Eckert. However, comparisons of the 
X-15 data and the theory were inconclusive due to uncertainties about the boundary 
layer conditions because of non-uniform flow and conduction losses. To evaluate 
the problem, researchers wanted to use a highly instrumented panel in a location 
with known flow characteristics. They also wanted the panel to be shielded from 
aerodynamic heating until the airplane was in a steady-state cruise condition.209 
 Researchers selected the X-15-3 with the sharp-leading-edge modification on 
the dorsal rudder to carry the experiment. The test panel was located just behind 
the right-side leading-edge boundary-layer trips 15.1 inches below the top of the 
rudder, and was constructed of 0 .0605-inch-thick Inconel X . Researchers installed 
a removable panel on the left side of the rudder to provide access to the instrumen-
tation used for the test panel. To obtain the desired wall-to-recovery temperature 
ratios and ensure an isothermal test surface when the airplane reached the desired 
speed and altitude, it was necessary to insulate the test panel during the initial 
phase of the flight. Explosive charges jettisoned the insulating cover from the test 
panel in approximately 50 milliseconds, resulting in an instantaneous heating of 
207 Wilson, “Drag and Wear Characteristics of Various Skid Materials,” pp. 2-2.
208 Ibid, pp. 2.
209 Robert D. Quinn and Frank V. Olinger, NASA confidential technical memorandum X-92, “Flight-Measured Heat 
Transfer and Skin Friction at a Mach Number of 5.25 and at Low Wall Temperatures,” 9 August 969, pp. -20. 
For data on earlier heat-transfer and skin-friction studies, see, for example, Richard D. Banner and Albert E. Kuhl, 
“A Summary of X-5 Heat-Transfer and Skin-Friction Measurements,” NASA technical memorandum X-20, 
966.
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the test panel (the so-called “cold wall” effect). Researchers instrumented the test 
panel with thermocouples, static-pressure orifices, and a skin-friction gage with 
the data recorded on tape by a PCM data acquisition system at a rate of 50 samples 
per second. A Millikan camera operating at 400 frames per second was in the up-
per bug-eye camera bay to record the events. The measurements obtained were in 
general agreement with previous X-15 data.210 
 Researchers used the same general location for another test panel, but without 
the cold wall. This panel, which was flush with the normal surface of the rudder, 
had a microphone and static-pressure orifice mounted flush, and an “L”-shaped 
total pressure probe sticking out and forward. The microphone was located 28.8 
inches from the original rudder leading edge (not the sharp extension) and 20.3 
inches from the top of the rudder. The data was recorded onboard the airplane and 
evaluated after the flight. The intent of the experiment was to determine when the 
boundary layer transitioned to turbulent flow. The highest noise levels occurred 
during reentry as the Reynolds numbers reached their peak value. The data gath-
ered provided a qualitative indication of the end of the transition that agreed rea-
sonably well with wind-tunnel data. Interestingly, researchers also recorded some 
data while the NB-52 carried the X-15, and described the noise level as “very 
high” due to aerodynamic interference with the carrier aircraft. This confirmed 
predictions made before the first glide flight.211 
Sonic Booms
 Just as the X-15 program was winding down, researchers noted that airplanes 
flying faster than Mach 3 (the YF-12C/SR-71A and XB-70A) did not generate a 
sonic-boom noise. NASA had made some measurements at Mach numbers up to 
16 during the liftoff and reentry of Apollo spacecraft, but did not consider this 
representative of future aerospace vehicles, such as the Space Shuttle . Therefore, 
researchers made measurements during several X-15 flights at Mach numbers up 
to 5.5 and compared these with results obtained by theoretical methods of deter-
mining overpressures.212 
 For flight 1-70-119, instruments were set up at Mud Lake to record the boom 
generated at Mach 5.3 and 92,000 feet. Researchers obtained satisfactory data even 
though the airplane was about 6 miles east of the monitoring site. The sonic boom 
was a typical far-field signature with some slight atmospheric distortion, although 
this was less than predicted. The boom peak overpressure was about 0.34 psf.213 
 For another flight, researchers installed microphone arrays around Goldstone 
and Cuddeback dry lakes. Since there were no meteorological facilities at either 
lake, researchers estimated the environmental conditions based on data obtained 
20 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  April 967, p. 2; Robert D. Quinn and 
Frank V. Olinger, NASA confidential technical memorandum X-92, “Flight-Measured Heat Transfer and Skin 
Friction at a Mach Number of 5.25 and at Low Wall Temperatures,” 9 August 969, pp. 5-8. 
2 Thomas L. Lewis and Richard D. Banner, NASA technical memorandum X-266, “Boundary-Layer Transition De-
tection on the X-5 Vertical Fin Using Surface Pressure-Fluctuation Measurements,” 20 August 97, passim.
22 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  April 967, p. ; Karen S. Green and 
Terrill W. Putnam, NASA technical memorandum X-326, “Measurements of Sonic Booms Generated by an 
Airplane Flying at Mach 3.5 and .8,” 5 September 97. Note that the X-5 flight program had been terminated 
nearly six years before this report was issued.
23 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to J. Martin/NASA Headquarters,  April 967, p. . 
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at Edwards. When the airplane arrived over Goldstone at Mach 4.8, the engine 
was operating at 50% thrust and the speed brakes were extended; at Cuddeback 
the engine had already shut down, the speed brakes had retracted, and the airplane 
was at Mach 3.5. Although the flight plan called for the airplane to fly directly 
over the microphone arrays, in reality it passed 1.7 miles south of the array at 
Goldstone and 7.9 miles south of the Cuddeback array–not an unusual amount of 
error for an X-15 flight.214 
 Researchers scaled and corrected the data collected from Goldstone so they 
could compare it with similar data obtained from an SR-71 flight. The two sets 
of data were in general agreement. Researchers did not evaluate the data from 
Cuddeback because of the X-15 miss distance. The results of the experiment also 
compared favorably to theoretical results, and no unusual phenomena related to 
the overpressure were encountered .215 
RECOVERABLE BOOSTER SYSTEM
 As early as 1960, some researchers considered the X-15 an ideal recoverable 
first stage for small launch vehicles, such as the NASA/USAF Blue Scout series . 
The researchers believed that this could result in significant cost savings and in-
creased reliability compared to four-stage, all-ballistic firings.216 
 Researchers had already gained some limited experience by launching small 
rockets from high-performance aircraft. Milt Thompson and Forrest Petersen 
had participated in five launches of Viper I-C sounding rockets from a Lockheed 
F-104A Starfighter (56-0749). The F-104 carried a hydraulically actuated MB-1 
launcher rack equipped with a modified Sidewinder launch rail on the centerline. 
The researchers expected that the single-stage Viper could reach 800,000 feet, an 
altitude comparable to that achieved by the ground-launched Nike-Asp sounding 
rocket. The F-104 was also equipped with a modified MA-2 low-altitude bomb-
ing system (LABS) computer from a North American F-100C Super Sabre that 
automatically launched the sounding rocket when the F-104 reached the proper 
altitude and pitch angle.217 
 Engineers believed the Viper was sufficiently safe to launch from a manned 
aircraft, but conducted two flights to verify that the rocket could withstand the 
stresses of the climb to altitude and the launch maneuver. The Air Force con-
ducted the launches over the Pacific Missile Range at Point Mugu, California, at 
altitudes between 28,600 feet and 51,100 feet, and the rockets attained altitudes 
 
2 Karen S. Green and Terrill W. Putnam, NASA technical memorandum X-326, “Measurements of Sonic Booms 
Generated by an Airplane Flying at Mach 3.5 and .8,” 5 September 97, no page numbers. 
25 Ibid. 
26 “Advanced Development Plan for X-5 Research Aircraft, Advanced Technology Program 653A,” p. 55. 
27 Victor W. Horton and Wesley E. Messing, NASA technical note D-279, “Some Operational Aspects of Using a 
High-Performance Airplane as a First-Stage Booster for Air-Launching Solid-Fuel Sounding Rockets,” January 
963, no page numbers.
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between 204,000 feet and 383,000 feet. These tests seemed to confirm that the 
concept was possible .218 
 Along the same lines, North American Aviation and the Aeronutronic Divi-
sion of the Ford Motor Company conducted a joint study during 1961 to determine 
the feasibility and desirability of using the X-15 to launch modified RM-89 Blue 
Scout rockets. The intent was to provide a “recoverable booster system capable of 
accomplishing a wide variety of space probe and orbital experiment missions.”219 
 The NACA conceived the basic Scout in 1958 as part of a study into the devel-
opment of an inexpensive, lightweight vehicle to launch small satellites or perform 
high-altitude research. NASA assigned the management of the Scout program to 
Langley, and the vehicle emerged as a four-stage vehicle. Engineers at Langley 
decided that all four stages would use solid propellants, citing the relative sim-
plicity and reliability of solid-fuel technology. In April 1959, Langley issued the 
Scout production contract to the Astronautics Division of Ling-Temco-Vought, a 
subsidiary of the Chance Vought Corporation. The Air Force modified the original 
NASA Scout under the names Blue Scout I, Blue Scout II, and Blue Scout Junior .
 Essentially, the North American-Ford study defined a three-stage booster. 
The NB-52 was the first stage, the X-15 was the second stage, and the upper two 
stages (stages 3 and 4) of the Blue Scout were called the third stage (despite being 
two physical stages). The study investigated both guided and unguided versions 
of the Scout, but concentrated on the unguided vehicle as a means of keeping 
costs at a minimum.220 
 As usual, the NB-52 would launch the X-15 at 45,000 feet, with the research 
airplane climbing to altitudes between 130,000 and 200,000 feet to launch the 
Blue Scout. The shutdown of the X-15 engine and ignition of the Blue Scout 
would occur simultaneously. 
 Ford and North American engineers believed they could reasonably predict 
the effects of adding an external store to the X-15, and the entire modification 
would add approximately 500 pounds to the empty weight of the airplane. With 
the missile pylon mounted on the bottom centerline of the fuselage, a slight re-
duction in directional stability was expected. However, engineers anticipated that 
partial deflection of the speed brakes could maintain a level of directional stabil-
ity comparable to that of the basic aircraft. Lateral stability would suffer from a 
slightly greater negative dihedral effect, but North American did not expect this 
to be a cause for concern since it was within the capability of the SAS to counter. 
The pylon was about the same height as the normal fixed portion of the ventral 
stabilizer and extended forward to the leading edge of the wing.221 
 North American did not expect reentry with the launcher pylon installed to 
present “any particular problems.” The study estimated that the temperatures on 
and around the pylon would be less than 1,000°F, and any local hot spots could be 
tolerated through the use of ablative materials.222 
28 Ibid.
29 Aeronutronic (a division of Ford Motor Company) report number 22U, “X-5 Recoverable Booster System,” 
 December 96, p. . In the files at the DFRC History Office.
220 Ibid, p. 3. 
22 Ibid, pp. 5, 0, 2, and drawings attached to the back of the report.
222 Ibid, p. 6. 
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 Before the X-15 pilot could extend the launcher and fire the missile, he had 
to arm the missile ignition circuit and the missile destruct system via switches in 
the cockpit. The launcher was extended and the missile fired by pressing a button 
on the center stick. Upon activation, the hydraulic actuator unlocked the uplock 
and extended the launch rail. Shortly before the bottom of the extension stroke 
the actuator became a snubber, and when it bottomed out it became a drag link. 
When the extension arms reached 60 degrees arc, the fire circuit for the missile 
energized and the missile left the launch rails. If the missile did not fire, it auto-
matically jettisoned at the bottom of the extension stroke along with the launch 
rails. During normal operation, the missile de-energized the jettison circuit as it 
left the launch rails, and the rails automatically retracted into the pylon.223 
 The Pacific Missile Range tracked the Blue Scout after launch from an 
X-15 flying from a lake near Wendover AFB heading west. The expended stages 
would fall into the Pacific off the coast of California. If the missile had to be 
destroyed during the first-stage boost, the remains would likely fall on govern-
ment land along the High Range. Engineers expected that the X-15/Blue Scout 
configuration could launch 150 pounds into a 115-mile orbit, or 60 pounds into a 
1,150-mile orbit.224 
 Ford estimated that using the NB-52 and X-15 to launch the Blue Scout 
could save between $150,000 and $250,000 per mission compared to ground-
launching a similar payload. Some figures showed even greater savings. Ford 
stated, “It is estimated that an orbital mission using the X-15 Recoverable Boost-
er System can be accomplished at a cost of approximately $250,000 as opposed 
to the $1,000,000 required for an orbital flight of the Scout vehicle. Based on 
50 and 100 vehicle launches over a 2-1/2 year period, it is estimated that sav-
ings in the order of 12 and 24 million dollars could be achieved. Amortization 
of vehicle and aircraft modifications and the required development program are 
reflected in these figures.” This did not completely agree with the assessment 
made a year or two later by the FRC that each X-15 launch alone cost approxi-
mately $600,000.225 
 Remembering that 1961 was the height of the Cold War, Ford also pointed 
out that “[e]xperimental missile launches from the X-15 aircraft in the environ-
ment of outer space should provide considerable data toward solving the problem 
of weapons delivery from a space plane or other orbital vehicle.” Interesting-
ly, NASA also conducted wind-tunnel tests of the X-15/Blue Scout carrying an 
ASSET research vehicle in support of the Dyna-Soar program.226 
 The study also proposed taking the X-15 “on the road” and conducting equa-
torial launches. The favored scenario apparently had the NB-52 taking off from 
Cape Canaveral, Florida, and the X-15 landing on Grand Bahama Island. The 
study continued, “Although it is realized that certain Ground Support Equipment 
223 Ibid, pp. 0-. 
22 Ibid, pp. 2-6 and 25. 
225 Ibid, pp. 8-9; James E. Love and William R. Young, NASA technical note D-3732, “Survey of Operation and 
Cost Experience of the X-5 Airplane as a Reusable Space Vehicle,” November 966, pp. 7. Interestingly, these 
are the same cost arguments made by Orbital Sciences Corporation for their current Pegasus launch vehicle. 
Ironically, the Pegasus first flew from the same NB-52 aircraft that supported the X-5 program.
226 Aeronutronic report number 22U, p. 6. 
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and facilities must be made available for landing and recovery of the X-15 in re-
mote places … the cost of achieving a mission … would be considerably less than 
required for establishing a missile ground launch site.” This seemed to ignore the 
fact that there are very few dry-lake landing sites around the equator, especially in 
the Bahamas.227 
 Ford and North American expected that the engineering would take only 
three months after they were given the authority to proceed, and the manufacture 
of the launch system and modifications to the X-15 and NB-52 would take an ad-
ditional three months. Two development tests (one at Hidden Hills and one at Sil-
ver Lake) were conducted seven months after the go-ahead was received. These 
tests used an unpowered missile to evaluate the captive-carry and jettison char-
acteristics of the configuration. The first test was performed at a relatively low 
altitude, peaking at 112,000 feet; the second would go to the full 180,000-foot 
expected launch altitude .228 
 When Paul Bikle heard about the proposal, he raised several questions, pri-
marily centering on range-safety aspects in the event of a Blue Scout failure, and 
the possible impact on the X-15 research program that could result from dedicat-
ing an airplane to this concept. It appears that the obstacles were too great for the 
expected return, and the concept just quietly faded from the scene.229 
RAMJETS
 Although the X-15 would eventually play a major role in the Hypersonic 
Research Engine (HRE) project, researchers had not considered air-breathing 
propulsion at all during its conceptual development in 1954. At the time, most 
researchers believed that hypersonic air-breathing engines were improbable or, 
more likely, impossible. Several military programs undertook subsonic-burning 
ramjet development, but there appeared to be fundamental obstacles to their use 
at hypersonic speeds. In 1955, William H. Avery at the Applied Physics Labo-
ratory (APL) of The Johns Hopkins University conducted a survey of ongoing 
ramjet development efforts and concluded that Mach 4 was about the highest 
speed achievable by ramjets. Two problems arose at higher speeds: the lack of 
structural materials for the combustor, and a serious energy loss due to disso-
ciation of the propulsive airflow and the failure of this plasma to recombine in 
the nozzle.230  
 A remarkable change from pessimism to optimism occurred during the late 
1950s and early 1960s. By 1964, researchers believed they could solve the prob-
lems encountered previously. In particular, a hydrogen-powered supersonic com-
bustion ramjet appeared to have the dramatic potential of useful performance up 
227 Ibid, p. 7; Keith J. Scala, “A History of Air-Launched Space Vehicles,” Quest, vol. 3, no. , spring 99, p. 38.
228 Aeronutronic report number 22U, pp. 20-28. 
229 X-5 Status Report, Paul F. Bikle/FRC to H. Brown/NASA Headquarters, 5 March 962, p. 3. 
230 John V. Becker, “A Hindsight Study of the NASA Hypersonic Research Engine Project,”  July 976, p. 2. Pre-
pared under contract NAS-250 but never published. Copy in the author’s collection.
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to near-orbital velocities. No single breakthrough created this newfound opti-
mism–it sprang from a confluence of results from a number of unrelated research 
efforts. The first important contribution was a series of external burning studies 
conducted at the NACA Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory and the Marquardt 
Corporation in Van Nuys, California. These studies appeared to confirm that 
combustion in a supersonic flow was possible. Similar results had been produced 
by the APL and Antonio Ferri at the Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute in the late 
1950s. The next innovation was the development of hydrogen as a fuel, which 
was also mainly accomplished at Lewis. Beginning in 1954, Richard J. Weber 
at Lewis began to think about the possibility of using supersonic combustion, 
internally, in a ramjet engine. Although he doubted that shock-free combustion 
would be possible in a supersonic combustor, Weber decided to analyze the ideal 
performance that would be attainable in a ramjet. The work had a low priority 
and proceeded slowly, but resulted in the first definitive analytical assessment of 
a supersonic ramjet.231  
 In a September 1958 report, Weber and John S. Mackay identified sever-
al beneficial features of a supersonic combustion ramjet (scramjet), noting that 
it could relax inlet/diffuser requirements, reduce combustor heating, minimize 
the nozzle-dissociation problem, alleviate variable-geometry inlet requirements, 
and provide the potential for performance levels much higher than any other air-
breathing engine at speeds above Mach 7. The effects of the combustor area ratio, 
thermal compression, and other design parameters were determined for the first 
time. Several other researchers generally confirmed the results of this research by 
1960. Ironically, by the time NASA finally published the Weber-Mackay paper in 
1958, the authors had moved on to other research, believing there would be little 
interest in the scramjets and few (if any) applications for them.232  
 This was an interesting time for the NACA laboratories. On 1 October 1958, 
the NACA ceased to exist and the new NASA came into being. Lewis was begin-
ning to abandon all work on air-breathing engines in favor of rocket engines. 
Thus, it surprised Weber when in early 1959 he was invited to speak at the 2nd 
Symposium on Advanced Propulsion Concepts as a specialist in supersonic com-
bustion . Weldon Worth, then technical director of the Aero-Propulsion Labora-
tory at Wright Field, organized an entire session on the subject. Worth had many 
interests, including Aerospaceplane, a large single-stage-to-orbit vehicle pow-
ered by scramjets. Shortly after the beginning of the Mercury program in 1959, 
most of the major aerospace companies participated in studies of the Aerospace-
plane, although in retrospect it is easy to see that the concept could never have 
worked given the technology of the era. Nevertheless, the concept was exciting, 
and Alexander Kartveli at Republic Aviation, for example, enlisted the services 
of Antonio Ferri to collaborate on orbital concepts. In addition to scramjets, the 
companies began working on imaginative new schemes, such as the air collec-
tion engine system (ACES) and the liquid air collection and enrichment system 
23 Ibid. Weber used, logically enough, the acronym SCRJ to describe the device, but this was difficult to pronounce 
and soon gave way to “scramjet” SCRAM had first been a Navy program to develop a supersonic combustion 
ramjet missile.
232 Ibid; Richard J. Weber and John S. Mackay, NACA technical note 386, “An Analysis of Ramjet Engines Using Su-
personic Combustion, September 958. Available online at http://naca.larc.nasa.gov/reports/1958/naca-tn-4386/.
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(LACES), that would extract air from the atmosphere on the way up to be used as 
oxidizer by rocket engines when the vehicle left the sensible atmosphere.233 
 The first public discussion of hypersonic propulsion and its possible applica-
tions was held at the 4th AGARD Colloquium in Milan during April 1960. Ferri 
fired the imagination of his audience with the prospects of air-breathing engines 
that worked all the way to orbit. Many of the older researchers were politely skep-
tical. The Aerospaceplane concepts would survive for several years within the Air 
Force before everybody came to realize they were simply too advanced for the 
state of the art. For a brief time, however, they influenced the road taken by some 
of the early space shuttle studies.234  
 The scramjet concept, however, survived relatively intact. Between 1959 and 
1963, the military spent $10 million on scramjet research, and researchers failed 
to uncover any “concept killer” obstacles. Perhaps equally important was the ap-
pearance of a rapidly growing cult of ardent scramjet enthusiasts of which Ferri 
was the chief spokesman and Worth the chief benefactor. By all appearances, it 
seemed that practical scramjet applications were just around the corner. One 1964 
summary stated that “scramjets are passing into the development stage” and listed 
no less than 19 institutions that were working on the concept, including five that 
were “testing complete engine models.”235 
 In 1964 the Air Force released Project Forecast, one of the periodic studies 
the military conducted into possible advanced concepts for future applications. 
Largely through the lobbying efforts of Ferri and Worth, the scramjet became an 
area that merited special emphasis. Consequently, General Bernard A . Schriever, 
the commander of the Air Force Systems Command, established a special task 
force to examine scramjet technology and its potential. However, the cards were 
stacked in favor of the technology because the majority of the members of the task 
force were members of Worth’s staff or representatives of the various contractors 
working under $22 million worth of scramjet contracts. The final report published 
in April 1965 envisioned “no unforeseen problems” and recommended initiating a 
high-priority national development program. There were, of course, skeptics who 
did not believe the technology was nearly as advanced as its proponents claimed. 
However, few of them were willing to buck the Air Force hierarchy, which appar-
ently had decided to embark on a crusade.236 
 The origination of large government research and development projects is sel-
dom a logical process, and the HRE was no exception. North American Aviation 
was always interested in new business, and during the early 1960s it was particu-
larly keen on finding new ways to exploit the X-15 research airplane. Given the 
newfound interest in scramjet propulsion, project aerodynamicist Bill Johnston 
decided to marry the two. During May 1962, Johnston visited various Air Force 
and NASA centers with a proposal to modify an X-15 for use as a flying test bed 
233 Becker, “A Hindsight Study of the NASA Hypersonic Research Engine Project,” pp. -5. For more information on 
Aerospaceplane, see Dennis R. Jenkins, Space Shuttle: The History of the National Space Transportation Sys-
tem–The First 100 Missions (North Branch, MN: Specialty Press, 200), pp. 52-57. ACES (air-collection engine 
system) and LACE (liquid air cycle engine) were actually brought to the small demonstrator stage, but no full-scale 
development was ever undertaken.
23 Becker, “A Hindsight Study of the NASA Hypersonic Research Engine Project,” pp. -5. 
235 Ibid, pp. 5-6. 
236 Ibid, pp. 6-7. 
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for hypersonic air-breathing engines. To many researchers, including some at the 
FRC, the X-15 seemed like an ideal test bed for such a propulsion system. As 
envisioned by the FRC in 1961, this idea was “an extensive air-breathing engine 
development program … in which one or more sub-scale modular experimental 
engines would be flown in a true flight environment aboard the X-15.” Surpris-
ingly, there were no takers, and the proposal floundered until November 1962 
when Jack McKay made an emergency landing in X-15-2, injuring himself and 
seriously damaging the airplane.237 
 North American took this opportunity to dust off Johnston’s concept and re-
iterated its proposal to modify the airplane for propulsion testing. The Air Force 
supported the plan and was willing to pay the estimated $4.75 million to rebuild 
and modify the aircraft. Many within NASA, however, were not in favor of the 
idea since they considered the proposed Mach 8 speed to be of limited value for 
propulsion research . Nevertheless, NASA did not press its objections and the Air 
Force authorized North American to modify the airplane. It thus appeared that a 
Mach 8 carrier vehicle would be available within a couple of years; however, the 
propulsion test engines themselves were completely undefined.238 
 To correct this illogical situation, the FRC quickly launched a study aimed 
at determining what type of engine would be appropriate for testing on the X-15. 
Recognizing that the expertise for monitoring such a study would be found chiefly 
at other NASA facilities, the FRC solicited comments on its draft procurement 
documents; no support was forthcoming. In fact, Kennedy F. Rubert at Langley 
expressed his opposition to any flight program as “an unwise expenditure of gov-
ernment funds” since engine research “is better done on the ground.” Undaunted, 
the FRC continued with its procurement and stated firmly that it planned “to take 
an active role in advanced air-breathing propulsion and the X-15 should prove very 
useful in this regard.” This course of action seemed to both prolong the X-15 pro-
gram and increase the participation of the FRC in basic research projects, despite 
philosophical misgivings on the part of many at the FRC, including Paul Bikle.239 
 After a brief proposal period, the FRC awarded a four-month study con-
tract to the Marquardt Corporation to generate requirements applicable to 
1) subsonic combustion ramjets, 2) LACES, 3) scramjets, 4) ducted rockets, and 
5) turboramjets.240 
 When the final report appeared in December 1963, the results bore little re-
semblance to the dummy ramjet that would ultimately fly on X-15A-2. Marquardt 
determined that the X-15 was a viable platform for testing ramjets in the speed 
range of Mach 4 to Mach 8, providing a useful complement to ground testing. The 
company proposed to test three different types of ramjets that required 33 months 
to develop and build. Surprisingly, the study investigated using one of the basic 
X-15s for preliminary testing while North American rebuilt X-15A-2.241 
237 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 0; Becker, “A Hindsight Study of the NASA Hyper-
sonic Research Engine Project,” pp. 8-9. 
238 Becker, “A Hindsight Study of the NASA Hypersonic Research Engine Project,” p. 9. 
239 Ibid. 
20 “X-5 Semi-Annual Status Report No. ,” October 963, p. 0. 
2 Marquardt report MP209, “Hypersonic Airbreathing Propulsion Systems for Testing on the X-5: Feasibility and 
Preliminary Design Study,” prepared under contract NAS-382, 3 December 963.
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 The three proposed engines included a subsonic combustion ramjet, a scram-
jet, and a “convertible ramjet,” all sharing a common external design referred to 
as MA-131. The convertible engine operated as a subsonic combustion engine 
between Mach 3 and 5, and with supersonic combustion between Mach 7 and 8; 
it transitioned from one mode to the other between Mach 5 and 7. Researchers 
investigated three other engine types—the turboramjet, ducted rocket, and LACE/
ACES–and ruled them out, although the ducted rocket returned as part of the later 
air-augmented rocket propulsion system (AARPS) concept.242  
 Marquardt considered regenerative, radiation, and ablative cooling schemes, 
and settled on the latter as being the most cost-effective and lowest risk. 
Unfortunately, this probably doomed the Marquardt proposal since most hyper-
sonic-engine researchers were firmly convinced that testing was not worthwhile 
unless the engine used regenerative cooling. Another controversial aspect of the 
Marquardt proposal was the plan to forego a true variable-geometry inlet design 
in favor of an inlet that could be set to various positions on the ground before 
flight. In retrospect, this seems like a good compromise. Undoubtedly, any pro-
duction engine would use a variable-geometry inlet, but it would be expensive 
and time-consuming to develop one. In addition, given how short a period the 
X-15 could maintain steady flight conditions, there would be little opportunity 
to adjust the inlet in flight in any case. Ground personnel could adjust it to allow 
data to be gathered on successive flights at different geometries. Still, the re-
searchers at Langley and Lewis believed the solution was inelegant and rejected 
it out of hand .243 
 The engineers at the FRC begged to differ, noting that “the elimination of 
complex and unproven inlet and exhaust nozzle control systems from the test 
engine also provides operational simplicity with reasonable assurance for success 
without a long and costly X-15 flight test program.” Nevertheless, the engineers 
worried that the drag created by the ramjet installation might result in much slow-
er-than-desired acceleration while on the way to the intended flight conditions. 
Marquardt modified the design so that the inlet would close during the accelera-
tion phase and open only when the correct test conditions were available.244 
 Instead of the round cross-section dummy ramjet that ultimately hung from 
the ventral stabilizer on X-15A-2, Marquardt proposed a rectangular shape that 
fit flush against the lower fuselage. The unit would be 188 inches long, 24 inches 
wide, and 21 inches high. A boundary-layer fence between the inlet and the low-
er fuselage ensured clean airflow into the inlet. Researchers expected the hydro-
gen-fueled ramjet could produce up to 1,000 lbf gross thrust. Several mockups 
were produced and fitted to X-15A-2 at various times, including one airshow 
at Edwards .245 
  
22 Irving Stone, “X-5 Use Planned in Ramjet Evaluations,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 August 96, pp. 
57-58; Marquardt report MP209, “Hypersonic Airbreathing Propulsion Systems for Testing on the X-5: Feasibil-
ity and Preliminary Design Study,” prepared under contract NAS-382, 3 December 963, no page numbers.
23 Ibid.
2 Memorandum, Douglas E. Wall/FRC (Airborne Hypersonic Research Program manager) to James E. Love/FRC 
(X-5 Program Manager), subject: Performance uprating of the YLR99 rocket engine in the X-5A-2 airplane for 
flight test of the USAF/NASA advanced ramjet engine, 20 October 963.
25 Marquardt report MP209.
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 Concurrently, North American conducted a study to determine the structural 
modifications needed to support the Marquardt concepts. In addition to the three 
engines proposed by Marquardt, engineers also studied an in-house-developed 
ramjet called the Typhon. North American estimated that the Typhon installa-
tion would weigh 803 pounds, while the three Marquardt engines would av-
erage about 900 pounds. The engineers believed all of these were within the 
capability of the X-15 to handle, although they shifted the center of gravity dan-
gerously rearward.246 
 In addition to the engine package itself, North American needed to install 
an engine control system, engine jettison system, liquid-fuel storage and transfer 
system, and fuel pressurization system, as well as a new fire detection system. The 
engine package would replace the ventral stabilizer on the basic X-15, but would 
hang from a stub ventral on X-15A-2.247 
 On the basic airplane the entire ventral stabilizer and lower rudder actuator 
would be removed, a “roller support system” would be installed that actually sup-
ported the ramjet, a new frame would be added in the fuselage at station 483.5, 
and a pair of conformal liquid-hydrogen slipper tanks would be added over the 
aft portions of the side tunnels. Since North American was including a liquid- 
hydrogen tank in the center-of-gravity compartment of the rebuilt X-15A-2, the 
slipper tanks would be unnecessary. The longer rear skids on the advanced air-
plane would also allow the ramjet to be mounted on the stub ventral stabilizer. 
This had a couple of desirable effects: the inlet would be farther away from the 
flow disturbance caused by the X-15 fuselage, and at least a small ventral stabiliz-
er would remain if the ramjet had to be jettisoned at high speeds. North American 
also suggested using JP-Pentaborane as an alternate fuel, and proposed installing 
a system that could handle either fuel as necessary.248 
 North American did express a couple of concerns. The modifications would 
increase landing-gear loads significantly, reducing the factor of safety below the 
150% normally maintained. The company suggested beefing up the landing gear 
on the basic X-15 at a minimum, and perhaps even strengthening the already beef-
ier gear on the advanced airplane. A more disturbing concern was the aft center of 
gravity that would be created by the ramjet installation, particularly in the basic 
airplane where the liquid hydrogen (and, more importantly, its tankage) would 
be mounted far aft. North American advised performing a new series of stability 
and control wind-tunnel tests to determine how bad the situation might really be. 
Ultimately, researchers at the JPL conducted these tests during 1966 on both the 
basic airplane and the advanced X-15A-2 .249 
 Assuming a go-ahead in February 1965, North American estimated it would 
take three months to design the modifications to X-15-1, four months to fabricate 
the modification kit, and four months to install it, meaning that X-15-1 would be 
26 North American report NA-63-, “X-5 Propulsion System Test Package Study,” December 963, no 
page numbers.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid. Although the report says that the slipper tanks would not be used on the X-5A-2, wind-tunnel studies at the 
JPL 20-inch hypersonic facility showed that slipper tanks were used on the X-5A-2 as well as several variations 
of the basic airplane.
29 North American report NA-63-.
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available to support hypersonic engine testing in January 1966. The advanced 
X-15A-2 would become available in July 1966. Researchers expected that the 
flight program would encompass approximately 25 flights spread over a two-
year period.250 
Hypersonic Research Engine
 None of the NASA reviewers, excepting the FRC, believed a research pro-
gram based on the Marquardt engine concept was justifiable. They pointed out 
that the emphasis on low cost would result in overly simplified designs that pro-
vided little valid test data. In addition, the use of ablative materials would produce 
contaminants that might strongly affect the combustion process. While discussing 
the problem with Kennedy Rubert, John Becker suggested that Rubert offer an 
alternative that might be worthwhile. Rubert then described, in general terms, a 
concept very close to what would eventually become the HRE–a sophisticated 
dual-mode engine that was thoroughly researched on the ground and used a clean 
internal metallic structure without ablative coatings. Becker argued that this was 
a superior alternative .251 
 After the final Marquardt briefing at the FRC, Douglas E. Wall, who was 
in charge of X-15 research engine activities, called an informal meeting of the 
NASA participants to discuss the next move. The outside center reviewers were 
unanimously against the Marquardt engines, and generally against any flight pro-
gram. Wall argued convincingly that financial support for an extensive scramjet 
program was unlikely to be forthcoming unless it was tied to an X-15 flight ex-
periment. Although almost everybody still viewed a flight program as unneces-
sary, all agreed that Wall was probably correct. Everybody recognized, however, 
that Lewis would present a formidable obstacle; not only was Lewis traditionally 
unsympathetic to research airplanes, but the center had also recently abandoned 
almost all air-breathing engine research. To bypass the expected objections, the 
researchers decided to propose the Hypersonic Research Engine (HRE) program 
as a joint FRC-Langley effort, with Langley managing the ground phase and the 
FRC being responsible for the flight phase.252 
 Although he was personally unconvinced, Paul Bikle endorsed this concept 
and verbally presented it to NASA Headquarters, with Rubert recommended as 
the program manager. The initial Langley reaction, however, was unfavorable, 
mainly because Lawrence K . Loftin, Jr ., one of the assistant center directors, had 
recently recommended against such a program. In Becker’s Aero Physics Division 
there was a very different reaction. For years, propulsion-related fluid mechanics 
and hypersonic inlet/diffuser work in the division had suffered from a dearth of 
real-life applications. The prospect of involvement with a real engine for X-15 
testing offered an exciting infusion of much needed vitality. Becker also pointed 
250 Irving Stone, “X-5 Use Planned in Ramjet Evaluations,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 August 96, pp. 
57-60; North American report NA-63-.
25 Becker, “A Hindsight Study of the NASA Hypersonic Research Engine Project,” p. 9. This section is largely an abridged 
version of: John V. Becker, “A Hindsight Study of the NASA Hypersonic Research Engine Project,”  July 976. Pre-
pared under contract NAS-250 but never published, for a variety of reasons best explained by Becker.
252 Ibid, pp. 9-0. 
X-15: EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
out that the HRE project would reveal whether any of the performance claims 
for the scramjet were valid, something that appealed to many Langley managers. 
Another important consideration was the complete lack in 1964 of ground-test 
facilities for true-temperature simulation with clean air above Mach 5. There-
fore, researchers viewed the X-15 as a unique test facility, and eventually Langley 
management came around and began supporting the project.253 
 NASA asked Rubert to develop a detailed plan for the HRE program, and on 
17 March 1964 he released a preliminary proposal that outlined a three-phase pro-
gram. Phase I was to define a practical, high-performance, Mach 3–8 hypersonic 
engine, and to design, develop, and build such an engine; Phase II was to measure 
the performance of the engine in the laboratory; and Phase III was to measure the 
performance of the engine in maneuvering flight and to validate the ground-test 
results. Significantly, the proposal did not discuss the need for scramjet research, 
assuming (incorrectly) that this was already well known. Rubert stated flatly that 
the “gaps” in component technology “had been filled,” leaving only uncertainties 
“which can be discovered and resolved only by design and construction of a truly 
practical research engine.” Nobody at Langley challenged these claims, which 
mainly demonstrated the inflated technical confidence in the concept that existed 
at the time. Rubert’s plan required four years at a cost of $30.4 million, plus the 
operations costs of the X-15. The proposal “sailed through” its approval process at 
NASA Headquarters “with no opposition and few questions asked.” Significantly, 
Lewis director Abe Silverstein did not oppose the project, although he stopped 
short of actually supporting it. Phase I funds were released on 13 June 1964.254 
 As Wall had indicated, tying the HRE proposal to the X-15 lent credibility. 
The X-15 was still a successful program that enjoyed almost universal approval 
within NASA; anything related to it, by default, usually enjoyed similar approval. 
Of course, there should have been questions. Both the schedule and budget were 
hopelessly optimistic for developing an entirely new type of engine. The lack of 
coordination with the Air Force and Navy should have been disturbing. Moreover, 
nobody asked how Langley was going to compensate for its lack of experience 
in engine development and testing (traditionally a Lewis task). It would not be as 
easy as it appeared.255 
 The proposed HRE engine was described as a “truly practical complete en-
gine” that would provide “factual” performance data under real-world conditions. 
If researchers could have fulfilled all of the hopeful claims of the original pro-
posal, this single engine project would have advanced the technology from the 
early exploratory research stage to an operational system. An elaborate subscale 
prototype engine was obviously required to fulfill such claims. Unfortunately, this 
was not what would be specified for the Phase I competition. Instead, the state-
ment of work called for the “best possible research engine.” While the Phase I 
253 Ibid, pp. 0-. 
25 Ibid, pp. -3. 
255 Ibid, pp. 3-. As a matter of fact, the Air Force was also beginning a scramjet flight program, only using rockets 
as boosters instead of the X-5. NASA received its first inkling of this program on 8 September 96 in the 
form of a copy of Technical Development Plan 56E, “Supersonic Combustion Ramjet Propulsion.” The Air Force 
intended to boost a series of incremental scramjet engines to progressively higher speeds starting at about Mach 
5 and eventually reaching Mach 9. What is ironic is that the Air Force was using low-cost versions of the simple 
ramjets originally proposed by Marquardt.
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engine would be required to deal with realistic internal flow conditions, it would 
not be required to consider the critically difficult high-temperature regeneratively 
cooled structure or to worry about external drag. In fact, the structure and external 
features were to be “refined only to the extent necessary for compatibility” with 
the internal flow performance requirements.256 
 Rubert never openly acknowledged the downgrading of the engine concept 
from the advanced prototype referred to in the original proposal to an aerother-
modynamic boilerplate. The rationale for the change was that project personnel 
soon realized that the limited funding they had requested could not possibly pay 
for a prototype engine; unfortunately, they continued to portray the engine as a 
prototype throughout the project. Ironically, the engine specified in the Phase I 
statement of work closely followed the 18-inch-diameter pod-type engine that 
had been suggested by Marquardt during the initial FRC study and was uniformly 
rejected by Langley and the other NASA centers.257 
 The decision to seek the highest possible internal performance and to impose 
no thrust-minus-drag requirement had several unfortunate consequences. In or-
der to comply, the contractor that eventually won the Phase I competition used 
a higher-than-optimal degree of external compression, which caused extremely 
high external cowl drag. In the final design, designers thickened the cowl to house 
research instrumentation, aggravating the drag problem even further. In the end, 
the engine was capable of producing essentially zero net thrust (thrust minus 
drag). When outside researchers realized this, most of the already lukewarm sup-
port for the project vanished .258 
 A Phase I request for proposals was issued to 35 potential bidders, calling for 
a nine-month, 27,500 man-hour (roughly 20 people) study to develop a concept 
and a preliminary design; determine performance, life, weight, and safety data; 
and provide a development plan, manufacturing plan, and costs for the Phase II 
effort. When the proposals arrived on 28 May 1964, only four companies had 
responded. A team of 50 engineers and researchers from Ames, Langley, Lewis, 
and the FRC convened to pick a winner. Significantly, there was only a single 
Air Force representative on the technical review panels . NASA awarded parallel 
study contracts to Garrett, General Electric, and Marquardt in October. The evalu-
ators never thoroughly understood why Pratt & Whitney had chosen to submit a 
proposal, since nobody thought it was a “serious effort to compete.”259 
 Nine months later, the same small army of evaluators reconvened to look 
over the results of the three studies. The concepts were essentially unchanged by 
the nine months of effort, and the results seemed to favor Garrett. John Becker 
later said that there were “some flaws in the deliberations which led to Garrett’s 
selection,” although he maintained they were honest mistakes and not deliberate 
attempts to mislead.260  
 The Garrett engine was the smallest, simplest, and easiest to cool, and had 
the best structural approach of the three designs. The evaluators also believed that 
256 John V. Becker, “A Hindsight Study of the NASA Hypersonic Research Engine Project,”  July 976, p. 6. 
257 Ibid, p. 6. 
258 Ibid, p. 7. 
259 Ibid, p. 8. 
260 Ibid, pp. 8-9. 
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the engine had a very high research potential because of the quasi-two-dimen-
sional nature of the flow in its shallow annular combustor. Researchers thought 
that this would simplify the analysis of the combustor data for use in any future 
two-dimensional combustor design. There was another powerful consideration in 
favor of Garrett: under the leadership of Anthony duPont, Garrett had exhibited 
an energy and zeal unmatched by the other companies. Drawing on $250,000 in 
company funds, it had built a full-scale HRE combustor model and later operated 
it successfully at the Navy Ordnance Aerophysics Laboratory in Daingerfield, 
Texas, under simulated Mach 6 conditions. This made it seem like the design was 
well along, and that developing an engine based on it would be a quick and inex-
pensive process .261 
 The General Electric design, on the other hand, did not appear to offer a two-
dimensional approach because its combustor annulus was too deep. The engine 
was also large, heavy, and hard to cool. The evaluation team also penalized Gen-
eral Electric because of its long development schedule and high cost, although in 
retrospect they were much more realistic than Garrett’s.262 
 The evaluators ranked the Marquardt engine developed by Ferri last because 
of its complex three-dimensional flows and a general lack of substantiation of the 
claims made for it. The most serious question revolved around the thermal com-
pression effect used to avoid having a variable-geometry inlet.263 
 As it turned out, there were three serious flaws in the evaluation. The sup-
posedly simple two-dimensional flow expounded by Garrett was illusory. The 
complex boundary layers, focused shock waves, and resulting separations and 
complex interactions made the actual flow virtually impossible to analyze, 
unique to this particular engine and undesirable from all standpoints. The gener-
ally better performance actually obtained with the General Electric combustor 
suggests that it should have received at least an equal rating. It is interesting 
to note that during his oral briefings to the evaluation board, Antonio Ferri had 
called attention to the problems of axisymmetrical design, including “focused 
shocks,” “high losses,” and “high cowl drag”–the same problems that were actu-
ally encountered by the Garrett engine. The evaluators unfortunately dismissed 
these comments as prejudiced.264 
 The second flaw in the evaluation was the belief that the study would reveal 
true time and cost estimates in a situation where the government told the contrac-
tors what the times and costs should be. The two contractors that fed back what 
the government wanted to hear were credited with “responsiveness,” while the 
one (Marquardt) that provided more realistic (but unpopular) estimates was pe-
nalized. The last flaw was perhaps the most unfortunate. Garrett gave the impres-
sion that the already-developed model combustor could be easily made to work. 
However, its apparent success during early tests was the result of researchers not 
understanding the test conditions, and in reality the development of the combustor 
would prove to be the primary problem of the HRE. Garrett later blamed its mis-
26 Ibid, pp. 8-9. 
262 Ibid, pp. 8-9. 
263 Ibid, p. 20. 
26 Ibid, p. 20. 
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leading experience with this model for its gross underestimates of the true time 
and cost of the actual engine.265 
 There were also questions, even prior to Phase I, regarding whether Garrett 
had sufficient expertise to undertake the development of the HRE. The company 
had little experience with scramjet aerothermodynamics, and both management 
and technical personnel were inexperienced in this type of development effort. 
The fact that the company was proceeding with the development of the com-
bustor model at its own expense was the primary consideration that overruled 
its inexperience .266 
 On 11 July 1966, NASA awarded Garrett the Phase II contract, but things 
quickly began to unravel during the negotiations for a final contract. Modifica-
tions and ground support equipment for X-15A-2 would cost a staggering $8.7 
million, vastly more than had been expected. Within six weeks, Garrett was pro-
posing a $10 million increase in overall costs. Given the overall reductions in 
funding caused by the conflict in Southeast Asia, NASA managers began to ques-
tion the necessity for the program.267 
 At a meeting of the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board on 5 
July 1966, the Air Force announced it would stop funding the X-15 program in 
1968 and that NASA would take sole responsibility for the majority of operational 
support (the military would continue to provide minor base support services). The 
withdrawal of Air Force support for the X-15 program was a serious setback be-
cause it meant that the NASA budget would need to find an additional $8 million 
per year, an enormous increase that was unlikely to occur. At the same time, there 
was another adverse development on the Air Force side: a gradual decrease in sup-
port for hypersonic technology in general, and scramjets in particular. Just before 
retiring from a long and notable career, General Bernard A . Schriever was unsuc-
cessful in his attempt to obtain $50 million for an ambitious scramjet program.268 
 Finding additional NASA funding would not be easy. This raised significant 
questions about how to proceed to Phase II. Interestingly, the question of whether 
to proceed seems not to have been raised at all. In September 1966, Langley 
established a formal project office to oversee Phase II, with Rubert designated 
as the project manager, and by year’s end approximately a dozen people staffed 
the office.269 
 On the contractor side, the president of Garrett, Harry Wetzel, was getting 
“politely impatient” with the delay in getting started. In a letter to NASA admin-
istrator James E. Webb on 16 December 1966, Wetzel indicated that he might 
invoke “pre-project costs” under a provision of the contract if delays should con-
tinue . This appeared to have the desired effect because a plan was soon devised 
that split the former Phase II effort into Phases IIA and IIB. The first part would 
cover development and the manufacture of one pre-prototype, flight-weight 
engine. Phase IIB would subsequently produce six prototype engines for ground 
tests, qualification testing, and later flight tests as part of Phase III. NASA for-
265 Ibid, p. 20. 
266 Ibid, pp. 20-2. 
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mally approved Phase IIA with a target cost of $15.6 million (including fee), and 
researchers estimated that Phase IIB would cost $13 million. However, nobody 
attempted to define a cost estimate for Phase III because it contained too many 
unknowns. In addition, project management did not address how to extend the 
X-15 program long enough to allow the engine to be developed, or how to pay for 
X-15 operations .270 
 In the high desert, plans to fly a “dummy” ramjet shape on the modified 
X-15A-2 were taking shape. In order to gain basic aerodynamic data and inves-
tigate the effects of carrying a generic ramjet shape on X-15A-2, the FRC had 
several dummy ramjets constructed. None of these resembled the engine mock-
ups that engineers had hung under the X-15 in the past. The FRC fabricated the 
dummy shapes, about 7 feet long and 2 feet in diameter, from a series of truncated 
cones. The program flew two different nose configurations: a 20-degree cone on 
flights 2-51-92 and 2-52-96, and a 40-degree cone on flight 2-53-97.271 
 To accommodate the dummy ramjet, NASA significantly modified the ven-
tral stabilizer on X-15A-2 by removing 2.8 feet from the front and adding a blunt, 
unswept leading edge. In addition, engineers removed approximately 3 inches 
of the lower surface for the first 3.3 feet of the ventral to allow the ramjet to be 
mounted in a semi-submerged location. Ten impact pressure probes were installed 
on the leading edge. Most of these protruded approximately 5 inches in front of 
the ventral, although the three closest to the ramjet were progressively shorter. The 
probes extended through the pylon standoff shock wave except near the ramjet, 
where they were made shorter to measure pylon-ramjet interference effects.272 
 A removable camera fairing installed over the center-of-gravity compartment 
interrupted the smooth cylindrical surface of the lower fuselage of X-15A-2. This 
was the same camera window used for the Hycon/Mauer experiments (#27) and 
it protruded a maximum of 1.75 inches below the fuselage. This protrusion was 
located approximately 13 feet ahead of the leading edge of the pylon, or about 
10.25 feet ahead of the tip of the 40-degree nose cone. For these tests, researchers 
installed a Millikan 16-mm movie camera to photograph the ramjet.273 
 Surface static-pressure orifices were located on the right side of the dummy 
ramjet and pylon. All orifices were normal to the surface and flush with the metal 
skin. When the ablative coating was used, an insert of higher-density ablative 
material at each orifice location maintained a sharp edge at the outer surface. The 
first flight with the 20-degree nose cone did not use any nose probes. The second 
flight with the 20-degree cone, and the only flight with the 40-degree cone used a 
rake with two 40-degree cone probes protruding from the extreme nose in an “L” 
shape. The top cone probe was on the ramjet centerline, and the lower cone was 
8 inches below .274 
  
270 Ibid, p. 2. 
27 Frank W. Burcham, Jr., and Jack Nugent, NASA technical note D-5638, “Local Flow Field Around a Pylon-
Mounted Dummy Ramjet Engine on the X-5A-2 Airplane for Mach Numbers From 2.0 to 6.7,” February 970, 
pp. 3- and 22-28.
272 Ibid, pp. 3- and 22-28.
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27 Ibid, pp. -5 and 22-28.
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 A wind-tunnel study conducted after the last X-15A-2 flight showed that 
shock waves generated by the wing leading edge, lower-fuselage camera window, 
and fuselage side fairing all impinged on the dummy ramjet and pylon. Research-
ers found that these were very sensitive to the angle of attack, with a 1% increase 
in free-stream angle of attack resulting in a 10% increase in impact pressure at 
Mach 6 .5 .275 
 At the beginning of 1967, the program planners, who had originally expected 
the program to be completed by the end of 1969, did not expect to begin flight 
tests of an operable ramjet before 1971 at the earliest. The schedule had begun to 
slip even before the start of Phase I, when NASA extended the original four-year 
project 15 months just to accommodate the procurement cycle. However, there 
was little actual concern among those involved at the time since they believed the 
Air Force and NASA would extend the X-15 program as required. By 1967, that 
prospect was beginning to look less likely.276 
 Faced with the long schedule extension, greatly increased costs, the loss of 
Air Force X-15 funding, waning interest in hypersonic technology in general, and 
the prospect for austere R&D funding in the years ahead, managers began to doubt 
they could complete the HRE program at all. In particular, they considered it un-
likely that the necessary continuation of the X-15 program could be obtained using 
only NASA funding. In retrospect, it was obvious to most of those involved that 
the HRE should have died a natural death at this point . As is often the case, howev-
er, the project had developed a life of its own. Some believed that Phase IIA would 
develop useful scramjet technology regardless of what transpired in the future. 
Since there was still a minor chance that the X-15 program would continue with 
the development of the delta-wing cruise vehicle, Langley launched HRE Phase 
IIA on 3 February 1967 with the signing of the final contract with Garrett.277 
 Any chance of flight-testing a real HRE vanished on 15 November 1967 
when X-15-3 crashed, ending the proposed delta-wing program at the same time. 
Surprisingly, perhaps because researchers had long anticipated it, the actual de-
mise of the X-15 portion of the program seems to have caused only minor distress 
in the HRE project office. Researchers suggested that the X-15 had served a very 
useful purpose by imposing “real” design requirements for the engine, but sur-
mised they could realize some 90% of the program objectives even without actual 
flight tests. By this time roughly half of the Phase IIA costs had been committed, 
and these would be lost if the HRE program was terminated. There would be other 
costs associated with terminating the project, possibly totaling the entire cost of 
Phase IIA; the decision was to let Phase IIA continue unchanged.278 
 Given the lack of a flight vehicle, NASA decided to reorient the HRE into a 
ground-based program. Ground testing moved from the Navy Daingerfield Facil-
ity to a newly completed test stand at the Lewis Plumbrook installation. In early 
1968, Rubert told Garrett to stop work on the X-15 modification package and 
other items related to flight-testing, and the dummy ramjet eventually tested on 
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X-15A-2 had little relation to the HRE developed by Garrett. As it turned out, 
stopping this work saved little money since the development of most flight sub-
systems continued in an effort to achieve a “realistic” engine. As John Becker 
later observed, “And thus was HRE adroitly decoupled from the X-15 which gave 
it birth and left to make its own way, apparently unchanged but actually now 
stripped of its glamour and its principle reason to exist.”279 
 The HRE had survived the loss of the X-15 flight phase by only a few months 
when mounting cost and schedule overruns forced the abandonment of the origi-
nal plan to develop and test a complete hydrogen-burning engine. Nevertheless, 
the program continued–with dubious results–until 22 April 1974, when NASA 
finally terminated it.280 
 Although the original promoters of the HRE had oriented Phase I only toward 
an internal aerothermodynamic performance test model of a scramjet, the com-
bination of the ambitious general claims made for the project and the X-15 flight 
requirements forced it in the direction of a much more costly subscale prototype 
with realistic structural and other subsystems. Much later John Becker estimated 
that the total cost of the entire HRE program, including 25 X-15 flights, would 
have exceeded $125 million, or about four times the original estimate. The total 
actually expended was $50.8 million, including $7.5 million charged to the re-
building of X-15A-2 and the construction of the dummy ramjets at the FRC.281 
Another Ramjet
 Despite the HRE debacle, Marquardt did not give up easily. Although NASA 
had ruled out a ducted rocket in 1963, Marquardt managed to generate enough 
interest in the concept to get a study contract from the FRC in early 1964, and the 
AARPS came back as a separate study. The designers of the AARPS contemplat-
ed the use of advanced air-breathing propulsion cycles, such as ducted rockets and 
ejector ramjets. NASA awarded Marquardt a small contract to define a research 
and development plan for AARPS and to determine the feasibility and usefulness 
of flight-testing the system on X-15A-2.282  
 On 3 January 1967, the company proposed a different ramjet installation 
for X-15A-2, actually providing power to allow a “cruise capability of approxi-
mately Mach 5.” The company proposed installing an “ejector ramjet on X-15A-
2 in the area now occupied by the rocket engine.” The ramjet would use jet fuel 
and liquid oxygen as propellants, although hydrogen peroxide was listed as an 
alternate oxidizer.283 
 The gross weight of the airplane would increase 2,571 pounds (from 35,735 
to 38,306 pounds). The amount of liquid oxygen would remain constant at 10,533 
279 Ibid, pp. 27-28. 
280 Ibid, pp. 28 and 5-58. 
28 Ibid, p. 58. Becker’s hindsight study traces the HRE project in considerable detail up through its termination, and 
offers some interesting insight into how and why the program progressed as it did. However, the story past this 
point is beyond the scope of this history and will be left to some future historian to tell.
282 Irving Stone, “X-5 Use Planned in Ramjet Evaluations,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 August 96, pp. 
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283 Marquardt report (no number), “A Study of the Ejector Ramjet Engine for X-5 Propulsion,” 3 January 967, 
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pounds, but 9,400 pounds of jet fuel would replace the normal 8,199 pounds of 
anhydrous ammonia. The propulsion system weight would increase from 910 
pounds (XLR99) to 2,280 pounds (1,380 pounds for the engine and 900 pounds 
for the inlet). On the airplane itself, the liquid-oxygen tank would remain un-
changed, but the proposal modified the existing ammonia tank to allow room for 
the inlet ducting. Unfortunately, Marquardt did not specify how it would accom-
plish this, given that the ammonia tank was a full-monocoque structural member 
of the fuselage.284 
 Another aspect that the company did not fully explain was exactly how the 
airplane would get to Mach 5. The ejector ramjet produced only 29,370 lbf, well 
below the 57,000 lbf provided by the XLR99 (but well above the 16,000 lbf pro-
vided by the interim XLR11s). Marquardt estimated that the acceleration to Mach 
5 would take 4.21 minutes at 1.04 g (much slower than the 90 seconds or so it 
normally took to get to Mach 6), covering approximately 150 miles in the process. 
Once at Mach 5 the ramjet would provide 14.8 minutes of steady-state cruise, 
covering 840 miles. This 1,000-mile flight would have necessitated a major exten-
sion to the High Range, and might well have exceeded the heat-sink capability of 
the Inconel structure, even with an ablative coating.285 
 Marquardt also suggested that the engine could be adapted to the delta-wing 
airplane, and that in the future a modified engine could provide additional cruise 
performance. In either case, the engine featured a large rectangular inlet located 
under the fuselage that started slightly ahead of the wing. The inlet duct swept up-
ward into the fuselage just ahead of the ventral stabilizer, explaining the required 
modifications to the fuel tank. The inlet faired into the ventral, and the ramjet 
engine was located where the normal XLR99 had been .286 
 It appears that NASA did not take any action based on the study results.
THIN DELTA WINGS
 During the mid-1960s, a proposed delta-wing modification to X-15-3 might 
have kept the program flying until 1972 or 1973. Unlike many proposals, such as 
the “orbital X-15,” the delta wing was a real project and was the subject of a great 
deal of research and engineering.
 The delta-wing X-15 grew out of hypersonic cruise research vehicle studies 
conducted during the early 1960s. A “hypersonic cruise” vehicle would spend 
minutes or tens of minutes at hypersonic velocities, in contrast to the original 
X-15 that spent only a few tens of seconds at that velocity. The delta-wing X-15 
configuration used the third airplane with the MH-96 and the basic modifications 
made to X-15A-2. Proponents of the concept, particularly John Becker at Lang-
ley, found the idea very attractive. Becker opined that “the highly swept delta 
28 Ibid.
285 Ibid.
286 Ibid.
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wing has emerged from studies of the past decade as the form most likely to be 
utilized on future hypersonic flight vehicles in which high lift/drag ratio is a prime 
requirement i.e., hypersonic transports and military hypersonic cruise vehicles, 
and certain recoverable boost vehicles as well.”287 
 Researchers held a meeting at the FRC on 9-10 December 1964 to determine 
exactly what research could be undertaken with a delta-wing hypersonic-cruise 
X-15. Attendees included researchers from Ames and Langley, and of course 
groups from the AFFTC and FRC. Not surprisingly, Ames and Langley did not 
necessarily agree on the exact nature of the research, and NASA Headquarters 
asked each center to submit a position paper outlining its preferences.
 The Langley paper included an evaluation of possible aerodynamic and heat-
transfer experiments, in-flight engine-inlet tests, and various structural recom-
mendations that might be applicable to the delta-wing X-15. The entire paper was 
remarkably short–only 11 pages, or about the same size as the original 1954 paper 
that had been the genesis of the X-15 program.288  
 John Becker and David E. Fetterman, Jr. led the Langley group that de-
fined the aerodynamic and heat-transfer experiments primarily concerned with 
evaluating the differences between data gathered during full-scale flight tests 
and the results of wind-tunnel and analytical data. They noted that “[s]ince air-
breathing hypersonic cruise vehicles will fly at such large Reynolds numbers 
that turbulent conditions will occur over the entire wing, it is obviously of great 
importance to establish the turbulent heat-transfer characteristics of delta wings. 
The lack of any rigorous theory to turbulent heat transfer places great emphasis 
on experimental determinations. It has proved impossible, however, to achieve 
natural turbulent boundary layers on delta wing models in hypersonic ground 
facilities except over the rearward regions.” Becker and Fetterman used similar 
logic to justify investigations into areas such as turbulent skin friction and Reyn-
olds analogy, turbulent boundary-layer profile surveys, interference heating, and 
pressure distributions .289  
 The discussion of engine-inlet testing led to a rather surprising conclusion: 
“an inlet flight test program on the X-15 is not recommended.” J. R. Henry be-
lieved that ground facilities such as the 20-inch hypersonic tunnel at Langley and 
the 3.5-foot hypersonic tunnel at Ames were more than adequate for research into 
inlet configurations up to Mach 8. Henry’s case was convincing, and despite the 
ongoing interest in the HRE experiment, Langley dropped engine-inlet testing 
from further consideration for the delta wing.290  
 Structural considerations were not so much possible experiments, but rath-
er recommendations prepared by J. C. Robinson representing the views of the 
Structures Research Division at Langley. The primary recommendation was to 
manufacture the main wing structure from one of the nickel- or cobalt-base “su-
287 Memorandum, John V. Becker to Floyd L. Thompson, 29 October 96; letter, Paul F. Bikle to C. W. Harper, 3 
November 96.
288 Letter, Floyd L. Thomson/Langley to Albert J. Evans/NASA headquarters, subject “Proposed experiments and 
structural recommendations for X-5 with delta wing,” 25 January 965, with three attachments. In the files at 
the DFRC History Office.
289 Ibid. Quote is from attachment (addendum) A, “Proposed Aerodynamic and Heat-Transfer Experiments for X-5 
with Delta Wing.” 
290 Ibid.
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peralloys” using simple construction methods such as “corrugated webs weld-
ed to machined cap members with a machined waffle plate skin between the 
cap members and welded or riveted to them.” It was also recommended that 
the leading-edge material “should be refurbishable, fabricated of thoria-dis-
persed nickel or a refractory metal, radiation cooled, and should have expan-
sion joints to accommodate differences in thermal expansion between it and the 
main structure.”291  
 The Ames position paper submitted by J. Lloyd Jones was more extensive, 
consisting of 18 pages using much smaller typeface. The paper also levied some 
criticism of the existing X-15 program.292 
 Ames agreed with Langley that the primary area of research should be tur-
bulent boundary layers “because of the difficulty of providing turbulent boundary 
layer flow on models in wind tunnel tests at hypersonic speeds.” Ames noted that 
the existing X-15 had already validated wind-tunnel results up to Mach 5, and the 
Mach 8 data would be a natural extension. Ames also pointed out that the delta-
wing X-15 “is more representative of hypersonic cruise aircraft configurations” 
and would therefore yield more useful data. Ames also believed that “knowledge 
that will accrue of the handling qualities of a delta winged vehicle representative of 
current concepts of airbreathing cruise configuration will certainly be of value.”293 
 The researchers at Ames seemed to want to take the lead on the delta-wing 
configuration, much as Langley had done on the original X-15, and their list of 
potential research areas was a good deal longer. Besides turbulent-boundary-layer 
research, Ames wanted to look at skin-friction surveys, pressure distributions and 
local flow fields, boundary-layer-transition definitions, ablative studies, panel-
flutter studies, and low-speed and hypersonic-handling qualities. To accompany 
these experiments, Ames believed that “an increased program of ground based 
research relating to hypersonic cruise aircraft technology should be initiated.”294  
 Although Ames acknowledged that “the X-15 program to date unquestionably 
has been very successful” and had turned into “a research facility with which to 
conduct studies never envisioned at its inception,” it believed the program was open 
to some criticism. “For example, measurement of heat transfer was one of the ma-
jor research experiments conducted on the airplane, but design inflexibility resulted 
in the acquisition of heat transfer data in an environment which compromised their 
value to the extent that they cannot be fully explained nor understood.”295 
 To overcome this fault on the new airplane, Ames indicated, “the key to the 
potential benefits … for a delta wing X-15 program lies in the design of the air-
29 Ibid. The thoria-dispersed nickel alloy was usually called a “dispersion-strengthened” alloy. Such allows suitable 
for use in temperature ranges up to ,600-2,00°F. At these temperatures, most nickel and cobalt superalloys 
lost most of their useful strength properties because of the dissolution of the precipitated phases responsible 
for strength. Consequently, other methods of strengthening nickel and cobalt alloys were required to extend the 
high-temperature capabilities of these metals. Dispersion strengthening was the most promising because the 
strengthening component did not lower the melting point of the matrix metal. Unfortunately, in the late 960s, 
only two variations were commercially available: ) a nickel alloy with 2–3% dispersed thoria, which had good 
strength but poor oxidation resistance, and 2) a nickel alloy with 20% chromium, which was not quite as strong 
but provided highly superior oxidation resistance.
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plane to accomplish well defined experimental tasks as primary objectives.” To 
this end, Ames made several recommendations for the vehicle configuration:296
 
Provision for removable test panels in the areas selected 
for measurements … to provide for heat transfer, bound-
ary layer and structural tests on both experimental and 
prototype panels. Design of the test panels and support-
ing structure should be guided by the requirement to avoid 
localized heat sinks that withdraw heat away from the 
boundary layer in a non-uniform manner.
Provide a smooth primary test area along the bottom cen-
terline of the airplane free of all protuberances . This con-
sideration may well lead to the requirement for a low-wing 
configuration to insure a test region with a definable uni-
form flow field.
A removable fuselage nose section ahead of the wheel well 
with an instrument compartment and a removable tip. This 
feature would provide for replacement nose sections hav-
ing different geometry.
An instrumentation bullet located at the wing-fin juncture 
may be advantageous.
 
 Ames went on to describe an elaborate research program that began with 
wind-tunnel studies, followed by flights using X-15A-2, and finally tests with the 
delta-wing aircraft. The program would concentrate most of the theoretical and 
wind-tunnel work at Ames. Based on the scope of the work described, it probably 
would have been expensive, although the report did not include a cost estimate.
 After reviewing the papers submitted by Ames and Langley, with additional 
input from the Air Force and FRC, NASA defined two primary objectives for the 
delta-wing X-15 program:297
 
Aerodynamic research–The flight tests would provide real-
istic aerodynamic data under fully developed turbulent flow 
conditions to supplement ground-based research where 
such conditions cannot be achieved . Answers would be ob-
tained to key questions relating to hypersonic aerodynamics 
of delta wings, large-scale behaviors of flap-type controls, 
tip-fin interference effects, and handling qualities of a con-
figuration typical of present thinking for a future hypersonic 
air-breathing vehicle. Aerodynamic research on this vehicle 
would be unclouded by propulsion effects, inasmuch as 
most of the data would be taken under gliding conditions. 
296 Ibid.
297 Paul F. Bikle and John S. McCollom, “X-5 Research Accomplishments and Future Plans,” a paper in the Prog-
ress of the X-15 Research Airplane Program, a compilation of the papers presented at the FRC, 7 October 965, 
NASA publication SP-90 (Washington, DC: NASA, 965), pp. 38-39.
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Structural research–The delta-wing proposal would per-
mit the evaluation in a practical flight application of a hot 
radiation-cooled structure designed for repeated flights at 
temperatures between 1,500 degrees and 2,200 degrees 
Fahrenheit . It would also focus technical effort on a refur-
bishable, hot-wing leading edge design.
 Paul Bikle concluded that “[i]n general, a delta-wing X-15 program could 
establish a baseline of confidence and technology from which decisions regard-
ing the feasibility and design of advanced air-breathing vehicles could be re-
alistically made. The proposed time for the delta X-15 fits well with that for 
an overall hypersonic research vehicle program and the cost does not appear to 
be unreasonable.”298 
 Things seemed to be progressing rapidly. In January 1965 the FRC drafted a 
statement of work for North American to conduct a detailed study of the delta-wing 
concept. This document indicated that “NASA is considering a hypersonic cruise 
vehicle research program which involves a modification of the basic X-15 configu-
ration for study of various aerodynamic, structural, and flight control problems. 
The program will also include limited investigations of flight to altitudes extending 
to about 180,000 feet.” Extreme high-altitude research was not a requirement.299 
 NASA suggested that an existing “X-15 airplane would be modified to incor-
porate a representative slender hypersonic wing substituted for the present wing 
and horizontal tail. The wing structure would be designed for sustained hypersonic 
flight at a Mach number of 7, but would also be capable of flight to Mach number 
8 for limited time periods. The basic X-15 fuselage structure, rocket engine, flight 
control and other systems would be retained with minimum modification, and the 
present B-52 launch system and high range facility would be utilized.”300 
 The work statement went on to indicate that the airplane should have a load 
limit of 5 g and a 2,000-psf design dynamic pressure. Potential “improvements” 
included relocating the wing to be flush with the bottom of the fuselage, increasing 
the dynamic pressure to 2,500 psi and the load factor to 7.33 g, including external 
propellant tank(s), and relocating the nose landing gear. Other possibilities included 
the addition of a permanent thermal-protection system (in lieu of ablative coatings) 
over the fuselage to prevent contamination of the wing with ablative products.301 
 The delta wing seemed to languish at the FRC for the remainder of the year 
while engineers put together a project development plan. By the end of the year, 
the FRC had released the second draft of the plan for internal review, providing 
more detail on how things might progress. The opening paragraph provided the 
justification for the program:302 
298 Ibid, p. 39.
299 Draft statement of work, “Feasibility Study and Cost Analysis of Modifying an X-5 Aircraft to a Slender Hyper-
sonic Configuration,” January 965, n. p. In the files at the DFRC History Office.
300 Ibid.
30 Ibid. 
302 Project Development Plan, “Delta Wing X-5,” second draft, December 965, p. . In the files at the DFRC History 
Office.
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Three of the most probable uses for hypersonic airbreathing 
aircraft are transport over long ranges, military reconnaissance, 
and as maneuverable reusable first-stage boosters. There are 
currently no military or civilian requirements of over-riding 
importance for any one of these. Their potential, however, con-
stitutes a clear justification to proceed with comprehensive pro-
grams to develop the required hypersonic technology.
 Unfortunately, the justification also included a rationale for not supporting 
the program, given the budget crunch NASA was experiencing as it continued the 
Apollo program to the detriment of the aeronautics budget. Nevertheless, the FRC 
pressed on with detailed plans. The FRC considered the delta-wing project an 
extension of the X-15 program, and assumed that all existing agreements between 
the Air Force and NASA would continue. Researchers believed that the manpow-
er requirements for the program could be satisfied “with the present complements 
of the Langley, Ames, and Flight Research Center.”303 
 Researchers at the FRC estimated the program would cost $29,750,000 
spread between FY67 and FY73. Of this, the airframe contractor would receive 
$24,600,000 to build the flight vehicle, while the other $5,150,000 would be “in-
house” expenses. The second year represented the largest annual expenditure: 
$14,500,000 to the contractor and a little over $1,000,000 in-house. The planners 
warned, however, that “if the military withdraws their operational support from 
the general X-15 program, this project would be responsible for additional ex-
penses over the 4-1/2 year operational period. These expenses could amount to as 
much as 17 million dollars.” The preliminary schedule showed a request for pro-
posals in August 1966, a contract award in March 1967, modifications to X-15-3 
between December 1967 and October 1968, and a first flight in January 1969. The 
37-flight research program continued until December 1972.304 
 In the project plan, the FRC had expected the X-15 Project Office at Wright-
Patterson AFB to handle the procurement of the modifications, although NASA 
would pay the bills. Although it would seem logical for North American to perform 
the modifications, several other contractors (Lockheed, Northrop, and Republic) 
had expressed interest in the program, so the FRC proposed to make it a competi-
tive process .305  
 The Air Force was not totally in favor of this since they saw their involve-
ment with the X-15 winding down, and had little apparent interest in the delta-
wing program. Despite negotiations between the Air Force and NASA at various 
levels, the X-15 Project Office declined to participate in the expected procurement 
of the delta-wing airplane; however, it did agree to transfer the X-15-3 airframe to 
NASA for the modification at the end of its flight program. 
 After nearly two years of delay, on 13 May 1967 the delta-wing program had 
progressed far enough for the FRC to issue a request for proposals (PR-7-174) 
for a formal conceptual design study. The primary objectives of the study were 
303 Ibid, pp. -2. 
30 Ibid, pp. 2-3. In addition to 37 powered flights, the planners envisioned two captive flights and one glide flight.
305 Ibid. 
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to 1) develop a preliminary design for evaluating the modification of X-15-3 to a 
delta-wing configuration, and 2) formulate an accurate estimate of performance, 
weight, cost, and schedule for such modification. A secondary objective was to 
analyze alternate approaches, such as unsegmented leading edges; eliminate the 
use of ablatives; and incorporate a fly-by-wire control system, multiplane airfoils, 
symmetrical tip fins, and different propulsion systems.306 
 There appears have been only a single respondent to the request for pro-
posals. North American submitted a two-volume, 500-page proposal containing 
detailed engineering concepts and cost data–and that was just the proposal to do 
the study! By this time, North American had already been testing the delta-wing 
X-15 in wind tunnels for over a year. The North American low-speed and hyper-
sonic tunnels and the Langley 20-inch hypersonic tunnel had tested 1/15-scale 
and 1/50-scale models at Mach numbers between 0.2 and 6.9 and Reynolds num-
bers up to 10,000,000 (equivalent, based on model length).307  
 The proposed North American delta-wing X-15-3 was not a simple conver-
sion. The 603-square-foot delta-wing planform had a 76-degree leading-edge 
sweep, but the span was the same as that of the original X-15 to ensure that there 
would be no clearance issues with the NB-52 carrier aircraft. Elevons (30.8 square 
feet each) at the trailing edge provided longitudinal and roll control by deflecting 
up to 4.5 degrees up or 5.0 degrees down. The existing dorsal and ventral stabiliz-
ers provided directional stability with the addition of wing-tip fins, and the existing 
dorsal rudder provided directional control. Engineers could adjust the removable 
tip fins on the ground for cant and tow-in, which allowed them to change the rela-
tive levels of directional and lateral stability to investigate the handling qualities of 
the vehicle. The tip fins compensated for the blanking of the normal centerline ver-
tical stabilizers by the fuselage at hypersonic speeds and large angles of attack.308 
 The position of the wing was the subject of a great deal of study since the 
HRE was expected to be carried on the ventral stabilizer (as the dummy was on 
X-15A-2), and the aircraft also had to be stable in flight without the 1,000-pound 
engine. It proved to be a difficult problem. The final answer before NASA termi-
nated the program was to position the wing in the best location to compensate for 
the HRE. On flights without the engine, as much research equipment or ballast 
as possible would be located in a new aft experiment compartment. Likewise, the 
shape of the wing leading edge was of some concern, but North American noted 
that “the effect of leading edge radius on the low-speed aerodynamic characteris-
tics of highly swept delta wings is not well understood.” Engineers did not think 
the effect on the leading-edge shape at supersonic speeds would be significant, be-
cause positive pressure on the wing lower surface would produce most of the lift. 
Nevertheless, since the leading-edge shape significantly influenced the landing 
306 North American report NA-67-3, “Technical Proposal for a Conceptual Design Study for the Modification of 
an X-5 Air Vehicle to a Hypersonic Delta-Wing Configuration,” 7 May 967, vol. I, p. . In the files at the JSC 
History Office.
307 North American report NA-67-3, “Proposal for a Conceptual Design Study for the Modification of an X-5 Air 
Vehicle to a Hypersonic Delta-Wing Configuration,” two volumes (Technical and Business Management), 7 May 
967; North American report NA-67-3, “Technical Proposal for a Conceptual Design Study for the Modification 
of an X-5 Air Vehicle to a Hypersonic Delta-Wing Configuration,” 7 May 967, vol. I, p. 2. 
308 North American report NA-67-3, “Technical Proposal for a Conceptual Design Study for the Modification of an 
X-5 Air Vehicle to a Hypersonic Delta-Wing Configuration,” 7 May 967, vol. I, pp. 2-3 and 28. 
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characteristics, North American investigated various configurations in its low-
speed wind tunnel. The company had not found a satisfactory answer, and was 
awaiting further data from NASA wind-tunnel tests, when the program ended.309 
 North American was also somewhat uncertain about the leading-edge ma-
terial, mainly because of the expected 2,200°F temperatures encountered on 
the design mission. North American built a segmented leading edge made from 
columbium alloy that successfully passed tests at 2,400°F. This appeared satis-
factory, at least for initial use. The company expected that no available material 
would prove satisfactory for the lower surface of the wing, and that some form of 
thermal protection system would have to be developed. Unsurprisingly, many of 
the North American ideas looked similar to concepts the company was investigat-
ing for the space shuttle. One of the most promising ideas was to use metallic heat 
309 Ibid, volume I, p. 3. 
During the mid-1960s, a proposed delta-wing modification to X-15-3 might have kept the program fly-
ing until 1972 or 1973. Unlike many proposals, such as the “orbital X-15,” the delta wing was a real 
project and was the subject of  a great deal of  research and engineering. Despite endorsements from the 
Flight Research Center and John Becker at Langley, support remained lukewarm within the Air Force 
and NASA. The FRC was still evaluating the proposals for the delta-wing study on 15 November 
1967 when the crash of  the X-15-3 effectively ended all thought of  such a modification. (NASA) 
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shields supported by standoff clips with a layer of low-density insulation sand-
wiched between the shield and the wing skin. Only an area about 2 feet wide just 
behind the leading edge needed this type of protection since the airflow further aft 
smoothed out sufficiently to keep temperatures within the ability of alloys such as 
TD nickel to survive unprotected .310 
 Originally, North American had envisioned using upswept wing tips to re-
place the directional stability lost by the removal of the ventral rudder from the 
delta-wing configuration. Although the X-15 program seldom used the ventral 
rudder, this was because most missions flew at high angles of attack, where the 
lower rudder was detrimental to stability. The delta-wing program, on the other 
hand, wanted to fly sustained high-speed cruise missions that would require little 
high-angle-of-attack work. The initial round of tests in the North American hy-
personic tunnel revealed that the upswept wing tips were inadequate above Mach 
6. Researchers tested various configurations in both the North American hyper-
sonic tunnel and the 20-inch Langley hypersonic tunnel until they found a set of 
tip fins that extended both above and below the wing centerline to be adequate. 
Nevertheless, engineers decided to make it easy to replace the fins just in case the 
wind-tunnel tests proved to be inaccurate .311 
 The large-angle-of-attack capability of the basic X-15s was no longer re-
quired since researchers did not intend the mission to go to high altitudes. Given 
that the maximum angle of attack envisioned for the new airplane was less than 
15 degrees, engineers decided to use a fixed-flow direction sensor to sense the 
angle of attack and sideslip. A hemispherical nose with five pressure taps could 
provide an air-data computer with sufficient information to derive the necessary 
angles without the complexity and weight of the ball nose. Conceptually, this was 
identical to the fixed alpha nose flown during six of the last X-15-1 flights.312  
 North American proposed to stretch the fuselage 10 feet to 62.43 feet over-
all, and to manufacture what was essentially a new fuselage from the cockpit 
rearward. The company would stretch the propellant tank section 91 inches and 
provide new mounting provisions for the delta wing. North American manufac-
tured test specimens from René 41 and Inconel 718 to determine which would be 
the best material for this area; these tests were in progress when NASA canceled 
the program. The space between the liquid-oxygen and ammonia tanks accom-
modated the standard center-of-gravity instrumentation compartment, and North 
American added a new 29-inch-long compartment behind the fuel tank but ahead 
of the engine to hold fuel and gases for the HRE. Designers also wanted to replace 
the existing ogive forward fuselage (in front of the canopy) with a 20-degree, 
included-angle-cone section. This semi-monocoque structure would use René 41 
outer skin and Inconel X (or Inconel 718) frames, and titanium would be used for 
the inner skin of the equipment compartment.313 
 North American investigated several different powerplants for the airplane, 
with the leading challenger being an Aerojet YLR91-AJ-15 from the second stage 
30 Ibid, volume I, pp. 0-08. Office.
3 Ibid, volume I, p. 38. 
32 Ibid, volume I, p. 38. 
33 Ibid, volume I, p. 28. 
X-15: EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
of a Titan II ICBM. This engine used unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine and ni-
trogen tetroxide as propellants, and had already been man-rated for the NASA 
Gemini program. When equipped with a 25:1 nozzle, this engine completed the 
reference mission without the use of external propellant tanks . In fact, at a launch 
weight of 52,485 pounds and a burnout weight of 18,985 pounds, the YLR91 
would have allowed a maximum velocity of 8,745 fps, well in excess of the 7,600 
fps required by NASA. The effect of carrying the 1,000-pound HRE would have 
reduced this by about 400 fps.314 
 North American briefly investigated the idea of using a separate “sustainer” 
engine to provide thrust to overcome drag during hypersonic cruise. Although the 
integration issues involved with incorporating a second engine and its propellants 
into the airframe eventually convinced all concerned that it would be too difficult, 
the particular engines investigated show how a program could come full circle. 
One of the engines investigated was the Bell YLR81-BA-11, a variation of the one 
of the engines proposed to power the X-15 in 1954. North American also investi-
gated several variants of the Reaction Motors LR11 family that had been used for 
the initial X-15 flights, along with the Aerojet LR52 (AJ-10).315 
 The engine that was ultimately selected was a modified XLR99 that provided 
83,000 lbf at 100,000 feet and was throttleable down to 8,000 lbf for sustained 
cruise . This was the version of the XLR99 that used a single thrust chamber and 
nozzle, not the Reaction Motors concept that used a second, remotely located 
alternate chamber. The increased internal fuel would permit sustained flights at 
Mach 6.5 using the low-thrust “sustainer” capability of the modified XLR99 to 
overcome drag but not produce any acceleration. The addition of a single center-
line external tank would allow Mach 8 flights.316 
 The main landing gear would be a version of the gear developed for the 
X-15A-2, appropriately strengthened for the almost 19,000-pound normal landing 
weight of the delta-wing design. As on the X-15-A-2, North American proposed 
to use both short and long versions of the rear shock struts; the long ones would 
provide clearance for the HRE under the ventral, while flights that did not carry 
the HRE would use the short ones. The nose gear would be moved to the instru-
ment compartment behind the pilot, and the recorders and other research instru-
mentation normally carried there would be moved to a new compartment in front 
of the pilot where the original nose gear well was.317 
 Although it was not part of the delta-wing baseline, North American was 
investigating the use of a fly-by-wire control system on the delta-wing X-15. 
Engineers believed that this would reduce the overall system size, weight, and 
volume, and provide better overall performance. This system would have used 
an analog flight-control system, not a digital one. The MH-96 adaptive control 
3 Ibid, vol. I, pp. 5 and 2. At some point North American had also proposed installing the YLR9 in the X-5A-2 
as a means of increasing its performance.
35 Ibid, vol. I, pp. 97-99. In the files at the JSC History Office. 
36 Bikle and McCollom, “X-5 Research Accomplishments and Future Plans,” pp. 38-39; Paul Gwozdz, Reaction 
Motors report number TR-085-, “A Study to Determine Modifications Which Extend the Low and High Thrust 
Range of the YLR99 Turborocket Engine,” undated (but signed on  October 966), p. 2. In the files at the DFRC 
History Office. The modified XLR99 (called a YLR99 in the report) would theoretically be capable of producing 
87,000 lbf at 00,000 feet, but Reaction Motors recommended slightly derating it to increase reliability.
37 North American report NA-67-3, vol. I, pp. 3-32. 
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system was capable of accepting electrical inputs that were equivalent to flying in 
a fly-by-wire mode, and Honeywell designed the MH-96 to interface to the fly-
by-wire flight-control system in the Dyna-Soar. In X-15-3 these were paralleled 
with mechanical linkages, and the delta wing could eliminate these mechanical 
linkages altogether. Given the facts that a fly-by-wire system had never flown, and 
the delta-wing airplane was flying in a new performance envelope anyway, NASA 
was not supportive of this effort .318  
 Although the delta-wing airplane was generally described as a modification 
of X-15-3, about the only structure from the original airplane that would remain 
would be the cockpit and the aft thrust structure . Most of the electronics (i .e ., the 
inertial system and MH-96) would also remain. However, at least by weight, the 
majority of the aircraft would be new. Since the North American study had not 
been completed when X-15-3 was lost, the company had not estimated the final 
cost, but the amount would probably have been substantial.
 Although no formal contracting arrangement existed, North American pressed 
on with a great deal of research into the delta-wing configuration. By March 1967, 
wind-tunnel models had accumulated over 300 hours of testing, with a 1/50-scale 
model used for high-speed tests and a 1/15-scale model used for low-speed tests. 
According to a North American news release, “the four year research program has 
38 Ibid, vol. I, pp. 76-80. 
The final delta-wing design spent a considerable amount of  time in this NASA Langley wind tunnel 
before the program was cancelled. (NASA)
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also enabled North American to check out the integrity of components using new 
super alloys that will be required at hypersonic speeds. Tanks, wing sections, and 
other components have been fabricated of such materials and put through exhaus-
tive thermal and structural tests.”319 
 Despite endorsements from the FRC and John Becker at Langley, support 
remained lukewarm within the Air Force and NASA. The FRC was still evaluat-
ing the proposals for the delta-wing study on 15 November 1967 when the crash 
of the X-15-3 effectively ended all thought of such a modification. Since the gen-
eral concept depended upon the use of the electronic systems that were unique 
to X-15-3, most researchers did not consider it readily possible to convert one of 
the other airframes; besides, the accident effectively sealed the fate of the entire 
X-15 program.320 
HIRES
 Perhaps the most unusual concept involving the use of X-15s was also the 
one that should have made the program most thankful it was never implemented. 
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Air Force investigated a single-stage-
to-orbit concept called Aerospaceplane (not to be confused with the later National 
Aero-Space Plane (NASP)). The vehicles explored during this program included 
some very exotic propulsion concepts, such as LACES and ACES, that extracted 
oxygen from the atmosphere during ascent and used it once the vehicle left the 
sensible atmosphere.321 
 Most of the contractors involved in the program performed parametric 
evaluations of conventional concepts that carried all of the propellants from the 
ground–termed “propellants onboard at takeoff” (POBATO)–in addition to the 
air-collection schemes. However, an even more bizarre concept was called the 
“hypersonic in-flight refueling system” (HIRES), and designers at Convair, Doug-
las, and North American each considered trying to refuel the Aerospaceplane in 
flight at Mach 6. This concept actually advanced far enough that the Air Force 
and NASA had preliminary discussions about using two X-15s flying in forma-
tion to validate the idea. The logistics of getting two X-15s in formation would 
have been formidable, and the piloting task daunting. On two separate occasions 
the X-15 program attempted to fly two flights in a single day (but not at the same 
39 North American news release GHH03067, 7 March 967. Provided courtesy of Mike Lombardi, Boeing Histori-
cal Archives.
320 It is somewhat difficult to determine which factor had the most effect on the decision not to proceed with the del-
ta-wing program. The MH-96 and other advanced flight-control equipment on X-5-3 could have been replaced. 
Spare parts and complete systems that had been procured for the Dyna-Soar were available if somebody had 
wanted to use them, although there would have been integration costs to bring them up to the X-5 configura-
tion. Political support for the program had been declining for some time. Apollo had siphoned off too much of the 
budget, but was obviously going to succeed despite the disastrous Apollo  fire in January 967. It was probably 
more a case of too many things going against the program, and the easiest answer was simply to not request 
continued funding.
32 For a better description of the Aerospaceplane program, see Dennis R. Jenkins, Space Shuttle: The History of 
the National Space Transportation System–The First 100 Missions (North Branch, MN: Specialty Press, 200), 
pp. 52-55.
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time, since the High Range could not support the concept), and each time one of 
the X-15s had a system problem that led to the flight being scrubbed. Fortunately 
for the X-15 program, the refueling demonstration was never attempted.322 
322 See, for example, Convair report GD/C-DCJ-65-00, “Reusable Space Launch Vehicle Study, 8 May 965.
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 Although 15 pilots were assigned to the X-15 program, only 12 of them ac-
tually flew the airplane. Al White was the backup pilot for Scott Crossfield and 
never needed to take over . Iven Kincheloe was the initial Air Force project pilot, 
but he died in an accident before the first airplane was delivered. NASA reas-
signed John Manke to the lifting-body program after the loss of X-15-3, before he 
was able to fly the X-15. In each of the four groups of government pilots, an equal 
number came from the Air Force and NASA. The following table shows the pilots 
in the order of their selection by the program: 
 
Name Pilot at Edwards Assigned to X-15 Left the X-15
Scott Crossfield 1950–1960 September 1955 December 1960
Al White 1954–1966 September 1955 December 1960
Iven Kincheloe 1955–1958 April 1958 July 1958
Bob White 1955–1963 April 1958 December 1962
Bob Rushworth 1957–1967 April 1958 July 1966
Joe Walker 1951–1966 April 1958 August 1963
Jack McKay 1951–1971 April 1958 September 1966
Neil Armstrong 1955–1962 April 1958 August 1962
Forrest Petersen 1958–1962 August 1958 February 1962
Joe Engle 1962–1966 June 1963 April 1966
Milt Thompson 1956–1967 June 1963 August 1965
Pete Knight 1958-1969/1979–1982 May 1965 December 1968
Bill Dana 1959–1991 May 1965 December 1968
Mike Adams 1963–1967 July 1966 November 1967
John Manke 1963-1975 July 1966 November 1967
 
 There were also plans to allow four Dyna-Soar pilots to fly the X-15 before 
Robert McNamara canceled that program, and some sources have indicated that 
Jacqueline Cochran attempted to get permission to fly the X-15 to set the women’s 
speed and altitude records .1
MICHAEL J. ADAMS, USAF
 Mike Adams flew the X-15 for 13 months from 6 October 1966 until 15 
November 1967, making seven flights. All of these were with the XLR99 engine 
 Jacqueline Cochran received her pilot license in 932, set three major flying records in 937, and won the pres-
tigious Bendix Race in 938. In 9, Cochran selected a group of highly qualified women pilots to ferry aircraft 
for the British Air Transport Auxiliary. In 92, Cochran, at the request of Army General Henry “Hap” Arnold, orga-
nized the Women’s Flying Training Detachment (WFTD), which subsequently merged with Nancy Love’s Women’s 
Auxiliary Ferry Squadron (WAFS) to form the Women Airforce Service Pilots (WASP) with Cochran as director. Fol-
lowing the war, Cochran continued to establish speed records into the 960s. She was the first woman to break 
the sound barrier, doing so in 953 in an F-86 Sabre. She was a -time winner of the Harmon Trophy, awarded 
to the best female pilot of the year. Cochran also became the first woman to break Mach 2 in the Lockheed F-
0 Starfighter. Cochran authored two autobiographies--The Stars at Noon and Jackie Cochran--with Mary Ann 
Bucknam Brinley. 
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and he reached Mach 5 .59, a maximum speed of 3,822 mph, and an altitude of 
266,000 feet. Adams died on flight 3-65-97.
 Michael James Adams was born on 5 May 1930 in Sacramento, California, 
and enlisted in the Air Force on 22 November 1950 after graduating from Sac-
ramento Junior College. Adams earned his pilot’s wings and commission on 25 
October 1952 at Webb AFB, Texas. He served as a fighter-bomber pilot in Korea, 
flying 49 missions during four months of combat service. For 30 months Adams 
served with the 613th Fighter-Bomber Squadron at England AFB, Louisiana, and 
for six months he served rotational duty at Chaumont Air Base in France.2  
 In 1958 Adams received a bachelor of science degree in aeronautical en-
gineering from Oklahoma University. In 1962, after 18 months of astronautics 
studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Adams attended the 
Experimental Test Pilot School at Edwards, where he won the Honts Trophy for 
being the best in his class. He subsequently attended the Aerospace Research Pilot 
School (ARPS), graduating with honors on 20 December 1963, and was assigned 
to the Manned Spacecraft Operations Division at Edwards AFB in the Manned 
Orbiting Laboratory program. During this time he was one of four Edwards aero-
space research pilots to participate in a five-month series of NASA Moon-landing 
practice tests conducted by the Martin Company in Baltimore, Maryland. 
 In July 1966 Adams came to the X-15 program with 3,940 hours of total flight 
time, including 2,505 hours in single-engine jets (primarily the F-80, F-84F, F-86, 
F-104, F-106, and T-33) and an additional 477 hours in multiengine jets (primar-
ily the F-5, T-38, and F-101). Unfortunately, Mike died during flight 3-65-97 on 
15 November 1967, and The Air Force posthumously awarded Adams an astro-
naut rating for his last flight in X-15-3, which had attained an altitude of 266,000 
feet (50.38 miles). In 1991, the Astronaut Memorial at the Kennedy Space Center 
in Florida added Adams to its list of astronauts who had been killed in the line 
of duty. 
NEIL A. ARMSTRONG, NASA
 Neil Armstrong flew the X-15 for 20 months from 30 November 1960 until 
26 July 1962, making seven flights. These included two flights with the XLR11 
and five with the XLR99. Armstrong reached Mach 5.74, a maximum speed of 
3,989 mph, and an altitude of 207,500 feet. His accomplishments include mak-
ing the first flight with the ball nose and the first flight with the MH-96 adaptive 
control system. 
 Neil Alden Armstrong was born on 5 August 1930 in Wapakoneta, Ohio. He 
attended Purdue University, earning his bachelor of science degree in aeronauti-
cal engineering in 1955. During Korea, which interrupted his engineering studies, 
Armstrong flew 78 combat missions in F9F-2 fighters, for which he earned the 
 
2 Biography of Major Michael J. Adams, Air Force Systems Command, Edwards AFB, 2 November 965; letter, Colo-
nel Clyde S. Cherry/AFFTC to Paul Bikle/FRC, subject: Selection of crew member for X-5 program,  July 966; 
letter, William H. Dana to Dennis R. Jenkins,  June 2002, containing comments to a draft of this manuscript.
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Air Medal and two Gold Stars. He later earned a master of science degree in aero-
space engineering from the University of Southern California.
 Armstrong joined the NACA Flight Propulsion Research Laboratory (now 
the Lewis Research Center) in 1955. Later that year he transferred to the High-
Speed Flight Station (HSFS) as an aeronautical research scientist and then as a 
pilot. Armstrong served as the project pilot on the F-100A, F-100C, F-101, and 
F-104A, and flew the X-1B, X-5, F-105, F-106, B-47, KC-135, and Paresev . He 
left with over 2,450 flying hours. 
 Armstrong was a member of the USAF-NASA Dyna-Soar Pilot Consultant 
Group before Robert McNamara canceled that program, and studied X-20 Dyna-
Soar approaches and aborts using F-102A and F5D aircraft. In 1962, when he 
was flying the X-15, Armstrong was one of nine pilots selected for the second 
NASA astronaut class. In March 1966 he was the commander of Gemini 8, with 
David Scott as pilot (this mission accomplished the first successful docking of 
two vehicles in orbit). On 20 July 1969, during the Apollo 11 mission, Armstrong 
became the first human to land on the Moon. Armstrong has a total of 8 days and 
14 hours in space, including 2 hours and 48 minutes walking on the Moon.
 After his lunar flight, Armstrong became the deputy associate administrator 
for aeronautics at NASA Headquarters. He resigned from NASA in August 1971 
to become professor of engineering at the University of Cincinnati, a post he held 
until 1979. Armstrong became chairman of the board of Cardwell International, 
Ltd., in 1980 and served in that capacity until 1982. During 1982–1992, he was 
chairman of Computing Technologies for Aviation, and from 1981 to 1999 he 
served on the board of directors for the Eaton Corporation . He was also vice chair 
of the Rogers Commission, which investigated the Space Shuttle Challenger ac-
cident in 1986 . 
 Armstrong has been the recipient of numerous awards, including the Presi-
dential Medal of Freedom and the Robert J. Collier Trophy in 1969, the Robert H. 
Goddard Memorial Trophy in 1970, and the Congressional Space Medal of Honor 
in 1978 .3  
JOHN V. BECKER, NASA
 John Becker is widely regarded as the father of the X-15, having served as the 
leader of the Langley researchers who defined the general concept of a hypersonic 
research airplane . 
 John Vernon Becker was born in 1913 in Albany, New York. He earned a 
bachelor of science degree in mechanical engineering (aero option) in 1935 and a 
master of science degree in aero engineering in 1936, both from New York State 
University. He joined the NACA Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory as a 
junior aeronautical engineer in 1936.4  
  
3 http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/PAO/PAIS/HTML/bd-dfrc-p001.html (accessed 29 April 2002); http://www.jsc.nasa.
gov/Bios/htmlbios/armstrong-na.html (accessed 29 April 2002).
 Biography, John V. Becker, 8 April 959; Resume, John V. Becker, 976. In the files at the NASA History Office.
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 Becker served as head of the 16-foot high-speed wind-tunnel branch from 
1943 until 1947 and chief of the Compressibility Research Division from 1947 
through 1957. During this time Becker contributed to the design and understand-
ing of the Bell X-1, Bell X-2, Douglas X-3, the Century Series fighters, and the 
XB-70, in addition to his work on the X-15. In 1958 Becker became the division 
chief of the Aero-Physics Research Division, a position he held until his retire-
ment in 1974. During that time he contributed to the X-20 Dyna-Soar and various 
lifting-reentry vehicles that led to the Space Shuttle, Mercury, Gemini, and Apol-
lo, as well as Project FIRE, Sprint, the hypersonic cruise vehicle, the hypersonic 
research engine, and others. After he retired from NASA, Becker was a consultant 
for the General Applied Sciences Laboratory, Burns and Roe, and the NASA Of-
fice of Aeronautics and Space Technology.
 Becker authored over 50 research papers in addition to numerous technical 
journal articles. In 1955, New York University cited Becker as one of its 100 
outstanding graduates from the College of Engineering. He received the Sylvanus 
Reed Award from the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) 
for 1960, and received other AIAA awards in 1961, 1968, and 1973 . Becker de-
livered the 3rd Eugen Sänger Memorial Lecture at the Deutsch Geaellschaft Fur 
Luftfahrforschung, Bonn, Germany, in December 1968.5
PAUL F. BIKLE, NASA 
 Paul F . Bikle was born on 5 June 1916 in Wilkensburg, Pennsylvania, and 
graduated from the University of Detroit with a bachelor of science degree in 
aeronautical engineering in 1939. His career with the Army Air Forces began in 
1940 when he became an aeronautical engineer at Wright Field, and in 1944 he 
became chief of the aerodynamics branch of the Flight Test Division. While work-
ing closely with other government agencies in establishing the first flying quali-
ties specifications for aircraft, he wrote AAF Technical Report 50693 (“Flight Test 
Methods”), which was used as a standard manual for conducting flight tests for 
more than five years. During World War II he was involved in more than 30 test 
projects and flew over 1,200 hours as an engineering observer. 
 In 1947, Bikle became chief of the performance engineering branch and di-
rected tests of the XB-43, XC-99, and F-86A. When the flight-test mission was 
transferred to the newly formed Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC) at Ed-
wards, Bikle came to the desert and advanced to assistant chief of the flight-test 
engineering laboratory in 1951. From there, he advanced to the position of AFFTC 
technical director. He replaced Walt Williams as director of the NASA Flight Re-
search Center (FRC) in September 1959. Like Williams, Bikle had little use for 
unnecessary paperwork, and often remarked that he would stay with NASA as 
long as the paperwork level remained below what he had experienced in the Air 
Force. He was also an avid soaring enthusiast and established two world soaring 
records during a flight near Lancaster on 25 February 1961 that still stands as of 
2006. In July 1962, Bikle received the NASA Medal for Outstanding Leadership 
5 Ibid.
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for directing the “successful X-15 flight operations and research activities,” and 
he received the 1963 FAI Lilienthal Medal . Bikle retired from NASA in May 1971 
and died on 20 January 1991.6  
A. SCOTT CROSSFIELD, NAA
 Scott Crossfield flew the X-15 for 18 months, from 8 June 1959 until 6 De-
cember 1960, making 14 flights. These included one glide flight, 10 flights with 
the XLR11, and three flights with the XLR99 . Crossfield reached Mach 2.97, a 
speed of 1,960 mph, and an altitude of 88,116 feet. His accomplishments include 
the first X-15 glide flight, the first powered flight, the first flight with the XLR99, 
and the first emergency landing. 
 Albert Scott Crossfield was born on 2 October 1921 in Berkeley, California. 
He began his engineering training at the University of Washington in 1940, but 
interrupted his education to join the U.S. Navy in 1942. Following flight train-
ing, he served as a fighter and gunnery instructor, and maintenance officer before 
spending six months in the South Pacific without seeing combat duty. After the 
war, Crossfield was the leader of a Navy acrobatic team that flew FG-1D Corsairs 
at various exhibitions and airshows in the Pacific Northwest.7 
 He resumed his engineering studies in 1946 and graduated with a bachelor of 
science degree in aeronautical engineering from the University of Washington in 
1949. He earned a master of science degree in aeronautical science the following 
year from the same university, and received an honorary doctor of science degree 
from the Florida Institute of Technology in 1982. 
 Crossfield joined the HSFS as a research pilot in June 1950. During the next 
five years he flew the X-1, X-4, X-5, XF-92A, D-558-1, and D-558-2 aircraft, 
accumulating 87 rocket-powered flights in the X-1 and D-558-2, and 12 in the 
D-558-2 with jet power only. On 20 November 1953, Crossfield became the first 
pilot to exceed Mach 2, in the D-558-2 Skyrocket. Crossfield left the NACA 
in 1955 to work for North American Aviation on the X-15 as both pilot and 
design consultant.8  
 In 1960, Crossfield published his autobiography (written with Clay Blair, 
Jr .), Always Another Dawn: The Story of a Rocket Test Pilot (Cleveland and New 
York: World Publishing Company, 1960; reprinted New York: Arno Press, 1971; 
reprinted North Stratford, NH: Ayer Company Publishers, 1999). The book covers 
his life through the completion of the early X-15 flights and is a fascinating story 
for anybody who is interested in that period of flight test.
 Crossfield also served for five years at North American as the director re-
sponsible for systems test, reliability engineering, and quality assurance for the 
WS-131 Hound Dog missile, the Paraglider, the Apollo command and service 
6 Richard P. Hallion, On the Frontier: Flight Research at Dryden, 1946-1981, NASA publication SP-303 (Wash-
ington, DC, 98), p. 0; letter, Richard J. Harer to Dennis R. Jenkins, 5 October 2002; http://records.fai.
org/pilot.asp?from=gliding&id=342 (accessed 23 October 2006).
7 Telephone conversation, Scott Crossfield with Dennis R. Jenkins, 8 August 2002.
8 Thompson quote from Milton O. Thompson, At the Edge of Space: The X-15 Flight Program, (Washington, DC: 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 992), p. .
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module, and the Saturn booster. From 1966 to 1967 he served as technical director 
of research engineering and test at North American Aviation. 
 Crossfield served as an executive for Eastern Airlines from 1967 to 1973, and 
as senior vice president of Hawker Siddeley Aviation during 1974–1975. From 
1977 until his retirement in 1993, Crossfield served as technical consultant to the 
House Committee on Science and Technology, advising committee members on 
matters related to civil aviation. In 1993 he received the NASA Distinguished 
Public Service Medal for his contributions to aeronautics and aviation over a pe-
riod spanning half a century. 
 Crossfield was a joint recipient of the 1961 Robert J. Collier Trophy pre-
sented by President John F. Kennedy at the White House in July 1962. Other 
awards included the International Clifford B. Harmon Trophy for 1960, the Law-
rence Sperry Award, the Octave Chanute Award, the Iven C. Kincheloe Award, 
and the Harmon International Trophy. He has been inducted into the National 
Aviation Hall of Fame (1983), the International Space Hall of Fame (1988), and 
the Aerospace Walk of Honor (1990). In 2006 the American Astronautical Society 
awarded Crossfield and David Clark the Victor A . Prather Award for the develop-
ment of the full-pressure suit . Crossfield died on 19 April 2006 when his Cessna 
210 crashed during a severe thunderstorm over Georgia.9
WILLIAM H. DANA, NASA
 Bill Dana flew the X-15 for 35 months from 4 November 1965 until 24 Oc-
tober 1968, making 16 flights. All of these were with the XLR99 engine. Dana 
reached Mach 5 .53, a maximum speed of 3,897 mph, an altitude of 306,900 feet, 
and flew the last flight of the program.
William Harvey Dana was born on 3 November 1930 in Pasadena, California. He 
received his bachelor of science degree from the U.S. Military Academy in 1952 
and served four years as a pilot in the Air Force. He joined NASA after receiv-
ing a master of science degree in aeronautical engineering from the University of 
Southern California in 1958 .
 During the late 1960s and the 1970s, Dana was a project pilot on the manned 
lifting-body program, for which he received the NASA Exceptional Service Med-
al. In 1976 he received the Haley Space Flight Award from the AIAA for his 
research work on the M2-F3 lifting-body control systems. In 1986 Dana became 
the chief pilot at the FRC, and later was an assistant chief of the Flight Operations 
Directorate. He was also a project pilot on the F-15 HIDEC (highly integrated 
digital electronic control) research program, and a co-project pilot on the F-18 
high-angle-of-attack research program. In August 1993, Dana became chief engi-
neer, a position he held until his retirement in 1998.10 
 He was inducted into the Aerospace Walk of Honor in 1993 and received 
the NASA Distinguished Service Medal in 1997. In 1998 the Smithsonian Insti-
9 http://www.edwards.af.mil/history/docs_html/people/pilot_crossfield.html (accessed 29 April 2002); http://www.
dfrc.nasa.gov/PAO/PAIS/HTML/bd-dfrc-p021.html (accessed 29 April 2002); http://www.aviationnow.com/
avnow/news/channel_awst_story.jsp?id=news/CROSS_spec.xml (accessed 23 October 2006).
0 Letter, William H. Dana to Dennis R. Jenkins,  June 2002.
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tution’s National Air and Space Museum honored Dana when he delivered the 
Charles A. Lindbergh Memorial Lecture. On 23 August 2005, Dana finally re-
ceived astronaut wings for his two X-15 flights above 50 miles altitude.11 
HUGH L. DRYDEN, NASA
 Hugh Latimer Dryden was born 2 July 1898 in Pocomoke City, Maryland. 
He earned his way through Johns Hopkins University, completing the four-year 
bachelor of arts course in three years and graduating with honors. Influenced by 
Dr. Joseph S. Ames, who for many years was chairman of the NACA, Dryden un-
dertook a study of fluid dynamics at the Bureau of Standards while taking gradu-
ate courses at Johns Hopkins. In recognition of his laboratory work, the university 
granted him a doctor of philosophy degree in 1919.12 
 Dryden became head of the bureau’s aerodynamics section in 1920. With A. 
M. Kuethe, in 1929 he published the first of a series of papers on the measure-
ment of turbulence in wind tunnels and the mechanics of boundary-layer flow. He 
advanced to chief of the Mechanics and Sound Division of the Bureau of Stan-
dards in 1934, and in January 1946 became assistant director. Six months later he 
became associate director. 
 In 1945 Dryden became deputy scientific director of the Army Air Forces 
Scientific Advisory Group. In 1946 he received the nation’s second highest civil-
ian decoration, the Medal of Freedom, for “an outstanding contribution to the 
fund of knowledge of the Army Air Forces with his research and analysis of the 
development and use of guided missiles by the enemy.” 
 In 1947 Dryden resigned from the Bureau of Standards to become director 
of aeronautical research at the NACA. Two years later the agency gave him ad-
ditional responsibilities and the new title of director. Dryden held this post until he 
became deputy administrator of the new National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration (NASA) in 1958. The National Civil Service League honored Dryden 
with the Career Service Award for 1958. He served as the deputy administrator of 
NASA until his death on 2 December 1965.
JOE H. ENGLE, USAF
 Joe Engle has the unique honor of having flown the X-15 and the Space 
Shuttle, bringing lifting-reentry vehicles full circle. Engle flew the X-15 for 24 
months from 7 October 1963 until 14 October 1965, making 16 flights with the 
XLR99 engine. Engle reached Mach 5.71, a maximum speed of 3,888 mph, and 
an altitude of 280,600 feet . 
 Joe Henry Engle was born on 26 August 1932 in Abilene, Kansas, and gradu-
ated from the University of Kansas at Lawrence with a bachelor of science degree 
 http://www.edwards.af.mil/history/docs_html/people/pilot_dana.html (accessed 29 April 2002); http://www.dfrc.
nasa.gov/PAO/PAIS/HTML/bd-dfrc-p002.html (accessed 29 April 2002).
2 http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/Biographies/dryden.html (accessed 2 May 2002).
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in aeronautical engineering in 1955. After graduation he worked at Cessna Air-
craft as a flight-test engineer before being commissioned through the Air Force 
ROTC program in 1956. Engle earned his pilot wings in 1958 and flew F-100s for 
the 474th Fighter Squadron (Day) and later the 309th Tactical Fighter Squadron 
at George AFB, California. 
 Engle graduated from the Test Pilot School in 1962 and attended the ARPS at 
Edwards for training as a military astronaut. He graduated from the ARPS in 1963 
and became a project pilot for the X-15 program in June 1963. Engle received an 
Air Force astronaut rating for making a flight above 50 miles in the X-15.13  
 In 1966, at the age of 32 years, Engle became the youngest person selected 
to become an astronaut. First assigned to the Apollo program, he served on the 
support crew for Apollo X and then as backup lunar module pilot for Apollo XIV. 
In 1977 he was commander of one of two crews that conducted the approach 
and landing tests with the Space Shuttle Enterprise. In November 1981 he com-
manded the second flight (STS-2) of the Columbia and manually flew the reentry, 
performing 29 flight-test maneuvers from Mach 25 through landing rollout. This 
was the first (and so far only) time a pilot has flown a winged aerospace vehicle 
from orbit through landing. He accumulated the last of his 224.5 hours in space 
when he commanded Discovery during mission 51-I (STS-27) in August 1985. 
 Engle has flown more than 180 different types of aircraft and logged nearly 
14,000 flight hours. Among his many honors, Engle has been awarded the Dis-
tinguished Flying Cross (1964), the AIAA Lawrence Sperry Award for Flight 
Research (1966), the NASA Distinguished Service Medal and Space Flight Med-
al, and the Harmon International, Robert J. Collier, Lawrence Sperry, Iven C. 
Kincheloe, Robert H. Goddard, and Thomas D. White aviation and space tro-
phies . In 1992 he was inducted into the Aerospace Walk of Honor .14
CHARLES H. FELTZ, NAA 
 Charles Henderson Feltz was born on 15 September 1916 on a small ranch 
near Channing, Texas. He graduated from Texas Technological College in 1940 
with a bachelor of science degree in mechanical engineering. He joined the Los 
Angeles Division of North American Aviation the same year, serving in a variety 
of engineering positions for the design and production of the B-25. Following the 
war, Feltz became the design group engineer in charge of the design of the wing 
structure for the F-82 and F-86 series of aircraft. Between 1948 and 1956 Feltz 
was the assistant project engineer for the development of the FJ2 Fury and the 
F-86D Sabre, and in 1956 he became the project engineer and program manager 
for the X-15 .15  
 In 1962 Feltz became the chief engineer for the Apollo command and ser-
vice module, and advanced to vice president and deputy program manager by 
3 Thompson quote from At the Edge of Space, p. 6.
 http://www.edwards.af.mil/history/docs_html/people/pilot_engle.html (accessed 29 April 2002); http://www.jsc.
nasa.gov/Bios/htmlbios/engle-jh.html (accessed 29 April 2002).
5 Resume provided to Dennis R. Jenkins by Charles H. Feltz, 5 May 2002; biography, Charles H. Feltz, 3 Febru-
ary 980, In the files of the Boeing Archives; http://www.charlesfeltz.com/ (accessed 23 October 2006).
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1970. When the Apollo program ended, he became the vice president and dep-
uty program manager for the Space Shuttle orbiter . Between 1974 and 1976, 
Feltz was the vice president and technical assistant to the president of the North 
American Rockwell Space Division. In 1976 he became vice president of the 
North American Aerospace Operations Division of Rockwell International, and 
in 1980 he became president of the Space Transportation System Development 
and Production Division of Rockwell International. Feltz retired from Rockwell 
International in 1981 . 
 Texas Tech named Feltz a distinguished engineer in 1967, and a distinguished 
alumnus in 1972. During his career Feltz received a variety of medals and honors 
from NASA and industry groups, including a NASA Distinguished Public Ser-
vice Medal in 1981. Charlie Feltz, the common-sense engineer, passed away on 3 
January 2003.
IVEN C. KINCHELOE, JR., USAF
 Iven Carl Kincheloe, Jr., was born on 2 July 1928 in Detroit, Michigan. In 
1945 he entered Purdue University, where he studied aeronautical engineering as 
a member of the Air Force ROTC unit. He graduated in 1949 with bachelor of 
science degree in aeronautical and mechanical engineering.16 
 Kincheloe received his wings at Williams AFB, Arizona, in 1951. In early 
1952 he was promoted to captain and entered the Korean War with the 5th Inter-
ceptor Wing. He flew 131 missions and shot down five MiG-15s, becoming the 
10th jet ace. For his outstanding service he received the Silver Star and the Distin-
guished Flying Cross with two oak leaf clusters. After he returned to the United 
States, Kincheloe was a gunnery instructor at Nellis AFB, Nevada, and in 1953 
he was accepted into the Empire Test School in Farnborough, England. While in 
England, he received a master of science degree in aeronautical engineering from 
Oxford in December 1954.17  
 Kincheloe flew the X-2 to an altitude of 126,200 feet, and became famous 
as “America’s first spaceman.” On 27 March Kincheloe was named chief of the 
manned spacecraft section, fighter operations branch, of the flight-test operations 
division that was responsible for training the Air Force pilots who were to par-
ticipate in the X-15 flight program. Kincheloe became the first Air Force project 
pilot for the X-15; unfortunately, however, he died before he had a chance to fly 
the airplane. On 26 July 1958, Kincheloe took off on a routine chase mission in 
an F-104. At 2,000 feet altitude the engine failed. Although Kincheloe was able to 
roll the airplane inverted to enable the downward-firing ejection seat, he was too 
low for his parachute to open . 
 A biography of Kincheloe, First of the Spacemen: Iven	C .	Kincheloe, Jr., by 
James J. Haggerty, Jr. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1960), was published 
in 1960, and a CD-ROM biography of “Kinch” was aboard the Space Shuttle 
Discovery on STS-70 in July 1995. 
6 http://icdweb.cc.purdue.edu/~ivenc/who.html (accessed 25 April 2002).
7 http://www.kinsella.org/director/iven.htm (accessed 25 April 2002).
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 During the course of his career, Kincheloe accumulated 3,573 flying hours in 
70 American and foreign aircraft. Numerous honors followed his death. One of the 
most meaningful came from his peers, when the Society of Experimental Test Pi-
lots (SETP) renamed its prestigious Outstanding Pilot Award in his honor. His most 
public tribute, however, took place far away in his home state when Kinross AFB 
in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula was renamed Kincheloe AFB in his memory.18
WILLIAM J. KNIGHT, USAF
 Pete Knight flew the X-15 for 35 months from 30 September 1965 until 13 
September 1968, making 16 flights with the XLR99 engine. Knight reached Mach 
6 .70, a maximum speed of 4,520 mph, and an altitude of 280,500 feet. His accom-
plishments include the first flight with the dummy ramjet, the first flight with a full 
ablative coating, and the maximum speed flight.
 William J. “Pete” Knight was born on 18 November 1929 in Noblesville, 
Indiana. He enlisted in the Air Force in 1951 and completed pilot training in 
1953. Flying an F-89D for the 438th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, Knight won 
the prestigious Allison Jet Trophy Race in September of 1954. He graduated with 
a bachelor of science degree in aeronautical engineering from the Air Force In-
stitute of Technology in 1958, and from the Experimental Test Pilot School later 
that same year. In 1960 he was one of six test pilots selected to fly the Dyna-Soar. 
After Robert McNamara canceled the X-20 in 1963, he completed the astronaut-
training curriculum at the new ARPS in 1964 and went on to fly the X-15. 
 In 1969, after nearly 10 years of flying at Edwards, Knight went to Southeast 
Asia, where he completed 253 combat missions in the F-100. Following this, he 
served as test director for the F-15 System Program Office at Wright-Patterson 
AFB and became the 10th pilot to fly the F-15 Eagle. Knight returned to Edwards 
AFB as vice commander of the AFFTC in 1979 and remained an active test pilot 
in the F-16 Combined Test Force. After 32 years of service and more than 7,000 
hours in more than 100 different aircraft, Colonel Knight retired from the Air 
Force in 1982. In 1984 the people of Palmdale elected Knight to the city council, 
and he became the city’s first elected mayor in 1988. Subsequently, Knight served 
in the California state assembly in 1992 and the California state senate in 1996.19 
 Among his many honors, Knight received the Legion of Merit with an oak 
leaf cluster, the Distinguished Flying Cross with two oak leaf clusters, the Air 
Medal with 10 oak leaf clusters, the Harmon International Trophy, the Octave 
Chanute Award, and the Air Force Association Citation of Honor . He was induct-
ed into the National Aviation Hall of Fame (1988), the Aerospace Walk of Honor 
(1990), and the International Space Hall of Fame (1998). Pete Knight died from 
cancer on 8 May 2004.20
 
8 http://www.edwards.af.mil/history/docs_html/people/bio_kincheloe.html (accessed 29 April 2002).
9 Total flight time from telephone conversation with William J. Knight to Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 June 2002.
20 http://www.edwards.af.mil/history/docs_html/people/pilot_knight.html (accessed 29 April 2002).
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JOHN A. MANKE, NASA
 John Manke was the last NASA pilot assigned to the X-15 program, but he 
never flew the airplane. Manke was born on 13 November 1931 in Selby, South 
Dakota. He attended the University of South Dakota before being selected for 
the NROTC program in 1951, and graduated from the Marquette University in 
Milwaukee in 1966 with a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering. 
Following graduation, Manke entered flight training and served as a fighter pilot 
with the Marine Corps. He left the service in 1960 and worked for Honeywell for 
two years.
 NASA hired Manke on 25 May 1962 as a flight research engineer, and he 
served as an X-15 flight planner. Along with Mike Adams, Manke completed 
X-15 “ground school” and conducted a test run of the XLR99 in the Rocket En-
gine Test Facility. Manke left the X-15 program after the X-15-3 accident that 
claimed Mike Adams’s life. On 28 May 1968 he flew the HL-10, the first of his 42 
flights in a heavyweight lifting body.
 After the X-15 program ended, Manke became chief of flight operations at 
the FRC in October 1981 and continued in that capacity until he retired on 27 
April 1984 .
JOHN B. MCKAY, NASA
 Jack McKay flew the X-15 for 70 months from 28 October 1960 until 8 Sep-
tember 1966, making 29 flights. These included two flights with the XLR11 and 
27 with the XLR99 . McKay reached Mach 5.65, a maximum speed of 3,938 mph, 
and an altitude of 295,600 feet. He made three emergency landings in the X-15, 
and although was seriously injured on one of them, he returned to fly 22 more 
X-15 missions. 
 John Barron “Jack” McKay was born on 8 December 1922 in Portsmouth, 
Virginia, and graduated from Virginia Polytechnic Institute in 1950 with a bach-
elor of science degree in aeronautical engineering. During World War II he served 
as a Navy pilot in the Pacific, earning the Air Medal with two oak leaf clusters and 
a Presidential Unit Citation while flying F6F Hellcats.
 He joined the NACA on 8 February 1951 and worked at Langley as an engi-
neer for a brief period before transferring to the HSFS, where he flew the F-100, 
YF-102, F-102A, F-104, YF-107A, D-558-1, D-558-2, X-1B, and X-1E . With the 
exception of Scott Crossfield, McKay accumulated more rocket flights than any 
other U.S. pilot (46 flights before he joined the X-15 program). As Milt Thompson 
remembers, “Jack was an excellent stick and rudder pilot, possibly the best of the 
X-15 pilots.” McKay retired from the NASA on 5 October 1971 and died on 27 
April 1975, mostly from late complications resulting from his X-15 crash. On 23 
August 2005, NASA presented McKay’s family with a set of astronaut wings, 
honoring MacKay’s high-altitude flight in the X-15.21
2 Thompson, At the Edge of Space, p. .
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FORREST S. PETERSON, USN
 Forrest “Pete” Petersen flew the X-15 for 15 months from 23 September 1960 
until 10 January 1962, making five flights. These included two flights with the 
XLR11 and three flights with the XLR99 . He reached Mach 5 .30, a maximum 
speed of 3,600 mph, and an altitude of 101,800 feet. 
 Forrest Silas Petersen was born on 16 May 1922 in Holdrege, Nebraska. After 
he graduated from the Naval Academy in June 1944, he reported to the destroyer 
USS Caperton (DD 650) and participated in campaigns in the Philippines, Formo-
sa, and Okinawa. Petersen switched from the “black shoe” Navy to “brown shoes” 
when he graduated from flight training in 1947 and was assigned to VF-20A. 
 Petersen completed two years of study at the Naval Post Graduate School and 
received a bachelor of science degree in aerospace engineering. He continued his 
studies at Princeton University and received a master’s degree in engineering in 
1953. In 1956 he attended the Naval Test Pilot School and remained as an instruc-
tor following graduation. The Navy assigned him to the X-15 program in August 
1958, and he served with NASA until January 1962. He was a joint recipient of 
the 1961 Robert J. Collier Trophy presented by President John F. Kennedy at the 
White House in July 1962, and the NASA Distinguished Service Medal presented 
by Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson. 
 Petersen served as commanding officer of VF-154 prior to being assigned to 
the office of director, Division of Naval Reactors, Atomic Energy Commission, 
for nuclear power training. He reported to USS Enterprise in January 1964 and 
served as executive officer until April 1966. Petersen received the Bronze Star 
during Enterprise’s first combat tour in Vietnam. Afterward, he became an as-
sistant to the director of naval program planning in the office of the chief of naval 
operations. In November 1967 he assumed command of USS Bexar (APA-237) 
and received the Navy Commendation Medal with Combat V. He later served as 
deputy chief of naval operations for air warfare, and commander of the Naval Air 
Systems Command. Vice Admiral Petersen retired from active duty in May 1980 
and died of cancer in Omaha, Nebraska, on 8 December 1990.
ROBERT A. RUSHWORTH, USAF
 Bob Rushworth flew the X-15 for 68 months from 4 November 1960 until 
1 July 1966, making 34 flights. These included two flights with the XLR11 and 
32 flights with the XLR99 . Rushworth reached Mach 6 .06, a maximum speed of 
4,018 mph, and an altitude of 285,000 feet. His accomplishments include the first 
ventral-off flight, the maximum dynamic-pressure flight, the maximum tempera-
ture flight, the maximum Mach number (6.06) in the basic X-15, the first flight of 
X-15A-2, and the first flight with external tanks. 
 Robert Aitken Rushworth was born on 9 October 1924 in Madison, Maine . 
He joined the Army Air Forces, flying C-46 and C-47 transports in World War II 
and later combat missions in Korea. In 1943 he graduated from Hebron Academy, 
Maine. He received bachelor of science degrees in mechanical engineering from 
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the University of Maine in 1951 and in aeronautical engineering from the Air 
Force Institute of Technology in 1954. He graduated from the National War Col-
lege at Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., in 1967.22 
 Rushworth began his flight-test career at Wright Field and transferred to Ed-
wards in 1956. Following graduation from the Experimental Test Pilot School, 
Rushworth reported to the fighter operations branch at Edwards and later became 
operations officer in the manned spacecraft section while flying the X-15. Prior to 
flying the X-15, Rushworth flew the F-101, TF-102, F-104, F-105, and F-106. He 
received the Distinguished Flying Cross for an emergency recovery of the X-15 af-
ter premature extension of the nose gear at near Mach 5 speeds, and the Legion of 
Merit for overall accomplishments in the national interest of initial space flights.23 
 He graduated from the National War College in August 1967 and attended 
F-4 Phantom II combat crew training at George AFB. In March 1968, Rushworth 
went to Cam Ranh Bay Air Base in Vietnam as the assistant deputy commander 
for operations with the 12th TFW and flew 189 combat missions. From April 
1969 to January 1971, he was program director for the AGM-65 Maverick, and 
in February 1971 he became commander of the 4950th Test Wing at Wright-Pat-
terson AFB . General Rushworth served as the inspector general for the Air Force 
systems command from May 1973 to February 1974 and returned to the AFFTC 
as commander until November 1975, when he became commander of the Air 
Force Test and Evaluation Center at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico . Rushworth re-
tired from the Air Force in 1981 as vice commander of the Aeronautical Systems 
Division at Wright-Patterson AFB. Bob Rushworth died of a heart attack on 18 
March 1993 in Camarillo, California.24
HARTLEY A. SOULÉ, NASA
 Hartley A. Soulé was born on 19 August 1904 in New York City. He re-
ceived a bachelor of science degree in mechanical engineering from New York 
University in 1927 and joined the staff at Langley in October 1927 after working 
briefly for the Fairchild Airplane Company in Long Island. Soulé concentrated his 
research on stability and control, and became chief of the Stability Research Divi-
sion in 1943. He became assistant chief of research in 1947 and assistant director 
of Langley in August 1952. 
 Soulé was a coinventor of the stability wind tunnel and directed the construc-
tion of three other wind tunnels at Langley. He pioneered the use of computing 
machinery for analytical and data reduction. He was also instrumental in estab-
lishing the Pilotless Aircraft Research Division at Wallops Island. Soulé became 
chairman of the Interlaboratory Research Airplane Projects Panel, and in that role 
he directed research on the Bell X-1 program and was instrumental in managing 
the early years of the X-15 program. Later he became project director for the Mer-
22 http://www.af.mil/news/biographies/rushworth_ra.html (accessed 2 June 2002); telephone conversation be-
tween William J. Knight and Dennis R. Jenkins, 2 June 2002.
23 http://www.af.mil/news/biographies/rushworth_ra.html (accessed 2 June 2002); Thompson, At the Edge of 
Space, p. 3.
2 http://www.af.mil/news/biographies/rushworth_ra.html (accessed 2 June 2002).
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cury worldwide tracking and ground instrumentation system. Soulé retired from 
NASA on 16 February 1962 and passed away in 1988.
HARRISON A. STORMS, JR., NAA
 Harrison A. “Stormy” Storms, Jr., was born in 1915 in Chicago, Illinois. He 
attended Northwestern University and graduated with a master of science degree 
in mechanical engineering in 1938. Storms then attended the California Institute 
of Technology (Caltech), earning a master of science degree in aeronautical en-
gineering. At Caltech he studied under Theodore von Kármán and worked in the 
wind tunnels at the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory (GALCIT) . 
 In 1940, Storms went to work on the P-51 Mustang at North American Avia-
tion, where he developed a reputation as an expert on wind flow and high-speed 
aircraft. He subsequently worked on the F-86 and F-100 jet fighters. In 1957, 
Storms became vice president and chief engineer of the Los Angeles Division, 
where he led the development of the XB-70 bomber. In 1959, he became vice 
president for program development, in charge of the development of the Apollo 
spacecraft . Between 1961 and 1967, he served as president of the Space and In-
formation Systems Division, an organization that peaked at more than 35,000 
employees in 1965. Storms took the brunt of the blame for the Apollo 1 fire and 
stepped out of the public eye, although he continued as a company vice president. 
The AIAA honored him with the 1970 Aircraft Design Award. Storms died in Los 
Angles in July 1992.25
MILTON O. THOMPSON, NASA
 Milt Thompson flew the X-15 for 22 months from 29 October 1963 until 
25 August 1965, making 14 flights with the XLR99 engine. Thompson reached 
Mach 5 .48, a maximum speed of 3,723 mph, and an altitude of 214,100 feet. 
 Milton Orville Thompson was born on 4 May 1926 in Crookston, Minnesota. 
Thompson began flying with the Navy and served in China and Japan during 
World War II. Following six years of active duty, Thompson entered the Universi-
ty of Washington and graduated with a bachelor of science degree in engineering 
in 1953. After graduation Thompson became a flight-test engineer for the Boeing 
Aircraft Company, testing, among other things, the B-52. 
 Thompson joined the HSFS on 19 March 1956 and became a research pilot 
in January 1958. At the time, there were only five pilots at the station: Joe Walker, 
Stan Butchart, Jack McKay, Neil Armstrong, and Thompson. In 1962, Thompson 
became the only civilian pilot on the X-20 Dyna-Soar, but Robert McNamara can-
celed that program just over a year later. On 16 August 1963, Thompson became 
the first person to fly a lifting body, the lightweight M2-F1. He flew it 47 times 
and made the first five flights of the all-metal M2-F2. Thompson concluded his 
25 Eve Dumovich, “Harrison Storms: The Quarterback for the Race to the Moon,” Manager (Boeing internal maga-
zine), issue 5/6, 2000. Copy provided by Charles H. Feltz.
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active flying career in 1967 and became chief of research projects two years later. 
In 1975, he became chief engineer and retained the position until his death on 6 
August 1993. Thompson also served on NASA’s Space Transportation System 
Technology Steering Committee during the 1970s. In this role he was success-
ful in leading the effort to design the Space Shuttle orbiters for power-off land-
ings rather than increase weight with air-breathing engines. His committee work 
earned him the NASA Distinguished Service Medal. 
 Thompson was a member of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots, and 
he received the organization’s Iven C. Kincheloe Trophy as the outstanding ex-
perimental test pilot of 1966 for his research flights in the M2 lifting bodies. He 
also received the 1967 Octave Chanute award from the AIAA for his lifting-body 
research. In 1990, the National Aeronautics Association selected Thompson as a 
recipient of its Elder Statesman of Aviation award (this award has been presented 
each year since 1955 to individuals who made contributions “of significant value 
over a period of years” in the field of aeronautics). Milt Thompson died on 6 Au-
gust 1993.26  
 Thompson wrote about his experiences with the X-15 in At the Edge of 
Space:	 The	 X-15	 Flight	 Program (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution 
Press, 1992). Anybody who is interested in an inside look at the program should 
pick up a copy; it is a fascinating read.
JOSEPH A. WALKER, NASA
 Joe Walker flew the X-15 for 41 months, from 25 March 1960 until 22 August 
1963, making 25 flights. These included five flights with the XLR11 and 20 with 
the XLR99 . Walker reached Mach 5 .92, a maximum speed of 4,104 mph, and an 
altitude of 354,200 feet. His accomplishments include the first government flight, 
the maximum speed (4,104 mph) flight of a basic X-15, and the maximum altitude 
(354,200 feet) flight. 
 Joseph Albert Walker was born on 20 February 1921 in Washington, Penn-
sylvania, and graduated from Washington & Jefferson College in 1942 with a 
bachelor of arts degree in physics. During World War II he flew P-38 fighters for 
the Army Air Forces in North Africa, earning the Distinguished Flying Cross and 
the Air Medal with seven oak leaf clusters . 
 He joined the NACA in March 1945 at the Aircraft Engine Research Labora-
tory (now the Lewis Research Center), where he was involved in icing research 
and spent many hours flying into the worse weather the Great Lakes region could 
dish out. He transferred to the HSFS in 1951 and became chief pilot in 1955. He 
served as project pilot on the D-558-1, D-558-2, X-1, X-3, X-4, X-5, and X-15, 
and flew the F-100, F-101, F-102, F-104, and B-47. He was the first man to pilot 
the Lunar Landing Research Vehicle (LLRV) used to develop piloting and opera-
tional techniques for lunar landings. 
 Prior to joining the X-15 program, Walker did some pioneering work on the 
concept of reaction controls, flying an JF-104A to peak altitudes of 90,000 feet. 
26 http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/PAO/PAIS/HTML/bd-dfrc-p018.html (accessed 29 April 2002).
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The indicated airspeed going over the top of this maneuver was less than 30 knots, 
providing an ideal environment for evaluating the reaction control system.27 
 Walker was a joint recipient of the 1961 Robert J. Collier Trophy present-
ed by President John F. Kennedy at the White House in July 1962. Walker also 
received the 1961 Harmon International Trophy for Aviators, the 1961 Iven C. 
Kincheloe Award, and the 1961 Octave Chanute Award. He received an honorary 
doctor of aeronautical sciences degree from his alma mater in June 1962, and in 
1963 the National Pilots Association named him Pilot of the Year for 1963. He 
was a charter member of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots, and one of the 
first to be designated a fellow. Tragically, Walker died on 8 June 1966 in a mid-
air collision between his F-104 and the second XB-70A .28  On 23 August 2005, 
the Walker family received a set of astronaut wings honoring Joe Walker’s flights 
above 50 miles altitude in the X-15.
ALVIN S. WHITE, NAA
 Al White was the second contractor pilot assigned to the X-15 project. He 
participated in the centrifuge program, attended the training sessions, flew the 
fixed-base simulator, practiced the landing-approach flights, and flew the photo 
chase airplane for many of the early X-15 flights. White never flew the X-15.
 Alvin S. White was born in December 1918 in Berkeley, California. In 1936, 
he enrolled in the University of California at Davis to study electrical engineer-
ing, transferring to the Berkeley campus two years later. In 1941, he enlisted as an 
aviation cadet in the Army Air Corps, graduating from flight school at Williams 
Field, Arizona, in May 1942.29 
 After nearly two years as an advanced flight instructor at Williams Field, White 
joined the 355th Fighter Group in England on 4 June 1944. He flew two tours as a 
combat fighter pilot from D-Day until the end of the war in Europe. White returned 
to the University of California at the end of 1945, earning his degree in mechanical 
engineering with elective courses in aeronautical engineering in 1947.
 In 1948, White reenlisted in the Air Force and spent nearly three years con-
ducting parachute research at Wright-Patterson AFB and the National Parachute 
Range at El Centro. In 1952, White graduated from the Air Force Test Pilot School 
at Edwards and joined the fighter test section. In May 1954, he left the Air Force 
to join North American Aviation.
 After four years of testing the F-86 series, the F-100 series, and the F-107, 
he became backup pilot to Scott Crossfield on the X-15. In 1957, White became 
project pilot for the XB-70, and concentrated his work on that program after 
the completion of the North American X-15 flights. After he retired from North 
American, White became a well-respected aviation consultant until his death on 
29 April 2006 .30
27 Thompson, At the Edge of Space, p. 5.
28 http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/PAO/PAIS/HTML/bd-dfrc-p019.html (accessed 29 April 2002).
29 Letter, Alvin S. White to Dennis R. Jenkins, 8 June 2002.
30 Letter, Alvin S. White to Dennis R. Jenkins, 8 June 2002.
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ROBERT M. WHITE, USAF
 Bob White flew the X-15 for 32 months from 13 April 1960 until 14 Decem-
ber 1962, making 16 flights. These included six flights with the XLR11 and 10 
with the XLR99 . White reached Mach 6 .04, a maximum speed of 4,093 mph, and 
an altitude of 314,750 feet. His accomplishments include the maximum Mach 
number (3.50) and maximum altitude (136,000 feet) with the XLR11, the first 
Mach 4 flight (of any manned aircraft), the first Mach 5 flight, the first Mach 6 
flight, the first flight over 200,000 feet (of any manned aircraft), the first flight 
over 300,000 feet, and an FAI record flight of 314,750 feet (which still stands as 
of 2006) . 
 Robert Michael White was born on 6 July 1924 in New York, New York. He 
entered the Army Air Forces in November 1942 and received his wings in Febru-
ary 1944. White subsequently joined the 354th Fighter Squadron in July 1944 fly-
ing the P-51 Mustang. In February 1945, the Germans shot White down during his 
52nd combat mission. He was captured by the Germans and remained a prisoner 
of war for two months.
 White returned to the United States and enrolled in New York University, 
where he received a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering in 1951. The Air 
Force recalled him to active duty in May 1951 as a pilot and engineering officer 
with the 514th Troop Carrier Wing at Mitchel AFB, New York. In February 1952, 
the Air Force sent him to Japan and assigned him to the 40th Fighter Squadron as 
an F-80 pilot and flight commander until the summer of 1953. 
 White became a systems engineer at the Rome Air Development Center in 
New York. In January 1955, he graduated from the Experimental Test Pilot School 
and stayed at Edwards to test the F-86K, F-89H, F-102A, and F-105B. He became 
the deputy chief of the Flight Test Operations Division, and somewhat later be-
came assistant chief of the manned spacecraft branch. Following the death of Iven 
Kincheloe, backup pilot White was designated the primary Air Force pilot for the 
X-15 program in 1958. 
 In October 1963, White became the operations officer for the 36th Tactical 
Fighter Wing at Bitburg, and then served as the commanding officer of the 53rd 
Tactical Fighter Squadron. He returned to the United States in August 1965 to 
attend the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Washington, where he gradu-
ated in 1966. That same year, he received a master of science degree in business 
administration from The George Washington University. White went to South-
east Asia in May 1967 as deputy commander for operations of the 355th Tactical 
Fighter Wing, and flew 70 combat missions.
 In June 1968, he went back to Wright-Patterson as director of the F-15 Sys-
tems Program Office. Brigadier General-selectee White assumed command of the 
AFFTC on 31 July 1970. White commanded the AFFTC until 17 October 1972 
when he assumed the duties of commandant of the Air Force ROTC. In February 
1975 he received his second star, and in March he became chief of staff of the 
Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force. White retired from active duty as a major general 
in February 1981.31  
3 http://www.edwards.af.mil/history/docs_html/people/white_biography.html (accessed 29 April 2002).
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 White was a joint recipient of the 1961 Robert J. Collier Trophy presented 
by President John F. Kennedy at the White House in July 1962. He also received 
the NASA Distinguished Service Medal, the Harmon International Trophy from 
the Ligue Internationale des Aviateurs for the most outstanding contribution to 
aviation for the year, and the Iven C. Kincheloe Award. Among his many military 
decorations are the Air Force Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal, the Silver 
Star with three oak leaf clusters, the Legion of Merit, the Distinguished Flying 
Cross with five oak leaf clusters, and the Knight Commander’s Cross of the Order 
of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany.32
WALTER C. WILLIAMS, NASA 
 Walter Charles Williams was born on 30 July 1919 in New Orleans, Lou-
isiana. He earned a bachelor of science degree in aerospace engineering from 
Louisiana State University in 1939 and went to work for the NACA in August 
1940, serving as a project engineer to improve the handling, maneuverability, 
and flight characteristics of World War II fighters. Williams became the project 
engineer for the X-1 in 1946 and went to the site that eventually became Edwards 
AFB to set up flight tests for the X-1 .33  
 He was the founding director of the organization that became the Dryden 
Flight Research Center{AQ8}. In September 1959, he became the associate direc-
tor of the new NASA Space Task Group at Langley, which was created to carry 
out Project Mercury. He later became director of operations for the project, and 
then associate director of the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston (sub-
sequently renamed the Johnson Space Center). 
 In January 1963, Williams moved to NASA Headquarters as deputy associ-
ate administrator of the Office of Manned Space Flight, and received an hon-
orary doctorate of engineering degree from Louisiana State University. From 
April 1964 to 1975, he was vice president and general manager of The Aerospace 
Corporation. Williams returned to NASA Headquarters as chief engineer in 1975 
and retired from that position in July 1982. Twice Williams received the NASA 
Distinguished Service Medal. He died at his home in Tarzana, California, on 7 
October 1995 . 
32 Letter, Major General Robert M. White (USAF, Retired) to Dennis R. Jenkins, 3 June 2002, with comments on a 
draft copy of this manuscript.
33 Biography, Walter C. Williams,  October 995. In the files at the NASA History Office.
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The two NB-52s prepare to launch two X-15s on the same day. The 4 November 1960 attempt resulted in the launch of 
56-6670 with Bob Rushworth as pilot, but 56-6671, piloted by Scott Crossﬁeld, aborted due to the failure of the #2 APU. On 18 November 1966 
the program would again try to launch two ﬂights in a single day, but again one X-15 would abort due to technical problems.
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X-15 Serial Numbers
First X-15 Highest Highest Highest
Flight Flights Mach Speed Altitude Notes
X-15-1 56-6670 08 Jun 59 81 Mach 6.06 4,104 mph 266,500
X-15-2 56-6671 17 Sep 59 31 Mach 6.04 4,093 mph 217,000 Airframe was rebuilt into X-15A-2
X-15A-2 56-6671 25 Jun 64 22 Mach 6.70 4,520 mph 249,000
X-15-3 56-6672 20 Dec 61 65 Mach 5.73 3,897 mph 354,200 Aircraft lost on ﬂight 191
X-15 Pilots
X-15 Highest Highest Highest
Name Flights Mach Speed Altitude Notes
Adams Major Michael J. Adams, USAF 7 Mach 5.59 3,822 mph 266,000 Killed on ﬂight 3-65-97
Armstrong Neil A. Armstrong, NASA 7 Mach 5.74 3,989 mph 207,500 Made ﬁrst ﬂight with ball nose and MH-96
Crossﬁeld A. Scott Crossﬁeld, NAA 14 Mach 2.97 1,960 mph 88,116 Made ﬁrst X-15 glide, ﬁrst XLR11, and ﬁrst XLR99 ﬂights
Dana William H. Dana, NASA 16 Mach 5.53 3,897 mph 306,900 Made last X-15 ﬂight
Engle Captain Joe H. Engle, USAF 16 Mach 5.71 3,888 mph 280,600
Kincheloe Captain Iven C. Kincheloe, Jr., USAF 0 — — — Killed in an F-104 accident prior to his ﬁrst X-15 ﬂight
Knight Major William J. "Pete" Knight, USAF 16 Mach 6.70 4,520 mph 280,500 Made maximum speed ﬂight
McKay John B. "Jack" McKay, NASA 29 Mach 5.65 3,863 mph 295,600
Petersen Lt. Cdr. Forrest S. Petersen, USN 5 Mach 5.30 3,600 mph 101,800
Rushworth Lt. Colonel Robert A. Rushworth, USAF 34 Mach 6.06 4,018 mph 285,000 Made ﬁrst ﬂight of X-15A-2
Thompson Milton O. Thompson, NASA 14 Mach 5.48 3,724 mph 214,100
Walker Joseph A. Walker, NASA 25 Mach 5.92 4,104 mph 354,200 Made maximum altitude ﬂight
White, Al Alvin S. White, NAA 0 — — — Scott Crossﬁeld's backup; never ﬂew the X-15
White Major Robert M. White, USAF 16 Mach 6.04 4,093 mph 314,750 Made FAI record ﬂight to 314,750 feet
Chase aircraft used on the X-15 program     Chase pilots supporting the X-15 program
Type Serial No. (BuNo) Notes Adams Major Michael J. Adams, USAF
Armstrong Neil A. Armstrong, NASA
F-100A 52-5760 Original North American landing trainer. Baker Robert "Bob" Baker, NAA
F-100A 52-5778 NASA support aircraft. Departed 10 Jun 60. Collins Captain Michael Collins, USAF
JF-100C 53-1717 NASA support aircraft. Used between 06 Nov 59 and 23 Feb 61. Crews Captain Albert H. Crews, Jr., USAF
F-100F 56-3726 AFFTC support aircraft. Crossﬁeld A. Scott Crossﬁeld, NAA
F-100F 56-3963 NAA suport aircraft. Curtis Captain Lawrence C. Curtis, Jr., USAF
F-100F 56-3875 AFFTC support aircraft. Cuthill Major Fred J. Cuthill, USAF
JF-104A 55-2961 NASA support aircraft. Dana William H. Dana, NASA
JF-104A 56-0749 NASA support aircraft. Delivered 13 Apr 59; written-off 20 Dec 62. Daniel Major Walter F. Daniel, USAF
F-104A 56-0740 AFFTC support aircraft. Davey Captain Thomas J. Davey, USAF
F-104A 56-0743 AFFTC support aircraft. DeLong John DeLong, NAA (cameraman)
F-104A 56-0744 AFFTC support aircraft. Enevoldson Einar Enevoldson, NASA
F-104A 56-0746 AFFTC support aircraft. Engle Captain Joe H. Engle, USAF
F-104A 56-0748 AFFTC support aircraft. Evenson Captain Mervin L. Evenson, USAF
F-104A 56-0749 AFFTC support aircraft. Fulton Lt. Colonel Fitzhugh L. Fulton, Jr., NASA
F-104A 56-0755 AFFTC support aircraft. Gentry Captain Jerauld A. Gentry, NASA
F-104A 56-0757 AFFTC support aircraft. Gordon Major Henry C. Gordon, USAF
F-104A 56-0760 AFFTC support aircraft. Haise Frederick W. Haise, Jr., NASA
F-104A 56-0763 AFFTC support aircraft. Hoag Captain Peter C. Hoag, USAF
F-104A 56-0764 AFFTC support aircraft. Hover Captain Robert C. Hover, USAF
F-104A 56-0766 AFFTC support aircraft. Jackson Hugh M. Jackson, NASA
F-104A 56-0768 AFFTC support aircraft. Knight Captain William J. "Pete" Knight, USAF
F-104A 56-0790/N820NA AFFTC support aircraft. To FRC on 27 Dec 66 as N820NA. Krier Gary E. Krier, NASA
F-104A 56-0802 AFFTC support aircraft. Livingston Captain David W. Livingston, USAF
F-104A 56-0817 AFFTC support aircraft. Looney Captain William R. Looney, USAF
F-104B 56-3722 AFFTC support aircraft. Mallick Donald L. Mallick, NASA
F-104B 57-1303 NASA support aircraft. Manke John A. Manke, NASA
F-104D 57-1314 AFFTC support aircraft. Marrett Captain George J. Marrett, USAF
F-104D 57-1315 AFFTC support aircraft. McDivitt Major James A. McDivitt, USAF
F-104D 57-1316 AFFTC support aircraft. McKay John B. McKay, NASA
F-104D 57-1331 AFFTC support aircraft. Parsons Major Robert K. Parsons, USAF
F-104D 57-1332 AFFTC support aircraft. Petersen Lt. Commander Forrest S. Petersen, USN
F-104N NASA 011/N811NA * NASA support aircraft. Delivered on 19 Aug 63. Peterson Bruce A. Peterson, NASA
F-104N NASA 012/N812NA * NASA support aircraft. Delivered on 6 Sep 63. Powell Captain Cecil Powell, USAF
F-104N NASA 013/N813NA * NASA support aircraft. Delivered on 22 Oct 63; written-off 8 Jun 66. Roberts J. O. Roberts, NAA
F4H-1 145313 Navy support aircraft. Flown during Mar 61. (See next entry) J. Rogers Major Joseph W. Rogers, USAF
F-4A 145313 NASA support aircraft. Delivered on 3 Dec 65; departed on 14 Jun 66. R. Rogers Major Russell L. Rogers, USAF
F-4C 63-7651 AFFTC support aircraft. Rushworth Major Robert A. Rushworth, USAF
F5D-1 139208/ NASA 212 NASA support aircraft. Delivered on 16 Jan 61; departed on 4 Mar 63. Shawler Captain Wendell H. "Wendy" Shawler, USAF
F5D-1 142350/NASA 213 NASA support aircraft. Delivered on 15 Jun 61. Later NASA 802. R.W. Smith Captain Robert W. Smith, USAF
YT-38A 58-1197 AFFTC support aircraft. R.J. Smith Captain Roger J. Smith, USAF
T-38A 59-1596 AFFTC support aircraft. Sorlie Major Donald M. Sorlie, USAF
T-38A 59-1598 AFFTC support aircraft. Stroface Captain Joseph F. Stroface, USAF
T-38A 59-1599 AFFTC support aircraft. Thompson Milton O. Thompson, NASA
T-38A 59-1600 AFFTC support aircraft. Twinting Major William T. "Ted" Twinting, USAF
T-38A 59-1601 AFFTC support aircraft. Walker Joseph A. Walker, NASA
T-38A 59-1604 AFFTC support aircraft. Ward Lt. Colonel Fred Ward, USAF
T-38A 59-1606 AFFTC support aircraft. Whelan Captain Robert E. Whelan, USAF
T-38A 60-0563 AFFTC support aircraft. A. White Alvin S. White, NAA
R. White Major Robert M. White, USAF
Wood Major James W. Wood, USAF
Notes:
* The F-104Ns changed from 0xx  to 8xx in March 1965
Data supplied by Betty J. Love and Peter W. Merlin, DFRC History Ofﬁce.
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NB-52 aircraft used on the X-15 program NB-52 Signiﬁcant Dates
NB-52A 52-003 "The High and the Mighty One" 29 Nov 57
04 Feb 58 B-52A was moved into the NAA hangar for start of modiﬁcation.
14 Nov 58 The modiﬁed NB-52A arrives at Edwards AFB.
14 Jan 61 NB-52A was ﬂown to Wichita, Kansas, for major overhaul.
23 Mar 61 NB-52 returns to Edwards from Boeing-Witchita.
17 Apr 61 NB-52A returns to operational status.
NB-52B 52-008 "The Challenger" 06 Jan 59 RB-52B (52-008) is ﬂown to NAA facility in Palmdale for modiﬁcation.
08 Jun 59 The modiﬁed NB-52B arrives at Edwards AFB.
(some source indicate this was originally designated NRB-52B)
Launch Panel Operators for the X-15 program
Berkowitz William "Bill" Berkowitz, NAA
Butchart Stanley P. Butchart, NASA
Dustin Allen F. Dustin, NASA
Moise John W. Moise, NASA
Peterson Bruce A. Peterson, NASA
Russell John "Jack" W. Russell, NASA
B-52 Pilots Supporting the X-15 program
Allavie Captain John E. "Jack" Allavie, USAF
Anderson Donald C. Anderson, USAF (one ﬂight, 2-A-39)
Andonian Colonel Harry Andonian, USAF
Archer Squadron Leader Harry M. Archer, RAF
Bement Captain Russell P. Bement, USAF
Bock Captain Charles C. Bock Jr., USAF (later Major)
Bowline Captain Jerry D. Bowline, USAF (later Major)
Branch Brigadier General  Irving "Twig" Branch, USAF (one ﬂight, 1-44-70)
Campbell Captain John K. Campbell, USAF
Cole Major Frank E. Cole, USAF
Cotton Lt. Colonel Joseph P. Cotton, USAF (later Colonel)
Cretney Squadron leader David Cretney, RAF
Crews Major Albert H. Crews Jr., USAF
Cross Major Carl S. Cross, USAF
Doryland Major Charles J. Doryland, USAF
Fulton Major Fitzhugh "Fitz" Fulton, USAF  (later Lt. Colonel)
Jones Colonel Gay E. Jones, USAF
Kuyk Captain Charles F. G. Kuyk Jr., USAF
Lewis Colonel Kenneth  K. Lewis, USAF
McDowell Major Edward D. McDowell Jr., USAF
Miller Squadron Leader John Miller, RAF
Mosley Captain Robert L. Mosley, USAF
Reschke Major William G. Reschke Jr., USAF  (later Lt. Colonel)
Stroup Captain Floyd B. Stroup, USAF
Sturmthal Lt. Colonel Emil "Ted" Sturmthal, USAF
Townsend Colonel Guy M. Townsend, USAF
Yeager Colonel Charles E. "Chuck" Yeager, USAF (one ﬂight, 2-A-38)
Notes:
Names taken from ﬂight logs.  Only last names and ranks of Air Force personnel were given.
On X-15 ﬂight 1-12-23, the B-52 pilot is listed as "Kirk," but this appears to be a misspelling of Kuyk in the original record.
Radio Locations Personnel Who Served as NASA 1
NASA 1 Bldg. 4800 Control Room, FRC Adams Major Michael J. Adams, USAF
NASA 2 Beatty Radar Site, High Range Armstrong Neil A. Armstrong, NASA
NASA 3 Ely Radar Site, High Range Butchart Stanley P. Butchart, NASA
Dana William H. Dana, NASA
Engle Captain Joe H. Engle, USAF
Harvey Q.C. Harvey, NAA
Knight Captain William J. "Pete" Knight, USAF
Manke John A. Manke, NASA
McKay John B. McKay, NASA
Petersen Lt. Commander Forrest S. Petersen, USN
Rushworth Major Robert A. Rushworth, USAF
Thompson Milton O. Thompson, NASA
Walker Joseph A. Walker, NASA
White Major Robert M. White, USAF
Miscellaneous Aircraft Supporting the X-15 program
C-47H (R4D) N817NA NASA support aircraft used for lakebed surveys and recovery from remote sites. Originally R4D-5 (BuNo 17136)
C-130A 54-1624 AFFTC support aircraft. Used to ferry X-15 rescue and paramedic personnel to uprange lakebeds.
C-130A 54-1626 AFFTC support aircraft. Used to ferry X-15 rescue and paramedic personnel to uprange lakebeds.
C-130A 53-3132 Assigned to X-15 support.
C-130A 53-3134 Assigned to X-15 program after 20 March 1959.
C-130A 53-3135 Assigned to X-15 support. Used during Mud Lake emergency landing recovery operations on 10 January 1962.
C-130B 57-0525 Assigned to X-15 support. Used during Mud Lake emergency landing recovery operations on 1 July 1966.
C-130E 61-2358 Assigned to X-15 support. Used during the last ﬂight of X-15-3.
UH-1F 63-13143 U.S. Army
YUH-1H 60-6029 U.S. Army
H-21B 51-15855 Originally bailed to Sperry Gyroscope. Became available to AFFTC around February 1959.
H-21B 53-4389 Originally bailed to Prewitt Aircraft Company. Became available to AFFTC around January 1959.
H-21B ?? Became available to AFFTC around September 1959.
JTF-102A 54-1354 Used from 1958 to early 1959 to test X-15 pressure suit and biomedical package.
JF-100C 53-1709 NASA variable-stability aircraft.
B-52A (52-0003) arrives at Air Force Plant 42 in
Palmdale, California. The aircraft came from Boeing
and was placed in storage pending modiﬁcations.
First names supplied by Betty Love and Peter W. Merlin, DFRC/HO based on Test Pilot School and AFFTC History Ofﬁce ﬁles,
         and personal interviews with Fitz Fulton, Wendell Shawler, and Johnny Armstrong.
0X-15 EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
   Ten Highest Mach X-15 Flights
Program Flight # Flight ID X-15 (s/n) Flight Date Pilot Max. Mach Max. Altitude Max. Speed
188 2-53-97 56-6671 03 Oct 67 Knight 6.70 102,100 4,520
175 2-50-89 56-6671 18 Nov 66 Knight 6.33 98,900 4,250
97 1-42-67 56-6670 05 Dec 63 Rushworth 6.06 101,000 4,018
45 2-21-37 56-6671 09 Nov 61 White 6.04 101,600 4,093
59 1-30-51 56-6670 27 Jun 62 Walker 5.92 123,700 4,104
44 1-24-40 56-6670 17 Oct 61 Walker 5.74 108,600 3,900
64 1-32-53 56-6670 26 Jul 62 Armstrong 5.74 98,900 3,989
76 3-13-23 56-6672 20 Dec 62 Walker 5.73 160,400 3,793
105 1-47-74 56-6670 29 Apr 64 Rushworth 5.72 101,600 3,906
   Ten Highest Speed X-15 Flights
Program Flight # Flight ID X-15 (s/n) Flight Date Pilot Max. Mach Max. Altitude Max. Speed Max. Velocity (fps)
188 2-53-97 56-6671 03 Oct 67 Knight 6.70 102,100 4,520 6,629
175 2-50-89 56-6671 18 Nov 66 Knight 6.33 98,900 4,250 6,233
59 1-30-51 56-6670 27 Jun 62 Walker 5.92 123,700 4,104 6,019
45 2-21-37 56-6671 09 Nov 61 White 6.04 101,600 4,093 6,003
97 1-42-67 56-6670 05 Dec 63 Rushworth 6.06 101,000 4,018 5,893
64 1-32-53 56-6670 26 Jul 62 Armstrong 5.74 98,900 3,989 5,851
137 2-39-70 56-6671 22 Jun 65 McKay 5.64 155,900 3,938 5,776
89 1-38-61 56-6670 18 Jul 63 Rushworth 5.63 104,800 3,925 5,757
86 1-36-57 56-6670 25 Jun 63 Walker 5.51 111,800 3,911 5,736
105 1-47-74 56-6670 29 Apr 64 Rushworth 5.72 101,600 3,906 5,729
   Ten Highest Altitude X-15 Flights
Program Flight # Flight ID X-15 (s/n) Flight Date Pilot Max. Mach Max. Altitude Max. Speed
91 3-22-36 56-6672 22 Aug 63 Walker 5.58 354,200 3,794
90 3-21-32 56-6672 19 Jul 63 Walker 5.50 347,800 3,710
62 3-7-14 56-6672 17 Jul 62 White 5.45 314,750 3,832
174 3-56-83 56-6672 01 Nov 66 Dana 5.46 306,900 3,750
150 3-49-73 56-6672 28 Sep 65 McKay 5.33 295,600 3,732
87 3-20-31 56-6672 27 Jun 63 Rushworth 4.89 285,000 3,425
138 3-44-67 56-6672 29 Jun 65 Engle 4.94 280,600 3,432
190 3-64-95 56-6672 17 Oct 67 Knight 5.53 280,500 3,869
77 3-14-24 56-6672 17 Jan 63 Walker 5.47 271,700 3,677
143 3-46-70 56-6672 10 Aug 65 Engle 5.20 271,000 3,550
   Speed Summary
The following represents to total time the three X-15s spent above the indicated Mach number. The total time includes time
      spent below Mach 1. Includes glide ﬂights. Does not include NB-52 carry time. Given as hours:minutes:seconds.
Aircraft Mach 1 Mach 2 Mach 3 Mach 4 Mach 5 Mach 6 Total
X-15-1 07:35:24 04:40:59 03:17:31 02:12:34 00:27:55 00:00:08 12:40:43
X-15-2 04:31:41 02:48:16 01:56:07 01:11:02 00:12:57 00:01:10 07:51:37
X-15-3 06:09:23 04:41:29 03:37:55 02:35:16 00:44:41 00:00:00 09:42:37
Total 18:16:28 12:10:44 08:51:33 05:58:52 01:25:33 00:01:18 30:14:57
0 Appendix B: X-15 Flight Log
   Ten Slowest Mach X-15 Flights
Program Flight # Flight ID X-15 (s/n) Flight Date Pilot Max. Mach Max. Altitude Max. Speed
1 1-1-5 56-6670 08 Jun 59 Crossﬁeld 0.79 37,550 522
47 1-25-44 56-6670 10 Jan 62 Petersen 0.97 44,750 645
4 2-3-9 56-6671 05 Nov 59 Crossﬁeld 1.00 45,462 660
74 2-31-52 56-6671 09 Nov 62 McKay 1.49 53,950 1,019
7 2-5-12 56-6671 17 Feb 60 Crossﬁeld 1.57 52,640 1,036
22 1-13-25 56-6670 23 Sep 60 Petersen 1.68 53,043 1,108
159 2-45-81 56-6671 01 Jul 66 Rushworth 1.70 44,800 1,061
29 1-18-31 56-6670 30 Nov 60 Armstrong 1.75 48,840 1,155
178 3-58-87 56-6672 26 Apr 67 Dana 1.80 53,400 1,163
31 1-19-32 56-6670 09 Dec 60 Armstrong 1.80 50,095 1,188
   Ten Slowest Speed X-15 Flights
Program Flight # Flight ID X-15 (s/n) Flight Date Pilot Max. Mach Max. Altitude Max. Speed Max. Velocity (fps)
1 1-1-5 56-6670 08 Jun 59 Crossﬁeld 0.79 37,550 522 766
47 1-25-44 56-6670 10 Jan 62 Petersen 0.97 44,750 645 946
4 2-3-9 56-6671 05 Nov 59 Crossﬁeld 1.00 45,462 660 968
74 2-31-52 56-6671 09 Nov 62 McKay 1.49 53,950 1,019 1,495
7 2-5-12 56-6671 17 Feb 60 Crossﬁeld 1.57 52,640 1,036 1,519
159 2-45-81 56-6671 01 Jul 66 Rushworth 1.70 44,800 1,061 1,556
22 1-13-25 56-6670 23 Sep 60 Petersen 1.68 53,043 1,108 1,625
29 1-18-31 56-6670 30 Nov 60 Armstrong 1.75 48,840 1,155 1,694
178 3-58-87 56-6672 26 Apr 67 Dana 1.80 53,400 1,163 1,706
31 1-19-32 56-6670 09 Dec 60 Armstrong 1.80 50,095 1,188 1,742
   Ten Lowest Altitude X-15 Flights
Program Flight # Flight ID X-15 (s/n) Flight Date Pilot Max. Mach Max. Altitude Max. Speed
1 1-1-5 56-6670 08 Jun 59 Crossﬁeld 0.79 37,550 522
47 1-25-44 56-6670 10 Jan 62 Petersen 0.97 44,750 645
159 2-45-81 56-6671 01 Jul 66 Rushworth 1.70 44,800 1,061
4 2-3-9 56-6671 05 Nov 59 Crossﬁeld 1.00 45,462 660
12 1-4-9 56-6670 13 Apr 60 White 1.90 48,000 1,254
9 1-3-8 56-6670 25 Mar 60 Walker 2.00 48,630 1,320
29 1-18-31 56-6670 30 Nov 60 Armstrong 1.75 48,840 1,155
25 1-16-29 56-6670 04 Nov 60 Rushworth 1.95 48,900 1,287
32 1-20-35 56-6670 01 Feb 61 McKay 1.88 49,780 1,211
10 2-7-15 56-6671 29 Mar 60 Crossﬁeld 1.96 49,982 1,293
0X-15 EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
   XLR11 Maximum Altitude
Program Flight # Flight ID X-15 (s/n) Flight Date Pilot Max. Mach Max. Altitude Max. Speed
X-15-1
19 1-10-19 56-6670 12 Aug 60 White 2.52 136,500 1,772
X-15-2
6 2-4-11 56-6671 11 Feb 60 Crossﬁeld 2.22 88,116 1,466
   XLR11 Maximum Speed
Program Flight # Flight ID X-15 (s/n) Flight Date Pilot Max. Mach Max. Altitude Max. Speed
X-15-1
33 1-21-36 56-6670 07 Feb 61 White 3.50 78,150 2,275
X-15-2
6 2-4-11 56-6671 11 Feb 60 Crossﬁeld 2.22 88,116 1,466
0 Appendix B: X-15 Flight Log
Program Flight #: Cumulative X-15 ﬂight number. Includes all glide and powered free-ﬂights.
Flight ID: X-15 ﬂight identiﬁcation.
   First number is which X-15 (1, 2, or 3).
   Second number is total number of free ﬂights by that aircraft.
Third number is total number of times that X-15 has been carried aloft by the B-52.
The second number is replaced by an "A" for unplanned aborts, and a "C" for planned captive ﬂights.
X-15 (s/n) The Air Force serial number (tail number) of the X-15.
Flight Date: The date the ﬂight was actually ﬂown.
Pilot (ﬂight #): The pilot, and the number of ﬂights he had made in an X-15.
Launch Lake: The dry lake the launch took place over (all launches took place near a dry lake to serve as an emergency abort landing site).
Launch Time: The time the launch took place. All X-15 times are given as hour:minute:second.tenths on a 24-hour clock. 
All times are local to Edwards AFB, California.
Landing Lake: The dry lake the ﬂight landed on.
Landing Time: The time the X-15 touched-down on the landing lake. Computed as the X-15 launch time plus the X-15 Flight Duration.
The following  entries have two components.
The "Plan" column contains the preﬂight planning values.
The "Actual" column contains the values actually achieved on the ﬂight.
Max Mach: The maximum Mach number attained by the X-15 on that ﬂight.
Max Altitude: The maximum altitude (feet; mean sea level) attained by the X-15 on that ﬂight.
Speed (mph): The maximum speed attained by the X-15 on that ﬂight. Listed in miles per hour, ﬁgured for a standard day.
X-15 Flight Duration: The total ﬂight time for the X-15 in hours:minutes:seconds.tenths. This information was obtained from ﬂight records (recorded onboard for 
X-15-1 and X-15-2; telemtered to the ground for X-15-3).
XLR11 (s/n): The serial numbers of the XLR11 engines used on that ﬂight. The ﬁrst number is the upper engine; then the lower.
XLR99 (s/n): The serial number of the XLR99 engine used on that ﬂight.
Powered Time (sec): The total powered ﬂight time. This disregards any momentary lapses in power due to restarts, etc.
    For XLR11 ﬂights, it includes any time at least one chamber on either engine was ﬁring.
These entries may contain one of the following annotations
    "B.O." indicates the engine burned-out (I.e. ran out of propellants).
    "S.D." indicates the engine was shut down by the pilot.
Thrust (chambers): For XLR11 ﬂights only. The total number of chambers that ﬁred on that ﬂight (of eight possible)
Thrust (pct): For XLR99 ﬂights only. The throttle setting for the ﬂight. May have multiple entries if the ﬂight required changing thrust levels.
Conﬁguration: Major conﬁguration of the X-15 vehicle. Lists items such as the ball nose, MH-96, wing tip pods, etc.
Purpose: The major purpose of this X-15 ﬂight. In later ﬂights this was frequently to exercise non-X-15 related experiments.
Aborts:
Any aborts leading up to this ﬂight. 
   Includes the ﬂight number (with an "A" as the middle component, signifying abort), date, and reason if the NB-52 took-off.
   Includes date and reason if the NB-52 did not take off (no program ﬂight number assigned).
NASA 1: The person who acted as the aircraft communicator in the NASA control room. Usually another X-15 pilot.
B-52 - Pilots - LP: The B-52 serial number, followed by the ﬂight crew (pilot ﬁrst, then copilot), followed by the X-15 launch panel operator in the B-52.
Take-Off Time: The B-52 take off time. The majority of available data only lists this to hour:minute, so that is how it is presented here. 
All times are local to Edwards AFB, California.
Landing Time: The B-52 landing time.
B-52 Flight Time: The total ﬂight time for the B-52 in hours:minutes. This is computed as landing time minus take-off time.
Chase 1: The aircraft type, serial number, and pilot of the ﬁrst chase aircraft.
Chase 2: The aircraft type, serial number, and pilot of the second chase aircraft.
Chase 3: The aircraft type, serial number, and pilot of the third chase aircraft.
Chase 4: The aircraft type, serial number, and pilot of the fourth chase aircraft, if any.
Chase 5: The aircraft type, serial number, and pilot of the ﬁfth chase aircraft, if any.
Rover: The aircraft type, serial number, and pilot of the "rover" chase aircraft, if any.
Notes: Includes any anomalies encountered on the ﬂight, additional chase aircraft, or other notes.
X-15 Flight Log Legend and Explanations
0X-15 EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
Program Flight #: 1 Plan Actual NASA 1: Harvey
Max Mach: 0.80 0.79 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bock / Allavie Berkowitcz
Flight ID: 1-1-5 Max Altitude: 40,000 37,550 Take-Off Time: 08:01
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (1) Speed (mph): –– 522 Landing Time: 08:58
Flight Date: 08 Jun 59 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:04:56.6 B-52 Flight Time: 00:57
Pilot (ﬂight #): Crossﬁeld (1)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100F 56-3726 Al White / DeLong
Launch Lake: Rosamond Powered Time (sec): 0 0 Chase 2: F-100F 56-3963 Wood
Launch Time: 08:38:40.0 Thrust (chambers): 0 0 Chase 3: F-100F White
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 08:43:36.6
Purpose:  Pilot familiarization – Crossﬁeld's ﬁrst X-15 ﬂight Notes: Pitch damper failed pre-launch;
Unauthorized aileron roll
Aborts: 1-C-1 10 Mar 59 Scheduled captive ﬂight Signiﬁcant instability duirng landing
1-A-2 01 Apr 59 Radio failure First X-15 glide ﬂight
1-A-3 10 Apr 59 Radio and APU failure
1-A-4 21 May 59 APU and SAS failure
–– 05 Jun 59 Smoke in cockpit during taxi All aborts used NB-52A 52-003; Crossﬁeld was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 2 Plan Actual NASA 1: Harvey
Max Mach: 2.00 2.11 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bock / Allavie Berkowitcz
Flight ID: 2-1-3 Max Altitude: 50,000 52,341 Take-Off Time: 07:31
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (1) Speed (mph): –– 1,393 Landing Time: 08:46
Flight Date: 17 Sep 59 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:11.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:15
Pilot (ﬂight #): Crossﬁeld (2)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100F 56-3963 Al White / DeLong
Launch Lake: Rosamond Powered Time (sec): ?? 224.3 Chase 2: F-100F Walker
Launch Time: 08:08:48.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1316 White
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 08:17:59.0
Purpose:  First X-15 powered ﬂight; Notes: Flaps extended only 60 percent;
Aircraft checkout Roll damper failed during ﬂight;
Unauthorized aileron roll
Aborts: 2-C-1 24 Jul 59 Scheduled full-propellant captive ﬂight
2-A-2 04 Sep 59 Vent malfunction All aborts used NB-52A 52-003; Crossﬁeld was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 3 Plan Actual NASA 1:
Max Mach: 2.00 2.15 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bock / Allavie Moise
Flight ID: 2-2-6 Max Altitude: 60,000 61,781 Take-Off Time: 09:25
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (2) Speed (mph): –– 1,419 Landing Time: 10:55
Flight Date: 17 Oct 59 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:37.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:30
Pilot (ﬂight #): Crossﬁeld (3)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100F 56-3963 Al White / DeLong
Launch Lake: Rosamond Powered Time (sec): ?? 254.5 Chase 2: F-104D Walker
Launch Time: 10:13:07.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104 White
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:22:44.7
Purpose: Aircraft checkout Notes: Roll damper off at launch - reengaged; 
Alcohol ﬁre in engine bay after landing
Aborts: 2-A-4 10 Oct 59 LOX topoff failure; Helium leak
2-A-5 14 Oct 59 LOX topoff failure; Cabin Pressure All aborts used NB-52A 52-003; Crossﬁeld was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 4 Plan Actual NASA 1: Harvey
Max Mach: 2.00 1.00 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Fulton Moise
Flight ID: 2-3-9 Max Altitude: 80,000 45,462 Take-Off Time: 09:00
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (3) Speed (mph): –– 660 Landing Time: 10:02
Flight Date: 05 Nov 59 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:05:28.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:02
Pilot (ﬂight #): Crossﬁeld (4)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100F Baker / DeLong
Launch Lake: Rosamond Powered Time (sec): 255 13.9 Chase 2: F-104 White
Launch Time: 09:39:28.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 7 Chase 3: F-104 Walker
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rosamond Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:44:56.0
Purpose: Aircraft checkout Notes: Explosion and ﬁre in lower engine; 
Roll damper dropped out at launch; 
Fuselage failed just forward of LOX tank 
    (station 226.8) at landing
Aborts: 2-A-7 22 Oct 59 Pilot's oxygen failure; torn gloves
2-A-8 31 Oct 59 Weather All aborts used NB-52A 52-003; Crossﬁeld was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
0 Appendix B: X-15 Flight Log
Program Flight #: 5 Plan Actual NASA 1: Harvey
Max Mach: 2.00 2.53 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Kuyk Berkowitcz
Flight ID: 1-2-7 Max Altitude: 65,000 66,844 Take-Off Time: 15:42
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (2) Speed (mph): –– 1,669 Landing Time: 17:00
Flight Date: 23 Jan 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:53.8 B-52 Flight Time: 01:18
Pilot (ﬂight #): Crossﬁeld (5)
XLR11 (s/n): –– 3 and 10 Chase 1: F-100F Baker / DeLong
Launch Lake: Rosamond Powered Time (sec): ?? 267.2 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 Walker
Launch Time: 16:17:05.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104 White
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 16:26:58.8
Purpose: Aircraft checkout; Notes: First ﬂight of the stable-platform;
 SAS evaluation; First launch from NB-52B 52-008
 First powered ﬂight by X-15-1
Aborts: 1-A-6 16 Dec 59 Radio failure; LOX regulator Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Crossﬁeld was the X-15 pilot on the abort
Program Flight #: 6 Plan Actual NASA 1: Harvey
Max Mach: 2.00 2.22 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Allavie / Fulton Moise
Flight ID: 2-4-11 Max Altitude: 80,000 88,116 Take-Off Time: 09:07
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (4) Speed (mph): –– 1,466 Landing Time: 10:34
Flight Date: 11 Feb 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:15.5 B-52 Flight Time: 01:27
Pilot (ﬂight #): Crossﬁeld (6)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100F 56-3963 Al White / DeLong
Launch Lake: Rosamond Powered Time (sec): 260 251.2 Chase 2: F-104 Walker
Launch Time: 10:15:04.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104 White
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:25:19.5
Purpose: Aircraft checkout Notes: Good ﬂight
Aborts: 2-A-10 04 Feb 60 Loss of source pressure Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Crossﬁeld was the X-15 pilot on the abort
Program Flight #: 7 Plan Actual NASA 1: Harvey
Max Mach: 2.00 1.57 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Allavie Moise
Flight ID: 2-5-12 Max Altitude: 50,000 52,640 Take-Off Time: 08:54
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (5) Speed (mph): –– 1,036 Landing Time: 10:02
Flight Date: 17 Feb 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:35.9 B-52 Flight Time: 01:08
Pilot (ﬂight #): Crossﬁeld (7)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100 White
Launch Lake: Rosamond Powered Time (sec): 260 309.4 Chase 2: F-104 Walker
Launch Time: 09:41:32.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 7 Chase 3: F-104
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:52:07.9
Purpose: Aircraft checkout; Notes: Upper engine problems - Restart on 7 chambers was successful
 SAS stability and control evaluation
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 8 Plan Actual NASA 1: Harvey
Max Mach: 2.00 2.15 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Allavie / Kuyk Moise
Flight ID: 2-6-13 Max Altitude: 50,000 52,640 Take-Off Time: 07:55
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (6) Speed (mph): –– 1,419 Landing Time: 08:46
Flight Date: 17 Mar 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:39.5 B-52 Flight Time: 00:51
Pilot (ﬂight #): Crossﬁeld (8-6)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100F 56-3726 Al White / DeLong
Launch Lake: Rosamond Powered Time (sec): ?? 233.5 Chase 2: F-104 White
Launch Time: 08:31:25.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104 Walker
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 08:40:04.5
Purpose:  Roll stability and control evaluation; Notes: Good ﬂight
 Dampers on and off evaluation
Aborts: None
X-15 EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
Program Flight #: 9 Plan Actual NASA 1:
Max Mach: 2.00 2.00 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Allavie Russell
Flight ID: 1-3-8 Max Altitude: 50,000 48,630 Take-Off Time: 14:44
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (3) Speed (mph): –– 1,320 Landing Time: 16:12
Flight Date: 25 Mar 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:08.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:28
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (1)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100 Crossﬁeld
Launch Lake: Rosamond Powered Time (sec): ?? 272.0 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 White
Launch Time: 15:43:23.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8, 6 Chase 3: F-100 McKay
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 15:52:31.0
Purpose:  Pilot familiarization – Walker's ﬁrst X-15 ﬂight Notes: First government ﬂight;
Stable platform malfunctioned prelaunch; 
Two restarts required on top engine; 
No roll damper
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 10 Plan Actual NASA 1: Harvey
Max Mach: 2.00 1.96 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Allavie Moise
Flight ID: 2-7-15 Max Altitude: 50,000 49,982 Take-Off Time: 08:16
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (7) Speed (mph): –– 1,293 Landing Time: 10:14
Flight Date: 29 Mar 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:10.5 B-52 Flight Time: 01:58
Pilot (ﬂight #): Crossﬁeld (9)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100F White
Launch Lake: Rosamond Powered Time (sec): 267 244.2 Chase 2: F-104D Knight
Launch Time: 09:59:28.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104C Rushworth
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:08:38.5
Purpose:  Launch characteristics evaluation; Notes: Good ﬂight
 Minus 2-g pushover; 
 Full throw rudder step evaluation
Aborts: 2-A-14 18 Mar 60 WALC leak Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Crossﬁeld was the X-15 pilot on the abort
Program Flight #: 11 Plan Actual NASA 1: Harvey
Max Mach: 2.00 2.03 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Allavie / Fulton Moise
Flight ID: 2-8-16 Max Altitude: 50,000 51,356 Take-Off Time: 08:03
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (8) Speed (mph): –– 1,340 Landing Time: 08:58
Flight Date: 31 Mar 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:56.5 B-52 Flight Time: 00:55
Pilot (ﬂight #): Crossﬁeld (10)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100 White
Launch Lake: Rosamond Powered Time (sec): ?? 254.5 Chase 2: F-104 Rushworth
Launch Time: 08:42:05.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104 Knight
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 08:51:01.5
Purpose:  High-g maneuvers; Notes: Good ﬂight;
 SAS gains checkout Landing was intentionally made with all  dampers off
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 12 Plan Actual NASA 1: Walker
Max Mach: 2.00 1.90 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Kuyk Russell
Flight ID: 1-4-9 Max Altitude: 50,000 48,000 Take-Off Time: 08:28
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (4) Speed (mph): –– 1,254 Landing Time: 09:33
Flight Date: 13 Apr 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:52.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:05
Pilot (ﬂight #): White (1)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100 Al White / DeLong
Launch Lake: Rosamond Powered Time (sec): ?? 253.7 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 Walker
Launch Time: 09:15:11.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104 Rushworth
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:24:03.7
Purpose:  Pilot familiarization – White's ﬁrst X-15 ﬂight Notes: First Air Force ﬂight;
First ﬂight with stiffened side-tunnel panels;
Flown on center stick;
No research data until High Key (pilot forgot to activate);
No landing data due to ﬁlm drum failure
Aborts: None
 Appendix B: X-15 Flight Log
Program Flight #: 13 Plan Actual NASA 1:
Max Mach: 2.35 2.56 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Allavie Russell
Flight ID: 1-5-10 Max Altitude: 60,000 59,496 Take-Off Time: 08:00
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (5) Speed (mph): –– 1,689 Landing Time: 09:10
Flight Date: 19 Apr 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:58.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:10
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (2)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100 Rushworth
Launch Lake: Rosamond Powered Time (sec): ?? 260.6 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104D (USAF) McKay
Launch Time: 08:51:44.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104 Knight
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:01:42.6
Purpose:  Performance buildup; Notes: Good ﬂight
 Stability and control buildup; No gear data taken
 Fuselage side fairing vibration and ﬂutter data
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 14 Plan Actual NASA 1: See Notes
Max Mach: 2.50 2.20 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Allavie Russell
Flight ID: 1-6-11 Max Altitude: 60,000 60,938 Take-Off Time: 09:06
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (6) Speed (mph): –– 1,452 Landing Time: 10:11
Flight Date: 06 May 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:23.2 B-52 Flight Time: 01:05
Pilot (ﬂight #): White (2)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100F Knight
Launch Lake: Rosamond Powered Time (sec): ?? 246.5 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104D McKay
Launch Time: 09:53:19.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104A Rushworth
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:02:42.2
Purpose:  Performance buildup; Notes: Roll damper failed at launch (reset)
 Stability and control buildup Normal ventral jettison failed; ventral came off when skids deployed
There was not a functional NASA 1 on this ﬂight due to radio problems;
   Pete Knight served as a radio relay from a chase aircraft
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 15 Plan Actual NASA 1: Armstrong
Max Mach: 3.00 3.19 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bock / Allavie Russell
Flight ID: 1-7-12 Max Altitude: 73,000 77,882 Take-Off Time: 08:08
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (7) Speed (mph): –– 2,111 Landing Time: 09:40
Flight Date: 12 May 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:10.3 B-52 Flight Time: 01:32
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (3)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100F White
Launch Lake: Silver Powered Time (sec): ?? 256.3 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104A Rushworth
Launch Time: 08:47:37.0 Thrust (chambers): 8, 5 8, 0 Chase 3: F-104A Knight
Chase 4: F-104D 57-1316 McKay
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 08:57:47.3
Purpose:  Performance buildup; Notes: Stable platform inoperative from launch;
 Stability and control buildup First launch (of any X-plane) from a remote lake;
First X-15 Mach 3 ﬂight;
Three chambers intentionally shut down -
   remaining 5 shut down seconds later;
Ventral chute failed, ventral  extensively damaged
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 16 Plan Actual NASA 1: Armstrong
Max Mach: 2.20 2.31 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bock / Allavie Russell
Flight ID: 1-8-13 Max Altitude: 110,000 108,997 Take-Off Time: 08:05
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (8) Speed (mph): –– 1,590 Landing Time: 09:20
Flight Date: 19 May 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:11:24.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:15
Pilot (ﬂight #): White (3)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100F Knight
Launch Lake: Silver Powered Time (sec): ?? 274.7 Chase 2: F-104A Rushworth
Launch Time: 08:46:47.0 Thrust (chambers): 6, 8 6, 8 Chase 3: F-104D McKay
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 08:58:11.6
Purpose: Altitude buildup Notes: First X-15 ﬂight above 100,000 feet
Aborts: None
X-15 EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
Program Flight #: 17 Plan Actual NASA 1: Harvey
Max Mach: 2.30 2.20 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bock / Allavie Moise
Flight ID: 2-9-18 Max Altitude: 78,000 51,282 Take-Off Time: 08:13
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (9) Speed (mph): –– 1,452 Landing Time: 09:30
Flight Date: 26 May 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:14.4 B-52 Flight Time: 01:17
Pilot (ﬂight #): Crossﬁeld (11)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100F 56-3963 Al White / DeLong
Launch Lake: Rosamond Powered Time (sec): 255 243.4 Chase 2: F-104 White
Launch Time: 09:08:36.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104D Petersen
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:17:50.4
Purpose:  High-g maneuvers; Notes: Good ﬂight
 SAS gains checkout; Last XLR11 ﬂight of X-15-2
 High alpha stability and control; 
 BCS checkout
Aborts: 2-A-17 05 May 60 #1 APU failure Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Crossﬁeld was the X-15 pilot on the abort
Program Flight #: 18 Plan Actual NASA 1: Butchart
Max Mach: 3.30 3.31 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Allavie Russell
Flight ID: 1-9-17 Max Altitude: 75,000 78,112 Take-Off Time: 08:15
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (9) Speed (mph): –– 2,196 Landing Time: 09:40
Flight Date: 04 Aug 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:22.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:25
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (4)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100F White
Launch Lake: Silver Powered Time (sec): 260 264.2 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104A Rushworth
Launch Time: 08:59:13.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104A Petersen
Chase 4: F-104D Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:09:35.6
Purpose:  Maximum speed with XLR11; Notes: Good ﬂight
 Stability and control data; 
Aerodynamic heating data
Aborts: 1-A-14 27 May 60 Loss of telemetry
1-A-15 03 Jun 60 #2 APU failure; Hydraulic pressure 1-A-14 and 1-A-16 used NB-52A 52-003; 1-A-15 used NB-52B 52-008
1-A-16 08 Jun 60 Source pressure Walker was the X-15 pilot for all the aborts
Program Flight #: 19 Plan Actual NASA 1:
Max Mach: 2.50 2.52 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Andoian Russell
Flight ID: 1-10-19 Max Altitude: 133,000 136,500 Take-Off Time: 08:06
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (10) Speed (mph): –– 1,772 Landing Time: 09:15
Flight Date: 12 Aug 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:11:39.1 B-52 Flight Time: 01:09
Pilot (ﬂight #): White (4)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100F Rushworth
Launch Lake: Silver Powered Time (sec): ?? 256.2 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104A Petersen
Launch Time: 08:48:43.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104D Looney
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:00:22.1
Purpose:  Maximum altitude with XLR11; Notes: Good ﬂight;
 Stability and control data Record altitude ﬂight;
Highest ﬂight with XLR11 engines
Aborts: 1-A-18 11 Aug 60 Loss of nitrogen source pressure Abort used NB-52A 52-003; White was the X-15 pilot on the abort
Program Flight #: 20 Plan Actual NASA 1:
Max Mach: 3.00 3.13 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Cole Butchart
Flight ID: 1-11-21 Max Altitude: 70,000 75,982 Take-Off Time: 07:51
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (11) Speed (mph): –– 1,986 Landing Time: 09:20
Flight Date: 19 Aug 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:42.4 B-52 Flight Time: 01:29
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (5)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100 White
Launch Lake: Silver Powered Time (sec): ?? 251.6 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 Rushworth
Launch Time: 08:34:22.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0764 Petersen
Chase 4: F-104 Looney
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 08:44:04.4
Purpose: Aerodynamic heating data; Notes: Alpha cross-pointer hooked up backwards
 Stability and control data;
 Performance data
Aborts: 1-A-20 18 Aug 60 APU #1 Failure Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Walker was the X-15 pilot on the abort
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Program Flight #: 21 Plan Actual NASA 1: Walker
Max Mach: 3.20 3.23 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Allavie / Kuyk Butchart
Flight ID: 1-12-23 Max Altitude: 80,000 79,864 Take-Off Time: 11:01
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (12) Speed (mph): –– 2,182 Landing Time: 12:25
Flight Date: 10 Sep 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:00.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:24
Pilot (ﬂight #): White (5)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100F Looney
Launch Lake: Silver Powered Time (sec): ?? 264.3 Chase 2: F-104A 56-0760 Armstrong
Launch Time: 11:45:10.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104A Rushworth
Chase 4: F-104D Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 11:55:10.0
Purpose:  Stability and control data; Notes: APU problem
 Performance data
Aborts: –– 01 Sep 60 Did not take off due to cloud cover Taxi used NB-52B 52-008; White was the X-15 pilot 
1-A-22 02 Sep 60 Telemetry failure Abort used NB-52B 52-008; White was the X-15 pilot on the abort
Program Flight #: 22 Plan Actual NASA 1: Thompson
Max Mach: 2.00 1.68 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Allavie / Fulton Russell
Flight ID: 1-13-25 Max Altitude: 50,000 53,043 Take-Off Time: 09:11
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (13) Speed (mph): –– 1,108 Landing Time: 10:20
Flight Date: 23 Sep 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:09.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:09
Pilot (ﬂight #): Petersen (1)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100F Looney
Launch Lake: Palmdale VOR Powered Time (sec): ?? 146.6 Chase 2: F-104A Walker
Launch Time: 09:52:06.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8, 4, 0 Chase 3: F-104D Rushworth
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:59:15.6
Purpose:  Pilot familiarization – Petersen's ﬁrst X-15 ﬂight Notes: First launch from Palmdale;
Engines shut down early;
Two unsuccessful restarts  on upper engine
Aborts: 1-A-24 20 Sep 60 #2 APU would not stay on Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Petersen was the X-15 pilot on the abort
Program Flight #: 23 Plan Actual NASA 1: Thompson
Max Mach: 2.00 1.94 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Kuyk Russell
Flight ID: 1-14-27 Max Altitude: 50,000 53,800 Take-Off Time: 08:59
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (14) Speed (mph): –– 1,280 Landing Time: 09:47
Flight Date: 20 Oct 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:26.1 B-52 Flight Time: 00:48
Pilot (ﬂight #): Petersen (2)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100F White
Launch Lake: Palmdale VOR Powered Time (sec): ?? 285.4 Chase 2: F-104A Rushworth
Launch Time: 09:30:27.0 Thrust (chambers): 8, 5 8, 5 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1314 Armstrong
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:39:53.1
Purpose:  Stability and control data; Notes: Good ﬂight
 Performance data; 
Alternate airspeed calibration;
Additional pilot familiarization
Aborts: –– 05 Oct 60 X-15 failed preﬂight checks
1-A-26 11 Oct 60 Failed engine H2O2 tank regulator Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Petersen was the X-15 pilot on the abort
Program Flight #: 24 Plan Actual NASA 1: Thompson
Max Mach: 2.00 2.02 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Cole Butchart
Flight ID: 1-15-28 Max Altitude: 50,000 50,700 Take-Off Time: 09:12
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (15) Speed (mph): –– 1,333 Landing Time: 10:06
Flight Date: 28 Oct 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:05.3 B-52 Flight Time: 00:54
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (1)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100 Looney
Launch Lake: Palmdale VOR Powered Time (sec): ?? 267.5 Chase 2: F-104 White
Launch Time: 09:43:56.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104 Petersen
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:53:01.3
Purpose:  Pilot familiarization – McKay's ﬁrst X-15 ﬂight Notes: Ventral chute did not open
 Stability and control data;
 Performance data;
Alternate airspeed calibration
Aborts: None
X-15 EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
Program Flight #: 25 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 2.00 1.95 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Cole Butchart
Flight ID: 1-16-29 Max Altitude: 50,000 48,900 Take-Off Time: 12:10
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (16) Speed (mph): –– 1,287 Landing Time: 13:15
Flight Date: 04 Nov 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:46.3 B-52 Flight Time: 01:05
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (1)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100 Looney
Launch Lake: Palmdale VOR Powered Time (sec): ?? 271.0 Chase 2: F-104 White
Launch Time: 12:43:33.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104 57-1316 Armstrong
Chase 4: F-100F 56-3963 Al White / DeLong
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 12:52:19.3
Purpose:  Pilot familiarization – Rushworth's ﬁrst X-15 ﬂight Notes: Good ﬂight
 Stability and control data;
 Performance data;
Alternate airspeed calibration
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 26 Plan Actual NASA 1: Harvey
Max Mach: 2.70 2.97 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Kuyk Moise
Flight ID: 2-10-21 Max Altitude: 60,000 81,200 Take-Off Time: 08:59
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (10) Speed (mph): –– 1,960 Landing Time: 10:16
Flight Date: 15 Nov 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:28.4 B-52 Flight Time: 01:17
Pilot (ﬂight #): Crossﬁeld (12)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: F-100F 56-3963 Al White / DeLong
Launch Lake: Rosamond Powered Time (sec): 155 137.3 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 Walker
Launch Time: 09:59:00.0 Thrust (pct): 50 50 Chase 3: F-104 White
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:07:28.4
Purpose:  XLR99 checkout; Notes: First XLR99 ﬂight
 Stability and control evaluation
Aborts: 2-A-19 13 Oct 60 H2O2 leak in #2 APU
2-A-20 04 Nov 60 Failed #2 APU shutoff valve All aborts used NB-52A 52-003; Crossﬁeld was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 27 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 2.20 1.90 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Allavie Russell
Flight ID: 1-17-30 Max Altitude: 55,000 54,750 Take-Off Time: 12:10
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (17) Speed (mph): –– 1,254 Landing Time: 13:00
Flight Date: 17 Nov 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:58.2 B-52 Flight Time: 00:50
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (2)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100 Looney
Launch Lake: Palmdale VOR Powered Time (sec): ?? 261.9 Chase 2: F-104 Walker
Launch Time: 12:43:07.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104 Knight
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 12:52:05.2
Purpose: Aerodynamic data Notes: Lower XLR11 engine shutdown and restarted;
Upper XLR11 removed on 24 November 1960
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 28 Plan Actual NASA 1: Harvey
Max Mach: 2.30 2.51 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Fulton Moise
Flight ID: 2-11-22 Max Altitude: 54,000 61,900 Take-Off Time: 12:46
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (11) Speed (mph): –– 1,656 Landing Time: 13:40
Flight Date: 22 Nov 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:31.7 B-52 Flight Time: 00:54
Pilot (ﬂight #): Crossﬁeld (13)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: F-100F 56-3963 Al White / DeLong
Launch Lake: Rosamond Powered Time (sec): 134 125.1 (**) Chase 2: F-104 Walker
Launch Time: 13:25:55.0 Thrust (pct): 50, 75, 100 50, 75, 100 Chase 3: F-104 White
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 13:33:26.7
Purpose:  XLR99 checkout - restart and throttle; Notes: First demonstration of XLR99 throttle capabilities;
 BCS evaluation First XLR99 inﬂight restart
** First engine run was shutdown (S.D.); 
Aborts: None Second was a burnout (B.O.)
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Program Flight #: 29 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 2.00 1.75 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Cole Butchart
Flight ID: 1-18-31 Max Altitude: 50,000 48,840 Take-Off Time: 10:10
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (18) Speed (mph): –– 1,155 Landing Time: 11:04
Flight Date: 30 Nov 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:53.8 B-52 Flight Time: 00:54
Pilot (ﬂight #): Armstrong (1)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100F Looney
Launch Lake: Palmdale VOR Powered Time (sec): ?? 309.1 Chase 2: F-104D (USAF) Petersen
Launch Time: 10:42:42.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 7 Chase 3: F-104A (USAF) Walker
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:52:35.8
Purpose:  Pilot familiarization – Armstrong's ﬁrst X-15 ﬂight Notes: Upper #3 chamber did not start;
Inertial attitudes incorrect
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 30 Plan Actual NASA 1: Harvey
Max Mach: 2.30 2.85 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Cole Moise
Flight ID: 2-12-23 Max Altitude: 54,000 53,374 Take-Off Time: 14:50
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (12) Speed (mph): –– 1,881 Landing Time: 16:00
Flight Date: 06 Dec 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:07.2 B-52 Flight Time: 01:10
Pilot (ﬂight #): Crossﬁeld (14)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: F-100F 56-3963 Al White / DeLong
Launch Lake: Lancaster (west of) Powered Time (sec): 121 128.9 Chase 2: F-104 Petersen
Launch Time: 15:29:30.0 Thrust (pct): 50, 70 50, 70 (**) Chase 3: F-104 White
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Nose boom Chase 5:
Landing Time: 15:37:37.2
Purpose:   XLR99 restart demonstration; BCS checks; Notes: Last North American Aviation ﬂight of X-15
  High-g maneuvers Two engine inﬂight restarts;
Last nose-boom ﬂight;
Only Lancaster launch
** First engine run was shutdown (S.D.); 
Aborts: None Second was shutdown (S.D.); Third was a burn-out (B.O.)
Program Flight #: 31 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 1.90 1.80 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Allavie / Cole Russell
Flight ID: 1-19-32 Max Altitude: 50,000 50,095 Take-Off Time: 11:21
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (19) Speed (mph): –– 1,188 Landing Time: 12:17
Flight Date: 09 Dec 60 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:49.0 B-52 Flight Time: 00:56
Pilot (ﬂight #): Armstrong (2)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100F Daniel
Launch Lake: Palmdale VOR Powered Time (sec): ?? 270.1 Chase 2: F-104D Petersen
Launch Time: 11:52:40.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104A White
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 12:03:29.0
Purpose:  Ball nose evaluation; Notes: First ball-nose ﬂight
 Stability and control data;
Alternate airspeed sources evaluation
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 32 Plan Actual NASA 1: Thompson
Max Mach: 2.00 1.88 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Lewis Russell
Flight ID: 1-20-35 Max Altitude: 50,000 49,780 Take-Off Time: 10:13
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (20) Speed (mph): –– 1,211 Landing Time: 11:08
Flight Date: 01 Feb 61 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:47.7 B-52 Flight Time: 00:55
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (2)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100 White
Launch Lake: Palmdale VOR Powered Time (sec): ?? 263.7 Chase 2: F-104 Petersen
Launch Time: 10:47:32.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104 Wood
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:57:19.7
Purpose:  Ball nose evaluation; Notes: Good ﬂight
 Side-stick controller evaluation;
 Inertial velocity indicator checkout
Alternate airspeed sources evaluation
Aborts: 1-A-33 15 Dec 60 #2 hydraulic system failure 1-A-33 used NB-52A 52-003; White was the X-15 pilot
1-A-34 11 Jan 61 #2 hydraulic system failure 1-A-34 used NB-52A 52-003; McKay was the X-15 pilot
X-15 EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
Program Flight #: 33 Plan Actual NASA 1: Armstrong
Max Mach: 3.10 3.50 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Mosely Butchart
Flight ID: 1-21-36 Max Altitude: 75,000 78,150 Take-Off Time: 12:17
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (21) Speed (mph): –– 2,275 Landing Time: 13:21
Flight Date: 07 Feb 61 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:27.8 B-52 Flight Time: 01:04
Pilot (ﬂight #): White (6)
XLR11 (s/n): –– ?? Chase 1: F-100 Daniel
Launch Lake: Silver Powered Time (sec): ?? 276.1 Chase 2: F-104 Knight
Launch Time: 12:56:10.0 Thrust (chambers): 8 8 Chase 3: F-104 Petersen
Chase 4: F-104 Rushworth
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 13:06:37.8
Purpose:  Stability and control data; Notes: Last X-15 XLR11 ﬂight;
 Performance data; Fastest ﬂight with XLR11 engines
 Flight systems evaluation
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 34 Plan Actual NASA 1: Butchart
Max Mach: 4.00 4.43 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Cole / Kuyk Russell
Flight ID: 2-13-26 Max Altitude: 84,000 77,450 Take-Off Time: 09:53
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (13) Speed (mph): –– 2,905 Landing Time: 10:50
Flight Date: 07 Mar 61 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:34.1 B-52 Flight Time: 00:57
Pilot (ﬂight #): White (7)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: F-100 Rushworth
Launch Lake: Silver Powered Time (sec): 116 127.0 (S.D.) Chase 2: F5D-1 212 (139208) Walker
Launch Time: 10:28:33.0 Thrust (pct): 50 50 Chase 3: F4H-1 145313 Petersen
Chase 4: F-104 Looney
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:37:07.1
Purpose:  Envelope expansion; Notes: First X-15-2 ball-nose ﬂight;
 Stability and control data; First Mach 4 ﬂight (for any aircraft);
Temperature data; First government XLR99 ﬂight
 B-70 IR emission coating test
Aborts: 2-A-24 21 Feb 61 Inertial platform failure
2-A-25 24 Feb 61 Attitude gyro failure All aborts used NB-52B 52-008; White was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 35 Plan Actual NASA 1:
Max Mach: 3.70 3.95 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Kuyk Russell
Flight ID: 2-14-28 Max Altitude: 150,000 169,600 Take-Off Time: 09:20
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (14) Speed (mph): –– 2,760 Landing Time: 10:35
Flight Date: 30 Mar 61 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:16.5 B-52 Flight Time: 01:15
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (6)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: F-100 White
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 79 81.9 (S.D.) Chase 2: T-38A Knight
Launch Time: 10:05:00.0 Thrust (pct): 75 75 Chase 3: F-104 (USAF) Petersen
Chase 4: F-104 Rushworth
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:15:16.5
Purpose: Altitude buildup; Notes: XLR99 lost ﬁre signal, Restart required; 
 Ballistic control system evaluation; SAS cycle limit;
Thermostructures data; First use of new A/P22S-2 full-pressure suit;
Aerodynamic data First Hidden Hills launch
Aborts: 2-A-27 21 Mar 61 Telemetry failure; NB-52 brake chute failed on landing Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Walker was the X-15 pilot for the abort in an A/P-22S
Program Flight #: 36 Plan Actual NASA 1: Armstrong
Max Mach: 4.60 4.62 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Mosley Russell
Flight ID: 2-15-29 Max Altitude: 105,000 105,000 Take-Off Time: 09:19
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (15) Speed (mph): –– 3,074 Landing Time: 10:32
Flight Date: 21 Apr 61 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:03.4 B-52 Flight Time: 01:13
Pilot (ﬂight #): White (8)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: F-100F Looney
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 67 71.6 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104A Walker
Launch Time: 10:05:17.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104A Rogers
Chase 4: F-104D Wood
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:15:20.4
Purpose:  Velocity buildup; Notes: Restart required; 
Aerodynamic heating data; Pitch damper dropout;
 Stability and control data; Cabin pressure rose to 46,000 feet
 Performance data
Aborts: None
 Appendix B: X-15 Flight Log
Program Flight #: 37 Plan Actual NASA 1:
Max Mach: 5.00 4.95 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Fulton Butchart
Flight ID: 2-16-31 Max Altitude: 117,000 107,500 Take-Off Time: 11:30
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (16) Speed (mph): –– 3,307 Landing Time: 12:52
Flight Date: 25 May 61 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:12:08.1 B-52 Flight Time: 01:22
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (7)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: F-100 Looney
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 73 74.3 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 Daniel
Launch Time: 12:16:35.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Petersen
Chase 4: F-104 Rushworth
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 12:28:43.1
Purpose:  Velocity buildup; Notes: First launch from Mud Lake;
 Stability and control data SAS dropped out at launch; 
 Performance data; Cabin altitude went to 50,000 feet
Aerodynamic heating data;
 SAS resildual oscillation evaluation
Aborts: 2-A-30 19 May 61 Lost Beatty radar Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Walker was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 38 Plan Actual NASA 1:
Max Mach: 5.30 5.27 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Fulton Butchart
Flight ID: 2-17-33 Max Altitude: 115,000 107,700 Take-Off Time: 13:08
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (17) Speed (mph): –– 3,603 Landing Time: 14:33
Flight Date: 23 Jun 61 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:05.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:25
Pilot (ﬂight #): White (9)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: F-100 Looney
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 75 78.7 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 Daniel
Launch Time: 14:00:05.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Crews
Chase 4: F-104 Walker
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 14:10:10.7
Purpose:  Velocity buildup; Notes: First Mach 5 ﬂight (for any aircraft);
 Stability and control data Cabin altitude rose to 56K feet; suit inﬂated
 Performance data;
Aerodynamic heating data
Aborts: 2-A-32 20 Jun 61 #1 APU failure Abort used NB-52A 52-003; White was X-15 pilot
Program Flight #: 39 Plan Actual NASA 1: Armstrong
Max Mach: 3.70 4.11 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Archer Russell
Flight ID: 1-22-37 Max Altitude: 75,000 78,200 Take-Off Time: 09:43
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (22) Speed (mph): –– 2,735 Landing Time: 10:44
Flight Date: 10 Aug 61 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:24.4 B-52 Flight Time: 01:01
Pilot (ﬂight #): Petersen (3)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: F-100 White
Launch Lake: Silver Powered Time (sec): 115 117.7 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 Rushworth
Launch Time: 10:27:05.0 Thrust (pct): 50 50 Chase 3: F-104 Walker
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:36:29.4
Purpose:  XLR99 systems checkout; Notes: First XLR99 ﬂight for X-15-1;
 Beta-dot control technique evaluation Delayed release from NB-52 due to drop switch problem
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 40 Plan Actual NASA 1: Butchart
Max Mach: 5.60 5.21 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Archer / Allavie Russell
Flight ID: 2-18-34 Max Altitude: 120,000 114,300 Take-Off Time: 13:44
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (18) Speed (mph): –– 3,618 Landing Time: 15:10
Flight Date: 12 Sep 61 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:43.9 B-52 Flight Time: 01:26
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (8)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 106 Chase 1: F-100 White
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 79 115.0 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 Petersen
Launch Time: 14:40:17.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 50 75 100, 50, 75 Chase 3: F-104 Daniel
Chase 4: F-104 Rushworth
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 14:49:00.9
Purpose:  Velocity buildup; Notes: XLR99 fuel suction pressure switch failure; 
Aerodynamic heating data; Fuel line low light at launch;
 Stability and control data; Airplane very loose approaching 15 degrees angle of attack
 Performance data;
 Base data for sharp-leading edge experiment on X-15-3
Aborts: None
X-15 EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
Program Flight #: 41 Plan Actual NASA 1: Thompson
Max Mach: 5.00 5.30 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Allavie / Archer Russell
Flight ID: 2-19-35 Max Altitude: 80,000 101,800 Take-Off Time: 09:04
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (19) Speed (mph): –– 3,600 Landing Time: 10:15
Flight Date: 28 Sep 61 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:41.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:11
Pilot (ﬂight #): Petersen (4)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 106 Chase 1: F-100 Daniel
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 90 87.1 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 McKay
Launch Time: 09:50:25.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 50 100, 50 Chase 3: F-104 Rogers
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:59:06.6
Purpose:  Heat transfer data; Notes: Good ﬂight
Thermostructural data;
 Stability and control data;
 Controllability at low dynamic pressure;
 Performance and stability data with speed brakes extended
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 42 Plan Actual NASA 1: Knight
Max Mach: 3.70 4.30 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Archer Russell
Flight ID: 1-23-39 Max Altitude: 80,000 78,000 Take-Off Time: 09:59
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (23) Speed (mph): –– 2,830 Landing Time: 11:10
Flight Date: 04 Oct 61 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:31.3 B-52 Flight Time: 01:11
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (3)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: F-100 Daniel
Launch Lake: Silver Powered Time (sec): 120 122.0 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 McKay
Launch Time: 10:40:50.0 Thrust (pct): 75, 50 75, 50 Chase 3: F-104 White
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:49:21.3
Purpose:  Ventral-off handling quality evaluation; Notes: First ventral off ﬂight;
 Ventral-off stability study Leading-edge heating slot shields
Aborts: 1-A-38 29 Sep 61 Stabilizer pulsing / feedback Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Rushworth was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 43 Plan Actual NASA 1: Petersen
Max Mach: 5.00 5.21 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Fulton Russell
Flight ID: 2-20-36 Max Altitude: 200,000 217,000 Take-Off Time: 11:22
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (20) Speed (mph): –– 3,647 Landing Time: 12:52
Flight Date: 11 Oct 61 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:14.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:30
Pilot (ﬂight #): White (10)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 106 Chase 1: F-100 Daniel
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 79 82.5 (S.D.) Chase 2: F5D 142350 / NASA 213 McKay
Launch Time: 12:20:00.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Wood
Chase 4: F-104 Rushworth
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 12:30:14.7
Purpose: Altitude buildup; Notes: First aircraft ﬂight above 200,000 feet;
Aerodynamic heating during reentry data; First X-15 ﬂight that used BCS for attitude control;
 Controllability at low dynamic pressure; Left outer windshield shattered on reentry;
 Performance and stability data with speed brakes extended The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude
Pete Knight was NASA 2
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 44 Plan Actual NASA 1: Petersen
Max Mach: 5.70 5.74 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Archer Butchart
Flight ID: 1-24-40 Max Altitude: 113,000 108,600 Take-Off Time: 10:01
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (24) Speed (mph): –– 3,900 Landing Time: 12:30
Flight Date: 17 Oct 61 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:11.7 B-52 Flight Time: 02:29
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (9)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: F-100F White
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 80 84.6 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D (USAF) McKay
Launch Time: 10:57:33.0 Thrust (pct): 75, 100 75, 100 Chase 3: F-104 Daniel
Chase 4: F-104 Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 11:07:44.7
Purpose:  Velocity buildup; Notes: Laterally out of trim to the right
Aerodynamic heating data;
 Stability and control data;
 Performance data
Aborts: None
0 Appendix B: X-15 Flight Log
Program Flight #: 45 Plan Actual NASA 1:
Max Mach: 6.00 6.04 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Allavie / Archer Russell
Flight ID: 2-21-37 Max Altitude: 110,000 101,600 Take-Off Time: 09:00
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (21) Speed (mph): –– 4,093 Landing Time: 10:26
Flight Date: 09 Nov 61 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:31.2 B-52 Flight Time: 01:26
Pilot (ﬂight #): White (11)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 109 Chase 1: F-100 Rushworth
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 83 86.9 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 Walker
Launch Time: 09:57:17.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Gordon
Chase 4: F-104 Daniel
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:06:48.2
Purpose:  Maximum velocity ﬂight; Notes: First Mach 6 ﬂight (for any aircraft);
Aerodynamic heating data; Right outer window shattered decelerating thru Mach 2.7
 Stability and control data;
 Performance data
Jack McKay was NASA 2
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 46 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 3.50 3.76 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Bement Butchart
Flight ID: 3-1-2 Max Altitude: 75,000 81,000 Take-Off Time: 14:07
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (1) Speed (mph): –– 2,502 Landing Time: 15:06
Flight Date: 20 Dec 61 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:25.4 B-52 Flight Time: 00:59
Pilot (ﬂight #): Armstrong (3)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 106 Chase 1: F-100 Daniel
Launch Lake: Silver Powered Time (sec): 104 106.3 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104A 56-0749 Petersen
Launch Time: 14:45:50.0 Thrust (pct): 75, 50 75, 50 Chase 3: F-104 Rushworth
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 14:56:15.4
Purpose:  MH-96 evaluation; Notes: First  X-15-3 ﬂight;
 Checkout of X-15-3 All three axes disengaged at launch - reset;
Yaw limit cycle cuased downmode to ﬁxed gain
Aborts: 3-A-1 19 Dec 61 XLR99 indication failure Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Armstrong was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 47 Plan Actual NASA 1: Thompson
Max Mach: 5.70 0.97 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Bement Russell
Flight ID: 1-25-44 Max Altitude: 117,000 44,750 Take-Off Time: 11:29
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (25) Speed (mph): –– 645 Landing Time: 13:20
Flight Date: 10 Jan 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:03:45.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:51
Pilot (ﬂight #): Petersen (5)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 111 Chase 1: F-100 Daniel
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 95 3.3 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 Walker
Launch Time: 12:28:16.0 Thrust (pct): 100 ** Chase 3: F-104 McDivitt
Chase 4: F-104 Rushworth
Landing Lake: Mud Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 12:32:01.7
Purpose:  High angle of attack stability and control data; Notes: Two engine malfunction shutdowns;
Aerodynamic heating data Emergency landing at Mud Lake; First uprange landing
Petersen's last ﬂight
Aborts: 1-A-41 27 Oct 61 Weather in launch area ** ≈ 238 psia chamber pressure maximum
1-A-42 02 Nov 61 Cabin pressure
1-A-43 03 Nov 61 XLR99 purge pressure switch failure All aborts used NB-52A 52-003; White was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 48 Plan Actual NASA 1: Thompson
Max Mach: 5.00 5.51 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Bement Butchart
Flight ID: 3-2-3 Max Altitude: 100,000 133,500 Take-Off Time: 11:05
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (2) Speed (mph): –– 3,765 Landing Time: 12:34
Flight Date: 17 Jan 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:27.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:29
Pilot (ﬂight #): Armstrong (4)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: F-100 Gordon
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 100 97.4 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 Petersen
Launch Time: 12:00:34.0 Thrust (pct): 75 75 Chase 3: F-104 McDivitt
Chase 4: F-104 Rushworth
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 12:11:01.7
Purpose:  MH-96 evaluation Notes: Good ﬂight
Aborts: None
X-15 EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
Program Flight #: 49 Plan Actual NASA 1: Walker
Max Mach: 4.00 4.12 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Allavie Butchart
Flight ID: 3-3-7 Max Altitude: 170,000 180,000 Take-Off Time: 09:23
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (3) Speed (mph): –– 2,850 Landing Time: 10:30
Flight Date: 05 Apr 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:11:17.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:07
Pilot (ﬂight #): Armstrong (5)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: F-100 Daniel
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 70 79.2 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 McKay
Launch Time: 10:04:25.0 Thrust (pct): 75, 100 75, 100 Chase 3: F-104 Rushworth
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:15:42.0
Purpose:  MH-96 evaluation at high and low dynamic pressure Notes: Engine failed to light on initial attempt; Restart required
Aborts: 3-A-4 29 Mar 62 Inertial platform failure
3-A-5 30 Mar 62 Igniter idle malfunction
3-A-6 31 Mar 62  analyzer test #24 failed All aborts used NB-52A 52-003; Armstrong was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 50 Plan Actual NASA 1: White
Max Mach: 5.90 5.69 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Archer Russell
Flight ID: 1-26-46 Max Altitude: 153,000 154,000 Take-Off Time: 08:58
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (26) Speed (mph): –– 3,866 Landing Time: 10:37
Flight Date: 19 Apr 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:58.9 B-52 Flight Time: 01:39
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (10)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 109 Chase 1: F-100 McKay (aborted)
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 83 84.3 (B.O.) Chase 2: JF-104A 55-2961 Dana (new Chase 1)
Launch Time: 10:02:20.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Rushworth
Chase 4: F-104 Daniel
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5: F-104 Knight
Landing Time: 10:11:18.9
Purpose: ASAS evaluation; Notes: Beta cross-pointer wired backwards;
 20-degree angle of attack evaluation; First ﬂight with ASAS installed (checkout only)
 (#1) UV stellar photography experiment preliminary data gathering
Aborts: 1-A-45 18 Apr 62 Weather in launch area Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Walker was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 51 Plan Actual NASA 1: Walker
Max Mach: 5.35 5.31 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Allavie / Bement Butchart
Flight ID: 3-4-8 Max Altitude: 205,000 207,500 Take-Off Time: 10:35
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (4) Speed (mph): –– 3,789 Landing Time: 11:57
Flight Date: 20 Apr 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:12:28.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:22
Pilot (ﬂight #): Armstrong (6)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: F-100 White
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 81 82.4 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 (USAF) McKay
Launch Time: 11:26:58.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Gordon
Chase 4: F-104 Rushworth
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 11:39:26.7  Delta-h indicator on I-panel
Purpose:  MH-96 evaluation Notes: Overshot (bounced) during reentry - ended up 45
   miles south of Edwards; Used max L/D glide to
   get back to Edwards
Longest ﬂight in X-15 program
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 52 Plan Actual NASA 1: Butchart
Max Mach: 5.35 4.94 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Allavie / Bement Russell
Flight ID: 1-27-48 Max Altitude: 255,000 246,700 Take-Off Time: 09:34
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (27) Speed (mph): –– 3,489 Landing Time: 10:52
Flight Date: 30 Apr 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:46.2 B-52 Flight Time: 01:18
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (11)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 109 Chase 1: F-100 Daniel
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 81 81.6 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 White
Launch Time: 10:23:20.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104B 57-1303 Dana / Thompson
Chase 4: F-104 Rushworth
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:33:06.2
Purpose: Altitude buildup; Notes: Certiﬁed altitude record;
 Controllability at low dynamic pressure data; First ﬂight of X-15-1 with operational ASAS
Aerodynamic heating during reentry data;
 Performance and stability with speed brakes extended
Aborts: 1-A-47 27 Apr 62 Weather Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Walker was the X-15 pilot for the abort
 Appendix B: X-15 Flight Log
Program Flight #: 53 Plan Actual NASA 1: Armstrong
Max Mach: 5.00 5.34 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Allavie / Bement Russell
Flight ID: 2-22-40 Max Altitude: 73,000 70,400 Take-Off Time: 09:07
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (22) Speed (mph): –– 3,524 Landing Time: 10:26
Flight Date: 08 May 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:50.4 B-52 Flight Time: 01:19
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (4)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 111 Chase 1: F-100 Daniel
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 103 97.9 (B.O) Chase 2: F-104 McKay
Launch Time: 10:01:28.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 30 100, 30 Chase 3: F-104 Rogers
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:10:18.4
Purpose:  Heat transfer investigation; Notes: First XLR99 operation at 30 percent; Vibrations noted;
 Stability at high-alpha with partial speed brakes; First X-15 ﬂight above q=2,000 psf
ASAS checkout Qbar overshoot due to lack of pilot presentation;
First ﬂight of X-15-2 with operational ASAS
Aborts: 2-A-38 25 Apr 62 Weather
2-A-39 26 Apr 62 XLR99 pump idle too high All aborts used NB-52A 52-003; White was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 54 Plan Actual NASA 1: Walker
Max Mach: 5.20 5.03 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Campbell Russell
Flight ID: 1-28-49 Max Altitude: 90,000 100,400 Take-Off Time: 09:24
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (28) Speed (mph): –– 3,450 Landing Time: 10:27
Flight Date: 22 May 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:16.2 B-52 Flight Time: 01:03
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (5)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 109 Chase 1: F-100 Daniel
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 77 75.3 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 (USAF) Dana
Launch Time: 10:04:46.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Rogers
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:14:02.2
Purpose:  Local ﬂow investigation Notes: Premature engine shutdown; Left roll out of trim
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 55 Plan Actual NASA 1: Walker
Max Mach: 5.80 5.42 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Bement Russell
Flight ID: 2-23-43 Max Altitude: 162,000 132,600 Take-Off Time: 10:00
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (23) Speed (mph): –– 3,675 Landing Time: 11:28
Flight Date: 01 Jun 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:01.9 B-52 Flight Time: 01:28
Pilot (ﬂight #): White (12)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 104 Chase 1: F-100 Daniel
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 93 86.0 Chase 2: F-104 Dana
Launch Time: 10:51:15.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 30, 75 100, 30 Chase 3: F-104 Rogers
Chase 4: F-104 Collins
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 11:01:16.9
Purpose: ASAS checkout; Notes: First launch from Delamar; 
 Stability data at 23 degrees angle of attack Vibrations noted at 30% thrust
Aborts: 2-A-41 25 May 62 Inertial platform and telemetry failure
2-A-42 29 May 62 Inertial platform cooling All aborts used NB-52B 52-008; White was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 56 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.60 5.39 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Bement Peterson
Flight ID: 1-29-50 Max Altitude: 100,000 103,600 Take-Off Time: 09:45
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (29) Speed (mph): –– 3,672 Landing Time: 10:53
Flight Date: 07 Jun 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:24.2 B-52 Flight Time: 01:08
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (12)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 109 Chase 1: F-100 Daniel
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 80 81.5 (S.D) Chase 2: F-104 (USAF) McKay
Launch Time: 10:29:20.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 White
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:37:44.2
Purpose:  Local ﬂow at high angles of attack Notes: Ammonia check valve in fuel tank stuck;
Rough engine operation
Aborts: None
X-15 EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
Program Flight #: 57 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.15 5.02 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Allavie Russell
Flight ID: 3-5-9 Max Altitude: 206,000 184,600 Take-Off Time: 10:56
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (5) Speed (mph): –– 3,517 Landing Time: 12:41
Flight Date: 12 Jun 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:33.9 B-52 Flight Time: 01:45
Pilot (ﬂight #): White (13)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 106 Chase 1: F-100 McDivitt
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 77 81.9 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 McKay
Launch Time: 12:04:00.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Collins
Chase 4: F-104 Gordon
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 12:13:33.9
Purpose:  Pilot checkout; Notes: Overshot altitude by 21,400 feet
 Ballistic control system evaluation
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 58 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.40 5.08 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Allavie / Lewis Butchart
Flight ID: 3-6-10 Max Altitude: 250,000 246,700 Take-Off Time: 09:01
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (6) Speed (mph): –– 3,641 Landing Time: 10:23
Flight Date: 21 Jun 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:33.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:22
Pilot (ﬂight #): White (14)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 106 Chase 1: F-100 Daniel
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 80 82.3 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 (USAF) McKay
Launch Time: 09:47:05.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1315 Armstrong
Chase 4: F-104 Collins
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:56:38.6
Purpose:  Contractual demonstration of MH-96 Notes: Good ﬂight
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 59 Plan Actual NASA 1:
Max Mach: 6.00 5.92 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Townsend Russell
Flight ID: 1-30-51 Max Altitude: 107,000 123,700 Take-Off Time: 12:13
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (30) Speed (mph): –– 4,104 Landing Time: 13:38
Flight Date: 27 Jun 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:32.4 B-52 Flight Time: 01:25
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (13)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: F-100 Rushworth
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 84 88.6 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 McKay
Launch Time: 13:08:10.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Knight
Chase 4: F-104 Daniel
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 13:17:42.4 Trim on side-stick
Purpose:  High angle of attack stability Notes: Unofﬁcial world absolute speed record;
Ventral chute lost during ﬂight;
Pitch damper tripped out during pull-up maneuver
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 60 Plan Actual NASA 1: Walker
Max Mach: 4.20 4.95 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Allavie / Archer Peterson
Flight ID: 2-24-44 Max Altitude: 84,000 83,200 Take-Off Time: 09:57
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (24) Speed (mph): –– 3,280 Landing Time: 11:05
Flight Date: 29 Jun 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:53.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:08
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (3)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: F-100 Rushworth
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 122 112.4 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104A 57-1316 Armstrong
Launch Time: 10:41:47.0 Thrust (pct): 85, 80, 50 85, 80, 50 Chase 3: F-104 Daniel
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:50:40.6  Q-meter on I-panel
Purpose:  Heating rates at low angle of attack and Mach; Notes: Speed brake handle seized temporarily;
 Notch ﬁlter evaluation Two SAS tripouts (one pilot induced);
Ballistic control system inoperative due to leaking valve
Aborts: None
 Appendix B: X-15 Flight Log
Program Flight #: 61 Plan Actual NASA 1:
Max Mach: 5.40 5.37 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Allavie / Archer B. Peterson
Flight ID: 1-31-52 Max Altitude: 105,000 107,200 Take-Off Time: 13:23
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (31) Speed (mph): –– 3,674 Landing Time: 14:40
Flight Date: 16 Jul 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:37.8 B-52 Flight Time: 01:17
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (14)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: F-100 Daniel
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 80 83.9 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 Dana
Launch Time: 14:09:25.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Engle
Chase 4: F-104 Rushworth
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 14:19:02.8
Purpose:  Notch ﬁlter evaluation at high dynamic pressure; Notes: Numerous pitch and roll tripouts;
Aerodynamic drag data; Ventral chute malfunctioned; 
ASAS stability investigation #2 generator tripped out during ﬂight (no reset)
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 62 Plan Actual NASA 1: Walker
Max Mach: 5.15 5.45 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Allavie / Archer Butchart
Flight ID: 3-7-14 Max Altitude: 282,000 314,750 Take-Off Time: 08:46
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (7) Speed (mph): –– 3,832 Landing Time: 10:03
Flight Date: 17 Jul 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:20.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:17
Pilot (ﬂight #): White (15)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: F-100 McDivitt
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 80 82.0 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 (USAF) McKay
Launch Time: 09:31:10.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 (USAF) Dana
Chase 4: F-104B 57-1303 Thompson / Petersen
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:41:30.7
Purpose:  Contractual demonstration of MH-96 Notes: Originally scheduled for Smith Ranch launch (rain)
FAI world altitude record for class;
First aircraft ﬂight above 300,000 feet; First ﬂight above 50 miles;
First Astronaut qualiﬁcation ﬂight;
Aborts: 3-A-11 10 Jul 62 B-52 landing gear Overshot altitude by 32,250 feet
3-A-12 11 Jul 62 #1 APU pressure regulator
3-A-13 16 Jul 62 Unplugged NB-52 umbilical All aborts used NB-52A 52-003; White was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 63 Plan Actual NASA 1: Armstrong
Max Mach: 4.60 5.18 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Bement B. Peterson
Flight ID: 2-25-45 Max Altitude: 73,000 85,250 Take-Off Time: 09:11
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (25) Speed (mph): –– 3,474 Landing Time: 10:20
Flight Date: 19 Jul 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:23.8 B-52 Flight Time: 01:09
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (4)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: F-100 Rogers
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 120 106.2 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1315 Dana
Launch Time: 09:53:45.0 Thrust (pct): 80, 40 80, 40 Chase 3: F-104A Rushworth
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:02:08.8
Purpose: Aerodynamic heating rates at low angle of attack and low Mach; Notes: Alpha indicator had oscillations;
Aerodynamic drag data;  Idle stop changed from 45  to 40 percent;
 Handling qualities data;  Ventral chute failed
 Wing pressure distribution investigation
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 64 Plan Actual NASA 1: Walker
Max Mach: 5.70 5.74 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Bement Russell
Flight ID: 1-32-53 Max Altitude: 111,000 98,900 Take-Off Time: 10:34
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (32) Speed (mph): –– 3,989 Landing Time: 11:57
Flight Date: 26 Jul 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:21.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:23
Pilot (ﬂight #): Armstrong (7)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 106 Chase 1: T-38A Rushworth
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 83 82.8 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 Collins
Launch Time: 11:22:30.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Daniel
Chase 4: F-104 White
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 11:32:51.6  Side-stick with beep trim
Purpose: Aerodynamic stability and drag; Notes:  Full back trim only gave 16 degrees of stabilizer;
 Handling qualities  Smoke in cockpit; 
Armstrong's last ﬂight
Aborts: None
X-15 EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
Program Flight #: 65 Plan Actual NASA 1: White
Max Mach: 5.10 5.07 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Bement Russell
Flight ID: 3-8-16 Max Altitude: 160,000 144,500 Take-Off Time: 09:05
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (8) Speed (mph): –– 3,438 Landing Time: 10:31
Flight Date: 02 Aug 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:14.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:26
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (15)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A Daniel
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 78 80.0 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 (USAF) McKay
Launch Time: 09:56:15.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Collins
Chase 4: F-104 Rushworth
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:05:29.0  Q-meter on I-panel
Purpose:  MH-96 ﬁxed gain evaluation Notes: Theta vernier wired backwards
Aborts: 3-A-15 01 Aug 62 NH3 tank pressure unreadable Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Walker was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 66 Plan Actual NASA 1: Walker
Max Mach: 4.00 4.40 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Sturmthal Russell
Flight ID: 2-26-46 Max Altitude: 84,000 90,877 Take-Off Time: 09:15
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (26) Speed (mph): –– 2,943 Landing Time: 10:33
Flight Date: 08 Aug 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:42.8 B-52 Flight Time: 01:18
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (6)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 111 Chase 1: T-38A McDivitt
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 98 95.8 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 McKay
Launch Time: 10:08:35.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 75, 65, 40 See note Chase 3: F-104 Engle
Chase 4: F-104 Collins
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:16:17.8
Purpose: Aerodynamic heating rates at high angle of attack and low Mach Notes: ASAS engaged with pilot induced yaw damper
 RAS checkout;
Aerodynamic drag data Actual engine thrust levels were 100, 75, 65, 52, and 39 percent
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 67 Plan Actual NASA 1: White
Max Mach: 5.80 5.25 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Crews Russell
Flight ID: 3-9-18 Max Altitude: 220,000 193,600 Take-Off Time: 09:46
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (9) Speed (mph): –– 3,747 Landing Time: 11:16
Flight Date: 14 Aug 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:04.9 B-52 Flight Time: 01:30
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (16)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A Rushworth
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 83 84.2 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104D (USAF) Dana
Launch Time: 10:41:35.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Engle
Chase 4: F-104 White
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:50:39.9
Purpose:  Constant theta reentry and stability at minimum yaw gain Notes:  Roll damper dropped off during reentry
 Last ﬂight of X-15-3 with ventral on
Aborts: 3-A-17 10 Aug 62 #1 BCS valve failed to open Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Walker was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 68 Plan Actual NASA 1:
Max Mach: 4.90 5.24 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Andonian Russell
Flight ID: 2-27-47 Max Altitude: 85,000 88,900 Take-Off Time: 09:20
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (27) Speed (mph): –– 3,534 Landing Time: 10:34
Flight Date: 20 Aug 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:38.2 B-52 Flight Time: 01:14
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (7)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 111 Chase 1: T-38A Gordon
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 92 86.5 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 (USAF) McKay
Launch Time: 10:08:40.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 75, 65, 40 100, 75, 60, 40 Chase 3: F-104 Engle
Chase 4: F-104 Daniel
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:17:18.2
Purpose:  Heating rates at moderate angle of attack and high Mach; Notes: Roll SAS failed at launch - would not reengage;
ASAS evaluation XLR99 second stage igniter injector face damage
Aerodynamic drag data;
 Stability and control data
Aborts: –– 17 Aug 62 Weather prior to taxi
 Appendix B: X-15 Flight Log
Program Flight #: 69 Plan Actual NASA 1: Armstrong
Max Mach: 4.80 5.12 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Bement Butchart
Flight ID: 2-28-48 Max Altitude: 87,000 97,200 Take-Off Time: 09:50
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (28) Speed (mph): –– 3,447 Landing Time: 11:00
Flight Date: 29 Aug 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:47.1 B-52 Flight Time: 01:10
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (8)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: T-38A White
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 91 92.0 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 (USAF) Walker
Launch Time: 10:36:03.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 80 100, 80 Chase 3: F-104 McDivitt
Chase 4: F-104 Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:44:50.1  Cut-away windshield retainer
Purpose:  Heating rates at high angle of attack and high Mach Notes: Intermittent roll SAS trip-outs;
Speed brake vibrations
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 70 Plan Actual NASA 1: Armstrong
Max Mach: 4.20 4.22 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Sturmthal Butchart
Flight ID: 2-29-50 Max Altitude: 87,000 68,200 Take-Off Time: 09:17
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (29) Speed (mph): –– 2,765 Landing Time: 10:34
Flight Date: 28 Sep 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:27.5 B-52 Flight Time: 01:17
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (5)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: T-38A White
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 124 128.2 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 (USAF) Walker
Launch Time: 10:04:55.0 Thrust (pct): 87, 44, 35 87, 44, 35 Chase 3: F-104 Engle
Chase 4: F-104 Rushworth
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:14:22.5
Purpose:  Heating rates at low angle of attack and low Mach; Notes: XLR99 igniter malfunction before launch;
 Ventral-off stability data; First  X-15-2 ﬂight without ventral
 Base data for sharp-leading edge experiment on X-15-3;
 (#1) UV stellar photography experiment preliminary data gathering
Aborts: 2-A-49 27 Sep 62 Left-hand ejection lever problems Abort used NB-52B 52-008; McKay was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 71 Plan Actual NASA 1: White
Max Mach: 5.00 5.17 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Lewis Butchart
Flight ID: 3-10-19 Max Altitude: 103,000 112,200 Take-Off Time: 09:26
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (10) Speed (mph): –– 3,493 Landing Time: 10:53
Flight Date: 04 Oct 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:50.5 B-52 Flight Time: 01:27
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (9)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A Rogers / Daniel
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 108 103.2 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 Walker
Launch Time: 10:10:11.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 50 100, 50 Chase 3: F-104 Collins
Chase 4: F-104 Gordon
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:20:01.5
Purpose:  Pilot checkout; Notes: #1 APU failed 5 minutes after launch (ﬁrst in-ﬂight APU failure)
 Ventral-off stability data    (Ball-nose and yaw damper lost as a result)
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 72 Plan Actual NASA 1: Walker
Max Mach: 5.30 5.46 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Lewis Russell
Flight ID: 2-30-51 Max Altitude: 125,000 130,200 Take-Off Time: 10:09
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (30) Speed (mph): –– 3,716 Landing Time: 11:38
Flight Date: 09 Oct 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:40.3 B-52 Flight Time: 01:29
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (6)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: T-38A White
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 81 79.5 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104B 56-3722 Dana
Launch Time: 10:58:32.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Rushworth
Chase 4: F-104 Rogers
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 11:08:12.3  LH & RH windshield retainer
Purpose:  Ventral-off stability data; Notes: Roll failed to ASAS at launch - reengaged;
 (#27) Hycon camera experiment XLR99 second stage igniter injector face damage
Aborts: None
X-15 EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
Program Flight #: 73 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.50 5.47 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Cross Butchart
Flight ID: 3-11-20 Max Altitude: 125,000 134,500 Take-Off Time: 10:31
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (11) Speed (mph): –– 3,716 Landing Time: 12:28
Flight Date: 23 Oct 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:46.5 B-52 Flight Time: 01:57
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (10)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A Rogers
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 79 78.0 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1315 Dana
Launch Time: 11:30:40.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104B 57-1303 Thompson
Chase 4: F-104 Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 11:40:26.5
Purpose:  Ventral-off stability data; Notes: B-52 launched X-15 (popped circuit breaker);
Lateral out-of-trim with damper off throughout ﬂight;
Aft windshield retainers removed
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 74 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.55 1.49 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Lewis Russell
Flight ID: 2-31-52 Max Altitude: 125,000 53,950 Take-Off Time: 09:28
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (31) Speed (mph): –– 1,019 Landing Time: 11:55
Flight Date: 09 Nov 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:06:31.1 B-52 Flight Time: 02:27
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (7)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: F-104 White
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 79 70.5 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 Walker
Launch Time: 10:23:07.0 Thrust (pct): 100 35 Chase 3: F-104 Evenson
Chase 4: F-104 Daniel
Landing Lake: Mud Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:29:38.1
Purpose:  Ventral-off stability data; Notes: Engine stuck at 35% requiring abort;
Aerodynamic boundary layer investigations Flaps did not extend resulting in fast landing;
Left skid failed; aircraft rolled over on ground damaging left wing 
   and horizontal stabilizer
Pilot jettisoned canopy prior to roll-over - sustained crushed 
   vertebrae but later returned to ﬂight status
Aborts: –– 7 Nov 62 Ammonia leak prior to taxi
Program Flight #: 75 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.40 5.65 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Cross Butchart
Flight ID: 3-12-22 Max Altitude: 153,000 141,400 Take-Off Time: 09:47
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (12) Speed (mph): –– 3,742 Landing Time: 11:18
Flight Date: 14 Dec 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:36.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:31
Pilot (ﬂight #): White (16)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 111 Chase 1: T-38A Rogers
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 79 77.7 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 (USAF) Dana
Launch Time: 10:44:07.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Evenson
Chase 4: F-104 Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:53:43.7  Delta-Psi indicator
Purpose:  Ventral-off stability data; Notes: White's last ﬂight
 Heading vernier checkout;
 (#2) UV Earth background experiment
Aborts: 3-A-21 13 Dec 62 Helium leak in cabin source Abort used NB-52B 52-008; White was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 76 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.56 5.73 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Fulton Butchart
Flight ID: 3-13-23 Max Altitude: 173,000 160,400 Take-Off Time: 10:30
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (13) Speed (mph): –– 3,793 Landing Time: 11:55
Flight Date: 20 Dec 62 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:54.4 B-52 Flight Time: 01:25
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (17)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 111 Chase 1: T-38A Rushworth
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 90 81.0 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 White
Launch Time: 11:25:04.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Daniel
Chase 4: F-104 Gordon
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 11:33:58.4
Purpose:  Ventral-off stability data; Notes: Good ﬂight
 MH-96 limit cycle investigation
Aborts: None
 Appendix B: X-15 Flight Log
Program Flight #: 77 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.22 5.47 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Archer Butchart
Flight ID: 3-14-24 Max Altitude: 250,000 271,700 Take-Off Time: 10:07
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (14) Speed (mph): –– 3,677 Landing Time: 12:08
Flight Date: 17 Jan 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:43.9 B-52 Flight Time: 02:01
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (18)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 109 Chase 1: T-38A White
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 77 81.2 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 Dana
Launch Time: 10:59:16.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Gordon
Chase 4: F-104 Daniel
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 11:08:59.9
Purpose:  Ventral-off altitude buildup; Notes: #1 APU failed four minutes after launch;
 (#1) UV stellar photography experiment preliminary data gathering; Ball-nose and rudder servo failed eight minutes after launch
 (#10) IR exhaust signature experiment
Since Walker was a NASA pilot, he did not get astronaut wings for a ﬂight 
   above 50 miles (the NASA standard was 62 miles)
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 78 Plan Actual NASA 1:
Max Mach: 4.00 4.25 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Archer Russell
Flight ID: 1-33-54 Max Altitude: 74,000 74,400 Take-Off Time: 09:21
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (33) Speed (mph): –– 2,864 Landing Time: 10:40
Flight Date: 11 Apr 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:56.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:19
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (11)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A Rogers
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 121 120.2 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 McKay
Launch Time: 10:03:20.0 Thrust (pct): 50 50 Chase 3: F-104 Crews
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:12:16.7  Squat switch (1st ﬂight)
Purpose:  (#5) Optical degradation phase I (KC-1) experiment; Notes: Roll SAS disengaged at launch - reengaged
Auxiliary power unit checkout
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 79 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.05 5.51 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Archer Butchart
Flight ID: 3-15-25 Max Altitude: 75,000 92,500 Take-Off Time: 11:36
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (15) Speed (mph): –– 3,770 Landing Time: 13:38
Flight Date: 18 Apr 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:13.2 B-52 Flight Time: 02:02
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (19)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: T-38A White
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 86 79.0 (B.O) Chase 2: F-104 Dana
Launch Time: 12:16:26.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Sorlie
Chase 4: F-104 Rogers
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 12:23:39.2
Purpose:  Heat transfer at high Mach and low angle of attack; Notes:  Nose gear scoop opened at 55,000 feet and Mach 3.4
 Local ﬂow at high Mach and low angle of attack;
 (#10) IR exhaust signature experiment
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 80 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.05 5.32 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Fulton Russell
Flight ID: 1-34-55 Max Altitude: 98,000 105,500 Take-Off Time: 13:14
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (34) Speed (mph): –– 3,654 Landing Time: 14:45
Flight Date: 25 Apr 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:32.3 B-52 Flight Time: 01:31
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (8)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A White
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 80 86.1 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 Thompson
Launch Time: 14:04:19.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Wood
Chase 4: F-104 Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 14:14:51.3
Purpose:  (#5) Optical degradation phase I (KC-1) experiment Notes: Roll SAS trip-out at launch - reset
Aborts: None
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Program Flight #: 81 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 4.97 4.73 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Archer Russell
Flight ID: 3-16-26 Max Altitude: 206,000 209,400 Take-Off Time: 09:08
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (16) Speed (mph): –– 3,488 Landing Time: 10:40
Flight Date: 02 May 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:17.2 B-52 Flight Time: 01:32
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (20)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: T-38A White
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 78 79.2 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 Dana
Launch Time: 09:59:12.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Rogers
Chase 4: F-104 Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:08:29.2
Purpose: APU altitude checkout; Notes: Good ﬂight
 High angle of attack aerodynamic ﬂow data;
 (#2) UV Earth background experiment;
 (#10) IR exhaust signature experiment
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 82 Plan Actual NASA 1: Walker
Max Mach: 4.80 5.20 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Archer Russell
Flight ID: 3-17-28 Max Altitude: 90,000 95,600 Take-Off Time: 11:30
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (17) Speed (mph): –– 3,600 Landing Time: 12:39
Flight Date: 14 May 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:33.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:09
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (12)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 84 86.9 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 Dana
Launch Time: 12:11:56.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 80 100, 80 Chase 3: F-104 Daniel
Chase 4: F-104B 57-1303 McKay
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 12:19:29.0
Purpose: Aerodynamic  heating rates at high Mach and high angle of attack; Notes: Engine restart required due to vibration shutdown
 (#2) UV Earth background experiment;
 (#10) IR exhaust signature experiment
Aborts: 3-A-27 10 May 63 Ruptured hydrualic line Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Rushworth was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 83 Plan Actual NASA 1: Walker
Max Mach: 5.53 5.57 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bement / Archer Butchart
Flight ID: 1-35-56 Max Altitude: 98,000 124,200 Take-Off Time: 09:57
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (35) Speed (mph): –– 3,856 Landing Time: 11:28
Flight Date: 15 May 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:20.5 B-52 Flight Time: 01:31
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (9)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A Rushworth
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 81 84.1 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 Dana
Launch Time: 10:50:46.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Evenson
Chase 4: F-104 Daniel
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 11:01:06.5
Purpose:  (#5) Optical degradation phase I (KC-1) experiment; Notes: Nose gear scoop opened at Mach ≈5.2;
Traversing probe development Nose tires blew at touchdown
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 84 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.60 5.52 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Fulton Butchart
Flight ID: 3-18-29 Max Altitude: 90,000 92,000 Take-Off Time: 09:53
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (18) Speed (mph): –– 3,858 Landing Time: 11:22
Flight Date: 29 May 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:11:48.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:29
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (21)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: T-38A White
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 86 84.3 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104D (USAF) Dana
Launch Time: 10:43:07.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 40 100, 41 Chase 3: F-104 Knight
Chase 4: F-104 Rogers
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:54:55.0
Purpose:  Ventral-off stability data; Notes: Left inner window cracked
Aerodynamic  heating rates at high Mach and low angle of attack
Aborts: –– 28 May 63 Weather prior to taxi
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Program Flight #: 85 Plan Actual NASA 1: Walker
Max Mach: 5.20 4.97 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Archer / Bement Russell
Flight ID: 3-19-30 Max Altitude: 220,000 223,700 Take-Off Time: 09:43
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (19) Speed (mph): –– 3,539 Landing Time: 11:40
Flight Date: 18 Jun 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:49.8 B-52 Flight Time: 01:57
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (13)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: T-38A Gordon
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 78 79.3 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 (USAF) Dana
Launch Time: 10:34:21.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Ward
Chase 4: F-104 Rogers
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:44:10.8
Purpose: Altitude buildup; Notes: Inertial altitude and altitude rate failed
 Vertical stabilizer pressure distribution investigation;
 (#2) UV Earth background experiment
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 86 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.50 5.51 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bement / Archer B. Peterson
Flight ID: 1-36-57 Max Altitude: 102,000 111,800 Take-Off Time: 09:03
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (36) Speed (mph): –– 3,911 Landing Time: 10:30
Flight Date: 25 Jun 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:59.3 B-52 Flight Time: 01:27
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (22)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1601 Daniel
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 83 92.8 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1314 McKay
Launch Time: 09:53:50.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 55 100, 55 Chase 3: F-104 Wood
Chase 4: F-104 Rogers
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:03:49.3
Purpose:  (#5) Optical degradation phase I (KC-1) experiment; Notes: Good ﬂight
Traversing probe development
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 87 Plan Actual NASA 1: Walker
Max Mach: 5.10 4.89 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Archer B. Peterson
Flight ID: 3-20-31 Max Altitude: 278,000 285,000 Take-Off Time: 09:07
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (20) Speed (mph): –– 3,425 Landing Time: 10:33
Flight Date: 27 Jun 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:28.1 B-52 Flight Time: 01:26
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (14)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: T-38A Daniel
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 79 80.1 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 McKay
Launch Time: 09:56:03.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Wood
Chase 4: F-104 R. Rogers
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:06:31.1
Purpose:  Ventral-off stability data; Notes: Rushworth's Astronaut qualiﬁcation
Altitude buildup; The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude
 (#2) UV Earth background experiment;
 (#10) IR exhaust signature experiment
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 88 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.20 5.07 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Archer / Lewis Russell
Flight ID: 1-37-59 Max Altitude: 220,000 226,400 Take-Off Time: 11:17
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (37) Speed (mph): –– 3,631 Landing Time: 12:49
Flight Date: 09 Jul 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:58.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:32
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (23)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: YT-38A 58-1197 Daniel
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 81 83.6 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1316 McKay
Launch Time: 12:12:12.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1314 Rogers
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0817 Wood
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 12:21:10.0
Purpose:  (#5) Optical degradation phase I (KC-1) experiment; Notes: Good ﬂight
Traversing probe development;
 RAS checkout;
 Cork ablative evaluation on lower right speed brake
Aborts: 1-A-58 03 Jul 63 X-15 radio problem Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Walker was the X-15 pilot for the abort
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Program Flight #: 89 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.60 5.63 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Bock B. Peterson
Flight ID: 1-38-61 Max Altitude: 112,000 104,800 Take-Off Time: 09:17
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (38) Speed (mph): –– 3,925 Landing Time: 10:42
Flight Date: 18 Jul 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:24.1 B-52 Flight Time: 01:25
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (15)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A Rogers
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 84 84.1 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D Dana
Launch Time: 10:07:20.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D Evenson
Chase 4: F-104D Gordon / Wood
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:16:44.1
Purpose:  Ventral-off stability data; Notes: Good ﬂight
 (#5) Optical degradation phase I (KC-1) experiment;
Ablator evaluation on upper left speed brake;
Ablator evaluation on ﬁxed ventral leading edge
Aborts: 1-A-60 17 Jul 63 Pilot O2 from B-52 disconnected Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Rushworth was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 90 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.40 5.50 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Bement Butchart
Flight ID: 3-21-32 Max Altitude: 315,000 347,800 Take-Off Time: 09:20
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (21) Speed (mph): –– 3,710 Landing Time: 11:04
Flight Date: 19 Jul 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:11:24.9 B-52 Flight Time: 01:44
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (24)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 111 Chase 1: T-38A Crews
Launch Lake: Smith Ranch Powered Time (sec): 83 84.6 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104A 56-0817 Rogers
Launch Time: 10:19:53.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Daniel
Chase 4: F-104D 57-1316 Wood / Gordon
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5: F-104 (USAF) Dana
Landing Time: 10:31:17.9
Purpose:  Expansion of ventral-off reentry; Notes: Instrumentation on balloon experiment failed;
 (#2) UV Earth background experiment; First Smith Ranch launch;
 (#10) IR exhaust signature experiment; Used left-hand side-stick (BCS) part of the ﬂight;
 (#16) Rareﬁed gas experiment (balloon) Overshot altitude by 31,200 feet;
Technically, Walker qualiﬁed as an Astronaut under NASA's 62-mile rule
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 91 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.38 5.58 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bement / Lewis Russell
Flight ID: 3-22-36 Max Altitude: 360,000 354,200 Take-Off Time: 09:09
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (22) Speed (mph): –– 3,794 Landing Time: 10:53
Flight Date: 22 Aug 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:11:08.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:44
Pilot (ﬂight #): Walker (25)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 111 Chase 1: YT-38A 58-1197 Wood
Launch Lake: Smith Ranch Powered Time (sec): 84.5 85.8 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1316 Dana
Launch Time: 10:05:42.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Gordon
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0817 Rogers
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:16:50.6 Altitude predictor
Purpose:  Expansion of vertical-off reentry; Notes: #1 left roll RCS thruster froze; 
Altitude predictor checkout; Unofﬁcial world altitude record; Highest X-15 ﬂight;
 (#3) UV exhaust plume experiment Little Joe II nose art;
Walker's last ﬂight;
Aborts: 3-A-33 06 Aug 63 Weather during climbout Technically, Walker qualiﬁed as an Astronaut under NASA's 62-mile rule
3-A-34 13 Aug 63 #1 APU would not keep running
3-A-35 15 Aug 63 Weather, #1 APU, Radio All aborts used NB-52B 52-008; Walker was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 92 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 4.00 4.21 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Jones Russell
Flight ID: 1-39-63 Max Altitude: 74,000 77,800 Take-Off Time: 11:22
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (39) Speed (mph): –– 2,834 Landing Time: 13:00
Flight Date: 07 Oct 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:37.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:38
Pilot (ﬂight #): Engle (1)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 122 118.6 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D Thompson
Launch Time: 12:22:56.0 Thrust (pct): 50 50 Chase 3: F-104 Rogers
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 12:30:33.0  Delta track indicator
Purpose:  Pilot familiarization – Engle's ﬁrst X-15 ﬂight; Notes: Unauthorized 360-degree roll performed by pilot;
 (#5) Optical degradation phase II (KS-25) experiment checkout; Abort called for alpha indicator failure – launched
 Delta cross-range indicator checkout;     anyway after it began working again.
 Emersom T-500 ablator on ﬁxed ventral and lower speed brakes Angle of attack indicator failed again at launch
Aborts: 1-A-62 04 Oct 63 Communications failure Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Engle was the X-15 pilot for the abort
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Program Flight #: 93 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 4.00 4.10 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Jones Butchart
Flight ID: 1-40-64 Max Altitude: 74,000 74,400 Take-Off Time: 11:59
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (40) Speed (mph): –– 2,712 Landing Time: 13:09
Flight Date: 29 Oct 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:43.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:10
Pilot (ﬂight #): Thompson (1)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 122 126.1 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 Walker
Launch Time: 12:42:34.0 Thrust (pct): 50 50 Chase 3: F-104 Rushworth
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 12:51:17.0
Purpose:  Pilot familiarization – Thompson's ﬁrst X-15 ﬂight; Notes: Thompson's ﬁrst ﬂight
 (#5) Optical degradation phase II (KS-25) experiment;
 Delta cross-range indicator checkout;
 Emersom T-500 ablator on ﬁxed ventral and lower speed brakes
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 94 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 4.05 4.40 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Jones Butchart
Flight ID: 3-23-39 Max Altitude: 79,000 82,300 Take-Off Time: 09:27
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (23) Speed (mph): –– 2,925 Landing Time: 10:41
Flight Date: 07 Nov 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:51.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:14
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (16)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: T-38A Gordon
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 115 108.2 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104A Thompson
Launch Time: 10:11:45.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 48 100, 48 Chase 3: F-104 Sorlie
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:20:36.7  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Heat transfer with sharp upper rudder; Notes: First ﬂight with sharp leading edge on upper rudder
 Damper off controllability;
 Sharp leading edge data
Aborts: –– 29 Aug 63 Damaged ﬂap during preﬂight
3-A-37 14 Oct 63 Stable platform
3-A-38 25 Oct 63 Stable platform All aborts used NB-52B 52-008; Rushworth was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 95 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 4.50 4.75 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Jones Russell
Flight ID: 1-41-65 Max Altitude: 92,000 90,800 Take-Off Time: 10:36
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (41) Speed (mph): –– 3,286 Landing Time: 11:55
Flight Date: 14 Nov 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:46.8 B-52 Flight Time: 01:19
Pilot (ﬂight #): Engle (2)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 104 Chase 1: T-38A Rushworth
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 82 83.1 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 Dana
Launch Time: 11:19:21.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 79 100, 79 Chase 3: F-104 Rogers
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 11:27:07.8
Purpose:  (#5) Optical degradation phase II (KS-25) experiment; Notes: Good ﬂight
 Delta cross-range indicator checkout
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 96 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 4.50 4.94 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Lewis Butchart
Flight ID: 3-24-41 Max Altitude: 92,000 89,800 Take-Off Time: 11:35
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (24) Speed (mph): –– 3,310 Landing Time: 12:59
Flight Date: 27 Nov 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:04.3 B-52 Flight Time: 01:24
Pilot (ﬂight #): Thompson (2)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: T-38A Rushworth
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 86 87.5 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1314 Dana
Launch Time: 12:18:22.0 Thrust (pct): 94, 78 94, 78 Chase 3: F-104A Sorlie
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 12:25:26.3  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Pilot checkout Notes: Inertials failed at launch;
Aircraft rolled left at launch (pilot induced)
Aborts: 3-A-40 19 Nov 63 Weather Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Thompson was the X-15 pilot for the abort
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Program Flight #: 97 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.70 6.06 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Jones Russell
Flight ID: 1-42-67 Max Altitude: 104,000 101,000 Take-Off Time: 10:11
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (42) Speed (mph): –– 4,018 Landing Time: 11:39
Flight Date: 05 Dec 63 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:34.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:28
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (17)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 104 Chase 1: T-38A Wood
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 78 81.2 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104D Sorlie
Launch Time: 11:04:36.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104N NASA 012 Dana
Chase 4: F-104 Engle
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Rover: F-104N NASA 011 Petersen
Landing Time: 11:14:10.0
Purpose:  (#5) Optical degradation phase II (KS-25) experiment; Notes: Highest Mach number for unmodiﬁed X-15;
 Delta cross-range indicator checkout Right inner windshield cracked in the pattern
 Emersom T-500 ablator on LN2 and LO2 tanks and side fairing
Aborts: –– 4 Dec 63 X-15 radio failure
1-A-66 3 Dec 63 X-15 radio failure Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Rushworth was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 98 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.20 5.32 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Lewis Russell
Flight ID: 1-43-69 Max Altitude: 130,000 139,900 Take-Off Time: 11:15
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (43) Speed (mph): –– 3,616 Landing Time: 12:44
Flight Date: 08 Jan 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:50.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:29
Pilot (ﬂight #): Engle (3)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 104 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1599 Rushworth
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 74 74.4 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1316 Dana
Launch Time: 12:10:31.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1314 Wood
Chase 4: F-104D Sorlie
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Rover: F-104N NASA 013 Petersen
Landing Time: 12:19:21.7
Purpose:  Pilot evaluation of damper-off stability Notes: Inertial malfunction at peak altitude
KS-25 camera removed due to malfunction during abort
Aborts: 1-A-68 18 Dec 63 Optical degradation experiment (#5)
  malfunction prior to launch Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Rushworth was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 99 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 4.65 4.92 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Futlon / Lewis Russell
Flight ID: 3-25-42 Max Altitude: 72,000 71,000 Take-Off Time: 09:20
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (25) Speed (mph): –– 3,242 Landing Time: 10:30
Flight Date: 16 Jan 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:17.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:10
Pilot (ﬂight #): Thompson (3)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 109 Chase 1: T-38A Gordon
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 104 90.5 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1315 Peterson
Launch Time: 10:03:29.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Crews
Rover: F-104N NASA 013 Walker
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Rover: F-104N NASA 011 Dana
Landing Time: 10:11:46.0  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Heat transfer with sharp upper rudder; Notes: Premature engine burn-out;
 Damper off stability; Speed brakes extremely hard to open during high
 Cermet skid evaluation;    heat phase of ﬂight
 (#10) IR exhaust signature experiment
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 100 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.50 5.34 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Branch Russell
Flight ID: 1-44-70 Max Altitude: 102,000 107,400 Take-Off Time: 11:15
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (44) Speed (mph): –– 3,618 Landing Time: 12:55
Flight Date: 28 Jan 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:25.5 B-52 Flight Time: 01:40
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (18)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 104 Chase 1: T-38A Engle
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 76 76.2 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1315 Dana
Launch Time: 12:11:36.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Crews
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0817 Wood
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Rover: F-104N NASA 012 Petersen
Landing Time: 12:22:01.5  Speed brake link removed
Purpose:  Stability evaluation using upper speed brake only Notes: SAS roll mode failed repeatedly
Aborts: None
 Appendix B: X-15 Flight Log
Program Flight #: 101 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.05 5.29 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Jones Russell
Flight ID: 3-26-43 Max Altitude: 75,000 78,600 Take-Off Time: 09:16
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (26) Speed (mph): –– 3,519 Landing Time: 10:55
Flight Date: 19 Feb 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:03.1 B-52 Flight Time: 01:39
Pilot (ﬂight #): Thompson (4)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A Rushworth
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 93 83.3 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104N NASA 012 Peterson
Launch Time: 09:57:13.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 40 100, 40 Chase 3: F-104N NASA 013 Dana
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:04:16.1  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Heat transfer with sharp upper rudder; Notes: Premature burn out - LOX line unported
 Boundary layer noise data;
 Cermet skid evaluation;
 Langley Purple Blend ablator evaluation
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 102 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 4.20 5.11 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bement / Lewis Butchart
Flight ID: 3-27-44 Max Altitude: 71,000 76,000 Take-Off Time: 09:01
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (27) Speed (mph): –– 3,392 Landing Time: 10:13
Flight Date: 13 Mar 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:29.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:12
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (10)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A Rogers
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 107 105.0 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1315 Peterson
Launch Time: 09:46:02.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 87, 43 100, 87, 43 Chase 3: F-104 Engle
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:53:31.0  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Heat transfer and skin friction with sharp upper rudder; Notes: Good ﬂight
 Boundary layer noise data;
 Cermet skid evaluation
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 103 Plan Actual NASA 1: Thompson
Max Mach: 5.70 5.63 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bement / Lewis Butchart
Flight ID: 1-45-72 Max Altitude: 103,000 101,500 Take-Off Time: 09:16
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (45) Speed (mph): –– 3,827 Landing Time: 11:30
Flight Date: 27 Mar 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:52.4 B-52 Flight Time: 02:14
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (19)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 111 Chase 1: T-38A Gordon
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 81 82.7 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1315 Peterson
Launch Time: 10:10:18.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104N NASA 012 Adams
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0817 Engle
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:20:10.4
Purpose:  (#5) Optical degradation phase II (KS-25) experiment; Notes: Inertial altitude about 10,000 feet off after shutdown
Aborts: 1-A-71 17 Mar 64 Optical degradation experiment (#5)
  malfunction prior to launch Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Rushworth was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 104 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.20 5.01 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Bement Russell
Flight ID: 1-46-73 Max Altitude: 180,000 175,000 Take-Off Time: 09:10
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (46) Speed (mph): –– 3,468 Landing Time: 10:38
Flight Date: 08 Apr 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:45.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:28
Pilot (ﬂight #): Engle (4)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 111 Chase 1: T-38A Gordon
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 78 81.8 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1314 Thmopson
Launch Time: 10:02:27.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Crews
Chase 4: F-104 Rogers
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Rover: F-104N NASA 011 Peterson
Landing Time: 10:12:12.7
Purpose:  (#5) Optical degradation phase II (KS-25) experiment; Notes: Reference lines were added to the inside windshield to deﬁne a 30-degree
Altitude buildup    airplane climb angle relative to the horizon
Flight "missed" Pahrump and Pilot Knob targets,
   marginal acquaition of Nellis target
Aborts: None
X-15 EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
Program Flight #: 105 Plan Actual NASA 1: Engle
Max Mach: 5.70 5.72 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Bock Russell
Flight ID: 1-47-74 Max Altitude: 102,000 101,600 Take-Off Time: 09:09
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (47) Speed (mph): –– 3,906 Landing Time: 10:40
Flight Date: 29 Apr 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:34.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:31
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (20)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 109 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 84 81.3 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N NASA 012 Dana
Launch Time: 10:00:27.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Crews
Chase 4: F-104 Rogers
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:10:01.6  Lines on window
Purpose:  (#5) Optical degradation phase II (KS-25) experiment; Notes: Right inner windshield cracked;
 Optical attitude indicator checkout Pilot reported smoke in cockpit;
Split-vision mirror installed in cockpit to use Earth horizon as an attitude reference,
This optical attitude indicator was deemed unsatisfactory
Flight directly over Nellis, 0.5 mile right of Pahrump, and
   1 mile left of Pilot Knob and Cuddeback (all within limits)
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 106 Plan Actual NASA 1: Thompson
Max Mach: 4.07 4.66 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bement / Jones Butchart
Flight ID: 3-28-47 Max Altitude: 69,000 72,800 Take-Off Time: 09:06
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (28) Speed (mph): –– 3,084 Landing Time: 10:40
Flight Date: 12 May 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:11.3 B-52 Flight Time: 01:34
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (11)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 110 108.6 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1315 Peterson
Launch Time: 09:51:46.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 43 100, 43 Chase 3: F-104 Engle
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:59:57.3  Sharp rudder; Seat cutter
Purpose:  Heat transfer and skin friction with sharp upper rudder; Notes: Inertial velocities failed at launch;
 Boundary layer noise data; MH-96 pitch and roll disengaged twice during boost
 Cermet skid evaluation
Aborts: 3-A-45 31 Mar 64 Inertial system, cabin pressure
3-A-46 11 May 64 LOX tank regulator All aborts used NB-52A 52-003; McKay was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 107 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.20 5.02 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Jones Butchart
Flight ID: 1-48-75 Max Altitude: 200,000 195,800 Take-Off Time: 09:35
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (48) Speed (mph): –– 3,494 Landing Time: 11:05
Flight Date: 19 May 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:01.2 B-52 Flight Time: 01:30
Pilot (ﬂight #): Engle (5)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 109 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 81 78.3 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 Gordon
Launch Time: 10:26:28.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104N NASA 012 Dana
Chase 4: F-104 Daniel
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:35:29.2
Purpose:  (#5) Optical degradation phase II (KS-25) experiment; Notes: Good ﬂight;
Altitude buildup Optical horizon indicator installed in cockpit
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 108 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 3.35 2.90 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Jones Butchart
Flight ID: 3-29-48 Max Altitude: 66,000 64,200 Take-Off Time: 09:00
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (29) Speed (mph): –– 1,865 Landing Time: 10:40
Flight Date: 21 May 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:56.5 B-52 Flight Time: 01:40
Pilot (ﬂight #): Thompson (5)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A Rushworth
Launch Lake: Silver Powered Time (sec): 120 41.0 (S.D) Chase 2: F-104 Dana
Launch Time: 09:39:55.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 45 100, 0 Chase 3: F-104A Sorlie
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Cuddeback Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Rover: F-104N NASA 011 Petersen
Landing Time: 09:47:51.5  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Heat transfer with sharp upper rudder; Notes: Premature engine shut down at throttle back;
 Boundary layer noise data; Emergency landing;
 Cermet skid evaluation First Cuddeback landing
Aborts: None
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Program Flight #: 109 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 4.50 4.59 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Bement Russell
Flight ID: 2-32-55 Max Altitude: 80,000 83,300 Take-Off Time: 08:50
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (32 / 1) Speed (mph): –– 3,104 Landing Time: 09:58
Flight Date: 25 Jun 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:54.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:08
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (21)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 106 Chase 1: T-38A Engle
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 78 77.0 (S.D.) Chase 2: JF-104A 55-2961 Peterson
Launch Time: 09:34:47.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Rogers
Chase 4: F-104N Sorlie
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:43:41.7
Purpose: Aircraft checkout and stability at low angle of attack Notes: First ﬂight of modiﬁed X-15A-2;
Right roll out-of-trim
Aborts: 2-C-53 15 Jun 64 Scheduled captive ﬂight Captive used NB-52A 52-003; Rushworth was the X-15 pilot for the captive ﬂight
2-A-54 23 Jun 64 #2 APU overspeed shutdown Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Rushworth was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 110 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.20 4.96 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Lewis Russell
Flight ID: 1-49-77 Max Altitude: 182,000 99,600 Take-Off Time: 08:59
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (49) Speed (mph): –– 3,334 Landing Time: 10:27
Flight Date: 30 Jun 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:11:27.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:28
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (12)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A Engle
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 80 83.4 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1314 Peterson / Kennedy
Launch Time: 09:49:40.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D Sorlie
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0763 Rogers
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Rover: F-104N NASA 011 Walker
Landing Time: 10:01:07.0
Purpose:  Pilot altitude buildup; Notes: McKay replaced Milt Thompson for this ﬂight;
 (#5) Optical degradation phase II (KS-25) experiment Inertial malfunction at launch;
Alternate proﬁle ﬂown;
250-foot ﬁlm magazine for KS-25 (instead of 100-foot)
Aborts: 1-A-76 11 Jun 64 Radio and SAS failure Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Thomson was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 111 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.20 5.05 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bement / Lewis Russell
Flight ID: 3-30-50 Max Altitude: 180,000 170,400 Take-Off Time: 11:59
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (30) Speed (mph): –– 3,520 Landing Time: 13:45
Flight Date: 08 Jul 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:55.9 B-52 Flight Time: 01:46
Pilot (ﬂight #): Engle (6)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 104 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 77.5 78.3 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1315 Dana
Launch Time: 13:02:57.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Smith
Chase 4: F-104 Rogers
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Rover: F-104N NASA 013 Mallick
Landing Time: 13:12:52.9  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  MH-96 pilot checkout; Notes: Dampers disengaged ~10 seconds after launch;
 (#4) LaRC horizon deﬁnition experiment; Had to shut off  to reengage;
 GE ablator on lower ventral and speed brakes Flew left hand BCS
Aborts: 3-A-49 02 Jul 64 XLR99 malfunction Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Engle was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 112 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.05 5.38 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Bement Russell
Flight ID: 3-31-52 Max Altitude: 78,000 78,000 Take-Off Time: 11:12
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (31) Speed (mph): –– 3,623 Landing Time: 12:20
Flight Date: 29 Jul 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:49.1 B-52 Flight Time: 01:08
Pilot (ﬂight #): Engle (7)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 104 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 90 93.6 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 (USAF) McKay
Launch Time: 11:54:57.0 Thrust (pct): 100, Tmin 100, 45 Chase 3: F-104 Rogers
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Rover: F-104N NASA 011 Petersen
Landing Time: 12:02:46.1  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Heat transfer data with surface distortion panels; Notes: Good ﬂight;
 Local ﬂow experiments; Thermopaint on F-3 and F-4 panels
 GE ablator on lower ventral and speed brakes and LO2 tank
X-15-3 had been used to ﬁlm "rescue movies" on 13-14 July
Aborts: 3-A-51 28 Jul 64 GN2 cooling gas depleted Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Engle was the X-15 pilot for the abort
X-15 EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
Program Flight #: 113 Plan Actual NASA 1: Engle
Max Mach: 5.02 5.24 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Bement Russell
Flight ID: 3-32-53 Max Altitude: 75,000 81,200 Take-Off Time: 09:30
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (32) Speed (mph): –– 3,535 Landing Time: 10:35
Flight Date: 12 Aug 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:06:42.8 B-52 Flight Time: 01:05
Pilot (ﬂight #): Thompson (6)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 104 Chase 1: T-38A Rushworth
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 90 82.1 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104N NASA 013 McKay
Launch Time: 10:12:27.0 Thrust (pct): 100, Tmin 100, 47 Chase 3: F-104 Sorlie
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:19:09.8  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Heat transfer data with surface distortion panels; Notes: Premature engine burn out;
 Boundary layer noise data; Thermopaint on F-3 and F-4 panels
 Local ﬂow experiments
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 114 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.20 5.23 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Bement Russell
Flight ID: 2-33-56 Max Altitude: 96,000 103,300 Take-Off Time: 09:04
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (33 / 2) Speed (mph): –– 3,590 Landing Time: 10:32
Flight Date: 14 Aug 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:12:06.3 B-52 Flight Time: 01:28
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (22)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 106 Chase 1: T-38A Knight
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 82 80.3 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 Dana
Launch Time: 09:54:32.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Engle
Chase 4: F-104N Sorlie
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Rover: F-104N NASA 013 Thompson
Landing Time: 10:06:38.3 "Guest" T-38A 63-8193 Armstrong
Purpose:  Stability and control evaluation; Notes: Nose gear extended above Mach 4.2;
 (#1) UV stellar photography experiment checkout Tires failed at landing;
First ﬂight of redesigned stable platform
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 115 Plan Actual NASA 1: Thompson
Max Mach: 5.02 5.65 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Bement Butchart
Flight ID: 3-33-54 Max Altitude: 75,000 91,000 Take-Off Time: 10:00
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (33) Speed (mph): –– 3,863 Landing Time: 11:23
Flight Date: 26 Aug 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:19.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:23
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (13)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 104 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 90 94.4 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104B 57-1303 Peterson
Launch Time: 10:42:07.0 Thrust (pct): 100, Tmin 100, 47 Chase 3: F-104 Knight
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:49:26.6  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Heat transfer data with surface distortion panels; Notes: Alpha indicator incorrect;
 Boundary layer noise data; Three stripes of green thermopaint across nose wheel door
 Local ﬂow experiments
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 116 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.05 5.35 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bement / Jones Peterson
Flight ID: 3-34-55 Max Altitude: 75,000 78,600 Take-Off Time: 09:10
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (34) Speed (mph): –– 3,615 Landing Time: 10:16
Flight Date: 03 Sep 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:06:18.1 B-52 Flight Time: 01:06
Pilot (ﬂight #): Thompson (4)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 104 Chase 1: T-38A Knight
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 92 91.0 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104N NASA 012 Walker
Launch Time: 09:54:59.0 Thrust (pct): 100, Tmin 100, 47 Chase 3: F-104 Rogers
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:01:17.1
Purpose:  Heat transfer data with surface distortion panels; Notes: U-2 took-off across the path of the X-15 during
 Boundary layer noise data;    ﬁnal approach
 Shear layer rakes data; 
 Center stick evaluation Blunt leading-edge rudder from X-15-1 installed for this ﬂight
Aborts: None
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Program Flight #: 117 Plan Actual NASA 1: Thompson
Max Mach: 5.65 5.59 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Lewis Butchart
Flight ID: 3-35-57 Max Altitude: 98,000 97,000 Take-Off Time: 12:24
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (35) Speed (mph): –– 3,888 Landing Time: 13:54
Flight Date: 28 Sep 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:34.3 B-52 Flight Time: 01:30
Pilot (ﬂight #): Engle (8)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A Rogers
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 82 80.3 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104N NASA 012 McKay
Launch Time: 13:16:18.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Parsons
Chase 4: F-104 56-0768 Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 13:25:52.3  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Martin MA-45R ablator on ventral and lower speed brakes; Notes: Inertial velocity malfunctioned;
 Langle Purple Blend ablator on F-3 panel; Smoke in the cockpit after burnout
 GE ESM-1004B ablator on F-4 panel;
 Boundary layer noise data;
 Skin-friction measurements
Aborts: 3-A-56 23 Sep 64 Canopy Seal Problems Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Engle was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 118 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.20 5.20 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Townsend Butchart
Flight ID: 2-34-57 Max Altitude: 96,000 97,800 Take-Off Time: 12:10
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (34 / 3) Speed (mph): –– 3,542 Landing Time: 13:30
Flight Date: 29 Sep 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:51.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:20
Pilot (ﬂight #): RushworthRushworth (23)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1599 Sorlie
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 81 79.7 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 Thompson
Launch Time: 13:00:05.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Parsons
Chase 4: F-104 Engle
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Rover: F-104N NASA 011 Peterson
Landing Time: 13:09:56.0
Purpose:  Stability and control evaluation; Notes: Nose gear scoop door came open above Mach 4.5;
 Landing dynamics; Theta vernier and 8-ball did not agree
 (#1) UV stellar photography experiment checkout;
 (#27) Hycon camera experiment
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 119 Plan Actual NASA 1: Engle
Max Mach: 4.30 4.56 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Cotton Butchart
Flight ID: 1-50-79 Max Altitude: 80,000 84,900 Take-Off Time: 12:32
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (50) Speed (mph): –– 3,048 Landing Time: 13:50
Flight Date: 15 Oct 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:40.9 B-52 Flight Time: 01:18
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (14)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A Rogers
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 73 72.9 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N NASA 011 Peterson
Launch Time: 13:15:40.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Knight
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5:
Landing Time: 13:24:20.9 Tip pods
Purpose:  Honeywell X-20 inertial system checkout; Notes: First ﬂight with wing-tip pods installed;
Tip-pod dynamic stability evaluation; Micrometeorite collector opened while going
 (#12) Atmospheric density experiment checkout    transonic at high-key
 (#13) Micrometeorite collection experiment; 
 (#19) High-altitude sky brightness epxeriment checkout
Aborts: 1-A-78 02 Oct 64 SAS malfunction Abort used NB-52A 52-003; McKay was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 120 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 4.50 4.66 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Lewis Butchart
Flight ID: 3-36-59 Max Altitude: 81,000 84,600 Take-Off Time: 09:12
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (36) Speed (mph): –– 3,113 Landing Time: 10:27
Flight Date: 30 Oct 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:10.1 B-52 Flight Time: 01:15
Pilot (ﬂight #): Thompson (5)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A Rushworth
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 74 74.4 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1316 Peterson
Launch Time: 09:51:52.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Engle
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:59:02.1  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Landing gear door mod checkout; Notes: Fire warning light 54 seconds after shutdown
 Boundary layer noise data;
 Skin-friction measurements;
 Center stick evaluation;
 McDonnell B-44 ablator on ventral and lower speed brakes
Aborts: 3-C-58 29 Oct 64 Scheduled captive ﬂight Captive used NB-52B 52-008; Thompson was the X-15 pilot for the captive ﬂight
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Program Flight #: 121 Plan Actual NASA 1: Thompson
Max Mach: 4.50 4.66 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Bock Russell
Flight ID: 2-35-60 Max Altitude: 80,000 87,200 Take-Off Time: 11:29
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (35 / 4) Speed (mph): –– 3,089 Landing Time: 12:42
Flight Date: 30 Nov 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:34.8 B-52 Flight Time: 01:13
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (15)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 80 75.3 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N NASA 012 Mallick
Launch Time: 12:09:32.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Rogers
Chase 4: F-104 Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Rover: F-104 Twinting
Landing Time: 12:18:06.8
Purpose:  Landing gear door modiﬁcation checkout; Notes: Blown fuse prevented UV experiment (#1) from acquiring data;
 Stability and control data; Boost performance did not match simulator
 (#1) UV stellar photography experiment checkout
Aborts: 2-C-58 06 Nov 64 Scheduled captive ﬂight
2-C-59 16 Nov 64 Scheduled captive ﬂight All captive ﬂights used NB-52B 52-008; McKay was the X-15 pilot
Program Flight #: 122 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.20 5.42 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Lewis Russell
Flight ID: 3-37-60 Max Altitude: 85,000 92,400 Take-Off Time: 09:53
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (37) Speed (mph): –– 3,723 Landing Time: 11:05
Flight Date: 09 Dec 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:06:25.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:12
Pilot (ﬂight #): Thompson (6)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 106 Chase 1: T-38A Rushworth
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 104 101.4 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N NASA 012 Peterson
Launch Time: 10:36:17.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100, 43 Chase 3: F-104A Sorlie
Chase 4: F-104 Twinting
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:42:42.7  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Non-uniform 3-dimensional ﬂow ﬁeld measurements; Notes: Purposely shutdown with negative g
 Boundary layer noise data;
 Skin-friction measurements;
 McDonnell Y-7 and B-44 ablators on right lower speed brake
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 123 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.20 5.35 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bock / Fulton Russell
Flight ID: 1-51-81 Max Altitude: 112,000 113,200 Take-Off Time: 10:15
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (51) Speed (mph): –– 3,675 Landing Time: 11:48
Flight Date: 10 Dec 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:44.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:33
Pilot (ﬂight #): Engle (9)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 78 80.5 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N NASA 012 McKay
Launch Time: 11:10:26.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Parsons
Chase 4: F-104 Rogers
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5:
Landing Time: 11:20:10.7 Tip pods
Purpose:  Honeywell X-20 inertial system checkout; Notes: Originally scheduled for Mud Lake;
Tip-pod dynamic stability evaluation; Pitch SAS tripout after launch;
 Center stick controller; Dark green theropaint on left wing-tip pod;
 (#12) Atmospheric density experiment; Light green theropaint on right wing-tip pod;
 (#17) MIT horizon deﬁnition phase I checkout (ﬁxed platform) Martin MA-25S ablator on nose BCS panels
Aborts: 1-A-80 04 Dec 64 Fuel vent valve malfunction Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Engle was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 124 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.18 5.55 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Bock Russell
Flight ID: 3-38-61 Max Altitude: 81,000 81,200 Take-Off Time: 09:55
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (38) Speed (mph): –– 3,593 Landing Time: 11:08
Flight Date: 22 Dec 64 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:50.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:13
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (24)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1599 Twinting
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 101 88.0 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N NASA 012 Mallick
Launch Time: 10:44:52.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 46 100, 46 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0817 Knight
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:52:42.0  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Non-uniform 3-dimensional ﬂow ﬁeld measurements; Notes: High gear loads due to crosswind landing
 Boundary layer noise data;
 Skin-friction measurements;
 Langley Purple Blend ablator on F-3 panel;
 GE ESM-1004B ablator on F-4 panel
Aborts: –– 17 Dec 64 Lack of support aircraft
0 Appendix B: X-15 Flight Log
Program Flight #: 125 Plan Actual NASA 1: Engle
Max Mach: 5.10 5.48 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fultun / Bement Butchart
Flight ID: 3-39-62 Max Altitude: 92,000 99,400 Take-Off Time: 10:03
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (39) Speed (mph): –– 3,712 Landing Time: 11:15
Flight Date: 13 Jan 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:06:47.5 B-52 Flight Time: 01:12
Pilot (ﬂight #): Thompson (10)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1599 Smith
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 90 98.5 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104A 56-0763 Dana
Launch Time: 10:50:50.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 46 100, 46 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0817 Rushworth
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:57:37.5  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Non-uniform 3-dimensional ﬂow ﬁeld measurements; Notes: Rate limiting and loss of pitch and roll damping
 Boundary layer noise data;    experienced during pull-up/roll maneuver after
 Skin-friction measurements    burnout
Aborts: –– 12 Jan 65 Cancelled, lack of C-130 support
Program Flight #: 126 Plan Actual NASA 1: Thompson
Max Mach: 5.64 5.71 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Bement Russell
Flight ID: 3-40-63 Max Altitude: 94,000 98,200 Take-Off Time: 12:00
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (40) Speed (mph): –– 3,885 Landing Time: 13:15
Flight Date: 02 Feb 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:58.3 B-52 Flight Time: 01:15
Pilot (ﬂight #): Engle (10)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 82.5 81.4 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104N NASA 012 Peterson
Launch Time: 12:50:02.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Stroface
Chase 4: F-104 Rushworth
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 13:00:00.3  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  MH-96 ﬁxed gain evaluation; Notes: Good ﬂight
 Boundary layer noise data;
 Skin-friction measurements;
 Martin MA-25S ablator on ventral, lower speed barkes, and F-4 panel;
 Langley Purple Blend ablator on F-3 panel;
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 127 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.20 5.27 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bement / Fulton Butchart
Flight ID: 2-36-63 Max Altitude: 96,000 95,100 Take-Off Time: 09:54
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (36 / 5) Speed (mph): –– 3,539 Landing Time: 11:16
Flight Date: 17 Feb 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:20.3 B-52 Flight Time: 01:22
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (25)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 81.5 79.8 (S.D.) Chase 2: JF-104A 55-2961 Dana
Launch Time: 10:44:27.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104N NASA 013 Thompson
Chase 4: F-104 Engle
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:53:47.3  Precision Attitude Indicator
Purpose:  Stability and control evaluation; Notes: Right main skid extended at Mach 4.3 and 85,000 feet;
 Landing dynamics data; Inertial altitude failed; Engine momentarily lost power
 (#1) UV stellar photography experiment checkout
Aborts: 2-C-61 15 Feb 65 Scheduled captive ﬂight All captive ﬂights used NB-52B 52-008; Rushworth was the X-15 pilot
2-C-62 15 Feb 65 Scheduled captive ﬂight The captive ﬂights were to evaluate X-15 landing gear loads
Program Flight #: 128 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.20 5.40 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Bock Russell
Flight ID: 1-52-85 Max Altitude: 180,000 153,600 Take-Off Time: 10:57
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (52) Speed (mph): –– 3,702 Landing Time: 12:16
Flight Date: 26 Feb 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:24.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:19
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (16)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: T-38A Knight
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 83 83.2 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N NASA 013 Peterson
Launch Time: 11:45:55.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 52 100, 52 Chase 3: F-104 Stroface
Chase 4: F-104 Engle
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5:
Landing Time: 11:55:19.7 Tip pods
Purpose:  (#12) Atmospheric density experiment; Notes: Computer malfunction at launch;
 (#17) MIT horizon deﬁnition phase I experiment; "NO DROP" light in X-15 cockpit changed to "23 SECONDS";
 (#19) High-altitude sky brightness experiment Modiﬁed RAS including 13-cycle nortch ﬁlter;
Experiment #5 quartz window removed (replaced with steel plate)
Aborts: 1-A-82 26 Jan 65 Inertial system failure
1-A-83 19 Feb 65 #2 APU failure
1-A-84 25 Feb 65 Edwards weather All aborts used NB-52B 52-008; McKay was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
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Program Flight #: 129 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.15 5.17 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Bock Russell
Flight ID: 1-53-86 Max Altitude: 104,000 101,900 Take-Off Time: 10:16
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (53) Speed (mph): –– 3,580 Landing Time: 11:44
Flight Date: 26 Mar 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:11:24.3 B-52 Flight Time: 01:28
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (26)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1600 Engle
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 75.5 79.6 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA Dana
Launch Time: 11:02:30.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1314 Gentry
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0817 Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5:
Landing Time: 11:13:54.3 Tip pods
Purpose:  Honeywell X-20 inertial system checkout; Notes: Alpha crosspointer did not work properly
 (#23) Infrared scanning radiometer experiment;
 (#31) Fixed ball nose on tip pod evaluation
Aborts: –– 25 Mar 65 Weather prior to taxi
Program Flight #: 130 Plan Actual NASA 1: Thompson
Max Mach: 5.20 5.48 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Cotton Butchart
Flight ID: 3-41-64 Max Altitude: 78,000 79,700 Take-Off Time: 09:05
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (41) Speed (mph): –– 3,657 Landing Time: 10:13
Flight Date: 23 Apr 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:42.1 B-52 Flight Time: 01:08
Pilot (ﬂight #): EngleRushworth (11)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 111 Chase 1: T-38A Rushworth
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 93 91.4 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA McKay
Launch Time: 09:44:58.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 57 100, 57 Chase 3: F-104 Knight
Chase 4: F-104N N813NA Walker
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:52:40.1  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Heat transfer data with surface distortion panels; Notes: Tmin changed from 40% to 50%
 Boundary layer noise data;
 (#3) UV exhaust plume experiment; 
 Martin MA-25S ablator on upper ﬁxed vertical
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 131 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 4.70 4.80 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bock / Townsend Russell
Flight ID: 2-37-64 Max Altitude: 84,000 92,600 Take-Off Time: 11:41
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (37 / 6) Speed (mph): –– 3,260 Landing Time: 13:00
Flight Date: 28 Apr 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:52.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:19
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (17)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: YT-38A 58-1197 Sorlie
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 83 78.9 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA Thompson
Launch Time: 12:26:32.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0763 Engle
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 12:34:24.6
Purpose:  Stability and control evaluation; Notes: Highest 'q' for damper off ﬂight during program
 Landing gear loads data;    (1200-1500 psf);
 Landing dynamics data; Inertial altitude rate (H-dot) failed
 (#1) UV stellar photography experiment checkout
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 132 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.20 5.17 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Jones Russell
Flight ID: 2-38-66 Max Altitude: 96,000 102,100 Take-Off Time: 09:07
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (38 / 7) Speed (mph): –– 3,541 Landing Time: 10:35
Flight Date: 18 May 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:42.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:28
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (18)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 81.5 78.9 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA Mallick
Launch Time: 09:56:56.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Gentry
Chase 4: F-104 Engle
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Rover: F-104N N811NA Haise
Landing Time: 10:06:38.0
Purpose:  Stability and control evaluation; Notes:  Engine shutdown during igniter idle - reset
 Landing gear loads data;
 Landing dynamics data;
 (#1) UV stellar photography experiment checkout
Aborts: 2-A-65 13 May 65 Cabin pressurization Abort used NB-52B 52-008; McKay was the X-15 pilot for the abort
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Program Flight #: 133 Plan Actual NASA 1: Engle
Max Mach: 4.90 4.87 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Jones Butchart
Flight ID: 1-54-88 Max Altitude: 180,000 179,800 Take-Off Time: 09:22
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (54) Speed (mph): –– 3,418 Landing Time: 10:35
Flight Date: 25 May 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:02.5 B-52 Flight Time: 01:13
Pilot (ﬂight #): Thompson (11)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: T-38A Rushworth
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 82 81.1 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1315 Peterson
Launch Time: 10:12:07.5 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Stroface
Chase 4: F-104 Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Rover: F-104N N811NA Walker
Landing Time: 10:21:10.0 Tip pods
Purpose:  Honeywell X-20 inertial system checkout; Notes: Squat switch never armed
 Pilot altitude buildup
 (#16) Pace transducer experiment;
 (#17) MIT horizon deﬁnition phase I experiment;
Aborts: –– 04 May 65 X-20 inertial failure prior to taxi
1-A-87 11 May 65 SAS and APU malfunctions Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Thompson was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 134 Plan Actual NASA 1: Thompson
Max Mach: 5.40 5.17 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Jones Butchart
Flight ID: 3-42-65 Max Altitude: 200,000 209,600 Take-Off Time: 08:56
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (42) Speed (mph): –– 3,754 Landing Time: 10:24
Flight Date: 28 May 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:35.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:28
Pilot (ﬂight #): Engle (12)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 82 82.5 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA Haise
Launch Time: 09:43:47.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Parsons
Chase 4: F-104 Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:53:22.6  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Boundary layer noise data; Notes: Good ﬂight
 (#3) UV exhaust plume experiment; First ﬂight for altitude predictor
 (#4) LaRC horizon deﬁnition experiment;
 Pilot buildup
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 135 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.00 4.69 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Cretney Russell
Flight ID: 3-43-66 Max Altitude: 240,000 244,700 Take-Off Time: 09:38
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (43) Speed (mph): –– 3,404 Landing Time: 11:00
Flight Date: 16 Jun 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:46.4 B-52 Flight Time: 01:22
Pilot (ﬂight #): Engle (13)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1600 Wood
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 79 77.8 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N813NA Mallick
Launch Time: 10:26:14.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1315 Sorlie
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0817 Twinting
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:36:00.4  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Boundary layer noise data; Notes: Good ﬂight
 (#3) UV exhaust plume experiment; The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude
 Pilot buildup
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 136 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.15 5.14 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Cotton Russell
Flight ID: 1-55-89 Max Altitude: 104,000 108,500 Take-Off Time: 08:56
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (55) Speed (mph): –– 3,541 Landing Time: 10:23
Flight Date: 17 Jun 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:54.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:27
Pilot (ﬂight #): Thompson (12)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: T-38A Twinting
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 81.5 82.2 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N813NA McKay
Launch Time: 09:40:53.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Stroface
Chase 4: F-104 Engle
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Rover: F-104N N811NA Mallick
Landing Time: 09:49:47.0
Purpose:  Honeywell X-20 inertial system checkout; Notes: Two pitch-out SAS tripouts (to ASAS) - reset once
 Cross-track vernier;
 GE ablator on forward BCS panels
 (#23) Infrared scanning radiometer experiment;
Aborts: None
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Program Flight #: 137 Plan Actual NASA 1: Engle
Max Mach: 5.40 5.64 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Bock Butchart
Flight ID: 2-39-70 Max Altitude: 160,000 155,900 Take-Off Time: 08:57
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (39 / 8) Speed (mph): –– 3,938 Landing Time: 10:15
Flight Date: 22 Jun 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:47.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:18
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (19)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A Rushworth
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 83 85.3 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA Peterson
Launch Time: 09:43:44.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Gentry
Chase 4: F-104 Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:53:31.7  RAS installed
Purpose:  Landing gear loads data; Notes: Good ﬂight
 (#1) UV stellar photography experiment checkout
 (#27) Hycon camera experiment
2-A-67 04 Jun 65 Cockpit pressure regulator
2-A-68 08 Jun 65 Helium source pressure
2-A-69 11 Jun 65 Helium source leak All aborts used NB-52B 52-008; McKay was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 138 Plan Actual NASA 1: Thompson
Max Mach: 5.10 4.94 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Andonian Russell
Flight ID: 3-44-67 Max Altitude: 283,000 280,600 Take-Off Time: 09:38
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (44) Speed (mph): –– 3,432 Landing Time: 11:05
Flight Date: 29 Jun 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:32.3 B-52 Flight Time: 01:27
Pilot (ﬂight #): Engle (14)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A Wood
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 82 81.0 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104 McKay
Launch Time: 10:21:18.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Gentry
Chase 4: F-104 Parsons
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:31:50.3  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Reentry manuever techniques; Notes: Engle's astronaut qualiﬁcation ﬂight
 Boundary layer noise data; The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude
 (#3) UV exhaust plume experiment;
 (#4) LaRC horizon deﬁnition experiment;
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 139 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.20 5.19 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Cotton Russell
Flight ID: 2-40-72 Max Altitude: 200,000 212,600 Take-Off Time: 08:28
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (40 / 9) Speed (mph): –– 3,659 Landing Time: 09:50
Flight Date: 08 Jul 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:33.4 B-52 Flight Time: 01:21
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (20)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A Adams
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 82.5 82.9 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA Peterson
Launch Time: 09:16:50.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Gentry
Chase 4: F-104 Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:26:23.4
Purpose: Altitude buildup; Notes: ASAS manual engage switch added;
 Landing dynamics data; RAS failed to operate
 (#1) UV stellar photography experiment;
 MA-25S ablator test
Aborts: 2-A-71 02 Jul 65 Inertial platform (loose umbilical) Abort used NB-52A 52-003; McKay was the X-15 pilot
Program Flight #: 140 Plan Actual NASA 1: Thompson
Max Mach: 5.50 5.40 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Jones / Andonian Russell
Flight ID: 3-45-69 Max Altitude: 92,000 105,400 Take-Off Time: 09:09
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (45) Speed (mph): –– 3,760 Landing Time: 10:38
Flight Date: 20 Jul 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:34.5 B-52 Flight Time: 01:29
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (27)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A Knight
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 80 79.5 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1315 Dana
Launch Time: 09:59:28.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Whelan
Chase 4: F-104 Gentry
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:10:02.5  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Boundary layer noise data Notes: Alpha exceeded 20 degrees after launch (subsonic)
Aborts: –– 16 Jul 65 Weather prior to taxi
–– 15 Jul 65 Weather prior to taxi
3-A-68 13 Jul 65 Cabin pressurization Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Rushworth was the X-15 pilot for the abort
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Program Flight #: 141 Plan Actual NASA 1: Engle
Max Mach: 5.15 5.16 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bock / Andonian Butchart
Flight ID: 2-41-73 Max Altitude: 200,000 208,700 Take-Off Time: 11:51
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (41 / 10) Speed (mph): –– 3,602 Landing Time: 13:05
Flight Date: 03 Aug 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:32.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:14
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (28)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1599 Sorlie
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 82 82.4 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1314 Dana
Launch Time: 12:39:50.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1315 Whelen
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0755 Stroface
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 12:49:22.0
Purpose: Altitude buildup; Notes: Right roll out of trim
 RAS checkout; The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude
 Landing dynamics data;
 (#1) UV stellar photography experiment
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 142 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.15 5.15 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Andonian Butchart
Flight ID: 1-56-93 Max Altitude: 104,000 103,200 Take-Off Time: 08:51
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (56) Speed (mph): –– 3,534 Landing Time: 10:36
Flight Date: 06 Aug 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:13.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:45
Pilot (ﬂight #): ThompsonRushworth (13)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: T-38A Rushworth
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 81 83.0 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1314 Haise
Launch Time: 09:41:40.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Livingston
Chase 4: F-104 Engle
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:51:53.0
Purpose:  Stability and control data Notes: Engine time did not start
 (#23) Infrared scanning radiometer experiment; No experiment #23 data obtained due to broken wire
Aborts: –– 22 Jul 65 Weather prior to taxi
1-A-90 23 Jul 65 Pressure Suit anomaly
1-A-91 27 Jul 65 X-15 radio antenna damage
1-A-92 28 Jul 65 Pilot error during preﬂight All aborts used NB-52A 52-003; Thompson was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 143 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.20 5.20 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Jones / Andonian Butchart
Flight ID: 3-46-70 Max Altitude: 266,000 271,000 Take-Off Time: 10:28
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (46) Speed (mph): –– 3,550 Landing Time: 12:00
Flight Date: 10 Aug 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:51.8 B-52 Flight Time: 01:32
Pilot (ﬂight #): Engle (15)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1599 Sorlie
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 81 82.1 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1314 Dana
Launch Time: 11:24:10.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1315 Gentry
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0763 Stroface
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Rover: F-104N N811NA Haise
Landing Time: 11:34:01.8  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Boundary layer noise data; Notes: Yaw damper dropped off at launch, and 20 other
 Reentry maneuver techniques;    times during the ﬂight, but the alternate ﬂight
 (#25) Optical background experiment    proﬁle was not ﬂown
The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude
Engle's second ﬂight above 50 miles.
Aborts: –– 04 Aug 65 Pitch angle sensor failed prior to taxi
–– Pitch angle sensor malfunction prior to taxi05 Aug 65 I ertial system failure prior to taxi
Program Flight #: 144 Plan Actual NASA 1: Engle
Max Mach: 5.20 5.11 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Cotton Russell
Flight ID: 1-57-96 Max Altitude: 222,000 214,100 Take-Off Time: 09:05
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (57) Speed (mph): –– 3,604 Landing Time: 10:38
Flight Date: 25 Aug 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:51.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:33
Pilot (ﬂight #): Thompson (14)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1598 Rushworth
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 81 84.5 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA McKay
Launch Time: 09:54:46.8 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1314 Marrett
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0763 Parsons
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:03:38.5 Tip pods
Purpose:  Stability and control data; Notes: Poor pitch control during landing due to aft
 (#17) MIT horizon deﬁnition phase I experiment;    center of gravity location;
 (#16) Pace transducer experiment Thompson's last X-15 ﬂight
Aborts: –– 12 Aug 65 Weather prior to taxi
1-A-94 20 Aug 65 Cabin pressure regulator
1-A-95 24 Aug 65 IFDS computer failure All aborts used NB-52A 52-003; Thompson was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
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Program Flight #: 145 Plan Actual NASA 1: Engle
Max Mach: 5.00 4.79 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Cotton / Bock Russell
Flight ID: 3-47-71 Max Altitude: 240,000 239,600 Take-Off Time: 09:01
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (47) Speed (mph): –– 3,372 Landing Time: 10:30
Flight Date: 26 Aug 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:27.5 B-52 Flight Time: 01:29
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (29)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1599 Sorlie
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 79 78.6 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1314 Haise
Launch Time: 09:51:47.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0748 Livingston
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0763 Parsons
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:02:14.5  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Boundary layer noise data; Notes: Experienced limit cycle 4-5 times during ﬂight
 (#3) UV exhaust plume experiment
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 146 Plan Actual NASA 1: Engle
Max Mach: 5.00 5.16 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bock / Jones Russell
Flight ID: 2-42-74 Max Altitude: 228,000 239,800 Take-Off Time: 08:52
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (42 / 11) Speed (mph): –– 3,570 Landing Time: 10:15
Flight Date: 02 Sep 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:12.8 B-52 Flight Time: 01:23
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (21)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 104 Chase 1: T-38A Rushworth
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 82 84.0 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1316 Peterson
Launch Time: 09:40:26.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Stroface
Chase 4: F-104 Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Rover: F-104N N811NA Haise
Landing Time: 09:49:38.8
Purpose: Altitude buildup; Notes: Good ﬂight;
 RAS checkout; The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude
 Landing dynamics data;
 (#1) UV stellar photography experiment The X-15A-2 structure was X-ray inspected at the AFFTC X-ray facility,
   no ﬂaws were found
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 147 Plan Actual NASA 1:
Max Mach: 5.15 5.25 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bock / Fulton Russell
Flight ID: 1-58-97 Max Altitude: 104,000 97,200 Take-Off Time: 09:09
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (58) Speed (mph): –– 3,534 Landing Time: 10:40
Flight Date: 09 Sep 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:11:10.2 B-52 Flight Time: 01:31
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (30)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1598 Wood
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 80 82.1 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA Peterson
Launch Time: 09:55:33.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0748 Livingston
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0755 Parsons
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Rover: F-104N N811NA Haise
Landing Time: 10:06:43.2
Purpose:  (#23) Infrared scanning radiometer experiment; Notes: Alpha indicator failed; 
 GE ablator on ventral and lower speed brakes  Unexplained buffet during ﬂight
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 148 Plan Actual NASA 1: Dana
Max Mach: 5.10 5.03 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bock / Jones Russell
Flight ID: 3-48-72 Max Altitude: 230,000 239,000 Take-Off Time: 09:12
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (48) Speed (mph): –– 3,519 Landing Time: 10:39
Flight Date: 14 Sep 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:58.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:27
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (22)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1601 Rushworth
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 80 80.9 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N811NA Haise
Launch Time: 10:01:42.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1314 Evenson
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0755 Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:11:40.0  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Boundary layer noise data; Notes: Auto-BCS affect adversely by servo transients;
 (#25) Optical background experiment The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude
Aborts: None
Knight / Thompson
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Program Flight #: 149 Plan Actual NASA 1: Knight
Max Mach: 5.15 5.18 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bock / Jones Russell
Flight ID: 1-59-98 Max Altitude: 104,000 100,300 Take-Off Time: 10:08
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (59) Speed (mph): –– 3,550 Landing Time: 11:38
Flight Date: 22 Sep 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:54.3 B-52 Flight Time: 01:30
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (31)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 80 82.0 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1314 Dana
Launch Time: 10:59:05.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Adams
Chase 4: F-104 Engle
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Rover: F-104N N811NA McKay
Landing Time: 11:09:59.3 Tip pods
Purpose:  (#23) Infrared scanning radiometer experiment Notes: Infrared experiment (#23) failed during ﬂight
Aborts: –– 17 Sep 65 Weather prior to taxi
Program Flight #: 150 Plan Actual NASA 1: Dana
Max Mach: 5.15 5.33 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bock / Andonian Russell
Flight ID: 3-49-73 Max Altitude: 260,000 295,600 Take-Off Time: 09:24
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (49) Speed (mph): –– 3,732 Landing Time: 10:42
Flight Date: 28 Sep 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:11:56.8 B-52 Flight Time: 01:18
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (23)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 109 Chase 1: T-38A Rushworth
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 79 80.8 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA Peterson
Launch Time: 10:08:06.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104N N811NA Haise
Chase 4: F-104 Engle
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:20:02.8  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Horizontal tail loads data; Notes: Roll-hold drop-out at launch
 Boundary layer noise data; The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude;
 (#3) UV exhaust plume experiment; Overshot altitude by 35,600 feet
 Martin MA-25S ablator on F-3 and F-4 panels
Since McKay was a NASA pilot, he did not get astronaut wings for a ﬂight 
Aborts: None    above 50 miles (the NASA standard was 62 miles)
Program Flight #: 151 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 4.00 4.06 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bock / Fulton Russell
Flight ID: 1-60-99 Max Altitude: 74,000 76,600 Take-Off Time: 08:55
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (60) Speed (mph): –– 2,718 Landing Time: 10:10
Flight Date: 30 Sep 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:22.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:15
Pilot (ﬂight #): Knight (1)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 126 127.4 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N811NA Peterson
Launch Time: 09:43:55.0 Thrust (pct): 53 94, 53 Chase 3: F-104 Engle
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Rover: F-104D 57-1315 Haise
Landing Time: 09:52:17.6 Tip pods
Purpose:  Pilot familiarization – Knight's ﬁrst X-15 ﬂight; Notes: Good ﬂight;
 (#23) Infrared scanning radiometer experiment Infrared experiment  (#23) even though Flight 1-59-98 was supposed 
   to be the last ﬂight (but no data was acquired)
Aborts: –– 21 Sep 65 Weather prior to taxi
Program Flight #: 152 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 4.50 4.62 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Jones / Fulton Russell
Flight ID: 3-50-74 Max Altitude: 91,000 94,400 Take-Off Time: 09:01
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (50) Speed (mph): –– 3,108 Landing Time: 10:22
Flight Date: 12 Oct 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:07.8 B-52 Flight Time: 01:20
Pilot (ﬂight #): Knight (2)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 109 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 93 86.2 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104A 56-0817 Petersen
Launch Time: 09:43:14.0 Thrust (pct): 78 93, 78 Chase 3: F-104 Engle
Chase 4: F-104N N811NA Haise
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:50:21.8  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Pilot checkout Notes: #2 APU shut down 1.5 seconds after launch;
Pitch/roll SAS servos locked up for 5 seconds;
APU restarted 90 seconds after shutdown
Aborts: None
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Program Flight #: 153 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.15 5.08 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bock / Jones Peterson
Flight ID: 1-61-101 Max Altitude: 250,000 266,500 Take-Off Time: 11:54
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (61) Speed (mph): –– 3,554 Landing Time: 13:26
Flight Date: 14 Oct 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:17.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:32
Pilot (ﬂight #): Engle (16)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1601 Sorlie
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 83 84.8 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA McKay
Launch Time: 12:45:57.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0817 Parsons
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0755 Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Rover: F-104N N811NA Haise
Landing Time: 12:55:14.7 Tip pods
Purpose:  (#16) Pace transducer experiment; Notes: Engle's third ﬂight above 50 miles;
 (#17) MIT horizon deﬁnition phase I experiment Engle's last X-15 ﬂight;
Yaw damper tripped twice - reset
Internal NASA data timer problem
The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude
Aborts: 1-A-100 08 Oct 65 Leak in ballistic pitch thruster
–– 13 Oct 65 Weather prior to taxi Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Engle was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 154 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 5.15 5.06 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Jones Russell
Flight ID: 3-51-75 Max Altitude: 260,000 236,900 Take-Off Time: 09:56
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (51) Speed (mph): –– 3,519 Landing Time: 11:20
Flight Date: 27 Oct 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:11:53.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:23
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKayRushworth (24)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 109 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1601 Sorlie
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 79 75.6 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N811NA Peterson
Launch Time: 10:49:29.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0748 Stroface
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0763 Engle
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 11:01:22.7  Sharp rudder
Purpose:  Horizontal tail loads data; Notes: Roll-hold engaged 8 degrees off heading at launch
 Boundary layer noise data; 
 (#3) UV exhaust plume experiment
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 155 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 2.20 2.31 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bock / Doryland Russell
Flight ID: 2-43-75 Max Altitude: 70,000 70,600 Take-Off Time: 08:26
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (43 / 12) Speed (mph): –– 1,500 Landing Time: 09:33
Flight Date: 03 Nov 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:05:01.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:07
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (32)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 104 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1606 Knight
Launch Lake: Cuddeback Powered Time (sec): 80 84.1 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1315 Haise
Launch Time: 09:09:32.0 Thrust (pct): 58 58 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0755 Engle
Chase 4: JT-38A 59-1599 Sorlie
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:14:33.6 Tanks (empty)
Purpose:  Handling qualities with external tanks; Notes: First ﬂight with external tanks (empty);
Tank separation characteristics; First, and only, launch from Cuddeback;
Tank trajectory evaluation LOX chute did not deploy - tank not repairable;
Ventral chute did not deploy;
TM antenna moved to forward fuselage
Tanks dropped at  Mach 2.25, 70,300 feet, q=343 psf, 5° alpha
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 156 Plan Actual NASA 1: Rushworth
Max Mach: 4.00 4.22 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Bock / Doryland Russell
Flight ID: 1-62-103 Max Altitude: 74,000 80,200 Take-Off Time: 08:22
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (62) Speed (mph): –– 2,765 Landing Time: 09:33
Flight Date: 04 Nov 65 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:45.8 B-52 Flight Time: 01:11
Pilot (ﬂight #): Dana (1)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 123 124.2 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104A 56-0187 Peterson
Launch Time: 09:11:13.0 Thrust (pct): 55 55 Chase 3: F-104 Knight
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Rover: F-104N N812NA Haise
Landing Time: 09:19:58.8 Tip pods
Purpose:  Pilot familiarization – Dana's ﬁrst X-15 ﬂight; Notes: Two engine restarts required
Aborts: 1-A-102 02 Nov 65 Cockpit pressure regulator Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Dana was the X-15 pilot for the abort
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Program Flight #: 157 Plan Actual NASA 1: Dana
Max Mach: 5.30 2.21 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Doryland Butchart
Flight ID: 1-63-104 Max Altitude: 199,000 68,400 Take-Off Time: 12:34
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (63) Speed (mph): –– 1,434 Landing Time: 14:22
Flight Date: 06 May 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:06:02.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:48
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (25)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A Knight
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 82 35.4 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1316 Peterson
Launch Time: 13:29:03.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 28 100, 28 Chase 3: F-104D Gentry / Hoag
Chase 4: F-104 Stroface
Landing Lake: Delamar Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5: T-38A Curtis / Livingston
Landing Time: 13:35:05.7 Tip pods
Purpose:  (#12) Atmospheric density experiment; Notes: Window shade installed on left canopy window to eliminate sun glare
 (#13) Micrometeorite collection experiment;    normally associated with afternoon ﬂights
 (#17) MIT horizon deﬁnition phase I experiment; Pump failure required premature shutdown;
 (#19) High-altitude sky brightness experiment Landing at Delamar; aircraft slid off lakebed; no damage;
   Canopy jettisoned prior to reaching end of lakebed;
   Micrometeorite experiment opened;
Aborts: –– 22 Apr 66 No C-130 support
Program Flight #: 158 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.38 5.43 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Doryland Russell
Flight ID: 2-44-79 Max Altitude: 100,000 99,000 Take-Off Time: 09:33
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (44 / 13) Speed (mph): –– 3,689 Landing Time: 11:00
Flight Date: 18 May 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:56.8 B-52 Flight Time: 01:27
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (33-11)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 106 Chase 1: T-38A Sorlie
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 84 81.9 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1314 Dana / Manke
Launch Time: 10:23:50.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104N N811NA Peterson
Chase 4: F-104 Gentry
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:32:46.8
Purpose:  Ventral-on stability and control; MA-25S ablator evaluation Notes: Good ﬂight;
Stabilizer torque tube enclosures;
Aborts: –– 05 Apr 66 No C-130 support Large-scale test of MA-25S/ESA-3560 ablators
–– 12 Apr 66 High winds at Edwards prior to taxi
2-A-76 13 Apr 66 Inertial system (cross-range)
2-A-77 20 Apr 66 Yaw SAS would not engage
2-A-78 05 May 66 Yaw SAS would not engage All aborts used NB-52A 52-003; Rushworth was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 159 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 6.00 1.70 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Doryland Russell
Flight ID: 2-45-81 Max Altitude: 100,000 44,800 Take-Off Time: 10:11
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (45 / 14) Speed (mph): –– 1,061 Landing Time: 11:55
Flight Date: 01 Jul 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:04:28.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:44
Pilot (ﬂight #): Rushworth (34)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 106 Chase 1: T-38A Knight
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 132 33.2 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1316 Peterson
Launch Time: 11:01:55.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 58 100, 58 Chase 3: F-104 Curtis
Chase 4: T-38A Sorlie
Landing Lake: Mud Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Rover: F-104N N812NA Dana
Landing Time: 11:06:23.6 Tanks; Alternate pitot
Purpose:  Full external tank checkout; Notes: Telemetry indicated no NH3 ﬂow from external tanks caused pilot
 MA-25S Ablator evaluation;    to throttle back, jettison external tanks, and land
Alternate pitot-static checkout;    at Mud Lake - faulty TM signal;
 (#27) Maurer camera experiment checkout Rushworth's last X-15 ﬂight (what a way to go out)
X-15 wing impacted camper on the return trip to Edwards.
Aborts: 2-C-80 27 Jun 66 Sceduled captive with full tanks Captive used NB-52B 52-008; Rushworth was the X-15 pilot
Program Flight #: 160 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.30 5.34 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Bowline Russell
Flight ID: 1-64-107 Max Altitude: 130,000 130,000 Take-Off Time: 10:44
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (64) Speed (mph): –– 3,652 Landing Time: 12:25
Flight Date: 12 Jul 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:38.5 B-52 Flight Time: 01:41
Pilot (ﬂight #): Knight (3)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A Curtis
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 80 83.2 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104B 57-1303 Dana
Launch Time: 11:32:13.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Hoag
Chase 4: F-104 Gentry
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5:
Landing Time: 11:40:51.5
Purpose:  Pilot checkout; Notes: Was originally scheduled as a 200,000-foot ﬂight
 Electrical loads survey;    with Jack McKay as pilot
 Non-glare glass evaluation; 
 Window shade checkout
Aborts: 1-A-105 02 Jun 66 Inertial System Failure
1-A-106 10 Jun 66 Inertial System Computer failure All aborts used NB-52A 52-003; McKay was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
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Program Flight #: 161 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.15 4.71 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Doryland Russell
Flight ID: 3-52-78 Max Altitude: 104,000 96,100 Take-Off Time: 10:52
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (52) Speed (mph): –– 3,217 Landing Time: 12:15
Flight Date: 18 Jul 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:30.2 B-52 Flight Time: 01:23
Pilot (ﬂight #): Dana (2)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 111 Chase 1: T-38A Curtis
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 80 95.5 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104A 56-0817 Manke
Launch Time: 11:38:20.0 Thrust (pct): 100 71 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0755 Gentry
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Rover: JF-104A 55-2961 Peterson
Landing Time: 11:45:50.2  Sharp rudder; 3rd skid
Purpose:  Pilot checkout; Notes: Could not see through the sunshade during
 Honeywell X-20 inertial system checkout;    90-degree left bank - replaced for next ﬂight;
 Horizontal tail loads data First ﬂight with Lear cockpit display
Aborts: 3-A-76 20 Jun 66 Inertial Computer overheat
3-A-77 13 Jul 66 Computer light and TM failure All aborts used NB-52A 52-003; Dana was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 162 Plan Actual NASA 1: Dana
Max Mach: 5.10 5.12 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Doryland / Bowline Russell
Flight ID: 2-46-83 Max Altitude: 180,000 192,300 Take-Off Time: 11:08
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (46 / 15) Speed (mph): –– 3,568 Landing Time: 12:30
Flight Date: 21 Jul 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:51.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:21
Pilot (ﬂight #): Knight (4)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 106 Chase 1: F-104D 57-1314 Manke
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 81 81.3 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104A 56-0748 Sorlie
Launch Time: 12:01:16.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0817 Gentry
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Rover: F5D-1 142350 (802) Peterson
Landing Time: 12:10:07.0 Alternate pitot; PAI on I-panel
Purpose:  Pilot altitude buildup; Notes: Right roll out of trim
Alternate pitot static system checkout;
 MA-25S ablator evaluation;
 Base drag study;
 (#1) UV stellar photography experiment;
Aborts: 2-A-82 20 Jul 66 Weather at launch lake Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Knight was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 163 Plan Actual NASA 1: Dana
Max Mach: 5.20 5.19 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Bowline Russell
Flight ID: 1-65-108 Max Altitude: 220,000 241,800 Take-Off Time: 09:08
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (65) Speed (mph): –– 3,702 Landing Time: 11:05
Flight Date: 28 Jul 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:43.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:57
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (26)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A Curtis
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 83 85.4 (S.D.) Chase 2: JF-104A 55-2961 Peterson
Launch Time: 10:01:03.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D Sorlie / Adams
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0755 Gentry
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:10:46.0 Tip pods
Purpose:  (#13) Micrometeorite collection experiment; Notes: Computer malfunction and pitch trip-out during
 (#16) Pace transducer experiment;    boost; inertials degraded after malfunction;
 (#17) MIT horizon deﬁnition phase I experiment; H-dot failed pre-launch
 (#19) High-altitude sky brightness experiment
Aborts: –– 25 Jul 66 IFDS failed preﬂight
Program Flight #: 164 Plan Actual NASA 1: Dana
Max Mach: 5.02 5.03 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Doryland / Bowline Russell
Flight ID: 2-47-84 Max Altitude: 230,000 249,000 Take-Off Time: 07:52
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (47 / 16) Speed (mph): –– 3,440 Landing Time: 09:24
Flight Date: 03 Aug 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:10.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:31
Pilot (ﬂight #): Knight (5)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 106 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1601 Curtis
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 82 81.8 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104A 56-0755 Manke
Launch Time: 08:43:26.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0748 Parsons
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0763 Sorlie
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Rover: F-104N N812NA Petersen
Landing Time: 08:52:36.7 Alternate pitot
Purpose:  Pilot altitude buildup; Notes: Inertial altitude read wrong most of the ﬂight;
Alternate pitot static system checkout; The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude
 Base drag study;
 (#1) UV stellar photography experiment
Aborts: –– 03 Aug 66 Weather prior to taxi
0 Appendix B: X-15 Flight Log
Program Flight #: 165 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.50 5.34 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Doryland / Bowline Russell
Flight ID: 3-53-79 Max Altitude: 130,000 132,700 Take-Off Time: 09:06
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (53) Speed (mph): –– 3,693 Landing Time: 10:45
Flight Date: 04 Aug 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:28.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:39
Pilot (ﬂight #): Dana (3)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 111 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1601 Curtis
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 80 78.9 (S.D.) Chase 2: JF-104A 55-2961 Manke
Launch Time: 09:55:23.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D Parsons / Sorlie
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0817 Gentry
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:03:51.0  Sharp rudder; 3rd skid
Purpose:  Pilot checkout; Notes: Tape 'q' read 50 psf higher than the gauge
 Lear Panel checkout;
 Boundary layer noise data; 
 Horizontal tail loads data;
 (#25) Optical background experiment
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 166 Plan Actual NASA 1: Dana
Max Mach: 5.15 5.21 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Doryland / Bowline Russell
Flight ID: 1-66-111 Max Altitude: 250,000 251,000 Take-Off Time: 08:53
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (66) Speed (mph): –– 3,590 Landing Time: 10:19
Flight Date: 11 Aug 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:22.2 B-52 Flight Time: 01:26
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKayRushworth (27)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1598 Sorlie
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 84 84.8 (S.D) Chase 2: JF-104A 55-2961 Manke
Launch Time: 09:44:26.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1314 Evenson / Smith
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0755 Gentry
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:53:48.2 Tip pods
Purpose:  (#13) Micrometeorite collection experiment; Notes: Highest dynamic pressure (2,202 psf) for any X-15;
 (#16) Pace transducer experiment; Computer malfunction and pitch-roll trip-out
 (#17) MIT horizon deﬁnition phase II experiment;    during boost - reset;
 (#19) High-altitude sky brightness experiment The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude
Aborts: 1-A-109 09 Aug 66 Inertial system failure
1-A-110 10 Aug 66 Launch lake helicopter lost engine All aborts used NB-52A 52-003; McKay was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 167 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.02 5.02 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Doryland / Bowline Russell
Flight ID: 2-48-85 Max Altitude: 230,000 231,100 Take-Off Time: 09:38
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (48 / 17) Speed (mph): –– 3,472 Landing Time: 11:04
Flight Date: 12 Aug 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:36.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:26
Pilot (ﬂight #): Knight (6)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 106 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1598 Sorlie
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 82 81.7 (S.D.) Chase 2: JF-104A 55-2961 Mallick
Launch Time: 10:25:05.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1315 Smith
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0763 Adams
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose Chase 5: F-104A 56-0748 Gentry
Landing Time: 10:33:41.6 Alternate pitot Rover: F-104N N812NA Dana
Purpose: Alternate pitot static system checkout; Notes: Good ﬂight;
 Base drag study; The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude
 (#1) UV stellar photography experiment
Additional Chase:
Rover: F-104N N812NA Dana
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 168 Plan Actual NASA 1: Knight
Max Mach: 5.20 5.20 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Bowline Russell
Flight ID: 3-54-80 Max Altitude: 180,000 178,000 Take-Off Time: 09:03
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (54) Speed (mph): –– 3,607 Landing Time: 10:45
Flight Date: 19 Aug 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:33.1 B-52 Flight Time: 01:42
Pilot (ﬂight #): Dana (4)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1598 Sorlie
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 80 75.8 (S.D.) Chase 2: JF-104A 55-2961 Manke
Launch Time: 10:03:03.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D Smith / Evenson
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0755 Adams
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5: F-104D 57-1315 Gentry
Landing Time: 10:12:36.1  Sharp rudder; 3rd skid
Purpose: Altitude buildup; Aborts: Notes: Tape 'q' read 80 psf higher than gauge;
 Lear Panel checkout; Landed with center stick
 Boundary layer noise data; 
 Horizontal tail loads data;
 (#25) Optical background experiment
Aborts: None
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Program Flight #: 169 Plan Actual NASA 1: Dana
Max Mach: 5.15 5.11 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Doryland / Bowline Russell
Flight ID: 1-67-112 Max Altitude: 250,000 257,500 Take-Off Time: 08:56
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (67) Speed (mph): –– 3,543 Landing Time: 10:35
Flight Date: 25 Aug 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:16.2 B-52 Flight Time: 01:39
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (28)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1600 Adams
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 84.5 83.4 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N811NA Manke
Launch Time: 09:47:09.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1315 Smith
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0757 Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5:
Landing Time: 09:57:25.2 Tip pods
Purpose:  (#13) Micrometeorite collection experiment; Notes: Telemetry lost after launch; 
 (#16) Pace transducer experiment; Inertial malfunction after launch;
 (#17) MIT horizon deﬁnition phase II experiment The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 170 Plan Actual NASA 1: Dana
Max Mach: 5.30 5.21 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Doryland / Cotton Peterson
Flight ID: 2-49-86 Max Altitude: 102,000 100,200 Take-Off Time: 09:01
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (49 / 18) Speed (mph): –– 3,543 Landing Time: 10:30
Flight Date: 30 Aug 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:57.9 B-52 Flight Time: 01:29
Pilot (ﬂight #): Knight (7)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 106 Chase 1: F-104A 56-0743 Curtis
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 81.8 80.5 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA Manke
Launch Time: 09:50:53.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1316 Hover
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0755 Stroface
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose Rover: F-104N N811NA Thompson
Landing Time: 09:59:50.9 Alternate pitot
Purpose:  Ventral on stability and control data; Notes: Pitch and roll SAS drop-out;
 MA-25S ablator tests; First ﬂight with Maurer camera on board;
 Glass fog test Ventral  chute deployed premature - ventral lost
 Base drag study;
 (#27) Maurer camera experiment
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 171 Plan Actual NASA 1: Adams
Max Mach: 5.42 2.44 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Doryland / Cotton Russell
Flight ID: 1-68-113 Max Altitude: 243,000 73,200 Take-Off Time: 09:40
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (68) Speed (mph): –– 1,602 Landing Time: 11:40
Flight Date: 08 Sep 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:06:26.5 B-52 Flight Time: 02:00
Pilot (ﬂight #): McKay (29)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1598 Curtis
Launch Lake: Smith Ranch Powered Time (sec): 85.5 45.5 (S.D) Chase 2: F-104N N811NA Manke
Launch Time: 10:37:24.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1316 Stroface
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0755 Gentry
Landing Lake: Smith Ranch Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Rover: JF-104A 55-2961 Peterson
Landing Time: 10:43:50.5
Purpose:  (#17) MIT horizon deﬁnition phase II-1 experiment; Notes: Fuel line low indication caused a throttleback,
 Electrical loads survey;    shutdown, and emergency landing at Smith Ranch Lake;
 Horizontal stabilizer angle of attack investigation McKay's last X-15 ﬂight
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 172 Plan Actual NASA 1: Knight
Max Mach: 5.10 5.12 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Doryland / Cotton Russell
Flight ID: 3-55-82 Max Altitude: 250,000 254,200 Take-Off Time: 11:11
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (55) Speed (mph): –– 3,586 Landing Time: 13:10
Flight Date: 14 Sep 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:58.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:59
Pilot (ﬂight #): Dana (5)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1598 Curtis
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 77 79.3 (S.D.) Chase 2: JF-104A 55-2961 Manke
Launch Time: 12:00:14.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1316 Hover
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0763 Stroface
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Rover: F-104N N811NA Peterson
Landing Time: 12:09:12.6 Tip pods; Sharp rudder; 3rd skid
Purpose: Altitude buildup; Notes: First wing-tip pod ﬂight on  X-15-3;
 Lear Panel checkout; Alert computer would not turn on (too cold);
 (#3) UV exhaust plume experiment; Third skid did not deploy;
 (#16) Pace transducer experiment; The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude
 (#29) Solar spectrum measurement experiment
Aborts: 3-A-81 13 Sep 66 Blown fuse in new ARC-51 radio Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Dana was the X-15 pilot for the abort
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Program Flight #: 173 Plan Actual NASA 1: Knight
Max Mach: 4.00 3.00 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Doryland / Cotton Russell
Flight ID: 1-69-116 Max Altitude: 74,000 75,400 Take-Off Time: 11:30
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (69) Speed (mph): –– 1,977 Landing Time: 13:10
Flight Date: 06 Oct 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:26.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:40
Pilot (ﬂight #): Adams (1)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 107 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1598 Sorlie
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 129 89.9 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1316 Dana
Launch Time: 12:16:09.0 Thrust (pct): 90, 50 88, 52, 0 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0755 Gentry
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Cuddeback Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5:
Landing Time: 12:24:35.0
Purpose:  Pilot familiarization – Adam's ﬁrst X-15 ﬂight Notes: Wet lakes forced planned altitude ﬂight with Jack McKay to
   be changed to a pilot familiarization ﬂight for Mike Adams;
Aborts: –– 22 Sep 66 Wet lakes uprange Ruptured fuel tank caused premature shutdown
1-A-114 28 Sep 66 Weather in launch area    and landing at Cuddeback;
–– 29 Sep 66 Rain at Edwards
1-A-115 04 Oct 66 Cabin source pressure
–– 05 Oct 66 Weather in launch area All aborts used NB-52A 52-003; Adams was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 174 Plan Actual NASA 1: Knight
Max Mach: 5.27 5.46 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Doryland / Reschke Russell
Flight ID: 3-56-83 Max Altitude: 267,000 306,900 Take-Off Time: 12:23
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (56) Speed (mph): –– 3,750 Landing Time: 14:23
Flight Date: 01 Nov 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:43.8 B-52 Flight Time: 01:59
Pilot (ﬂight #): Dana (6)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1598 Adams
Launch Lake: Smith Ranch Powered Time (sec): 81 82.8 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA Peterson
Launch Time: 13:24:47.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1316 Stroface
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0755 Gentry
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Rover: F-104N N811NA Manke
Landing Time: 13:35:30.8 Tip pods; Sharp rudder; 3rd skid
Purpose:  Precision attitude checkout; Notes: Last X-15 ﬂight above 300,000 feet;
 (#13) Micrometeorite collection experiment; Micrometeorite collector did not cycle;
 (#19) Sky brightness experiment; The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude;
 (#25) Optical background experiment Overshot altitude by 39,900 feet
Since Dana was a NASA pilot, he did not get astronaut wings for a ﬂight 
Aborts: –– 31 Oct 66 Malfunction of PAI    above 50 miles (the NASA standard was 62 miles)
Program Flight #: 175 Plan Actual NASA 1: Dana
Max Mach: 6.00 6.33 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Fulton / Cotton Russell
Flight ID: 2-50-89 Max Altitude: 100,000 98,900 Take-Off Time: 12:29
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (50 / 19) Speed (mph): –– 4,250 Landing Time: 14:10
Flight Date: 18 Nov 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:26.8 B-52 Flight Time: 01:40
Pilot (ﬂight #): Knight (8)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 106 Chase 1: T-38A Adams
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 132 136.4 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104A 56-0802 Peterson
Launch Time: 13:24:54.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Curtis
Chase 4: F-104N N812NA McKay
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral on; Ball-nose; Eyelid Chase 5: F-104 Gentry
Landing Time: 13:33:20.8 Tanks; Alternate pitot
Purpose:  Full tanks handling qualities; Notes: X-15-3 aborted a ﬂight earlier in the day;
 (#27) Maurer camera experiment Tanks dropped at  Mach 2.27, 69,700 feet, q=340 psf, 3.5° alpha; Recovered;
Fuel line low light - throttled back, then to 100%;
Aborts: 2-A-87 07 Oct 66 Telemetry malfunction World absolute speed record
2-A-88 19 Oct 66 MH3 low tank pressure
–– 20 Oct 66 Overcast skies at Edwards 2-A-87 used NB-52B 52-008; Knight was the X-15 pilot
–– 08 Nov 66 Weather at Edwards 2-A-88 used NB-52A 52-003; Knight was the X-15 pilot
Program Flight #: 176 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 4.50 4.65 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Fulton / Cotton Russell
Flight ID: 3-57-86 Max Altitude: 95,000 92,000 Take-Off Time: 10:55
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (57) Speed (mph): –– 3,120 Landing Time: 12:25
Flight Date: 29 Nov 66 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:56.2 B-52 Flight Time: 01:30
Pilot (ﬂight #): Adams (2)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1600 Knight
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 98 97.9 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N811NA Manke
Launch Time: 11:38:49.0 Thrust (pct): 75 75 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0763 Gentry
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5:
Landing Time: 11:46:45.2 Tip pods; Sharp rudder; 3rd skid
Purpose:  Pilot checkout; Notes: No radio from launch to Cuddeback
Tip pod accelerometer data;
 (#16) Pace transducer experiment;
Aborts: 3-A-84 18 Nov 66 Loss of Hadley transformer (Dana) 3-A-84 used NB-52A 52-003; Dana was the X-15 pilot
3-A-85 23 Nov 66 APU bearing temperatures too high 3-A-85 used NB-52A 52-003; Adams was the X-15 pilot
X-15 EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
Program Flight #: 177 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.50 5.59 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Cotton / Reschke Russell
Flight ID: 1-70-119 Max Altitude: 130,000 133,100 Take-Off Time: 08:58
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (70) Speed (mph): –– 3,822 Landing Time: 10:15
Flight Date: 22 Mar 67 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:29.5 B-52 Flight Time: 01:17
Pilot (ﬂight #): Adams (3)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1601 Gentry
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 82.5 79.7 (S.D.) Chase 2: JF-104A 55-2961 Peterson
Launch Time: 09:52:56.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0763 Evenson
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0755 Knight
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5: F-4C 63-7651 Hoag
Landing Time: 10:02:25.5  3rd skid; PAI
Purpose:  Electrical loads evaluation; Notes: Cockpit pressure lost during boost; Intertials failed after shutdown; Roll out of trim
Third skid checkout;
 Sonic boom study at Mach 5.5, Additional Chase:
Chase 6: F-104A 56-0817 Cuthill
Rover: F-104N N812NA Manke
Aborts: 1-A-117 15 Mar 67 Weather
1-A-118 21 Mar 67 Inertial system failure All aborts used NB-52A 52-003; Adams was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 178 Plan Actual NASA 1: Adams
Max Mach: 1.65 1.80 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Cotton / Bowline Russell
Flight ID: 3-58-87 Max Altitude: 71,000 53,400 Take-Off Time: 10:17
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (58) Speed (mph): –– 1,163 Landing Time: 12:09
Flight Date: 26 Apr 67 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:05:16.8 B-52 Flight Time: 01:52
Pilot (ﬂight #): DanaRushworth (7)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1598 Gentry
Launch Lake: Silver Powered Time (sec): 103 23.2 (S.D.) Chase 2: JF-104A 55-2961 Manke
Launch Time: 11:18:36.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0817 Knight
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Silver Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Rover: F-104N N811NA Petersen
Landing Time: 11:23:52.8 Tip pods; Sharp rudder; 3rd skid
Purpose:  Boost guidance checkout; Notes: Frozen ball-nose required a 10 minute turn 
 Cold wall heat transfer panel;    prior to launch;
 Horizontal tail loads data; Premature shutdown due to fuel line low indication
 PCM system checkout;    (frozen pressure sensing line);
 Somic boom study First ﬂight with PCM telemetry system;
Cold wall panel
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 179 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.20 5.44 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Cotton / Bowline Russell
Flight ID: 1-71-121 Max Altitude: 180,000 167,200 Take-Off Time: 08:31
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (71) Speed (mph): –– 3,720 Landing Time: 10:30
Flight Date: 28 Apr 67 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:15.9 B-52 Flight Time: 01:58
Pilot (ﬂight #): Adams (4)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 104 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1601 Sorlie
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 81 82.0 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA Manke
Launch Time: 09:23:41.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1316 Evenson
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0763 Cuthill
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5: JF-104A 55-2961 Jackson
Landing Time: 09:32:56.9  3rd skid; PAI
Purpose: Third skid checkout; Notes: Pitch attitude malfunction; 
 IRIG timer checkout; Inertial velocity erratic
 (#17) MIT horizon deﬁnition phase II-1 experiment;
 (#20) WTR experiment checkout; Additional Chase:
 Sonic boom study Rover: F-104N N811NA Dana
Aborts: 1-A-120 20 Apr 67 Weather in launch area Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Adams was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 180 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 4.50 4.75 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Cotton / Reschke Russell
Flight ID: 2-51-92 Max Altitude: 90,000 97,600 Take-Off Time: 11:43
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (51 / 20) Speed (mph): –– 3,193 Landing Time: 12:59
Flight Date: 08 May 67 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:26.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:15
Pilot (ﬂight #): Knight (9)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 109 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1601 Sorlie
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 74 76.9 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1315 Evenson
Launch Time: 12:27:28.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104N N811NA Dana
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0763 Adams
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; Eyelid Chase 5:
Landing Time: 12:35:54.6 Alternate pitot; Dummy ramjet
Purpose:  Stability and control data with dummy ramjet; Notes: Three-axis transients when eyelid opened;
 Canopy eyelid checkout; Ramjet chute came off but ramjet was refurbishable;
 Ramjet sepration characteristics; Left window fogged when eyelid opened in pattern;
 MA-25S ablator test 20-degree nose cone on dummy ramjet
Aborts: 2-C-90 22 Dec 66 Scheduled captive with ramjet Captive ﬂight used NB-52A 52-003; Knight was the X-15 pilot 
2-A-91 05 May 67 Weather in launch area Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Knight  was the X-15 pilot
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Program Flight #: 181 Plan Actual NASA 1: Adams
Max Mach: 4.65 4.80 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Reschke / Cotton Russell
Flight ID: 3-59-89 Max Altitude: 71,000 71,100 Take-Off Time: 09:55
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (59) Speed (mph): –– 3,177 Landing Time: 11:22
Flight Date: 17 May 67 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:06:55.6 B-52 Flight Time: 01:27
Pilot (ﬂight #): Dana (8)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1601 Sorlie
Launch Lake: Silver Powered Time (sec): 103 96.1 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104N N811NA Manke
Launch Time: 10:43:45.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 50 100, 50 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1316 Evenson
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0817 Cuthill
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Rover: F-104N N812NA McKay
Landing Time: 10:50:40.6 Tip pods; Sharp rudder; 3rd skid
Purpose:  Boost guidance checkout; Notes: Cold-wall panel ejected at q=1,500 psf - caused a severe
 Cold wall heat transfer panel;    oscillation in upper vertical tail
 Horizontal tail loads data; 
 PCM system checkout;
 Somic boom study
Aborts: 3-A-88 12 May 67 Ball-nose failure Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Dana was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 182 Plan Actual NASA 1: Knight
Max Mach: 5.15 5.14 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Cotton / Reschke Russell
Flight ID: 1-72-125 Max Altitude: 220,000 229,300 Take-Off Time: 10:10
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (72) Speed (mph): –– 3,606 Landing Time: 12:00
Flight Date: 15 Jun 67 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:11.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:50
Pilot (ﬂight #): Adams (5)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 104 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1600 Gentry
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 81 81.4 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA Manke
Launch Time: 11:10:07.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0817 Davey
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0744 Hoag
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5: F-4A 145313 Jackson
Landing Time: 11:19:18.0  3rd skid; PAI
Purpose:  IRIG timer checkout; Notes: Stick kicker inoperative;
 (#17) MIT horizon deﬁnition phase II-1 experiment; The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude
 (#20) WTR experiment
Additional Chase:
Aborts: 1-A-122 25 May 67 Inertial system failure Rover: F-104N N811NA Dana
1-A-123 01 Jun 67 Inertial system failure
1-A-124 14 Jun 67 X-15 radio failure All aborts used NB-52A 52-003; Adams was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 183 Plan Actual NASA 1: McKay
Max Mach: 5.30 5.34 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Cotton / Sturmthal Russell
Flight ID: 3-60-90 Max Altitude: 82,000 82,200 Take-Off Time: 13:55
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (60) Speed (mph): –– 3,611 Landing Time: 15:38
Flight Date: 22 Jun 67 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:06.5 B-52 Flight Time: 01:42
Pilot (ﬂight #): Dana (9)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1598 Knight
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 95 93.2 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104N N811NA Manke
Launch Time: 14:55:40.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 50 100 Chase 3: F-104B 57-1303 Krier
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0817 Gentry
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5:
Landing Time: 15:02:46.5 Tip pods; Sharp rudder; 3rd skid
Purpose:  Boost guidance checkout; Notes: Cold wall panel ejected at q=1,200 psf - severe oscillations;
 Cold wall heat transfer panel; Window shade would not retract;
 Somic boom study Buffet at 10 degrees pull-up at Mach 3
Aborts: –– 20 Jun 67 PCM  failure prio to taxi
Program Flight #: 184 Plan Actual NASA 1: Adams
Max Mach: 5.70 4.17 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Reschke / Sturmthal Russell
Flight ID: 1-73-126 Max Altitude: 250,000 173,000 Take-Off Time: 10:22
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (73) Speed (mph): –– 2,870 Landing Time: 12:00
Flight Date: 29 Jun 67 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:07.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:38
Pilot (ﬂight #): Knight (10)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1598 Cuthill
Launch Lake: Smith Ranch Powered Time (sec): 87 67.6 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA Dana
Launch Time: 11:28:23.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104N N811NA Jackson
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0763 Evenson
Landing Lake: Mud Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5: F-104D 57-1314 Hoag / Davey
Landing Time: 11:38:30.0  3rd skid
Purpose:  Horizontal stabilizer angle of attack data; Notes: Total power failure going through 107,000 feet
Yaw ASAS checkout;    both APUs shut down (loss of all electrics and hydraulics);
 (#17) MIT horizon deﬁnition phase II-1 experiment; One APU restarted; Emergency landing at Mud Lake
 (#20) WTR experiment    (should have landed at Grapevine per energy)
Aborts: None
X-15 EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
Program Flight #: 185 Plan Actual NASA 1: Knight
Max Mach: 5.30 5.44 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Cotton / Fulton Russell
Flight ID: 3-61-91 Max Altitude: 82,000 84,300 Take-Off Time: 09:19
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (61) Speed (mph): –– 3,693 Landing Time: 10:42
Flight Date: 20 Jul 67 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:36.5 B-52 Flight Time: 01:23
Pilot (ﬂight #): Dana (10)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A Adams
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 95 92.1 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA Krier
Launch Time: 10:10:26.0 Thrust (pct): 100, 50 100 Chase 3: F-104 Davey
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Rover: F-104N N811NA Manke
Landing Time: 10:18:02.5 Tip pods; Sharp rudder; 3rd skid
Purpose:  Boost guidance checkout; Notes: Alert computer did not operate;
 Cold wall heat transfer panel; Cold wall panel ejected at q=1,000 psf
 Horizontal tail loads data; 
 PCM system checkout
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 186 Plan Actual NASA 1: Dana
Max Mach: 5.10 4.94 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Cotton / Reschke Russell
Flight ID: 2-52-96 Max Altitude: 90,000 91,000 Take-Off Time: 10:00
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (52 / 21) Speed (mph): –– 3,368 Landing Time: 11:30
Flight Date: 21 Aug 67 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:39.3 B-52 Flight Time: 01:29
Pilot (ﬂight #): Knight (11)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: T-38A 57-1598 Cuthill
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 85 82.2 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1314 Gentry
Launch Time: 10:58:52.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0748 Manke
Chase 4: F-104D 57-1332 Davey
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; Eyelid Chase 5: F-104A 56-0755 Adams
Landing Time: 11:06:31.3 Ablator; Dummy ramjet
Purpose:  Stability and control data with dummy ramjet; Notes: First ﬂight with full ablative coating; No tanks;
 MA-25S full ablator test; Forward quarter of window smeared due to ablative;
 (#27) Hycon phase II camera experiment Ramjet ejected too close to ground - refurbished;
20-degree nose cone on dummy ramjet
Aborts: 2-C-93 07 Aug 67 Scheduled captive ﬂight (with ext. tanks)
2-A-94 11 Aug 67 LN2 leak in pylon Scheduled captive ﬂight used NB-52B 52-008; Knight was X-15 pilot
2-A-95 16 Aug 67 #2 APU source pressure loss Both aborts used NB-52B 52-008; Knight was the X-15 pilot for both aborts
Program Flight #: 187 Plan Actual NASA 1: Dana
Max Mach: 6.00 4.63 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Bowline / Reschke Dustin
Flight ID: 3-62-92 Max Altitude: 100,000 84,400 Take-Off Time: 12:35
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (62) Speed (mph): –– 3,115 Landing Time: 14:01
Flight Date: 25 Aug 67 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:37.0 B-52 Flight Time: 01:26
Pilot (ﬂight #): Adams (6)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1598 Gentry
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 132 71.3 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104A 56-0755 Jackson
Launch Time: 13:29:35.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Knight
Chase 4:
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Rover: F-104N N811NA Krier
Landing Time: 13:37:12.0  Sharp rudder; 3rd skid
Purpose:  Cold wall heat transfer panel; Notes: Engine relight required at 16 seconds;
 Horizontal tail loads data; Inertials and Ball-nose failed 10 seconds prior to
 Boundary layer noise data    touchdown (circuit breaker)
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 188 Plan Actual NASA 1: Dana
Max Mach: 6.50 6.70 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Cotton / Reschke Russell
Flight ID: 2-53-97 Max Altitude: 100,000 102,100 Take-Off Time: 13:31
X-15 (s/n) 56-6671 (53 / 22) Speed (mph): –– 4,520 Landing Time: 15:20
Flight Date: 03 Oct 67 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:08:12.1 B-52 Flight Time: 01:48
Pilot (ﬂight #): Knight (12)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 110 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1600 Cuthill
Launch Lake: Mud Powered Time (sec): 141 140.7 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104D 57-1314 Twinting
Launch Time: 14:32:11.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104B 57-1303 Krier
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0748 Adams
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; Eyelid Rover: F-104N N812NA Jackson
Landing Time: 14:40:23.1 Tanks; Ablator; Dummy ramjet
Purpose:  MA-25S full ablator tests; Notes: Fastest ﬂight of X-15 program;
 Ramjet local ﬂow tests; Last ﬂight of X-15A-2 aircraft;
 Stability and control with ramjet; Extensive thermal damage to pylon and ramjet;
 Fluidic temperaure probe test Unofﬁcial world's speed record for class
Tanks dropped at  Mach 2.4, 72,300 feet, q=287 psf, 4.4° alpha;
Eyelid opened at Mach 1.6;
Aborts: None 40-degree nose cone on dummy ramjet
 Appendix B: X-15 Flight Log
Program Flight #: 189 Plan Actual NASA 1: Adams
Max Mach: 5.50 5.53 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Cotton / Reschke Dustin
Flight ID: 3-63-94 Max Altitude: 130,000 251,100 Take-Off Time: 09:12
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (63) Speed (mph): –– 3,897 Landing Time: 11:03
Flight Date: 04 Oct 67 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:47.5 B-52 Flight Time: 01:51
Pilot (ﬂight #): Dana (11)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A Cuthill
Launch Lake: Smith Ranch Powered Time (sec): 82.5 84.7 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA Krier
Launch Time: 10:16:35.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Gentry
Chase 4: JF-104A 55-2961 Manke
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5:
Landing Time: 10:27:22.5 Tip pods; Sharp rudder; 3rd skid
Purpose:  (#3) UV exhaust plume experiment; Notes: Pilot's oxygen low light in pattern;
 (#13) Micrometeorite collection experiment; Micrometeorite experiment did not retract;
 (#14) Ames boost guidance; Inertials failed after shutdown;
 (#29) Solar spectrum measurement experiment The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude
Aborts: 3-A-93 22 Sep 67 Weather at launch lake Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Dana was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 190 Plan Actual NASA 1: Dana
Max Mach: 5.60 5.53 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Reschke / Miller Dustin
Flight ID: 3-64-95 Max Altitude: 273,000 280,500 Take-Off Time: 08:41
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (64) Speed (mph): –– 3,869 Landing Time: 10:28
Flight Date: 17 Oct 67 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:06.4 B-52 Flight Time: 01:46
Pilot (ﬂight #): KnightRushworth (13)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A Cuthill
Launch Lake: Smith Ranch Powered Time (sec): 84.4 84.2 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104 Twinting
Launch Time: 09:38:36.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104 Gentry
Chase 4: F-104 Adams
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Rover: F-104N N812NA Krier
Landing Time: 09:48:42.4 Tip pods; Sharp rudder; 3rd skid
Purpose:  (#3) UV exhaust plume experiment; Notes: Third skid did not deploy;
 (#13) Micrometeorite collection experiment; The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude;
 (#14) Ames boost guidance; Knight's Astronaut qualiﬁcation ﬂight.
 (#29) Solar spectrum measurement experiment
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 191 Plan Actual NASA 1: Knight
Max Mach: 5.10 5.20 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Cotton / Miller Russell
Flight ID: 3-65-97 Max Altitude: 250,000 266,000 Take-Off Time: 09:13
X-15 (s/n) 56-6672 (65) Speed (mph): –– 3,570 Landing Time: 11:25
Flight Date: 15 Nov 67 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:04:50.1 B-52 Flight Time: 02:12
Pilot (ﬂight #): Adams (7)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 111 Chase 1: T-38A Cuthill
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 79 82.3 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA Jackson
Launch Time: 10:30:07.4 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104N N811NA Dana
Chase 4: F-104 Twinting
Landing Lake: N/A Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5:
Lost Telemetry: 10:34:57.5 Tip pods; Sharp rudder; 3rd skid
Purpose:  (#3) UV exhaust plume experiment; Notes: Inertial malfunction, damper malfunction, lack of
 (#13) Micrometeorite collection experiment;    proper response to heading error caused uncontrolled
 (#14) Ames boost guidance;    gyrations, aircraft broke up and crashed near
 (#29) Solar spectrum measurement experiment;    Red Mountain; only fatality of program;
 Saturn insulation Adams posthumously awarded Astronaut Wings
Aborts: 3-A-96 31 Oct 67 Engine would not go into igniter idle Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Adams was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 192 Plan Actual NASA 1: Manke
Max Mach: 4.10 4.36 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Cotton / Stroup Dustin
Flight ID: 1-74-130 Max Altitude: 106,000 104,500 Take-Off Time: 10:34
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (74) Speed (mph): –– 2,878 Landing Time: 11:55
Flight Date: 01 Mar 68 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:07:34.7 B-52 Flight Time: 01:21
Pilot (ﬂight #): Dana (12)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 109 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1601 Twinting
Launch Lake: Hidden Hills Powered Time (sec): 66 65.6 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA Krier
Launch Time: 11:30:05.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1316 Knight
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0748 Hoag
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5: F-104N N811NA Jackson
Landing Time: 11:37:39.7  3rd skid
Purpose: Aircraft systems and yaw ASAS checkout; Notes: g-suit grabbed at 1.5-g during pattern;
 (#17) MIT horizon deﬁnition phase II-1 experiment; Saturn ablative evaluation
 (#20) WTR experiment
Aborts: 1-C-127 06 Feb 68 Scheduled captive Captive ﬂight used NB-52B 52-008; Dana was the X-15 pilot 
1-A-128 07 Feb 68 Cabin pressurization and weather
1-A-129 27 Feb 68 SAS failure Both aborts used NB-52B 52-008; Dana was the X-15 pilot for both aborts
X-15 EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF FLIGHT
Program Flight #: 193 Plan Actual NASA 1: Manke
Max Mach: 5.00 5.27 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Cotton / Sturmthal Russell
Flight ID: 1-75-133 Max Altitude: 180,000 187,500 Take-Off Time: 08:29
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (75) Speed (mph): –– 3,610 Landing Time: 10:43
Flight Date: 04 Apr 68 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:22.8 B-52 Flight Time: 02:13
Pilot (ﬂight #): Dana (13)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 109 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1598 Cuthill
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 79 78.8 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N812NA Jackson
Launch Time: 10:03:46.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0748 Smith
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0817 Hoag
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5: F-104N N811NA Fulton
Landing Time: 10:13:08.8 Tip pods; 3rd skid
Purpose:  Saturn ablatives on upper speed brakes; Notes: First ﬂight with second set of wing-tip pods installed;
Tip pod camera; Emergency retract of WTR experiment
 (#20) WTR experiment;
 (#31) Fixed alpha nose experiment
Aborts: 1-A-131 28 Mar 68 Radio and source pressure
1-A-132 03 Apr 68 Weather at Delamar All aborts used NB-52B 52-008; Dana was the X-15 pilot for all aborts
Program Flight #: 194 Plan Actual NASA 1: Dana
Max Mach: 5.10 5.05 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Sturmthal / Reschke Dustin
Flight ID: 1-76-134 Max Altitude: 100,000 209,600 Take-Off Time: 10:49
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (76) Speed (mph): –– 3,545 Landing Time: 12:45
Flight Date: 26 Apr 68 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:17.1 B-52 Flight Time: 01:55
Pilot (ﬂight #): Knight (14)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: F5D-1 142350 (802) Manke
Launch Lake: Delamar Powered Time (sec): 80 81.5 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104A 56-0790 Krier
Launch Time: 11:51:49.8 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1316 Livingston
Chase 4: F-104D 57-1314 Gentry
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Rover: F-104N N811NA Fulton
Landing Time: 12:01:06.9 Tip pods; 3rd skid
Purpose:  Saturn (2nd stage)  ablatives on upper speed brakes; Notes: Low alpha, high-q rotation performed with 10°
 (#17) MIT horizon deﬁnition phase II-2 experiment;    speed brakes during boost for Saturn experiment
 (#31) Fixed alpha nose experiment
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 195 Plan Actual NASA 1: Knight
Max Mach: 5.40 5.15 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-008 Reschke / Cotton Russell
Flight ID: 1-77-136 Max Altitude: 222,000 220,100 Take-Off Time: 07:19
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (77) Speed (mph): –– 3,563 Landing Time: 09:24
Flight Date: 12 Jun 68 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:11:32.9 B-52 Flight Time: 02:05
Pilot (ﬂight #): Dana (14)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 108 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1598 Gentry
Launch Lake: Smith Ranch Powered Time (sec): 84.6 83.4 (S.D.) Chase 2: F5D-1 142350 (802) Manke
Launch Time: 08:31:01.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104N N811NA Jackson
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0755 Hoag
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Rover: F-104N N812NA Fulton
Landing Time: 08:42:33.9 Tip pods; 3rd skid
Purpose:  Saturn ablatives on lower speed brakes; Notes: Emergency retract of WTR experiment
 (#17) MIT horizon deﬁnition phase II-2 experiment;
 (#20) WTR experiment;
 (#31) Fixed alpha nose experiment
Aborts: 1-A-135 23 May 68 Malfunction of second stage ignitor Abort used NB-52B 52-008; Dana was the X-15 pilot for the abort
Program Flight #: 196 Plan Actual NASA 1: Dana
Max Mach: 4.95 4.79 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Sturmthal / Reschke Russell
Flight ID: 1-78-138 Max Altitude: 250,000 221,500 Take-Off Time: 14:17
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (78) Speed (mph): –– 3,382 Landing Time: 16:24
Flight Date: 16 Jul 68 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:42.6 B-52 Flight Time: 02:07
Pilot (ﬂight #): Knight (15)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 104 Chase 1: F-104A 56-0743 Gentry
Launch Lake: Railroad Powered Time (sec): 83 80.5 (S.D.) Chase 2: F5D-1 142350 (802) Manke
Launch Time: 15:23:06.7 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0748 Cuthill
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0763 Davey
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Rover: F-104N N812NA Krier
Landing Time: 15:32:49.3 Tip pods w/camera; 3rd skid
Purpose:  Fluidic probe; Notes: First launch from Railroad Valley;
 (#19) High-altitude sky brightness experiment Hydraulic gauge malfunction during boost;
 (#20) WTR experiment; WTR experiment not extended due to vibrations
 (#31) Fixed alpha nose experiment The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude
Aborts: 1-A-137 15 Jul 68 Roll RAS malfunction Abort used NB-52A 52-003; Knight was the X-15 pilot for the abort
 Appendix B: X-15 Flight Log
Program Flight #: 197 Plan Actual NASA 1: Manke
Max Mach: 4.95 5.01 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Sturmthal / Fulton Russell
Flight ID: 1-79-139 Max Altitude: 250,000 267,500 Take-Off Time: 07:52
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (79) Speed (mph): –– 3,443 Landing Time: 10:30
Flight Date: 21 Aug 68 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:09:23.3 B-52 Flight Time: 02:38
Pilot (ﬂight #): Dana (15)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 104 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1598 Cuthill
Launch Lake: Railroad Powered Time (sec): 82.5 82.9 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N811NA Krier
Launch Time: 09:04:48.0 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104D 57-1316 Hoag
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0755 Gentry
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5: F-104A 56-0763 Shawler
Landing Time: 09:14:11.3 Tip pods; 3rd skid
Purpose:  Fluidic probe; Notes: WTR retracted on timer due to altitude overshoot;
 (#17) MIT horizon deﬁnition phase II-2 experiment; Last X-15 ﬂight over 50 miles altitude
 (#20) WTR experiment; The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude
 (#31) Fixed alpha nose experiment
Since Dana was a NASA pilot, he did not get astronaut wings for a ﬂight 
   above 50 miles (the NASA standard was 62 miles)
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 198 Plan Actual NASA 1: Dana
Max Mach: 5.47 5.37 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Sturmthal / Miller Dustin
Flight ID: 1-80-140 Max Altitude: 250,000 254,100 Take-Off Time: 10:06
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (80) Speed (mph): –– 3,723 Landing Time: 12:15
Flight Date: 13 Sep 68 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:10:55.5 B-52 Flight Time: 02:09
Pilot (ﬂight #): Knight (16)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1598 Twinting
Launch Lake: Smith Ranch Powered Time (sec): 88 84.3 (B.O.) Chase 2: F-104N N811NA Manke
Launch Time: 11:19:23.2 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0748 Shawler
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0763 Gentry
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5: F-104A 56-0790 Krier
Landing Time: 11:30:18.7 Tip pods w/braces; 3rd skid
Purpose:  Fluidic probe; Notes: Emergency retract of WTR experiment;
 (#17) MIT horizon deﬁnition phase II-2 experiment; Knight's last ﬂight in the X-15;
 (#20) WTR experiment; The highest Mach number was achieved during descent from max altitude
 (#31) Fixed alpha nose experiment
Additional Chase:
Rover: F-104A 56-0755 Powell
Aborts: None
Program Flight #: 199 Plan Actual NASA 1: Knight
Max Mach: 5.45 5.38 B-52 - Pilots - LP: 52-003 Sturmthal / Miller Russell
Flight ID: 1-81-141 Max Altitude: 250,000 255,000 Take-Off Time: 08:56
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (81) Speed (mph): –– 3,716 Landing Time: 11:05
Flight Date: 24 Oct 68 X-15 Flight Time: –– 00:11:28.0 B-52 Flight Time: 02:09
Pilot (ﬂight #): Dana (16)
XLR99 (s/n): –– 103 Chase 1: T-38A 59-1598 Cuthill
Launch Lake: Smith Ranch Powered Time (sec): 84 83.8 (S.D.) Chase 2: F-104N N811NA Krier
Launch Time: 10:02:47.3 Thrust (pct): 100 100 Chase 3: F-104A 56-0740 Enovoldsen
Chase 4: F-104A 56-0746 Evenson
Landing Lake: Rogers Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS Chase 5: F-104A 56-0817 Hoag
Landing Time: 10:14:15.3 Tip pods w/braces; 3rd skid
Purpose:  Fluidic probe; Notes: WTR experiment extended but lost power;
 (#20) WTR experiment; No. 2 RCS never turned on
 (#31) Fixed alpha nose experiment
Last ﬂight of the X-15 program
Additional Chase:
Aborts: None Rover: F-104B 57-1303 Manke
Program Flight #: 200
Flight ID: Not Flown Conﬁguration:  Ventral off; Ball-nose; X-20 IFDS
X-15 (s/n) 56-6670 (82) Tip pods w/braces; 3rd skid
Flight Date: Not Flown  (#24) High-altitude IR background experiment
Pilot (ﬂight #): Knight (17)  (#19) High-altitude sky brightness experiment
 (#31) Fixed alpha nose experiment
Cancellation: (1-82-142) 21 Nov 68 Flight cancelled due to NB-52A 52-003 problems. Would have been a Smith Ranch launch. X-15 transferred to the NB-52B 52-008
27 Nov 68 Flight cancelled due to a helium leak in APU #2
Cancellation: (1-82-142) 27 Nov 68 Flight cancelled due to hydrogen peroxide leak and other problems. X-15 transferred back to NB-52A 52-003 on 9 December.
   Launch lake would have been Railroad Valley.
Cancellation: (1-82-142) 10 Dec 68 Cancelled for weather.
Cancellation: (1-82-142) 11 Dec 68 Cancelled for weather.
Abort: 1-A-142 12 Dec 68 Last X-15 ﬂight attempt. Aborted due to intertial guidance system failure.
   Launch lake would have been Railroad Valley.
Cancellation: (1-82-143) 13 Dec 68 Cancelled for weather.
Cancellation: (1-82-143) 17 Dec 68 Cancelled due to lack of C-130 support.
Cancellation: (1-82-143) 18 Dec 68 Cancelled for weather.
Cancellation: (1-82-143) 19 Dec 68 No microwave available.  Flight plan changed to Hidden Hills launch lake.
Cancellation: (1-82-143) 20 Dec 68 Bill Dana taxied an F-104 for a weather ﬂight, but was recalled by John Manke due to snow at Edwards.
   Launch lake would have been Hidden Hills.
The End. 20 Dec 68 X-15 demated from NB-52A 52-003 and prepared for indeﬁnite storage. The X-15 program ends.

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
OF THE X-15 AIRPLANE
APPENDIX C
0 Appendix C: Physical Characteristics Of The X-15 Airplane
(Source: Edwin J. Saltzman, “Preliminary Full-Scale Power-Off Drag of the 
X-15 Airplane for Mach Numbers from 0.7 to 3.1,” NASA technical memoran-
dum X-430, December 1960; Gene J. Matranga, “Analysis of X-15 Landing Ap-
proach and Flare Characteristics Determined from the First 30 Flights,” NASA 
technical note D-1057, July 1961; and Lawrence C. Montoya, “Drag Character-
istics Obtained From Several Configurations of the Modified X-15A-2 Airplane 
Up to Mach 6.7,” NASA technical memorandum X-2056, August 1970.) The data 
given are for the stub (ramjet-ready) ventral on X-15A-2.
X-15 X-15A-2
Fuselage
Length (feet): 50 .75 53 .16
Maximum width (feet): 7 .33 7 .33
Maximum depth (feet): 4 .67 4 .67
Maximum depth over 
canopy (feet):
4 .97 4 .97
Side area, total (square 
feet):
215 .66 221 .38
Fineness ratio: 10 .91 11 .38
Base area (fuselage, side fairings, 
verticals; square feet):
31 .18 32 .19
Wing
Airfoil section: NASA 66005 
(modified)
same
Total area, including 94.98 
square feet covered by the 
fuselage (square feet):
200 .00 200 .00
Span (feet): 22 .36 22 .36
Mean aerodynamic chord 
(feet):
10 .27 10 .27
Root chord (feet): 14 .91 14 .91
Tip chord (feet): 2 .98 2 .98
Taper ratio: 0 .20 0 .20
Aspect ratio: 2 .50 2 .50
Sweep at 25% chord line 
(degrees):
25 .64 25 .64
Incidence (degrees): 0 0
Dihedral (degrees): 0 0
Aerodynamic twist  
(degrees):
0 0
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X-15 X-15A-2
Flap
Type: Plain Plain
Area, each (square feet): 8 .30 8 .30
Span, each (feet): 4 .50 4 .50
Inboard chord (feet): 2 .61 2 .61
Outboard chord (feet): 1 .08 1 .08
Deflection (degrees) –40/–30 –40/–30
Ratio flap chord to wing 
chord:
0 .22 0 .22
Ratio total flap area to 
wing area:
0 .08 0 .08
Ratio flap span to wing 
semispan:
0 .40 0 .40
Trailing-edge angle 
(degrees):
5 .67 5 .67
Sweepback angle of hinge 
line (degrees):
0 0
Horizontal stabilizer
Airfoil section: NACA 66005 
(modified)
same
Total area, including 63.29 
square feet by the fuselage 
(square feet):
115 .34 115 .34
Span (feet): 18 .08 18 .08
Mean aerodynamic chord 
(feet):
7 .05 7 .05
Root chord (feet): 10 .22 10 .22
Tip chord (feet): 2 .11 2 .11
Taper ratio: 0 .21 0 .21
Aspect ratio: 2 .83 2 .83
Sweep at 25% chord line 
(degrees):
45 45
Dihedral (degrees): –15 –15
Ratio horizontal stabilizer 
area to wing area:
0 .58 0 .58
Movable surface area 
(square feet):
51 .77 51 .77
Deflection:
Longitudinal (degrees): +15/–35 +15/–35
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Lateral differential, pilot 
authority (degrees):
±15 ±15
Lateral differential, auto-
pilot authority (degrees):
±30 ±30
Dorsal stabilizer
Airfoil section: 10-degree 
single wedge
same
Total area (square feet): 40 .91 40 .91
Span (feet): 4 .58 4 .58
Mean aerodynamic chord 
(feet):
8 .95 8 .95
Root chord (feet): 10 .21 10 .21
Tip chord, feet 7 .56 7 .56
Taper ratio: 0 .74 0 .74
Aspect ratio: 0 .51 0 .51
Sweep at 25% chord line 
(degrees):
23 .41 23 .41
Ratio dorsal stabilizer to 
wing area:
0 .20 0 .20
Movable surface area 
(square feet):
26 .45 26 .45
Deflection (degrees): ±7 .50 ±7 .50
Sweepback of hinge line 
(degrees):
0 0
Ventral stabilizer
Airfoil section: 10-degree 
single wedge
same
Total area (square feet): 34 .41 14 .46
Span (feet): 3 .83 3 .83
Mean aerodynamic chord 
(feet):
9 .17 7 .38
Root chord (feet): 10 .21 7 .38
Tip chord (feet): 8 .00 7 .38
Taper ratio: 0 .78 1 .00
Aspect ratio: 0 .43 0 .43
Sweep at 25% chord line 
(degrees):
23 .41 0
Ratio ventral stabilizer to 
wing area:
0 .17 0 .08
Movable surface area 
(square feet):
19 .95 0
Deflection (degrees): ±7 .50 –
Sweepback of hinge line 
(degrees):
0 –
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Speed brake
Area, each (square feet): 5 .37 5 .37
Mean span, each (feet): 1 .60 1 .60
Chord, each (feet): 3 .36 3 .36
Deflection (degrees): 35 35
Frontal area at maximum 
deflection (square feet):
13 .80 13 .80
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NASA-Dryden test pilot William H. Dana with the 
X-15-3 after a successful mission. Courtesy of  NASA, 
no. EC67-1716. The back cover images: (left) The ad-
vanced X-15A-2 shows its new external fuel tanks. 
Courtesy of  NASA, no. EC65-0893, (middle) NASA 
test pilot Neil A. Armstrong with the X-15-1 fol-
lowing a mission. Courtesy of  NASA, no. E60-6286. 
(right) X-15-3 being secured by ground crew after 
landing. Courtesy of  NASA, no. ET62-0243.
Neil Armstrong, amongst others, has called the X-15 “the most successful research airplane in 
history.” That might be stretching a point, but it was certainly the most successful of  the high-
speed X-planes. 
It had taken 44 years to go from Kitty Hawk to Air Force Captain Charles E. Yeager’s first su-
personic flight in the Bell X-1 on 14 October 1947. Six more years were required before NACA 
test pilot Scott Crossfield got to Mach 2 in the Navy-Douglas D-558-2 Skyrocket. A remarkably 
short three years had passed when Captain Milburn G. Apt coaxed the X-2 above Mach 3, before 
tumbling out of  control to his death. There, progress stalled, awaiting the arrival of  the three 
small, black North American X-15 research airplanes that would more than double the speed and 
altitude milestones.
The X-15 flight program began slowly, mostly because the million-horsepower XLR99 engine was 
not ready. This undoubtedly worked in the program’s favor since it forced the engineers and pilots 
to gain experience with the airplane and its systems prior to pushing the envelope too far. 
The first 20 months took the X-15 from Crossfield’s glide flight to essentially duplicating the per-
formance of  the X-2: Mach 3.5 and 136,500 feet. Then the XLR99s arrived and things got serious. 
Six days after the last flight with the interim XLR11s, Major Robert M. White took X-15-2 past 
Mach 4, the first time a piloted aircraft had flown that fast. Mach 5 fell, also to Bob White, four 
months later. Mach 6, again to White, took six more months. Once it began flying with the ulti-
mate engine, it took only 15 flights to double the maximum Mach number achieved by the X-2.
Altitude was a similar story. Captain Iven C. Kincheloe, Jr. was the first person to fly above 100,000 
feet, in the X-2 on 7 September 1956. Thirteen flights with the big engine allowed Bob White to fly 
above 200,000 feet for the first time. Three months later, he broke 300,000 feet. Once it began flying 
with the ultimate engine, the X-15 took only 19 months to double the maximum altitude achieved 
by the X-2. Ultimately, during its 199 flights, the X-15 recorded a maximum altitude of  354,200 feet 
and a maximum speed of  4,520 mph (Mach  6.7). They were stunning achievements. 
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X-15: Extending the Frontiers  
of Flight
X-15: Extending the Frontiers of  Flight is the result 
of  15 years of  research into the cooperative NASA-
Air Force-Navy X-15 research airplane program. 
This history covers the program from its inception, 
through the preliminary conceptual studies, the air-
frame and engine competitions, the flight program, 
and the follow-on research program. Particular at-
tention is paid to the program highlights, such as the 
development of  a workable full pressure suit and 
early biomedical testing in the human centrifuge at 
the Naval Air Development Center Johnsville.  
Despite appearances, the program was not about set-
ting records. It is interesting to note that although 
the X-15 is generally considered a Mach 6 vehicle, 
only two of  the three airplanes ever flew that fast, 
and then only four times. On the other hand, 108 
other flights exceeded Mach 5, accumulating 1 hour, 
25 minutes, and 33 seconds of  hypersonic flight. It 
was a fast airplane. Similarly, there were only four 
flights above 300,000 feet (all by X-15-3), but only 
the initial glide flight was below 40,000 feet. How-
ever, the actual speed and altitude achieved by the 
program were not the ultimate test, and the fact 
that the basic airplane never achieved its advertised 
6,600 feet per second velocity was of  little conse-
quence. What interested the researchers was the en-
vironment in which the airplane flew. They wanted 
to study dynamic pressures, heating rates, and total 
temperatures. In that regard, the X-15 performed 
almost flawlessly, and the data collected during the 
program represented the majority of  the hypersonic 
database available when the development of  Space 
Shuttle began in the late 1960s.
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